Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and
HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner.

Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for respondents.

DIZON, J.:

On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari — docketed as
G.R. L-21938 — against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of
First Instance of Negros Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as
the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively — praying:

... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April
1963 (Annex 'H') and 11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court dismissing
the first instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and the order of 1 July 1963
(Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court denying petitioner's omnibus motion to
intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra,
both special proceedings pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of the same
deceased, and consequently annulling all proceedings had in Special Proceeding
No. 51396; supra, of the respondent Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.

For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings, petitioner
prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila
court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from proceeding with Special
Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this Court.

Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:

6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344,
supra, and failing to declare itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as prescribed in Rule 75
section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss its
Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24,
1963.

On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS — docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 —
praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued by the
Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record on
appeal and the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding said court to
approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a
resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for certiorari (G.R. L-
21938) is taken up on the merits.

On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's
contention that the respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the
matters alleged in the petition for certiorari.

It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging
therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime
of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed the
Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the
date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance
with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National
Bank never actually qualified as special administrator.

On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an
opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy
whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt
thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the intestate
proceeding.

On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special
Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of
the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate
proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate
said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the
Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.

Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to
take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and
dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said
order having been denied on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal
bond and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on questions
of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December 7, 1963
the Negros Court issued the following order:

Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be
dismissed for having been filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the
meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved by this Court, the
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente
Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-
21938, bringing this case squarely before the Supreme Court on questions of law
which is tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.

WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the
petitioner is hereby disapproved.

In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus
mentioned heretofore.

On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending
in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the
annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court
in its order of July 1 of the same year.

It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros
Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case
No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly
inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced the
aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y
Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.

The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone
farther than the appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank
who, as stated heretofore, failed to qualify.

On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding
No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the last will of
Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate appearing not to have been contested. It appears
further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied
petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of
said proceedings.

Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the
Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y
Goite and of the petition filed with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost
from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew
of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its probate.

The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros
Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b)
whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396
notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original
exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons — whether they died testate or intestate. While their
jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court
of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule
75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether
a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any
province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident
alien — like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the
deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are
the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left
considerable properties. From this premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first
taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special
Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special
Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his
alleged will, and that consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344,
while the second court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with
his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings
for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn
over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is
understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed
the petition for the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court —
particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344 — or was entitled to commence the corresponding
separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.

The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he should
have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or
in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344.
In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration
of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved. This, in
effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place,
when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of
letters of administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and
when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding
No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from
which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate
with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for
the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it
seems quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he
had expressly promised to submit said will for probate to the Negros Court.

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court,
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept
petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition,
albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in
the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is
enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan
Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial
petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the
existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its
probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for
the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15,
1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking
for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to
that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed
but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October
31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the
Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put
a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to
annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor,
if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised
too late.

In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the
Negros Court said that he was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch
as the herein petitioner has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the
decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this proceedings. If the petitioner is to be
consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the proper thing for him to do
would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in
the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an independent action, for indeed his
supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of his doubtful character pending the final decision
of the action for compulsory acknowledgment."

We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No.
6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court,
if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for
determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said
court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the
deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged
natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino
vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G.
1119).

Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the opinion,
and so hold, that in view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and
academic. If the said supplemental petition is successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros
Court to give due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said court dated
December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner's motion for the
reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has been said
heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be other than that the
intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent
our ruling that he can no longer question the validity of said orders.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs
prayed for and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the
supplemental petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 128314      May 29, 2002

RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao,
who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of
stock and other personal properties.

On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1 Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that
he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually
dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real
properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased
parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.

Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. 2 He argued that the
deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their
deaths. The decedent’s actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother
used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they
stayed in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of
obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence
previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voter’s affidavits, statements
of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all
indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga. 1âwphi1.nêt

In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo’s house
in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their
death certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon
City.4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother,
Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said document.

Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents’ residence on
the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as
reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same
way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to Perico’s residence at Legaspi
Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive
evidence of the decedents’ residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise. 5

The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position. 6 Both failed to
comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived. 7

Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived. 8 After the parties submitted
the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as
special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao. 9

On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:

A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and 1989,
respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence of the
decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were
supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant,
therefore, cannot disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position other than
his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit
movant’s motion to dismiss.

SO ORDERED.10

Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo having
been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the
respondent Judge is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.11

Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed resolution
dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:
 I

RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN

ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE
DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.

II

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE

COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY
INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE
RULES OF COURT.

III

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE

AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENT’S RESIDENCE RATHER
THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.

IV

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE

CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS
TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN
SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF

PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH
CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH
THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.

VI

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS

AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.

VII

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507. 13
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga,
where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed
before their demise?

Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)

Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration
granted in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death.

Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that
the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent
residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the
following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom
of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein
permanently.15 While it appears that the decedents in this case chose to be physically present in
Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their
permanent residence. 1âwphi1.nêt

The contention lacks merit.

The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres
Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in
Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to
purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a
house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that
Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be
said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in
Quezon City was just temporary.

In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner’s
Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their elderly
parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.

Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both residents of
Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late
mother’s death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner
recognized his deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to
contest the entry in Ignacio’s death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly
considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate court’s
observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and
respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at
the time of their parents’ death.

The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at the time of
death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the
documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required by
the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of
Appeals,16 we held:

xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and
"residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary.17

Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been living with
petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be
substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that,
contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents’ physical
presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents’ stay therein was more
than temporary. In the absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts’ factual findings
stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.

Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2, 18 on
ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings.
He argues that while venue in the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the
purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in
Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to
permanent residence or domicile because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept
and where most of the decedents’ properties are located.

Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.

It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are kept in the place where he
permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a person’s properties can be found mostly in
the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different
from that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business
interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep
records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and peculiarities.

At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary
civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court
of Appeals,20 we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one
and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that
venue for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City
court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.