DUNGOG VS CA

FACTS: First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Bohol Ucat issued a resolution finding a prima facie case
for the filing of an information for estafa against Pantaleon del Rosario from an alleged
misappropriation of the proceeds of the sale of 24 heads of Heifer cattle, under a contract of agency
and was approved by the respondent Provincial Fiscal of Bohol Inting. Information was filed with RTC
Bohol, PR filed a Motion for Reinvesttigation and petitioner filed his comment. The PF reversed
himself finding no prima facie case against PR, respondent Provincial Fiscal filed an Omnibus Motion
For Postponement Of Arraignment And To Allow Withdrawal Of Information. RTC Judge denied the
respondent Provincial Fiscal's Motion to Withdraw Information; 9 and that from the denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration, 10 two petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
were filed by the respondent Provincial Fiscal and the private respondent before the respondent Court
of Appeals. Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in favor of the respondent Provincial Fiscal and
the private respondent setting aside the questioned orders granting the Motion to Withdraw
Information filed by the Provincial Fiscal, and enjoining the Presiding Judge from proceeding with the
trial of the criminal aspect

ISSUE: W/N the preliminary injunction is proper

RULING: No. once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case as to its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
court. 13 Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. 14 For while it is true
that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court, once the case had already been brought to court, whatever disposition the fiscal may
deem proper thereafter should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval.

PINEDA VS CA

FACTS: Pineda entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (May-MOA)[2] with Lakandula High School
(LHS) for a five-year lease of the school canteen with a monthly rental of P20,000.00 and an
additional P4,000.00 monthly for the school’s feeding program as well as medicines for the school
clinic. faculty and personnel of LHS sent a letter to the Division School Superintendent, questioning
the validity of the May-MOA. RTC directing the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
enjoining respondent Department of Education (DepEd) from enforcing its decision to cancel a 5-year
lease of the school canteen. Pineda and Dr. Blas executed another MOA (August-MOA)[6]superseding
the May-MOA. DepEd, through Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon (Usec. Gascon), declared
the August-MOA “null and void ab initio” and ordered it “cancelled.” Pineda was also ordered to
“cease and desist” from further managing and operating the canteen. DepEd made clear that the
management and operation of the canteen should revert to the Home Economics Department of the
School.[9] This prompted Pineda to file a petition for Certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC. RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining the enforcement of Usec. Gascon’s decision. Montesa),
filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA seeking to set aside the March 14, 2005 and June 7, 2005
orders of the RTC. CA affirmed the June 7, 2005 order of the RTC denying DepEd’s motion to dismiss
but reversed its March 14, 2005 order granting the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.

ISSUE: W/N the PI is proper

RULING: Yes. The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could no longer lie for the
acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated. DepEd already
prohibited Pineda from operating the school canteen. As correctly ruled by the CA in its questioned
decision, since Pineda had ceased the operation of the school canteen since 2005, the RTC’s
preliminary writ should be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. The correctible through a
writ of Certiorari.[22] In this case, the status quo ante litem or the state of affairs existing at the
time of the filing of the case was that Pineda was already prohibited from operating the school
canteen. A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective
is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.

Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual
controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court
must not make use of its injunctive relief to alter such status.

NGO V ALLIED

FACTS: petitioner-spouses alleged in the main that Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank)
unlawfully and unjustifiably refused to discharge/release the real estate mortgage constituted on the
two lots of spouses Anthony Ngo and So Hon Ngo, and withheld the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT,
despite spouses Ngo's full payment of the P12 million loan secured by the mortgage. Allied Bank
admitted the satisfaction of the P12 million loan but clarified that the real estate mortgage on the lots
still secures the unpaid P42,900,000.00 loan of Civic Merchandising, Inc., for which Anthony Ngo
stands as a surety. RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, directing Allied Bank
to discharge the real estate mortgage constituted on the subject properties, and to release to
spouses Ngo the owner's copy of the TCTs of the lots. CA annulled the RTC's orders upon finding that
petitioner-spouses failed to establish a clear and unmistakable right to warrant the issuance of the
provisional injunctive writ against Allied Bank.

ISSUE: W/N, the writ for PI was proper

RULING: No. Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a writ of
preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be granted if the following requisites
are met: 
(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right in esse; 
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; 
(3) There is an urgent need to issue the writ in order to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant;
and 
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable
injury.

Mere fact of payment of the P12 million loan is a scant justification for the issuance of the writ. The
RTC accorded too much weight thereon and deliberately ignored other relevant facts alleged in the
pleadings and shown in the annexes submitted by the parties, specifically the real estate mortgage
and the Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety Agreement. Settled is the rule that courts
should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case
without trial. RTC improperly issued the writ of preliminary injunction and the CA was correct in
annulling the same.

CASTRO V DELA CRUZ

FACTS: Spouses Perez) obtained a ₱250,000 loan from Spouses Isagani and Diosdada Castro
(petitioners) on November 15, 1996, to secure which they executed a real estate mortgage in
petitioners’ favor covering an unregistered 417 square meter parcel of land, located in San Isidro,
Hagonoy, Bulacan. Perez having failed to settle their loan, petitioners extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage and, as the highest bidder at the public auction, bought the property on February
4, 1999. But Perez sold the property to respondent Spouses dela Cruz who had in fact caused the
cancellation of TD in 1997. Petitioner filed complaint against herein two sets of respondent Spouses,
for annulment of Deed of Sale and TD before RTC. Spouses dela Cruz prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore them to physical possession of the property.

ISSUE: W/N the writ is proper

RULING: YES. For an injunctive writ to issue, a clear showing of extreme urgency to prevent
irreparable injury and a clear and unmistakable right to it must be proven by the party seeking it.
The primary objective of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.5

[T]he rule is well-entrenched that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the
sound discretion of the trial court. It bears reiterating that Section 4 of Rule 58 gives generous
latitude to the trial courts in this regard for the reason that conflicting claims in an application for a
provisional writ more often than not involve a factual determination which is not the function of
appellate courts. Petitioners failed to show that the appellate court erred in upholding the trial court’s
exercise of its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the challenged
Decision stands.

RIVERA VS MIRASOL

FACTS: Benjamin Rivera, Simeon Quilang, Jr. and Nicanor Asuncion filed with the Court an Affidavit-
Complaint against Judge Teodulo E. Mirasol OF RTC Roxas, Isabela for gross ignorance of the law.
Complainants are the defendants in a case for recovery of possession of property filed by the
Municipality of Roxas, Isabela. Without summons having been served, the municipality filed an
unverified motion for preliminary mandatory injunction against them with motion for writ of
demolition. Complainants filed their answer to the complaint opposing the motion. Judge issued an
order granting the writ of preliminary injunction and placing the municipality in possession of the
areas occupied by complainants.

ISSUE: W/N the writ was proper

RULING: No. Respondent Judge does not deny that he issued the writ of preliminary injunction and
the concomitant writs of demolition based on an unverified application filed by the Municipality of
Roxas, Isabela. However, he claims that his determination of the propriety of the issuance of the
writs of preliminary injunction and demolition is merely an error of judgment. Moreover, Rule 58,
Section 4 (a) of the Rules of Court is clear with regard to the procedure to be followed in the issuance
of writs of preliminary injunction, i.e., a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may be
granted only when the application in the action or proceeding is verified, and shows facts entitling
the applicant to the relief demanded. The rule is very explicit in its requirement that a preliminary
injunction may be granted only when the complaint is verified. Absence of verification makes an
application or petition for preliminary injunction patently insufficient both in form and substance.

CHINA BANK VS CIRIACO

FACTS: Spouses Ciriaco obtained a P1,500,000.00 loan from the petitioner secured by a real estate
mortgage5 over their 526-square meter land in La Trinidad. When the respondents defaulted in the
payment of their loan, the petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed 7 the mortgaged property and sold it at
public auction where the petitioner emerged as the highest bidder.  Respondents filed a complaint
with RTC for Injunction to enjoin the consolidation of title in the petitioner s favor, assailing the
redemption price of the foreclosed property. RTC dismissed the complaint for being moot due to the
consolidation of title in the petitioner’s favor

ISSUE: whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
granting the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.

RULING: No, void. before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, a clear showing must be
made that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be
directed are violative of an established right. 32 The holding of a hearing, where both parties can
introduce evidence and present their side, is also required before the courts may issue a TRO or an
injunctive writ.  It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and
the emergency demands it;37 no power exists whose exercise is more delicate, which requires greater
caution and deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, that the issuance of an injunction.

ESTARES VS CA

FACTS: Estares spouses filed a complaint for "Damages and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction"
against private respondent Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC) before RTC Laguna. they
obtained a loan from PLCC for ₱800,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage over a 363-square
meter parcel of land with improvements situated in the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, covered
by TCT, promissory note and rem were falsified because they affixed their signatures in two blank
documents. Estares spouses sought to declare as null and void the promissory note and the real
estate mortgage for not reflecting their true agreement. They prayed for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin PLCC from taking possession of the
mortgaged property and proceeding with the extrajudicial sale.

ISSUE: W/N COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
TO PREVENT RESPONDENTS PLCC AND PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LAGUNA/ SHERIFF ARNEL MAGAT
FROM FORECLOSING THE MORTGAGE AND CONDUCTING THE AUCTION SALE

RULING: The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the following
requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive relief: (a) the existence of their right to be
protected; and (b) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of such
right.33] To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a
clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage. Estares spouses failed to establish their right to injunctive relief. They do not deny that they
are indebted to PLCC but only question the amount thereof. Their property is by their own choice
encumbered by a real estate mortgage. Upon the nonpayment of the loan, which was secured by the
mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale.

AGOO VS LBP

FACTS: ARMC obtained from the LBP a Term Loan (TL) for P 2,000,000.00 and two (2) Short-Term
Loan Lines (STLLs) amounting to a total of P 15,000,000.00,6Ï‚rνll evidenced by promissory notes
secured by a Real and Chattel Mortgage over the ARMCs four (4) commercial lots, including their
improvements, and its rice mill machineries and generator. ARMC made several partial payments to
cover the loans interests,9Ï‚rνll but found it difficult to fully settle its loan obligations on time. ARMC,
through its President, filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, and for recovery of damages. ARMC mainly
alleged that LBPs proposed extrajudicial foreclosure should be enjoined for being premature,
improper and in violation of ARMCs contractual and property rights since negotiations for the
restructuring of its loans were still ongoing. ARMC contended that, unless enjoined, the foreclosure
would cause its company grave injustice and irreparable injury. Executive Judge Vicente A. Pacquing
ued a 72hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) directing the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of La
Union to cease and desist from proceeding foreclosure sale The following day, the RTC ordered the
extension of the TRO for seventeen (17) days. RTC ordered the proceedings suspended in view of the
parties manifestation to have the case amicably settled. 33Ï‚rνll The contemplated settlement,
however, failed. Thus, the RTC proceeded with the hearing on the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction 

ISSUE: W/N injunction was proper

RULING: "Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or

refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as
an incident in the main action."45Ï‚rνll For an injunction to issue, the following essential requisites
must be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and
(2) the act against which the injunction is directed to constitute a violation of such right. 46ςrνll

The ARMC filed a complaint for injunction against the LBP on the ground that the latters then
impending foreclosure of its mortgaged properties was in violation of its contractual and property
rights, particularly the right of the ARMC to have its outstanding loan restructured by the LBP. Under
these terms, the ARMC cannot secure an injunction against the LBP, a government financial
institution. An injunction suit becomes moot and academic after the act sought to be enjoined had
already been consummated.

AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL VS PADRE GARCIA

FACTS: fire razed to the ground the old public market of respondent Municipality of Padre Garcia.
Municipal Mayor Eugenio Gutierrez, invited petitioner Australian Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI) to
rebuild the public market and construct a shopping center. Under the MOA, APRI undertook to
construct a shopping complex in the 5,000-square-meter area. In return, APRI acquired the exclusive
right to operate, manage, and lease stall spaces for a period of 25 years. Mayor Reyes initiated a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of Agreement with Damages. petitioners filed
before the CA a Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 4 The motion prayed for an order to restrain
the RTC from "further proceeding and issuing any further Order, Resolution, Writ of Execution, and
any other court processes"

ISSUE: w/n the petition is meritorious

RULING: No denied for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA. A writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of
substantive rights and interests.12 An application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing of a verified application showing facts entitling the
applicant to the relief demanded. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of Court, 14 a TRO may be
issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be
heard. Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there exists a clear
and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be
enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage. The general rule is that
after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its
execution. No court should interfere, by injunction or otherwise, to restrain such execution. 25 The
rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as the following: (1) when facts and circumstances later
transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust; or (2) when there is a change in the
situation of the parties that may warrant an injunctive relief. 26 In this case, after the finality of the
RTC Decision, there were no supervening events or changes in the situation of the parties that would
entail the injunction of the Writ of Execution.

SY VS AUTOBUS

FACTS: SY entered into a verbal agreement with respondent Autobus Transport Systems, Inc., 5 a
public utility bus company plying the northern Luzon routes from Manila. 6 Under their agreement,
respondent would purchase Konvecta air conditioning units from petitioner and petitioner would
finance respondent’s acquisition of twenty-two (22) units of bus engine and chassis from Commercial
Motors Corporation (CMC) and twenty-two (22) bus deluxe bodies to be built by Almazora Motors
Corporation (AMC). espondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction,40 praying for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction commanding
petitioner to return to respondent the five titles. 41

ISSUE: WHETHER XXX THE HONORABLE [CA] COMMITTED A GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
FOUND THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION

RULING: A preliminary injunction may be issued at any time before judgment or final order. 69 It may
be a prohibitory injunction, which requires a party to refrain from doing a particular act, or a
mandatory injunction, which commands a party to perform a positive act to correct a wrong in the
past.70 A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, however, is more cautiously regarded because it
commands the performance of an act.71 Accordingly, it must be issued only upon a clear showing that
the following requisites are established: (1) the applicant has a clear and unmistakable right that
must be protected; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and (3) there is an
urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant. 7From the verified complaint
filed in this case as well as the [respondent’s] verified Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction, it is clear that the five (5) land titles registered in the name of Gregorio
Araneta III were delivered by the [respondent] to the [petitioner] to secure the latter’s advances to
CMC for the financing of the twenty two (22) bus chassis which [respondent] purchased from CMC.
However, [petitioner] defaulted in his obligations to CMC which compelled the [respondent] to
directly pay CMC some of the obligations of the [petitioner]. Since the condition for the delivery
of the land titles which is the payment by the [petitioner] of the obligations of the
[respondent] to CMC has not been complied with by the [petitioner], there is no further
justification for the [petitioner] to hold on to the possession of the land titles. RTC had
sufficient bases to issue the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as all the requisites for the
issuance of such writ were established. We agree with the RTC that respondent has a right to recover
the five titles because petitioner failed to comply with his obligation to respondent. It bears stressing
that respondent was compelled to directly pay CMC to avoid the foreclosure of the chattel mortgages,
which respondent executed in favor of CMC. Considering that respondent has paid most, if not all, of
its obligations to CMC, there is no reason for petitioner to hold on to the titles.