REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways, through the Hon.

Secretary,
HERMOGENES EBDANE V ALBERTO A. DOMINGO
FACTS: respondent Alberto A. Domingo filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages 5 against the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH), Region III, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 333-M-2002 in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18. Domingo
averred that from April to September 1992, he entered into seven contracts with the DPWH Region III for the lease of his construction
equipment to said government agency.6 The lease contracts were allegedly executed in order to implement the emergency projects of the
DPWH Region III, which aimed to control the flow of lahar from Mt. Pinatubo in the adjacent towns in the provinces of Tarlac and
Pampanga. After the completion of the projects, Domingo claimed that the unpaid rentals of the DPWH Region III amounted to
₱6,320,163.05. Despite repeated demands, Domingo asserted that the DPWH Region III failed to pay its obligations. Domingo was, thus,
compelled to file the above case for the payment of the ₱6,320,163.05 balance, plus ₱200,000.00 as moral and compensatory damages,
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees. 7
Thereafter, summons was issued by the RTC. No summons was issued to either of said representatives, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the Republic. The absence of indispensable parties allegedly rendered null and void the subsequent acts of the trial court
because of its lack of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present. The Republic prayed for the
annulment of the RTC Decision.
ISSUE: WON, regional office is an extension of the department itself and service of summons upon the former is service upon the
latter. WON summons was properly served according to the Rules of Court.
RULING: No. Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by
which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through coercive process,
generally by the service of summons issued by the court, or through the defendant's voluntary appearance or submission to the court. It is
clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service of summons must be made on the Solicitor
General.  Court holds that the Republic was not validly served with summons. RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
Republic. Consequently, the proceedings had before the trial court and its Decision dated February 18, 2003 are hereby declared void.
TRIMICA v. POLARIS MARKETING CORPORATION
On October 27, 1966 Polaris sued the House of Fine Furnitures, Inc. (hereinafter called Fine Furnitures) in the municipal court of Makati,
Rizal for the recovery of the price of foam products. after the judgment had become final, Trimica, Inc., through Toledo filed a motion to set
aside the judgment against it on the ground that the judgment was void for lack of due process since Trimica, Inc. was never summoned.
Judge Flores denied the motion. He observed that Trimica, Inc. had been given its day in court through Capistrano, its president, and that to
retry the case would just be a waste of time because of Capistrano's admission that Trimica, Inc. had used the foam products. Judge Flores
noted that the decision had already become final.
ISSUE: W/N there was proper service of summons
RULING: No jurisdiction was acquired over Trimica, Inc. because it was never summoned. The appearance in court of its president,
Capistrano, was in the capacity of counsel for Fine Furnitures and not as representative or counsel of Trimica, Inc. Hence, such appearance
cannot be construed as a voluntary submission of Trimica, Inc. to the court's jurisdiction.

ELLICE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v YOUNG

Rodel T. Young, Delfin Chan and Jim Wee (respondents) and Ellice Agro-Industrial Corporation (EAIC), represented by its alleged corporate
secretary and attorney-in-fact, Guia G. Domingo (Domingo), entered into a Contract to Sell, under certain terms and conditions, wherein
EAIC agreed to sell to the respondents a 30,000 square-meter portion of a parcel of land located in Lutucan, Sariaya, Quezon and registered
under EAIC’s name and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-157038 in consideration of One Million and Fifty Thousand
(P1,050,000.00) Pesos. EAIC failed to deliver to respondents the owner’s duplicate certificate of title of the subject property and the
corresponding deed of sale as required under the Contract to Sell.

The initial attempt to serve the summons and a copy of the complaint and its annexes on EAIC, through Domingo, on Rizal Street, Sariaya,
Quezon, was unsuccessful as EAIC could not be located in the said address.
Another attempt was made to serve the alias summons on EAIC at 996 Maligaya Street, Singalong, Manila, the residence of Domingo. The
second attempt to serve the alias summons to Domingo was, this time, successful.
ISSUE: whether the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of EAIC
RULING: No. It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s
voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service
of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void. 27 The purpose of
summons is not only to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to give notice to the defendant that an action has
been commenced against it and to afford it an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against it. Conversely, service of summons on
anyone other than the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or director, is not valid. 996 GIS30 of EAIC, the pertinent document
showing EAIC’s composition at the time the summons was served upon it, through Domingo, will readily reveal that she was not its
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or director. Due to this fact, the Court is of the view that her honest belief that she was the
authorized corporate secretary was clearly mistaken because she was evidently not the corporate secretary she claimed to be. In view of
Domingo’s lack of authority to properly represent EAIC, the Court is constrained to rule that there was no valid service of summons binding
on it.

Manotoc v. Court of Appeals

Facts: Mrs. Agapita Trajano sought the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the US District Court of Hawaii against Ma. Imelda
M. Manotoc (Imee Marcos) for the wrongful death of Mr. Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence in the Philippines
allegedly working for Manotoc. The RTC issued summons for Manotoc addressed at Alexandra Homes, Pasig. It was served on a Macky dela
Cruz described as a caretaker of her unit. Manotoc failed to file her answer and was declared in default.
On October 1993, manotoc filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person, stating that she is not a resident
of the said condo and that she does not hold office there, as well as that Macky dela Cruz is not her representative or employee. Thus no
valid service was made. Further, she states that she is a resident of Singapore.
On October 1994, the RTC denied the motion. On December 1994, denied her MR for lack of merit.
Manotoc filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA on January 1995, that was denied on March 1997, and the MR denied on
April 1997. The CA ruled that:
1) As per findings of the trial court, the residence of Manotoc was indeed at Alexandra Homes.
2) The disembarkation/embarkation cord and certification were hearsay. It rejected a proof of her residency in Singapore based
on her passport in which two pages were withheld.
Issue:
Whether there was valid substituted service.
Held:
No.
In actions strictly ‘in personam’ jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is mandatory and can be complied with valid service of
summons.
If defendant cannot be served, for excusable reason, within a reasonable time, substituted service can be resorted to.
It is extraordinary in character and a derogation of the usual method of service thus rules for such must be faithfully complied with.
The requirements of valid substituted service if there is impossibility of prompt personal service which is 15-30 days for the sheriff are:
1) By leaving copies of summons at defendant’s residence with a person of suitable age and discretion residing therein or by leaving
copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge.
2) The sheriff must narrate in specific details how service in person became impossible.
3) The attempt must be extraordinary and at least three times. The person of suitable age and discretion must be at least 18 years
old, able to read the summons written in English, and must be with confidential relation to defendant. A competent person in
charge can be the president or manager.
The substituted service was invalid because the sheriff did not comply with the requirements. Macky dela Cruz was not a representative of
Manotoc. Therefore, since there was no valid service of summons, there was no jurisdiction acquired. The RTC’s decision is null and void.
De Dios vs CA, Lopingco
80491 / Aug 12, 1992

Doctrine: Only when new causes of actions are alleged in an amended complaint filed before the defendant appeared in court that another
summons must be served on the defendant with the amended complaint.
Facts:
1. Veterans Bank conveyed a parcel of land under a conditional sale to Averdi Marketing and Development Corporation. Artie Vergel de
Dios, as General Manager of Averdi, transferred his rights to Eduardo Lopingco subject to the terms and agreement specified in their
Memorandum of Agreement.
2. Lopingco filed with the RTC a complaint against De Dios and Veterans Bank for the recession of his contract with De Dios. Copies of the
complaint were sent to De Dios and Veterans Bank.
3. Lopingco filed an amended complaint and at the same time served a copy thereof to De Dios by registered mail.
4. On the same day, but after the filing of the amended complaint, the law firm representing De Dios filed its entry of appearance and
motion for extension of time to file responsive pleading. RTC granted the motion but only for 10 days.
5. De Dios filed an omnibus motion asking that he be furnished a copy of the amended complaint. Lopingco objected on the ground that
the copy had already been sent directly to De Dios by registered mail “because at the time said copy was mailed, there was as yet no
appearance of counsel for said defendant”
6. RTC declared De Dios in default upon presentation of a certification from the Makati Central PO that De Dios had received a copy of
the amended complaint.
7. De Dios filed a motion for new trial alleging the error of the RTC for declaring him on default although he had not been served a copy
of the amended complaint and his omnibus motion had not yet been resolved. RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed the RTC.
8. De Dios argues that since the amended complaint completely replaced the original complaint, the latter was stricken from the record
and considered non-existent and so was the summons that accompanied it. As the amended complaint was a completely new
pleading, a new summons should have been issued requiring the defendants to answer the same.For failing to do this and thereafter
declaring him in default, the trial court denied him the right to be heard in violation of due process.
Issue:
Whether a new summons should have been issued due to the complaint being amended.
Held: no new summons on the amended complaint was necessary
 The rule is that it is only when new causes of action are alleged in an amended complaint filed before the defendant has appeared in
court that another summons must be served on the defendant with the amended complaint.

JOSE v BOYON
In 1998, Sps. Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance in RTC of Muntinlupa against Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them
to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The RTC issued a summons to respondents. The
process server went to the residence of Sps. Boyon in Alabang  on July 22, 1998 to try to serve the summons personally. However, he found
out that Helen was in the United States and Romeo was in Bicol.  Hence, the process server explained in the Return of Summons that
substituted service was resorted to because efforts to serve personally failed.

Meanwhile, Sps. Jose filed before the RTC an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect summons by publication. The court granted the
motion. Sps. Boyon  were declared in default and Sps. Jose was allowed to present their evidence ex parte. On December 7, 1999, the RTC
issued a Resolution in favor of Sps. Jose.

Helen Boyon, who was then in United Sates, was surprised to learn from her sister of the resolution issued by the court. Sps. Boyon filed an
Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. The RTC denied the
said motion on the basis of the defaulted respondent supposed loss of standing in court. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.

Sps. Boyon appealed to the Court of Appeals which ruled that the RTC had no authority to issue the questioned resolution and orders.

Issue: Were the summons validly served upon Sps. Boyon?

Held: No. The personal service of summons was defective and the summons by publication was improper.

Defective Personal Service of Summons

In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and
the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
“Sec. 6.   Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant
in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
“Sec. 7.   Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.”

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former
cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter.  Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the
impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the
summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or
regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the
proof of service or in the officer’s return.  The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of
substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.

A review of the records reveals that the only effort he exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to
try to serve the summons personally on respondents (Sps. Boyon). While the Return of Summons states that efforts to do so were
ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what
efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not specify where or from whom the process server obtained
the information on their whereabouts.

The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld.  This is necessary because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service.  It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute.
Summons by publication improper

The extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the
action against the thing itself instead of against the defendant’s person if the action is in rem or an individual is named as defendant and
the purpose is to subject the individual’s interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in rem. In the instant
case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally
involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover, court has consistently declared that an action
for specific performance is an action in personam. Having failed to serve the summons on Sps. Boyon properly, the RTC did not validly
acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process demands that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should
be deemed null and void.

Judge Alma Crispina B. Collado-Lacorte vs.  Eduardo Rabena

According to Judge Collado-Lacorte, the Officer's Return dated 18 February 2008 revealed that summons upon defendants Rowell Mark D.
Abero and Ernesto R. Rabena were served, through substituted service, upon Elvira Abero and Anita Rabena, respectively. The service was
made without stating in the Return the facts and circumstances surrounding the failed personal service; the date and time of the attempts
on personal service; the inquiries made to locate the defendants; the names of the occupants of the defendants' alleged residence, and all
other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendants. Hence, the substituted service on the defendants was improper, as it
failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court, and deviated from the ruling of the Supreme Court in Ma. Imelda
M. Manotoc v. Court of Appeals.2 Accordingly, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
As gleaned from the cited case and from the Return of Service of Summons of Process Server Eduardo R. Rabena and his explanation,
respondent is liable for simple neglect or dereliction of duty.
A process server’s primary duty is to serve court notices. This requires utmost dedication on his part to ensure that all notices assigned to
him are duly served on the parties.
Considering the grave responsibilities imposed on him, Eduardo R. Rabena, despite his explanation that he had performed his duty with
utmost good faith, proved to be careless and imprudent in discharging his duties. Neither neglect nor delay should be allowed to stall the
expeditious disposition of cases. As such, he is indeed guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is the failure of an employee to give proper
attention to a required task. Simple neglect of duty signifies “disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.

CHU v MACH ASIA

FACTS:
Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation is a corporation engaged in importing dump trucks and heavy equipments. Petitioner Sixto N.
Chu purchased on installment one (1) Hitachi Excavator, one (1) motorgrader and one (1) payloader. Petitioner made down payments with
the balance payable in 12 monthly installments through Land Bank postdated checks. However, upon presentment of the checks for
encashment, they were dishonored by the bank either by reason of “closed account,” “drawn against insufficient funds,” or “payment
stopped.” Respondent filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for sum of money, replevin, attorney’s fees and
damages against the petitioner. The RTC issued an Order allowing the issuance of a writ of replevin on the subject heavy equipments.
Sheriff Cortes proceeded at petitioner’s given address for the purpose of serving the summons, together with the complaint, writ of
replevin and bond. However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons personally upon the petitioner, since the latter was not there. The
Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by having the summons and the complaint received by a certain Rolando Bonayon, a security
guard of the petitioner. Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading. Upon motion the RTC issued an Order declaring defendant in
default and, thereafter, allowed respondent to present its evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a decision against the petitioner. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Was the substituted service of summons to the security guard considered to be a valid as to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner Chu?
 
HELD: NO.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot be served personally within a
reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to. Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
“SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding
section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.”
It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in the
defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the
summon. Clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and
possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by
law. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service.
The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the
court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. Since the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, the judgment rendered by the court could not be considered binding upon him for being null
and void.

GINEZ V JABALDE
FACTS: This involves the celebrated case of Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) killed at the Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay Drive in
Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton (Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by
Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton before the Office of the City Prosecutor which Information was later filed with the
RTC in Olongapo City.
On 19 December 2014, Pemberton surrendered personally to the RTC Judge and was later arraigned. On the same day of Arraignment
petitioner Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender the Custody of Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media Coverage. The motion was scheduled on 22 December 2014, 2PM. According to petitioners,
they were only able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through registered mail. In any case, they claim to have also “furnished a
copy of the [M]otion personally … at the hearing of the [M]otion.  On 23 December 2014, the Urgent Motion was denied, as well as its
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Are the averments of the petitioner, that the 3-day notice rule should be should be liberally applied due to the timing of the arrest
and arraignment, tenable?
HELD: NO. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on
the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting
the adverse party’s right to procedural due process.
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be
made and the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his
or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and
engage the arguments of the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study
petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process.
Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail only during the hearing. They attempt to elude the consequences of this belated
notice by arguing that they also served a copy of the Motion by registered mail on Pemberton’s counsel. They also attempt to underscore
the urgency of the Motion by making a reference to the Christmas season and the “series of legal holidays” where courts would be closed.
To compound their obfuscation, petitioners claim that the hearing held on December 22, 2014, attended by Pemberton’s counsel
sufficiently satisfied the rationale of the three-day notice rule. These circumstances taken together do not cure the Motion’s deficiencies.
Even granting that Pemberton’s counsel was able to comment on the motion orally during the hearing, which incidentally was set for
another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton was able to study and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the
Motion. Judge Ginez-J abalde was correct to deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody
of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on noncompliance of procedural rules. To rule otherwise would be to prejudice Pemberton’s
rights as an accused.

Nation Petroleum Gas VS RCBC

FACTS:Respondent filed against petitioner a Complaint5 for civil damages arising from estafa in relation to violations of the Trust Receipts
Law. after an ex parte hearing was conducted, respondent’s prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment was granted and the corresponding
writ was issued.6 Thereafter, Sheriff Leodel N. Roxas served upon petitioners a copy of the summons, complaint, application for attachment,
respondent’s affidavit and bond, and the order and writ of attachment.
Petitioners filed through counsel a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss 8 on November 15, 2006. They asserted that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the corporation since the summons was improperly served upon Claudia Abante (Abante), who is a mere
liaison officer and not one of the corporate officers specifically enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules.  the RTC denied petitioners’
motion to dismiss and ruled that there was valid service of summons. CA affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION BY SERVICE
OF SUMMONS UPON ITS MERE EMPLOYEE.
RULING: YES.Service of summons on Domestic Corporation, partnership or other juridical entity is governed by Section 11, Rule 14 of
the Rules, which states:
SECTION 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized
under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
In this case, Abante proceeded to receive the summons and accompanying documents only after receiving instructions to do so from
Melinda Ang, an individual petitioner herein and the petitioner corporation’s corporate secretary. It is clear, therefore, that Abante, in so
receiving the summons, did so in representation of Ang who, as corporate secretary, is one of the officers competent under the Rules of
Court to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical person. Thus, while it may be true that there was no direct, physical handing of
the summons to Ang, the latter could at least be charged with having constructively received the same, which in Our view, amounts to a
valid service of summons.

SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATION v. CA, GR No. 158836, 2015-09-30

Facts:
In 1999, the Sangguniang Barangay of Cupang requested the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City to construct a city road to connect
Barangay Cupang and Marcos Highway.
Sunrise Garden Corporation was an affected landowner. Its property was located in Barangay Cupang, which Sunrise Garden Corporation
planned to develop into a memorial park.
The city road project, thus, became a joint project of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo, Barangay Cupang, Barangay Mayamot, and
Sunrise Garden Corporation.
Hardrock Aggregates, Inc., prevented Sunrise Garden Corporation's... contractor from using an access road to move the construction
equipment.
Sunrise Garden Corporation filed a Complaint[19] for damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc.
While the Complaint was pending, informal settlers started to encroach on the area of the proposed city road.
The trial court granted Sunrise Garden Corporation's Motion
On January 29, 2003, the trial court issued an Order stating that since First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. could not prove
ownership over the properties, then First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. or any of its hired security agencies must comply with the
Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
-9 Security Agency and First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. filed a Motion for Reconsideration[76] reiterating their arguments that
since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over them, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction could not be... enforced against them.[77]
First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency's Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Issues:
whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
Ruling:
While Rule 14, Section 20[212] of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons, the same rule
also provides that "[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the... person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance."
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1)Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2)Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and
(3)Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion
seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.
The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency should not be deemed as a voluntary
appearance because it was for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of this case show that the defense
of... lack of jurisdiction was raised at the first instance and repeatedly argued by K-9 Security Agency and respondent First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. in their pleadings.