EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

CASE NAME
COPY THE FORMAT
FACTS:
1. Blah CTRL+F YOUR CASE TITLE, IT’S ALREADY DISTRIBUTED.
2. Blah DEADLINE: SUNDAY (MAR. 17, 2019), 11:59PM
a. Sub Blah
3. RTC ruled RULE 130
4. CA ruled Section 34.
1. Metrobank v. Custodio, G.R. No. 173780, March 21, 2011. - SO
ISSUES: 2. Bank of Commerce (formerly Boston Bank of the Philippines) v.
1. WoN Blah is blah? YES/NO Manalo, G.R. No. 158149, February 9, 2006, 482 SCRA 108. - PELONGCO
3. People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 141644, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 478. -
RULING + RATIO: LOPEZ
1. Blah
a. Sub Blah Section 35.
2. Concept Section 36.
a. Explain explain 1. People v. Estibal, G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014. - MANALANG
2. People v. Lumaho, G.R. No. 208716, September 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 542.
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION? REVERSED? - CABOCHAN
3. Espineli v. People, G.R. No. 179535, June 29, 2014. - TAYLO
DOCTRINE: etc etc etc 4. Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 135. -
TALION

Section 37.
1. People v. Suarez y Zurita, G.R. No. 224889, October 19, 2016. - NOEL
2. People v. Quisayas, G.R. No. 198022, April 7, 2014, 721 SCRA 16. -
NAVAL
3. People v. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013, 688 SCRA 646. -
PEREZ

Section 38.
1. Sabili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 664. -
DOROJA
2. Lazaro v. Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 298. -
REYES, G.
3. Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 421. -
FUEGO
4. Philippine Free Press v. CA, G.R. No. 132864, October 24, 2005, 473
SCRA 639. - SANTOS, JR.

Section 39.
1. Tandog v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 144208, September 11, 2007. - UY
2. Herrera v. Alba, Supra.

Section 40.
1. Herrera v. Alba, Supra.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Section 41.
1. Cruz v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 140422, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 37. -
BONOAN

Section 42.
1. People v. Guting, Supra.
2. People v. Estibal y Calungsag, Supra.
3. People v. Quisayas, Supra.
4. Belbis, Jr. v. People, Supra.

Section 43.
1. LBP v. Oñate, G.R. No. 192371, January 15, 2014. - SIQUIAN
2. Sps. Dela Cruz v. Planters Product, Inc., G.R. No. 158649, February 18,
2013. - SO
3. Patula v. People, Supra.
4. Jose, Jr. v. Michaelmar Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 169606, November 27, 2009,
606 SCRA 116. - PELONGCO

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Metrobank v. Custodio, G.R. No. 173780, March 21, 2011
FACTS:
The facts arent important for the issue as in biglang may lilitaw na cubao pero wala
sa facts. So, for recit…
Basically, Respondent was the bank teller in Laoag City, when she submitted her
transactions to Ms Castro, which was approved, may nawalang P600,000.
Apparently, when she worked in cubao before, a certain amount of money also went
missing under her care but nothing was filed against her, and nevertheless she was
transferred to Laoag city branch for the exact same job. After random investigations
was conducted, she was suddenly served summons for the 600,000.
(You can now move to the issue derecho but if you want to read the facts then here).
1. Petitioner is a banking corporation and respondent is a bank teller employed
at the Laoag City branch of petitioner.
2. Respondent reported for work in petitioner bank’s branch in Laoag City. At
the start of the banking day, respondent received loose money (picos) for
the day’s business and was assigned as Teller. In the course of performing
her duties, respondent handled several cash transactions with the customers
on behalf of petitioner bank.
3. A cash transfer of PhP200,000 was made from Teller No. 1 to respondent.
Petitioner Metrobank explained that, usually, a transfer of money from one
teller to another occurs if the latter needs money, maybe to pay for the
withdrawal.” However, petitioner bank pointed out that it was unnecessary
for respondent to borrow from another teller at that time, since respondent
had sufficient cash on hand to cover a withdrawal in the same amount as the
cash transfer.
4. At the close of banking hours, respondent balanced her transactions for the
day and turned over the funds to the bank’s cash custodian, Ms. Castro, in
the amount of PhP2,113,500. Ms. Castro acknowledged receipt of the cash.
However, she discovered that there was a shortage amounting to
PhP600,000. When the cash transactions and accountings were reviewed,
no errors were found in the records of the transactions, and the shortage
was confirmed.
5. Petitioner bank alleged that it was able to recover 8 bill wrappers only for
bundles of 500-peso bills that purportedly corresponded to the missing
PhP400,000. These bill wrappers bore a rubber stamp "PEPT-3" for Teller
No. 3. Respondent, however, countered that the discovery of the bill
wrappers being attributed to her care was never mentioned at the time the
cash shortage occurred, and that these wrappers could have been obtained
subsequently by stamping unmarked ones.
6. Respondent was allowed to continue to render services as a teller in
petitioner bank. Afterwards, investigators confronted the employees,
including respondent. After these meetings, Ms. Castro, the cash custodian,
allegedly admitted that she received and acknowledged the cash bundles
and signed the Cash Transfer Slip for the funds turned over by respondent.
7. Employees of the Laoag City branch including the new accounts clerk, the
remittance clerk and all the other tellers were made to take polygraph tests
at the NBI, except for respondent because she was 8 months pregnant at
that time. Petitioner bank filed a Complaint for a sum of money against
Petitioner.
8. After she was served the summons, respondent was supposedly caught
bringing out a teller’s copy of the journal print transactions with the related
cash transfer slips for that particular banking day. These bank records were
confiscated from respondent, when they were discovered in her dress
pocket during a body search done on all employees leaving the office.
9. Respondent teller later explained that she had mistakenly brought out these
records because she was no longer allowed to go inside the teller’s cage to
file the transaction journal, after she was served the summons and
Complaint. She claimed that, at that time, she was confused by the bank’s
Complaint filed against her, so she placed the transaction journal in her right
pocket. It was admitted by the bank manager, however, that no cash
shortage occurred on that day.
10. Thereafter, respondent Custodio was relegated to a non-accountable
position.
11. Because of her alleged attempt to take the journal print transactions, Mr.
Lucas, the branch manager, recommended that respondent Custodio be
preventively suspended.
12. Despite respondent’s motion to have the Cash Transfer Slip produced in the
trial proceedings and the manifestation of petitioner bank’s counsel that it
would present the slip, the document was not entered into the records.
13. Trial court ruled in favor of Petitioner bank.
14. CA ruled in favor of Respondent.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N the similar occurrence or situation in relation to Respondent in the
cubao branch is enough evidence to impute her of the crime? NO.
RATIO:
1. Petitioner bank argues that respondent’s prior involvement in a cash
shortage in its Cubao branch is admissible as evidence to prove a scheme
or habit on her part.
2. The general evidentiary rule is that evidence that one did or did not do
a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that one did or
did not do the same or a similar thing at another time. However,
evidence of similar acts may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and
the like.
3. Citibank N.A. v. Sabeniano: The rule is founded upon reason, public policy,
justice and judicial convenience. The fact that a person has committed the
same or similar acts at some prior time affords, as a general rule, no logical
guaranty that he committed the act in question. This is so because,
subjectively, a man's mind and even his modes of life may change; and,
objectively, the conditions under which he may find himself at a given time
may likewise change and thus induce him to act in a different way. Besides,
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

if evidence of similar acts are to be invariably admitted, they will give rise to
a multiplicity of collateral issues and will subject the defendant to surprise as
well as confuse the court and prolong the trial.
4. Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant, especially to
actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the state
of mind or knowledge of a person; it provides insight into such
person's motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan, or it
reveals a mistake.
5. In this case however, respondent’s prior involvement in a cash shortage in
the bank’s Cubao branch does not conclusively prove that she is responsible
for the loss of PhP600,000 in the Laoag City branch, subject of the instant
case.
6. Although the previous cash shortage in Cubao could possibly shed light on
the intent, scheme or habit of respondent, that previous cash shortage is not
sufficient to affirm a definitive finding of fact that she took the funds in the
Laoag City branch. If the prior cash shortage in Cubao showed a reasonable
intent or habit on the part of respondent, then there was no reason for
petitioner bank to continue to employ her, considering the degree of trust
and confidence required of a bank teller. Nevertheless, respondent
continued to serve the bank and this continued employment was an
affirmation that she was still worthy of the bank’s trust, insofar as she was
allowed to continue to handle sums of money in the Laoag City branch.
7. There were a lot of other issues here but basically she wasn’t found guilty
because there was no preponderance of evidence to show that she took the
money, or that her acting “irregularly” establishes the act of committing the
crime. More than that the money she supposedly took was found in the bank
so no basis to make her liable for the losses. There was also proof that the
guards, tellers, and other employees did not exercise a high degree of
diligence in securing the bank’s money.

DISPOSITION: In view of the foregoing, the Court DENIES the instant Petition for
Review filed by Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. The Court of Appeals’ 14 July
2006 Decision, which dismissed the complaint against respondent Marina Custodio,
is hereby AFFIRMED.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Bank of Commerce (formerly Boston Bank of the Philippines) v. Manalo, G.R.
No. 158149, February 9, 2006, 482 SCRA 108
FACTS:
1. Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) sold to The Overseas Bank of Manila
(OBM)some residential lots in Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI
continued selling the residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM.
2. Carlos Manalo, Jr. proposed to XEI, through its President Emerito
Ramos(Ramos), that he will purchase two lots in the Xavierville subdivision
and offered as part of the downpayment the P34,887.66 Ramos owed him.
XEI,through Ramos, agreed.
3. In a letter dated August 22, 1972 to Perla Manalo (Carlos’ wife), Ramos
confirmed the reservation of the lots. In the letter he also pegged the price of
the lots at P348,060 with a 20% down payment of the purchase price
amounting to P69,612.00 (less the P34,887.66 owing from Ramos), payable
as soon as XEI resumes its selling operations; the corresponding Contract of
Conditional Sale would then be signed on or before the same date.
PerlaManalo conformed to the letter agreement.
4. Thereafter, the spouses constructed a house on the property. The spouses
were notified of XEI’s resumption of selling operations. However,they did not
pay the balance of the down payment because XEI failed to prepare a
contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to them. XEI also billed
them for unpaid interests which they also refused to pay. XEI turned over its
selling operations to OBM. -Subsequently, Commercial Bank of Manila
(CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM requested Perla
Manalo to stop any on-going construction on the property since it (CBM) was
the owner of the lot and she had no permission for such construction. Perla
informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM, through XEI, to
purchase the property.She promised to send CBM the documents. However,
she failed to do so.Thus, CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
the spouses. But later on, CBM moved to withdraw its complaint because of
the issues raised.In the meantime, CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of
the Philippines.
5. Then, the spouses filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
against the bank before the RTC. The spouses alleged that they had always
been ready and willing to pay the installments on the lots sold to them but no
contract was forthcoming. The spouses further alleged that upon their partial
payment of the down payment, they were entitled to the execution and
delivery of a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject lots. During the
trial,the spouses adduced in evidence the separate Contracts of Conditional
Sale executed between XEI and 3 other buyers to prove that XEI continued
selling residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the latter had
acquired the said lots.
6. The trial court ordered the petitioner (Boston Bank) to execute a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of the spouses upon the payment of the
spouses of the balance of the purchase price. It ruled that under the
August 22, 1972 letter agreement of XEI and the spouses, the parties
had a "complete contract to sell" over the lots, and that they had
already partially consummated the same.
7. The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC, but declared that
the balance of the purchase price of the property was payable in fixed
amounts on a monthly basis for 120 months, based on the deeds of
conditional sale executed by XEI in favor of other lot buyers.Boston
Bank filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the decision alleging
that there was no perfected contract to sell the two lots, as there was
no agreement between XEI and the respondents on the manner of
payment as well as the other terms and conditions of the sale. Boston
Bank also asserts that there is no factual basis for the CA ruling that
the terms and conditions relating to the payment of the balance of the
purchase price of the property(as agreed upon by XEI and other lot
buyers in the same subdivision) were also applicable to the contract
entered into between the petitioner and the respondents. CA denied
the MR, hence to SC.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether the factual issues raised by the petitioner are proper. (YES)
2. Whether petitioner or its predecessors-in-interest, the XEI or the OBM,
as seller, and the respondents, as buyers, forged a perfected contract
to sell over the property (NO)
3. Whether petitioner is estopped from contending that no such contract
was forged by the parties (NO)
4. Whether respondents has a cause of action against the petitioner for
specific performance (NO)
RATIO:
1. YES, CA committed error in dismissing petitioner’s appeal, is contrary to law,
and not supported by evidence.
1. In this case, the issue of whether XEI had agreed to allow the respondents
to pay the purchase price of the property was raised by the parties. The trial
court ruled that the parties had perfected a contract to sell, as against
petitioners claim that no such contract existed. However, in resolving the
issue of whether the petitioner was obliged to sell the property to the
respondents, while the CA declared that XEI or OBM and the respondents
failed to agree on the schedule of payment of the balance of the purchase
price of the property, it ruled that XEI and the respondents had forged a
contract to sell; hence, petitioner is entitled to ventilate the issue before this
Court.
2. We agree with petitioners contention that, for a perfected contract of sale or
contract to sell to exist in law, there must be an agreement of the parties, not
only on the price of the property sold, but also on the manner the price is to
be paid by the vendee.
3. A definite agreement as to the price is an essential element of a binding
agreement to sell personal or real property because it seriously affects the
rights and obligations of the parties. Price is an essential element in the
formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fixing of the
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
price can never be left to the decision of one of the contracting parties. But a
price fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by the other, gives
rise to a perfected sale.
4. In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that the parties
agree on the price as well as the amount of downpayment. The parties must,
likewise, agree on the manner of payment of the balance of the purchase
price and on the other terms and conditions relative to the sale. Even if the
buyer makes a downpayment or portion thereof, such payment cannot be
considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale
between the parties.
5. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that, as held by the CA,
there is no showing, in the records, of the schedule of payment of the
balance of the purchase price on the property amounting to
P278,448.00. We have meticulously reviewed the records, including
Ramos February 8, 1972 and August 22, 1972 letters to respondents,
[61] and find that said parties confined themselves to agreeing on the
price of the property (P348,060.00), the 20% downpayment of the
purchase price (P69,612.00), and credited respondents for the
P34,887.00 owing from Ramos as part of the 20% down payment. The
timeline for the payment of the balance of the down payment
(P34,724.34) was also agreed upon, that is, on or before XEI resumed
its selling operations, on or before December 31, 1972, or within five (5)
days from written notice of such resumption of selling operations. The
parties had also agreed to incorporate all the terms and conditions
relating to the sale, inclusive of the terms of payment of the balance of
the purchase price and the other substantial terms and conditions in
the corresponding contract of conditional sale, to be later signed by
the parties, simultaneously with respondents settlement of the balance
of the down payment.
6. Based on the two letters, the determination of the terms of payment of the
P278,448.00 had yet to be agreed upon on or before December 31, 1972, or
even afterwards, when the parties sign the corresponding contract of
conditional sale.
7. There is no evidence on record to prove that XEI or OBM and the
respondents had agreed, after December 31, 1972, on the terms of payment
of the balance of the purchase price of the property and the other substantial
terms and conditions relative to the sale. Indeed, the parties are in
agreement that there had been no contract of conditional sale ever executed
by XEI, OBM or petitioner, as vendor, and the respondents, as vendees.
8. We reject the submission of respondents that they and Ramos had intended
to incorporate the terms of payment contained in the three contracts of
conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers in the corresponding
contract of conditional sale, which would later be signed by them. We have
meticulously reviewed the respondents complaint and find no such allegation
therein. Indeed, respondents merely alleged in their complaint that they were
bound to pay the balance of the purchase price of the property in
installments. When respondent Manalo, Jr. testified, he was never asked, on
direct examination or even on cross-examination, whether the terms of
payment of the balance of the purchase price of the lots under the contracts
of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers would form part of
the corresponding contract of conditional sale to be signed by them
simultaneously with the payment of the balance of the downpayment on the
purchase price.
9. We note that, in its letter to the respondents dated June 17, 1976, or almost
three years from the execution by the parties of their August 22, 1972 letter
agreement, XEI stated, in part, that respondents had purchased the property
on installment basis. However, in the said letter, XEI failed to state a specific
amount for each installment, and whether such payments were to be made
monthly, semi-annually, or annually. Also, respondents, as plaintiffs below,
failed to adduce a shred of evidence to prove that they were obliged to pay
the P278,448.00 monthly, semi-annually or annually. The allegation that the
payment of the P278,448.00 was to be paid in installments is, thus, vague
and indefinite. Case law is that, for a contract to be enforceable, its terms
must be certain and explicit, not vague or indefinite.
10. Respondents, as plaintiffs below, failed to allege in their complaint that
the terms of payment of the P278,448.00 to be incorporated in the
corresponding contract of conditional sale were those contained in the
contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and Soller, Aguila and
Roque.[76] They likewise failed to prove such allegation in this Court.
11. The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of
the purchase price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly
installments does not constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give
the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment of the
P278,448.00.
12. Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence
that one did a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that
he did the same or similar thing at another time, although such
evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or
the intent of the parties.
13. However, respondents failed to allege and prove, in the trial court, that, as a
matter of business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all lot
buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase price in installments of
120 months of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and that XEI and
the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to the
sale of the two lots in question. Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence
the three contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers
merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as sales
agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern
of conduct on the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to
pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in 120 months. It further
failed to prove that the trial court admitted the said deeds as part of the
testimony of respondent Manalo, Jr.
14. In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and
sufficiently regular, the key criteria are adequacy of sampling and
uniformity of response. After all, habit means a course of behavior of a
person regularly represented in like circumstances.It is only when
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

examples offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous

enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples are
admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity
of response or ratio of reaction to situations.
15. However, the respondents inexplicably failed to adduce sufficient competent
evidence to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct of XEI to justify the use
of the terms of payment in the contracts of the other lot buyers, and thus
grant respondents the right to pay the P278,448.00 in 120 months,
presumably because of respondents belief that the manner of payment of
the said amount is not an essential element of a contract to sell.

DISPOSITION: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47458 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98 is ordered
to dismiss the complaint. Costs against the respondents.

DOCTRINE: IN BOLD

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Pineda, G.R. No., May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 478
FACTS:
1. The Information charged appellant, along with Celso Sison y Lloren (Sison),
Victor Emmanuel Colet (Colet), Totie Jacob (Jacob), John Doe and Peter
Doe, with the crime of Highway Robbery resulting in Homicide.
Version of Prosecution:
1. At around 7:00 p.m. of 15 October 1997 while bus driver Camilo Ferrer
(Ferrer) was driving his assigned passenger bus, the Dreamline Aircon Bus,
accused Rolando Pineda (Accused Pineda) and his five companions
boarded the bus along Quirino Highway near Lagro. After the bus conductor
Jimmy Ramos (Ramos) had collected the passengers individual fares,
accused Pineda rose from his seat and held driver Ferrer by the neck while
poking a gun at his nape and announced a hold-up. Accused Pineda
instructed his companions to close all the windows and bus curtains and
commanded the passengers to bow down their heads.
2. While the bus was somewhere in Malaria, Caloocan City, a commotion
ensued inside the bus when one passenger later identified as Victim SPO1
Arnel Fuensalida grappled with one of the hold-uppers for the possession of
his clutch bag containing his service firearm. When the bus was in Pangarap
Village, Caloocan City, six shots rang out. Ferrer kept on driving until
accused Pineda ordered him to stop the bus upon reaching Sampaguita
Street, Caloocan City where all the malefactors alighted with their loot
including victim Fuensalidas service firearm i.e. a caliber .38 Smith and
Wesson revolver.
3. The passengers all alighted at the Tungko Police Station, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan. For lack of jurisdiction the police officers referred Ferrer,
Ramos and the crying lady to Malaria Police Station, Caloocan City. The
police officers after looking at the victims cadaver and conducting an initial
investigation referred them to the Urduja Police Station. An ocular inspection
of the bus disclosed the lifeless body of victim lying facedown on the
flooring. Police investigators took down on the same day the sworn
statements of Ferrer and Ramos as well as that of the private complainant
Amalia Fuensalida (Private Complainant).
4. It came to pass that P/Supt. Benjamin Cabiltes, Chief of Urduja Police Sub-
Station 4 and other operatives of the Special Operations Group conducted a
follow-up investigation of the case. Based on an information by one of the
passengers, one of the robbers called was called Totie, which the San Jose
del Monte police identified as Totie Jacob, a member of the gang of accused
Rolando Pineda who with another companion named Celso Sison was said
to be detained at the Municipal Jail of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan for
another case of robbery who were out on bail. The picutes of Pineda and
Sison were shown to Ferrer, who positively identified the duo as two of the
six malefactors involved in the robbery with homicide in question.
5. With the above findings together with the sworn statements of witnesses and
the Joint Affidavits of the police officers and other pertinent documents such
as the Death Certificate of victim, the case against accused Rolando Pineda,
Celso Sison, Victor Colet, Totie Jacob, and two Does, John and Peter, were
referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor which resulted in the filing of
instant charge against the aforenamed accused after a preliminary
investigation conducted by Asst. City Prosecutor Sancho G. Lomadilla.
Version of the Defense:
1. On that day, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., accused was in the house of one
Victor Inting Villena where he installed the electrical wiring per contract with
contractor Lillian Tan. He never left his said place of work. After work at
around 5pm, he went home and at around 6pm he went to the nearby house
of Lilian Tan where he stayed until 9pm when he went home. He slept at
around 10pm. Pineda claims that he had no previous encounter or quarrel
with these FERRER and RAMOS and did not know them prior to the
incident. He claims that the charges against him was just fabricated and he
was being framed by the police). Celso Sision was instrumental for his arrest
for alleged violation of P.D. 1866 filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan which was subsequently dismissed after he posted
the required bailbond; He was again framed-up by the police when he was
arrested for allegedly concealing a deadly weapon and assault where in
Inquest Prosecutor Acua ordered his release as no evidence was
confiscated from his person. His alleged involvement in the instant case was
not even brought up by police operatives during his custodial investigation
before Prosecutor Acua and in furtherance of the police efforts to file trump-
up charge against him the Caloocan City Police Station implicated him for
alleged Violation of P.D. 1866 and Robbery which allegedly happened on 5
September 1997 despite the fact that he was detained as early as 5 August
1998 at the Caloocan City Jail. While in jail he met fellow inmate Efren
Quiton from Bulacan who expressed surprise on why he was implicated in
the instant case as he claimed to know what really happened and the
persons really involved in this case and volunteered to testify for him in
Court.
2. The other defense witness Efren Quiton corroborated the testimony of the
Accused relative to his getting acquainted with him at the City Jail and his
knowledge about the offense for which he (accused) was being implicated.
Quiton testified that a police officer approached him and asked whether he
saw Boyet Tartaro, Victor Colet and one Tito who were said to be the
suspects in the bus hold-up incident wherein one policeman was killed and
that the name of the Accused Pineda was never mentioned as among those
he suspected.
3. After the defense was deemed to have rested its case following the
admission of its formal offer of evidence, a Motion To Reopen Trial was filed
for the purpose of admitting newly discovered evidence brought about by the
arrest of accused Victor Emmanuel Colet. The case was set anew for the
reception of Accused Pineda’s additional evidence which consists solely of
the testimony of co-accused Colet to corroborate his defense of alibi.
4. On the day of the incident, Colet boarded the bus for the purpose of going
home, he noted the presence of Celso Sison, Spencer and Totie Jacob
inside the bus. Totie suddenly stood up and declared a hold-up. Colet
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
claimed that his co-accused Pineda was neither a passenger of the bus, nor
one of the six hold-uppers and that he did not see PINEDA at anytime on
that evening of 15 October 1997. On cross-examination, Colet explained that
while stooping down, he managed to peep surreptitiously and saw Roberto
Sison @ Boyet Tartaro @ Celso Sison shooting the policeman victim who
was then in seating position with his .38 caliber handgun.
5. The trial court ruled that the proper charge is robbery with homicide. It found
the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos positive, spontaneous and forthright
and observed that they remained steadfast and convincing despite the rigid
cross-examination by defense counsel and the clarificatory questions of the
trial court judge. After evaluating the evidence, the trial court convicted
appellant and acquitted Colet.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N prosecution witnesses positively identified Pineda as one of the
perpetrators – NO
2. W/N trial court erred in giving probative weight and value to the testimonies
of Camilo Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos despite being inconsistent on material
and relevant points and being untruthful to the court - YES
3. W/N evidence from a different, independent crime can be used in a
present case - NO
RATIO:
1. A conviction for a crime rests on two bases: (1) credible and convincing
testimony establishes the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime; and (2) the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that all
elements of the crime are attributable to the accused.
2. The trial courts conviction of appellant fails in both bases.
ISSUES 1 & 2:
1. The police invited Ferrer to identify the perpetrators of the crime from
photographs the police showed to him. Ramos also gave a statement to the
police but he admitted that he could not identify any of the perpetrators. The
police later arrested appellant based on an out-of-court identification by
Ferrer. Ferrer first identified appellant and Sison through mug shots the
police presented to them, who only showed the photographs of appellant
and his co-accused Sison.
2. In resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors: (1) the witness opportunity to view the perpetrator of the
crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at the time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty shown by the
witness of his identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series
of photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect. The
second rule directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their
arrangement and display should in no way suggest which one of the pictures
pertains to the suspect. Where a photograph has been identified as that of
the guilty party, any subsequent corporeal identification of that person may
be based not upon the witnesss recollection of the features of the guilty
party, but upon his recollection of the photograph. A recognition of this
psychological phenomenon leads logically to the conclusion that where a
witness has made a photographic identification of a person, his subsequent
corporeal identification of that same person is somewhat impaired in value,
and its accuracy must be evaluated in light of the fact that he first saw a
photograph
3. In the present case, there was impermissible suggestion because the
photographs were only of appellant and Sison. The police obviously
suggested the identity of the accused by showing only appellant and Sisons
photographs to Ferrer and Ramos. The testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos
show that their identification of appellant fails the totality of circumstances
test. The out-of-court identification of appellant casts doubt on the
testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos in court.
4. The trial court relied on the testimonies of Ferrer and Ramos to prove that
appellant is one of the perpetrators. On closer examination, we see that
Ferrer and Ramos failed to establish that what they saw of the perpetrators
is sufficient to produce an accurate memory of the incident. During direct
examination, Ferrer testified that one of the perpetrators, who poked a gun
at his nape, did not allow him to turn back his head. There was limited
opportunity for Ferrer, while driving the bus, to see the perpetrators. Ferrers
identification of the perpetrator is inconsistent on how he saw the
perpetrator, through the rearview mirror or by looking back at him
5. Ramos testified that he saw how appellant and his companions robbed the
passengers and killed Fuensalida. However, even if during trial Ramos
pointed to appellant as the perpetrator, an examination of Ramos testimony
shows that he did not actually see, much less remember, the faces of the
perpetrators
6. A well-known authority in eyewitness identification made a list of 12 danger
signals that exist independently of the identification procedures investigators
use. These signals give warning that the identification may be erroneous
even though the method used is proper. The list is not exhaustive.1
1 The witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;
a. the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made no
accusation against him when questioned by the police;
b. a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness original
description and the actual description of the accused;
c. before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously identified
some other person
d. other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;
e. before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify him;
f. before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited opportunity to
see the accused;
g. the witness and the person identified are of different racial groups;
h. during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the witness
was unaware that a crime was involved;
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

7. Three of these danger signals apply to the prosecution witnesses reasonable doubt. His immediate release is ordered, unless there are other valid
identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Ramos originally causes for his continued detention.
stated that he could not identify any of the perpetrators. Ferrer had a limited
opportunity to see the perpetrators before the robbery started. When he first DOCTRINE: In bold
saw appellant, Ferrer had no inkling that appellant would rob them
8. The defense of denial and alibi is futile in the face of positive identification of
the accused. It assumes importance where the evidence for the prosecution
is weak and there is no positive identification of the accused as in this case.
9. While it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the
crime, corroboration of his alibi comes from three separate sources: Tan,
Quiton, and Colet. Tan corroborated appellants testimony on his
whereabouts at the time of the crime. Quiton testified that a day after the
crime, he was asked by SPO4 Mario Larenas if he had knowledge of the
whereabouts of Boyet Tartaro, Kulit and Tito. SPO4 Larenas approached
Quiton because he knew that Quiton was acquainted with the three. SPO4
Larenas did not mention appellants name as one of the suspect. Colet, on
the other hand, claimed to have knowledge of the crime and the perpetrators
as he was a bus passenger at the time of the crime. He testified that
appellant was not a perpetrator in the crime and absolved him from liability.

ISSUE 3 (RELEVANT):
1. In its attempt to pin the crime on appellant, the prosecution dug up other
criminal cases filed against appellant. Appellant was previously charged with
robbery and illegal possession of a deadly weapon, concealing a deadly
weapon, and assault, for which he was released after posting bond. Section
34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is instructive on this point:
a. SEC. 34. Similar acts as evidence. ─ Evidence that one did or did
not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he
did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it
may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity,
plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
2. Evidence is not admissible when it shows, or tends to show, that the
accused in a criminal case has committed a crime independent from
the offense for which he is on trial. A man may be a notorious criminal,
and may have committed many crimes, and still be innocent of the
crime charged on trial
3. Section 14, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. An accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to discharge its
burden of proof. We hold that appellant is entitled to a mandatory acquittal.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the trial

court is REVERSED. Appellant Rolando Pineda y Manalo is ACQUITTED on

i. a considerable time elapsed between the witness view of the criminal and
his identification of the accused;
j. several persons committed the crime; and
k. the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Estibal, G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014
FACTS:
1. Estibal, 43 years old, was accused of raping his 13yo daughter.
2. Prosecution presented four witnesses:
a. The medico-legal who testified that she examined the victim and
results show penertration and trauma to the hymen;
b. Two men from Barangay Security Force who testified that in the
evening of Feb 2009, AAA and BBB went to them to narrate the
incident of rape that happened, and that they arrested the accused
thereafter
c. Police officer assigned to PNP Women and Children Protection
Center, who testified that she took down the sworn statement of
AAA, and that in the narration she said that AAA and BBB were
crying when AAA told her that she was raped by the accused since
Grade 3. Police officer said, that according to her training and from
her observations of AAA’s demeanor, she’s telling the truth
3. During the pre-trial and trial, BBB, wife of the accused-appellant and mother
of AAA, the minor victim, disclaimed any further interest to pursue the case.
Her reasons were that she pitied the accused-appellant and, according to
her, AAA had already forgiven her father. They didn’t appear in court and all
the subpoenas issued was returned unserved.
4. Accused only presented denial. He said that he and his wife are security
guards, and that his wife was on night duty the night of the alleged rape, and
that he slept with his two children around midnight.
5. RTC ruled for the accused’s conviction. The Court relied on the Police
Officer's testimony of what AAA narrated to her, the RTC considered the
spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA as confirmed by the police
officer as part of the res gestae.
6. Accused, on appeal said that there’s failure to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt since the prosecution’s testimonies were all hearsay and
does not fall under the exception of res gestae.
7. CA upheld RTC decision. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses form
part of the res gestae, although none of them was a participant, victim or
spectator to the crime.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N the prosecution’s witnesses’ testimonies were all hearsay? YES
2. W/N the it falls within the ambit of res gestae? NO
RATIO:
1. The testimonies must be dismissed as hearsay, since AAA’s statements
were not subjected to cross-examination consistent with the constitutional
right of the accused-appellant to confront the evidence against him.
2. Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that the
original declarant was not placed under oath or affirmation, nor subjected to
cross-examination by the defense, except in a few instances as where the
statement is considered part of the res gestae.
a. It is an immemorial rule that a witness can testify only as to his own
personal perception or knowledge of the actual facts or events. His
testimony cannot be proof as to the truth of what he learned or
heard from others.
b. Furthermore, Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights guarantees that “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x
x to meet the witnesses face to face x x x.” By allowing the accused
to test the perception, memory, and veracity of the witness, the trial
court is able to weigh the trustworthiness and reliability of his
testimony.
3. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called
upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the
credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity
and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
4. The rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there
was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have
been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against
a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is
hearsay just the same.
a. Which is why Section 1 R132 requires that all the witnesses in a
judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath and
affirmation; and
b. Section 6 R132 requires all the witnesses by subject to the cross-
examination by the adverse party
5. The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns
about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not
being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being
subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant
or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out of-court statement
depends.
Res Gestae
6. The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations
must have been “voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly
contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they
illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as
necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation.”
a. Three essential requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae,
be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3)
that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediate attending circumstances
b. There is no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be
determined although a number of factors have been considered,
including, but not always confined to
i. the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act
or transaction and the making of the statement,
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

ii. the place where the statement is made,

iii. the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given,
iv. the presence or absence of intervening events between
the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and
v. the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself.
c. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event
that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction
itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.
d. In this case, AAA’s statements to the barangay tanod and the
police do not qualify as part of res gestae in view of the missing
element of spontaneity and the lapse of an appreciable time
between the rape and the declarations which afforded her sufficient
opportunity for reflection.
i. there was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or instinctive
about the declarations which AAA made since it was a re-
telling of what she had already confessed to her mother
earlier that afternoon
ii. It is obvious that AAA had by then undergone a serious
deliberation, prodded by her mother, whose own outrage
as the betrayed wife and grieving mother so emboldened
AAA that she finally resolved to emerge from her fear of
her father.
7. Since the inculpatory facts were susceptible of two or more interpretations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence
does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction, the
accused is acquitted.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Anecito Estibal y Calungsag is hereby
ACQUITTED. His immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless
he is being held for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate
implementation, who is then directed to report to this Court the action he has taken
within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Lumaho, G.R. No. 208716, September 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 542
FACTS:
1. Involves the Rape of a 7-year old by her father.
2. Information reads: “That sometime in the morning of December, 2007, at
Nuntiguing, Panubtuban, Asipulo, Ifugao, hence, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused DID then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by force and intimidation have sexual intercourse
with one [AAA], a minor, seven (7) years of age, at the time of the
commission of the offense and a daughter of the accused, against her will
and consent.”
3. The victim, AAA, then 7-years-old,narrated that her father, accused Lumaho,
raped her sometime in December 2007.
a. That she was staying in her grandfather’s house in Panubtuban,
Asipulo, Ifugao, when she decided to visit her father Lumaho in his
house located also in Panubtuban. Upon reaching his house, she
narrated that Lumaho brought her to a shanty and he removed her
shirt, pants and panty. He then had carnal knowledge of AAA by
inserting his penis inside her vagina.
4. The crime eventually came to the knowledge of BBB (distant grandmother),
prompting BBB and AAA to go to the police station to report the crime.
Afterwards, AAA was brought to the hospital for medical examination.
Though the victim failed to recall the exact date of the commission of rape,
she remembered that it happened in December because she was on a
school vacation and Christmas carols were being played during that time.
a. The prosecution presented its last witness, BBB. BBB testified that
she is the first cousin of the grandmother of AAA. She testified that
sometime in March 2008, AAA’s cousin, CCC, went to her and told
her about the rape incident committed against AAA. Out of pity, she
brought AAA to the police station to report the crime.
b. In her presence, AAA narrated to the investigating officers that she
(AAA) was sexually abused by her own father Lumaho.
5. The prosecution likewise presented Dr. Mae Codamon-Diaz (Dr. Diaz), the
medico-legal expert assigned at Ifugao Provincial Hospital who examined
AAA. Dr. Diaz narrated that on 28 January 2008, she examined AAA in
relation to her complaint of sexual abuse against her father. Upon receipt of
such information, she interviewed AAA and elicited from her that she was
sexually abused by her father one month ago.
6. The defense presented its lone witness Roland Bennog (Bennog) to prove
that the accused Lumaho was not present in his house in Nuntiguing,
Asipulo when the alleged rape happened. He testified that from August 2007
until 3 January 2008, Lumaho was with him in his house located at Naddug,
Panubtuban, Asipulo, Ifugao. He stated that it would take at around 20 to 30-
minutes to travel from Naddug to Nuntiguing through hiking.
7. RTC: Convicted Lumaho. Imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without the benefit of parole in lieu of the non-imposition of the
death penalty.
8. CA: On 30 May 2013, the appellate court modified the ruling of the trial court
as to the imposition of amount of moral and exemplary damages. (Moral
increased from 50K to 75K; Exemplary increased from 25K to 30K).
ISSUE/HELD: WON BBB’s testimony is Hearsay? NO.
RATIO:
1. In the same way, we also dismiss the [defense’s] argument of hearsay
evidence.
a. The defense is trying to suggest that BBB’s knowledge of AAA’s
sexual abuse is only hearsay. It emphasized BBB’s answer during
cross-examination that the first part of her testimony was related
only by CCC.
b. An evidence is considered hearsay if its probative value is not
based on personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge
of some other person not on the witness stand. A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge and derived from his own perception.
c. Upon review of the records, BBB indeed testified that the first
portion of her statement was related only by CCC. However, the
defense failed to specify with particularity which of the first portion
was hearsay. Contrary to the allegation of the defense, what is
apparent is the narration of BBB that she personally heard from
AAA herself, during police investigation, that she was abused by
her father. And this statement obviously does not fall within the
ambit of hearsay.
Other Matters
1. AAA’s positive identification of her father as the person who had carnal
knowledge of her in the shanty was done in open court. In straightforward,
positive narration, she was able to convey, despite her tender age, the
essential details to convict the accused. Jurisprudentially settled is the
principle that if a victim's testimony is straightforward, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by
any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility and
the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.
2. AAA’s narration was strengthened by the testimony of Dr. Diaz, Medico-
Legal.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 30 May 2013 Decision or
the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR-HC No. 05214 modi rying the judgment of
conviction dated 5 September 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Lagawe,
lfugao is hereby AFFIRMED with FURTHER MODIFICATION on the amounts of civil
indemnity and damages, and imposition of six percent (6%) interest from finality or
judgment until fully paid.
DOCTRINES:
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

1. An evidence is considered hearsay if its probative value is not based on

personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other
person not on the witness stand. A witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge and derived from his own
perception.
2. The defense failed to specify with particularity which of the first portion was
hearsay. Contrary to the allegation of the defense, what is apparent is the
narration of BBB that she personally heard from AAA herself, during police
investigation, that she was abused by her father. And this statement
obviously does not fall within the ambit of hearsay.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Espineli v. People, G.R. No. 179535, June 29, 2014
FACTS:
1. An Information charging petitioner Jose Espineli (a.k.a. Danilo "Danny"
Espineli) with the crime of murder was filed before the RTC.
2. In the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto Berbon y Downie
(Alberto), a 49-year old Senior Desk Coordinator of the radio station
DZMM, was shot in the head and different parts of the body in front of
his house in Imus, Cavite by unidentified malefactors who immediately
fled the crime scene on board a waiting car.
3. Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) arrested and took into custody one Romeo Reyes
(Reyes) for the crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon.
4. Reyes confided to the group of Atty. Dizon that he was willing to give
vital information regarding the Berbon case.
a. In due course, NBI Agent Dave Segunial (NBI Agent Segunial)
interviewed Reyes and reduced his statement into writing
(Sinumpaang Salaysay of Reyes), whereby Reyes claimed that
on December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes
(Paredes) board a red car while armed with a .45 caliber
firearm and armalite, respectively; and that petitioner told
Paredes that "ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si
Berbon."
b. Reyes posted bail and was released. Thenceforth, he jumped bail
and was never again heard of.
5. The victim's widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) likewise testified.
a. According to her, sometime in the third week of February 1997,
Reyes sought financial help so he could transfer his family to the
province and protect them from any untoward consequence that
may result from his giving information to the NBI regarding the
death of Sabina's husband.
i. Sabina gave him the total amount of P1,500.00 and
promised to help him in applying for the witness protection
program.
ii. This was affirmed on the witness stand by Sabina's
brother, Bartolome Pakingan.
b. After that, however, Reyes never came back.
6. Rodolfo Dayao (Rodolfo), testified that he sold his red Ford Escort car to
three persons who came to his residence in the afternoon of September 1,
1996.
a. He later identified the said car from the photographs presented to
him by the police officers.
7. Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat (Dr. Lagat), the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who
conducted a post-mortem examination on Alberto, declared in his Autopsy
Report that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the head and
body. He also stated that based on the size of the gunshot wounds or
entrance, high-powered guns were used in the killing.
8. Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence for his defense.
a.
Instead, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court.
b.
As no action whatsoever was taken thereon by the trial court,
petitioner just moved that the case be deemed submitted for
decision.
9. RTC → GUILTY of MURDER
10. CA → GUILTY of HOMICIDE
a. On the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength: none
of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was perpetrated.
b. On the aggravating circumstance of nighttime as the time of the
commission of the crime: not alleged in the Information.
ISSUE: W/N the prosecution has amply proved by circumstantial evidence
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING + RATIO: YES
1. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in
issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence
established."
2. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
would be sufficient to convict the offender if:
a. (1) there is more than one circumstance;
b. (2) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and
c. (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
3. All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent.
4. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided
that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others as the guilty person.
5. The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of
Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to render their verdict of
conviction on circumstantial evidence.
6. In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken
chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner, to the
exclusion of all others, is the guilty person are the following:
a. (1) In the morning of December 15, 1996, petitioner was heard
telling his co-accused Sotero Paredes (Sotero) "ayaw ko nang
abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" before boarding a red car.
Sotero was holding an armalite rifle while petitioner was armed with
a .45 caliber pistol;
b. (2) The said red car was identified or recognized by prosecution
witness Rodolfo to be the same car he had sold to Sotero;
c. (3) The victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day (December
15, 1996) by unidentified gunmen who thereafter immediately fled
riding a red car; and
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
d. (4) Post-mortem examination of the victim's body showed that he
sustained multiple gunshot wounds, the nature, severity and
characteristics of which indicate that they were inflicted using high-
powered guns, possibly an armalite rifle and .22 caliber pistol.
Circumstance #1:
7. NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and reduced the
latter's statement into writing declaring
8. Petitioner takes vigorous exception to the said findings, insisting that the said
sworn statement belongs to the category of hearsay evidence and therefore
inadmissible. He asserts that its contents were never confirmed or
authenticated by Reyes, thus, it lacks probative value → WRONG
9. While the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by
another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the
fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is
otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is
merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such
statement, was made.
a. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is
relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the
hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown.
b. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement
is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to
the existence of such a fact. This is known as the doctrine of
independently relevant statements.
10. In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial cannot be
regarded as hearsay evidence.
a. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial's testimony was
not presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for
the purpose of establishing that Reyes executed a sworn
statement containing such narration of facts.
b. Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is
incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes' statement.
c. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of
an independently relevant statement.
d. In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as
evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.
e. Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized document
having been duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A.
Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI.
Circumstance #2:
11. The identification and recognition through photograph by Rodolfo of the
1971 Ford Escort red colored car as the same car he had sold to Sotero
clearly and convincingly prove that it was the very same red car used in the
killing of Alberto on December 15, 1996.
Circumstance #3:
12. Alberto was shot and killed on December 15, 1996 and the gunmen
immediately fled the scene riding a red car which was identified as the same
car previously sold by Rodolfo to Sotero.
Circumstance #4:
13. Though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the post-mortem
examination of the cadaver of Alberto, his findings that the victim suffered
multiple gunshot wounds and that the same were caused by high-powered
guns, served as corroborative evidence and contributed in a significant way
in establishing the level of proof that the law requires in convicting petitioner.
Circumstance #5 (not found by the RTC/CA):
14. Petitioner's escape from detention while the case was pending can also be
considered as another circumstance since it is a strong indication of his guilt.
Conclusion:
15. All told, this Court finds the concordant combination and cumulative effect of
the alleged established circumstances, which essentially were the same
circumstances found by the trial court and the appellate court, to have
satisfied the requirement of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, the incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an
unbroken chain of events enough to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner
was responsible for the killing of the victim.
16. The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner is guilty only of the crime of
homicide in view of the prosecution's failure to prove any of the alleged
attendant circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nighttime.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Petition is hereby
DENIED. The Decision dated July 6, 2007 and Resolution dated September 14, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that petitioner JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO "DANNY" ESPINELI
is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ALBERTO BERBON y DOWNIE
P50,000.00 as moral damages as well as interest on all the damages assessed at the
legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
DOCTRINES:
1. While the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another
person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in
the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made, regardless of the truth
or falsity of the statement.
2. Evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for
the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact. This is known as the doctrine of
independently relevant statements.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 135
FACTS:
1. Anna Patula was charged with estafa under an information filed in the RTC
of Dumaguete.
2. The information stated that Patula was a sales representative of Footluckers
Chain of Stores and having received a sum of 131K from several customers,
under express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver
it to the company, she did not comply despite repeated demands and failed
to give the money and that she misappropriated it for herself to the prejudice
of the company.
3. Patula pleaded not guilty. At pre-trial there was no stipulations of facts and
she did not avail of a plea bargain. Then the trial started.
4. Prosecution only had 2 witnesses.
a. First witness Lamberto Go, the branch manager, testified that
since Patula was a Sales Rep she was authorized to take orders
and collect payments from wholesale customers from different
towns. She could issue and sign official receipts which she would
then remit and submit for reconciliation. Her first volume of sales
were high but then it dropped and when confronted why, she said
business was slow. This made Go verify with accounting and the
clerk found erasures on the receipts. She was then subjected to
audit by the company (by Guivencan). He learned from a customer
that the customer outstanding balance was fully paid but it was
indicated unpaid in the company records. One night Patula with her
parents went to his house and denied misappropriating the money
and pleaded with him not to push through with the case against her
— promising to settle on a monthly basis. After that she didn’t settle
and just stopped going to work.
b. (Important) Second witness Karen Guivencan, the store auditor,
testified that at Go’s request, she audited Patula and did this by
going to the customers and it was then that she discovered that the
amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the
possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts
written on the duplicate copies of the receipts Patula submitted to
the office. After she submitted to Go a report that stated the
misappropriated amount of 131K+.
5. During Guivencan’s stint as a witness, the prosecution marked the ledgers of
Patula’s customers with the indicated discrepancies.
6. To establish the elements of estafa, the Prosecution presented the
testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various documents consisting of:
(marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive):
a. the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers
upon their payment,
b. the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with
the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the
payments, and
c. the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself
1. During Guivencia’s direct-examination, Patula’s counsel interposed a
continuing objection on the ground that the ledgers were hearsay because
the people who made the entries were nit presented in court. With that, her
counsel didn’t cross-examine Guivencan anymore regarding her testimony
as irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification— an offense
not alleged in the information.
2. Both parties rested their case and submitted it for decision.
3. RTC: Guilty of Estafa. Patula had opted not to present evidence for her
defense the Prosecution’s evidence remained unrefuted and uncontroverted.
MR denied.
ISSUE/HELD: WON the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the information? NO.
RATIO:
1. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the
amounts actually received by Petula from the customers or remitted by
Petula to Footluckers. This means that persons other than Guivencan
prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive.
2. Guivencan could not honestly identify Petula’s signature on the receipts
either because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she
had not seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts.
3. There was lack of proper authentication as to the ledgers the Prosecution
presented to prove the discrepancies between the amounts Patula had
allegedly received from the customers and the amounts she had actually
remitted to Footluckers. Guivencan exclusively relied on the entries of the
unauthenticated ledgers to support her audit report on petitioners supposed
misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of independent
knowledge of the veracity of the entries.
4. Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts
supposedly issued by Petula and in the ledgers held by Footluckers
corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of
some of the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified
on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to
validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of
Petula’s misappropriation or conversion through cross examination by
Petula’s counsel.
5. The denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation
or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes
of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
6. Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can
testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules of Court.
7. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact.
The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence

due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to
its not being subjected to cross examination by the opposing counsel
to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out -
of court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out
of court statement depends. Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony
rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross
examine the declarant (dead or absent author).
8. Example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard
the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is
admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to
show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay
in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore,
between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay
rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
9. Therefore, Guivencans testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of Petula’s
misappropriation or conversion.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE AND REVERSES the

decision convicting ANNA LERIMA PATULA of estafa as charged, and ACQUITS
her for failure of the Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without
prejudice to a civil action brought against her for the recovery of any amount still
owing in favor of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.

DOCTRINE: BOLD

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Suarez y Zurita, G.R. No. 224889, October 19, 2016
FACTS:
1. Suare, Ravena and Vicencio were indicted for Murder in an information
which alleged that accused, conniving and mutually helping each other,
stabbed and killed Roger Setera on or about February 2 2011 and that killing
was qualified by treachery and abuse of superior strength
2. Prosecution witness Nancy Lauresta is an employee of 123 Videoke Bar in
Iloilo where she was working that night. Appellans Vicencio and Suarez
arrived at 9;30 then Ravena followed. Roger the victim arrived at 10:30 with
2 companions
3. 2 incidents then happened before appellants decided to leave at midnight
a. Vicencio uttered “Parts, wala sang matabo sa aton (Parts, nothing
will happen to us).” Then Suarez threw a bottle on the floor and
said “Ano guid haw (So what)”
b. As they were exiting, they were stopped by the cashier who told
them to pay first. Ravena took out a 100 peso bill and gave it. But
this wasn’t enough as the balance of 40 pesos remained and it was
Tiyay Esang who settled it later on
4. Appellants then left and proceeded to a lamppost outside which stood 3
meters away from where Nancy as was cleaning tables. Suarez broke a
bottle again and the three started to push each other
5. Roger shouted “You all go home.” Appellants made a sign to Roger with
their fingers, asking him to come closer. As Roger approached, Vicencio and
Suarez started to simultaneously and continuously box him. Ravena who
was positioned at the back of Roger delivered a stab blow to the latter’s
back. Then they all ran away
6. Prudencio (another witness) heard Roger shout that he was hit. He asked
Roger what happened and Roger replied “They stabbed me and I am
wounded!”, then he asked who stabbed him and Roger replied “the children”
7. At the police station, Roger told PO3 that he was “stabbed by three persons
he knew.” Prudencio and PO3 Minerva accompanied Roger in the
ambulance and they asked Roger who was it that stabbed him and Roger
replied that it was “Joseph Acosta” or “Janjan.” The next morning Roger died
8. P03 Minerva investigated the matter and met the attendants of the bar
including Nancy. The police then conducted a hot pursuit and were able to
arrest Suarez and Vicencio
9. Dr. Lebaquin conducted the autopsy and found that Roger sustained “stab
wound at the right lumbar area of the back which also lacerated the right
kidney…and died due to a stab wound at the right lumbar area at the back”
a. Assailant could’ve been standing directly at the back of Roger when
the stab blow was inflicted
Version of Defense:
1. Ravena was at his house washing his clothes then played basketball with
Vicencio then they went to the bar around 9pm. Suarez joined them as well.
Ravena then noticed the argument between Roger and Royroy when Roger
denied the latter’s request to buy him a drink. Royroy then told Roger “you
will have something later”
2. They chipped-in to pay the bill amounting 120 pesos but the cashier told
them that they haven’t fully paid and there was a balance of 40 pesos which
Tiyay Esang paid.
3. Suarez threw an empty bottle on the road as a reaction to the embarrassing
situation which arose from the incident. Roger then approached them and
said “Gaano kamo dodri gapaisog-isog (Are you displaying your bravery
here?).” Upon hearing this, Suarez and Vicencio fled then the Royroy
approached Roger and fought
4. Ravena heard that he was one of the suspects and then surrendered at the
police station. Suarez fled to her grandmother near the beach but police
accosted him and told him to go to the police station. Vicencio was then
arrested near his house
5. RTC found the appellants guilty as charged for murder. It ruled that the
defenses of denial and alibi could not prevail over the testimony of Nancy
who testified that she saw Ravena stab Roger while he was being punched
by Suarez and Vicencio. RTC also wrote that the testimony of Prudencio
Taño on Roger’s dying declaration effectively unmasked the identities of the
accused as his assailants
6. CA affirmed the conviction. It likewise gave evidentiary weight on Roger’s
dying declaration, as testified by Taño which revealed that Ravena was the
person who stabbed him and that Suarez and Vicencio participated in the
commission of the crime.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the commission of the
crime and the identities of the culprits? YES
2. W/N there was conspiracy? YES
3. W/N there was the qualifying circumstance of Treachery and abuse of
superior strength? NO
RATIO:
1. The Court concurs with the findings of both RTC and CA
2. Accused did not present any fact or circumstance of weight that the RTC or
CA overlooked or misapprehended which could later the finding that they
were responsible for killing Roger
3. Nancy’s identification of all accused was positive and reliable for being
based on her recognition of each of them during the incident. Despite
grueling cross-examination, she steadfastly related the occurrence and
consistently identified accused as the culprits. She is familiar with them
because they were regular customers of the bar and were all residents of the
same barangay which eliminates any possibility of mistaken identification.
She spotted them from a distance of only 3 meters away under good
visibility provided by the lighted lamppost.
4. No better indicator of the reliability and accuracy of her recollection than its
congruence with the physical evidence adduced at the trial by the post-
mortem examination conducted by Dr. Lebaquin
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

5. Aside from the testimony of Nancy, the dying declaration of Roger left
no doubt as to the identity of the perpetrator
a. Roger was very well aware of his imminent death and his
declaration to Taño that Ravena was responsible for his stab
wounds was made in the belief that he would not survive his
injury. The declarations of Roger related to circumstances
pertaining to his impending death and he would have been
competent to testify had he survived
6. Accused content that Roger’s dying declaration failed to implicate them to
the killing inasmuch as it did not specifically mention them as his assailants
– Argument is UNTENABLE
a. When Roger was first asked who stabbed him, he answered it was
the children. When he was asked a 2nd time, he categorically
pointed to Ravena as the perpetrator. Thus while appellants Suarez
and Vicencio were not named, their companion Ravena was
identified and since it was established that appellants were together
at the time of the incident, it can be safely concluded that “the
children” who Roger pointed to were Ravena, Suarez and Vicencio
7. The combined efforts of the accused were perpetrated with concerted
coordination indicating their common objective to inflict injury on Roger.
Action in concert to achieve a common design is the hallmark of conspiracy
a. All the accused flashed the dirty finger and then Suarez and
Vicencio started raining fist blows on him. Ravena then suddenly
delivered the fatal blow
8. Court upholds the finding that treachery did not attend the killing of Roger.
The fight which ensued was not planned and happened in the spur of the
moment. Cannot be declared that the boxing and stabbing were deliberately
adopted by the accused to ensure commission of the crime
9. There was also no abuse of superior strength. Prosecution failed to proffer
proof as to the relative disparity in age, size and strength, or force, except
the showing that 3 assailants, one of them Ravena was armed with a
pointed object. Neither did it present evidence to show that Roger suffered
from an inferior physical condition from which the circumstance can be
inferred—Roger was able to parry the fist blows by Suarez and Vicencio.
Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of the presence of this
circumstance
10. Accused are found guilty only of homicide.

DISPOSITION: Decision of CA is modified: accused are found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Quisayas, G.R. No. 198022, April 7, 2014, 721 SCRA 16
FACTS:
1. Quisayas and accused Sonny Gatarin were charged in an information with
Robbery with Homicide.2
2. Quisayas was arrested and pleaded guilty. Gatarin remained at large.
3. The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses:
(1) Maria Castillo, the victim’s wife; (2) Howel Umali (Umali), who allegedly
saw how the accused mauled the victim; (3) SPO3 Gregorio G. Mendoza
(SPO3 Mendoza) of the Mabini Police Station, who saw the victim lying on
the floor and the accused running away from the crime scene, and testified
on the dying declaration of Januario; (4) Dr. Catalino Ike A. Rasa Jr. (Dr.
Rasa), who attended to the victim when he was brought to the hospital; and
(5) PO1 Rogelio Dizon Coronel (PO1 Coronel), who saw the accused
running fast near the crime scene and who, likewise, testified on Januario’s
ante mortem statement.
4. Prosecution:
a. Umali was riding a bike on his way home when he saw Januario
(victim) being mauled by 2 persons. Upon seeing the incident, he
stayed in front of the church until he saw accused run away since
the police were chasing him
b. SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol
vehicle performing their routine patrol duty when they met two men,
later identified as the accused, who were running at a fast speed.
They then saw Januario lying on the street so they brought him to
the hospital. They asked Januario who hurt him and the latter
answered it was “Jay-Ar and his uncle”
i. “Jay-Ar” referring to Gatarin and “uncle” referring to
Quisayas
c. At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who
found him in critical condition. Three fatal wounds caused by a
bladed weapon were found in Januario’s body which eventually
caused his death
d. Maria Castillo, for her part, testified on how she learned of what
happened to her husband, the victim herein, the amount allegedly
2 “That on or about the 3rd day of November, 2004, at about 8:00 o’clock (sic) in the evening, at
Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Mabini, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon,
conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping each
other, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof and with
violence against or intimidation of person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, rob, and carry away cash money amounting to Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00),
Philippine Currency, belonging to Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias "Ka Maning," to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount and that on the occasion and
by reason of said robbery, the said accused with intent to kill and taking advantage of their
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with the said weapon Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias "Ka Maning," thereby inflicting upon
the latter the stab wounds to [the] anterior chest and right shoulder and right axilla, which directly
caused his death.”
stolen from her husband, as well as on the expenses and loss
incurred by reason of Januario’s death. She, further, quantified the
sorrow and anxiety the family suffered by reason of such death.
5. Quisayas denied the accusation against him. He said he was in Muntinlupa
on the date and time of the crime.
a. The prosecution’s rebuttal witness Mr. Bienvenido Caponpon,
however, belied appellant’s claim and insisted that appellant was
renting a house in Mabini, Batangas and that he was seen there
until the day the crime was committed
6. RTC: Quisayas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
a. As to the identity of the perpetrators, the court considered the
victim’s response to SPO3 Mendoza’s question as to who
committed the crime against him as part of the res gestae,
which is an exception to the hearsay rule.As to appellant’s
defense of alibi, the court gave more weight to the prosecution’s
rebuttal evidence that indeed the former was an actual resident of
Mabini, Batangas
7. CA: Affirmed
a. Contrary, however, to the RTC’s conclusion, the appellate court
considered Januario’s statement to SPO3 Mendoza, that the
accused were the ones who stabbed him and took his wallet,
not only as part of res gestae but also as a dying declaration
ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N Quisayas is quilty beyond reasonable doubt? YES but not of robbery
with homicide but of Murder.
2. W/N the requisites of a dying declaration are present? NO but the victim’s
statements may still be appreciated as part of res gestae [syllabus topic]
RATIO: [syllabus related topic starts at number 5]
1. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must
prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to
another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the
crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed.
2. First, in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide,
it is necessary that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other
essential element of the crime.In order for the crime of robbery with homicide
to exist, it must be established that a robbery has actually taken place and
that, as a consequence or on the occasion of robbery, a homicide be
committed.
3. For there to be robbery, there must be taking of personal property belonging
to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person or by using force upon on things. Both the RTC and the CA
concluded that robbery was committed based on the testimonies of Maria
Castillo, SPO3 Mendoza, and PO1 Coronel. A closer look at the testimonies
of these witnesses, however, failed to convince us that indeed robbery took
place.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
4. It is obvious that the wife of the victim, Maria Castillo, was not present at the
scene of the crime on that day. She was only informed that the incident took
place. She had no personal knowledge that Januario was robbed. No
evidence was presented to show that Januario was in possession of the
cash money at that time. The prosecution’s failure to present such evidence
creates doubt as to the existence of the money.
5. The trial and appellate courts likewise relied on the testimony of SPO3
Mendoza and PO1 Coronel on the statement of Januario after the
commission of the crime. While both policemen testified as to the dying
declaration of Januario pertaining to the cause and circumstances
surrounding his death, only PO1 Coronel testified during his direct
examination that when asked who stabbed him, Januario replied that it was
"Jay-Ar and his uncle who stabbed him and took his wallet."In response to
the Presiding Judge’s clarificatory question, however, PO1 Coronel admitted
that when he asked Januario who stabbed him, he replied that it was Jay-Ar
and his uncle. After which, no further question was asked.On the other hand,
nowhere in SPO3 Mendoza’s testimony did he talk about the alleged taking
of wallet.
6. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the evidence presented to prove
the robbery aspect of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
does not show that robbery actually took place. The prosecution did not
convincingly establish the corpus delicti of the crime of robbery.
7. To establish the fact that appellant and his co-accused killed the victim by
stabbing him with a bladed weapon, the prosecution presented Umali as an
eyewitness to the mauling incident. It was this same witness who identified
the perpetrators. The trial and appellate courts also relied on the statement
of Januario as to the circumstances of his death, testified to by PO1 Coronel
and SPO3 Mendoza as dying declaration and as part of res gestae.
8. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due
to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the
following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns the
cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is
made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is
offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's
death.
9. In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying
declaration are present. From the records, no questions relative to the
second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear that
the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death
when he made the statements. The rule is that, in order to make a
dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent
death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending
death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that
renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as
certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not
be considered as a dying declaration.
10. However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a
dying declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part of
the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact
as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether
the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.
11. The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res
gestae concur herein. When Januario gave the identity of the assailants to
SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring to a startling occurrence which is the
stabbing by appellant and his co-accused. At that time, Januario and the
witness were in the vehicle that would bring him to the hospital, and thus,
had no time to contrive his identification of the assailant. His utterance about
appellant and his co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question
of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is relevant because it identified
the accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of Januario,
perpetrated by appellant, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the Court of
Appeals Decision dated February 23, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 03593, affirming
the Regional Trial Court Decision dated June 20, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 13838,
convicting appellant Eduardo Quisayas of Robbery with Homicide. We find appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

People v. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603, January 16, 2013, 688 SCRA 646 5. The statement of Florendo made to his brother Renato has complied with
the requisites of a dying declaration. After being stabbed by accused twice
FACTS: on the chest, Florendo went home and under labored breathing, told Renato
1. Ramil Rarugal was charged of crime of murder. that it was accused who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was
2. One night, while victim Florendo was cycling along a street in QC, the an expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of his death,
accused with the use of a long double-bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo; and under the consciousness of impending death. There being nothing in the
thus, forcibly depriving him of his bicycle. Immediately thereafter, accused records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been
hurriedly fled the scene. This incident was witnessed by Roberto Sit-Jar, competent to testify had he survived. It is enough to state that the deceased
who positively identified accused in court. was at the time competent as a witness. Lastly, the dying declaration is
3. Florendo arrived home bleeding. He was quickly attended to by his siblings, offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death.
including his brother Renato. When Renato recounted the events of that 6. It is of no moment that the victim died seven days from the stabbing incident
night to the court, he testified that Florendo told him and his other relatives and after receiving adequate care and treatment, because the apparent
that it was accused who had stabbed him. He died in the hospital. proximate cause of his death, the punctures in his lungs, was a
4. In his defense, accused denied that he stabbed Florendo since he was at consequence of accused's stabbing him in the chest.
that time working as a farm administrator for the town mayor in Pangasinan.
He stated that during the period 1997 to 1998 (incident happened in 1998), DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The June 30, 2008 Decision of
he did not visit Manila at any point. On cross-examination, accused stated the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02413 is AFFIRMED. Appellant
that he was arrested (2001) in front of his house in Novaliches, Quezon City. RAMIL RARUGAL alias "Amay Bisaya" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
5. RTC found him liable. CA affirmed. of MURDER, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant
is further ordered to pay the heirs of Arnel M. Florendo the amounts of P27,896.00 as
ISSUE/HELD: Whether the accused is guilty – yes actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn
RATIO: interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until
1. The prosecution witness (Roberto) recounted the details of that fateful night fully paid.
in a "clear, straightforward and convincing [manner], devoid of any signs of
falsehood or fabrication."
2. First, prosecution witness Sit-Jar positively identified accused as the victim's
assailant in contrast to the accused's defense of denial and alibi. The
records are devoid of any indication that it was physically impossible for
accused to have been in the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.
3. Second, the victim was still alive after the stabbing incident. He had time to
reach his house and confide in his brother, witness Renato, that it was
accused who had stabbed him. Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court
provides
a. SEC. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person,
made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be
received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such
death.
4. In People v. Maglian, SC said that a dying declaration is admissible as
evidence if the following circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the
cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is
made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is
offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's
death

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Sabili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 664 Palomares, particularly regarding her assertion that the Lipa property had
been purchased solely with petitioner’s money.
FACTS 5. If the COMELEC accepts the registration of the Lipa property in her name to
1. Petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections where be accurate, her affidavit disavowing ownership thereof in favor of petitioner
he stated that he had been a resident of the city for 2 years and 8 months. was far from self-serving as it ran counter to her (and her children’s) property
2. Private respondent filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel COC interest.
claiming that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in his COC 6. Moreover, it is notable that Palomares’s assertion in her affidavit that she
and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency. and petitioner have been living in Lipa since April 2007 is corroborated by
3. Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had other evidence, including the affidavits of barangay officials and neighbors.
already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to
the scheduled local elections. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED.
4. In support of his allegation, private respondent presented (1) Certificates
regarding ownership of real property; (2) petitioners Voter Registration and
Certification (common exhibits of the parties); (3) petitioners COCs in
previous elections; (3) Certifications regarding petitioners family members;
and (4) Affidavits of Lipa City residents.
5. Petitioner also presented evidence, among which was an affidavit
executed by his common-law wife Palomares, wherein the latter swore
that she and petitioner began residing in Lipa City in 2007, and that the
funds used to purchase the Lipa property were petitioner’s personal
funds.
6. COMELEC declared petitioner disqualified.
7. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, during the pendency of which he was
elected. MR denied.
8. Petitioner argues that since the property regime between him and
Palomares is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code (based on the
parties actual contribution) as the COMELEC stressed, then Palomares’s
Affidavit expressly stating that petitioners money alone had been used to
purchase the Lipa property (notwithstanding that it was registered in her
name) was not self-serving, but was in fact, a declaration against interest.

ISSUE/HELD: WON Palomares’s affidavit was a declaration against interest -- NO

RATIO:
1. Petitioner’s argument that Palomares’s affidavit was a declaration against
interest is, strictly speaking, inaccurate and irrelevant.
2. A declaration against interest, under the Rules of Civil Procedure, refers to a
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify against the
interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time
it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed
it to be true. A declaration against interest is an exception to the hearsay
rule.
3. As such, it pertains only to the admissibility of, not the weight accorded to,
testimonial evidence.
4. Nevertheless, the court saw logic in petitioners claim that the COMELEC
had committed GADALEJ in being inconsistent in its stand regarding

24
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Lazaro v. Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 298
[ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO, assisted by her husband, ISAURO M. LAZARO;
LEONCIO D. SANTOS; ADOLFO SANTOS; NENITA S. LACAR; ANGELINA S.
SAGLES, assisted by her husband, ALBERTO SANTOS, JR.; REGINA SANTOS and
FABIAN SANTOS, petitioners v. MODESTA AGUSTIN, FILEMON AGUSTIN,
VENANCIA AGUSTIN, MARCELINA AGUSTIN, PAUL A. DALALO, NOEL A.
DALALO, GREGORIO AGUSTIN and BIENVENIDO AGUSTIN, respondents]
FACTS:
1. On November 4, 1998, petitioners Lazaro et al filed against respondents a
complaint for partition with the MTCC pf Laoag City, alleging that:
2. Simoen C. Santos is the ascendant of plaintiffs and the defendants and
married to Trinidad Duludulao.
3. He died intestate leaving a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Natividad
Nstra. Sra., Muncipality of Laoag, designated as Lot No. 10675 of the
Cadastral Survey of Laoag.
4. He had 4 legitimate children, namely:
a. Basilisisa D. Santosn and was married to Petronillo Agustin, who is
now deceased
b. Alberto D. Santos, and was married to Rizalina Guerrero, now
deceased
c. Leoncio D. Santos married to Dictinia Tabeta, still living
d. Alejandra D. Santos married to Isauro M. Lazaro, still living.
5. That in the desire of the children of Simeon C. Santos from whom the parcel
of land originated as owner, his children, namely[:] Alberto, Leoncio and
Alejandra, all surnamed Santos, consented that the parcel of land mentioned
in paragraph II of this complaint be titled in the name of Basilisa, the latter
being the eldest and so Original Certificate of Title No. 20742 in the name of
Basilisa Santos was obtained although it was agreed among them that it did
not and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole and
exclusive owner of this parcel of land, and as embodied in the Title obtained
in the name of Basilisa Santos.
6. There is a residential house constructed on the lot described in paragraph IV
of this complaint and in the construction of which plaintiff Alejandra Santos,
then still single, spent the amount of P68,308.60, while Basilisa Santos and
her children spent the amount of P3,495.00. Afterwards, Alejandra Santos
got married to Isauro M. Lazaro who was employed in a private company
and when he retired from the service, some additional constructions were
made on the residential house and lot such as a bedroom, azotea, two (2)
toilets, two (2) kitchens, a car garage, the money spent for these additional
constructions came from the earnings of the spouses Alejandra Santos-
Lazaro and Isauro M. Lazaro. The said residential house is now covered by
Tax Declaration No. 010-00225 in the names of Basilio Agustin (should be
Basilisa Agustin) and Alejandra Santos for the year 1994 with a market value
of P93,920.00 and an assessed value of zero;
7. That without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, the title of the lot
described in paragraph IV of the complaint was transferred into another title
which is now Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20695 in the names of
Modesta Agustin, Filemon Agustin, Venancia Agustin, Marcelina Agustin,
Monica Agustin, Gregorio Agustin and Bienvenido Agustin who are the
children of the late Basilisa Santos-Agustin who are herein named as
defendants with Monica Agustin now deceased represented by her children
Paul A. Dalalo and Noel A. Dalalo as defendants;
8. That during the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, plaintiff Alejandra
Santos-Lazaro informed the former, who are sisters, that the transfer of the
title covering the lot described in paragraph IV of this complaint in the name
of Basilisa Santos into the names of her children would erroneously imply
that the lot is solely and exclusively owned by Basilisa Santos-Agustin's
children, but Basilisa Santos-Agustin replied [to] plaintiff Alejandra Santos-
Lazaro not to worry because an affidavit was already executed by her
recognizing and specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos and Leoncio
Santos, and her sister Alejandra Santos-Lazaro would each get one fourth
share of the lot;
9. That Simeon C. Santos during his lifetime, married to Trinidad Duldulao,
begot four (4) legitimate children, namely: Basilisa D. Santos, Alberto D.
Santos, Leoncio D. Santos and Alejandra D. Santos. Basilisa D. Santos,
[who] was married to Petronilo Agustin, is now deceased; Alberto Santos,
married to Rizalina Guerrero, is now deceased, while Leoncio D. Santos,
married to Dictinia Tabeta, and Alejandra D. Santos married to Isauro M.
Lazaro, are still living;
10. But that the children of Basilisa Santos-Agustin and her grandchildren Paul
A. Dalalo and Noel A. Dalalo refused and opposed the partition claiming that
they are the sole and exclusive owners of the lot being that the lot is now
titled in their names, and hence there was no settlement as shown by the
certification of the barangay court hereto attached as annex A.
11. Answer of Respondents, raising the following as their special/affirmative
defenses:
a. The subject parcel of land is owned exclusively by the defendants
as heirs of the late Basilisa Santos, wife of Petronilo Agustin, who
was the original registered owner of the property evidenced by OCT
No. 20742; the plaintiffs never became owners of said land. There
was never any agreement between the ascendants of the plaintiffs
and defendants, neither is there any agreement between the
plaintiffs and defendants themselves that in the ownership, the
plaintiffs have a share over the lot;
b. The defendants are the ones paying for the real estate taxes of said
land;
c. Some of the plaintiffs were able to stay on the subject house
because defendants' mother Basilisa Santos was the eldest sibling
and she had to take care of her brother Leoncio and sister
Alejandra when these siblings were not yet employed and Basilisa
allowed them to reside in the house constructed within the lot;
Alejandra Santos stayed in the house up to the present with the
agreement that she will spend for the renovation of the house in
lieu of monthly rentals that she has to pay when she already
became financially able;
25
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
d. Prior to 1962, subject property was mortgaged by Basilisa Santos
Agustin to the Philippine National Bank and the property was
foreclosed by PNB when the loan was not paid, hence, TCT No. (T-
9522)-4495, under the name of the Philippine National Bank was
issued (Annex A). Thereafter, Basilisa Santos-Agustin, purchased it
from the PNB and TCT No. T-5662 was issued under her name
(Annex B); the property was later on transferred to her direct
descendants, the defendants herein as evidenced by TCT No. T-
20695 (Annex C);
12. On January 6, 2000, the MTCC rendered its Decision dismissing the
complaint and denying petitioners' prayer for partition.
13. The MTCC ruled, among others, that no evidentiary value could be given to
the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly
acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject property with her siblings
Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented on
the witness stand, such that all the statements made in her affidavit were
hearsay. Moreover, the MTCC held that two credible witnesses testified in
plain, simple and straightforward manner that at the time the affidavit was
supposed to have been signed and sworn to before the notary public,
Basilisa was already bedridden and an invalid who could not even raise her
hand to feed herself. In addition, the MTCC also gave credence to the
testimony of the notary public, before whom the document was supposedly
signed and sworn to, that the said affidavit was already complete and
thumbmarked when the same was presented to him by a person who
claimed to be Basilisa.
ISSUE/HELD: Whether or not the subject sworn statement of Basilisa, granting that it
refers to the property being disputed in the present case, can be give full faith and
credence in view of the issues raised regarding its genuineness and due execution?
NO.
RATIO:
1. Basilisa’s alleged sworn statement is an admission against interest.
2. Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and
declarations against interest.
3. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by
one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are
admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness.
4. Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a
party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and
constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when
the declarant is unavailable as a witness.
5. In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest
and is, thus, in privity with the latter's legal interest, the former's sworn
statement, if proven genuine and duly executed, should be considered as an
admission against interest.
6. The alleged sworn statement here is a notarized document.
7. Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and
documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
presumption of regularity.However, this presumption is not absolute and may
be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
8. Moreover, not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on
authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public
document just because it contains a notarial jurat.The presumptions that
attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular.
9. However, a question involving the regularity of notarization as well as the
due execution of the subject sworn statement of Basilisa would require an
inquiry into the appreciation of evidence by the trial court. It is not the
function of this Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative
value of the evidence presented. A question of fact would arise in such
event. Settled is the rule that questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal
via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for its
consideration.
10. The following testimonies of the witnesses were given credence by the trial
court and the CA:
a. Testimony of the Notary Lawyer backfired because he admitted
notarizing an affidavit which was already thumbmarked when
presented.
b. Testimony of Atty. Angel Respicio did not suffice to rebut the
evidence of the appellees considering his admission that the
affidavit was already thumbmarked when presented to him by one
who claimed to Basilisa Santos and whom, the witness said he did
not know her personally. Further, what makes the documents
suspect is the fact that it was subscribed on the same date as the
financial statement of Alejandra Santos.
c. A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are
impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth
of what are stated therein.
d. In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised utmost
diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person executing
the said sworn statement. However, the notary public did not
comply with this requirement. He simply relied on the affirmative
answers of the person appearing before him attesting that she was
Basilisa Santos; that the contents of the sworn statement are true;
and that the thumbmark appearing on the said document was hers.
e. However, this would not suffice. He could have further asked the
person who appeared before him to produce any identification to
prove that she was indeed Basilisa Santos, considering that the
said person was not personally known to him, and that the
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

thumbmark appearing on the document sought to be notarized was

not affixed in his presence.
f. But he did not. Thus, the lower courts did not commit any error in
not giving evidentiary weight to the subject sworn statement.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 21, 2002

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63321 is AFFIRMED.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 421 14. RTC later granted Marissa’s MR; declared the Deed of Sale void, ordered
the cancellation of the new TCTs in Antonio’s name, and directed Antonio to
FACTS: pay Marissa damages; declared the Deed of Donation in favor of Marissa
1. Sisters Anita and Peregrina were the registered co-owners of 4 covered by valid. The RTC gave credence to the medical records of Peregrina.
TCTs in Cebu City. 15. Antonio and Anita filed MR; RTC reinstated the 1st decision which favored
2. The sisters, who were based in the United States, sold the lots to their the; CA affirmed.
nephew Antonio under a Deed of Sale dated March 11, 1994. 16. [SYLLABUS-related contention] Marissa faults the appellate court for not
3. Peregrina, with SPA from Anita, went to the house of their brother, Dr. excluding the videotaped statement of Anita as hearsay evidence.
Lozada in Long Beach, California.
a. Dr. Lozada agreed to advance the purchase price of P10M for ISSUE/HELD: WON CA correctly ruled that Anita’s videotaped statement is
Antonio, his nephew. The Deed of Sale was later notarized and inadmissible -- YES
authenticated at the Philippine Consul’s Office.
b. Dr. Lozada then forwarded the deed, special power of attorney, and RATIO:
owners’ copies of the titles to Antonio in the Philippines. 1. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part,
4. Upon receipt of said documents, Antonio recorded the sale with the Register on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
of Deeds of Cebu. Accordingly, TCs were issued in the name of Antonio whom it is sought to be produced.
Lozada. 2. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence:
5. Pending registration of the deed, petitioner Marissa caused the annotation of a. Absence of cross-examination;
an adverse claim on the lots. b. Absence of demeanor evidence; and
a. Marissa claimed that Anita donated an undivided share in the lots c. Absence of oath.
to her under an unregistered Deed of Donation dated February 4, 3. It is a hornbook doctrine that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where
1987. its maker did not take the witness stand.
6. Antonio and Anita brought a case against Marissa for quieting of title with a. Verily, the sworn statement of Anita was of this kind because she
application for preliminary injunction and restraining order. did not appear in court to affirm her averments therein.
7. Marissa filed an action to declare the Deed of Sale void and to cancel TCTs. 4. Yet, a more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that
The cases were consolidated and tried jointly. they do not cover admissions of a party; the videotaped statement of Anita
8. At the trial, respondents presented a notarized and duly authenticated appears to belong to this class.
sworn statement, and videotape where Anita denied having donated a. Section 26 of Rule 130: "the act, declaration or omission of a party
land in favor of Marissa. as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
9. Dr. Lozada testified that he agreed to advance payment for Antonio in b. It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even
preparation for their plan to form a corporation. if they are hearsay.
10. The lots are to be eventually infused in the capitalization of Damasa 5. There is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and
Corporation, where he and Antonio are to have 40% and 60% stake, declaration against interest.
respectively. Meanwhile, Lourdes G. Vicencio, a witness for respondents
confirmed that she had been renting the ground floor of Anita’s house since Admissions against interest Declaration against interest
1983, and tendering rentals to Antonio.
11. For her part, Marissa testified that she accompanied Anita to the office of Made by a party to a litigation or by Made by a person who is neither a
Atty. Tomakin for the signing of the Deed of Donation. She allegedly kept it one in privity with or identified in party nor in privity with a party to
in a safety deposit box but continued to funnel monthly rentals to Peregrina’s legal interest with such party, and the suit, are secondary evidence
account. are admissible whether or not and constitute an exception to the
12. A witness for Marissa, one Dr. Cecilia Fuentes, testified on Peregrina’s the declarant is available as a hearsay rule. They are admissible
medical records. According to her interpretation of said records, it was witness. only when the declarant is
physically impossible for Peregrina to have signed the Deed of Sale on unavailable as a witness.
March 11, 1994, when she was reported to be suffering from edema.
Peregrina died on April 4, 1994. 6. Thus, a man’s acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if
13. RTC declared the absolute owner of the properties in question, and the voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to
Deed of Donation null and void; directed Marissa to surrender the original presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they
thereof to the Court for cancellation. do not.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

7. HOWEVER, as a further qualification, object evidence, such as the records appears to show that Peregrina was so incapacitated as to prevent her from
videotape in this case, must be authenticated by a special testimony executing the Deed of Sale. Quite the contrary, the records reveal that close to the
showing that it was a faithful reproduction. date of the sale, specifically on March 9, 1994, Peregrina was even able to issue
8. Lacking this, SC is constrained to exclude as evidence the videotaped checks33 to pay for her attorney’s professional fees and her own hospital bills. At no
statement of Anita. point in the course of the trial did Marissa dispute this revelation.
9. Even so, this does not detract from our conclusion concerning petitioner’s
failure to prove, by preponderant evidence, any right to the lands subject of
this case.
a. The sale between the sisters Lozada and their nephew Antonio did
not violate the public policy prohibiting aliens from owning lands in
the Philippines.
b. Even as Dr. Lozada advanced the money for the payment of
Antonio’s share, at no point were the lots registered in Dr. Lozada’s
name; nor was it contemplated that the lots be under his control for
they are actually to be included as capital of Damasa Corporation.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 23,
2006, and Resolution dated April 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV.
No. 73829 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The awards of moral damages and
exemplary damages in favor of respondents are deleted. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE:
See Table + Bolded in Ratio

[Other details on evidence just in case]

Marissa calls on the Court to ascertain Peregrina’s physical ability to execute the
Deed of Sale on March 11, 1994. This essentially necessitates a calibration of facts,
which is not the function of this Court. Nevertheless, we have sifted through the
Decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals but found no reason to overturn their
factual findings. Both the trial court and appellate court noted the lack of substantial
evidence to establish total impossibility for Peregrina to execute the Deed of Sale.

In support of its contentions, petitioner submits a copy of Peregrina’s medical records

to show that she was confined at the Martin Luther Hospital from February 27, 1994
until she died on April 4, 1994. However, a Certification from Randy E. Rice, Manager
for the Health Information Management of the hospital undermines the authenticity of
said medical records. In the certification, Rice denied having certified or having
mailed copies of Peregrina’s medical records to the Philippines. As a rule, a
document to be admissible in evidence, should be previously authenticated, that is, its
due execution or genuineness should be first shown.31 Accordingly, the
unauthenticated medical records were excluded from the evidence. Even assuming
that Peregrina was confined in the cited hospital, the Deed of Sale was executed on
March 11, 1994, a month before Peregrina reportedly succumbed to Hepato Renal
Failure caused by Septicemia due to Myflodysplastic Syndrome. Nothing in the
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Philippine Free Press v. CA, G.R. No. 132864, October 24, 2005, 473 SCRA 639
FACTS:
1. Philippine Free Press (petitioner) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
publication of Philippine Free Press Magazine, one of the widely circulated
political magazines in the Philippines. Sometime in 1963, Petitioner
purchased a parcel of land in Pasong Tamo Street, Makati. Upon taking
possession of the subject land, petitioner constructed an office building
thereon to house its various machineries, equipment, office furniture and
fixture which then became their main office.
a. Upon the election of the late President Ferdinand Marcos in 1965
and prior to the imposition of Martial law on September 21, 1972,
[petitioner] printed numerous articles highly critical of the Marcos
administration, exposing the corruption and abuses of the regime.
b. In the evening of September 20, 1972, soldiers surrounded the
Free Press Building, forced out its employees at gunpoint and
padlocked the said establishment. The soldier in charge of the
military contingent then informed Teodoro Locsin, Jr., the son of
Teodoro Locsin, Sr., the President of [petitioner], that Martial Law
had been declared and that they were instructed by the late
President Marcos to take over the building and to close the printing
press.
2. On Sep 21, 1972, Teodoro Locsin, Sr. was arrested. December, 1972,
Locsin, Sr. was informethat no charges were to be filed against him and that
he was to be provisionally released subject to the following conditions, to wit
a. He remained (sic) under city arrest;
b. He was not to publish the Philippine Free Press nor was he to do,
say or write anything critical of the Marcos administration
3. Publication of the Philippine Free Press ceased. The subject building
remained padlocked and under heavy military guard The cessation of the
publication of the magazine led to the financial ruin of petitioner.
4. Inn 1973, Locsin, Sr. was approached by the late Atty. Crispin Baizas
with offers from then President Marcos for the acquisition of the
petitioner. However, Locsin, Sr. refused the offer stating that petitioner was
not for sale.
a. Few months later, the late Secretary Guillermo De Vega
approached Locsin, Sr. reiterating Marcoss offer to purchase the
name and the assets of the petitioner.
b. Sometime during the middle of 1973, Locsin, Sr. was contacted by
Brig. Gen. Hans Menzi, the former aide-de-camp of then President
Marcos concerning the sale of the petitioner
i. Menzi once more reiterated Marcos’ offer to purchase both
the name and the assets of [petitioner] adding that Marcos
cannot be denied. Locsin, Sr. refused but Menzi
insisted that he had no choice but to sell. Locsin, Sr.
then made a counteroffer that he will sell the land, the
building and all the machineries and equipment therein but
he will be allowed to keep the name of the [petitioner].
ii. On, August 22, 1973, Menzi tendered to Locsin, Sr. a
check for P1, 000,000.00 downpayment for the sale.
Locsin, Sr. accepted the check, subject to the condition
that he will refund the same in case the sale will not push
through.
5. Board of Directors of [petitioner] held a meeting and reluctantly passed a
resolution authorizing Locsin, Sr. to sell the assets of the [petitioner] to
Menzi minus the name Philippine Free Press.
a. October 23, 1973: two (2) notarized Deeds of Sale covering the
land, building and the machineries of the [petitioner] were executed.
b. Locsin, Sr. thereafter used the proceeds of the sale to pay the
separation pay of [petitioners] employees, buy out the shares of the
minority stockholders as well as to settle all its obligations.
6. February 26, 1987, [petitioner] filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale
against [respondent] Liwayway and the PCGG before the RTC on the
grounds of vitiated consent and gross inadequacy of purchase price.
a. The trial court dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit.
7. Upon appeal it affirmed the TC decision with modification as to the deletion
of awards as to attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: W/N the testimonial evidence offered establishing threats towards
petitioner is hearsay?
RULING + RATIO: YES
1. The evidence referred to as hearsay pertains mainly to the testimonies of
Messrs. Locsin, Sr. and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. (the Locsins, collectively)
a. The widely circulated Free Press magazine declarant took the
strongest critical stand against the Marcos administration, was
closed down on the eve of such declaration, which closure
eventually drove petitioner to financial ruin;
b. upon Marcos orders, Mr. Locsin, Sr. was arrested and detained for
over 2 months without charges and, together with his family, was
threatened with execution;
c. Mr. Locsin, Sr. was provisionally released on the condition that he
refrains from reopening Free Press and writing anything critical of
the Marcos administration;
d. Mr. Locsin, Sr. and his family remained fearful of reprisals from
Marcos until the 1986 EDSA Revolution.
2. Per the Locsins, it was amidst the foregoing circumstances that petitioners
property in question was sold to private respondent, represented by Gen.
Menzi, who, before the sale, allegedly applied the squeeze on Mr.
Locsin, Sr. thru the medium of the Marcos cannot be denied and [you]
have no choice but to sell line.
a. CA’s ruling (correct): must be noted, however, that the
testimonies of Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr. regarding Menzis alleged
implied threat that Marcos cannot be denied and that [respondent]
was to be the corporate vehicle for Marcoss takeover of the Free
Press is hearsay as Menzi already passed away and is no
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

longer in a position to defend himself; the same can be said of DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged
the offers to purchase made by Atty. Crispin Baizas and decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED
Secretary Guillermo de Vega who are also both dead.
i. It is clear from the provisions of Section 36, Rule 130 of
the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence that any evidence,
is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the
knowledge of some other person not on the witness
stand. Consequently, hearsay evidence, whether objected
to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can
show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule.
3. In assessing the probative value of Gen. Menzis supposed declaration
against interest, i.e., that he was acting for the late President Marcos when
he purportedly coerced Mr. Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free Press property, we
are loathed to give it the evidentiary weight petitioner endeavors to impress
upon us. For, the Locsins can hardly be considered as disinterested
witnesses. They are likely to gain the most from the annulment of the subject
contracts. Moreover, allegations of duress or coercion should, like fraud, be
viewed with utmost caution. They should not be laid lightly at the door of
men whose lips had been sealed by death.
4. Even if petitioner succeeds in halving its testimonial evidence, one half
purporting to quote the words of a live witness and the other half
purporting to quote what the live witness heard from one already dead, the
other pertaining to the dead shall nevertheless remain hearsay in
character
a. There can be no quibbling that petitioners witnesses cannot testify
respecting what President Marcos said to Gen. Menzi about the
acquisition of petitioners newspaper, if any there be, precisely
because none of said witnesses ever had an opportunity to hear
what the two talked about
b. Neither may petitioner circumvent the hearsay rule by invoking
the exception under the declaration against interest rule. In
context, the only declaration supposedly made by Gen. Menzi
which can conceivably be labeled as adverse to his interest
could be that the was acting in behalf of Marcos in offering to
acquire the physical assets of petitioner.
i. Far from making a statement contrary to his own interest,
a declaration conveying the notion that the declarant
possessed the authority to speak and to act for the
President of the Republic can hardly be considered as a
declaration against interest.
DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement made or a
testimony is hearsay if offered against a party who has no opportunity to cross
examine the witness. Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely because the party
against whom it is presented is deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to
crossexamine the persons to whom the statements or writings are attributed.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Tandog v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 144208, September 11, 2007
FACTS:
1. Subject of the controversy is a land consisting of 147, 991 sq m situated at
Brgy Inuman, San Isidro Antipolo, where petitioners claim that, together with
their predecessors-in-interest, they have been in actual, open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land. Such claim was traced from
Casimiro Policarpio, unmarried, who died in 1945. As nephews and nieces,
they survived the deceased and continued possession nd cultivation of land.
2. Petitioners found that portions of the land have been occupied by spouses
Calderon and Renato Macapagal, respondents. Sps Calderon purportedly
used falsified documents to justify their possession of the land which they
sold to the government. For his part, Renato Macapagal applied for and was
granted Free Patent which led to the issuance to him of OCT No. P665.
Thus, petitioners filed with RTC, a complaint for quieting of title.
3. Respondent Calderon specifically denied petitioners' allegations and alleged
that she and her husband bought their property in 1958 and, since then, paid
taxes and have been in possession and cultivated the same. She does not
know petitioners who are all strangers in the place.
4. Before hearing, petitioners and Macapagal entered into a Compromise
Agreement. Petitioners acknowledged Macapagal’s ownership over the
portions of the land covered by OCT No. P665. This agreement was
approved by the trial court.
5. Sps Calderon filed demurrer which was granted and dismissed the
complaint. Thus, petitioners appealed in CA. CA held that the appellants had
nothing to show that that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow
upon the owner's title to or interest in real property. The most that they did
was to mark a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY & OR
RIGHTS OR INTERESTS THEREIN as Exh. "D" and a SPA as Exh. "E",
which allegedly are the falsified documents used by the appellees as basis
for their claim over the subject lot.
6. CA also held that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and
marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part
of the evidence of a party. Any evidence which a party desires to submit for
the consideration of the court must formally be offered by him, otherwise it is
excluded and rejected.
7. Hence, this petition.
of right based on acquisitive prescription or adverse possession has been
held to constitute a removable cloud on title.
2. Here, petitioners failed to prove that respondents’ claim of adverse
possession is a cloud on their interest in the land. The alleged falsified
documents were merely marked as exhibits but were never formally offered
in evidence by petitioners.
3. Documents which may have been marked as exhibits during the
hearing, but which were not formally offered in evidence, cannot be
considered as evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value.
4. Petitioners must first establish their legal or equitable title to, or interest in
the real property which is the subject matter of the action. Petitioners failed
to do so. They did not present any evidence to prove that Casimiro
Policarpio "existed" and that he is their predecessor-in-interest. Their
testimonies can not be considered declarations about pedigree.
5. To prove pedigree, it is necessary that (a) the actor or declarant is dead or
unable to testify; (b) the act or declaration is made by a person related to the
subject by birth or marriage; (c) the relationship between the declarant or the
actor and the subject is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration; and (d) the act or declaration was made ante litem motam, or
prior to the controversy. Petitioners failed.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the CA.
DOCTRINE:
*BOLD

ISSUE/HELD: W the allegations of Sps Calderon that they purchased their

property and Macapagal's claim that he applied for a Free Patent are judicial
admissions which are cloud upon their interest in the disputed property. NO

RATIO:
1. GR: a cloud which may be removed by suit to quiet title is not created by
mere verbal or parol assertion of ownership of or an interest in property.
There must be a written or factual basis for the asserted right. Thus, a claim

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

Herrera v. Alba, Supra liberally allowing scientific tests for proving paternity and filiation, subject to
restrictions established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence
FACTS:
1. Respondent Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of
before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also
damages (paternity suit) against Rosendo Herrera. AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June 2000 issued by Branch 48 of
2. The latter denied that he is the biological father of respondent, and asserted the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759.
that he never had any physical contact with the former’s mother.
3. A motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the DOCTRINE: The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge,
proceedings was also filed, which was grounded on the testimony of skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received in
Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D, who was the head of the University of the evidence.
Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute (“UP-NSRI”), a DNA
analysis laboratory.
4. She described the process and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate
of 99.9999% in establishing paternity. This was granted by the trial court
and affirmed by the appellate court, despite opposition by the petitioner on
the ground that the test has not gained acceptability, and that it violates his
right against self-incrimination.
5. RTC granted motion to conduct DNA Paternity Testing on Petitioner,
Respondent, and Armi Alba.
6. CA affirmed decision of the RTC and ruled that it does not violate his right
against self-incrimination.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N DNA paternity testing can be admitted as evidence YES
2. W/N the same violates the right against self-incrimination NO

RATIO:
1. Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony,
states that: “The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess may
be received in evidence.” There is no statute or Rules of Court provision
which makes such test inadmissible as evidence. Moreover, the test is
relevant to the fact in issue, in this case, a paternity test. Prior jurisprudence
have gone further as to its probative value, especially in the 2002 case of
People vs. Vallejo, where the process of DNA testing was explained in
detail. In an analysis of DNA for a paternity test, a negative result
(Probability<99.9%) is conclusive proof of non-paternity between the child
and the putative father. A positive result (Probability>99.9%), on the other
hand, is prima facie evidence of paternity.
2. The right against self-incrimination enshrined in Article III, Section 17 of the
1987 Constitution (and Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure) is only a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant. Material
evidence taken from the body is not included in this prohibition. Even the
provisions of the Family Code related to paternity and filiation of children
does not prevent the putative parent to claim his or her defenses, despite

33
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Cruz v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 140422, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 37
FACTS:
1. PETITIONERS (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the
deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are
the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to
Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, RESPONDENTS (Norberto, Florencio,
Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata
Enriquez.
2. 1926: Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of
535 square meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan,
Metro Manila, covered by a TCT (the subject property).
3. 1930: Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later,
petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial
partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names.
4. Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle, but no
settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint for Annulment of Title and
Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private
respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject
property.
5. To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the
baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were
presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born in 1909, she produced a
certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the year 1909 were
destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
6. Petitioner Elisa testified that her mother died when she was only one year
and seven months old. She lived with the sister of her father because the
latter married his second wife, Donata Enriquez. Her brother Anselmo and
sister Socorro lived with their father and the latter’s family in the subject
property. She claimed that when their father died in 1930, his brother
Anselmo stayed with her and her auntie while Socorro stayed with their
eldest sister, Mercedes, who was then married. Meanwhile, when her
stepmother Donata Enriquez died, the children from the second marriage
lived with them and her aunt Martina Cristobal. Witness testified that she is
now residing at the property subject of the present litigation. She has been
living in the said property since 1948. She claimed that there are other
houses in the area particularly those which belong to her half brothers and
sisters which were now converted into factories. She claimed that out of the
535 square meters she occupies only 36 square meters of the subject lot.
She testified that respondents divided the property among themselves
without giving the petitioners their share. She said that she was offered by
respondent Eufrosina to choose between a portion of the land in question or
money because one of the children of defendant Jose Cristobal wanted to
construct an apartment on the lot. She said that she will have to ask the
opinion of her other brothers and sisters.
7. Thereafter she made an inquiry regarding the land and she found out that
the property belonging to their father Buenaventura Cristobal had been
transferred to the defendants as evidenced by TCTs issued under the
names of Florencio Cristobal, Norberto Cristobal, Eufrosina Cristobal and
Jose Cristobal. She declared that she felt bad when she learned that the title
to the property belonging to her father had been transferred to her half
brothers and sisters with the exclusion of herself and the other children from
the first marriage.She filed a petition in the barangay to settle the issue
among themselves, however, no settlement was reached therein. This
prompted the petitioners to file the present case. On cross-examination,
petitioner Elisa Cristobal Sikat admitted that she was aware that the subject
property was owned by her father Buenaventura Cristobal even before the
latter died. She likewise stated that the respondents are the ones paying the
real estate tax due on the lot.
8. Ester Santos testified for the petitioners. In her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" she
claimed that she was a neighbor of Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro, Elisa,
Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal in San Juan, Metro
Manila. She said that she knows that Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro and Elisa
are the children of Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter’s first marriage and
the Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina, and Jose are the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter’s second marriage
9. The said witness testified that Buenaventura Cristobal and his first family
lived right across where she stayed. Witness corroborated the testimony of
Elisa Cristobal Sikat regarding that the fact that Martina Cristobal is the
sister of Buenaventura Cristobal. The said sister of Buenaventura Cristobal
allegedly took care of Elisa. Anselmo and Socorro were taken care of by
Buenaventura Cristobal and the latter’s second wife, Donata Enriquez, at P.
Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila. When Buenaventura Cristobal died
Anselmo was taken care of by Martina Cristobal together with Elisa. Socorro
on the other hand lived with Mercedes who was then married. Witness
testified that she and Elisa were classmates from Grade I until they finished
high school at the Philippine School of Commerce in Manila. When the
second wife of Buenaventura Cristobal died, Martina Cristobal took care of
Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal. Witness said that the
brothers and sisters from the first and second marriages lived together with
their aunt Martina Cristobal for a long time. When Elisa got married, she and
her husband built their house on the lot located at 194 P. Parada St., San
Juan, Metro Manila. Until at present, Elisa and her family lives in the said
vicinity. Witness Ester Santos declared that the children from the second
marriage namely Norberto, Eufrosina, Florencio and Jose built their houses
and factory at 194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila. She said that the
children from the first and second marriages of Buenaventura Cristobal had
a harmonious relationship until sometime in 1994 when petitioners and Elisa
Cristobal’s grandchildren were called "squatters" by the respondents and
their grandchildren for residing in the subject land. On cross-examination,
witness Ester Santos said she cannot recall the name of the first wife of
Buenaventura Cristobal and that she only knew them to be married although
she is not aware when.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
10. Petitioners presented Jose Cristobal to bolster the claim that they are
brothers and sisters of the respondents. He claimed that the only time when
he became aware that petitioners are his brothers and sisters was when he
lived with their aunt Martina. He said that the reason why they were giving a
portion of the lot in question to Elisa Cristobal Sikat was because the
respondents want her to have a piece of property of her own and is not an
admission that she is their sister.
11. Respondents on the other hand presented Eufrosina Cristobal as their first
witness. She testified that her parents, Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata
Enriquez were married in 1919. Out of the said union, Norberto, Florentino,
Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal were born. The witness said that in 1926, her
parents were able to buy a certain property containing 535sqm. She claimed
that her brother Norberto died on 1980 leaving his wife Marcelina and
children Buenaflor and Norberto, Jr. Eufrosina admitted having executed an
Extrajudicial Partition with her brothers and sisters of the property left by
their parents. She said that since her father died in 1930, Elisa, Mercedes,
and Anselmo never asserted their alleged right over the property subject of
the present litigation. She claimed that the respondents have been paying all
the taxes due on the parcel of land and that title to the property has been
subdivided under their respective names. On cross-examination, she said
that when their parents passed away they were taken care of by their aunt
Martina who was the sister of her father. She testified that she addressed
Elisa Cristobal as "Kaka" and that since they were kids, she had known that
the petitioners are their brothers and sisters.
12. TC: dismissed the case, petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates
presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners’ inaction for a
long time amounts to laches.
13. CA: ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal thru "other means allowed by the ROC and special
laws," but affirmed the ruling of the trial court because of laches.
ISSUE:
1. W/N petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal;
2. W/N the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition of the subject
property executed by the private respondents;
3. W/N petitioners’ right to question the Deed of Partition had prescribed; and
4. W/N petitioners’ right to recover their share of the subject property is barred
by laches.
RULING + RATIO:
1. Before anything else, it must be noted that the title of the original complaint
filed by petitioners before the RTC was denominated as "Annulment of Title
and Damages”. While the title of the complaint alone implies that the action
involves property rights to a piece of land, the prayer in the complaint
reveals that, more than property rights, the action involves hereditary or
successional rights of petitioners to their deceased father’s estate solely,
composed of the subject property. Thus, we find it practicable to rule on the
division of the subject property based on the rules of succession as prayed
for in the complaint, considering that the averments in the complaint, not the
title are controlling.
(1) The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal.
1. Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
a. (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
b. (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
2. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
a. (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
b. (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
3. "Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws,"
may consist of the child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family bible in which the child’s name has been entered, common
reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
4. Here, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were
presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary
evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909,
she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the
years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed
due to ordinary wear and tear.
5. Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that
petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they
reside as being the children of Buevaventura Cristobal with his first wife.
Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by
continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. In contrast, it bears
to point out that private respondents were unable to present any proof to
refute the petitioners’ claim and evidences of filiation to Buenaventura
Cristobal. The foregoing evidence is sufficient in that petitioners are, indeed,
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
(2) As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the
private respondents among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners, the applicable
rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the ROC, which states: The fact of the extrajudicial
settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice.
1. Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in
the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons.
In the case at bar, since the estate of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal
is composed solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the
private respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of
Buenaventura Cristobal’s estate. The partition of the subject property by the
private respondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners were
excluded therefrom. Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition
executed by private respondents among themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa
became aware of the transfer and registration of the subject property in the
names of private respondents only in 1994 when she was offered by private
respondent Eufrocina to choose between a portion of the subject property or
money, as one of the children of private respondent Jose wanted to
construct an apartment on the subject property. This led petitioner Elisa to
inquire as to the status of the subject property. She learned afterwards that
the title to the subject property had been transferred to the names of private
respondents, her half brothers and sisters, to the exclusion of herself and
her siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal. The Deed of
Partition excluded four of the eight heirs of Buenaventura Cristobal who
were also entitled to their respective shares in the subject property. Since
petitioners were not able to participate in the execution of the Deed of
Partition, which constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
late Buenaventura Cristobal by private respondents, such settlement is not
binding on them. As the extrajudicial settlement executed by the private
respondents in February 1948 did not affect the right of petitioners to also
inherit from the estate of their deceased father, it was incorrect for the trial
and appellate court to hold that petitioners’ right to challenge the said
settlement had prescribed. Respondents defense of prescription against an
action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the CC,
"no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner
may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar
as his share is concerned." In Budlong v. Bondoc, this Court has interpreted
said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It
cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the CC explicitly
declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
2. Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect
the right of petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall
then proceed to divide the subject property between petitioners and private
respondents, as the rule on succession prescribes.
3. It appears that the 535 square meters subject property was a conjugal
property of Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez, the second wife,
as the property was purchased in 1926, during the time of their marriage.
Upon the deaths of Buenaventura in 1930 and Donata in 1936, both deaths
occurring before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950, all the four
children of the first marriage and the four children of the second marriage
shall share equally in the subject property in accordance with the Old Civil
Code. Absent any allegation showing that Buenaventura Cristobal left any
will and testament, the subject property shall be divided into eight equal
parts pursuant to Articles 921 and 931 of the Old Civil Code on intestate
succession, each receiving 66.875 square meters thereof.
4. At the time of death of Buenaventura Cristobal in 1930, Donata was only
entitled to the usufruct of the land pursuant to Article 834 of the Old Civil
Code, which provides:
a. A widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not
divorced, or should be so by the fault of the deceased, shall be
entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way
of legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants who
has not received any betterment. If only one legitimate child or
descendant survives, the widow or widower shall have the usufruct
of the third availment for betterment, such child or descendant to
have the naked ownership until, on the death of the surviving
spouse, the whole title is merged in him.
5. Donata’s right to usufruct of the subject property terminated upon her death
in 1936.
6. Accordingly, the pro-indiviso shares of Buenaventura Cristobal’s eight
children and their heirs, by right of representation, upon his death in 1930,
are as follows: 66.875 square meters each.
(3) Respondents’ defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not
involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the
assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances
inequitable or unfair to permit.
1. In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant case. Note
that upon petitioner Elisa’s knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject
property had been transferred to the private respondents to the exclusion of
herself and her siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal,
petitioners filed in 1995 a petition with their barangay to settle the case
among themselves and private respondents, but since no settlement was
had, they lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995, to annul
private respondents’ title over the land. There is no evidence showing failure
or neglect on their part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would apply only where for the
reason of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce
his legal rights. Moreover, absence any strong or compelling reason, this
Court is not disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat
the rights of an owner. Laches is a creation of equity and its application is
controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat
justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither should its application be used to
prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been
fraudulently registered in the name of another.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

2. Considering that (1) petitioners were unlawfully deprived of their legal

participation in the partition of the subject property; (2) this case has dragged
on for more than a decade, and (3) undoubtedly, petitioners sustained injury
but the exact amount of which, unfortunately, was not proved, we find it
reasonable to grant in petitioners’ favor nominal damages. Nominal
damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated and invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. Where
these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong but
simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. The amount to be
awarded as such damages should at least be commensurate to the injury
sustained by the petitioners considering the concept and purpose of said
damages. Such award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited
and the special reasons extant in the present case.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:

(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late
Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding
upon petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof;
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and No.
165135, in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters is
ORDERED to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision and
appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of the
late Cristobal Buenaventura, and
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Guting, Supra
FACTS:
1. [Criminal information for parricide] That on or about 4:50 in the rainy
afternoon of July 30, 2006 at Plaridel St., Poblacion B. Camiling, Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with
evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill his
own father Jose Guting y Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while inside their
residential house, and armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and
unexpectedly stabbed several times the victim, employing means, manner
and form in the execution thereof which tender directly and specially to
insure its commission without danger to the person of said accused, the
result of which attack was that said victim received multiple stab wounds on
his body which directly caused his instantaneous death.
2. When arraigned, Guting pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter,
pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.
3. Summary of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies:
a. PO1 Fidel Torre: On the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2005, at around
5PM, he and PO1 Alexis Macusi were standing in front of the
Camiling Police Station when accused-appellant, all wet from the
rain and with a bladed weapon in his hand, suddenly approached
them and told them that he had stabbed his father. Hearing
accused-appellant's statement, PO1 Torre immediately got the
bladed weapon from accused-appellant and turned it over to PO1
Macusi for proper disposition.
b. PO1 Macusi: Corroborated PO1 Torre's testimony; narrated that
Guting suddenly appeared before them at the Police Station, all wet
and holding a knife. Guting proclaimed that his father was already
dead. Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi asked who killed his father.
Guting answered, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na
po!"
i. PO1 Torre then got the knife from accused-appellant and
gave it to PO1 Macusi. PO1 Macusi placed the knife in the
custodian cabinet in the Police Station.
ii. PO1 Macusi, SPO2 Eliseo Hermosado, and SPO2 Noli
Felipe went to the residence of Jose Guting (father), to
verify the reported crime, while other police officers
informed Flora Guting (Flora), Jose's wife (mother), who
was still in the market with Emerlito Guting (Emerlito),
Jose and Flora's other son (brother), who was then driving
a tricycle for hire.
iii. While waiting for Flora and Emerlito, PO1 Macusi, SPO2
Hermosado, and SPO2 Felipe inquired from the neighbors
if anybody had witnessed the crime, but no one did. When
Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the house and
saw Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his
wounds. Immediately, Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to
the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Subsequently, Flora and Emerlito executed their
respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and filed a case for
Parricide against Guting.
4. On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was given
to him by PO1 Torre for safekeeping, he did not ask Guting if it was the knife
he used to kill his father. Neither did Guting mention to PO1 Macusi that it
was the knife he used in stabbing Jose. All that accused-appellant said was,
"Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Macusi also
admitted that he did not request for the examination of the knife because it
was clean; any trace or stain of blood on it would have been washed away
by the rains at that time. PO1 Macusi was further questioned as to why he
did not put into writing accused-appellant's admission that he killed his
father, and PO1 Macusi explained that it escaped his mind as he was still
new at the job then and he was carried away by the fast flow of events.
5. Flora conceded that she was not present when Jose, her husband, was
killed by accused-appellant, their son. Flora only learned of the stabbing
incident and accused-appellant's surrender from the police officers of the
Camiling Police Station. Flora declared that she spent for the wake and
burial of Jose and that Jose, who was a tricycle driver, had been earning
around P200.00 a day at the time of his death.
6. Doctor Valentin Theodore Lomibao (Dr. Lomibao) conducted the autopsy of
Jose's body. Dr. Lomibao reported that Jose suffered around 39 stab
wounds on the head, neck, thorax, abdomen, and extremities, causing
severe injury to Jose’s internal organs.
7. Guting opted not to present any evidence in his defense.
8. RTC: Guting is guilty of Parricide based on his verbal admission that he
killed his father, Jose.
a. Even assuming that accused-appellant's admission was
inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the prosecution
was still able to establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which,
taken collectively, pointed to accused-appellant as the perpetrator
of the brutal killing of his father.
9. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: WON Guting’s conviction is justified by sufficient evidence -- YES.
RATIO:
1. Guting argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi,
without the assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having
been made in blatant violation of his constitutional right.
2. HOWEVER, Guting was not under custodial investigation when he admitted,
without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he
stabbed his father to death.
a. Guting’s verbal confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily
given and was not elicited through questioning by the police
authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked accused-
appellant who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so in
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
response to Guring’s initial declaration that his father was already
dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no idea who actually
committed the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as the
suspect in his father's killing.
b. Guting was also merely standing before PO1 Torre and PO1
Macusi in front of the Camiling Police Station and was not yet in
police custody.
3. [SYLLABUS] Guting’s verbal confession that he stabbed his father to death
made to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, established through the testimonies of
said police officers, falls under Rule 130, Sec. 26.
a. Guting’s declaration is admissible for being part of the res gestae.
b. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible
in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when these
three requisites concur:
i. The principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence;
ii. The statements were made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and
iii. The statements concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.
c. All the requisites are present in this case.
i. Guting had just been through a startling and gruesome
occurrence, that is, his father's death.
ii. He made the confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi
only a few minutes after and while he was still under the
influence of said startling occurrence, before he had the
opportunity to concoct or contrive a story.In fact, Guting
seemed to still be in shock when he walked to the Police
Station completely unmindful of the rain and the knife in
his hand, and headed directly to PO1 Torre and PO1
Macusi, who were standing in front of the Police Station, to
confess to stabbing his father to death.
iii. As res gestae, accused-appellant's spontaneous
statement is admissible in evidence against him.
4. Guting’s confession was further corroborated by the circumstantial evidence.
5. Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates the conditions when
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, thus:
a. SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
i. (a) There is more than one circumstance;
ii. (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
iii. (c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
6. The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the aforequoted
requisites have been satisfied in this case given the following circumstantial
evidence:
a. On or about 4:50 o'clock in the afternoon of July 30, 2006, the
victim was stabbed to death.
b. Thirty minutes later, Guting personally went to Camiling Police
Station and surrendered himself and the bladed weapon he used in
killing his father to the police authorities of the said police station.
c. When his mother learned about the incident, [accused-appellant]
did nothing to appease his responding mother. "It has always been
said that criminal case are primarily about human nature." Here is a
case of a son doing nothing to explain the death of his father to his
grieving mother. Such inaction is contrary to human nature.
d. When he was detained after police investigation, Guting did not
object to his continued detention.
7. These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that points to Guting, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.
8. The incriminating collage of facts against Guting was created by
circumstantial evidence anchored on the credible and unbiased testimony of
the prosecution's witnesses.
9. SC will not disturb but shall accord the highest respect to the findings of the
RTC on the issue of credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, it
having had the opportunity to observe their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596,
finding accused-appellant, Adrian Guting y Tomas,GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs
of the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and P316,455.00 as compensation for loss of earning capacity. All monetary awards
for damages shall be subject to interest of six percent (6%) per annum from date of
finality of this Decision until they are fully paid.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Estibal y Calungsag, Supra
FACTS:
1. Estibal, 43 years old, was accused of raping his 13yo daughter.
2. Prosecution presented four witnesses:
a. The medico-legal who testified that she examined the victim and
results show penertration and trauma to the hymen;
b. Two men from Barangay Security Force who testified that in the
evening of Feb 2009, AAA and BBB went to them to narrate the
incident of rape that happened, and that they arrested the accused
thereafter
c. Police officer assigned to PNP Women and Children Protection
Center, who testified that she took down the sworn statement of
AAA, and that in the narration she said that AAA and BBB were
crying when AAA told her that she was raped by the accused since
Grade 3. Police officer said, that according to her training and from
her observations of AAA’s demeanor, she’s telling the truth
3. During the pre-trial and trial, BBB, wife of the accused-appellant and mother
of AAA, the minor victim, disclaimed any further interest to pursue the case.
Her reasons were that she pitied the accused-appellant and, according to
her, AAA had already forgiven her father. They didn’t appear in court and all
the subpoenas issued was returned unserved.
4. Accused only presented denial. He said that he and his wife are security
guards, and that his wife was on night duty the night of the alleged rape, and
that he slept with his two children around midnight.
5. RTC ruled for the accused’s conviction. The Court relied on the Police
Officer's testimony of what AAA narrated to her, the RTC considered the
spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA as confirmed by the police
officer as part of the res gestae.
6. Accused, on appeal said that there’s failure to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt since the prosecution’s testimonies were all hearsay and
does not fall under the exception of res gestae.
7. CA upheld RTC decision. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses form
part of the res gestae, although none of them was a participant, victim or
spectator to the crime.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N the prosecution’s witnesses’ testimonies were all hearsay? YES
2. W/N the it falls within the ambit of res gestae? NO
RATIO:
1. The testimonies must be dismissed as hearsay, since AAA’s statements
were not subjected to cross-examination consistent with the constitutional
right of the accused-appellant to confront the evidence against him.
2. Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that the
original declarant was not placed under oath or affirmation, nor subjected to
cross-examination by the defense, except in a few instances as where the
statement is considered part of the res gestae.
a. It is an immemorial rule that a witness can testify only as to his own
personal perception or knowledge of the actual facts or events. His
testimony cannot be proof as to the truth of what he learned or
heard from others.
b. Furthermore, Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights guarantees that “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x
x to meet the witnesses face to face x x x.” By allowing the accused
to test the perception, memory, and veracity of the witness, the trial
court is able to weigh the trustworthiness and reliability of his
testimony.
3. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called
upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the
credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity
and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
4. The rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there
was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have
been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against
a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is
hearsay just the same.
a. Which is why Section 1 R132 requires that all the witnesses in a
judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath and
affirmation; and
b. Section 6 R132 requires all the witnesses by subject to the cross-
examination by the adverse party
5. The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns
about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not
being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being
subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant
or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out of-court statement
depends.
Res Gestae
1. The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations
must have been “voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly
contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they
illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as
necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation.”
a. Three essential requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae,
be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3)
that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediate attending circumstances
b. There is no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be
determined although a number of factors have been considered,
including, but not always confined to
i. the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act
or transaction and the making of the statement,
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

ii. the place where the statement is made,

iii. the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given,
iv. the presence or absence of intervening events between
the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and
v. the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself.
c. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event
that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction
itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.
d. In this case, AAA’s statements to the barangay tanod and the
police do not qualify as part of res gestae in view of the missing
element of spontaneity and the lapse of an appreciable time
between the rape and the declarations which afforded her sufficient
opportunity for reflection.
i. there was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or instinctive
about the declarations which AAA made since it was a re-
telling of what she had already confessed to her mother
earlier that afternoon
ii. It is obvious that AAA had by then undergone a serious
deliberation, prodded by her mother, whose own outrage
as the betrayed wife and grieving mother so emboldened
AAA that she finally resolved to emerge from her fear of
her father.
8. Since the inculpatory facts were susceptible of two or more interpretations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence
does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction, the
accused is acquitted.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Anecito Estibal y Calungsag is hereby
ACQUITTED. His immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless
he is being held for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate
implementation, who is then directed to report to this Court the action he has taken
within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
People v. Quisayas, Supra
FACTS:
1. Quisayas and accused Sonny Gatarin were charged in an information with
Robbery with Homicide.3
2. Quisayas was arrested and pleaded guilty. Gatarin remained at large.
3. The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses:
(1) Maria Castillo, the victim’s wife; (2) Howel Umali (Umali), who allegedly
saw how the accused mauled the victim; (3) SPO3 Gregorio G. Mendoza
(SPO3 Mendoza) of the Mabini Police Station, who saw the victim lying on
the floor and the accused running away from the crime scene, and testified
on the dying declaration of Januario; (4) Dr. Catalino Ike A. Rasa Jr. (Dr.
Rasa), who attended to the victim when he was brought to the hospital; and
(5) PO1 Rogelio Dizon Coronel (PO1 Coronel), who saw the accused
running fast near the crime scene and who, likewise, testified on Januario’s
ante mortem statement.
4. Prosecution:
a. Umali was riding a bike on his way home when he saw Januario
(victim) being mauled by 2 persons. Upon seeing the incident, he
stayed in front of the church until he saw accused run away since
the police were chasing him
b. SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol
vehicle performing their routine patrol duty when they met two men,
later identified as the accused, who were running at a fast speed.
They then saw Januario lying on the street so they brought him to
the hospital. They asked Januario who hurt him and the latter
answered it was “Jay-Ar and his uncle”
i. “Jay-Ar” referring to Gatarin and “uncle” referring to
Quisayas
c. At the Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa who
found him in critical condition. Three fatal wounds caused by a
bladed weapon were found in Januario’s body which eventually
caused his death
d. Maria Castillo, for her part, testified on how she learned of what
happened to her husband, the victim herein, the amount allegedly
3 “That on or about the 3rd day of November, 2004, at about 8:00 o’clock (sic) in the evening, at
Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Mabini, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon,
conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping each
other, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof and with
violence against or intimidation of person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, rob, and carry away cash money amounting to Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00),
Philippine Currency, belonging to Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias "Ka Maning," to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforementioned amount and that on the occasion and
by reason of said robbery, the said accused with intent to kill and taking advantage of their
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with the said weapon Januario Castillo y Masangcay alias "Ka Maning," thereby inflicting upon
the latter the stab wounds to [the] anterior chest and right shoulder and right axilla, which directly
caused his death.”
stolen from her husband, as well as on the expenses and loss
incurred by reason of Januario’s death. She, further, quantified the
sorrow and anxiety the family suffered by reason of such death.
5. Quisayas denied the accusation against him. He said he was in Muntinlupa
on the date and time of the crime.
a. The prosecution’s rebuttal witness Mr. Bienvenido Caponpon,
however, belied appellant’s claim and insisted that appellant was
renting a house in Mabini, Batangas and that he was seen there
until the day the crime was committed
6. RTC: Quisayas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
a. As to the identity of the perpetrators, the court considered the
victim’s response to SPO3 Mendoza’s question as to who
committed the crime against him as part of the res gestae,
which is an exception to the hearsay rule.As to appellant’s
defense of alibi, the court gave more weight to the prosecution’s
rebuttal evidence that indeed the former was an actual resident of
Mabini, Batangas
7. CA: Affirmed
a. Contrary, however, to the RTC’s conclusion, the appellate court
considered Januario’s statement to SPO3 Mendoza, that the
accused were the ones who stabbed him and took his wallet,
not only as part of res gestae but also as a dying declaration
ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N Quisayas is quilty beyond reasonable doubt? YES but not of robbery
with homicide but of Murder.
2. W/N the requisites of a dying declaration are present? NO but the victim’s
statements may still be appreciated as part of res gestae [syllabus topic]
RATIO: [syllabus related topic starts at number 5]
1. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must
prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to
another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the
crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed.
2. First, in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide,
it is necessary that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other
essential element of the crime.In order for the crime of robbery with homicide
to exist, it must be established that a robbery has actually taken place and
that, as a consequence or on the occasion of robbery, a homicide be
committed.
3. For there to be robbery, there must be taking of personal property belonging
to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person or by using force upon on things. Both the RTC and the CA
concluded that robbery was committed based on the testimonies of Maria
Castillo, SPO3 Mendoza, and PO1 Coronel. A closer look at the testimonies
of these witnesses, however, failed to convince us that indeed robbery took
place.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
4. It is obvious that the wife of the victim, Maria Castillo, was not present at the
scene of the crime on that day. She was only informed that the incident took
place. She had no personal knowledge that Januario was robbed. No
evidence was presented to show that Januario was in possession of the
cash money at that time. The prosecution’s failure to present such evidence
creates doubt as to the existence of the money.
5. The trial and appellate courts likewise relied on the testimony of SPO3
Mendoza and PO1 Coronel on the statement of Januario after the
commission of the crime. While both policemen testified as to the dying
declaration of Januario pertaining to the cause and circumstances
surrounding his death, only PO1 Coronel testified during his direct
examination that when asked who stabbed him, Januario replied that it was
"Jay-Ar and his uncle who stabbed him and took his wallet."In response to
the Presiding Judge’s clarificatory question, however, PO1 Coronel admitted
that when he asked Januario who stabbed him, he replied that it was Jay-Ar
and his uncle. After which, no further question was asked.On the other hand,
nowhere in SPO3 Mendoza’s testimony did he talk about the alleged taking
of wallet.
6. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the evidence presented to prove
the robbery aspect of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
does not show that robbery actually took place. The prosecution did not
convincingly establish the corpus delicti of the crime of robbery.
7. To establish the fact that appellant and his co-accused killed the victim by
stabbing him with a bladed weapon, the prosecution presented Umali as an
eyewitness to the mauling incident. It was this same witness who identified
the perpetrators. The trial and appellate courts also relied on the statement
of Januario as to the circumstances of his death, testified to by PO1 Coronel
and SPO3 Mendoza as dying declaration and as part of res gestae.
8. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due
to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the
following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns the
cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is
made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is
offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's
death.
9. In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying
declaration are present. From the records, no questions relative to the
second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear that
the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death
when he made the statements. The rule is that, in order to make a
dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent
death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending
death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that
renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as
certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not
be considered as a dying declaration.
10. However, even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a
dying declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part of
the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact
as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether
the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.
11. The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res
gestae concur herein. When Januario gave the identity of the assailants to
SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring to a startling occurrence which is the
stabbing by appellant and his co-accused. At that time, Januario and the
witness were in the vehicle that would bring him to the hospital, and thus,
had no time to contrive his identification of the assailant. His utterance about
appellant and his co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question
of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. Definitely, the statement is relevant because it identified
the accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of Januario,
perpetrated by appellant, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the Court of
Appeals Decision dated February 23, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 03593, affirming
the Regional Trial Court Decision dated June 20, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 13838,
convicting appellant Eduardo Quisayas of Robbery with Homicide. We find appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Belbis, Jr. v. People, Supra (NOT SUPRA!!! THIS CASE IS NEW HUEHUE THE
CITATION IS: G.R. No. 181052. November 14, 2012)
FACTS:
1. Version of the Prosecution:
a. Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio
Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay. On the night of December 9,
1997, Jose left his house to do his rounds. At around 10:00 p.m.,
Veronica Dacir, Jose’s live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and
calling her name and went to where Jose was and saw blood at his
back and shorts. It was there that Jose told Veronica that he was
held by Boboy (petitioner Alberto Brucales), while Paul (petitioner
Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was brought to Albay
Provincial Hospital where he was confined for 6 days. Jose was
brought back to the hospital on January 7, 1998 and it was found
out that his kidneys had inflamed due to infection. He died the next
day.
2. Version of the Defense:
a. Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a
store in engaged in a conversation with other people when Jose
went to them and told them to go home. While on their way home,
they heard Jose’s whistle go off as the latter was following them.
Rodolfo asked Jose what is the matter and the latter replied, “What
about?” Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on Rodolfo, but the latter
was able to evade it. The night stick was actually a bolo sheathed
on a scabbard. Rodolfo and Jose grappled for the bolo while
Alberto was merely shouting at them to stop. Rodolfo eventually got
hold of the bolo but he suffered a wound in his hand so Alberto took
him to the hospital.
3. The RTC convicted the petitioners of the crime charged against them, but
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
4. After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners elevated
the case to the CA. However, the latter denied their appeal and affirmed the
RTC decision with modification that there was no mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable
doubt which would warrant his acquittal
RULING + RATIO: NO
1. Petitioners claim that there is discrepancy in the findings of the RTC and the
CA. According to them, the RTC never mentioned about a dying declaration
which the CA discussed in its decision. They then argue that the CA erred in
ruling that the statements made by the victim in the presence of witnesses
Veronica Dacir right after being stabbed, and SPO1 Lerma Bataller before
he died, are dying declarations within the contemplation of the law as the
victim still lived for one month after the said dying declaration was made.
2. A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring
to the material facts which concern the cause and circumstances of the
killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is impending and is
certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity
of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is
a statement made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted,
under a belief that death is certain, stating the facts concerning the cause
and circumstances surrounding his/her death.
3. As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as
follows:
a. (1) the declaration is made by the deceased under the
consciousness of his impending death;
b. (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a witness;
c. (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; and
d. (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the
declarant's death is the subject of inquiry.
4. The fact that the victim was stabbed on December 9, 1997 and died only on
January 8, 1998 does not prove that the victim made the statement or
declaration under the consciousness of an impending death.
5. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed
belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant.
a. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible.
b. It is not necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the
personal feelings of the deceased.
c. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of
survival and looked on death as certainly impending.
6. As such, the CA incorrectly ruled that there were dying declarations.
7. The CA should have admitted the statement made by the victim to Veronica
Dacir right after he was stabbed as part of the res gestae and not a dying
declaration.
8. There are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae:
a. (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
b. (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to
contrive or devise a falsehood; and
c. (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediate attending circumstances.
9. It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical. The
following factors are then considered in determining whether statements
offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made
spontaneously:
a. (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or
transaction and the making of the statement;
b. (2) the place where the statement was made;
c. (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement;
d. (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the
occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

e. (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself. offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made
10. Clearly, the statement made by the victim identifying his assailants was spontaneously:
made immediately after a startling occurrence which is his being stabbed, a. (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or
precluding any chance to concoct a lie. transaction and the making of the statement;
11. Petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists that he had done b. (2) the place where the statement was made;
the deed to defend himself. It is settled that when an accused admits killing c. (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement;
the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused d. (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the
assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and
evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he e. (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.
killed the victim.
12. The unlawful aggression, a requisite for self-defense, on the part of the
victim ceased when petitioner Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed
weapon. Rodolfo, who was in possession of the same weapon, already
became the unlawful aggressor. Furthermore, the means employed by a
person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the
extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary
to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. In the present case, four stab
wounds to the back of the victim are not necessary to prevent the alleged
continuous unlawful aggression from the victim as the latter was already
without a weapon.
13. Moreover, the fact that there is a lapse of time from the incident and the
death of the victim is not controlling since what really needs to be proven in
a case when the victim dies is the proximate cause of his death. It can be
concluded from the doctors’ testimonies that without the stab wounds, the
victim could not have been afflicted with an infection which later on caused
multiple organ failure that caused his death. The offender is criminally liable
for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or
contributed to the death of the victim. The petitioners are found guilty of
homicide.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
dated February 22, 2008, of Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales, is hereby
DENIED. Consequently, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 17, 2007,
and its Resolution dated January 4, 2008, affirming with modification the Decision
dated December 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Tabaco City, Albay, Branch 17,
finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide are
hereby AFFIRMED.

DOCTRINES:
1. There are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae:
a. (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
b. (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to
contrive or devise a falsehood; and
c. (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediate attending circumstances.
2. It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical. The
following factors are then considered in determining whether statements

45
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
LBP v. Oñate, G.R. No. 192371, January 15, 2014
FACTS:
1. LBP is a government financial institution created under RA 3844. From
1978 to 1980, Onate opened and maintained seven (7) Trust Accounts with
LBP, each was covered with an Investment Management Account (IMA) with
full discretion, and Onate appointed LBP as his agent with full powers to
hold, invest, and reinvest the fund.
2. On October 8, 1981, LBP claims a miscredit of P4M to 5 of Onate’s Trust
Account, for as claimed by LBP the checks deposited to these accounts
were issued to LBP by their 4 corporate borrowers, who preterminated their
loans. Such checks were deposited allegedly by Polonio (Onate’s
Representative) to Onate’s Trust Account, and were later withdrawn by him.
3. Onate refused to return such funds after LBP has demanded it from him. A
meeting was held yo settle such matter, but has failed to reach an
agreement. The issue of miscrediting remained unsettled, and on June 21,
1991, LBP unilaterally set-off the outstanding balance in all of Onate’s
Accounts, debiting only P1,528,538.48.
4. LBP filed a complaint for Sum of Money seeking to recover P8,222,687.89
plus legal interest per annum. Onate in his answer, asserted that the set-off
was without legal and factual basis. Onate further asserted presence of
undocumented withdrawals and such are unauthorized transactions from his
accounts and must be credited back to him.
5. Upon Onate’s motion, the RTC ordered to create a Board to examine the
records of Onate’s 7 trust accounts. The Board submitted reports of
withdrawals without withdrawal slips from Onate’s account. LBP did not file
any comment or objection to the Boards consolidated report.
6. RTC RULING: The RTC dismissed LBP’s complaint for failure to establish
that P4M was allegedly miscredited to Onate’s accounts, and ordered to
restore the P1.5M set-off amount to Onate’s account On Onate’s
counterclaim, RTC rules that under the IMA’s, LBP had authority to withdraw
even without withdrawal slips from Onate’s account.
7. Motion for reconsideration by LBP was denied. Both parties appealed to the
CA.
8. CA RULING: CA denied LBP’s appeal and granted Onate’s. CA affirmed
RTC ruling and agreed that Onate is entitled to the unaccounted withdrawals
which was reported by the Board which was P60M and $3M. The CA
anchored on the bank’s failure to give full disclosure of the services rendered
and should conduct its dealings with transparency, as mandated in Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas Manual of Regulation for Banks (MORB).
9. LBP filed for a Motion for Reconsideration, CA denied, hence LBP filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N the entries in the passbook issued by LBP are subjected to meet
the Rule on Presumption of Regularity of entries in the course of business? NO
RATIO:
1. Petition is denied. The issues raised are factual and do not involve
questions of law. The RTC already created a Board to assist in determining
the respective cash inflows and outflows of said accounts, which the parties
agreed to submit the case based on said reports.
2. LBP failed to prove that the ‘miscredited’ funds came from proceeds of
the pre-terminated loans of corporate borrowers. LBP argument that
the entries in the passbook were made in the regular course of
business and should be accepted as prima facie evidence of facts is
qualified as hearsay, and they should establish the exceptions of the
hearsay rule, which are:
a. Person who made entries is dead, outside of the country, or
unable to testify;
b. Entries were made at or near the time of the transaction to
which they refer;
c. Entrant was in a position to know the facts stated therein;
d. Entries were made in the professional capacity or in the
course of duty of the entrant; and,
e. Entries were made in the ordinary course of business or duty.
3. LBP has neither identified the persons who made the entries in the
passbooks nor established that they are already dead or unable to testify as
required by Section 43 or Rule 130 of the RC.
4. LBP failed to prove that the amount allegedly ‘miscredited’ to Onate’s
account came from the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans of its clients. It
is worth emphasizing that in civil cases, the party making allegations has the
burden of proving them by preponderance of evidence. Mere allegations is
not sufficient.
5. Decisions of the CA is affirmed.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the December 18,
2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89346 is AFFIRMED with
modification in that the interest of 12% per annum compounded annually, for the
debited amount of ₱1,471,416.52 shall commence to run on May 31, 2006, while the
same rate of interest shall apply to the undocumented withdrawals in the amounts of
₱60,663,488.11 and US 3,210,222.85 starting December 18 2009. Beginning July 1,
2013, however, the applicable rate of interest on all amounts awarded shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum compounded yearly, until fully paid.
DOCTRINE: IN BOLD
46
EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Sps. Dela Cruz v. Planters Product, Inc., G.R. No. 158649, February 18, 2013
FACTS:
1. Spouses Quirino V. Dela Cruz and Gloria Dela Cruz, petitioners, operated
the Barangay Agricultural Supply, an agricultural supply store in Aliaga,
Nueva Ecija engaged in the distribution and sale of fertilizers and agricultural
chemical products, among others. At the time material to the case, Quirino, a
lawyer, was the Municipal Mayor of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija.
2. Gloria applied for and was granted by respondent a regular credit line of
P200,000.00 for a 60-day term, with trust receipts as collaterals. Gloria
signed in the presence of the PPI distribution officer/assistant sales
representative two documents and subscribed to specific undertakings, as
follows:
a. “For and in consideration thereof, I/We hereby agree to hold said
goods in trust for PPI, as its property, with liberty to deliver and sell
the same for PPI’s account, in favor of farmers accepted to
participate in PPI’s Special Credit Scheme within 60 days from
receipt of inputs from PPI. In case of such delivery and sale, I/We
agree to require the execution of a Trust Agreement by the farmer-
participants in my/our favor, which Agreement will in turn be
Assigned by me/us in favor of PPI with Recourse. In the event,
I/We cannot deliver/serve to the farmer-participants all the inputs as
enumerated above within 60 days, then I/We agree that the
undelivered inputs will be charged to my/our credit line, in which
case, the corresponding adjustment of price and interests shall be
made by PPI.”
b. Gloria expressly agreed to: (a) “supervise the collection of the
equivalent number of cavanes of palay and/or corn from the farmer-
participant” and to “turn over the proceeds of the sale of the
deposited palay and corn as soon as received, to PPI to be applied
against the listed invoices”; xxx (d) “require the farmer-participants
to deposit the palay or corn sufficient to cover their respective
accounts within 72 hours after the harvest of the farmer-
participants” and should the farmer-participants refuse to make the
required deposit, Gloria would notify PPI thereof within 24 hours.
For that purpose, negligence on her part would make her obligation
under the Trust Receipt “direct and primary.”
3. In addition, Gloria’s obligation included the following terms and conditions, to
wit:
a. “All obligations of the undersigned under this Trust Receipt shall
bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum plus 2% service
charges, reckoned from the date Dealer delivers to farmer-
participants the fertilizer and agchem products. Where I/We have
not delivered within 60 days, interest and service charges shall
become effective on the 61st day.”
b. “In consideration of PPI complying with the foregoing we jointly and
severally agree and undertake to pay on demand to PPI all sums of
money which PPI may call upon us to pay arising out of or
pertaining to and/or in any event connected with the default of
and/or non-fulfillment in any respect of the undertaking of the
aforesaid.”
4. Gloria executed 3 more documents where Gloria filled up customer order
forms for fertilizer and agricultural chemical products. The products were
released to Gloria under the supervision of Cristina G. Llanera of PPI.
5. The 60-day credit term lapsed without Gloria paying her obligation under the
Trust Receipt/SCS. Hence, PPI wrote collection letters to her. But no reply.
6. PPI brought against Quirino and Gloria in the erstwhile Court of First
Instance in Pasig, Metro Manila a complaint for the recovery of a sum of
money. It charged that Gloria did not return the goods indicated in the
invoices and did not remit the proceeds of sales.
7. In her answer, the petitioners alleged that Gloria was only a marketing outlet
of PPI under its SCS Program, not a dealer primarily obligated to PPI for the
products delivered to her; that she had not collected from the farmers
participating in the SCS Program because of the October 27-28, 1979
typhoon Kading that had destroyed the participating farmers’ crops; and that
she had paid P50,000.00 to PPI despite the failure of the farmers to pay.
ISSUE/HELD: W/N exhibit V is admissible because of Llanera’s failure to affirm its
contents as stated in Sec. 43, Rule 130 of ROC? NO.
RATIO:
1. Not related but one of the issues: Gloria was arguing that she didn’t know
about the creditor-debtor relationship and that her responsibility was of a
marketing outlet since the products were delivered to the farmers not to her.
a. She clearly knew the obligation in the contract, her husband is also
a lawyer, how could they not know. “When both parties enter into
an agreement knowing that the return of the goods subject of the
trust receipt is not possible even without any fault on the part of the
trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized under Section
13 of P.D. 115; the only obligation actually agreed upon by the
parties would be the return of the proceeds of the sale transaction.
This transaction becomes a mere loan, where the borrower is
obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the
goods.”
b. The obligation assumed by Gloria under the Trust Receipt/SCS
involved “the execution of a Trust Agreement by the farmer-
participants” in her favor, which, in turn, she would assign “in favor
of PPI with recourse” in case of delivery and sale to the farmer-
participants.
c. Furthermore, petitioners could not validly justify the non-compliance
by Gloria with her obligations under the Trust Receipt/SCS by citing
the loss of the farm outputs due to typhoon Kading. There is no
question that she had expressly agreed that her liability would not
be extinguished by the destruction or damage of the crops.
2. The petitioners dispute the contents of Exhibit V by invoking Section 43,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

a. “Section 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or

near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the
facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if
such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of
business.”
3. The petitioners insist that they could not be held liable for the balance stated
in Exhibit V due to such document being hearsay as a “mere statement of
account.” They argue that Cristina Llanera, the witness of PPI on the matter,
was only a warehouse assistant who was not shown to be either an
accountant, or bookkeeper, or auditor or a person knowledgeable in
accounting. They posit that Llanera’s testimony on Exhibit V was limited to
stating that she had prepared the statement of account contained therein;
that she did not affirm the correctness or veracity of the contents of the
document; and that, consequently, Exhibit V had no evidentiary value as
proof of their total liability for P240,355.10, the amount stated therein.
a. The invocation of the rule is misplaced because the rule speaks of
a situation where the person who made the entries is dead or
unable to testify, which was not the situation here. Regardless, we
have to point out that entries made in the course of business
enjoy the presumption of regularity. If properly authenticated,
the entries serve as evidence of the status of the account of
the petitioners.
b. In Land Bank case: such entries are accorded unusual
reliability because their regularity and continuity are
calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit of
precision; and that if the entries are financial, the records are
routinely balanced and audited; hence, in actual experience,
the whole of the business world function in reliance of such
kind of records.
c. Nor have the petitioners proved that the entries contained in Exhibit
V were incorrect and untruthful. They cannot be permitted to do so
now at this stage of final appeal.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision promulgated on

April 11, 2003 by the Court of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the
rate of interest is 12% per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint until full
payment; and (b) the award of attorney’s fees is deleted.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Patula v. People, Supra
FACTS:
1. Anna Patula was charged with estafa under an information filed in the RTC
of Dumaguete.
2. The information stated that Patula was a sales representative of Footluckers
Chain of Stores and having received a sum of 131K from several customers,
under express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver
it to the company, she did not comply despite repeated demands and failed
to give the money and that she misappropriated it for herself to the prejudice
of the company.
3. Patula pleaded not guilty. At pre-trial there was no stipulations of facts and
she did not avail of a plea bargain. Then the trial started.
4. Prosecution only had 2 witnesses.
a. First witness Lamberto Go, the branch manager, testified that
since Patula was a Sales Rep she was authorized to take orders
and collect payments from wholesale customers from different
towns. She could issue and sign official receipts which she would
then remit and submit for reconciliation. Her first volume of sales
were high but then it dropped and when confronted why, she said
business was slow. This made Go verify with accounting and the
clerk found erasures on the receipts. She was then subjected to
audit by the company (by Guivencan). He learned from a customer
that the customer outstanding balance was fully paid but it was
indicated unpaid in the company records. One night Patula with her
parents went to his house and denied misappropriating the money
and pleaded with him not to push through with the case against her
— promising to settle on a monthly basis. After that she didn’t settle
and just stopped going to work.
b. (Important) Second witness Karen Guivencan, the store auditor,
testified that at Go’s request, she audited Patula and did this by
going to the customers and it was then that she discovered that the
amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the
possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts
written on the duplicate copies of the receipts Patula submitted to
the office. After she submitted to Go a report that stated the
misappropriated amount of 131K+.
5. During Guivencan’s stint as a witness, the prosecution marked the ledgers of
Patula’s customers with the indicated discrepancies.
6. To establish the elements of estafa, the Prosecution presented the
testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various documents consisting of:
(marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive):
a. the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers
upon their payment,
b. the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with
the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the
payments, and
c. the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself
4. During Guivencia’s direct-examination, Patula’s counsel interposed a
continuing objection on the ground that the ledgers were hearsay because
the people who made the entries were nit presented in court. With that, her
counsel didn’t cross-examine Guivencan anymore regarding her testimony
as irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification— an offense
not alleged in the information.
5. Both parties rested their case and submitted it for decision.
6. RTC: Guilty of Estafa. Patula had opted not to present evidence for her
defense the Prosecution’s evidence remained unrefuted and uncontroverted.
MR denied.
ISSUE/HELD: WON the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the information? NO.
RATIO:
1. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the
amounts actually received by Petula from the customers or remitted by
Petula to Footluckers. This means that persons other than Guivencan
prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive.
2. Guivencan could not honestly identify Petula’s signature on the receipts
either because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she
had not seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts.
3. There was lack of proper authentication as to the ledgers the Prosecution
presented to prove the discrepancies between the amounts Patula had
allegedly received from the customers and the amounts she had actually
remitted to Footluckers. Guivencan exclusively relied on the entries of the
unauthenticated ledgers to support her audit report on petitioners supposed
misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of independent
knowledge of the veracity of the entries.
4. Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts
supposedly issued by Petula and in the ledgers held by Footluckers
corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of
some of the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified
on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to
validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of
Petula’s misappropriation or conversion through cross examination by
Petula’s counsel.
5. The denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation
or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes
of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
6. Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can
testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules of Court.
7. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact.
The rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious
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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020

concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE AND REVERSES the
due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to decision convicting ANNA LERIMA PATULA of estafa as charged, and ACQUITS
its not being subjected to cross examination by the opposing counsel her for failure of the Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without
to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out - prejudice to a civil action brought against her for the recovery of any amount still
of court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out owing in favor of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.
of court statement depends. Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony
rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross DOCTRINE: BOLD
examine the declarant (dead or absent author).
8. Example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard
the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is
admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to
show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay
in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore,
between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay
rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
9. Therefore, Guivencans testimony as well as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of Petula’s
misappropriation or conversion.
10. Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application
of the hearsay rule by also tersely stating that the ledgers "were prepared in
the regular course of business." Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
11. This was another grave error of the RTC. The terse yet sweeping
manner of justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable
due to the need to show the concurrence of the several requisites
before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the
hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows
a. The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to
testify
b. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer;
c. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries;
d. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or
religious;
e. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
12. The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of every
criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the State's evidence of guilt in order
to ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of admissibility
before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such
evidence. The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the guarantee of
due of process of law in favor of the accused, who had no obligation to prove
her innocence. Her acquittal should follow.

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EVIDENCE JUSTICE SINGH 3D 2020
Jose, Jr. v. Michaelmar Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 169606, November 27, 2009, 606
SCRA 116
FACTS:
1. Bernardo B. Jose is employed as an oiler by Michaelmar Shipping Services
(MSSI) and Michaelmar Philippines Inc. Employment contract included a
declaration implementing the Drug and Alcohol Policy of the employer with
the following provisions:
a. Banning all alcoholic beverages, banned substances, and
unprescribed drugs, including but not limited to the following:
Marijuana Cocaine Phencyclidine, Amphetamine, Heroin Opiates
b. Disciplinary action up to and including dismissal will be taken
against any employee found to be in possession of or impaired by
the use of any of the above substance
2. In a random drug test conducted on all officers and crew members of M/T
Limar at the Port of Curacao, Bernardo tested positive for marijuana. Asked
if he was taking any medications, he said he was only taking Centrum
vitamins
3. Bernardo was allowed to continue performing his duties on board M/T Limar
from October 8 to November 29, 2002. For his work performance from the
period of August 1 to November 28, he received a 98% rating and was
described as hardworking, reliable, and trustworthy
4. Upon reaching the next post after Curacao, he was repatriated to the
Phiippines
5. When Bernardo reached the Philippines, he asked for another drug test from
MPI, but was ignored. On his own, he procured drug tests from Manila
Doctor’s Hospital, S.M. Lazo Medical Clinic, Inc., and Maritime Clinic for
International Services, Inc. The results from these tests show he tested
negative for marijuana
6. He them filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal
7. Labor Arbiter said there was valid termination
a. Contract provisions are clear
b. Ship doctor’s report (Dr. A.R.A. Heath) can be relied on
8. NLRC reversed the LA, said there was invalid termination
a. Names of doctors are typewritten while word “marijuana” was
handwritten. There was no signature by the doctors, hence veracity
of the documents are questionable
b. Master of the vessel suggested another drug test for Bernard
9. CA reversed the NLRC and affirmed the LA
a. Under legal rules of evidence, not all unsigned documents or
papers fail the test of admissibility. There are kinds of evidence
known as exceptions to the hearsay rule which need not be
invariably signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from him
because of necessity, and under the circumstances that safeguard
the trustworthiness of the paper
b. A number of evidence of this sort are called entries in the course of
business, which are transactions made by persons in the regular
course of their duty or business
c. The tests administered to the crew were routine measures of the
vessel conducted to enforce its stated policy, and it was a matter of
course for medical reports to be issued and released by the
medical officer
d. The ship’s physician at Curacao, under whom the tests were
conducted was admittedly Dr. Heath. It was under his name and
with his handwritten comments, and there is no basis to suspect
that these results were issued other than in the ordinary course of
his duty
e. The drug test report is evidence in itself and does not require
additional supporting evidence EXCEPT if it appears that the drug
test was conducted not in accordance with drug testing procedures,
which was not alleged in this case
ISSUES:
1. W/N CA correct in ruling drug test as entry in regular course of
business?
2. W/N there was just cause for Bernardo’s dismissal?
RULING + RATIO:
ISSUE #1: YES, CA CORRECT IN RULING DRUG TEST AS AN ENTRY IN
REGULAR COURSE OF BUSINESS.
1. Bernardo did not show that CA ruling is violative of any law or
jurisprudence
2. In Canque v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the requisites for
admission in evidence of entries in the course of business:
a. (1) the person who made the entry is dead, outside the
country, or unable to testify;
b. (2) the entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
c. (3) the person who made the entry was in a position to know
the facts stated in the entries;
d. (4) the entries were made in a professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty; and
e. (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty.
3. Here, all the requisites are present: (1) Dr. Heath is outside the country; (2)
the entries were made near the time the random drug test was conducted;
(3) Dr. Heath was in a position to know the facts made in the entries; (4) Dr.
Heath made the entries in his professional capacity and in the performance
of his duty; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course
of business or duty.
4. The fact that the drug test result is unsigned does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that Jose, Jr. was not found positive for marijuana. In KAR ASIA,
Inc. v. Corona, the Court admitted in evidence unsigned payrolls. In that
case, the SC said:
a. Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business,
enjoy the presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43
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of the Rules of Court. It is therefore incumbent upon the c. (3) the person who made the entry was in a position to know
respondents to adduce clear and convincing evidence in the facts stated in the entries;
support of their claim. Unfortunately, respondents naked d. (4) the entries were made in a professional capacity or in the
assertions without proof in corroboration will not suffice to performance of a duty; and
overcome the disputable presumption e. (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
5. In the present case, the following facts are established (1) random drug business or duty.
tests are regularly conducted on all officers and crew members of M/T
Limar; (2) a random drug test was conducted at the port of Curacao on
8 October 2002; (3) Dr. Heath was the authorized physician of M/T
Limar; (4) the drug test result of Jose, Jr. showed that he was positive
for marijuana; (5) the drug test result was issued under Dr. Heaths
name and contained his handwritten comments.

ISSUE #2: NO, THERE WAS NO JUST CAUSE FOR TERMINATION, CA ERRED.
1. The SC agrees that Bernardo was not afforded due process.
2. There are two requisites for a valid dismissal:
a. (1) there must be just cause, and
b. (2) the employee must be afforded due process.
3. To meet the requirements of due process, the employer must furnish the
employee with two written notices a notice apprising the employee of the
particular act or omission for which the dismissal is sought and another
notice informing the employee of the employers decision to dismiss.
4. In the present case, Jose, Jr. was not given any written notice about
his dismissal. However, the propriety of Jose, Jr.s dismissal is not
affected by the lack of written notices. When the dismissal is for just
cause, the lack of due process does not render the dismissal
ineffectual but merely gives rise to the payment of P30,000 in nominal
damages.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 11 May 2005 Decision

and 5 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83272
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that OSG Ship Management Manila, Inc.
is ordered to pay Bernardo B. Jose, Jr. P30,000 in nominal damages.

DOCTRINES:
1. Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the
presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of the Rules of
Court. It is therefore incumbent upon the respondents to adduce clear
and convincing evidence in support of their claim. Unfortunately,
respondents naked assertions without proof in corroboration will not
suffice to overcome the disputable presumption.
2. In Canque v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the requisites for
admission in evidence of entries in the course of business:
a. (1) the person who made the entry is dead, outside the
country, or unable to testify;
b. (2) the entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;

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