L-21938-39. May 29, 1970.

VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.

Judiciary Act of 1948; Courts of First Instance; Jurisdiction over probate matters defined.—Under the Judiciary Act of
1948 (Section 44, paragraph [4]), Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of
probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons—whether they died
testate or intestate.

Special proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased persons; Venue; General rule.—The matter of venue, or the
particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a
decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate.

Same; Same; Testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.—In accordance with settled jurisprudence
in this jurisdiction. testate proceedings for the Settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for
'the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice ,that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding- shall continue as an intestacy,

Same; Same; Same; Where intestate proceedings had been commenced, the probate of will should be filed in same
court; Reasons.—Where intestate proceedings before a court of first instance had already been commenced, the
probate of the will should be filed in the same court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate
motion for said purpose filed in the already pending intestate proceeding. This is especially true where the party
seeking the probate of the will had been informed or had knowledge of the pendency of the intestate proceedings. It is
not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply
litigation, especially if several courts would be involved, which would be the result if the probate of will were f iled in
another court.

Same: Same; Venue; Waiver of improper venue by laches.—It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is
merely a waivable procedural defect, and. such waiver may occur by laches where, a party had been served notice of
the filing of the probate petition for about a year and allowed the proceedings to continue for such time before filing a
motion to dismiss the same.

Same; Same; Question of acknowledgment as a natural child of testator may be presented to probate court.—A party
claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of testator is entitled to intervene in proceedings for the probate of will
of testator if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit f or
determination the question of his acknowledgment as a natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its
capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a
particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child.

ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner,

Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for respondents.

DIZON, J.:

On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari—docketed as G.R. L-21938 against
the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental and of
Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively—praying:

"x x x x x x that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April 1968 (Annex 'H') and 11
July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No, 6344, supra, and
the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court denying petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene and
to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings pertaining to the
settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and consequently annulling all proceedings had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the respondent Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction,

"For the preservation of the rights of the parties pendingthese proceedings, petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from
proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this Court."

Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:

"6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to declare itself 'the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as prescribed in
Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss its Special Proceeding No.
51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court."

The writ of preliminary Injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner f iled against the same respondents a pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR
MANDAMUS—docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939—praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment be
rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first
disapproving his record on appeal and the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding
said court to approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution
deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the
merits,

On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's contention that the
respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition for
certiorari.

It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner f iled with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate
of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of
the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No.
6142 in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros
Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set
the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that-the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The
record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine National Bank never actually qualified as
special administrator.

On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the above-
mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will
and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this
Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the
intestate proceeding.

On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396
in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last. will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and
on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the
following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed
with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate
said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for
Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.

Petitioner opposed the af oresaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the
same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special
Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on July 27,
1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing
from said orders to this court on questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila
Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December
7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the following order:

"Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for having been filed
out of time and for being incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved by this Court,
the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely before the Supreme Court on
questions of law which is tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.

"WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby disapproved."

In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus mentioned heretofore.

On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila
Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had
in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same year,

It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente
Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his
compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the action, as
well as when he commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of
Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered,

The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone farther than the
appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed
to qualify.

On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the
Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for
probate appearing not to have been contested, It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the
Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition
and Annulment of said proceedings.

Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the Negros Court filed by
Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed with the
Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros
Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its
probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly
erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No.
6344 in the Negros Court.

Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction
over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased. persons—
whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the matter
of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by
former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides
that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall
be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of
a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be
settled is that of a non-resident alien—like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite—-the Courts of First Instance in provinces
where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding
for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila
Courts—province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this premise
petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his
alleged will, and that consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second
court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in
this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the
probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his passession to the executor
subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be
rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have f iled the petition for
the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court—particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344—
or was entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court

The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he should have submitted
said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said
purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy
and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts
would be involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the
second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of
letters of administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a
will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan
Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a
copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before
filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros
Court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems
quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to
submit said will for probate to the Negros Court.

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue
therefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to
raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner
knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his
opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of
the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the
Manila Court since August 28, 1862 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding
No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the
proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the
will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31,
1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the
validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover,
it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the proper venue therefore if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is
raised too late.

In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court said that he
was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has Instituted Civil
Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this
proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the
proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No.
51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an independent action, for indeed- his supposed
interest in the estate of the decedent is of his doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory
acknowledgment."

We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is
finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its
reopening if it has already been closed, sa as to be able to submit for determination the question of his
acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court.
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be
declared his acknowledged natural child (1[ Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249;
Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).

Coming now to the supplemental petition f or mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the opinion, and so hold, that in
view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said supplemental petition
is successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that petitioner was
taking from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said
court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner's motion for the
reconsideration of said order of dismissal Said orders being, as a result of what has been said heretofore, beyond
petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful
purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the validity of
said orders.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a
result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition for mandamus docketed
as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With costs
against petitioner,

Writs denied.

Notes.—(a) Requisites for the acquisition of probate ju-risdiction.—The following requisites must be shown in order
that a Court of First Instance may acquire jurisdiction to probate a will: (1) that a person has died leaving a will; (2) that
if a resident of the Philippines, he died in the province where the court exercises territorial jurisdiction; (3) that if a
nonresident, he has left an estate in the province where the court is situated; and (4) that the testament or last will of
the decedent has been delivered to the court and it is in possession thereof (Salazar vs. Court of First Instance of
Laguna, 64 Phil. 785). See also Eusebio vs. Eusebio, L-8409, Dec. 28, 1956; De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792, July 27, 1955).

(b) Venue waivable.—Venue is not jurisdictional and may be waived (Navarro vs. Aguila, 66 Phil. 604). This may be done
expressly, as by provisions in a contract (Navarro vs. Aguila, supra), or impliedly, as when it is not objected to prior to
trial (Juanillo vs. De la Rama, 74 Phil. 43; Evangelista vs. Lantor, L-1721, May 19, 1950).

VICENTE URIARTE vs. CFI, et. al.

G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

Doctrine: The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be
commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, shall be in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate.
Facts:
Petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite, a non-
resident alien, in CFI Negros Oriental, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural son of the decedent and his sole heir.
Petitioner had previously initiated an action before the same court for compulsory acknowledgment as natural son but
there was no final judgment yet. Private respondents, nephews of the decedent, filed an opposition alleging that the
decedent had left a will in Spain. Later, the same respondents filed a petition for probate in CFI Manila using the alleged
last will of the decedent, and then filed a motion to dismiss the special proceedings in CFI Negros Oriental. The CFI
Manila allowed the petition for probate, and the CFI Negros dismissed the intestate proceeding. Petitioner then filed a
motion for reconsideration in CFI Negros which was denied. He also filed an omnibus motion in CFI Manila asking for
the dismissal of the probate proceeding on the ground that it was the CFI Negros that took first cognizance of the case.
Said motion was denied by CFI Manila.

Hence this petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion of the two courts, CFI
Manila and Negros Oriental.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the special proceedings in CFI Negros was proper; and
2. Whether or not CFI Manila has jurisdiction to probate the alleged will.

Held:
On the first issue, it was proper that the intestate proceeding in Negros CFI be discontinued because of the fact that the
decedent had left a will. It is well-settled that testacy is favored over intestacy, and that any intestate proceeding may
be terminated at any time when it is discovered that the deceased had left a will. However, the proper thing the private
respondents should have done was to file the petition for probate in CFI Negros which was already hearing the
intestate proceeding. The issue now is improper venue, not jurisdiction. Unfortunately for petitioner, he is now guilty of
laches for failing to timely object to the filing of the petition for probate in CFI Manila. It is settled that questions of
venue may be waived when not timely objected to. Hence, the CFI Manila may continue with the probate case, without
prejudice to petitioner's successful action for his compulsory recognition as heir.

Petition for certiorari was denied

UNION BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ, GR NO. 149926, 2005-02-23

Doctrine: A probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.[20] The... said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated
The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right... of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the... validity of a will.

Facts:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez entered into a loan
agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1)
unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due
on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.

On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement... this time in the amount of
P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor, with... accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his
son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note,
they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the... loan dated December 13, 1980.

Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. During the pendency of the testate proceedings,
the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement[8]... dated July 22,
1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2)
tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father
to FCCC, corresponding to... the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities[9] was executed by and between FCCC and
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities
to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund
and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued
against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down
to respondent Florence S. Ariola.

The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court before which the
testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation
incurred by the said decedent. The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to
his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement
marked as Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that... she cannot deny her liability under the said
document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to
present the same before the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of
those... enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in
the estate proceedings. On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the
petitioner should have been presented before the probate court.

Issues:
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the
heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs' assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the
petitioner can hold the heirs liable on... the obligation of the deceased.

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit. The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs' assumption of the
indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. The assumption of liability was conditioned... upon
the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the
agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were... each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs
in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and
effect.

The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim
Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The filing of a money claim against the decedent's estate in the probate court is mandatory.
As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker
of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of... course, subject to any defenses Edmund
may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it
unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
FRANCISCO CUIZON, ROSITA CUIZON, PURIFICATION C. GUIDO married to TEODORO GUIDO, and JUAN ARCHE,
petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, DOMINGO
L. ANTIGUA and SEGUNDO ZAMBO Cuizon vs. Ramolete
129 SCRA 495, G.R. No. L-51291, May 29, 1984

Doctrine: It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to
belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so
(Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).

Facts:

In 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue City then
covered by certificates of Tax Declaration in Land Registration Case No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his property
between his two children, Rufina and Irene. Part of the property given to Irene consisted largely of salt beds which
eventually became the subject of this controversy.

On December 29, 1971, Irene Cuizon executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds
in favor of the petitioners Francisco, Rosita and Purificacion, all surnamed Cuizon. At that time, Francisco and Rosita
were minors and assisted by their mother, Rufina, only sister of Irene. However, the sale was not registered because
the petitioners felt it was unnecessary due to the lifetime usufructuary rights of Irene.

On September 28, 1978, a petition for letters of administration was filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Sp.
Proc. No. 3864-R) by respondent Domingo Antigua, allegedly selected by the heirs of Irene numbering seventeen (17) in
all to act as administrator of the estate of the decedent. The petition was granted.

Respondent Antigua as administrator filed an inventory of the estate of Irene. He included in the inventory the property
in question which was being administered by Juan Arche, one of the petitioners. On June 27, 1979, respondent Antigua
filed a motion asking the court for authority to sell the salt from the property and praying that petitioner Arche be
ordered to deliver the salt to the administrator. The motion was granted and respondent court issued the an order.

Issue:

Whether or not a probate court has jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title
issued in favor of owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said parcels have been included in the
inventory of properties of the estate prepared by the administrator.

Held:

No.
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong
to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so
(Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).

Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. C.A., (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto
but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership
which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473;
Lachenal v. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).

In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it was sold seven years before the
death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to the proceedings. In Bolisay v.
Alcid, (85 SCRA 213), this Court was confronted with a similar situation. The petitioners therein sought to annul the
order of the respondent court in a special proceeding which in effect ruled that notwithstanding that the subject
property was duly titled in the name of petitioners, the administratrix of the intestate estate involved in said
proceeding had the right to collect the rentals of said property over the objection of the titled owners just because it
was included in the inventory of said estate and there was an ordinary action in the regular court over the ownership
thereof and the estate was one of the parties therein. This Court viewed the petition as one seeking for a prima facie
determination and not a final resolution of the claim of ownership.

Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court
should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the
inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and
ownership of the property. Respondent court was clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27, 1979. Thus,
it was unnecessary for the petitioners to first apply for relief with the intestate court.

Even assuming the truth of the private respondents’ allegations that the sale of December 29, 1971 was effected under
suspicious circumstances and tainted with fraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged half-sister and sole heir of Irene
remains open to question, these issues may only be threshed out in a separate civil action filed by the respondent
administrator against the petitioners and not in the intestate proceedings.
 Rufina Luy Lim vs. CA
G.R. No. 124715. JANUARY 24, 2000 

FACTS:

Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse ofthe late Pastor Y. Lim who died intestate on 11 June 1994  whose
estate is the subject of probate proceedings. Petitioner,as surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephewGeorge
Luy, filed on 17 March 1995, a joint petition for theadministration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the RTC of
Quezon aside City.The deceased left properties and in the amended petition, the widow sought to include properties in
the name of several corporations, private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed
Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and ActionCompany as part of the estate of the deceased. Likewise petitioner
averred that not only the properties of privaterespondent corporations are properly part of the decedent’s estate but
also the private respondent corporations themselves.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate
of a deceased person?

RULING:
NO. It is settled that a corporation is clothed withpersonality separate and distinct from that of the personscomposing
it. It may not generally be held liable for that of thepersons composing it. It may not be held liable for the
personalindebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entitiesconnected with it. Inasmuch as the real properties
included inthe inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name
of private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their
stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of
conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand undisturbed.
 
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified and set aside the
orders issued by the Regional Trial Court.