CASE DIGEST IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 2

CASE 1 LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. FLORENCIO 0. VILLARIN G.R. No. 175727 March 6, 2019

CASE 2. TSUNEISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES (CEBU),vs MIS MARITIME G.R. No. 193572, April 04, 2018

CASE 3 LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION vs.CA G.R. No. 104405 May 13, 1993

CASE 4 TILLSON VS. CAG.R. No. 89870, May 28, 1991

CASE 5 JORGENETICS VS. THICK THIN AGRI PRODUCTS G.R. No. 21044 and 222691 May 5,2021

CASE 6 MILAGROS P. ENRIQUEZ, vs. THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO., INC. GR. No. 210950 August 15, 2018

CASE 7 WILLIAM ANGHIAN SY VS ALVIN TOMLIN GR 205998, April 24, 2017

CASE 8 MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY ,INC., VS DIANA P. ALIBUDBUD G.R. No. 209011, April 20, 2016

CASE 9 OROS vs.CA G.R.No.111080,April 5, 2000

CASE 10 PINAUSUKAN VS.FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY,G.R. No. 159926 . January 20, 2014

CASE 11 BACLARAN MARKETING CORPORATION, vs NIEVA RespondentsG.R. No. 189881 April 19,2017

CASE 12 CHARNNEL SHANE THOMAS VS. RACHEL TRONO GR NO. 241032, March 15, 2021

CASE 13 ANTONIO DEMETRIOU vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 115595 November 14, 1994

Submitted by:

KARYL ANN J. AQUINO, JD 2

Submitted to:

HON. DONABEL A. BALOT

CASE 1

LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION

vs.
FLORENCIO 0. VILLARIN
G.R. No. 175727 March 6, 2019

DOCTRINE:

A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is
pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter
by the Sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured in said action by the
attaching creditor against the defendant. It is governed by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court.Rule 57
Section 1 (d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring
the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.

FACTS:

Guerrero G. Dajao (Dajao), as President and General Manager of CASSCOR, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with Serafin Cabanlit (Cabanlit) and Florencio Villarin (Villarin) wherein Villarin and
Cabanlit undertook to operate and manage the arrastre and stevedoring operations of CASSCOR with respect
to LSC's vessels. Villarin and Cabanlit alleged that the rest of the proceeds, amounting to 73%, were due to
them.Alleging that CASSCOR failed to remit their shares from July 1999 onwards, Villarin, Cabanlit and FCC
filed a complaint for specific performance and accounting against CASSCOR and Dajao.The complaint was
subsequently amended stating that LSC is a nominal defendant and a prayer for mandatory injunction against
LSC and a writ of preliminary injunction against CASSCOR and Dajao.A writ of preliminary injunction was
thereafter issued by the RTC against CASSCOR and Dajao.

On January 2004, Villarin et. al filed a motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and was
granted by the RTC with a P150,000 bond.LSC filed a motion for Clarification/Reconsideration arguing that
it cannot be subjected to the attachment writ.Before the court can act on LSC's Motion for
Clarification/Reconsideration, a Notice of Garnishment was served on LSC prompting it to file a motion to
post a counter-bond.

RTC Judge Caminade issued an order granting LSC's motion to post a counter-bond. Hence, LSC and
CASSCOR both posted counter-bonds worth Php 150,000.00 each, resulting in the discharge of the writ of
attachment..

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC’s ruling against LSC should be reversed.

RULING.

YES.It must be borne in mind that Villarin's action is for specific performance. The main thrust of his
complaint is to compel Dajao and CASSCOR to observe the provisions of the MOA. All the other remedies
sought by the complaint are merely ancillary to this primary relief. The MOA, therefore, is the obligation upon
which Villarin's action is brought; hence the obligation sought to be upheld in this case is ex contractu.

In the case at bar, the MOA was entered into by Dajao (as CASSCOR President) on one hand, and Villarin, et
al. on the other. LSC cannot be guilty of fraud within the contemplation of Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules
of Court because it did not enter into any agreement or contract with Villarin. In the absence of any assignment
of rights to LSC, the MOA can only bind the parties thereto. Not being a party to the MOA, LSC cannot be
subjected to an attachment writ on the basis of Section 1(d).

Therefore, petition is granted and that the amounts deposited by LSC should be returned.
CASE 2.

TSUNEISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES (CEBU),

vs
MIS MARITIME CORPORATIOTSUNEISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES (CEBU), INC
G.R. No. 193572, April 04, 2018

DOCTRINE:

The purpose of a writ of preliminary attachment is twofold:First, it seizes upon property of an alleged debtor
in advance of final judgment and holds it subject to appropriation, thereby preventing the loss or dissipation
of the property through fraud or other means. Second, it subjects the property of the debtor to the payment of
a creditor's claim, in those cases in which personal service upon the debtor cannot be obtained.

FACTS:

Tsuneishi filed a complaint against MIS before the RTC that it is invoking the admiralty jurisdiction of the
RTC to enforce a maritime lien under Section 21 of the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 (Ship Mortgage Decree).
It also alleged as a cause of action MIS' unjustified refusal to pay the amount it owes Tsuneishi under their
contract. The complaint included a prayer for the issuance of arrest order/writ of preliminary attachment. To
support this prayer, the complaint alleged that Section 21 of the Ship Mortgage Decree as well as Rule 57 of
the Rules of Court on attachment authorize the issuance of an order of arrest of vessel and/or writ of
preliminary attachment.

Tsuneishi's complaint alleges that there are sufficient grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment. In particular, it claims that MIS is guilty of fraud in the performance of its obligation.

The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment without hearing.

MIS filed a motion to discharge the attachment but RTC denied this motion .MIS filed a motion for
reconsideration which the RTC also denied .MIS then filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA
assailing the three Orders. CA ruled in favor of MIS. It reversed the three assailed Orders after finding that
the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment.

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether a maritime lien under Section 21 of the Ship Mortgage Decree may be enforced through a writ of
preliminary attachment under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and

(2) Whether the CA correctly ruled that Tsuneishi failed to comply with the requirements for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.

Ruling:

1.No. Its error is in insisting that a maritime lien can only be operationalized by granting a writ of preliminary
attachment under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Tsuneishi's argument is rooted on a faulty understanding of
a lien and a writ of preliminary attachment. As we said, a maritime lien exists in accordance with the provision
of the Ship Mortgage Decree. It is enforced by filing a proceeding in court. When a maritime lien exists, this
means that the party in whose favor the lien was established may ask the court to enforce it by ordering the
sale of the subject property and using the proceeds to settle the obligation.

2.YES. The record clearly shows that the Bitera Affidavit does not state that MIS has no other sufficient
security for the claim sought to be enforced. This is a requirement under Section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court. We cannot agree with Tsuneishi's insistence that this allegation need not be stated in the affidavit
since it was already found in the complaint. The rules are clear and unequivocal. Further, rules governing
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment are strictly construed.
CASE 3
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 104405 May 13, 1993

DOCTRINE: To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud
should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the
time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case. Fraud is
a state of mind and need not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances
attendant in each case.

FACTS:
Imperial Organizations and Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines entered into an agreement to promote two
concerts, with Coca-Cola sponsoring the concerts and Imperial Organizations promoting the same.To ensure
compliance, Coca-Cola required Imperial Organizations to put up a performance bond. Upon application of
Imperial Organization, Petitioner Liberty Insurance, put up the performance bond in the amount of Three
Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00. In turn, petitioner Liberty Insurance required Imperial Organizations, to
execute an indemnity agreement in its favor to indemnify it for any and all damages including attorney's fees
which the petitioner may incur by reason of the issuance of the bond.

The concerts took place, however, Imperial Organizations and private respondents failed to comply with their
obligations to Coca Cola, as a result of which petitioner Liberty Insurance became liable upon its performance
bond paying Coca-Cola Three Million Pesos. Petitioner Liberty Insurance filed a complaint for damages with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against private respondents.

On September 20, 1988, the Trial Court, issued an order allowing the issuance of the writ.Respondent Arkin
filed a motion to Quash/ Recall Writ of Attachment but the trial court, this time presided by respondent
judge Napoleon K. Flojo, denied the motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment in question was properly or regularly issued?

RULING:

YES.
To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be
committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of
contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case. Fraud is a state
of mind and need not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances attendant in
each case (Republic v. Gonzales, 13 SCRA 633 [1965]).

Here, it has been established that all the collaterals given by the respondent Arkin as security for the bend
were either fraudulent or heavily encumbered. Furthermore, it has also been proven that subsequent to the
issuance of the May 30, 1988 surety bond, respondent Arkin started disposing of his other properties. All these
circumstances unerringly point to the devious scheme of respondent Arkin to defraud petitioner.

It is therefore clear that fraud was present when private respondent, among others, entered into an indemnity
agreement with petitioner. The actuations of respondent Arkin indubitably lead to the conclusion that he
never entertained the idea of fulfilling his obligations under the agreement and was bent on defrauding
petitioner from the very beginning.
CASE 4
TILLSON
VS.
CA
G.R. No. 89870, May 28, 1991

DEFINITION OF TERM:

Replevin is a form of action which lies to regain the possession of personal chattels which have been taken
from the plaintiff unlawfully and detained upon the person’s giving security to try the matter in court and
return the goods if defeated in the action.

FACTS:

David Tillson brought suit in the RTC against Leonard Lappiere and Seacraft International Corporation
alleging that he entered into contract with Pierre for construction of yacht but it was Seacraft that actually
undertook the construction of the boat and advances on the price made by Tillson. The money advance
however was used for the construction of yacht 36.

RTC authorized the execution of the default judgment and the sheriff levied on and subsequently took
possession of the 2 yachts. Which was later on awarded to Tillson as the highest bidder after execution sale.
However, Cooney filed a claim for vessel 36 on the ground of a compromise agreement between them with La
Pierre; hence the vessel was seized from Tillson but was not released to Cooney.

Tillson filed thru counsel an Urgent Motion for Approval of Bond (and) Surrender of yacht 40 submitting a
bond and praying that the boat seized from him by the sheriff be ordered returned/surrendered/released, in
accordance with Section 5 of Rule 60 of the ROC.

However, the Trial Court refused to order re-delivery of the boat to Tillson holding that the provision for the
return of seized property on a counterbond in Rule 60 is not exactly applicable to the situation because said
provision presupposes that possession is to be given to the plaintiff when the writ precisely ordered that the
possession and control of yacht be put under the Coast Guard.

ISSUE:

Whether Rules 60, writ of replevin, applies in the case.

RULING:

YES. The case is not removed from the operation of Rule 60 by the fact that after the property was taken from
the defendant it was not turned over to the plaintiff Cooney (but) to the Coast Guard. That circumstance is
totally inconsequential.

For one thing, it does not alter the reality of the defendant’s loss of possession; it is unreasonable to approve
of the taking of the boat from his possession pursuant to Rule 60, and then deny him the remedies prescribed
by that self same rule; and if the seizure was not effected in accordance with Rule 60, then the seizure was
unjustified.

For another, property seized under a writ of delivery or replevin is not supposed to be turned over to the
plaintiff until after the lapse of five 5 days, a proposition that is made plain by Section 6 of Rule 60.

Hence, whether the property remained with the sheriff, or was given over to another officer designated by the
Court is of no significance, and certainly should not be taken as disabling the defendant from moving for the
return of the property to him by either of the modes set out in Section 5 of Rule 60: (1) by objecting to the
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s replevin bond, or (2) if he does not so object, by filing a counter-bond “in double
the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff’s affidavit.
CASE 5
JORGENETICS
VS.
THICK THIN AGRI PRODUCTS
G.R. No. 21044 and 222691 May 5,2021

FACTS:

TTAI filed a complaint for replevin with damages against Jorgenetics seeking possession of the hogs that were
subject of chattel mortgage between the parties after Jorgenetics failure to pay the supplies for its hog raising
business. Trial court issued a writ of replevin and Jorgenetics filed a Motion for issuance of Writ of Execution
against the replevin bond on the basis of incurring damages on the alleged wrongful seizure of the hogs. TTAI
filed petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage covering the hogs which later on win the
public auction and was issued certificate of sale.

ISSUE:

Whether the return of the seized hogs by virtue of writ of replevin is proper.

RULING:

Yes. replevin is an action for recovery of personal property. It is both a principal remedy and a provisional
relief. When utilized as principal remedy, the objective is to recover possession of personal property that may
have been wrongfully detained by another. When sought as a provisional relief, it allws a plaintiff to retain the
contested property during the pendency of the action.

Being provisional and ancillary in character, the existence and efficacy of the writ of replevin depends on the
outcome of the case. Ancillary writs are not causes of action in themselves, but mere adjuncts to the main suit
with the sole object of preserving the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. An ancillary writ
"cannot survive the main case of which it is an incident because an ancillary writ loses its force and effect after
the decision in the main petition.

Considering that a decision has already been rendered in the main case, adjudicating rightful possession of
the livestock to TTAI, and which may be maintained in light of the Court's foregoing ruling that the trial court
validly acquired jurisdiction over Jorgenetics, the court finds that any disposition by this Court on the validity
and efficacy of the writ of replevin, which was merely ancillary to the main action, serves no practical purpose.
Thus, a discussion on the said issue is moot and may be dispensed with.
CASE 6
MILAGROS P. ENRIQUEZ,
vs.
THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE CO., INC.
GR. No. 210950 August 15, 2018

DEFINITION: Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal property. It is both a principal remedy and
a provisional relief.

DOCTRINE:A surety bond remains effective until the action or proceeding is finally decided, resolved, or
terminated, regardless of whether the applicant fails to renew the bond. The applicant will be liable to the
surety for any payment the surety makes on the bond, but only up to the amount of this bond.

FACTS:In Civil Case No. 10846, petitioner Enriquez filed a replevin case against Asuten for the recovery of
the Toyota Hi-Ace van valued at ₱300,000.00. She applied for a bond in the amount of ₱600,000.00 with
respondent in Asuten's favor. The RTC approved the bond and ordered the sheriff to recover the van from
Asuten and to deliver it to petitioner. While the van was in petitioner's custody, the RTC dismissed the case
without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Thus, it ordered the sheriff to restore the van to Asuten. When
petitioner failed to produce the van, the RTC directed respondent to pay Asuten the amount of the bond.
Mercantile Insurance Co. paid Asuten because of failure of Enriquez to remit the payment of bond. Thus,it
filed a collection suit against Enriquez ,which the RTC ruled in favor of respondent.

Petitioner contends that she should not have been held liable for the full amount of the bond. Citing Rule 60,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court, she argues that a judgment on replevin is only "either for the delivery of the
property or for its value in case delivery cannot be made and for such damages as either party may prove,
with costs,as well as that the bond already expired and did not renew the bond.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner Enriquez be made liable for the full amount of the bond paid by
respondent in relation to replevin filed by petitioner?

RULING:

YES. The Regional Trial Court forfeited the replevin bond which she had filed because she refused to return
the property. She is now made liable for the replevin bond because she failed to appeal its forfeiture.

Forfeiture of the replevin bond, therefore, requires first, a judgment on the merits in the defendant's favor,
and second, an application by the defendant for damages. Neither circumstance appears in this case. The
RTC would have erred in ordering the forfeiture of the entire bond in Asuten's favor. This judgment could
have been reversed had petitioner appealed .Unfortunately, she did not. Hence,liable.
CASE 7
WILLIAM ANGHIAN SY
VS
ALVIN TOMLIN
GR 205998, April 24, 2017

DOCTRINE:

"In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled
to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal
possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same. "Rule 60 x x x allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery
of possession of personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is 'the owner of the
property claimed ... or is entitled to the possession thereof.’ The plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he
is able to specify his right to the possession of the property and his legal basis therefor."

FACTS:

Petitioner William Anghian Sy, filed before the RTC of QC a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Prayer
for Replevin against Ong, Centeno, Chua and herein respondent Tomlin.Petitioner alleged that he is the owner
of 2007 model Range Rover he purchased from Lopez which he entrusted to Ong ( a buy and sell 2 nd hand car
business owner) to be offered in his showroom.

The vehicle was sold to respondent, Tomlin and were able to transfer its registration to his name.Respondent
argued that petitioner could not prove his ownership of the vehicle. That the only pieces of evidence he
presented were a manager’s check and cash voucher as proof of payment and the affidavit of Lopez who sold
him the vehicle.

ISSUE:

Whether Replevin has been properly implemented

RULING:

A party praying for the recovery of possession of personal property must show by his own affidavit or that of
some other person who personally knows the facts that he is the owner of the property claimed, particularly
describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof It must be borne in mind that replevin is a possessory
action the gist of which focuses on the right of possession that, in turn, is dependent on a legal basis that, not
infrequently, looks to the ownership of the object sought to be replevied. Wrongful detention by the defendant
of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic
averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued. 28

Petitioner had constituted and appointed Ong as his agent to sell the vehicle, surrendering to the latter the
vehicle and all documents pertaining thereto (deed of sale/ OR/ CR) with full understanding that Ong will be
selling the vehicle to his clients. Ong was able to sell the vehicle to Chua, but he failed to remit the proceeds to
the petitioner. Thus make the petitioner entitled to sue for estafa through abuse of confidence. Since Ong was
able to sell the vehicle to Chua, petitioner thus ceased to be the owner nor he is entitled to the possession of
the vehicle. Petitioner had no longer right to file report “Failed to Return Vehicle” his only right left is only
against Ong, for collection of the proceeds of sale”

Considering that petitioner is no longer the owner of the subject vehicle at the time he filed the civil case,
petitioner may not seek a return of the same through replevin. Respondent, who obtained the vehicle from
Chua and registered and transfer with the LTO, is the rightful owner thereof, he is entitled to the possession.
CASE 8
MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY ,INC.,
VS
DIANA P. ALIBUDBUD
G.R. No. 209011, April 20, 2016

FACTS :

Petitioner filed a case of replevin/collection of sum of money against the respondent before the Regional Trial
Court based from the Promissory Note executed by the respondent in favor of the petitioner.

Respondent assails that she was illegally dismissed by the petitioner as an employee and that the proceedings
in the RTC should be suspended pending the resolution in the labor case that if granted, would result to
irreconcilable conflict not contemplated by law, much less conducive to the orderly administration of justice.

The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and it was opined that: (1) reference shall be made only on the
Promissory Note which Alibudbud executed in favor of Malayan in determining the rights and obligations of
the parties; (2) the cause of action in the replevin case is rooted from the Promissory Note; and (3) the issue
in the labor dispute is in no way connected with the rights and obligations of the parties arising out of the
Promissory Note.

On appeal, the CA ruled to set aside the decision of the trial court. The CA explained that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance over the replevin action because of the "employer-employee" relations between
the parties which Malayan never denied. Certainly, Alibudbud could not have availed of the benefits of the Car
Financing Plan if she was not employed by Malayan. Citing Section 1,34 Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the
CA upheld to dismiss the replevin action considering that the ground of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC properly took cognizance of the Replevin case?

RULING:

YES.The RTC correctly took cognizance of the action for replevin.

"Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover
those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such
goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover property in specie from
one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the
recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of
the property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action."

It should be noted that the present action involves the parties' relationship as debtor and creditor, not their
"employer-employee" relationship. Malayan's demand for Alibudbud to pay the 50% company equity over the
car or, to surrender its possession, is civil in nature. The trial court's ruling also aptly noted the Promissory
Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage voluntarily signed by Alibudbud to secure her financial obligation to avail
of the car being offered under Malayan's Car Financing Plan. Clearly, the issue in the replevin action is
separate and distinct from the illegal dismissal case.
 CASE 9.
JOSE S. OROSA and MARTHA P. OROSA
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FCP CREDIT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 111080,April 5, 2000

DOCTRINE: Sec 9, Rule 60. After trial of the issues, the court shall determine who has the right of
possession to and the value of the property and shall render judgment in the alternative for the delivery
thereof to the party entitled to the same, or for its value in case delivery cannot be made, and also for such
damages as either party may prove, with costs.

FACTS:

On December 6, 1984, private respondent FCP Credit Corporation filed a complaint for replevin and
damages in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner Jose S. Orosa and one John Doe to
recover possession of a 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan with Motor and Serial No. SUNKBT- 14584. The
complaint alleged that on September 28, 1983, petitioner purchased the subject motor vehicle on
installment from Fiesta Motor Sales Corporation. He executed and delivered to Fiesta Motor Sales Corp. a
promissory note in the sum of P133,824.00 payable in monthly installments.

To secure payment, petitioner executed a chattel mortgage over the subject motor vehicle in favor of
Fiesta Motor Sales Corp. On September 28, 1983, Fiesta Motor Sales assigned the promissory note and
chattel mortgage to private respondent FCP Credit Corporation. The complaint further alleged that
petitioner failed to pay part of the installment which fell due on July 28, 1984 as well as three (3)
consecutive installment which fell due on August 28, September 28, and October 28, 1984. Consequently,
private respondent FCP Credit Corporation demanded from petitioner payment of the entire outstanding
balance of the obligation amounting to P106,154.48 with accrued interest and to surrender the vehicle
which petitioner was allegedly detaining.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court made a mistake in ordering private respondent to return the subject car or its
equivalent considering that petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase price.

RULING:

YES.T trial court erred when it ordered private respondent to return the subject car or its equivalent
considering that petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase price. Verily, to sustain the trial court's
decision would amount to unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals was correct when it instead ordered
private respondent to return, not the car itself, but only the amount equivalent to the fourteen installments
actually paid with interest.Section 9 of Rule 60After trial of the issues, the court shall determine who has the
right of possession to and the value of the property and shall render judgment in the alternative for the
delivery thereof to the party entitled to the same, or for its value in case delivery cannot be made, and also
for such damages as either party may prove, with costs.
CASE 10

PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC.

VS.
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
G.R. No. 159926 . January 20, 2014

FACTS :

Petitioner brought against the Bank and the sheriff an action for the annulment of real estate mortgages in the
RTC, averring that Bonier had obtained the loans only in his personal capacity and had constituted the
mortgages on the corporate asset without Pinausukan’s consent through a board resolution. Accordingly, the
RTC dismissed the action filed by the petitioner for failure to prosecute. The order of dismissal attained
finality.

The sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale concerning the property of Pinausukan. The notice was received
by Pinausukan a week later.Pinausukan brought the petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification
of the order of the RTC. Petitioner contends that its counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence
in failing to keep track of the case he was handling, and in failing to apprise Pinausukan of the developments
on the case which constituted professional misconduct which amounted to extrinsic fraud ,thus, properly
warranting the annulment of the Order of the trial court and unduly deprived of its right to present evidence
through no fault of its own.

The CA dismissed the petition for annulment, citing the failure to attach the affidavits of witnesses attesting
to and describing the alleged extrinsic fraud supporting the cause of action as required by Section 4, Rule 47
of the Rules of Court; and observing that the verified petition related only to the correctness of its allegations,
a requirement entirely different and separate from the affidavits of witnesses required under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court. The CA denied Pinausukan’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the requirement for attaching the affidavits of witnesses to the petition for annulment should
be relaxed?

RULING :

NO.A requirement in a petition for annulment of judgment demands that the petition should be verified, and
should allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting
the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. The need for particularity
cannot be dispensed with because averring the circumstances constituting either fraud or mistake with
particularity is a universal requirement in the rules of pleading.

In this case, the procedural defect consisted in Pinausukan’s failure to submit together with the petition the
affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action. It is true that the petition, which narrated
the facts relied upon, was verified under oath by Roxanne. However, the submission of the affidavits of
witnesses together with the petition was not dispensable for that reason.

Pinausukan’s failure to include the affidavits of witnesses was fatal to its petition for annulment. Worthy to
reiterate is that the objective of the requirements of verification and submission of the affidavits of witnesses
is to bring all the relevant facts that will enable the CA to immediately determine whether the petition has
substantial merit. In that regard, however, the requirements are separate from each other, for only by the
affidavits of the witnesses who had competence about the circumstances constituting the extrinsic fraud can
the petitioner detail the extrinsic fraud being relied upon as the ground for its petition for annulment. This is
because extrinsic fraud cannot be presumed from the recitals alone of the pleading but needs to be
particularized as to the facts constitutive of it.
CASE 11.
BACLARAN MARKETING CORPORATION
vs.
FERNANDO C. NIEVA and MAMERTO SIBULO, JR.
G.R. No. 189881

DOCTRINE:
Rule 47, Section 2 provides extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction as the exclusive grounds for the remedy
of annulment of judgment. Case law, however, recognizes a third ground— denial of due process of law.

FACTS:
In a case for damages, the RTC of Antipolo ruled in favor of BMC and Mendoza and dismissed Sibulo's
complaint. However, on appeal, the CA reversed the decision and awarded Sibulo damages. In the absence
of a motion for reconsideration, the Decision became final and executor.

The Antipolo Court subsequently issued a Writ of Execution. The sheriff of the Antipolo Court levied upon
BMC's real property. He sold the property and its improvements through public auction where Nieva
emerged as the highest bidder. For BMC's failure to redeem the property within one year from the sale, Nieva
consolidated ownership over it. He filed a Petition for Cancellation of TCT before the RTC of Paranaque
which ordered the Register of Deeds to annul BMC’s TCT and issue a new title in Nieva's name. The Decision
of the Parañaque Court became final. Consequently, Nieva filed a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession over the property in the Parañaque Court which was granted.

In view of the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate issued against it, BMC filed a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment before the CA. BMC alleged that its counsel committed acts of gross and inexcusable negligence
constituting "extrinsic fraud," in not informing them of the appeal which deprived it of due process and an
opportunity to present its side. The CA denied BMC's petition ruling that the remedy of annulment of
judgment is not available to BMC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the remedy of petition for Annulment of Judgment may be availed of by petitioner

RULING:

NO. The petition failed to comply with some of the statutory requirements under Rule 47.First, an auction
sale and a writ of execution are not final orders. Corollarily, an order implementing a writ of execution
issued over certain real properties is also not a final order as it merely enforces a judicial process over an
identified object. It does not involve an adjudication on the merits or determination of the rights of the
parties. A writ of possession is also not a final order because it is merely a judicial process to enforce a final
order against the losing party. In fine, only the Decision of the Parañaque Court ordering the cancellation of
BMC's title over the property qualifies as a final judgment. It is a judgment on the merits declaring who
between Nieva and BMC has the right over the title to the property. Therefore, it may be the subject of an
action for annulment of judgment.
Second, BMC failed to prove that any of the grounds for annulment are present in this case.
In this case, the CA correctly found that BMC neither alleged nor proved that the gross negligence of its
former counsel was done in connivance with Nieva or Sibulo. Therefore, it is not the extrinsic fraud
contemplated under Rule 47, Section 2.
CASE 12
CHARNNEL SHANE THOMAS
VS.
RACHEL TRONO AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR NO. 241032, March 15, 2021

FACTS:

Charnnel Shane Thomas (Charnnel) filed a petition for annulment of judgment against Rachel Trono and
the Republic of the Philippines. Earl Alphonso Thomas (Alphonso), an American citizen, was married to
Rachel Trono on October 7, 1984, and they had a son named Earl James Thomas. Alphonso filed a petition
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Rachel, which was granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City on August 22, 1997. The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio due to Alphonso's existing
marriage to Nancy Thomas. During the trial, Alphonso and Rachel agreed that the properties acquired
during their marriage would go to Rachel and Earl. Alphonso then cohabited with Jocelyn C. Ledres and
they got married on July 22, 2007. Alphonso passed away on February 12, 2011, and Jocelyn requested
certified true copies of the 1997 decision from the RTC. The RTC discovered that the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) was not furnished a copy of the decision and instead of granting Jocelyn's request, the RTC
furnished the OSG with a copy and gave them 15 days to perfect an appeal or file a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration on March 28, 2011, and the RTC granted the
motion on June 28, 2011, reversing its previous decision and ruling that the marriage between Alphonso
and Rachel is valid and subsisting. Charnnel, as the child of Alphonso and Jocelyn, filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals (CA) on the ground of denial of due process.

ISSUE:

The main issue raised in the case is whether Charnnel was denied due process of law when she was not
allowed to participate in the proceedings for reconsideration before the RTC.

RULING:

YES.The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Charnnel and granted the petition for annulment of judgment.

The Court held that Charnnel, as an heir of Alphonso, had the legal standing to challenge the marriage of
Alphonso and Rachel. The Court recognized that void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party, and Charnnel, as an heir, had the right to assert her interests. The Court found that Charnnel
was not made a party to the proceedings for reconsideration before the RTC, and thus, she was denied due
process of law. The Court emphasized that due process requires that all parties affected by a judgment must
be given the opportunity to be heard and present their evidence. In this case, Charnnel was not given the
chance to participate in the proceedings and present her arguments and evidence. The Court also noted that
the OSG, as the representative of the State, did not adequately represent Charnnel's interests. The Court
held that the denial of Charnnel's right to participate in the proceedings for reconsideration violated her
constitutional right to due process of law.
CASE 13
ANTONIO DEMETRIOU
vs
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115595 November 14, 1994

DEFINITION:
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his
side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent

Intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial such as the use of forged or
false document or perjured testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a
fair and just determination of the case

DOCTRINE: A judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but
also because of lack of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it

FACTS:

Petitioners are the co-owners of a lot of the subdivision situated at Poblacion, Tabacco, Albay.After
awaiting the termination of the lease before registering the sale and obtaining a new title in their name,the
father of petitioners learned from the Register of Deeds that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-
65878 in the possession of the petitioner had been declared of no further force and effect and that a new
second owner's duplicate copy of said title has been issued to the private respondent. Investigation by the
petitioners disclosed that respondent falsely and fraudulently alleged that "the owner's duplicate copy of
the said title was lost and/or destroyed while in the possession and custody of herein petitioner as per her
Affidavit of Affidavit . respondent. On the basis of these allegations the appellate court ruled that the fraud
alleged was, if at all, only intrinsic and not extrinsic in character.the instant petition for annulment of the
said December 1, 1990 order of the lower court was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether CA’s dismissal for annulment of judgment was proper?

RULING:

NO.A judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but also
because of lack of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. In Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, on facts
analogous to those involved in this case, this Court already held that if a certificate of title has not been
lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court
rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently the decision may be attacked any
time. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 26, s 18 provides that "in case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed
be found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title." It was, therefore,
error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for annulment of judgment of the petitioners.