ASSOC.
OF SMALL LANDOWERS IN THE PHILS The petitioners are therefore asking the Honorable
INC. V SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM G.R NO.
78742  JULY 14, 1989
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS: These are consolidated cases involving
common legal questions including serious challenges
to the constitutionality of several measures like E.O.
No. 228, P.D. No. 27, Presidential Proclamation No.
131, E.O. No. 229 and R.A. No. 6657 –
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In G.R. No. 7977
The petitioners in the said case are questioning P.D.
No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds of
separation of powers, equal protection, due process
and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners in this case claim that the power to
provide for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as provided in the Constitution is lodged in
the Congress and not to the President. The
petitioners also seek to prohibit the implementation of
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. The
petitioners contend that the taking of the property
must be simultaneous with the payment of just
compensation which Sec. 5 of E.O. No. 229 does not
provide.
In G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229
were invalidly issued by the President and that the
said E.O.s violate the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process
or just compensation which was denied to the
petitioner.
In G.R. No. 78742
Petitioner claims that they are unable to enjoy their
right of retention because they cannot eject their
tenants due to the fact that the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) has not issued the
implementing rules required under the said decree.
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR to
issue the said rules
ISSUE: WON the laws questioned are valid exercise
of power of eminent domain.
RULING: YES. There are traditional distinctions
between the power of eminent domain and police
power which logically preclude the application of both
powers at the same time involving the same subject.
The property condemned under police power is
harmful or intended for harmful purposes, like a
building on the verge of collapse, which needs to be
demolished for public safety, or obscene materials,
which should be destroyed in the interest of public
morals. Under police power, the confiscation of such
property is not compensable, unlike the taking done
in the exercise of power of eminent domain, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the
owner.
The petitions before the Court present no knotty
complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. There is an exercise of police
power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution with regards to the
extent that the laws in question merely prescribe the
retention limits for the landowners. However, there is
definitely a taking under power of eminent domain
which payment of just compensation is imperative
when in order to carry out the regulation, it is
necessary to deprive such land now.
PO and MUTIA vs. DAMPAL, GR 173329
FACTS:
On December 19, 1984, two farm lots located in
Bukidnon with an approximate area of 2.5773 and
2.0651 hectares, respectively, were mortgaged for
P33,000.00 by the spouses Florencio and Ester
Causin, through their attorney-in-fact Manuel
Causin, to the now-defunct Rural Bank of
Tagoloan, Inc. For failure to pay the obligation, the
bank foreclosed the mortgage and sold the lots at
public auction to petitioner who was the highest
bidder. The original certificates of title were
subsequently cancelled and TCTs in their stead
were issued in favor of Po, following the spouses
Causin‘s failure to redeem the property.
On September 13, 1993, petitioner sold one of the
bought lot to her herein co-petitioner Mutia who
was issued new TCT. On September 29, 1994, the
spouses Causin and their tenant-herein
respondent Dampal filed with the Regional
Trial Court a complaint against the bank for
Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and Sale.
While the civil case was pending or on June 16,
1997, respondent filed a complaint against
petitioners before the DARAB for Legal
Redemption with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
DARAB disallowed the redemption prayed for on
the ground of prescription, albeit he declared that
Dampal is entitled to security of tenure as a tenant;
and that although Dampal was not given notice in
writing of the public auction sale, he was deemed
to have knowledge thereof because of the civil
case for annulment, hence, there was substantial
compliance with the rules. DARAB Central Office
reversed the Adjudicator‘s ruling. On appeal, the
appellate court held that petitioners should have
appealed the DARAB Decision via Rule 43,
instead of Rule 65, dismissed petitioners‘ petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the need for sending him notice in
writing could be dispensed with.
HELD:
In its disquisition, the DARAB held that absence of
written notice to the tenant of the sale, as well as
to the DAR, is indispensable, particularly in view of
Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389, which mandates that the
180-day period must be reckoned from the notice
in writing upon registration of the sale.
Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the
Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389, otherwise
known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines, provides:
Sec. 12. Lessee’s right of redemption. – In
case the landholding is sold to a third
person without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the
right to redeem the same at a reasonable
price and consideration: Provided, That
where there are two or more agricultural
lessees, each shall be entitled to said right
of redemption only to the extent of the area
actually cultivated by him. The right of
redemption under this Section may be
exercised within one hundred eighty days
from notice in writing which shall be served
by the vendee on all lessees affected and
the Department of Agrarian Reform upon
the registration of the sale, and shall have
priority over any other right of legal
redemption. The redemption price shall be
the reasonable price of the land at the time
of the sale. (emphasis supplied)
The admitted lack of written notice on
Dampal and the DAR thus tolled the running of the
prescriptive period. Petitioners‘ contention that
Dampal must be considered to have had
constructive knowledge thereof fails in light of the
express requirement for notice to be in writing.
OTILIA STA. ANA v. SPS. LEON G. CARPO AND
AURORA CARPO, GR No. 164340, 2008-11-28
Facts:
Respondent Leon Carpo (Leon) and his brother
Francisco G. Carpo are the registered co-owners of a
parcel of land designated as Lot No. 2175 of the
Santa Rosa Estate Subdivision, situated at Sta.
Rosa, Laguna
A portion thereof, consisting of 3.5 hectares,
pertained to Leon and his wife, respondent Aurora
Carpo
It was devoted to rice and corn production
(subject land) and was tenanted by one Domingo
Pastolero (Domingo), husband of Adoracion
Pastolero (Adoracion).
However, on December 29, 1983, Adoracion, by
executing a notarized Pinanumpaang Salaysay[8]
with the conformity of Leon, and for a consideration
of P72,500.00, transferred her rights in favor of
petitioner Otilia Sta. Ana[9]
(petitioner) who, together with her husband,
Marciano de la Cruz (Marciano), became the new
tenants of the subject land.
At the outset, the parties had a harmonious tenancy
relationship.
In their Complaint for Ejectment due to Non-Payment
of Lease Rentals[11] dated December 1, 1989,
respondents alleged that it was their agreement with
petitioner and Marciano to increase the existing
rentals from 36 cavans to 45 cavans, and that, if...
respondents wanted to repossess the property, they
only had to pay the petitioner the amount of
P72,500.00, the same amount paid by the latter to
Adoracion.
In their Answer[12] dated January 26, 1990,
petitioner and Marciano denied that there was an
agreement to increase the existing rental which was
already fixed at 36 cavans of palay, once or twice a
year depending on the availability of irrigation
water;... that neither was there an agreement as to
the future surrender of the land in favor of the
respondents; that they did not refuse to pay the
rentals because they even sent verbal and written
notices to the respondents, advising them to accept
the same;... the PARAD ruled that petitioner and
Marciano deliberately defaulted in the payment of the
rentals due the respondents.
The DARAB's Ruling
It is a fundamental rule in this jurisdiction that for
non-payment of lease rentals to warrant the
dispossession and ejectment of a tenant, the same
must be made in a willful and deliberate manner
For a valid ouster or ejectment of a farmer-tenant,
the willful and deliberate intent not to pay lease
rentals and/or share can be ascertained when there
is a determination of will not to do a certain act.
Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case,
it cannot be concluded that the defendants-
appellants deliberately failed or refused to pay their
lease rentals. It was not the fault of defendants-
appellants herein that the rentals did not reach the
plaintiffs-appellees... because the latter choose to
lend a deaf ear to the notices sent to them.
On March 5, 2004, the CA affirmed the factual
findings of the PARAD that petitioner and Marciano
failed to pay the rentals and that there was no valid
tender of payment
The CA added that this failure to pay was tainted with
bad faith and deliberate intent. Thus, petitioner and
Marciano did not legally comply with their duties as
tenants.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
Petitioner asseverates that there is no evidence to
support respondents' claim that the failure to pay the
lease rentals was tainted with malevolence, as the
records are replete with acts indicative of good faith
on the part of the petitioner and Marciano and bad
faith on the... part of respondents.
Issues:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the subject land
had already become residential, commercial and/or
industrial, thus, excluded from the coverage of our
laws on agrarian reform;
Whether the petitioner, as an agricultural tenant,
failed to pay her lease rentals when the same fell due
as to warrant her dispossession of the subject land.
Ruling:
Without doubt, the PARAD acted without jurisdiction
when it held that the subject land was no longer
covered by our agrarian laws because of the
retention rights of the respondents. The CA likewise
acted without jurisdiction when it ruled that the land
had become... non-agricultural based on a zoning
ordinance of 1981-- on the strength of a mere vicinity
map. These rulings violated the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship
between petitioner and respondents in this case. An
action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease
rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute, cognizable at
the initial stage by... the PARAD and thereafter by
the DARAB.
Proof necessary for the resolution of the issue of the
land being covered by, or excluded/exempted from,
P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 6657, and other pertinent
agrarian laws, as well as of the issue of the right of
retention of the respondents, was not offered in
evidence.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844,[40] as
amended, coupled with the fact that the respondents
are the complainants themselves, the burden of proof
to show the existence of a lawful cause for the
ejectment of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee...
rests upon the respondents as agricultural lessors.
Respondents failed to discharge such burden. The
agricultural tenant's failure to pay the lease rentals
must be willful and deliberate in order to warrant his
dispossession of the land that he tills.
The term "deliberate" is characterized by or results
from slow, careful, thorough calculation and
consideration of effects and consequences.[44] The
term "willful," on the other hand, is defined as one
governed by will without yielding to reason or
without... regard to reason.
We agree with the findings of the DARAB that it was
not the fault of petitioner that the lease rentals did not
reach the respondents because the latter chose to
ignore the notices sent to them.
To note, as early as November 10, 1986, Marciano
executed an Affidavit[46] stating that Leon refused to
receive the respective lease rentals consisting of 37
cavans for November 1985 and July 1986.
These factual circumstances negate the PARAD
findings of Marciano's and petitioner's deliberate and
willful intent not to pay lease rentals. Good faith was
clearly demonstrated by Marciano and petitioner
when, because respondents refused to accept the
proffered payment, they... even went to the point of
seeking government intervention in order to address
their problems with respondents.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 60640 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Principles:
For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) more
specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). Executive Order 229
vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters;
and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of the...
agrarian reform program.
Under Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657 (CARP Law),
"agrarian dispute" is defined to include "(d) . . . any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning... farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes
any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and...
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners
to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
Simply put, agrarian disputes, as defined by law and
settled in jurisprudence, are within the primary and
exclusive original jurisdiction of the PARAD and the
DARAB, while issues of retention and non-coverage
of a land under agrarian reform, among others, are
within the domain... of the DAR Secretary.
Section 36 of the same law pertinently provides:
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. --
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee
shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession has
been... authorized by the Court in a judgment that is
final and executory if after due hearing it is shown
that:
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease
rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-
payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to
the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a
fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a
ground for... dispossession, although the obligation
to pay the rental due that particular crop is not
thereby extinguished;
ISMAEL V. CRISOSTOMO v. MARTIN P.
VICTORIA, GR No. 175098, 2015-08-26
Facts:
Crisostomo, were the registered owners of a parcel
of riceland... located in Sta. Barbara, Baliuag,
Bulacan.
he and his brother allegedly entered into a lease
contract with David Hipolito (Hipolito) over a portion
of the riceland
The... contract was supposedly in effect until
Hipolito's death
As Hipolito died without any known heirs, Crisostomo
was set to reclaim possession and to take over
cultivation of the disputed portion.
However,... Victoria entered the disputed portion...
and began cultivating it without the knowledge and
consent of Crisostomo. Crisostomo confronted
Victoria, who insisted that he had tenancy rights over
the disputed portion.
In his Answer, Victoria claimed that Hipolito was his
uncle. He alleged that even during the lifetime of
Hipolito, it was he who was doing farmwork on the
disputed portion and that he did so with Crisostomo's
knowledge. He added that from the time Hipolito
became bedridden, it... was he who performed all
duties pertaining to tenancy, including the delivery of
lease rentals and corresponding shares in the
harvest to Crisostomo. He asserted that
Crisostomo's act of receiving lease rentals from him
amounted to implied consent, which gave rise to a
tenancy... relationship between them.
Issues:
whether respondent Martin P. Victoria is a bona fide
tenant of the disputed portion
Ruling:
The Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator, noting that the essential element of
consent was absent, held that Victoria could not be
deemed the tenant of the disputed portion. It further
held that implied tenancy could not arise in a
situation where another person... is validly instituted
as tenant and is enjoying recognition as such by the
landowner.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known
as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, identifies the
recognized parties in an agricultural leasehold
relation:
SECTION 6. Parties to Agricultural Leasehold
Relation. — The agricultural leasehold relation shall
be limited to the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who
personally... cultivates the same.
This court has settled that tenancy relations cannot
be an expedient artifice for vesting in the tenant
rights over the landholding which far exceed those of
the landowner. It cannot be a means for vesting a
tenant with security of tenure, such that he or she is
effectively the... landowner.
Even while agrarian reform laws are pieces of social
legislation, landowners are equally entitled to
protection.
The landowners deserve as much consideration as
the tenants themselves in order not to create an
economic dislocation, where tenants are solely
favored but the landowners become... impoverished.
Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, does not
automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a
tenant without the consent of the landowner.
Section 6 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is a
subsequent restatement of a "precursor"... provision:
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1199.
SECTION 8. Limitation of Relation. — The relation of
landholder and tenant shall be limited to the person
who furnishes land, either as owner, lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the person
who actually works the land himself with the aid of
labor... available from within his immediate farm
household.
it is simply to settle that whatever relation exists, it
shall be limited to two persons only: first, the person
who furnished the land; and second, the person who
actually works the land. "Once the tenancy relation is
established, the parties to that... relation are limited
to the persons therein stated."... the reason for Sec.
6 of R.A. No. 3844 and Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 1199 in
limiting the relationship to the lessee and the lessor
is to
"discourage absenteeism on the part of the lessor
and the custom of co-tenancy" under which "the
tenant (lessee) employs another to do the farm work
for him, although it is he with whom the landholder
(lessor) deals directly.
Hipolito was not clothed with authority to "allow"...
respondent to be the tenant himself. Hipolito, as
lessee, was entitled to possession of the disputed
portion, and legally so. He was, in this sense, a "legal
possessor." However, his capacities ended here.
There was nothing that authorized him to enter into a
tenancy relation... with another.
the following essential elements of tenancy: 1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is...
consent between the parties to the relationship; 4)
the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between
landowner and tenant or... agricultural lessee. The
presence of all these elements must be proved by
substantial evidence.
Unless a person has established his status as a de
jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure and
is not covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under... existing tenancy laws. Tenancy
relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is
a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of
tenure.
To hold that respondent is the bona fide tenant of the
disputed portion would be to extend petitioner's
dispossession for a period much longer that he had
originally contemplated. It puts him at the mercy of a
person whom he recognized as a tenant. This is
precisely the
"economic dislocation" that this court warned against
in Calderon. To hold as such would be to permit
agrarian reform laws to be used as a convenient
artifice for investing in a supposed tenant rights that
far exceed those of the owner.
Victoria and all those claiming rights under him are
ordered to vacate and surrender possession of the
disputed portion to petitioner Ismael V. Crisostomo.
JESUS VELASQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES
PATERNO C. CRUZ AND ROSARIO CRUZ,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review of the
Decision[1] dated 12 August 2009 and
[2]
Resolution  dated 24 February 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 105140 which ordered
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City,
Branch 79 to assume jurisdiction over the complaint
in Civil Case No. 264-M-2007 for recovery of
possession with damages.
The facts are as follows:
Respondents Spouses Paterno and Rosario Cruz are
the registered owners of a parcel of land situated
at Barangay Sta. Monica in Hagonoy, Bulacan with
an area of four hectares, more or less, and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 020-10-022-11-027. On 7
May 2007, respondents filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession with Accounting and
Damages against petitioner Jesus Velasquez.
Respondents alleged in their Complaint that
petitioner's father-in-law, Bernabe Navarro (Navarro)
was a tenant in said lot until 6 April 1985 when the
latter relinquished his tenancy rights by virtue of
a Sinumpaang Salaysay; that no other person was
installed as tenant of the farmland; that they
discovered that petitioner entered the farmland
without their knowledge and consent; that from 1985
up to the time of the filing of the complaint, petitioner
never paid a single centavo as rent for the use of the
land; and that they leased the farmland to a certain
Godofredo Tosco in 1995 but petitioner refused to
vacate the property. Respondents prayed for the
surrender of possession of the property to them and
for accounting and damages.[3]
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,, petitioner
contended that, jurisdiction pertains to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) because in the instant controversy is an
agrarian dispute. Petitioner asserted that he was
assisting Navarro in tilling the land since 1975. He
claimed that he continued working on the land after
the death of Navarro. Petitioner defended his non-
payment of rentals due to the fact that the subject
land has lost its suitability for agricultural production,
thus, his non-payment is not a ground for
dispossession. As a further justification to the non-
payment of rentals, petitioner emphasized that since
the implementation of the Operation Land Transfer,
he is deemed to be the owner of the subject land and
respondents had no more right to demand rentals.
Petitioner claimed that he was identified as a farmer-
beneficiary and has since been paying amortizations
to Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). [4]
On 15 April 2008, the RTC issued an
Order[5] dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.
On 27 June 2008, the trial court denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by respondents for violation
of the three-day notice rule.[6]
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals arguing that the elements of
tenancy, which would vest jurisdiction on the
DARAB, were not sufficiently established.
Respondents also assailed the denial of their motion
for reconsideration for violation of the three-day
notice rule. Respondents explained that the motion
for reconsideration was served on 5 May 2008 and
the hearing was set on 9 May 2008. Respondents
averred that they had no intention to violate the said
rule because they were of the belief that the motion
for reconsideration would be received by
respondents' counsel on the following day, 6 May
2008.[7]
During the pendency of the petition before the
appellate court, petitioner became the registered
owner of the subject land under Original Certificate of
Title No. EP-992-C.[8]
Before petitioner could inform the appellate court of
this significant development, the Court of Appeals, on
12 August 2009, found merit in respondents' petition.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals'
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April
15, 2008 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos
City, Branch 79, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is hereby ordered to
assume jurisdiction over the case and act on it with
dispatch.[9]
The appellate court ruled that petitioner failed to
establish tenancy relationship between the parties.
According to the appellate court, the elements of
consent and sharing of harvest are lacking.
Moreover, petitioner was held as unqualified to be a
successor-tenant by virtue of hereditary succession
because he is not among those listed under Section
9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, he being only a
relative by affinity.
In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner claimed
absolute ownership over the disputed land by virtue
of the issuance of an emancipation patent in his favor
and the corresponding registration of the same With
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on 19 September
2008. Resultantly, petitioner argued that the issue of
tenancy is now immaterial and any and all matters
relating to the identification, qualification or
disqualification of petitioner as a farmer-beneficiary,
as well as the validity of his emancipation patent are
in the nature of an agrarian dispute, hence, beyond
the jurisdiction of the trial court.

On 24 February 2010, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. [10]
Aggrieved, petitioner file d the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari contending that the award of an
emancipation patent in the name of petitioner is the
best proof that Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) has identified him as the bonafide successor
of his deceased father-in-law, Navarro. Petitioner
adds that by becoming the farmer-beneficiary and
registered owner of the subject lot, the issue of the
existence or non-existence of tenancy relationship
between the parties has become moot and
academic. Petitioner maintains that since Original
Certificate of Title No. EP-992-C was issued
pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 and
Operation Land Transfer, any and all actions
pertaining to the right and obligation of petitioner in
connection thereto is vested in DARAB which has
primary and exclusive original and appellate
jurisdiction. Similarly, any and all matters relating to
the identification, qualification or disqualification of
petitioner as a farmer-beneficiary over the subject
land and the validity of his emancipation patent over
the same land are in the nature of an agrarian
dispute beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC. Lastly,
petitioner asserts that respondents had clearly
recognized the authority of the DAR to take
cognizance of the dispute between the parties when
they had previously submitted the matter involved
herein with the various DAR offices.
Respondents counter that not all the elements of
agricultural tenancy are present in this case.
Petitioner could not have succeeded Navarro as
tenant of respondents because he is not among
those listed under Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844.
Respondents cite the Court of Appeals observation
that it has not come across any official document
from the DAR expressly identifying petitioner as
Navarro's successor. Respondents insist that a
tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.
The core of this dispute is the question of whom
between the DARAB and the RTC, has jurisdiction
over the case.
Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 provides:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The
DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
Rule II, Section 1(1.1) of the DARAB 2003 Rules of
Procedure:
RULE II
Jurisdiction of the Board and its Adjudicators
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original
Jurisdiction. — The Adjudicator shall have primary
and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate the following cases:
1.1 The rights and obligations of persons, whether
natural or juridical, engaged in the management,
cultivation, and use of all agricultural lands covered
by Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL),
and other related agrarian laws;
Based on the above-cited rules, only DARAB can
adjudicate an agrarian dispute.
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian
dispute in this wise:
(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating
to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers' associations or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation
of lands acquired under R.A. 6657 and other terms
and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there
must be tenancy relationship between the parties.
Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises
between a landowner and a tenant once they agree,
expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the
cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a
result of which relationship the tenant acquires the
right to continue working on and cultivating the land.
The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not
automatically give rise to security of tenure. [11]
In order for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is
essential to establish all its indispensable elements,
viz.: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4)
the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. All
these requisites are necessary to create a tenancy
relationship, and the absence of one or more
requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de
facto tenant.[12]
The Court of Appeals anchored its ruling on the
absence of the consent and sharing of harvests as
indispensable elements of a tenancy relationship. We
agree with the appellate court's disquisition. The
appellate court held in this wise:
It appears that the element of consent and sharing of
harvests are clearly lacking. [Petitioner] merely
alleged that he was verbally asked by all the heirs of
Guillerma Coronel to continue working on the land.
The fact that [petitioner] was allowed to stay on the
property does not mean that [respondents] impliedly
recognized the existence of a leasehold relation with
[petitioner]. Occupancy and continued possession of
the land will not ipso facto make one a dejure tenant.
In this case, [petitioner]could not present any
evidence showing that [respondents] had recognized
him as tenant. The other pieces of evidence
submitted by the [petitioner] do not prove the alleged
tenancy relationship as the certifications he
presented could only show that he is the actual
occupant of the land, a fact recognized by the
[respondents] and the reason why they instituted an
action for recovery of possession. Being an actual
occupant of the land is definitely different from being
a tenant thereof.
More importantly, [petitioner] was not able to show
that he shared his harvests, not even once, with the
[respondents]. He just reasoned out that he was not
able to remit his dues because the land became
unproductive due to the intrusion of saline waters. No
explanation was offered to show that he exerted
efforts to make the land productive for agricultural
production. Instead, he took the opportunity to
release bangus fingerlings but without giving any
share of this income to the [respondents].[13]
According to the Court of Appeals, petitioner's claim
that he succeeded Navarro as tenant is questionable.
Section 9 of RA 3844 provides an exclusive
enumeration of those who are qualified to succeed to
the leasehold rights of a deceased or incapacitated
tenant, to wit:
Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not
Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the Parties. -
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the
leasehold shall continue between the agricultural
lessor and the person who can cultivate the
landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural
lessor within one month from such death or
permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a)
the surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct
descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest
descendant or descendants in the order of their age:
Provided, That in case the death or permanent
incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the
agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at
the end of that agricultural year: Provided, further,
That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to
exercise his choice within the periods herein
provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the
order herein established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall bind his legal
heirs.
Petitioner, a relative by affinity of Navarro, is, to the
Court of Appeals, not qualified to succeed as tenant.
The Court of Appeals cited additional reasons, based
on standing rulings and administrative issuances,
which support petitioner's disqualification as
successor of the deceased tenant, thus:
Neither can this Court recognize him as the bona fide
successor of Navarro's Certificate of Land Transfer
(CLT) award under P.D. 27. The ruling in the case
of Tumol vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 150646, July 15,
2005, is instructive:
Pursuant to the provisions of the Presidential Decree
No. 27, and the Policy of the Government laid down
in the Code of Agrarian Reforms to establish owner-
cultivatorship and the economic family size farm as
the basis of agricultural development of the country,
the following rules and regulations shall be observed
in the event of death of a tenant-beneficiary:
Succession to the farmholding covered by Operation
Land Transfer, shall be governed by the pertinent
provisions of the New Civil Code of the Philippines
subject to the following limitations:
2. For the purpose of determining who among the
heirs shall be the sole owner-cultivator, the following
rules shall apply:
b. Where there are several heirs, and in the absence
of extra-judicial settlement or waiver of rights in favor
of one heir who shall be the sole owner and
cultivator, the heirs shall within one month from death
of the tenant-beneficiary be free to choose from
among themselves one who shall have sole
ownership and cultivation of the land, subject to
Paragraph 1(b) and (c) hereof: Provided, however,
That the surviving spouse shall be given first
preference; otherwise, in the absence or due to the
permanent incapacity of the surviving spouse, priority
shall be determined among the heirs according to
age.
In fact, Ministry Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series
of 1978 also provides:
Where there are several heirs, and in the absence of
extra judicial settlement or waiver of rights in favor of
the one heir who shall be the sole owner and
cultivator, the heirs shall[,] within one month from the
death of the tenant-beneficiary[,] be free to choose
from among themselves one who shall have sole
ownership and cultivation of the land, xxx Provided,
however, That [sic] the surviving spouse shall be
given first preference; otherwise, in the absence or
due to the permanent incapacity of the surviving
spouse, priority shall be determined among the heirs
according to age (emphases and underlining
omitted).
Moreover, the ministry memorandum circular
specifically provides that:
1. Succession to the farmholding covered by
Operation Land Transfer shall be governed by the
pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines subject to the following limitations:
a. The farmholding shall not be partitioned or
fragmented.
b. The ownership and cultivation of the farmholding
shall ultimately be consolidated in one heir who
possesses the following qualifications:
(1) being a full-fledged member of a duly recognized
farmer's cooperative;
(2) capable of personally cultivating the farmholding;
and
(3) willing to assume the obligations and
responsibilities of a tenant-beneficiary.
c. Such owner-cultivator shall compensate the other
heirs to the extent of their respective legal interest in
the land, subject to the payment of whatever
outstanding obligations of the deceased tenant-
beneficiary.
Again, being a relative only by affinity of the
deceased Bernabe Navarro, [petitioner]cannot lay
claim as his successor. The (c)ourt cannot accept his
assertion that he was already identified by the DAR
as the successor on the basis of land amortization
receipts. Said receipts merely show that [petitioner]
was the payor but these do not, in any way,
recognize him as the tenant-beneficiary of the land. It
could be that it was in the account of Bernabe
Navarro. The [c]ourt has not come across any official
document from the DAR that expressly identified him
as Bernabe Navarro's successor.[14]
We also note the appellate court's reference to the
well-entrenched principle that the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter on the existence of the
action is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein.[15] A court does not
lose its jurisdiction over a case by the simple
expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the
alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between
the parties. The court continues to have the authority
to hear and evaluate the evidence, precisely to
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, and, if,
after hearing, tenancy is shown to exist, it shall
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. [16]
It was mentioned by the appellate court that the
Complaint alleged the following material facts:
3. Plaintiffs are the registered owners of a parcel of
farmland located at Brgy. Sta. Monica, Hagonoy,
Bulacan with an area of four (4) hectares, more or
less, under Tax Declaration Property Index No. 020-
10-022-11-027, which they acquired from Guillerma
Coronel Vda. de Cruz, plaintiff Paterno's mother.
4. For a long period of time, the said farmland was
tenanted by Bernabe Navarro;
5. On April 6, 1985, tenant Bernabe Navarro
voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights over the
aforesaid lot through a Sinumpaang Salaysay. x x x
6. After Bernabe Navarro relinquished his tenancy
rights in favor of [respondents'] predecessor-in-
interest, no other person was installed as tenant of
the farmland;
7. Not long thereafter, [respondents] discovered that
[petitioner] Jesus Velasquez entered the farmland
without their consent and without the knowledge of
their predecessor-in-interest. Thus, they confronted
[petitioner] for his actuations.
8. However, from 1985 up to the present, [petitioner]
Jesus Velasquez never paid even a single centavo to
[respondents] as rent for the use of the land. Worse,
[petitioner] converted the farmland into a fishpond
without notice and consent of the [respondents] or
their predecessor-in-interest;
9. Sometime in 1988 and 1989 Fernando Cruz and
Jose Cruz, brothers of [Paterno Cruz], attempted to
visit the farmland but they were menacingly denied
entry by the [petitioner];
10. Considering that [respondents] never received
any rental payment from [petitioner], they sought
means on how tc earn income therefrom. Hence, on
July 6, 1995, [respondent] Paterno Cruz, together
with his siblings, entered into a lease contract over
the premises subject matter of this action with
Godofredo M. Tosco. x x x
11. Unfortunately, [petitioner] unjustifiably refused the
entry of and surrender to Mr. Godofredo Tosco the
peaceful possession of the farmland. This,
[petitioner] did, despite receipt from [respondent]
Rosario Cruz a letter informing him that Mr. Tosco
would be the lawful possessor of the lot by virtue of
his lease contract with [respondents
14. On account of [petitioner's] illegal occupancy of
the lot in controversy, [respondents] were deprived of
their income that could be derived from the rental
thereof, the amount of which is submitted to the
sound discretion of this Honorable Court, after
[petitioner] is ordered to account for all the benefits
he derived from use of the premises.[17]
Reading the material allegations of the Complaint,
the decision under review concluded that the case
below was for recovery of possession or an accion
publiciana, a plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in the proper
regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for
more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding
to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of
the filing of the complaint more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of
possession or defendant's possession had become
illegal, the action will be an accion publiciana.[18]
The averments of respondents' complaint, taken as
true, establish the nature of the action which the
court has jurisdiction to determine, precisely, whether
or not tenancy exist between the parties. Thus did
respondents as plaintiffs aver that they are the
registered owners of the subject property which they
acquired from Guillerma Coronel Vda. de Cruz; that
their tenant, Navarro, relinquished his tenancy rights
on 6 April 1985, and since then, no one was installed
as tenant; that in 1995, respondents were
dispossessed of their property when petitioner
refused the entry of and surrender the possession of
farmland to Mr. Godofredo Tosco, a lessee of
respondents. Jurisdiction pertains to the RTC where
an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independently of title
takes place.
The issuance of the emancipation patent was
brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals
through a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the appellate court and rightfully so. Our
discussion is and should be limited only on the issue
of tenancy, which is determinative of jurisdietion. The
validity of the emancipation patent, which may or
may not involve tenancy, cannot be decided by this
Court. We can only resolve said issue if brought
before us on appeal and only after the exhaustion of
administrative remedies.[19]
To reiterate, the RTC retains jurisdiction over the
instant action for recovery of possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
and Resolution dated 12 August 2009 and 24
February 2010, respectively of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 105140, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198770 : November 12, 2012
AURELIA GUA-AN AND SONIA GUA-AN
MAMON, Petitioners, v. GERTRUDES QUIRINO,
represented by ELMER QUIRINO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Decision1Ï‚rνll dated February 25, 2011 and
Resolution2Ï‚rνll dated September 15, 2011
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 00589-MIN which set aside the December
29, 2004 Decision3Ï‚rνll of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and
afforded respondent the preferential right of
redemption over the subject landholdings.
The Factual Antecedents
Subject of the instant case is a 2.8800 hectare
agricultural land situated in Batangan, Valencia,
Bukidnon known as Lot 0899, covered by Certificate
of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-025227 in the name of
Prisco Quirino, Sr.+ (Prisco+) issued by the Ministry
(now Department) of Agrarian
Reform on October 16, 1979 pursuant to Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27. On February 27, 1985, Prisco+
executed a Deed of Conditional Sale (deed) covering
the subject landholding to Ernesto Bayagna
(Ernesto) under the following conditions: that the
condition of this sale is that I, Prisco Quirino, Sr. and
my heirs hereby [reserve our] right to redeem or
repurchase the herein subject parcel of land by
returning to Ernesto Bayagna or his heirs the same
amount of Forty thousand Pesos (P40,000.00),
Philippine currency, after the lapse of eight (8) years
from the date of execution of this instrument and if
the subject land is not redeemed or repurchased
after the said eight years, there shall be an automatic
extension of four (4) years from the date the [eighth]
year expires, and if after the 4 term expires, and I,
Prisco Quirino, Sr., or my heirs still [fail] to redeem or
repurchase the herein subject land, Ernesto Bayagna
or his heirs shall continue to possess and enjoy the
subject land until it is finally redeemed or
repurchased. After the P40,000.00 is returned to
Ernesto Bayagna or his heirs, the latter shall be
obligated to return peacefully the subject land without
any tenant or lessee.4ςrνll
Ernesto thereupon possessed and cultivated the
subject land for more than 10 years before Prisco+
offered to redeem the same in 1996, which was
refused. Instead, Ernesto allowed the former owner
of the land, petitioner Aurelia Gua-An (Aurelia),
through her daughter, petitioner Sonia Gua-An
Mamon (Sonia), to redeem the lot. Subsequently,
Prisco+ passed away.
On January 30, 1998, respondent Gertrudes Quirino,
Prisco's widow, represented by their son, Elmer, filed
before the Office of the Agrarian Reform Regional
Adjudicator (RARAD) a Complaint for Specific
Performance, Redemption, Reinstatement and
Damages with Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and TRO against Ernesto and petitioners.
In their Answer, petitioners averred that Prisco's+
right over the subject land was merely inchoate for
failure to establish payment of just compensation to
the landowner; the deed was null and void for being
violative of the law and public policy; and that the
failure to consign the redemption money effectively
bars the redemption prayed for.
For his part, Ernesto averred that he allowed
petitioners to redeem the lot because Prisco+ failed
to appear on the agreed date for redemption and on
the information that the subject land was erroneously
awarded to the latter.
On May 6, 1998, the RARAD dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.
The DARAB Ruling
In the Decision5Ï‚rνll dated December 29, 2004, the
DARAB denied respondent's appeal and declared
Prisco+ to have violated agrarian laws and of having
abandoned the land by his failure to cultivate the
same continuously for a period of more than two (2)
calendar years. It canceled CLT No. 0-025227 in
Prisco's+ name and ordered the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) to reallocate the subject
landholding to a qualified beneficiary.
The CA Ruling
On petition for review, the CA reversed and set
aside6Ï‚rνll the DARAB's decision. It ruled that the
pacto de retro sale between Prisco+ and Ernesto
was a mere equitable mortgage, hence, not a
prohibited transaction under P.D. 27, which is limited
to "transfers or conveyances of title to a landholding
acquired under the Land Reform Program of the
Government." Having acquired the subject land as a
"qualified beneficiary," Prisco+ and his heirs possess
security of tenure thereon and could not be
dispossessed thereof except for cause and only
through a final and executory judgment. Thus, the
CA afforded the heirs of Prisco+ the preferential right
of redemption over the subject landholding.
In the instant petition, petitioners insist that since
respondent failed to tender and consign the
redemption money, the latter has no cause of action
against them. Moreover, considering that Prisco+
was not the absolute owner of the subject property,
he cannot validly mortgage the same. Besides,
Prisco+ had lost his rights as a farmer-beneficiary
when he transacted with Ernesto in violation of the
provisions of Section 73(f)7Ï‚rνll of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657, as amended (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988).
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
It bears to stress that upon the promulgation of P.D.
27, farmer-tenants were deemed owners of the land
they were tilling and given the rights to possess,
cultivate and enjoy the landholding for
themselves.8Ï‚rνll Thus, P.D. 27 specifically
prohibited any transfer of such landholding except to
the government or by hereditary succession. Section
279Ï‚rνll of R.A. 6657 further allowed transfers to the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and to other
qualified beneficiaries. Consequently, any other
transfer constitutes a violation of the above
proscription and is null and void for being contrary to
law.10Ï‚rνll Relevant on this point is Ministry of
Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular No. 7, series
of 1979 which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Despite the x x x prohibition, x x x many farmer-
beneficiaries of P.D. 27 have transferred their
ownership, rights and/or possession of their
farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered
the same to their former landowners. All these
transactions/surrenders are violative of P.D. 27 and
therefore null and void."
A perusal of the Deed of Conditional Sale reveals the
real intention of the parties not to enter into a
contract of sale but merely to secure the payment of
the P40,000.00 loan of Prisco+. This is evident from
the fact that the latter was given the right to
repurchase the subject property even beyond the 12-
year (original and extended) period, allowing in the
meantime the continued possession of Ernesto
pending payment of the consideration. Under these
conditions and in accordance with Article
160211Ï‚rνll of the Civil Code, the CA did not err in
adjudging the pacto de retro sale to be in reality an
equitable mortgage.
However, contrary to the finding of the CA, the
subject transaction is covered by the prohibition
under P.D. No. 27 and R.A. No. 6657 which include
transfer of possession of the landholding to the
vendee a retro, Ernesto, who, not being a qualified
beneficiary, remained in possession thereof for a
period of eleven (11) years. Hence, notwithstanding
such possession, the latter did not acquire any valid
right or title thereto, especially since he failed to take
any positive measure to cause the cancellation of
Prisco's+ CLT No. 0-025227 despite the long lapse
of time.
On the other hand, the redemption made by
petitioner Aurelia was ineffective and void since
reversion of the landholding to the former owner is
likewise proscribed under P.D. No. 27 in accordance
with its policy of holding such lands under trust for
the succeeding generations of farmers.12ςrνll
However, while CLT No. 0-025227 remains in
Prisco's+ name, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to
the fact that Prisco+ surrendered possession and
cultivation of the subject land to Ernesto, not for a
mere temporary period, but for a period of 11 years
without any justifiable reason. Such act constituted
abandonment despite his avowed intent to resume
possession of the land upon payment of the loan. As
defined in DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of
1994, abandonment is a willful failure of the agrarian
reform beneficiary, together with his farm household,
"to cultivate, till, or develop his land to produce any
crop, or to use the land for any specific economic
purpose continuously for a period of two calendar
years." It is a ground for cancellation by the DARAB
of an award to the agrarian reform beneficiary.
Consequently, respondent and/or Prisco's+ heirs had
lost any right to redeem the subject landholding.
In fine, we find the DARAB Decision finding Prisco+
to have violated agrarian laws, canceling his CLT
and ordering the reallocation of the subject land to be
more in accord with the law and
jurisprudence.ςηαοblενιrυαllαωlιbrαr
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated February
25, 2011 and Resolution dated September 15, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 00589-
MIN are hereby SET ASIDE. The DARAB Decision
dated December 29, 2004 is REINSTATED.Ï‚rαlαÏ
‰lιbrαr
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180476 June 26, 2013
CODERIAS Vs CHIOCO
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Case: The Court cannot sanction the use of force to
evict The CA SET ASIDE DARAB’s decision. It held
that beneficiaries of land reform. Eviction using force
is reversion undoubtedly, a tenancy relation
existed between Chioco and to the feudal system,
where the landed elite have free rein over
petitioner under RA 3844.24Nevertheless, it found
that their poor vassals. In effect, might is right.
petitioner’s action had prescribed, in that the
complained acts occurred in 1980 but petitioner filed
only in 1995, or beyond
Facts:
the three-year prescriptive period under Section 38 of
RA. The deceased Juan O. Chioco (Chioco) owned a
4- 3844. The CA held that this delayed action
by petitioner hectare farm in Lupao, Nueva Ecija (the
farm). As tiller of the amounts to laches as well.
farm,5 petitioner Raymundo Coderias was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) on April 26, 1974.
6 In 1980,
Issue:
individuals connected with Chioco – who was a
former Whether or not the CA committed
an error in setting aside the
Governor of Nueva Ecija – threatened to kill
petitioner if he decision of DARAB, thereby making
petitoner’s contention
did not leave the farm. His standing crops (corn and
untenable due to prescription vegetables) and house
were bulldozed. For fear of his life, petitioner,
together with his family, left the farm.7
Our Ruling:
The Court grants the Petition.
In 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death, petitioner
and his family re-established themselves on the
farm.8 It must be recalled from
the facts that the farm been placed under the
coverage of RA 3844. It is also
On March 9, 19959 petitioner filed with the
undisputed that a tenancy relation existed between
Chioco and
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
petitioner. In fact, a CLT had been issued in favor of
the (DARAB) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija a Petition10
against petitioner; thus, petitioner already
had an expectant right to the respondent Chioco’s
estate praying that his possession and farm.31
A CLT serves as "a provisional title of ownership
over cultivation of the farm be respected; that the
corresponding the landholding while the lot
owner is awaiting full payment agricultural leasehold
contract between them be executed; that of just
compensation or for as long as the tenant-farmer is
an he be awarded actual damages for the destruction
of his house, amortizing owner. This certificate
proves inchoate ownership his standing crops,
unrealized harvest from 1980 up to 1993, of an
agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and corn
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. 11 Respondent
moved to production. It is issued in order for the
tenant-farmer to dismiss12 the Petition, contending
that petitioner’s cause of acquire the land he was
tilling."32 Since the farm is considered action has
prescribed under Section 38 13 of Republic Act (RA)
expropriated and placed under the coverage of the
land reform No. 3844,14 as amended, since the
alleged dispossession took law,33Chioco had
no right to evict petitioner and enter the place in 1980
but the Petition was filed only in 1995, or
property. More significantly, Chioco had no right to
claim that beyond the statutory three-year period for
filing such claims. petitioner’s cause of action had
prescribed.
Petitioner filed an opposition15 arguing that his
tenure/tillage should be deemed uninterrupted since
his departure was due to. To strengthen the security
of tenure of tenants, threats made by Chioco’s
henchmen; thus, the three-year Section 10 of
R.A. No. 3844 provides that the agricultural
prescriptive period should not be applied to his case.
leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by the
sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of
the
Ruling of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
landholding. With unyielding consistency, we have
held that (PARAD) transactions involving the
agricultural land over which an
The PARAD issued a Decision16 dismissing the
agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change of
Petition on the ground of prescription. It adopted
respondent’s ownership, such as the sale or
transfer of legal possession, will
argument, adding that although petitioner was
forcibly evicted not terminate the rights of the
agricultural lessee who is given from the farm, he
was not without remedy under the law to
protection by the law by making such rights
enforceable assert his rights. Yet, he filed the Petition
only after 14 years, against the transferee or the
landowner's successor in interest. or in 1995. He is
thus guilty of laches and is deemed to have
abandoned his rights and privileges under the
agrarian laws. In addition, Section 7 of the
law enunciates theprinciple of security of tenure of
the tenant, such that it
Ruling of the DARAB prescribes that the relationship
of landholder and tenant canPetitioner
appealed17The appealed decision is hereby
only be terminated for causes provided by law.
Security of set aside. A new judgment is entered
Ordering the tenure is a legal concession to
agricultural lessees which they Respondent-Appellee
to respect and maintain the Petitioner- value as
life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is
Appellant in his peaceful possession and cultivation
of the tantamount to deprivation of their only
means of livelihood. subject landholding; and
Ordering the Respondent-Appellee Perforce,
the termination of the leasehold relationship can take
to reimburse Raymundo Coderias of the money
equivalent place only for causes provided by
law. representing the latter’s unrealized harvest from
1980 to 1993 The CA has failed to recognize this
vinculum juris, therefore understandable that
instead of fighting for the farm, this juridical tie, that
exists between the petitioner and Chioco, petitioner
opted to leave and keep his family safe. Any man
which the latter is bound to respect.
who cherishes his family more than the most
valuable material thing in his life would have done
the same.
Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural
leasehold relation shall be extinguished only under
any of the Force and intimidation restrict or
hinder the exercise following three circumstances, to
wit: "(1) abandonment of the of the will, and so
long as they exist, petitioner is deprived of
landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural
lessor; his free will. He could not occupy his
farm, plant his crops,
(2) voluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural tend to them, and harvest them. He
could not file an agrarian
lessee, written notice of which shall be served three
months in case against Chioco, for that meant
having to return to Nueva
advance; or (3) absence of the persons under
Section 9 to Ecija. He could not file the case
anywhere else; any other succeed the lessee x x x."
None of these is obtaining in this agrarian
tribunal or agency would have declined to exercise
case. In particular, petitioner cannot be said to have
abandoned jurisdiction. the landholding. It will be
recalled that Chioco forcibly ejected him from the
property through threats and intimidation. His
The Agricultural Land Reform Code has been house
was bulldozed and his crops were destroyed.
Petitioner designed to promote economic and
social stability. Being a left the farm in 1980 and
returned only in 1993 upon learning social
legislation, it must be interpreted liberally to give full
of Chioco’s death. Two years after, or in 1995, he
filed the force and effect to its clear intent, which
is ‘to achieve an instant Petition.
dignified existence for the small farmers’ and to make
them ‘more independent, self-reliant and responsible
citizens, and a
Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides
source of genuine strength in our democratic
society’.37 that "an action to enforce any cause of
action under this Code shall be barred if not
commenced within three years after such
We have ruled time and again that litigants should
cause of action accrued." In this case, we deem it
proper to have the amplest opportunity for a
proper and just disposition reckon petitioner’s cause
of action to have accrued only upon of their
cause – free, as much as possible, from the
constraints his knowledge of the death of Chioco in
1993, and not at the of procedural technicalities.
In the interest of its equity time he was forcibly
ejected from the landholding in 1980. For
jurisdiction, the Court may disregard procedural
lapses so that as long as the intimidation and threats
to petitioner’s life and a case may be resolved on
its merits. Rules of procedure limb existed, petitioner
had a cause of action against Chioco to should
promote, not defeat, substantial justice. Hence, the
enforce the recognition of this juridical tie. Since the
threats Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally
to resolve and intimidation ended with Chioco’s
death, petitioner’s substantial issues raised
by the parties. obligation to file a case to assert his
rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws
within the prescriptive period Our law on
agrarian reform is a legislated promise to
commenced. These rights, as enumerated above,
include the emancipate poor farm families
from the bondage of the soil.
right to security of tenure, to continue in possession
of the P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in the exact
same spirit, with land he works despite the expiration
of the contract or the sale mechanisms which hope
to forestall a reversion to the or transfer of the land to
third persons, the pre-emptive right to antiquated
and inequitable feudal system of land ownership. It
buy the land, as well as the right to redeem the land,
if sold to aims to ensure the continued possession,
cultivation and a third person without his knowledge.
enjoyment by the beneficiary of the land that he tills
which would certainly not be possible where the
former owner is
Petitioner may not be faulted for acting only after
allowed to reacquire the land at any time following
the award Chioco passed away for his life and the
lives of members of – in contravention of the
government’s objective to his family are not worth
gambling for a piece of land. The emancipate
tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil.43
bulldozing of his house – his castle – is only an
example of the fate that could befall them. Under the
circumstances, it is
GR No. 145568
HEIRS OF ENRIQUE TAN, Sr. vs. REYNALDA
POLLESCAS
FACTS:
Petitioners Tan were co-owners of a coconut
farmland.Esteban Pollescas was the original
tenant of the land. Upon Esteban’s death, his
son Enrique succeeded him and was
appointed tenant by the landowners. However,
respondent Reynalda, Esteban’s surviving
second spouse, demanded that the Tans
recognize her as Esteban’s successor.
Reynalda filed a complaint before DARAB,
questioning the tenancy relationship of Tan and
Enrique. DARAB ruled in favor of Reynalda,
declaring her as the lawful tenant of the Land.
DARAB apportioned the harvests between the
Tans and Reynalda based on the customary
sharing system which is 2/3 to the landowner
and 1/3 to the tenant.
Reynalda failed to deliver the 2/3 of the
harvest. Tan heirs demanded the payment
thereof, but Reynalda ignored such demand.
Tan heirs filed a case for estafa for her failure
to pay and deliver the share.
Petitioner: The agreement was extinguished
due to non-payment of lease (the 2/3 of the
harvest).
Respondent: The Tans demand excessive
amount
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
CORRECTLY RULED THAT REYNALDA IS
OBLIGED TO PAY ONLY 1/4 OR 25% OF THE
NORMAL HARVEST AND NOT 2/3 WHEN THE
SUBJECT LAND WAS NOT YET PLACED
UNDER THE LEASEHOLD SYSTEM
PURSUANT TO SECTION 12 OF RA 6657
HELD: YES
In this case, the Tans seek ejectement of
Reynalda from the Land due to non- payment
of lease rental. In order for non-payment of
the lease rental to be a valid ground to
dispossess the agricultural lessee of the
landholding, the amount of the lease rental
must first of all be lawful. If the amount of
lease rental claimed exceeds the limit
allowed by law, non-payment of lease rental
cannot be a ground to dispossess the
agricultural lessee of the landholding.
Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended
mandates that not x x x more than 25% of
the average normal harvest shall constitute
the just and fair rental for leasehold. In this
case, the Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to
deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental,
which clearly exceeded the 25% maximum
amount prescribed by law. Therefore, the
Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess
Reynalda of the landholding for non-
payment of rental precisely because the
lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is
unlawful.
DOCTRINE:
Section 36 of RA 3844 as amended
enumerates the grounds for dispossession of
the tenants landholding, to wit:
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding;
Exceptions. Notwithstanding any agreement
as to the period or future surrender of the
land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in
the enjoyment and possession of his
landholding except when his dispossession
has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:
1. The landholding is declared by the
department head upon
recommendation of the National
Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or
some other urban purposes:
Provided, That the agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five
times the average of the gross
harvests on his landholding during
the last five preceding calendar
years;
2. The agricultural lessee failed to
substantially comply with any of the
terms and conditions of the contract or
any of the provisions of this Code
unless his failure is caused by
fortuitous event or force majeure;
3. The agricultural lessee planted crops or
used the landholding for a purpose other
than what had been previously agreed
upon;
4. The agricultural lessee failed to adopt
proven farm practices as determined
under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-
nine;
5. The land or other substantial
permanent improvement thereon is
substantially damaged or destroyed or
has unreasonably deteriorated through
the fault or negligence of the
agricultural lessee;
6. The agricultural lessee does not
pay the lease rental when it falls
due: Provided, That if the non-
payment of the rental shall be due
to crop failure to the extent of
seventy-five per centum as a result
of a fortuitous event, the non-
payment shall not be a ground for
dispossession, although the
obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby
extinguished; or
7. The lessee employed a sub-lessee on
his landholding in violation of the
 terms of paragraph 2 of Section
twenty-seven. (1) Cruel, inhuman or
offensive treatment of the
 SEC. 28. Termination of Leasehold by agricultural lessee or any member of
Agricultural Lessee During his immediate farm household by the
Agricultural Year.The agricultural agricultural lessor or his
lessee may terminate the leasehold representative with the knowledge
during the agricultural year for any of and consent of the lessor;
the following causes:
(2) Non-compliance on the and the respondents Fernando and Andres Mariano
part of the agricultural lessor with and Dorotea Garcia.
any of the obligations imposed upon
him by the provisions of this Code or  
by his contract with the agricultural In 1998, Natividad filed with the PARAD a petition for
lessee; ejectment and payment of back lease rentals against
Mariano, et al. Natividad alleged that despite
(3) Compulsion of the repeated verbal demands said tenants failed to pay
agricultural lessee or any member of him rentals. This prompted him to orally demand that
his immediate farm household by the they vacate the lot – and eventually his petition for
agricultural lessor to do any work or ejectment.
render any service not in any way
connected with farm work or even When Mariano, et al failed to answer the summons
without compulsion if no and did not rebut Natividad’s petition, PARAD
compensation is paid; decided the case ex parte and granted the petition
for ejectment and ordered payment of back rentals in
(4) Commission of a crime favor of Natividad.
by the agricultural lessor or his
representative against the agricultural The first petition for reconsideration filed by the
lessee or any member of his respondents is on the ground of excusable
immediate farm household; or negligence – for inexperience and lack of knowledge
of agrarian reform laws and the DARAB
(5) Voluntary surrender due implementing rules and regulations.  In their second
to circumstances more petition, filed by the DAR Agrarian Legal Assistance,
advantageous to him and his family. the respondents added as justification their lack of
sufficient financial means. Both petitions were denied
by PARAD in view that they filed beyond the
prescribed reglementary period and the decision has
become final and executory.
ERNESTO L. NATIVIDAD VS. FERNANDO
MARIANO, ET AL.  The case was raised to the DARAB, which reversed
the decision of PARAD, and ordered Natividad to
Facts: maintain the respondents’ peaceful possession of the
Ernesto Natividad purchased a 66,997 lot from property. DARAB’s decision was later on affirmed by
Esperanza Yuson at a public auction in 1988. The lot the Court of Appeals…; Hence, this petition for
was, however, covered by a lease tenancy certiorari with the Supreme Cour.
agreement under RA 6657 (CARL) between Yuzon  
Issue:
Whether or not, Ernesto had sufficient cause to eject
the respondents from the subject property.
 
Held:
The Supreme Court affirmed with modification the
decision of the DARAB and the Court of Appeals;
finding that:
1. For the broader interest of justice and equity,
despite the Doctrine of Immutability of Final
Judgments (by PARAD), appellate courts did not err
in re-opening, and ruling on the merits of the case;
2. Review of the DAR implementing rules revealed
that the petition of the respondents were well within
the prescribed reglementery period;
3. Natividad did not show evidence to prove he
demanded from respondents payment of lease
rentals since 1988 when he acquired the land;
demand was considered made only in 1998 upon his
petition;
4. The alleged non-payment of lease rentals did not
last for two (2) years; thus ejection is NOT YET DUE
as required by the statute;
5. Natividad’s prolonged inaction in making his
demand led the respondents to consider Corazon
and Laureano – Yuson’s representatives – to still be
the authorized payees of the lease.
REYES V. REYES
G.R. No. 140164, 6 September 2002
FACTS:
As disclosed by the record, the instant case
stemmed from a complaint for reinstatement with
damages filed with the DARAB Region III Office by
Dionisia Reyes on April 22, 1991 against her four
younger brothers, herein respondents. She alleged
that her father, the late Felizardo Reyes, was the
tenant of a two-hectare agricultural lot in Parulan,
Plaridel, Bulacan, owned by Marciano Castro. After
her fathers death on February 17, 1989, she and
Marciano Castro, through the latters son and
attorney-in-fact, Ramon R. Castro, executed a
leasehold contract naming her as the agricultural
lessee of the property. However, sometime before
the start of the planting of the dry season crop in
1989, herein respondents forcibly entered the area
and occupied a one-hectare portion of the property.
They claimed to be the tenants thereof. Respondents
then paid rent to the Castros overseer, Armando
Duran, and continued to occupy half of the property
to petitioners damage and prejudice.
In their answer, respondents denied Dionisias claim
that she was the bona fide leasehold tenant. They
claimed that they inherited the lease rights to the
property from their deceased father. Respondents
pointed out that petitioner was a woman who could
not possibly work or till the land by herself. They
likewise averred that they were the ones actually
cultivating the portion occupied by them. Hence,
petitioners claim to be the lawful agricultural lessee
had no basis, either in fact or in law.
After attempts to amicably solve the dispute failed,
the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) ruled for
petitioner. Respondents then seasonably appealed
the PARADs judgment to the DARAB-Central Office.
In its decision of September 1, 1997, however, the
instant appeal was DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the subject decision AFFIRMED. Respondents
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and ruled
in their favor hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
The core issue in this petition is, who among the
parties should be considered the lawful and rightful
tenant of the Castro property?
RULING:
When an agricultural tenant dies, the choice for the
substitute tenant is given to the land owner. It is the
latter who has the option to place a new tenant of his
choice on the land. That choice is, however, not
absolute as it shall be exercised from among the
surviving compulsory heirs of the deceased tenant.
Hence, the surviving heirs cannot preempt that
choice by deciding among themselves who shall
take-over the cultivation or opting to cultivate the land
collectively. It is only when the landowner fails to
exercise such right, or waive the same, that the
survivors may agree among themselves regarding
the cultivation. The law is specific on the matter as so
provided in Section 9, Republic Act No. 3844.
Petitioner pleads that in agrarian cases, the power of
appellate review is limited to questions of law and
findings of fact of the DARAB, when supported by
substantial evidence, shall be binding upon the Court
of Appeals. Hence, the appellate court cannot make
its own findings of fact and substitute the same in lieu
of the findings of the DARAB, unless there was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the DARAB.
Petitioner stresses that the finding by the appellate
court of Ricardos previous possession runs counter
to the finding of the DARAB that Ricardo was a mere
usurper who forcibly took over the disputed one-
hectare portion. The appellate court also erred in
finding that Ricardo and other respondents were
made to believe that overseer Duran had authority to
bind the Castro family to allow them to possess and
cultivate the lot. This is because the DARAB found
that Durans authority was limited only to collecting
rentals from tenants duly appointed by the Castros,
and Duran was in bad faith in accepting two rentals
from Ricardo and his co-Respondents.
Petitioner asserts that Duran cannot be deemed an
implied agent of the Castros under Article 1869 of the
Civil Code since there are neither acts nor omissions
of either Marciano Castro or Ramon Castro from
which to imply an agency. Respondents insist that an
agricultural leasehold contract over a one-hectare
portion of the landholding arose as a result of the
actions of Ramons overseer, who must be viewed as
the latters agent.
While undoubtedly Duran was an agent of Ramon,
he was not a general agent of the latter with respect
to the landholding. The record shows that as
overseer, Durans duties and responsibilities were
limited to issuing receipts, selling mangoes and
bamboo trees and all other things saleable. Thus, by
his own admission, Duran was a special agent under
Article 1876 of the Civil Code.Durans duties and
responsibilities as a special agent do not include the
acceptance of rentals from persons other than the
tenant so designated by the landowner. Durans
authority as a special agent likewise excludes the
power to appoint tenants or successor-tenants.
Clearly, Duran acted beyond the limits of his
authority as an agent. Absent substantial evidence to
show Durans authority from the Castros to give
consent to the creation of a tenancy relationship, his
actions could not give rise to an implied tenancy.
Respondents stance before the DARAB that they
had inherited or succeeded to the tenancy rights of
their late father is likewise erroneous. Defendants-
Appellants should not confuse the law on succession
provided for in the Civil Code of the Philippines with
succession in agrarian cases. In the former, (the)
statute spreads the estate of the deceased
throughout his heirs; while in agrarian laws, the
security of tenure of the deceased tenant shall pass
on to only one (1) heir in the manner provided for in
Section 9. The petition is GRANTED. The decision of
the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
judgment of the DARAB in affirming the decision of
the Provincial Adjudicator of DARAB Region III is
hereby REINSTATED.
SIGRE VS CA, GR NO. 109568, 2002
FACTS:   
 Presidential Decree No. 27 issued by Pres.
Ferdinand Marcos proclaimed the entire country as a
“Land Reform Area” and further decreed the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil,
transferring to them ownership of the land they till.
 Sigre was Gonzales’ tenant in Iloilo and previously
paid Gonzales a lease rental of 32 cavans per year
which he stopped and instead started to remit lease
rentals to LBP pursuant to DAR’s memorandum
circular which set the guidelines of lease rental
payment by farmer-beneficiaries under the land
transfer program of PD 27.
Lilia Gonzales, acting in her capacity as co-
administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, filed a
petition for petitioner and Mandamus seeking to
prohibit the Land Bank of the Philippines from
accepting leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre and
for LBP to turn over to Gonzales the rentals
previously remitted to it by Sigre.
ISSUE:
Is Presidential Decree No. 27 valid and
constitutional?
LAW:
        Presidential Decree No. 27, issued on October
21, 1972 by then Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
proclaimed the entire country as a “land reform area”
and decreed the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil, transferring to them the
ownership of the land they till. To achieve its
purpose, the decree laid down a system for the
purchase by tenant-farmers, long-recognized as the
backbone of the economy, of the lands they were
tilling. Owners of rice and corn lands that exceeded
the minimum retention area were bound to sell their
lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and subject
to conditions. It was pursuant to said decree that the
DAR issued Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of
1978.
 
RULING/RATIO:
 
        The power of subordinate legislation allows
administrative bodies to implement the broad policies
laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details. All that
is required is that the regulation should be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity
with the standards prescribed by the law. One such
administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum
Circular No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v.
Zobel, emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e.,
freedom from the bondage of the soil by transferring
to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land
they’re tilling. As noted, however, in
the whereas clauses of the Circular, problems have
been encountered in the expeditious implementation
of the land reform program, thus necessitating its
promulgation. The rationale for the Circular was
explicitly recognized by the appellate court when it
stated that “The main purpose of the circular is to
make certain that the lease rental payments of the
tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the
purchase price of the land. . . . The circular was
meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-
farmer’s lease rentals to landowner were not credited
in his favor against the determined purchase price of
the land, thus making him a perpetual obligor for said
purchase price.” Since the assailed Circular
essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose
of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being the case,
it has the force of law and is entitled to great respect.
G.R. NO. 133706 SUPREME COURT 3RD
DIVISION (PANGANIBAN, J.)
FRANCISCO ESTOLAS VS. ADOLFO MABALOT
MAY 7, 2002
Facts:
Adolfo Mabalot was awarded with an agricultural land
by virtue of PD 27. Corresponding Certificate of Land
Transfer was issued on November 11, 1973. In May
1978, he needed money for medical treatment and
passed the land to Francisco Estolas in exchange of
P5,800 and P200 worth of rice. According to
Mabalot, the transfer was only a verbal mortgage but
Estolas treated the same as sale. Department of
Agrarian Reform then issued a Transfer Certificate
Title in favor of Estolas. In 1988, Mabalot tried to
redeem the land from petitioner but was
unsuccessful. DAR Regional Office decided in favor
of the petitioner contending that there was
abandonment on the part of the respondent. DAR
Central Office, however, reversed its regional office’s
decision. Estolas appealed but Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of respondent, contending that the
transfer of land to petitioner is void and there was no
abandonment by respondent since failure on the
redemption was due to a higher redemption price set
by the petitioner.
Issue:
Is the transfer of the agricultural land valid?
Law:
Presidential Decree 27 provides that title to land
acquired pursuant to its mandate or to that of the
Land Reform Program of the government shall not be
transferable except to the grantee’s heirs by
hereditary succession or back to the government by
other legal means.
Ruling:
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent. It
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and
cited that there is no room for interpretation in the
provision of PD 27 regarding transfer of agricultural
land. It affirmed, as well, CA’s decision on the non-
abandonment of the subject land
by the respondent.
G.R. NO. 175175 CASE DIGEST
G.R. NO. 175175, SEPTEMBER 29, 2008
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS HEIRS OF ELEUTERIO CRUZ
Facts:
Respondents are registered owners of an unirrigated
riceland situated in Cagayan, which was placed by
the government under the coverage of the operation
land transfer under PD 27. LBP pegged the value of
the land but was rejected the valuation.
Because of such rejection, SAC held that the value of
the land different from that of the valuation made by
the LBP, following the valuation made by the
PARAD. On petition, the CA ruled that the area
covered by the agrarian reform program was duly
established before PARAD, however, CA affirmed
the land valuation made by the SAC. Hence, this
instant petition.
Issue:
Whether the SAC has the jurisdiction to determine
the valuation of the land.
Ruling:
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 states:
SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In
determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
and the assessment made by government
assessors, shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farm workers and by government to the property as
well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to
determine its valuation.
A perusal of the PARADs Decision dated 23
November 1999, which mandated payment of just
compensation in the amount of P80,000.00 per
hectare, reveals that the PARAD did not adhere to
the formula prescribed in any of the aforementioned
regulations issued by the DAR or was at least silent
on the applicability of the aforementioned DAR
regulations to the question of just compensation. The
PARAD decision also did not refer to any evidence in
support of its finding
The SAC, meanwhile, referred to DAR A.O. No. 6,
series of 1992, as amended, as the controlling
guideline in fixing just compensation. Pertinently, to
obtain the land value, the formula under said
regulation requires that the values for the Capitalized
Net Income, Comparable Sales and Market Value
based on the tax declaration must be shown.
Moreover, said formula has been superseded by
DAR A.O. No. 05, series of 1998, which also requires
values for Capitalized Net Income, Comparable
Sales and Market Value, the same parameters laid
down in the prior regulation.
Stating that no evidence was presented by
respondents on the aforementioned parameters, the
SAC ruled that it was constrained to adopt the finding
of the PARAD, which fixed the value of the land at
P80,000.00 per hectare. On appeal, the CA adopted
the same finding. The general rule is that factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the CA, are binding and conclusive on the Court.
However, the rule admits of exceptions, as when the
factual findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures or when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based
A perusal of the PARAD decision, which was
adopted by both the SAC and the CA, shows that its
valuation of P80,000.00 per hectare is sorely lacking
in any evidentiary or legal basis. While the Court
wants to fix just compensation due to respondents if
only to write finis to the controversy, the evidence on
record is not sufficient for the Court to do so in
accordance with DAR A.O. No. 5, series of
1998.Decision of CA was reversed and set aside, the
case was remanded to RTC to determine the just
compensation.
LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO L.
SANTOS, GR No. 213863, 2016-01-27
Facts:
Santos owned three (3) parcels of agricultural land
devoted to corn
In 1984, the subject lands were placed under the
government's Operation Land Transfer Program[9]
pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27,[10] and
distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries who were
issued the corresponding Emancipation Patents.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) fixed the
just compensation
On May 25, 2000, the LBP received the claim folder
covering the subject lands[15] and allowed Santos to
collect the initial valuation for Land 3. It withheld the
release of the valuation for Lands 1 and 2 until the
submission of the certificates of title... thereto... on
August 30, 2000 and December 17, 2003,
respectively, Santos was issued Agrarian Reform
(AR) Bond No. 0079665 in the amount of P11,674.59
representing the initial valuation of Land 3 and AR
Bond No. 0079666 in the amount of P30,428.83
representing the six percent (6%)... increment
pursuant to PD 27 and EO 228, and paid cash in the
total amount ofP4,678.16.
Finding the valuation unreasonable, Santos filed
three (3) petitions[20] for summary administrative
proceedings for the determination of just
compensation of the subject lands before the Office
of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD)
On March 27, 2001, the PARAD rendered separate
decisions[21] fixing the just compensation as follows:
(a) P510,034.29[22] for Land 1; (b)
P2,532,060.31[23] for Land 2; and (c) P1,147,466.73
However, in arriving at such values, the PARAD used
the recent government support price (GSP) for corn
of P300.00/cavan (P6.00/kilo) as certified by the
National Food Authority
Provincial Manager of Camarines Sur, instead of the
P31.00/cavan provided under Section 2[26] of EO
228. Hence, it no longer applied the six percent (6%)
annual incremental interest granted under DAR
Administrative Order (DAR AO) No. 13,[27] Series of
1994.
In a letter[28] dated September 5, 2001, Santos
unconditionally accepted and called for the
immediate payment of the valuations for Lands 2 and
3.
Dissatisfied with the PARAD's valuation, the LBP
instituted two (2) separate complaints[29] for the
determination of just compensation before the RTC,
averring that the computations were erroneous when
they disregarded the formula provided under EO 228.
Santos moved to dismiss[32] the complaints on the
ground that the LBP has no legal personality to
institute such action, and that the complaints were
barred by the finality of the PARAD's Decision.
The RTC dismissed both complaints. Meanwhile,
Branch 23 of the same RTC was designated as the
new SAC that gave due course to the LBP's notices
of appeal.[34] The appeals, however,... were set
aside by the CA's Fifth and Third Divisions, which
remanded the cases to the RTC for appropriate
proceedings, and computation of just compensation,
respectively.
On May 5, 2009, Santos filed before the RTC a
motion to release the initial valuation for Lands 1 and
2 as fixed by the DAR, which was granted on June 2,
2009, conditioned on the submission of several
documentary requirements.[36] Santos moved for...
reconsideration, pointing out that what was sought
was the initial valuation only and not its full payment,
but nonetheless, committed (a) to submit two (2)
valid ID cards, two (2) latest ID pictures and his CTC
for the current year, and (b) to execute a Deed of
Assignment,... Warranties and Undertaking in favor
of the LBP.
In opposition, the LBP insisted that Santos must: (a)
first establish his ownership over the said properties,
it appearing that a Decree covering Land 1 was
issued in favor of a certain Mariano Garchitorena,
hence, the owner's duplicate of the said title must be
surrendered to... the Registry of Deeds for
cancellation; and (b) submit a real estate tax
clearance to prove that there were no encumbrances
burdening the property and that the taxes thereon
had been fully paid until 1972.
The RTC ruled in favor of Santos, holding that since
Land 1 was processed as an untitled property and
the LBP had admitted in its petitions for just
compensation that Santos was the owner of the
untitled... lands covered by PD 27 as reflected in the
tax declarations, the LBP cannot maintain an
inconsistent position by requiring Santos to prove his
ownership thereto. It added that the submission of
the required documents may still be directed upon
full payment of the just... compensation.
The LBP's motion for reconsideration[40] was denied
The LBP elevated the matter to the CA via a petition
for certiorari and prohibition
The LBP's application for the issuance of a TRO
having been denied,[46] it was constrained to deposit
the initial valuation for Lands 1 and 2 as directed by
the RTC[47] after Santos' assignee,[48] Romeo
Santos,... signed the required Deed of Assignment,
Warranties and Undertaking[49] in favor of the LBP.
The RTC directed the LBP to submit a revaluation for
Lands 1, 2, and 3 in accordance with the factors set
forth under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,[51]
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988
In compliance therewith, the LBP recomputed the
valuation of the subject lands as follows:
P514,936.44[53] for Land 1, P2,506,873.43[54] for
Land 2, and Pl,155,223.41[55] for Land 3, which
Santos accepted.
Considering, however, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP
No. 110779 involving Lands 1 and 2, Santos moved
for a separate judgment relative to Land 3.
The RTC Ruling... e RTC issued a Judgment[57] in
Civil Case No. 2001-0315, adopting and approving
the LBP's uncontested revaluation for Land 3 in the
amount of P1,155,223.41, and ordering its payment
to Santos in accordance with Section 18 of RA
6657,... minus the initial valuation that had already
been paid to him.
Santos moved for reconsideration, contending that
the RTC failed to order the payment of twelve
percent (12%) interest reckoned from the time the
property was taken from him by the government in
1972 and distributed to the farmer beneficiaries until
full payment of the just... compensation.
The RTC granted the motion and awarded twelve
percent (12%) interest... when the LBP approved the
payment of the initial valuation for the property up
to... the date the decision was rendered, or a total
amount of P1,437,669.75.
Both parties moved for reconsideration.
The RTC modified its August 31, 2011 Order, holding
that the twelve percent (12%) interest should be
reckoned from January 1, 2010 until full payment
since the revaluation of Land 3 already included
the... required six percent (6%) annual incremental
interest under DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994,[62]
DAR AO No. 2, Series of 2004,[63] and DAR AO No.
6, Series of 2008,[64] from the time of taking until
December 31, 2009.
Dissatisfied, Santos filed a petition for review[65]
before the CA,... he LBP fully paid Santos the
amount of PI, 155,223.41 representing the just
compensation for Land 3
The CA Ruling... he CA dismissed the petitions, and
affirmed the RTC's Orders
Issues:
The LBP contended that the CA committed reversible
error in: (a) not finding the RTC to have acted with
grave abuse of discretion in allowing the release of
the initial valuation of Lands 1 and 2 without
submitting the documents... listed under DAR AO No.
2, Series of 2005; (b) ignoring the final decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75010 that effectively barred the
RTC from further proceeding with the determination
of just compensation relative to Lands 2 and 3; and
(c) holding it liable for twelve percent (12%) interest
on the unpaid just compensation for Land 3.
Santos raised in his petition in G.R. No. 214021 the
sole question of whether or not the CA erred in
reckoning the award of twelve percent (12%) interest
from January 1, 2010 until full payment of the just
compensation.
Ruling:
The Court's Ruling:
The Court has repeatedly held that the seizure of
landholdings or properties covered by PD 27 did not
take place on October 21, 1972, but upon the
payment of just compensation.[75] Thus, if the
agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in
this... case where the just compensation due the
landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded
under RA 6657.
Note that in case of rejection, RA 6657 entitles the
landowner to withdraw the initial valuation of the
landholding pending the determination of just
compensation.[81] In this case, however, the LBP,
citing DAR AO No. 2, Series of 2005, posited that
the... release of such amount is conditioned on the
submission of all the documentary requirements
listed therein, and that the RTC's failure to require
Santos to comply therewith constitutes grave abuse
of discretion.
The Court is not persuaded.
Contrary to the LBP's assertion in G.R. No. 213863,
nowhere from the said administrative guideline can it
be inferred that the submission of the complete
documents is a pre-condition for the release of the
initial valuation to a landowner. To hold otherwise
would... effectively protract payment of the amount
which RA 6657 guarantees to be immediately due
the landowner even pending the determination of just
compensation.
Thus, the leniency accorded by the RTC cannot be
construed as a capricious exercise of power as it
merely expedited the procedure for payment which is
inherently fairer under the circumstances
Neither can the Court subscribe to the LBP's
contention that the RTC was barred by res judicata
from conducting further proceedings to determine
just compensation for Lands 2 and 3 since the final
and executory Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 75010
merely called for a remand of the case for
computation purposes only.
As correctly observed by the CA, the decision in CA-
G.R. CV No. 75010 did not preclude the RTC from
proceeding with the determination of just
compensation of the subject lands since the issue
raised in the said case merely pertained to the LBP's
legal standing to institute the... complaints for just
compensation and not the valuation of the subject
lands.[92] The pronouncement in the said decision
on the matter of computation of just compensation
was a mere obiter dictum
Besides, it bears stressing that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation is vested in the
RTC,[96] hence, it cannot be unduly restricted in the
exercise of its judicial function.
With respect to the award of twelve percent (12%)
interest on the unpaid just compensation for Land 3
subject of G.R. No. 214021, the Court finds
untenable the LBP's contention that the same was
bereft of factual and legal bases, grounded on its
having promptly paid Santos the initial valuation
therefor barely two months after it approved the
DAR's valuation on June 26, 2000.
Notably, while the LBP released the initial valuation
in the amount of P46,781.58 in favor of Santos in the
year 2000, the said amount is way below, or only four
(4%)[98] of the just compensation finally adjudged by
the RTC. To be considered as just, the compensation
must be fair and equitable, and the landowners must
have received it without any delay.
In expropriation cases, interest is imposed if there is
delay in the payment of just compensation to the
landowner since the obligation is deemed to be an
effective forbearance on the part of the State. Such
interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve...
percent (12%) per annum on the unpaid balance of
the just compensation, reckoned from the time of
taking,[102] or the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property,[103]
such as when title is... transferred to the Republic,
[104] or emancipation patents are issued by the
government, until full payment.[105] To clarify, unlike
the six percent (6%) annual incremental interest
allowed under DAR AO No. 13,... Series of 1994,
DAR AO No. 2, Series of 2004 and DAR AO No. 6,
Series of 2008, this twelve percent (12%) annual
interest is not granted on the computed just
compensation; rather, it is a penalty imposed for
damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay
in its payment.
Accordingly, the award of twelve percent (12%)
annual interest on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation for Land 3 should be computed from
the time of taking, and not from January 1, 2010 as
ruled by the RTC and the CA, until full payment on
October 12, 2011.
However, copies of the emancipation patents issued
to the farmer-beneficiaries have not been attached to
the records of the case. Hence, the Court is
constrained to remand the case to the RTC of Naga
City for receipt of evidence as to the... date of the
grant of the emancipation patents, which shall serve
as the reckoning point for the computation of the
interests due Santos.
LBP V PADILLA-MUNSAYACG.R. NO.201856-
57MARCH 16, 2016
The applicable law on computing just compensation
FACTS:
Chioco and Padilla were the registered owners of Lot
1460, which had an area of 53,342 square meters,
and Lot 1464 with an area of 28,222 squaremeters.
These properties were transferred to Concepcion
Padilla-Munsayac and Jose Padilla by way of
succession. Jose waived his right to theproperty in
favour of Concepcion.These properties became a
subject for the agrarian reform program. 8 hectares
of which were placed to the Operation Land Transfer
in accordanceof PD 27 in October 21, 1972. Thus, a
just compensation was computed by the DAR. Initial
computation was at P4,294 pursuant to the
formulafollowed in PD 27. However, respondents
rejected it and filed a complaint for just
compensation.(Take Note: Take note that RA 6657
was enacted when the just compensation was still
not given to respondents Munsayac-Padilla.)
RTC:
The law that should be applied is PD 6657, not PD
27 and EO 228 as these had only suppletory
application. Thus, the just compensation should be
atP978,756. An MR was denied.
CA:
Appeal to CA. Also denied for lack of merit and
affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether PD 27 is the applicable law in computing
the just compensation considering that PD 6657 was
already enacted and said just compensationwas still
not final.
RULING:
When the agrarian reform process under P.D. 27
remains incomplete and is overtaken by R.A. 6657,
the rule is that just compensation for thelandowner —
if it has yet to be settled — should be determined and
the process concluded under R.A. 6657, with P.D. 27
and E.O. 228 applying onlysuppletorily.Considering
the passage of R.A. 6657 before the completion of
this process, the just compensation should be
determined and the process concludedunder the said
law. Indeed, R.A. 6657 is the applicable law, with
P.D. 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect,
conformably with our ruling inParis v. Alfeche.R.A.
6657 is the applicable law when the acquisition
process under P.D. 27 is still incomplete and is
overtaken by the former's enactment.Petitioners,
therefore, cannot insist on applying P.D. 27;
otherwise, Section 75 of R.A. 6657 would be
rendered inutile.This law, which further amended
R.A. 6657, was passed by the Congress on 01 July
2009. 34 Notwithstanding this new law, R.A. 6657 is
stillapplicable. The later is supported by R.A. 9700,
Section 5 of which provides:Section 5. Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 7. Priorities. — The DAR, in coordination with
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)
shall plan and program the finalacquisition and
distribution of all remaining unacquired and
undistributed agricultural lands from the effectivity of
this Act until June 30, 2014.Lands shall be acquired
and distributed as follows: Phase One: During the ?
ve (5)-year extension period hereafter all remaining
lands above fifty(50) hectares shall be covered for
purposes of agrarian reform upon the effectivity of
this Act. All private agricultural lands of landowners
withaggregate landholdings in excess of ?fty (50)
hectares which have already been subjected to a
notice of coverage issued on or before December
10,2008; rice and corn lands under Presidential
Decree No. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all
private lands voluntarily offered by the owners
foragrarian reform: Provided, That with respect to
voluntary land transfer, only those submitted by June
30, 2009 shall be allowed: Provided, further,That
after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall
be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory
acquisition: Provided, furthermore, That all previously
acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to
challenge by landowners shall be completed and
finally resolved pursuant toSection 17 of Republic Act
No. 6657, as amended.
The word "challenge" shall refer to the expression of
non-acceptance of valuation by the landowner
through the ?ling of a justcompensation case in
Court; a written protest or a similar instrument; or
impliedly thru noncompliance with the requirement to
submit pre-payment/documentary requirements
despite receipt of notice or demand. 36 Considering
that the just compensation offered by the DAR or the
LBPfor the acquisition of respondents' rice land is
being challenged by the landowners, who are
respondents in court, it cannot be gainsaid that this
casefalls squarely within the ambit of Sec. 5 of R.A.
9700.
The computation of the just compensation is under
Section 17 of RA 6657:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. — In
determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value oflike
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations
and the assessment made by the government
assessors shall be considered.
The judicial determination of the just compensation of
the CA and RTC is affirmed by the Supreme Court
considering that it correctly computed the valuation. It
based its valuation on the reports of the
Commissioners. They took into consideration the
different factors provided for in Section 17, R.A. 6657
such as average gross production, current value, like
properties, nature of the subject properties and
actual use.
CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY
(DELOS SANTOS) G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
FACTS:
The government through the Commissioner of Public
Highways signed a contract with the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the
construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all
the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total
reclaimed land. A few years after, the PEA entered
into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to
develop the Freedom Islands. This JVA was entered
into through negotiation without public bidding.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation.
Among the conclusion are: that the reclaimed lands
PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are
lands of the public domain which the government has
not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA
cannot alienate these lands, the certificates of the
title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
the JVA itself is illegal.
On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the
instant petition for mandamus with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose
billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI.
Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms
of any renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore,
petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domains as a violation of Sec 3, Art XII of the
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of
the public domain to private corporations. Petitioner
assert that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of
pesos in properties of the State that are of public
dominion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation, can
acquire and own the lands under the amended joint
venture agreement having 367.5 hectares s. of
reclaimed foreshore and submerged area in Manila
Bay in view of Sections 2 & 3, Art. 12 of the
Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of
the public domain. Since the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also
seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay,
such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.
The Ponce Cases were decided under the 1935
Constitution which allowed private corporations to
acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
However, the 1973 Constitution prohibited private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain, and the 1987 Constitution reiterated
this prohibition. Obviously, the Ponce Cases cannot
serve as authority for a private corporation to acquire
alienable public lands, much less submerged lands,
since under the present Constitution a private
corporation like Amari is barred from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain.
LUZ FARMS vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
(GATACELO) G.R. No. 86889 December 4, 1990
FACTS:
Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock
and poultry business, prayed that Sections 3(b), 11,
13, 16(d), 17, and 32 of R.A.
No. 6657, including the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, be
declared unconstitutional for being repugnant to the
due process clause. Sections 13 and 32 directed
"corporate farms", which included livestock and
poultry raisers to execute and implement
"production-sharing plans" (pending final
redistribution of their landholdings) that would
distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales
and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their
workers as additional compensation. Luz Farms also
argued that livestock or poultry raising was not
similar to crop or tree farming; it was not the primary
resource in this undertaking and represented no
more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of
commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Thus, they
must not be covered by the law. On the other hand,
DAR commented that livestock and poultry raising
were embraced in the term "agriculture" based on
Webster's International Dictionary’s definition. The
Court, then, took cognizance of the case, as it
assailed the constitutionality of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the contested provisions and implementing
rules, which covered livestock and poultry industry
under agrarian reform, were unconstitutional.
HELD:
Yes. The transcripts of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning
of the word "agricultural" clearly showed that it was
never the intention of the framers of the Constitution
to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian
reform program of the Government. Moreover, the
Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural
land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as
laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited
to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and
abandoned land. Simply, the said provisions and
rules were violative of the Constitution.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
represented by SECRETARY JOSE MARI B.
PONCE (OIC), Petitioner,
vs
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTONSOLIMAN and
HARRY T. SUTTON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005
FACTS:
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate,
inherited by respondents which has been devoted
exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26,
1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform
program of the government, respondents made a
voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to
petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the
law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It
included in its coverage farm used for raising
livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the
case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, this Court
ruled that lands devoted to livestock and
poultryraising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. Hence, we declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL
insofar as they included livestock farms in the
coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed
with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their
VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to
cattleraising and thus exempted from the coverage of
the CARL.
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected
respondents land and found that it was devoted
solely to cattleraising and breeding. He
recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to
petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and
requested the return of the supporting papers they
submitted in connection therewith. Petitioner ignored
their request.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9,
series of 1993, which provided that only portions of
private agricultural lands used for the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall
be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In
determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O.
fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animalland
ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall
be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815
hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21
heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the
operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR
Secretary and advised him to consider as final and
irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the
Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is
exempted from the CARL.
On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary
Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order partially granting
the application of respondents for exemption from the
coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits
outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted
1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing
purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for
infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of
respondents landholding to be segregated and
placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They
contend that their entire landholding should b
exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattleraising.
Their motion was denied.
They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the
President. On October 9, 2001, the Office of the
President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner
DAR. It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not
run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O.
Provided the guidelines to determine whether a
certain parcel of land is being used for cattleraising.
However, the issue on the constitutionality of the
assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the
courts as the sole arbiters of such issue.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993,
void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987
Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms
from the land reform program of the government.
ISSUE:
W/N DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which
prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of
lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional.
HELD: NO.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is
invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.
sought to regulate livestock farms by including them
in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their ownership.
However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia,
all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and
poultryraising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms
case that livestock, swine and poultryraising are
industrial activities and do not fall within the definition
of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of
livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or
tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural,
activity. A great portion of the investment in this
enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets,
such as: animal housing structures and facilities,
drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with
grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and
generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds
and other supplies, antipollution equipment like
biogas and digester plants augmented by lagoons
and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water
tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other
technological appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate
livestock farms which have been exempted by the
Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It
has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
through the HON. SECRETARY NASSER C.
PANGANDAMAN, Petitioner,
vs
SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRIBUSINESS CORP.,
represented by SALVADOR N. LOPEZ, JR.,
President and General Manager, Respondent.
G.R. No. 178895
FACTS:
Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land
with an aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares
registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez
AgriBusiness Corporation. Said parcels of land are
hereinafter described as follows:
On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga issued a Notice of
Coverage to petitioner with regards (sic) to the
aforementioned landholdings which were
subsequently placed under Compulsory Acquisition
pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law).
On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), Davao
Oriental, an Application for Exemption of the lots
covered by TCT No. T12637 and T12639 from CARP
coverage. It alleged that pursuant to the case of Luz
Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels of land are
exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land
with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for
grazing and habitat of petitioners 105 heads of cattle,
5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of goats and 18
heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
On December 13, 1992 and March 1, 1993, the
MARO conducted an onsite investigation on the two
parcels of land confirming the presence of the
livestock as enumerated. The Investigation Report
dated March 9, 1993 stated:
“Cognitive thereto, we are favorably recommending
for the exemption from the coverage of CARP based
on LUZ FARMS as enunciated by the Supreme Court
the herein Lot No. 1293-B Psd-65835 under TCT No.
T12639 except Lot No. 1298, Cad. 286 of TCT No.
T12637 which is already covered under the
Compulsory Acquisition (CA) Scheme and had
already been valued by the Land Valuation Office,
Land Bank of the Philippines.”
On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T12635 covering Lots
1454A & 1296 was cancelled and a new one issued
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under
RP T16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through
its President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a
letteraffidavit addressed to the respondent Secretary
requesting for the exclusion from CARP coverage of
Lots 1454A and 1296 on the ground that they
needed the additional area for its livestock business.
On March 28, 1995, petitioner filed before the DAR
Regional Director of Davao City an application for the
exemption from CARP coverage of Lots 1454A and
1296 stating that it has been operating grazing lands
even prior to June 15, 1988 and that the said two (2)
lots form an integral part of its grazing land.
The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the
properties, issued an Order dated March 5, 1997
denying the application for exemption of Lots 1454A
and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown
that the same were actually, directly and exclusively
used for livestock raising since in its application,
petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for
additional grazing area. The application for
exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of
land was approved.
On its partial motion for reconsideration, petitioner
argued that Lots 1454A & 1296 were taken beyond
the operation of the CARP pursuant to its
reclassification to a Pollutive Industrial District
(Heavy Industry) per Resolution No. 39 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mati, Davao Oriental, enacted
on April 7, 1992. The DAR Regional Director denied
the Motion.
The petitioner appealed the Regional Directors
Orders to respondent DAR. On June 10, 1998, the
latter issued its assailed Order affirming the Regional
Directors ruling on Lots 1454A & 1296 and further
declared Lots 1298 and 1293B as covered by the
CARP.
On October 17, 2002, petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by respondent
prompting the former to file the instant petition.
The Court of Appeals partially granted the SNLABC
Petition and excluded the two (2) parcels of land
(Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] Nos. T12637 and
T12639) located in Barrio Don Enrique Lopez (the
Lopez lands) from coverage of the CARL.
However, it upheld the Decisions of the Regional
Director and the DAR Secretary denying the
application for exemption with respect to Lots 1454A
and 1296 (previously under TCT No. T12635) in
Barrio Limot (the Limot lands). These lots were
already covered by a new title under the name of the
Republic of the Philippines (RP T16356). The DAR
and SNLABC separately sought a partial
reconsideration of the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals, but their motions for reconsideration
were subsequently denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be
considered grazing lands for its livestock business
and are thus exempted from the coverage of the
CARL under the Courts ruling in Luz Farms v. DAR.
HELD:
NO. The Limot lands were found to be agricultural
lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and are
thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage.
In the Report dated 06 April 1994, the team that
conducted the inspection found that the entire Limot
lands were devoted to coconuts (41.5706 hectares)
and rubber (8.000 hectares) and recommended the
denial of the application for exemption. Verily, the
Limot lands were actually, directly and exclusively
used for agricultural activities, a fact that necessarily
makes them subject to the CARP. These findings of
the inspection team were given credence by the DAR
Regional Director who denied the application, and
were even subsequently affirmed by the DAR
Secretary and the Court of Appeals.
Tthe MARO itself in the Investigation Report cited by
no less than SNLABC, found that the livestock were
only moved to the Limot lands sporadically and were
not permanently designated there. The DAR
Secretary even described SNLABCs use of the area
as a seasonal extension of the applicants grazing
lands during the summer. Therefore, the Limot lands
cannot be claimed to have been actually, directly and
exclusively used for SNLABCs livestock business,
especially since these were only intermittently and
secondarily used as grazing areas. The said lands
are more suitable and are in fact actually, directly
and exclusively being used for agricultural purposes.
MILESTONE FARMS, INC., Petitioner,
vs
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182332 February 23, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. (petitioner) was
incorporated with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on January 8, 1960. Among its pertinent
secondary purposes are: (1) to engage in the raising
of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; to acquire lands
by purchase or lease, which may be needed for this
purpose; and to sell and otherwise dispose of said
cattle, pigs, and other livestock and their produce
when advisable and beneficial to the corporation; (2)
to breed, raise, and sell poultry; to purchase or
acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the
supplies, stocks, equipment, accessories,
appurtenances, products, and byproducts of said
business; and (3) to import cattle, pigs, and other
livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising
of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock as may be
authorized by law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL),
took effect, which included the raising of livestock,
poultry, and swine in its coverage. However, on
December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled
in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform that agricultural lands devoted to
livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded
from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP).
Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the
exemption/exclusion of its several properties from the
coverage of the CARL, pursuant to the
aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9),
setting forth rules and regulations to govern the
exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock,
poultry, and swine raising from CAR coverage. Thus,
on January 10, 1994, petitioner redocumented its
application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9.
Acting on the said application, the DARs Land Use
Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of
Region IV conducted an ocular inspection on
petitioners property and arrived with a
recommendation for the exemption of petitioners
316.0422hectare property from the coverage of
CARP. Adopting the LUCECs findings and
recommendation, DAR Regional Director Percival
Dalugdug (Director Dalugdug) issued an Order dated
June 27, 1994, exempting petitioners 316.0422
hectare property from CARP.
The Southern Pinugay Farmers MultiPurpose
Cooperative, Inc. (Pinugay Farmers), represented by
Timiano Balajadia, Sr. (Balajadia), moved for the
reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was
denied by Director Dalugdug in his Order dated
November 24, 1994. Subsequently, the Pinugay
Farmers filed a letterappeal with the DAR Secretary.
Correlatively, on June 4, 1994, petitioner filed a
complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and
company before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of TeresaBaras, Rizal. The MCTC ruled in
favor of petitioner, but the decision was later
reversed by the Regional Trial Court, Ultimately, the
case reached the CA, which, in its Decision dated
October 8, 1999, reinstated the MCTCs ruling,
ordering Balajadia and all defendants therein to
vacate portions of the property. In its Resolution
dated July 31, 2000, the CA held that the defendants
therein failed to timely file a motion for
reconsideration, given the fact that their counsel of
record received its October 8, 1999 Decision; hence,
the same became final and executory.
In the meantime, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by
R.A. No. 7881, which was approved on February 20,
1995. Private agricultural lands devoted to livestock,
poultry, and swine raising were excluded from the
coverage of the CARL. On October 22, 1996, the
factfinding team formed by the DAR Undersecretary
for Field Operations and Support Services conducted
an actual headcount of the livestock population on
the property. The headcount showed that there were
448 heads of cattle and more than 5,000 heads of
swine.
On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto
D. Garilao (Secretary Garilao) issued an Order
exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the
316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director
Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the
property to be covered by CARP.
Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural
lands to be excluded from CARP, they must already
be devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising as
of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. He
found that the Certificates of Ownership of Large
Cattle submitted by petitioner showed that only 86
heads of cattle were registered in the name of
petitioners president, Misael Vera, Jr., prior to June
15, 1988; 133 were subsequently bought in 1990,
while 204 were registered from 1992 to 1995.
Secretary Garilao gave more weight to the
certificates rather than to the headcount because the
same explicitly provide for the number of cattle
owned by petitioner as of June 15, 1988.
Applying the animalland ratio (1 hectare for grazing
for every head of cattle/carabao/horse) and the
infrastructureanimal ratio (1.7815 hectares for 21
heads of cattle/carabao/horse, and 0.5126 hectare
for 21 heads of hogs) under DAR A.O. No. 9,
Secretary Garilao exempted 240.9776 hectares of
the property.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
however, Secretary Garilao denied petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed its Memorandum on
Appeal before the Office of the President (OP). On
February 4, 2000, the OP rendered a decision
reinstating Director Dalugdugs Order dated June 27,
1994 and declared the entire 316.0422hectare
property exempt from the coverage of CARP.
However, on separate motions for reconsideration of
the aforesaid decision filed by farmergroups
Samahang AnakPawis ng Lagundi (SAPLAG) and
Pinugay Farmers, and the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance of DAR, the OP issued a resolution dated
September 16, 2002, setting aside its previous
decision and a new one entered REINSTATING the
Order dated 21 January 1997 of then DAR Secretary
Ernesto D. Garilao.
On April 29, 2005, the CA found that, based on the
documentary evidence presented, the property
subject of the application for exclusion had more than
satisfied the animal -and and infrastructure-animal
ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9. The CA also found that
petitioner applied for exclusion long before the
effectivity of DAR A.O. No. 9, thus, negating the
claim that petitioner merely converted the property
for livestock, poultry, and swine raising in order to
exclude it from CARP coverage.
Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 4,
2004, without the knowledge of the CA as the parties
did not inform the appellate court then DAR
Secretary Rene C. Villa (Secretary Villa) issued DAR
Conversion Order No. CON04100016 (Conversion
Order), granting petitioners application to convert
portions of the 316.0422hectare property from
agricultural to residential and golf courses use.
On the CAs decision of April 29, 2005, Motions for
Reconsideration were filed by farmergroups, namely:
the farmers represented by Miguel Espinas (Espinas
group), the Pinugay Farmers, and the SAPLAG. The
farmergroups all claimed that the CA should have
accorded respect to the factual findings of the OP.
Moreover, the farmergroups unanimously intimated
that petitioner already converted and developed a
portion of the property into a
leisureresidentialcommercial estate known as the
Palo Alto Leisure and Sports Complex (Palo Alto).
With the CA now made aware of these
developments, particularly Secretary Villas
Conversion Order of November 4, 2004, the
appellate court had to acknowledge that the property
subject of the controversy would now be limited to
the remaining 162.7373 hectares. In the same token,
the Espinas group prayed that this remaining area be
covered by the CARP.
CA amended its decision and the 162.7373
hectareagricultural portion is declared covered by
CARP. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but was denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the parcels of land owned by the petitioners can
be subjected to CARP.
HELD: YES.
The subject parcels of land were not directly,
actually, and exclusively used for pasture.
Indeed, as pointed out by the CA, the instant case
does not rest on facts parallel to those of Sutton
because, in Sutton, the subject property remained a
livestock farm. We even highlighted therein the fact
that there has been no change of business interest in
the case of respondents.
Petitioners admission that, since 2001, it leased
another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its
cause. While petitioner advances a defense that it
leased this ranch because the occupants of the
subject property harmed its cattle, like the CA, we
find it surprising that not even a single police and/or
barangay report was filed by petitioner to amplify its
indignation over these alleged illegal acts. Moreover,
we accord respect to the CAs keen observation that
the assailed MARO reports and the Investigating
Teams Report do not actually contradict one another,
finding that the 43 cows, while owned by petitioner,
were actually pastured outside the subject property.
HOLY TRINITY REALTY v. VICTORIO DELA CRUZ,
GR No. 200454, 2014-10-22
Facts:
Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land located
in Brgy. Dakila, Malolos, Bulacan (Dakila property)
registered in the name of Freddie Santiago
The Dakila property used to be tenanted... but in
August 1991, these tenants freely and voluntarily
relinquished their tenancy rights in favor of Santiago
through their respective sinumpaang pahayag... in
exchange for some financial assistance and
individual... homelots titled and distributed in their
names... the petitioner purchased the remaining
208,050 square meters of the Dakila property from
Santiago,[7] and later caused the transfer of the title
to its name as well as subdivided the Dakila property
into six lots
The petitioner then developed the property by
dumping filling materials on the topsoil, and by
erecting a perimeter fence and steel gate. It
established its field office on the property.
The Sanggunian Bayan ng Malolos passed Municipal
Resolution No. 16-98 reclassifying four of the six
subdivided lots
Consequently, the Municipal Planning and
Development Office (MPDO) of Malolos, Bulacan
issued a Certificate of Eligibility for Conversion
(Certificate of Zoning Conformance),[11] as well as a
Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance in
favor of the... petitioner for its residential subdivision
project on the Dakila property.
On August 23, 1999, the petitioner purchased from
Santiago another parcel of land with an area of
25,611 located in Barangay Sumapang Matanda,
Malolos, Bulacan (Sumapang Matanda property)
April 2006, a certain Silvino Manalad and the alleged
heirs of Felix Surio wrote to the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO) of Bulacan to request an
investigation of the sale of the Dakila property.[14]
This was followed by the letter request of Sumapang
Matanda Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC)
Chairman Numeriano L. Enriquez to place the Dakila
property within the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
27,... The OIC-Regional Director opined that the sale
of the Dakila property was a prohibited transaction
under Presidential Decree No. 27, Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6657[18] and DAR Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 1989; and that the petitioner
was... disqualified from acquiring land under
Republic Act No. 6657 because it was a corporation.
Pending resolution of the Motion to
Withdraw/Quash/Set Aside,... the Register of Deeds
issued emancipation patents (EPs) pursuant to the
order of the OIC-Regional Director. The petitioner's
titles were canceled and EPs were issued to the
respondents... on the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, the DAR Secretary said that the
Dakila property was not exempt from the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 27 and Republic Act No.
6657 because Municipal Resolution No. 16-98 did
not change or reclassify but merely re-zoned the
Dakila property.
(OP) reversed the ruling of DAR Secretary
Pangandaman upon its finding that the Dakila
property had ceased to be suitable for agriculture,
and had been reclassified as residential land
pursuant to Municipal Resolution No. 16-98... the CA
reversed and set aside the decision of the OP. It
declared that prior to the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 6657 on June 15, 1988 and even after the
passage of Municipal Resolution No.16-98 on March
4, 1998, the Dakila property was an agricultural land;
that there was no valid reclassification
Issues:
Did the CA gravely err in limiting its decision to the
issue of whether or not the Dakila property was
subject to the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657?
Was the Dakila property agricultural land within the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 or Presidential
Decree No. 27?
Was the issuance of the EPs pursuant to the August
16, 2006 order of the DAR Regional Office proper?
Ruling:
We reverse the CA, and reinstate the decision of the
OP
The CA declared that the Dakila property as an
agricultural land; and that there was no valid
reclassification under Municipal Resolution No. 16-98
because the law required an ordinance, not a
resolution.
We agree in part with the CA.
Nonetheless, the Dakila property was not an
agricultural land subject to the coverage of Republic
Act No. 6657 or Presidential Decree No. 27.
Verily, the basic condition for land to be placed under
the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 is that it must
either be primarily devoted to or be suitable for
agriculture.
Consequently, before land may be placed under the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, two requisites
must be met, namely: (1) that the land must be
devoted to agricultural activity; and (2) that the land
must not be classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.
Considering that the Dakila property has not been
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial
or industrial, the second requisite is satisfied. For the
first requisite to be met, however, there must be a
showing that agricultural activity is undertaken on the
property.
Here, no evidence was submitted to show that any
agricultural activity like cultivation of the land,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,... and other
farm activities and practices were... being performed
on the Dakila property in order to subject it to the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6657. Even if we
supplemented the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 27, the outcome is still the same, because the
Dakila property was still not within the scope of the
law. For land to be covered under Presidential
Decree No. 27, it must be devoted to rice or corn
crops, and... there must be a system of share-crop or
lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is
absent, the land must be excluded.
Section 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private
Lands. - For purposes of acquisition of private lands,
the following procedures shall be followed:
(a) After having identified the land, the landowners
and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice
to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal
delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and
barangay hall of the place where the property is
located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the
DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance
with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and
other pertinent provisions hereof.
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of
written notice by personal delivery or registered mail,
the landowner, his administrator or representative
shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of
the offer.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) shall pay the
landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty
(30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of
transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders
the Certificate of Title and other monuments of title.
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR
shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to
determine the compensation for the land by requiring
the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties
to submit evidence as to the just compensation for
the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
the notice. After the expiration of the above period,
the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The
DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days
after it is submitted for decision.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with
an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance
with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with
the redistribution of the land to the qualified
beneficiaries.
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may
bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for
final determination of just compensation.
The unquestioned non-compliance with the
procedures set by Republic Act No. 6657 and its
relevant rules and regulations further denied to the
petitioner the exercise of its right of retention.[81] In
doing so, the OIC-Regional Director disregarded this
constitutionally guaranteed right. We cannot
understate the value of the right of retention as the
means to mitigate the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner
and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that
social justice is not meant to perpetrate an injustice
against the landowner.
In fine, the order of the OIC-Regional Director was
patently null and void. The denial of due process to
the petitioner sufficed to cast the impress of nullity on
the official act thereby taken. A decision rendered
without due process is void ab initio and may be
attacked... directly or collaterally.[83] All the resulting
acts were also null and void. Consequently, the EPs
awarded to the respondents should be nullified.
Principles:
Land on which no agricultural activity is being
conducted is not subject to the coverage of either
Presidential Decree No. 27 or Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).
NATALIA REALTY INC AND ESTATE
DEVELOPERS & INVESTORS CORP VS DAR
FACTS:
Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous
parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal.
On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No.
1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the
Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban
as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill
in the metropolis which were designated as the
Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia properties
are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite
reservation.
EDIC, developer of Natalia, applied for and was
granted preliminary approval and locational
clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission. Petitioners were likewise issued
development permits after complying with the
requirements. Thus the Natalia properties later
became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
On 15 June 1988, CARL was enacted.
DAR, through MARO, issued a Notice of Coverage
on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307
hectares.
Natalia and EDIC protested to this.
Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok
Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA), filed a complaint against
Natalia and EDIC before the DAR Regional
Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing
areas under cultivation by SAMBA members.
DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining
petitioners from further developing the subdivision.
Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but the
latter merely remanded the case to the Regional
Adjudicator for further proceedings
Natalia wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian
Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice
of Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor
respondent Director took action on the protest-letters.
Hence, this petition.
Natalia’s contention: Subject properties already
ceased to be agricultural lands when they were
included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for
townsite reservation.
OSG’s contention: The permits granted petitioners
were not valid and binding because they did not
comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and
Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective
Decree," in that no application for conversion of the
NATALIA lands from agricultural to residential was
ever filed with the DAR. In other words, there was no
valid conversion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties shall be
included in the coverage of CARP
HELD:
NO.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall
"cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands." As to what constitutes
"agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial
or industrial land. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
"Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are
"arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not
include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as
"agricultural lands." These lots were intended for
residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands
upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod
Silangan Reservation.
ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR
FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN
REFORM
OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.
G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999
FACTS:
This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu,
Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the
acquisition of these haciendas by the government
under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and
is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely,
Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located
in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda
Palico is 1,024 hectares in area.
On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines
formally convened and took over legislative power
from the President. 2 This Congress passed
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by
the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on
June 15, 1988.
Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988,
petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer
to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions
of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were
later placed under compulsory acquisition by
respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.
Hacienda Palico
On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through
respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled
"Invitation to Parties" to petitioner. The Invitation was
addressed to "Jaime Pimentel, Hda. Administrator,
Hda. Palico." Therein, the MARO invited petitioner to
a conference on October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in
Nasugbu to discuss the results of the DAR
investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was
"scheduled for compulsory acquisition this year
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program."
On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through
then Department Secretary Miriam D. Santiago sent
a "Notice of Acquisition" to petitioner. The Notice was
addressed as follows:
Roxas y Cia, Limited
Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes
Manila, Metro Manila.
Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its
land in Hacienda Palico were subject to immediate
acquisition and distribution by the government under
the CARL; that based on the DAR's valuation criteria,
the government was offering compensation of P3.4
million for 333.0800 hectares; that whether this offer
was to be accepted or rejected, petitioner was to
inform the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution (BLAD) of the DAR; that in case of
petitioner's rejection or failure to reply within thirty
days, respondent DAR shall conduct summary
administrative proceedings with notice to petitioner to
determine just compensation for the land; that if
petitioner accepts respondent DAR's offer, or upon
deposit of the compensation with an accessible bank
if it rejects the same, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land.
Almost two years later, on September 26, 1991, the
DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land
Valuation Manager three (3) separate Memoranda
entitled "Request to Open Trust Account." Each
Memoranda requested that a trust account
representing the valuation of three portions of
Hacienda Palico be opened in favor of the petitioner
in view of the latter's rejection of its offered value.
Despite petitioner's application for conversion,
respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of
the two Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as
compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by
respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. On
October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No.
985 of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No.
6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOA's were distributed
to farmer beneficiaries.
Hacienda Banilad
On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through
respondent MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a
notice to petitioner addressed as follows:
Mr. Jaime Pimentel
Hacienda Administrator
Hacienda Banilad
Nasugbu, Batangas
The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad
was subject to compulsory acquisition under the
CARL; that should petitioner wish to avail of the other
schemes such as Voluntary Offer to Sell or Voluntary
Land Transfer, respondent DAR was willing to
provide assistance thereto.
On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through
the Department Secretary, sent to petitioner two (2)
separate "Notices of Acquisition" over Hacienda
Banilad. These Notices were sent on the same day
as the Notice of Acquisition over Hacienda Palico.
Unlike the Notice over Hacienda Palico, however, the
Notices over Hacienda Banilad were addressed to:
Roxas y Cia. Limited
7th Floor, CachoGonzales
Bldg. 101 Aguirre St., Leg.
Makati, Metro Manila.
Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation of
P15,108,995.52 for 729.4190 hectares and
P4,428,496.00 for 234.6498 hectares.
On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director
sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager a "Request
to Open Trust Account" in petitioner's name as
compensation for 234.6493 hectares of Hacienda
Banilad. A second "Request to Open Trust Account"
was sent on November 18, 1991 over 723.4130
hectares of said Hacienda.
On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified that the
amounts of P4,428,496.40 and P21,234,468.78 in
cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as
compensation for petitioner's land in Hacienda
Banilad.
On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of
both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.
Hacienda Caylaway
Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale
to the government on May 6, 1988 before the
effectivity of the CARL. The Hacienda has a total
area of 867.4571 hectares.
On January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the
Regional Director for Region IV, sent to petitioner two
(2) separate Resolutions accepting petitioner's
voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway,
particularly TCT Nos. T44664 and T44663. The
Resolutions were addressed to:
Roxas & Company, Inc.
7th Flr. CachoGonzales Bldg.
Aguirre, Legaspi Village
Makati, M. M
Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through
its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the
Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of
Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the
reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to nonagricultural. As a result, petitioner
informed respondent DAR that it was applying for
conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to
other uses.
In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent
DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a
reclassification of the land would not exempt it from
agrarian reform. Respondent Secretary also denied
petitioner's withdrawal of the VOS on the ground that
withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds
such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if
the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the
land is undeveloped.
Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of
Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner filed
its application for conversion of both Haciendas
Palico and Banilad.
On August 24, 1993 petitioner instituted Case No.
N00179646 (BA) with respondent DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the
CLOA's issued by respondent DAR in the name of
several persons. Petitioner alleged that the
Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are
located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the
land is not suitable for agricultural production, and
that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had
reclassified the land to nonagricultural.
In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent
DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial
question of whether the property was subject to
agrarian reform, hence, this question should be
submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform for determination.
ISSUE(S):
W/N this Court can take cognizance of this petition
despite petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies;
W/N the acquisition proceedings over the three
haciendas were valid and in accordance with law;
assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from
agricultural to nonagricultural, W/N this court has the
power to rule on this issue.
HELD:
YES.
As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to
invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is
expected to have exhausted all means of
administrative redress. This is not absolute, however.
There are instances when judicial action may be
resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions
are:
when the question raised is purely legal;
when the administrative body is in estoppel;
when the act complained of is patently illegal;
when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
when the respondent acted in disregard of due
process;
when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear
the implied or assumed approval of the latter;
when irreparable damage will be suffered;
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy;
when strong public interest is involved;
when the subject of the controversy is private land;
and
in quo warranto proceedings.
Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the
courts. There was a violation of its rights and to
require it to exhaust administrative remedies before
the DAR itself was not a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.
Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA's) to farmer beneficiaries
over portions of petitioner's land without just
compensation to petitioner. A Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) is evidence of ownership
of land by a beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Before this may be awarded to a farmer beneficiary,
the land must first be acquired by the State from the
landowner and ownership transferred to the former.
The transfer of possession and ownership of the land
to the government are conditioned upon the receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or
deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an
accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the
landowner. There was no receipt by petitioner of any
compensation for any of the lands acquired by the
government.
The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner
is also specific. The law provides that the deposit
must be made only in "cash" or "LBP bonds."
Respondent DAR's opening of trust account deposits
in petitioner' s name with the Land Bank of the
Philippines does not constitute payment under the
law. Trust account deposits are not cash or LBP
bonds. The replacement of the trust account with
cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of
compensation; for essentially, the determination of
this compensation was marred by lack of due
process. In fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings,
respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements
of administrative due process. Under these
circumstances, the issuance of the CLOA's to farmer
beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial action
on the part of the petitioner.
NO.
Procedure in the acquisition of private lands under
the provisions of the law:
A. Modes of Acquisition of Land under R. A. 6657
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), provides for two (2)
modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and
voluntary. The procedure for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands is set forth in Section 16
of R.A. 6657.
In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the
landholding, the landowners and the farmer
beneficiaries must first be identified. After
identification, the DAR shall send a Notice of
Acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in
the municipal building and barangay hall of the place
where the property is located. Within thirty days from
receipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the landowner,
his administrator or representative shall inform the
DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the
landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed
of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders
the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the
execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase
price. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails
to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary
administrative proceedings to determine just
compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP
representative and other interested parties may
submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen
days from notice. Within thirty days from submission,
the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner
of its decision and the amount of just compensation.
Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding
payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response
from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take
possession of the land and cause the issuance of a
transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines. The land shall then be
redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party
may question the decision of the DAR in the regular
courts for final determination of just compensation.
Under Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in
compulsory acquisition is the identification of the
land, the landowners and the beneficiaries. However,
the law is silent on how the identification process
must be made. To fill in this gap, the DAR issued on
July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12, Series or
1989, which set the operating procedure in the
identification of such lands.
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires
that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands
under the CARP in his area of responsibility
containing all the required information. The MARO
prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder
(CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO
then sends the landowner a "Notice of Coverage"
and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/meeting"
over the land covered by the CACF. He also sends
invitations to the prospective farmerbeneficiaries the
representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) and other interested parties to discuss the
inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit
views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the
parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked to
indicate his retention area.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall
complete the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection
and verification of the property by the PARO shall be
mandatory when the computed value of the estate
exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the
valuation, the PARO shall forward all papers together
with his recommendation to the Central Office of the
DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the
Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD),
shall review, evaluate and determine the final land
valuation of the property. The BLAD shall prepare, on
the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized
representative, a Notice of Acquisition for the subject
property. From this point, the provisions of Section
16 of R.A. 6657 then apply.
For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two
notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and
letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to
the landowner, the representatives of the BARC,
LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested
parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989;
and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the
landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of
Coverage and the letter of invitation to the
conference, and its actual conduct cannot be
understated. They are steps designed to comply with
the requirements of administrative due process. The
implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the
State's police power and the power of eminent
domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes
retention limits to the landowners, there is an
exercise of police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry ou such regulation, the owners are
deprived of lands they own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under
the power of eminent domain. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of
the land. What is required is the surrender of the title
to and physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." The CARL was
not intended to take away property without due
process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent
domain requires that due process be observed in the
taking of private property.
DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989, from whence the
Notice of Coverage first sprung, was amended in
1990 by DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and in 1993
by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. The Notice of
Coverage and letter of invitation to the conference
meeting were expanded and amplified in said
amendments.
DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 lays down the rules
on both Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and
Compulsory Acquisition (CA) transactions involving
lands enumerated under Section 7 of the CARL. In
both VOS and CA. transactions, the MARO prepares
the Voluntary Offer to Sell Case Folder (VOCF) and
the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF), as
the case may be, over a particular landholding. The
MARO notifies the landowner as well as
representatives of the LBP, BARC and prospective
beneficiaries of the date of the ocular inspection of
the property at least one week before the scheduled
date and invites them to attend the same. The
MARO, LBP or BARC conducts the ocular inspection
and investigation by identifying the land and
landowner, determining the suitability of the land for
agriculture and productivity, interviewing and
screening prospective farmer beneficiaries. Based on
its investigation, the MARO, LBP or BARC prepares
the Field Investigation Report which shall be signed
by all parties concerned. In addition to the field
investigation, a boundary or subdivision survey of the
land ma also be conducted by a Survey Party of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) to be assisted by the MARO. This survey
shall delineate the areas covered by Operation Land
Transfer (OLT), areas retained by the landowner,
areas with infrastructure, and the areas subject to
VOS and CA. After the survey and field investigation,
the MARO sends a "Notice of Coverage" to the
landowner or his duly authorized representative
inviting him to a conference or public hearing with the
farmer beneficiaries, representatives of the BARC,
LBP, DENR, Department of Agriculture (DA),
nongovernment organizations, farmer's organizations
and other interested parties. At the public hearing,
the parties shall discuss the results of the field
investigation, issues that may be raised in relation
thereto, inputs to the valuation of the subject
landholding, and other comments and
recommendations by all parties concerned. The
Minutes of the conference/public hearing shall form
part of the VOCF or CACF which files shall be
forwarded by the MARO to the PARO. The PARO
reviews, evaluates and validates the Field
Investigation Report and other documents in the
VOCF/CACF. He then forwards the records to the
RARO for another review.
DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, modified the
identification process and increased the number of
governmen agencies involved in the identification
and delineation of the land subject to acquisition.
This time, the Notice of Coverage is sent to the
landowner before the conduct of the field
investigation and the sending must comply with
specific requirements. Representatives of the DAR
Municipal Office (DARMO) must send the Notice of
Coverage to the landowner by "personal delivery with
proof of service, or by registered mail with return
card," informing him that his property is under CARP
coverage and that if he desires to avail of his right of
retention, he may choose which area he shall retain.
The Notice of Coverage shall also invite the
landowner to attend the field investigation to be
scheduled at least two weeks from notice. The field
investigation is for the purpose of identifying the
landholding and determining its suitability for
agriculture and its productivity. A copy of the Notice
of Coverage shall be posted for at least one week on
the bulletin board of the municipal and barangay
halls where the property
is located. The date of the field investigation shall
also be sent by the DAR Municipal Office to
representatives of the LBP, BARC, DENR and
prospective farmer beneficiaries. The field
investigation shall be conducted on the date set with
the participation of the landowner and the various
representatives. If the landowner and other
representatives are absent, the field investigation
shall proceed, provided they were duly notified
thereof. Should there be a variance between the
findings of the DAR and the LBP as to whether the
land be placed under agrarian reform, the land's
suitability to agriculture, the degree or development
of the slope, etc., the conflict shall be resolved by a
composite team of the DAR, LBP, DENR and DA
which shall jointly conduct further investigation. The
team's findings shall be binding on both DAR and
LBP. After the field investigation, the DAR Municipal
Office shall prepare the Field Investigation Report
and Land Use Map, a copy of which shall be
furnished the landowner "by personal delivery with
proof of service or registered mail with return card."
Another copy of the Report and Map shall likewise be
posted for at least one week in the municipal or
barangay halls where the property is located.
B. The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico
and Banilad
In the case at bar, respondent DAR claims that it,
through MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a letter of
invitation entitled "Invitation to Parties" dated
September 29, 1989 to petitioner corporation,
through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of
Hacienda Palico. The invitation was received on the
same day it was sent as indicated by a signature and
the date received at the bottom left corner of said
invitation. With regard to Hacienda Banilad,
respondent DAR claims that Jaime Pimentel,
administrator also of Hacienda Banilad, was notified
and sent an invitation to the conference. Pimentel
actually attended the conference on September 21,
1989 and signed the Minutes of the meeting on
behalf of petitioner corporation. The Minutes was
also signed by the representatives of the BARC, the
LBP and farmer beneficiaries. No letter of invitation
was sent or conference meeting held with respect to
Hacienda Caylaway because it was subject to a
Voluntary Offer to Sell to respondent DAR.
When respondent DAR, through the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), sent to the various
parties the Notice of Coverage and invitation to the
conference, DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989 was
already in effect more than a month earlier. The
Operating Procedure in DAR Administrative Order
No. 12 does not specify how notices or letters of
invitation shall be sent to the landowner, the
representatives of the BARC, the LBP, the farmer
beneficiaries and other interested parties. The
procedure in the sending of these notices is
important to comply with the requisites of due
process especially when the owner, as in this case,
is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domestic
corporation, and therefore, has a personality
separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers
and employees.
The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL
is required to be sent to the landowner by "personal
delivery or registered mail." Whether the landowner
be a natural or juridical person to whose address the
Notice may be sent by personal delivery or registered
mail, the law does not distinguish. The DAR
Administrative Orders also do not distinguish. In the
proceedings before the DAR, the distinction between
natural and juridical persons in the sending of notices
may be found in the Revised Rules of Procedure of
the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Service of
pleadings before the DARAB is governed by Section
6, Rule V of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure.
Notices and pleadings are served on private
domestic corporations or partnerships in the following
manner:
Sec. 6. Service upon Private Domestic Corporation
or Partnership. — If the defendant is a corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made on
the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or
any of its directors or partners.
Similarly, the Revised Rules of Court of the
Philippines, in Section 13, Rule 14 provides:
Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation
or partnership. — If the defendant is a corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made on
the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or
any of its directors.
Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against
a private domestic corporation before the DARAB
and the regular courts are served on the president,
manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its
directors. These persons are those through whom
the private domestic corporation or partnership is
capable of action.
Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager,
secretary, cashier or director of petitioner
corporation.
Assuming further that petitioner was duly notified of
the CARP coverage of its haciendas, the areas found
actually subject to CARP were not properly identified
before they were taken over by respondent DAR.
Respondents insist that the lands were identified
because they are all registered property and the
technical description in their respective titles
specifies their metes and bounds. Respondents
admit at the same time, however, that not all areas in
the haciendas were placed under the comprehensive
agrarian reform program invariably by reason of
elevation or character or use of the land.
The acquisition of the landholdings did not cover the
entire expanse of the two haciendas, but only
portions thereof. Hacienda Palico has an area of
1,024 hectares and only 688.7576 hectares were
targetted for acquisition. Hacienda Banilad has an
area of 1,050 hectares but only 964.0688 hectares
were subject to CARP. The haciendas are not
entirely agricultural lands. In fact, the various tax
declarations over the haciendas describe the
landholdings as "sugarland," and "forest, sugarland,
pasture land, horticulture and woodland."
Under Section 16 of the CARL, the sending of the
Notice of Acquisition specifically requires that the
land subject to land reform be first identified. The two
haciendas in the instant case cover vast tracts of
land. Before Notices of Acquisition were sent to
petitioner, however, the exact areas of the
landholdings were not properly segregated and
delineated. Upon receipt of this notice, therefore,
petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of
its estate were subject to compulsory acquisition,
which portions it could rightfully retain, whether these
retained portions were compact or contiguous, and
which portions were excluded from CARP coverage.
Even respondent DAR's evidence does not show that
petitioner, through its duly authorized representative,
was notified of any ocular inspection and
investigation that was to be conducted by respondent
DAR. Neither is there proof that petitioner was given
the opportunity to at least choose and identify its
retention area in those portions to be acquired
compulsorily. The right of retention and how this right
is exercised, is guaranteed in Section 6 of the CARL.
Under the law, a landowner may retain not more than
five hectares out of the total area of his agricultural
land subject to CARP. The right to choose the area
to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous,
pertains to the landowner. If the area chosen for
retention is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option
to choose whether to remain on the portion or be a
beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
with similar or comparable features.
C. The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway
Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale
in 1989. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571
hectares and is covered by four (4) titles. In two
separate Resolutions both dated January 12, 1989,
respondent DAR, through the
Regional Director, formally accepted the VOS over
the two of these four titles. The land covered by two
titles has an area of 855.5257 hectares, but only
648.8544 hectares thereof fell within the coverage of
R.A. 6657. Petitioner claims it does not know where
these portions are located.
Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that
surveys on the land covered by the four titles were
conducted in 1989, and that petitioner, as landowner,
was not denied participation therein, The results of
the survey and the land valuation summary report,
however, do not indicate whether notices to attend
the same were actually sent to and received by
petitioner or its duly authorized representative. To
reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down
the operating procedure, much less the notice
requirements, before the VOS is accepted by
respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner, however,
cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative
due process and is an essential requisite to enable
the landowner himself to exercise, at the very least,
his right of retention guaranteed under the CARL.
NO.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant
a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. Respondent DAR is in a better position
to resolve petitioner's application for conversion,
being primarily the agency possessing the necessary
expertise on the matter. The power to determine
whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway
are nonagricultural, hence, exempt from the
coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this
Court.
NHA vs. ALLARDE [G.R. No. 106593. November 16,
1999]
FACTS:
Two parcels of land were acquired by the Republic in
1938 from Philtrust Co. Said lots were part of the
Tala Estate which was later reserved for housing
programs by NHA by virtue of Proclamation No. 483.
Rufino Mateo lived in the property since his birth in
1928. He started farming and working on the 6-
hectare lot included in the contested property since
1950. In 1983, NHA informed Mateo that said
property was already under the housing program.
Despite this, Mateo applied such lands for CARP
(took effect in 1987) in 1989. To reinforce Proc. No.
483, NHA proceeded in bulldozing the lots which
caused several damages to dikes and irrigations. On
March 18, 1992, the Mateo Spouses, relying on their
claim that subject lots are agricultural land within the
coverage of the CARP filed before RTC a complaint
for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, to enjoin NHA from bulldozing further and
making constructions on the lots under controversy.
NHA contended that the said lots which were
previously reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for
housing and resettlement purposes, are not covered
by the CARP as they are not agricultural lands within
the definition and contemplation of Section 3 (c) of R.
A. No. 6657. ISSUE: Whether or not the
Compressive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers
government lands reserved for specific public
purposes prior to the effectivity of said law HELD:
NO. RATIO: In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of
Agrarian Reform, the Court succinctly held that lands
reserved for,or converted to, non-agricultural uses by
government agencies other than the Department of
Agrarian Reform, prior to the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), are
not considered and treated as agricultural lands and
therefore, outside the ambit of said law, on the basis
of the following disquisition: "x x x Section 4 of R.A.
6657 provides that the CARL shall 'cover, regardless
of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands.' As to what
constitutes 'agricultural land,' it is referred to as
'lands devoted to agricultural activity as defined in
this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
confirm this limitation. 'Agricultural lands' are only
those lands which are 'arable and suitable
agricultural lands' and 'do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands' Based on the
foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language
be considered as 'agricultural lands.' These lots were
intended for residential use. They ceased to be
agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in
the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. x x x" Thus,
since as early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate
(including the disputed lots) was reserved, inter alia,
under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the
housing program of the National Housing Authority,
the same has been categorized as not being devoted
to the agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3
(c) of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore, outside the
coverage of the CARL. Verily, the assailed Orders of
the respondent Court declaring the lots under
controversy as "agricultural land" and restraining the
petitioner from involving the same in its housing
project thereon, are evidently bereft of any
sustainable basis.
[G.R. NO. 147146. July 29, 2005]
JOSE, JULIO and FEDERICO, All Surnamed
JUNIO, Petitioners, v. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, in
His Capacity as Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lands already classified and identified as
commercial, industrial or residential before June 15,
1988 - - the date of effectivity of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) - - are outside the
coverage of this law. Therefore, they no longer need
any conversion clearance from the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR).
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
February 24, 2000 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-GR SP No. 37217. The Decision denied
petitioners' Petition for Certiorari3 for its failure to
show that the DAR had acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it issued its Exemption Order dated September
13, 1994. The Order, issued by then DAR Secretary
Ernesto D. Garilao, had excluded Lot 835-B from the
coverage of Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as
the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)."
In its Resolution dated April 4, 2001, this Court
(through the Second Division) immediately denied
the Petition for failure of petitioners (1) to attach the
duplicate original/certified true copy of the CA
Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration
of the CA Decision; and (2) to state the dates of their
receipt and filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of
that Decision.
In their Motion for Reconsideration4 of the April 4,
2001 Resolution, petitioners alleged that they had
received the assailed CA Decision on March 8, 2000
and filed their Motion for Reconsideration on March
22, 2000. They likewise submitted a duplicate
original of the February 2, 2001 CA
Resolution,5 which had denied that Motion.
On January 22, 2002, petitioners filed a
Manifestation.6 It stated that in a clarificatory letter
dated July 30, 1997,7 Salvador S. Malibong, the
deputized zoning administrator of Bacolod City,
completely reversed the false Certification he had
issued earlier. That Certification had been the basis
of the DAR secretary's assailed Exemption Order.
On February 18, 2002, public respondent submitted
its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by petitioners. They in turn submitted their Reply to
the Comment on June 14, 2002, in compliance with
the Court's Resolution dated April 10, 2002. In its
Resolution dated August 13, 2003, the Court
(Second Division) resolved to grant their Motion for
Reconsideration and to require the solicitor general
to comment on the Petition within ten days from
notice.
On October 9, 2003, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) submitted a Manifestation in Lieu of
Comment. The OSG stated that its Comment on the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on
February 18, 2002, had fully addressed the issues
presented in their Petition for Review. On November
12, 2003, the Court resolved to give due course to
the Petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within thirty days from notice.
Thereafter, the case was transferred to the First
Division, and finally to the Third, which will now
resolve the controversy.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case as
follows:
"In a Complaint dated February 12, 1994, filed with
the [Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB)] by complainants (some of whom
are herein petitioners), identified as 'Potential CARP
Beneficiaries' per Certification of OIC [Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)] dated November
21, 1991 x x x, it is prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued against the registered owners of
a certain parcel of agricultural land consisting of 71
hectares, more or less, known as Lot No. 835-B of
Bacolod Cadastre, Brgy. Pahanocoy, Bacolod City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-79622.
Petitioners claim that x x x Sta. Lucia Realty
Corporation and the Estate of Guillermo Villasor,
represented by Irving Villasor, are bulldozing and
leveling the subject property for the purpose of
converting it into a residential subdivision; that as
prospective CARP beneficiaries of the land in
question, 'being former laborers, actual occupants
and permanent residents of Barangay Pahanocoy,'
their rights will be prejudiced by the illegal conversion
of the land into a residential subdivision x x x.
"On April 13, 1994, the DARAB OIC Executive
Director forwarded the complaint to [Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)], DAR,
Region VI, Bacolod City for appropriate action x x x.
Before any hearing could be conducted thereon, the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
issued an Order dated September 13, 1994 in 'RE:
PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM CARP
COVERAGE PURSUANT TO DOJ OPINION NO. 44,
SERIES OF 1990, IRVING P. VILLASOR, et al., Rep.
by Atty. Angel Lobaton, Jr., Petitioners,' portions of
which read as follows:
'After a careful study of the facts of the case and the
evidences presented by the parties, this Office finds
the petition for exemption to be well founded. Under
DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, it provides that
lands which has already been classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial and industrial areas,
prior to June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from CARP
coverage. To this, it is an [i]nescapable conclusion
that the subject property is exempted from CARP
coverage considering the fact that the same was
classified as residential as evidenced by the
Resolution No. 5153-A, Series of 1976 of the City
Council of Bacolod and as approved by the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (now HLURB)
in its Resolution dated September 24, 1980 as per
Certification dated June 22, 1994 issued by the said
Commission. The Certification of the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) dated June 9, 1994
stated that the subject land is not irrigable or is
outside the service area of the irrigation system in
the locality. In effect the said application had
conformed to the requirements of the law on
exemption. In accord thereto, the stand of Mr.
Espanola that the portion, which he planted to trees
and developed into mini-forest should be covered by
CARP[,] is beyond recognition as the program does
not apply to those which are already classified as
residential lands prior to the effectivity of CARL on
June 15, 1988. Instead, it is confined only to
agricultural lands, which under R.A. 6657, Sec. 3(c),
it defines agricultural lands as lands devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential or industrial
land. With the above stated definition, it is beyond
reason that the placing of the said portion under
CARP coverage (1.5 hectare) is devoid of legal and
factual basis. '"8
As earlier said, the Exemption Order was challenged
before the appellate court via a Petition for Certiorari.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the Exemption Order
issued by public respondent. It found that prior to
June 15, 1988, Lot 835-B had been reclassified from
agricultural to residential land. It relied on the Court's
pronouncement in Natalia Realty v. Department of
Agrarian Reform9 that lands were outside the
coverage of the CARL if they had been converted to
non-agricultural uses by government agencies, other
than the DAR, prior to the effectivity of that law.
Further, the CA ruled that neither the CARL nor the
Local Government Code of 1991 had nullified the
reclassification of Lot 835-B. The appellate court
noted that the land had been validly reclassified from
agricultural to residential in 1976, prior to the
effective date of both laws. It added that neither of
those two laws could be applied retroactively, since
they contained no provision authorizing their
retroactivity.
Hence, this Petition.10
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit this lone
issue for our consideration:
"Whether the respondent DAR secretary had the
inherent authority or power to exclude or exempt at
will from the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) the subject
agricultural land which was already automatically
covered by the CARL (RA 6657) upon its effectivity
on June 15, 1988 without affording due process to
herein petitioners and without the necessity of
Congress having first to amend Section 4 of the said
law authorizing such exemption or exclusion from
CARP coverage."11
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Sole Issue:
Coverage
Section 4 of RA 6657 sets forth the coverage of the
CARL as follows:
"SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
"More specifically, the following lands are covered by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
xxx
"(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for
agriculture regardless of the agricultural products
raised or that can be raised thereon.
Section 3(c) of the CARL defines agricultural land as
that which is "devoted to agricultural activity x x x and
not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land."
The meaning of agricultural lands  covered by the
CARL was explained further by the DAR in its
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, 12 entitled
"Revised Rules and Regulations Governing
Conversion of Private Agricultural Land to Non-
Agricultural Uses," issued pursuant to Section 49 of
CARL, which we quote:
"x x x. Agricultural land refers to those devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not
classified as mineral or forest by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
predecessor agencies, and not classified in town
plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15
June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial
use." (Emphasis supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
Prior to this Order, Department of Justice Opinion
No. 44 dated March 16, 1990, which was addressed
to then DAR Secretary Florencio Abad, recognized
the fact that before the date of the law's effectivity on
June 15, 1988, the reclassification or conversion of
lands was not exclusively done by the DAR.13 Rather,
it was a "coordinated effort" of all concerned
agencies; namely, the Department of Local
Governments and Community Development, the
Human Settlements Commission and the
DAR.14 Then Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon
explained the coordination in this wise:
"x x x. Under R.A. No. 3844, 15 as amended by R.A.
No. 6389,16 an agricultural lessee may, by order of
the court, be dispossessed of his landholding if after
due hearing, it is shown that the 'landholding is
declared by the [DAR] upon the recommendation of
the National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other
urban purposes. '17
"Likewise, under various Presidential Decrees (P.D.
Nos. 583, 815 and 946) which were issued to give
teeth to the implementation of the agrarian reform
program decreed in P.D. No. 27, the DAR was
empowered to authorize conversions of tenanted
agricultural lands, specifically those planted to rice
and/or corn, to other agricultural or to non-agricultural
uses, 'subject to studies on zoning of the Human
Settlements Commissions' (HSC). This non-
exclusive authority of the DAR under the aforesaid
laws was, x x x recognized and reaffirmed by other
concerned agencies, such as the Department of
Local Government and Community Development
(DLGCD) and the then Human Settlements
Commission (HSC) in a Memorandum of Agreement
executed by the DAR and these two agencies on
May 13, 1977, which is an admission that with
respect to land use planning and conversions, the
authority is not exclusive to any particular agency but
is a coordinated effort of all concerned agencies.
"It is significant to mention that in 1978, the then
Ministry of Human Settlements was granted authority
to review and ratify land use plans and zoning
ordinance of local governments and to approve
development proposals which include land use
conversions (see LOI No. 729 [1978]). This was
followed by [E.O.] No. 648 (1981) which conferred
upon the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (the predecessors of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] the authority to
promulgate zoning and other land use control
standards and guidelines which shall govern land
use plans and zoning ordinances of local
governments, subdivision or estate development
projects of both the public and private sector and
urban renewal plans, programs and projects; as well
as to review, evaluate and approve or disapprove
comprehensive land use development plans and
zoning components of civil works and infrastructure
projects, of national, regional and local governments,
subdivisions, condominiums or estate development
projects including industrial estates."
Hence, the justice secretary opined that the authority
of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural
lands to non-agricultural uses could be exercised
only from the date of the law's effectivity on June 15,
1988.
Following the opinion of the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the DAR issued Administrative Order (AO)
No. 6, Series of 1994,18 stating that conversion
clearances were no longer needed for lands already
classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of
Republic Act 6657. Designed to "streamline the
issuance of exemption clearances, based on DOJ
Opinion No. 44," the AO provided guidelines and
procedures for the issuance of exemption
clearances.
Thereafter, DAR issued AO 12,19 Series of 1994,
entitled "Consolidated and Revised Rules and
Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural
Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses." It provided that the
guidelines on how to secure an exemption clearance
under DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994, shall apply to
agricultural lands classified or zoned for non-
agricultural uses by local government units (LGUs);
and approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) before June 15, 1988.
Under this AO, the DAR secretary had the ultimate
authority to issue orders granting or denying
applications for exemption filed by landowners whose
lands were covered by DOJ Opinion No. 44.
Contrary to petitioners' stance, the CA properly
applied Natalia Realty v. Department of Agrarian
Reform,20 which had earlier held that lands previously
converted by government agencies, other than DAR,
to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the
CARL were outside the coverage of that law. Our
ruling in Natalia was not confined solely to
agricultural lands located within townsite
reservations, but applied also to real estate
converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of the CARL,21 provided the conversion
was made by government agencies other than the
DAR - - like the HLURB and its predecessor, the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission
(HSRC).22
The Court's ruling in Natalia was reiterated
in Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association v. Court of
Appeals,23 which affirmed the authority of the
Municipal Council of Carmona to issue a zoning
classification and to reclassify the property in
question from agricultural to residential, as approved
by the HSRC (now the HLURB). The Court held that
Section 3 of RA 2264,24 amending the Local
Government Code, specifically empowered municipal
and/or city councils, in consultation with the National
Planning Commission, to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations. Hence, the
power of the local government to convert or
reclassify lands to residential or non-agricultural was
not subject to the approval of the DAR.25
It is thus settled that with respect to areas classified
and identified as zonal areas not for agricultural
uses, like those approved by the HSRC before the
effectivity of RA 6657 on June 15, 1988, the DAR's
clearance is no longer necessary for conversion.
The next question before us is whether the subject
landholding was in fact reclassified as residential
before June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of the
CARL. The Exemption Order of the DAR secretary
pointed out that the parcel had indeed been
reclassified as residential under Resolution No.
5153-A of the City Council of Bacolod. This
reclassification was later affirmed by the HSRC.
The courts generally accord great respect, if not
finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies
because of their special knowledge and expertise
over matters falling under their jurisdiction.26 It must
be stressed at this point that with the DAR lies the
power to determine whether Lot 835-B is non-
agricultural and, hence, exempt from the coverage of
the CARL.
According to DAR AO 6-94, an application for
exemption from the coverage of the CARP must be
accompanied by a certification from the HLURB that
the pertinent zoning ordinance has been approved by
the Board prior to June 15, 1988 (the date of
effectivity of the CARL). In the instant case, the
landowner did file an accompanying Certification
from the HLURB.
The Certification issued by the Board expressly
mentioned that the "property x x x, Lot 835-B located
at Brgy. Tangub, Bacolod City, covered by TCT T-
79622, x x x was identified for residential use under
the 1976 Framework Plan of the City of Bacolod
prepared pursuant to the Program of the then
Ministry of Local Government and approved by the
City Council in its Resolution No. 5153-A, Series of
1976."27 It also certified that the "area where the
aforecited property is located was likewise identified
for residential use under the Town Planning, Housing
Zoning Program of the National Coordinating Council
of the then Ministry of Human Settlements as
approved under the City Council Resolution No.
5792, Series of 1977. x x x."28
These Certifications carried the presumption of
regularity in their issuance. Petitioners did not
present any evidence to overcome that
presumption.29 The letter of the deputized zoning
administrator of Bacolod City - - cited by petitioners
to contradict the Certifications - - did not touch on,
much less corroborate, their claim that the subject
landholding remained classified as agricultural. It
merely restated what was already provided in the law
- - that only the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bacolod
City could reclassify lands.
Petitioners next assert that, for tax purposes, the
subject property was declared by its owners as
agricultural land since time immemorial until at least
1994.30 It is settled, however, that a tax declaration is
not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning
purposes.31 It may have been declared by its owner
as residential for real estate taxation purposes, but it
may well be within a commercial zone.32 In the
determination of the nature of a piece of property, a
discrepancy would thus exist between its
classification for real estate taxation purposes vis - à-
vis that for zoning purposes.
Under the Real Property Tax Code, a tax declaration
serves only to enable the assessor to identify a
property for assessment levels,33 not to bind a
provincial/city assessor. Under Section 220 of the
Real Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment
are based on the actual use, regardless of "any
previous assessment or taxpayer's valuation
thereon" which, in turn, is based on a taxpayer's
declaration.
Republic v. Court of Appeals34 ruled thus:
"There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the
land classification embodied in the tax declarations is
conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further
inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly
not the sole basis of the classification of a land. In
fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6 lists other
documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be
submitted when applying for exemption from CARP.
In Halili v. Court of Appeals,  we sustained the trial
court when it ruled that the classification made by the
Land Regulatory Board of the land in question
outweighed the classification stated in the tax
declaration."
Consequently, even if the subject landholding has
been declared as agricultural for taxation purposes,
once a local government has reclassified it as
residential, that determination must prevail for zoning
purposes.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED.  Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154094 : March 9, 2010
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
represented by SECRETARY HERNANIA.
BRAGANZA, Petitioner, v. PABLO BERENGUER,
BELINDA BERENGUER, CARLO BERENGUER,
ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS, and
REMEDIOS BERENGUER-LINTAG, Respondents.
BERSAMIN,J.:
FACTS:
In April 1998, the respondents received from the
DAR notices ofcoverage of their said landholdings by
the Governments Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657
(CARL). They protested the notices of coverage,
filing onOctober 5, 1998, in the office of DAR
Regional Director Dalugdug inLegaspiCity, their
application for exclusion of their landholdings from
CARP coverage, and praying for the lifting of the
notices of coverage.
In October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary,
without acting on the respondents application for
exclusion, cancelled their titles and issuedcertificates
of land ownership awards(CLOAs), covering their
landholdings, to the members of the Baribag
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development
Cooperative (Baribag), not to the respondents
workers on the landholdings, although Baribag was
not impleaded in the respondents application for
exclusion. Regional Director Dalugdug denied the
respondents application for exclusion.Thus, they
appealed the denial to the DAR Secretary.
On March 9, 1999, pending resolution of the
respondents appeal to the DAR Secretary, Baribag
filed in the office of DAR Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD) for Legaspi City RARAD Florin
a petition seeking to implement the order of Regional
Director Dalugdug denying the respondents
application for exclusion.
OnMarch 15, 1999, RARAD Florin issued an
implementing writ placing Baribag in possession of
the respondents landholdings. She denied the
respondentsmotion for reconsideration.
OnMarch 24, 1999, the respondents appealed before
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board by filing a notice of appeal with the office of
RARAD Florin.
OnApril 6, 1999, then Acting DAR Secretary Conrado
Navarro denied the respondents appeal of the order
of Regional Director Dalugdug denying their
application for exclusion and petition to lift the notice
of coverage. RARAD Florin noted the respondents
notice of appeal, and issued the writ of possession
sought by Baribag.
The respondents filed a petition forcertioraribefore
the CA, which treated the petition as a petition for
review. The CA granted the petition, and reversed
the DAR SecretarysApril 6, 1999order. The CA set
aside the writ of execution and writ of possession
issued by RARAD Florin; ordered the cancellation of
Baribags CLOAs; and directed the DAR Secretary to
restore the respondents in the possession of their
landholdings.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lanholdings of the respondents
are subject to the coverage of CARL?
Whether or not Baribag was justified to be a
beneficiary?
HELD:
The petition is denied.
Resolution No. 5, passed onMarch 12, 1981by
theSangguniang Bayanof Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
showed that the limits of thepoblacionarea of the
municipalityincludedBarangay Bibincahan, where the
respondents landholdings were situated. The
significance of this fact cannot be overstated, for,
thereby, the respondents landholdings were
presumed to be industrial and residential lands.
Jurisprudence has been clear about the presumption.
There is no dispute that as early as 1981, the
respondents landholdings have been part of
thepoblacionof Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Thus,
respondents landholding were non-agricultural, and,
consequently, outside the coverage of the CARL,
was fully warranted. In fact, the excerpt from the
Comprehensive Development Plan of Sorsogon,
Sorsogon showed that Barangay Bibincahan was
within the Central Business District of the
municipality.
POLITICAL LAW: qualified beneficiaries of CARP
The CARL has set forth in mandatory terms in its
Section 22 of the CARL whoshould bethe qualified
beneficiaries, but the DAR did not strictly comply with
the law. Instead, the DAR excluded such workers
based on its speculation and conjecture on why the
actual workers on the landholdings had not shown
interest and had not responded to the call of the DAR
field officers during the screening process.As such,
the DAR did not really determine who the lawful
beneficiaries were, failing even to present any
documentary proof that showed that the respondents
workers genuinely lacked interest to be considered
beneficiaries of the landholdings, or refused to
subject themselves to the screening process.
There was also no evidence presented to justify that
Baribag was a qualified beneficiary within the context
of Section 22 of the CARL, and be entitled to be
awarded the landholdings.
The highly irregular actuations of the DAR did not
end with the unwarranted awarding of the
landholdings to Baribag in violation of Section 22 of
the CARL. The DAR also violated the respondents
right of retention under Section 6 of the CARL, which
accorded to the respondents as the landowners the
right to retain five hectares of their landholdings, and
the right to choose the areas to be retained, which
should be compact or contiguous. Thus, assuming
that the respondents landholdings were covered by
the CARL, and that the DAR was correct in awarding
the landholdings to Baribag, the DARs cancellation of
all of the respondents TCTs effectively nullified the
respondents right of retention, thereby depriving
them of their property without due process of law.
Lastly, RARAD Florins issuance of the writ of
execution in favor of Baribag was highly irregular.It
must be noted, first of all, that because Baribag was
not even a party in relation to the respondents
application for exclusion before Regional Director
Dalugdug, RARAD Florindid notacquire jurisdiction
over Baribag. As such, the legal authority of RARAD
Florin to implement the award to Baribag by
execution did not exist. Secondly, the denial of the
respondents application for exclusion was still
pending review by the DAR Secretary when RARAD
Florin issued the writ of execution to implement
Regional Director Dalugdugs order to place Baribag
in possession of the respondents landholdings.
Hence, the issuance of the writ of execution was
premature and bereft of legal basis.
It is timely to stress that the noble purpose of the
CARL to emancipate the tenants from the bondage
of the soil and to transfer to them the ownership of
the lands they till should not be the guise to trample
upon the landowners rights by including lands that
are unquestionably outside the coverage of the
CARL.Neither should such noble intention be
frustrated by designating beneficiaries who are
neither the tenants or tillers of the land, nor otherwise
qualified under the law to be the beneficiaries of land
reform.
REMEDIAL LAW: certiorari treated as review;
sustainable
The CA did not err in treating the petition
forcertiorarias a petition for review.The Court had
occasion to expound on the exceptions to the rule
that a recourse to a petition forcertiorariunder Rule
65 rendered the petition dismissible for being the
wrong remedy, to wit: (a) when public welfare and
the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when
the broader interest of justice so requires;(c) when
the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise
of judicial authority.
As shown in the discussion, exception (c) applies to
the present case.
The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
are affirmed.
NOEL L. ONG v. NICOLASA O. IMPERIAL, GR No.
197127, 2015-07-15
Facts:
Petitioners Noel L. Ong, Omar Anthony L. Ong, and
Norman L. Ong (petitioners) are registered owners of
a parcel of land with an area of Four Hundred Five
Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Five (405,645) square
meters... located in Barangay Dogongan, Daet,
Camarines Norte
The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of
Daet issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioners on
August 14, 1994.
Petitioners wrote a letter[3] dated April 26, 1995
"vehemently protesting/objecting" to the coverage of
the subject property under compulsory acquisition
under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL),
for the following reasons:
The entire area of 40.5645 [hectares] had been used
as grazing area for cattle and carabao long before
the passage of R.A. 6657, and is therefore, excluded
from the coverage of CARL;
After deducting the retention area of the individual
landowners, the excess area of each is only 8.5215
has.;
Considering that there are several bills pending in
Congress to increase the retention area of
landowners, to cover lands below 20 hectares will
result only in confusion and needless paperwork
should the retention area be increased in answer to
the clamor of... majority of landowners.
MARO Jinny Glorioso sent a letter-reply[4] on May
31, 1995, stating that the petitioners had confirmed
that the entire 40.5645 hectares was actually being
used for coconut production, so petitioners had failed
to comply with the requirement that the... property
must be actually, directly and exclusively used for
livestock, poultry, and swine-raising purposes.
MARO Glorioso also wrote that the subject property
was covered by CARL because the retention area for
landowners is five hectares, and the excess area in
this case is
8.5214 hectares; thus, it is covered
On September 23, 1996, MARO Glorioso issued a
Notice of Acquisition over the subject property.[5]
Petitioners then filed an application for exemption
clearance with the Department of Agrarian Reform...
laiming that subject property had already been
reclassified as residential built-up area pursuant to
the Town Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of Daet dated September 21, 1978 and
Zoning Ordinance No. 04, series of 1980.
DAR Region V Director Percival C. Dalugdug sent a
letter[7] dated June 5, 1997 to Deputized Zoning
Administrator Fernandez, which reads in part:
Please be informed that subject property has already
been covered by the CARP under the [Compulsory]
Acquisition scheme, because we believe that the
land is agricultural and not otherwise. x x x.
xxxx
In order to rectify these conflicting claims may we
request from your good office for a revalidation and
verification of the exact location of the above-
mentioned landholding as far as its zoning location is
concerned according to the Official Land Use Plan of
Daet, for the... proper guidance of this office in the
issuance of requested DAR Exemption Clearance, x
x x. (Emphasis ours.)
Deputized Zoning Administrator Fernandez replied to
the DAR Director's request for revalidation and
verification of the exact location of the subject
property in the following manner:
Please be informed that there is no conflict between
the official land use map of 1978 and the certification
issued by our Office. Please note that what is
reflected in the aforesaid town plan is the actual use
of properties in Daet as of 1978, while our
Certification states that the property under TCT T-
17045 is within the RESIDENTIAL BUILT-UP AREA.
xxx.
The DAR Regional Center for Land Use Policy,
Planning and Implementation (RCLUPPI) V
conducted an investigation and in its report
The area has been reclassified as residential prior to
15 June 1988;
Based on their findings, the DAR RCLUPPI V
investigating team recommended the denial of
petitioners' application for exemption.
DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. issued an
Order[11] dated February 2, 2000 denying
petitioners' Application for Exemption under DOJ
Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, and directing the
Director of DAR Region V "to proceed with the
acquisition of the subject landholding in accordance
with existing agrarian laws."... ecretary Morales's
Order contained the following discussion, which we
quote:
First, the justification made by Jesus L. Fernandez,
Jr., Deputized Zoning Administrator of Daet,
Camarines Norte, in his letter dated 7 July 1997, is
not sufficient to prove that the subject land is
classified as built-up area for residential purposes. It
is true... that the said agency is the proper forum to
certify as to the classification of a parcel of land
within their jurisdiction. However, the same must be
supported by substantial evidence. The findings of
the Regional Director reveal that the built-up area for
residential purposes... provided in the right hand
portion of the Official Land Use Plan of 1978 of the
Municipality of Daet has long been exhausted. Thus,
the present residential area of Daet is well beyond
the 556-hectare limit set for 1982. Therefore, the
subject landholding cannot be considered... as part
of the built-up area reserved for residential purposes.
The subject landholding remains agricultural based
on the original land use plan in 1978. Being an
agricultural land, the subject landholding is within the
ambit of RA 6657.
Second, Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994,
requires that any application for exemption should be
accompanied by a Certification from the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) that the
pertinent zoning ordinance has been approved by the
Board prior to 15 June
However, it is not shown that the 1982 land use plan
had been similarly approved by the HLURB. No proof
has ever been presented that the 1982 land use...
plan had been approved by the HLURB. Since
coverage is the general rule, applicant has the
burden of proof that subject property is exempt.
AR Secretary Hernani A. Braganza issued an
Order[13] on June 20, 2002 stating that the opinion
of the Deputized Zoning Administrator had
insufficient basis and could not... prevail over the
clear findings of the DAR Regional Director.
Meanwhile, TCT No. T-4202-A
"Nicolasa Imperial, et al." covering 253,263 square
meters in Barangay Dogongan, Municipality of Daet,
Province of Camarines Norte on October 27,... 2000.
Petitioners appealed the DAR Orders dated February
2, 2000 and June 20, 2002 (the questioned DAR
Orders) to the Office of the President for review.
The Office of the President found that "[a] closer
scrutiny of the facts will reveal that the DAR
Secretary concurred with the findings of the DAR
Regional Director, who in turn relied on his own...
belief that the land is agricultural and not otherwise."
The Office of the President. reversed and set aside
the questioned DAR Orders and approved
petitioners' application for clearance, "exempting
from CARP coverage the 40.5 hectares property with
TCT No. T-17045,... situated in Barangay Dogongan,
Daet, Camarines Norte."
Issues:
whether or not the subject property had been
reclassified as residential so... as to exempt it from
Comprehensive Agrarian Report Program (CARP)
coverage.
Whether or not the subject landholding of the
petitioners is exempted from the coverage of the
government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program;
Ruling:
The petition has merit. We sustain the September 5,
2005 Decision of the Office of the President and its
Order dated March 3, 2006 and thus reverse the
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, which upheld the decision of the DAR to
deny petitioner's request... for exemption from CARP
for the subject property.
The power to reclassify land is granted by law to the
local government, which was validly exercised in this
case. The subject property having already been
validly reclassified to residential land by the
municipality of Daet prior to June 15, 1988, when the
CARL took effect, then... it is exempt from the
coverage of CARP.
we disagree with the Court of Appeals' disposition of
the substantive issue of whether subject property is
exempt from the coverage of the CARP.
quivocally held that "to be exempt from CARP, all
that is needed is one valid reclassification of the land
from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly
authorized government agency before June 15,
1988, when the CARL took effect."
As to what is a "duly authorized government agency,"
the DAR Handbook for CARP Implementors[33]
recognizes and discusses the LGU's authority to
reclassify lands under Republic Act No. 7160 or the
Local Government Code
In the case now before us, the Court of Appeals
reversed the Office of the President's ruling
approving petitioners' application for exemption
clearance "because of [petitioners'] failure to comply
with the requirements for such exemption." Even
though not specifically assigned... as an error, the
Court of Appeals focused on the discrepancy it had
allegedly found between the certification issued by
the Deputized Zoning Administrator and the one from
the HLURB regarding the year that the subject
property was reclassified by the local government
from... agricultural to residential. The Court of
Appeals even went on to state that "[a] careful
scrutiny of the record of this case reveals that the
Office of the President failed to judiciously examine
the supporting documents submitted by respondents
in their application for... exemption."
The Court of Appeals found it material that the
HLURB certified that the "Town Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of Daet, Camarines Norte was approved
by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board,
then Human Settlements Regulatory Commission on
September 21, 1978"[39] while the Deputized Zoning
Administrator authorized that as per Zoning
Ordinance No. 4, series of 1980, subject property
was within the residential built-up area. The Court of
Appeals insisted that petitioners should have
submitted the HLURB certification for Zoning
Ordinance No. 4.
Factual as this may seem, this brings to us the
crucial question of whether, based on these two
certifications, petitioners had effectively complied
with the requirements for exemption.
Looking at such requirements, DAR Administrative
Order No. 06-94[42] or the "Guidelines for the
Issuance of Exemption Clearances Based on Sec.
3(c) of Republic Act No. 6657 and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series Of 1990" was
the... prevailing rule when petitioners filed their
petition for exemption. Under A.O. No. 06-94's
chapter entitled "Legal Basis,"
DAR A.O. No. 06-94 also provided a list of required
documents to be attached to the application for
exemption clearance, as follows:
The application should be duly signed by the
landowner or his representative, and should be
accompanied by the following documents:
-Duly notarized Special Power of Attorney, if the
applicant is not the landowner himself;
-Certified true copies of the titles which is the subject
of the application;
-Current tax declaration (s) covering the property;
-Location Map or Vicinity Map;
-Certification from the Deputized Zoning
Administrator that the land has been reclassified to
residential industrial or commercial use prior to June
15, 1988;
-Certification from the HLURB that the pertinent
zoning ordinances has been approved by the Board
prior to June 15, 1988;
-Certification from the National Irrigation
Administration that the land is not covered by
Administrative Order No. 20, s. 1992, i.e., that the
area is not irrigated, nor scheduled for irrigation
rehabilitation nor irrigable with firm funding
commitment.
-Proof of payment of disturbance compensation, if
the area is presently being occupied by farmers, or
waiver/undertaking by the occupants that they will
vacate the area whenever required.
To our mind, the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it decided the case based on a
ground neither found in the aforequoted assignment
of errors submitted by respondents nor in the
arguments propounded in the appellants' brief.
Although the Court has declared many exceptions to
the above rule, and the Court of Appeals
painstakingly enumerated some of these exceptions,
the Court of Appeals omitted to discuss to which
exception this alleged error belongs, and exactly how
this error falls under... such exception. To our mind,
flexibility in applying the rules must be balanced with
sufficient reason and justification, clearly arrived at
and explained by the Court of Appeals, so as not to
"contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice."
We find that the decision of the Office of the
President is more consistent with law and
jurisprudence. The Office of the President found that
the subject property had been properly reclassified
by the appropriate local government authority as
residential, a fact even noted by... the DAR.
G.R. No. 174588, December 11, 2013
DAVAO NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES GLORIA
ESPINO SALIGA AND CESAR SALIGA, AND
SPOUSES DEMETRIO EHARA AND ROBERTA
SUGUE EHARA, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We pass upon the petition for review
on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
challenging the March 28, 2006 decision2 and the
September 5, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79377. This CA
ruling affirmed the January 12, 2001 decision4 of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 7775. The DARAB set
aside the July 6, 1998 decision5 of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) that ruled in
favor of petitioner Davao New Town Development
Corporation (DNTDC). The Factual Antecedents
At the root of the present controversy are two parcels
of land – 4.9964 hectares6 and 2.5574
hectares7 (subject property) - situated in Catalunan
Pequeño, Davao City and originally registered in the
name of Atty. Eugenio Mendiola (deceased).
On February 5, 1998,8 the respondents - spouses
Gloria Espino Saliga and Cesar Saliga (spouses
Saliga) and spouses Demetrio Ehara and Roberta
Sugue Ehara (spouses Ehara), (collectively referred
to as respondents) - filed before the Office of the
PARAD in Davao City a complaint for injunction,
cancellation of titles and damages against DNTDC.
They amended this complaint on February 13, 1998.
In their complaint and amended complaint, the
respondents claimed that they and their parents,
from whom they took over the cultivation of the
landholding, had been tenants of the property as
early as 1965. On August 12, 1981, the respondents
and Eugenio executed a five-year lease
contract.9 While they made stipulations regarding
their respective rights and obligations over the
landholding, the respondents claimed that the
instrument was actually a device Eugenio used to
evade the land reform law.
The respondents also argued that pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, they,
as tenants, were deemed owners of the property
beginning October 21, 1972 (the Act’s effectivity
date); thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to
DNTDC was not valid. The respondents added that
DNTDC could not have been a buyer in good faith as
it did not verify the status of the property – whether
tenanted or not tenanted - prior to its purchase. The
respondents submitted, among others, the pertinent
tax declarations showing that the property was
agricultural as of 1985.
In its answer, DNTDC alleged in defense that it
purchased the property in good faith from the
previous owners (Paz M. Flores and Elizabeth M.
Nepumuceno)10 in 1995. At that time, the alleged
tenancy relationship between the respondents and
Eugenio had already expired following the expiration
of their lease contracts in 1986. DNTDC also claimed
that prior to the sale, the Davao City Office of the
Zoning Administrator confirmed that the property was
not classified as agricultural; it pointed out that the
affidavit of non-tenancy executed by the vendors
affirmed the absence of any recognized agricultural
lessees on the property. DNTDC added that the
property had already been classified to be within an
“urban/urbanizing zone” in the “1979-2000
Comprehensive Land Use Plan for Davao City ” that
was duly adopted by the City Council of Davao City
and approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) (now the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board [HLURB]).
In its decision of July 6, 1998, the PARAD ordered
the DNTDC to pay the spouses Saliga the sum of
P20,000.00 and the spouses Ehara the sum of
P15,000.00 as disturbance compensation, and to
allocate to each of the respondent spouses a 150-
square meter homelot. While the PARAD conceded
that the respondents were tenants of the property, it
nevertheless ruled that the property had already
been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural
uses prior to June 15, 1988, the date when Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988) took effect. Thus, since R.A.
No. 6657 covers only agricultural lands, the property
fell outside its coverage.
The respondents appealed the case to the DARAB.
The ejectment case before the MTCC
Pending resolution of the appeal before the DARAB,
DNTDC filed before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Davao City a complaint for unlawful
detainer11 against Demetrio Ehara, Jr., Reynaldo
Saliga and Liza Saliga, the children of respondent
spouses Ehara and spouses Saliga. DNTDC claimed
that it owned the 2.5574-hectare portion of the
property which the respondents’ children had been
occupying by its mere tolerance. Despite its repeated
demands, the respondents’ children refused to
vacate and continued to illegally occupy it.
In their answer, the respondents’ children raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the case
involved an agrarian dispute. They contended that
the law considers them immediate members of the
farm household, to whom R.A. No. 3844 and R.A.
No. 6657 extend tenurial security. Thus, they claimed
that they, as tenants, were entitled to continue
occupying the disputed portion.
On December 20, 2000, the MTCC rendered its
decision12 granting the DNTDC’s complaint and
ordering the respondents’ children to vacate the
2.5574-hectare portion of the property. The MTCC
ruled that the respondents’ children were not tenants
of the property because they failed to prove that their
stay on the premises was by virtue of a tenancy
agreement and because they had been occupying
portions different from their parents’ landholding. The
MTCC also ruled that the 2.5574-hectare portion was
no longer agricultural and was thus removed from the
coverage of R.A. No. 6657.
The prohibition case before the RTC
The respondents’ children did not appeal the MTCC
decision. Instead, on June 1, 2001, they filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Davao
City a petition for Prohibition 13 against DNTDC to
enjoin the execution of the MTCC decision. They
repeated the defenses and allegations in their
pleading before the MTCC. The children of the
spouses Saliga – Liza and Reynaldo - however
added that Cesar had already died; hence, they were
filing the prohibition case in their own right as
heirs/successors-in-interest of Cesar.
On November 29, 2001, the respondents’ children
and DNTDC entered into a compromise
agreement.14 The respondents’ children undertook to
voluntarily and peacefully vacate the 2.5574-hectare
portion of the property and to remove and demolish
their respective houses built on its premises, while
DNTDC agreed to give each of them the amount of
P20,000.00 as financial assistance. The RTC
approved the compromise agreement in its
December 7, 2001
decision.15chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Ruling of the DARAB
In its decision16 of January 12, 2001, the DARAB
reversed and set aside the PARAD’s ruling. The
DARAB ordered DNTDC and all persons acting in its
behalf to respect and maintain the respondents in the
peaceful possession and cultivation of the property,
and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
to enjoin the DNTDC from disturbing and/or
molesting the respondents in their peaceful
possession and cultivation of it.
As the PARAD did, the DARAB declared that a
tenancy relationship existed between Eugenio and
the respondents, which was not extinguished by the
expiration of the five-year term stated in their lease
contracts. Thus, when DNTDC purchased the
property, it had been subrogated to the rights and
obligations of the previous landowner pursuant to the
provisions of R.A. No. 3844.17
Unlike the PARAD, however, the DARAB was not
convinced that the property had already been
reclassified to non-agricultural uses so as to remove
it from the coverage of R.A. No. 6657. With
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1994 as basis,
the DARAB held that the alleged reclassification of
the property did not and could not have divested the
respondents of their rights as “deemed owners”
under P.D. No. 27. The DARAB also pointed out that
while Davao City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982
(adopting the Comprehensive Development Plan of
Davao City), reclassified the property to be within the
“urban/urbanizing zone,” the DNTDC did not submit
the required certifications from the HLURB, adopting
the zoning ordinance, and from the DAR, approving
the conversion to make the reclassification valid.
When the DARAB denied the DNTDC’s motion for
reconsideration in its August 28, 2003
resolution,18 the DNTDC elevated the case to the CA
via a petition for review.19chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Ruling of the CA
In its March 28, 2006 decision, 20 the CA affirmed in
toto the January 12, 2001 decision of the DARAB.
The CA similarly declared that the tenancy
relationship established between the respondents
and Eugenio was not extinguished by the expiration
of the five-year term of their lease contracts or by the
subsequent transfer of the property to DNTDC. The
CA noted that both the DARAB and the PARAD
arrived at the same findings and that the DNTDC
impliedly admitted in its pleadings the existence of
the tenancy relationship.
The CA was also convinced that the property was
still agricultural and was, therefore, covered by R.A.
No. 6657. While the CA conceded that the
conversion of the use of lands that had been
reclassified as residential, commercial or industrial,
prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657, no longer
requires the DAR’s approval, the CA pointed out that
the landowner must first comply with certain pre-
conditions for exemption and/or conversion. Among
other requirements, the landowner must secure an
exemption clearance from the DAR. This exemption
clearance shall be issued after the landowner files
the certifications issued by the deputized zoning
administrator, stating that the land had been
reclassified, and by the HLURB, stating that it had
approved the pertinent zoning ordinance, with both
the reclassification and the approval carried out prior
to June 15, 1988.

In this case, the CA held that DNTDC failed to secure
and present any exemption clearance. The CA also
pointed out that: (1) Davao City Ordinance No. 363,
series of 1982, adopting the Comprehensive
Development Plan of Davao City did not substantially
show that it had reclassified the property from
agricultural to non-agricultural uses; (2) DNTDC
failed to submit during the proceedings before the
PARAD and the DARAB the HLURB certification
allegedly approving Davao City Ordinance No. 363,
series of 1982; (3) while DNTDC attached to its
motion for reconsideration of the DARAB’s decision a
certification from the HLURB stating that by
resolution (Resolution No. R-39-4) dated July 31,
1980, it approved the Comprehensive Development
Plan, yet at the time of the alleged HLURB approval,
the pertinent zoning ordinance - Davao City
Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 - adopting such
plan had not yet been enacted; and (4) the HLURB
certification that DNTDC presented referred to a
parcel of land subject of another case.
DNTDC filed the present petition after the CA denied
its motion for reconsideration21 in the CA’s
September 5, 2006
resolution.22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Petition
In its present petition,23 DNTDC argues that the CA
seriously erred when it: (1) failed to consider the fact
that the respondents violated the compromise
agreement; (2) ruled that a tenancy relationship
exists between it and the respondents; and (3)
declared that the subject property is agricultural. 24
Directly addressing the CA’s ruling, DNTDC argues
that: first, the respondents, in the compromise
agreement, categorically agreed to voluntarily vacate
the property upon receipt of the stated financial
assistance. Since the RTC approved the compromise
agreement and the respondents had already
received the agreed financial assistance, the CA
should have considered these incidents that
immediately bound the respondents to comply with
their undertaking to vacate.
Second, no tenancy relationship exists between
DNTDC and the respondents. DNTDC maintains that
while a tenancy relationship existed between the
respondents and Eugenio, this relationship was
terminated when the MTCC ordered the respondents
to vacate the property. It emphasizes that this MTCC
decision that ordered the respondents to vacate the
property had already become final and executory
upon the respondents’ failure to seasonably appeal.
DNTDC adds that after the respondents’ lease
contract with Eugenio expired and the latter simply
allowed the former to continue occupying the
property, the respondents became bound by an
implied promise to vacate its premises upon demand.
Thus, when, as the new owner, it demanded the
return of the property, the respondents were
obligated to comply with their implied promise to
vacate.
Finally, the property is no longer agricultural, contrary
to the findings of the DARAB and the CA. DNTDC
points out that the proceedings before the PARAD
had sufficiently addressed this issue, which the CA
recognized in the assailed decision. Thus, DNTDC
contends that the findings of the PARAD should
prevail over those of the DARAB.
In its reply25 to the respondents’ comment, DNTDC
additionally argues that the MTCC and the RTC
cases are closely intertwined with and relevant to the
present case. It points out that Reynaldo and Liza
categorically stated in their petition in the RTC case
that they were suing in their own right as
heirs/successors-in-interest of Cesar. Consequently,
the spouses Saliga, as represented and succeeded
by Reynaldo and Liza, are bound by the compromise
agreement that the latter signed in the RTC case.
The Case for the Respondents
In their comment,26 the respondents argue that the
MTCC and the RTC cases do not bear any
significance to the present controversy. They point
out that the parties in the MTCC and the RTC cases,
aside from DNTDC, were Demetrio Ehara, Jr.,
Reynaldo and Liza who are undeniably different from
them.
Relying on the ruling of the CA, the respondents also
argue that a tenancy relationship exists between
them and DNTDC and that the property is still
agricultural. The respondents quoted in toto the CA’s
discussions on these issues to support their position.
The Issues
In sum, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether
the property had been reclassified from agricultural to
non-agricultural uses prior to June 15, 1988 so as to
remove it from the coverage of R.A. No. 6657; (2)
whether an agricultural leasehold or tenancy
relationship exists between DNTDC and the
respondents; and (3) whether the compromise
agreement signed by the respondents’ children in the
RTC case binds the respondents.
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
Preliminary considerations
At the outset, we reiterate the settled rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.27 Questions of facts are not allowed in a Rule
45 petition because this Court is not a trier of
facts.28 The Court generally accords respect, if not
finality, to the factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies,
among them is the DARAB, as these bodies are
deemed experts in their respective fields.29 The
question of the existence of a tenancy relationship
intertwined with the question of reclassification
requires for its resolution a review of the factual
findings of the agricultural tribunals and of the CA.
These are questions we cannot generally touch in a
Rule 45 petition.
Nevertheless, the case also presents a legal
question as the issue of tenancy relationship is both
factual and legal. Moreover, the findings of the
PARAD conflict with those of the DARAB. These
circumstances impel us to disregard the above
general rule and to address both the presented
factual and legal issues in view of their social justice
implications and the duty to do justice that this Court
has sworn to uphold.
We now resolve the merits of the petition.
The subject property had been reclassified as non-
agricultural prior to June 15, 1988; hence, they are
no longer covered by R.A. No. 6657
At the core of the controversy is the questioned
reclassification of the property to non-agricultural
uses. This issue is intertwined with and on which
depends the resolution of the issue concerning the
claimed agricultural leasehold relationship.
In reversing the PARAD and holding that the property
was still agricultural, the DARAB considered the
Comprehensive Development Plan (approved by the
HSRC through Board Resolution R-39-4 dated July
31, 1980) and Davao City Ordinance No. 363, series
of 1982 (adopting the Comprehensive Development
Plan) as invalid reclassification measures. It gave as
reason the absence of the requisite certification from
the HLURB and the approval of the DAR. In the
alternative, and citing P.D. No. 27, in relation with
R.A. No. 6657, as basis, the DARAB considered the
alleged reclassification ineffective so as to free the
property from the legal effects of P.D. No. 27 that
deemed it taken under the government’s operation
land transfer (OLT) program as of October 21, 1972.
We differ from, and cannot accept, the DARAB’s
position.
We hold that the property had been reclassified to
non-agricultural uses and was, therefore, already
outside the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) after it took effect on July 15,
1988.
1. Power of the local government units to reclassify
lands from agricultural to non-agricultural uses; the
DAR approval is not required    
Indubitably, the City Council of Davao City has the
authority to adopt zoning resolutions and ordinances.
Under Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264 30 (the then
governing Local Government Code), municipal
and/or city officials are specifically empowered
to “adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning
Commission.”31
In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,32 the Court held that this power of the local
government units to reclassify or convert lands to
non-agricultural uses is not subject to the approval of
the DAR.33 There, the Court affirmed the authority of
the Municipal Council of Carmona to issue a zoning
classification and to reclassify the property in dispute
from agricultural to residential through the Council’s
Kapasiyahang Bilang 30, as approved by the HSRC.
In the subsequent case of Junio v. Secretary
Garilao,34 this Court clarified, once and for all, that
“with respect to areas classified and identified as
zonal areas not for agricultural uses, like those
approved by the HSRC before the effectivity of RA
6657 on June 15, 1988, the DAR’s clearance is no
longer necessary for conversion.”35 The Court in that
case declared the disputed landholding as validly
reclassified from agricultural to residential pursuant
to Resolution No. 5153-A of the City Council of
Bacolod.
Citing the cases of Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso.,
Inc. and Junio, this Court arrived at significantly
similar ruling in the case of Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Association (ARBA) v. Nicolas.36
Based on these considerations, we hold that the
property had been validly reclassified as non-
agricultural land prior to June 15, 1988. We note the
following facts established in the records that support
this conclusion: (1) the Davao City Planning and
Development Board prepared the Comprehensive
Development Plan for the year 1979-2000 in order to
provide for a comprehensive zoning plan for Davao
City; (2) the HSRC approved this Comprehensive
Development Plan through Board Resolution R-39-4
dated July 31, 1980; (3) the HLURB confirmed the
approval per the certification issued on April 26,
2006;37 (4) the City Council of Davao City adopted
the Comprehensive Development Plan through its
Resolution No. 894 and City Ordinance No. 363,
series of 1982;38 (5) the Office of the City Planning
and Development Coordinator, Office of the Zoning
Administrator expressly certified on June 15, 1995
that per City Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 as
amended by S.P. Resolution No. 2843, Ordinance
No. 561, series of 1992, the property (located in
barangay Catalunan Pequeño) is within an
“urban/urbanizing” zone;39 (6) the Office of the City
Agriculturist confirmed the above classification and
further stated that the property is not classified as
prime agricultural land and is not irrigated nor
covered by an irrigation project as certified by the
National Irrigation Administration, per the certification
issued on December 4, 1998;40 and (7) the HLURB,
per certification dated May 2, 1996,41 quoted the April
8, 1996 certification issued by the Office of the City
Planning and Development Coordinator stating that
“the Mintal District which includes barangay
Catalunan Pequeño, is identified as one of the
‘urbaning [sic] district centers and priority areas and
for development and investments’ in Davao City.”
We note that while the DNTDC attached, to its
motion for reconsideration of the DARAB’s decision,
the May 2, 1996 certification of the HLURB, both the
DARAB and the CA simply brushed this aside on
technicality. The CA reasoned that the certificate was
belatedly presented and that it referred to a parcel of
lot subject of another case, albeit, similarly involving
DNTDC, as one of the parties, and property located
within the same district.
We cannot support this position of the CA for the
following reasons: first, while, generally, evidence
submitted past the presentation-of-evidence stage is
no longer admissible and should be disregarded for
reasons of fairness, strict application of this general
rule may be relaxed. By way of exception, we relax
the application of the rules when, as here, the merits
of the case call for, and the governing rules of
procedure explicitly command, a relaxation. Under
Section 3, Rule I of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of
Procedure (the governing DARAB rules), the DARAB
shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure
and evidence provided under the Rules of Court,
which shall not apply even in a suppletory character,
and shall employ all reasonable means to ascertain
facts of every case.
Time and again, this Court has held that “rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure,
not override, substantial justice.”42 Thus, while
DNTDC, in this case, attached the May 2, 1996
HLURB certification only in its motion for
reconsideration, the DARAB should have considered
it, especially in the light of the various documents
that DNTDC presented to support its position that the
property had already been reclassified as non-
agricultural land prior to June 15, 1988.
And second, granting arguendo that the May 2, 1996
HLURB certification was issued in relation to another
case that involved a different parcel of land, it is not
without value. The clear-cut declarations of the
HLURB in the certification, which the DARAB and the
CA should have considered and which we find
sufficiently convincing, show that Catalunan Pequeño
(where the property lies) is classified as within the
urbanizing district centers of Davao City. Thus, for all
intents and purposes, the May 2, 1996 HLURB
certification satisfied the purpose of this requirement,
which is to establish by sufficient evidence the
property’s reclassification as non-agricultural land
prior to June 15, 1988.
Considering that the property is no longer agricultural
as of June 15, 1988, it is removed from the operation
of R.A. No. 6657. By express provision, the
CARL covers only those public or private lands
devoted or suitable for agriculture,43 the operative
word being agricultural. Under Section 3(c) of R.A.
No. 6657, agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to
agricultural activity and not otherwise classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial
land.44 In its Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1990,45 the DAR further explained the term
“agricultural lands” as referring to “those devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and x x
x not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances
as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding
competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for
residential, commercial or industrial use.” If only to
emphasize, we reiterate - only those parcels of land
specifically classified as agricultural are covered by
the CARL; any parcel of land otherwise classified is
beyond its ambit.
2. No vested rights over the property accrued to the
respondents under P.D. No. 27
Under P.D. No. 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn
agricultural lands are “deemed owners” of the land
that they till as of October 21, 1972. Under these
terms, vested rights cannot simply be taken away by
the expedience of adopting zoning plans and
ordinances reclassifying an agricultural land to an
“urban/urbanizing” area.
We need to clarify, however, that while tenant
farmers of rice and corn lands are “deemed owners”
as of October 21, 1972 following the provisions of
P.D. No. 27, this policy should not be interpreted as
automatically vesting in them absolute ownership
over their respective tillage. The tenant-farmers must
still first comply with the requisite preconditions,  i.e.,
payment of just compensation and perfection of title
before acquisition of full ownership.46
In Del Castillo v. Orciga,47 the Court explained that
land transfer under P.D. No. 27 is effected in two (2)
stages: first, the issuance of a certificate of land
transfer (CLT); and second, the issuance of an
emancipation patent (EP). The first stage - issuance
of the CLT - serves as the government’s recognition
of the tenant farmers’ inchoate right as “deemed
owners” of the land that they till. 48 The second stage
– issuance of the EP – perfects the title of the tenant
farmers and vests in them absolute ownership upon
full compliance with the prescribed
requirements.49 As a preliminary step, therefore, the
CLT immediately serves as the tangible evidence of
the government’s recognition of the tenant farmers’
inchoate right and of the subjection of the particular
landholding to the government’s OLT program.
In this case, the record does not show that the
respondents had been issued CLTs. The CLT could
have been their best evidence of the government’s
recognition of their inchoate right as “deemed
owners” of the property. Similarly, the record does
not show that the government had placed the
property under its OLT program or that the
government, through the MARO, recognized the
respondents as the actual tenants of the property on
the relevant date, thereby sufficiently vesting in them
such inchoate right.
Consequently, this Court can safely conclude that no
CLTs had ever been issued to the respondents and
that the government never recognized any inchoate
right on the part of the respondents as “deemed
owners” of the property. In effect, therefore, no
vested rights under P.D. No. 27, in relation to R.A.
No. 6657, accrued to the respondents such that
when the property was reclassified prior to June 15,
1988, it did not fall, by clear legal recognition within
the coverage of R.A. No. 6657.
Interestingly, the contract of lease executed between
Eugenio and the respondents shows that the
property was primarily planted with coconut and
coffee trees and, secondarily with several fruit-
bearing trees. By its explicit terms, P.D. No. 27
applies only to private agricultural lands primarily
devoted to rice and corn production. Thus, the
property could never have been covered by P.D. No.
27 as it was not classified as rice and corn land.
For these reasons, we hold that the property is no
longer agricultural and that the CA erred when it
affirmed the DARAB’s ruling that the property –
notwithstanding the various documents that
unquestionably established the contrary – was
agricultural . of the legal possession of the landholding shall not
No tenancy relationship exists between DNTDC and
the respondents; the tenancy relationship between
the respondents and Eugenio ceased when the
property was reclassified
In Solmayor v. Arroyo,50 the Court outlined the
essential requisites of a tenancy relationship, all of
which must concur for the relationship to exist,
namely:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.
The absence of any of these requisites does not
make an occupant a cultivator, or a planter, a de
jure tenant.51 Consequently, a person who is not a de
jure tenant is not entitled to security of tenure nor
covered by the land reform program of the
government under any existing tenancy laws.52
In this case, we hold that no tenancy relationship
exists between DNTDC, as the owner of the
property, and the respondents, as the purported
tenants; the second essential requisite as outlined
above – the subject is agricultural land – is lacking.
To recall, the property had already been reclassified
as non-agricultural land. Accordingly, the
respondents are not de jure tenants and are,
therefore, not entitled to the benefits granted to
agricultural lessees under the provisions of P.D. No.
27, in relation to R.A. No. 6657.
We note that the respondents, through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been tenants of
Eugenio as early as 1965. Under Section 7 of R.A.
No. 3844, once the leasehold relation is established,
the agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure
and acquires the right to continue working on the
landholding. Section 10 of this Act further
strengthens such tenurial security by declaring that
the mere expiration of the term or period in a
leasehold contract, or the sale, alienation or transfer
extinguish the leasehold relation; and in case of sale
or transfer, the purchaser or transferee is subrogated
to the rights and obligations of the landowner/lessor.
By the provisions of Section 10, mere expiration of
the five-year term on the respondents’ lease contract
could not have caused the termination of any
tenancy relationship that may have existed between
the respondents and Eugenio.
Still, however, we cannot agree with the position that
the respondents are the tenants of DNTDC. This is
because, despite the guaranty, R.A. No. 3844 also
enumerates the instances that put an end to the
lessee’s protected tenurial rights. Under Section 7 of
R.A. No. 3844, the right of the agricultural lessee to
continue working on the landholding ceases when
the leasehold relation is extinguished or when the
lessee is lawfully ejected from the landholding.
Section 853 enumerates the causes that terminate a
relationship, while Section 36 enumerates the
grounds for dispossessing the agricultural lessee of
the landholding.54
Notably, under Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844, as
amended by Section 7 of R.A. No.
6389,55 declaration by the department head, upon
recommendation of the National Planning
Commission, to be suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes, terminates
the right of the agricultural lessee to continue in its
possession and enjoyment. The approval of the
conversion, however, is not limited to the authority of
the DAR or the courts. In the case of Pasong
Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,56 and again in Junio v. Secretary
Garilao,57 the Court essentially explained that the
reclassification and conversion of agricultural lands
to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of R.A.
No. 6657, on June 15, 1988, was a coordinated effort
of several government agencies, such as local
government units and the HSRC.
In effect, therefore, whether the leasehold
relationship between the respondents and Eugenio
had been established by virtue of the provisions of
R.A. No. 3844 or of the five-year lease contract
executed in 1981, this leasehold relationship had
been terminated with the reclassification of the
property as non-agricultural land in 1982. The
expiration the five-year lease contract in 1986 could
not have done more than simply finally terminate any
leasehold relationship that may have prevailed under
the terms of that contract.
Consequently, when the DNTDC purchased the
property in 1995, there was no longer any tenancy
relationship that could have subrogated the DNTDC
to the rights and obligations of the previous owner.
We, therefore, disagree with the findings of the CA,
as it affirmed the DARAB that a tenancy relationship
exists between DNTDC and the respondents.
The respondents are not bound by the November 29,
2001 compromise agreement before the RTC
The respondents argue that the compromise
agreement of Demetrio Ehara, Jr., Reynaldo and
Liza – entered into with DNTDC on November 29,
2001 and approved by the RTC on December 7,
2001 – does not and cannot bind them as they are
different from the former.
We agree for two plain reasons.
First, the respondents’ position on this matter finds
support in logic. Indeed, as the respondents have
well pointed out and contrary to DNTDC’s position,
this similarity in their last names or familial
relationship cannot automatically bind the
respondents to any undertaking that their children in
the RTC case had agreed to. This is because
DNTDC has not shown that the respondents had
expressly or impliedly acquiesced to their children’s
undertaking; that the respondents had authorized the
latter to bind them in the compromise agreement; or
that the respondents’ cause of action in the instant
case arose from or depended on those of their
children in the cases before the MTCC and the RTC.
Moreover, the respondents’ children and DNTDC
executed the compromise agreement in the RTC
case with the view of settling the controversy
concerning only the issue of physical possession
over the disputed 2.5574-hectare portion subject of
the ejectment case before the MTCC.
And second, the issues involved in the cases before
the MTCC and the RTC are different from the issues
involved in the present case. In the ejectment case
before the MTCC, the sole issue was possession de
jure, while in the prohibition case before the RTC, the
issue was the propriety of the execution of the
decision of the MTCC in the ejectment case. In
contrast, the issues in the present controversy that
originated from the PARAD boil down to the
respondents’ averred rights, as tenants of the
property.
With these considerations, therefore, whatever
decision that the MTCC in the ejectment case arrived
at, which was limited to possession de jure of the
disputed 2.5574-hectare portion of the property,
could not have affected any right that the
respondents may have had, as tenants, over the
property. Consequently, any agreement that the
respondents’ children had entered into in the RTC
case could not have bound the respondents in the
present controversy as the respondents’ claim over
the property and their alleged right to continue in its
possession clearly go beyond mere possession de
jure, whether of the 2.5574-hectare portion of the
property that was subject of the ejectment case
before the MTCC or of the entire property in the
present case.
dated March 28, 2006 and the resolution dated
September 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 79377. We REINSTATE the decision
dated July 6, 1998 and the resolution dated
September 8, 1998 of the PARAD in DARAB Case
No. XI-1418-DC-98.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we

hereby GRANT the petition, and
accordingly REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision