1.2. Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 385 , G.R. No.

133000 October 02, 2001

Facts:

Spouses Graciano and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land.
Upon the death of Graciana their six children entered in an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s
estate. Before Graciano contracted his second marriage to herein petitioner, he first donated his
pieces of properties to his children leaving only enough for himself. That lot which is left for him
was subdivided into two where the first lot was sold to a third person and the second one was
still in his ownership. Then when Graciano married Patricia Natcher, he sold the second lot to
her. Graciano died. Here comes the controversy that rooted from the sale of the second lot by
their father to herein petitioner. The six children of Graciano want that the sale be annulled
because it was through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery that the second lot was sold to
Natcher. The RTC issued a decision, among which is the declaration that the deed of sale
cannot be regarded as donation it may however be regarded as an extension of advance
inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir. CA reversed the decision of RTC.

Issue:
Whether or Not RTC acting on its general jurisdiction could render adjudication and
resolve the issue of advancement of real property

Ruling:

No. RTC is devoid of authority to render adjudication and resolved the issue of
advancement of real property. Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of
the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction. SC contended that RTC Manila was not properly constituted to be a probate court
when it decides on these matters.
In a train of decisions, SC has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that
although generally a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are
not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
1.3. GARCIA FULE V. COURT OF APPEALS

Alvarez, Miguel Lorenzo

FACTS:

On April 26, 1973 Amado G. Garcia died, he owned property in Calamba, Laguna. On May 2, 1973,
Virginia G. Fule filed with CFI Laguna a petition for letters of administration and exparte appointment as
special administratrix over the estate. Subsequently, the motion was granted..There was an allegation
that the wife was Carolina Carpio

Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and nn behalf of their child: Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was
denied by CFI. Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere illegitimate sister of
thedeceased is not entitled to succeed from him.

The Court of Appeals reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule. Preciosa became special
administratrix upon a bond of P30, 000.00.

ISSUES:

a.)What is the distinction between venue and jurisdiction

b.)What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73, Section 1 mean?

RULING:

Rule 73, Section 1.“if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled at
the CFI in theprovince in which he resides at the time of his death, And if he is an Atty. Gerald Chan I
Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 60 Page inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI
of any province in which he had estate.

The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction
to theexclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place
of residence of the decedent, or of thelocation of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, inthe original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. ”Fule’s own submitted Death Certificate shows that the deceased resided in QC
at the time of his death, therefore the venueof Laguna was improper.

Venue is subject to waiver (Rule 4, Section 4), but Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for
alternativeremedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse. However, venue is distinct from “jurisdiction”
which is conferred by Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended to bewith CFIs independently from the place of
residence of the deceased.

Rule 79 Section 2, demands that the petition should show the existence of jurisdiction to make the
appointmentsought, and should allege all the necessary facts such as death, name, last residence,
existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as next of kin, creditor or
otherwise to be appointed.

Resides – ex vi termini “actual residence”-Elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it isemployed.-Same meaning as “inhabitant”.
2.26 REYES vs. SOTERO

FACTS:

Private Respondent Corazon Chichioco filed a petition for the settlement of estate of Elena Lising,
claiming that she is the niece and heir of the latter who died intestate.Petitioner Reyes filed for an
Opposition claiming that she was an adopted child of Elena Lising and the latter’s husband Serafin Delos
Santos, hence the petition should be dismissed and that she be appointed administrator of the estate

In her Supplemental she attached Certification issued be the Municipal Civil Registrar stating that she
was adopted by the spouses pursuant to a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance promulgated
and duly registered with the Office of Civil Registrar. Also presenting a copy of Judicial Form indicating
that the adoption decree was on file in the RTC-Tarlac City and a Decree of Final Distribution issued by
the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) showing that benefits were paid to Elena Lising, widow of
Serafin Delos Santos and his daughter Anna Joyce Delos Santos.

Respondent filed before the CA a petition for annulment of the adoption decree claiming that no
proceedings for adoption ever took place. Upon Motion, RTC suspended the hearing, however CA
dismissed the petition which became final and executory.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for immediate resolution of her opposition. RTC issued a
Resolution deferring resolution pending the outcome of the criminal case filed against the Petitioner for
falsification of public documents.

Respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special Administrator before the RTC, praying that the
Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Paulino Saguyod be appointed as such, which the court granted.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration for the appointment of Atty Saguyod reiterating his contention
that she is the sole heir of the decedent and that the former was appointed without being required to
file a bond. Petitioner subsequently filed a special civil action before the CA alleging that said resolution.
CA nullified the resolution of the RTC and it held that the presiding Respondent Judge Cesar Sotero
gravely abused his discretion in appointing Atty. Saguyod as special administrator

ISSUE:

Whether Petitioner need to prove the validity of her adoption as assailed by the respondents in the
proceeding of settlement of estate.

RULING:

No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had
already presented before the trial court. The documents presented by the Petitioners were issued under
the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Mere imputations of irregularities will not cast a
cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until
proof to the contrary is offered.

In this regard it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action
brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. It cannot be assailed collaterally in
a proceeding for the settlement of decedent’s estate as held in Santos v. Aranzanso.

Respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat
petitioner’s claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an
appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter as
well as the facts stated should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real.

Petitioner’s status as an adopted child of the decedent remains rebutted and no serious challenge has
been brought against her standing as such. Therefore as long as petitioner’s adoption is considered
valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate.
1.4 Uriarte vs, Court of First Instance

33 SCRA 252

May 29, 1970

Facts of the Case:

Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain and he left reasonable properties in the Philippines.
Vicente Uriarte, who is claiming to be the son and sole heir of the deceased, filed a petition for
the intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. However, said petition was opposed by the nephews of Juan stating that there is a
valid will left by the deceased in Spain, a copy of which is being requested. Then, the nephews
filed a settlement of the estate in the court of Manila, on the basis of the alleged will of the
deceased.

Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement of estate in the court of Manila stating that
the court of Negros Occidental has already acquired original jurisdiction over the case. The
opposition of Vicente was dismissed together with the intestate settlement In the CFI of Negros.

Hence, Vicente filed a petition for certiorari questioning the dismissal of the intestate
settlement in the CFI of Negros.

Issue:

Whether or not the intestate settlement should be dismissed.

Ruling of the Case:

The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is proper. Under
the Rules on the settlement of estate of the deceased person, testate proceedings enjoy priority
over intestate proceedings. Therefore, in case intestate settlement was filed prior to the finding
of the will of the deceased, then the intestate proceedings shall be dismissed to give priority to
the testate proceeding.