Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount
to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small
scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession
by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.
Secretary of DENR vs Yap

GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

FACTS:

This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist
zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed
a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No.
705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE: Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land,
therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:

No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and
a legislative act or statute.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
Junio vs. De Los Santos

GR No. L-35744 ; September 28, 1984

Facts:

Wenceslao Junio is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Bayambang, Pangasinan with an
area of 7.65 hectares covered by TCT No. 1004. An Affidavit of Adverse Claim was executed by
respondent Feliciano de los Santos, claiming one third undivided portion of Junio’s property by virtue of
a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Junio. Junio then denies having sold any portion of his
property to De Los Santos, hence his petition for the cancellation of said adverse claim. Junio disputes
the appropriateness of the annotation alleging that under section 110 of the land registration act such
inscription may be resorted only when there is no other means of registering an interest or right, and
that section 57 of the same statute provides for the registration of a documented sale involving a titled
property and that the register of deeds acted negligently in registering the document without the formal
legal requisites. Respondent de los Santos countered that he had tried to avail himself of Section 57 by
requesting Junio to surrender his owner’s duplicate certificate of title but since the latter refused to do
so he was compelled to present an adverse claim pursuant to section 110 of the LRA.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent’s acts were appropriate

Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties

Held:

The court ruled that considering that Junio had refused to surrender the title; De Los Santos could not
avail of Section 57. Hence the latter correctly resorted to the annotation of an adverse claim. Further,
the court found that the genuineness and due execution of the sale between the parties is in
controversy. Moreover, although the grounds relied upon by Junio for the cancellation of the adverse
claim were unmeritorious, it behooved the lower court to have conducted a speedy hearing upon the
question of validity of the adverse claim. The case was remanded to the RTC for hearing and for passing
upon the controversy on the merits between Junio and De Los Santos.

In fact, the lower Court, instead of confining itself to the propriety of the registration of the
adverse claim should already have decided the controversy between the parties on the merits thereof.
Doctrinal jurisprudence holds that the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), as a Land
Registration Court, can hear cases otherwise litigable only in ordinary civil actions, since the Courts of
First Instance are at the same time, Courts of general jurisdiction and could entertain and dispose of the
validity or invalidity of respondent's adverse claim, with a view to determining whether petitioner is
entitled or not to the relief that he seeks. That doctrine is based on expediency. In fact, petitioner has
also prayed in his Brief that the case be returned to the lower Court for further proceedings. Note
should also be taken of the fact that an adverse claim may be cancelled only after it is adjudged invalid
or unmeritorious by the Court acting either as a land registration Court or a Court of general jurisdiction.
The two other co-vendees, however, should be impleaded as parties so that the entire controversy as to
ownership may be threshed out in a single action to prevent multiplicity of suits.
Arceo v. CA

G.R. No. 81401,18 May 1990

Nature: petition to review the decision of the CA

Ponente: InesLuciano, J.

Facts:

● Spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo had one son, Esteban. Spouses were also the
owners of 4 parcels of unregistered land located in Pulilan, Bulacan. Abdon died in 1953, Escolastica in
16 sept 1942 and Esteban in 2 Sept 1941. Esteban sired Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio and Sotera. Jose
married Virginia Franco with whom he fathered 6 children and are the petitioners of this case against
Jose’s siblings.

● On October (or Sept) 27 1941, the spouses Arceo executed a deed of donation on the said
parcels of land in favor of Jose, presented in court as “exhibit J”. On 2 August 1950, the spouses Arceo
executed another deed of donation to Jose on the same parcels of land, presented in court as “exhibit
T”. Exhibit J and T were executed inter vivos. On the other hand, on October 3(or 30) 1941 which was,
“exhibit 1”, the spouses Arceo executed a deed of donation to ALL GRANDCHILDREN including Jose,
thereby revoking “exhibit J”.

● On 12 January 1972, Petitioners filed with the Cadastral Court (CC) an application for the 4 lots
under the strength of exhibits J and T. Respondents contested the petition on the strength of exhibit 1.
CC dismissed the petition and distributed the land based on intestate succession, CA affirmed the
decision CC, hence this petition.

Issue: WON the CC had no jurisdiction to decide cases on claims of ownership of property.

Ruling: No. The CC HAD jurisdiction to decide cases on claims of ownership of property.

Under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as a land
registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration
act. The PRD “has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by Act 497 when acting merely as a Cadastral court.” Such
amendment conferred upon the trial courts he authority to act not only on applications for ‘original
registration” but also “over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions.”

Likewise, where the issues of ownership is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration,
the Cadastral Court has jurisdiction over it. Hence, decision of CA is set aside.