PROVISIONAL REMEDIES AND SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

PUP College of Law

Atty. Albertson S. Cajayon

I. Provisional Remedies
1. Nature of provisional remedies
GMA Network, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 181789,
[February 3, 2016], 780 PHIL 244-257
2. What are the different provisional remedies under the Rules of Court?
Calo v. Roldan, G.R. No. L-252, [March 30, 1946], 76 PHIL 445-456
3. Jurisdiction over provisional remedies
4. Other provisional remedies under various Supreme Court Issuances and Special Laws

II. Preliminary Attachment

a. Grounds for issuance of writ of attachment
i.Fraud Incurring the obligation

1. Liberty Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104405, [May 13,
1993]:

To sustain an attachment against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt, it must
be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the
creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason
which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To
constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be
committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon.
A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or
intention not to pay, as it is in this case. Fraud is a state of mind and need not be proved by direct
evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances attendant in each case.
FACTS:
Imperial Organizations put up a performance bond with Liberty Insurance to ensure compliance of the
concerts entered by the former with Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines.
In turn, Liberty Insurance required Imperial Organizations, Jose Imperial, Atilla Arkin and Carmen
Madlangbayan to execute an indemnity agreement in its favour to indemnify it for any and all
damages which it may incur by reason of the bund.
While the concerts took place, Imperial Organizations and private respondents failed to comply with
their obligations, as a result of which petitioner Liberty Insurance paid to Coca-cola the P3M bond.
Petitioner Liberty made demands upon the private respondents based on the indemnity bond but to
no avail.
Petitioner filed with RTC a complaint for damages with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against respondents.
RTC issued Order allowing issuance of writ, stating that there could have been fraud committed.
Arkin filed a motion to Quash/recall Writ of Attachment but this was denied.

Arkin filed MR. The Judge reversed the prior Order of denial of the Motion to Quash and thus directed
the lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment because a close examination of the evidence shows
that the delivery of the “fake collaterals” were made 2 days after the issuance of the surety bond.
Thus it was not prior or simultaneous with the execution of the Surety bond.
On the claim that Arkin removed or disposed of his property with intent to defraud his creditors,
plaintiff did not prove the intent of Arkin to defraud creditors.
Aggrieved, Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
CA dismissed petition on the ground that petitioner did not file MR.
ISSUE:
Was the writ of preliminary attachment properly issued?
HELD:
No. It has been established that all the collaterals given by the respondent Arkin as security for the
bond were either fraudulent or heavily encumbered. Records show that the TCT issued by the ROD
used as one of the collaterals, turned out to be fake and spurious. Likewise, the supposed lien-free
motor vehicle offered as collateral turned out to be heavily mortgaged and was even disposed of
without informing petitioner. Furthermore, it has also been proven that subsequent to the issuance of
the surety bond, respondent Arkin started disposing of his other properties. Prior to the filing of the
complaint, respondent not only had sold the motor vehicle given as collateral but that his two other
condominium units, were also alienated in favor of a company of which respondent Arkin is the
president. All these circumstances unerringly point to the devious scheme of respondent Arkin to
defraud petitioner.

2. Wee v. Tankiansee, G.R. No. 171124, [February 13, 2008], 568 PHIL 819-832

FACTS:
Alejandro Ng Wee, a valued client of Westmont Bank (now United Overseas Bank), made several
money placements totaling P210,595,991.62 with the bank’s affiliate, Westmont Investment
Corporation (Wincorp), a domestic entity engaged in the business of an investment house with the
authority and license to extend credit.

Sometime in Feb. 2000, Petitioner received disturbing news on Wincorp’s financial condition
prompting him to inquire about and investigate the company’s operations and transactions with its
borrowers. He then discovered that the company extended a loan equal to his total money placement
to a Corporation [Power Merge] with a subscribed capital of only P37.5M. This credit facility originated
from another loan of about P1.5B extended by Wincorp to another Corporation [Hottick Holdings].
When the latter defaulted in its obligation, Wincorp instituted a case against it and its surety.
Settlement was, however, reached in which Hottick’s president, Virata, assumed the obligation of the
surety.

Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp and Hottick’s president, Petitioner’s money placements
were transferred without his knowledge and consent to the loan account of Power Merge through an
agreement that virtually freed the latter of any liability. Allegedly, through the false representations of
Wincorp and its officers and directors, Petitioner was enticed to roll over his placements so that
Wincorp could loan the same to Virata or Power Merge.

Finding that Virata purportedly used Power Merge as a conduit and connived with Wincorp’s officers
and directors to fraudulently obtain for his benefit without any intention of paying the said placements,
Petitioner instituted a case for damages with the RTC of Manila. One of the defendants impleaded in
the complaint is herein respondent Tankiansee, Vice-Chairman and Director of WinCorp. The trial
court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties not exempt from
execution of all the defendants in the subject, among others, to Petitioner’s filing of a P50M bond. The
writ was consequently issued.
Arguing that the writ was improperly issued and that the bond furnished was grossly insufficient,
respondent moved for the discharge of the attachment. The other defendants likewise filed similar
motions. The RTC denied all the motions for the discharge of the attachment. The defendants,
including respondent herein, filed their respective motions for reconsideration but the trial court
denied the same.

Incidentally, while respondent opted not to question anymore the said orders, his co-defendants,
Virata and UEM-MARA Philippines Corp. (UEM-MARA), assailed the same via certiorari under Rule
65 before the CA. The CA, however, denied the petition for certiorari, and the MR thereof.
In a Petition for review on certiorari before the SC, in G.R. No. 162928, the court denied the Petition
and affirmed the CA rulings for Virata’s and UEMMARA’s failure to sufficiently show that the appellate
court committed any reversible error. The SC subsequently denied the Petition with finality.
On Sept. 30, 2004, respondent filed before the trial court another Motion to Discharge Attachment, re-
pleading the grounds he raised in his first motion but raising the following additional grounds: (1) that
he was not present in Wincorp’s board meetings approving the questionable transactions; and (2) that
he could not have connived with Wincorp and the other defendants because he and Pearlbank
Securities, Inc., in which he is a major stockholder, filed cases against the company as they were also
victimized by its fraudulent schemes.

Ruling that the grounds raised were already passed upon by it in the previous orders affirmed by the
CA and the SC, and that the additional grounds were respondent’s affirmative defenses that properly
pertained to the merits of the case, the trial court denied the motion. With the denial of its MR,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and the latter rendered the assailed Decision
reversing and setting aside the aforementioned orders of the trial court and lifting the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment to the extent that it concerned respondent’s properties. Petitioner moved for
the reconsideration of the said ruling, but the CA denied the same. Thus, Petitioner filed the instant
Petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the preliminary attachment should be discharged.
RULING:

In the case at bench, the basis of Petitioner’s application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of respondent is Section 1 (d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
which pertinently reads:
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue.- At the commencement of the action or at any
time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse
party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following
cases: x xxx
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt / incurring the
obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.
For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual
circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor’s
mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The applicant must then be
able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.
In the instant case, Petitioner’s Affidavit is bereft of any factual statement that respondent committed
a fraud. The affidavit narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata
and/or Power Merge, which, by the way, explains why the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 162928,
affirmed the writ of attachment issued against the latter.
The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to how the fraud
imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ. Absent
any statement of other factual circumstances to show that respondent, at the time of contracting the
obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or without any showing of how respondent
committed the alleged fraud, the general averment in the affidavit that respondent is an officer and
director of Wincorp who allegedly connived w/ the other defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient
to support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

In the application for the writ under the said ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about what
constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated because established is the rule that fraud is never
presumed. Verily, the mere fact that respondent is an officer and director of the company does not
necessarily give rise to the inference that he committed a fraud or that he connived with the other
defendants to commit a fraud.

While under certain circumstances, courts may treat a Corporation as a mere aggroupment of
persons, to whom liability will directly attach, this is only done when the wrongdoing has been clearly
& convincingly established.

Let it be stressed that the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh and rigorous for it
exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance. The rules governing its issuance are, therefore,
strictly construed against the applicant, such that if the requisites for its grant are not shown to be all
present, the court shall refrain from issuing it, for, otherwise, the court which issues it acts in excess
of its jurisdiction.

Likewise, the writ should not be abused to cause unnecessary prejudice. If it is wrongfully issued on
the basis of false or insufficient allegations, it should at once be corrected.
Considering, therefore, that, in this case, Petitioner has not fully satisfied the legal obligation to show
the specific acts constitutive of the alleged fraud committed by respondent, the trial court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction when it issued the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of
respondent.

3. FCY Construction Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123358,

[February 1, 2000], 381 PHIL 282-290
FACTS:

On June 1993, Ley Construction and Development Corporation filed a Complaint for collection of a sum of
money with application for preliminary attachment against petitioner FCY Construction Group, Inc. and Francis
C. Yu with the Makati Regional Trial Court.

Respondent alleged that it had a joint venture agreement with petitioner FYC Group over the Tandang Sora
Commonwealth Flyover government project for which it had provided funds and construction materials. The
Complaint was filed in order to compel petitioners to pay its half share in the collections received in the project
as well as those yet to be received therein. In support of its application for a writ of attachment, private
respondent alleged that petitioners were guilty of fraud in incurring the obligation and had fraudulently
misapplied or converted the money paid them, to which it had an equal share. Defendants denied such
allegation that there was fraud in incurring the obligations in the agreement.
An ex parte hearing was conducted and the lower ordered for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
and conditioned upon filing of 7M attachment bond.

Petitioners move for the lifting of the writ on several grounds and prayed in there motion that the attachments
must be limited to receivables with the DPWH. The court then lifted the attachment and reduce and confined
the attachment to receivables due petitioners inTandang Sora commonwealth fly over.

Defendant subsequently filed two motions before the RTC, first a motion for consideration, and second an
omnibus motion for leave and to delete Francis Yu as party defendant. However both motions were denied by
the RTC.
Defendants appealed the case in the CA but was also dened. Hence an instant petition was elevated to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether writ of preliminary attachment was irregularly issued inasmuch as there was no evidence of fraud in
incurring the obligations sued upon.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that based on the the foregoing facts of the case, the alleged inducement by the
DPWH officials upon private respondent as well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the joint
venture agreement, both appear immaterial as they were not committed upon contracting the obligation sued
upon but occurred long after the obligation has been established.

The fact that petitioners have paid a substantial amount of money to private respondent cannot save the day
for them either. As per their own accounting, such payments were for accounts payable for labor supplied,
construction materials and cash advances. It is not denied that no payment of profits has been given to private
respondent, which is precisely what it is suing for.

Considering that the writ of preliminary attachment has been issued on account of allegations of fraud in
contracting the obligation upon which the action is brought petitioners' efforts to have the writ of preliminary
attachment dissolved on the ground that it was improperly or irregularly issued is in vain. Citing the previos
case of Liberty Insurance Corporation,

“when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's
cause of action: e.g., x x x an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt
or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion
to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual
averments in the plaintiff’s application and affidavits on which the writ was based and consequently that
the writ based therein had been improperly or irregularly issued - the reason being that the hearing on
such motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial on the merits.”

4. Metro, Inc. v. Lara's Gifts and Decors, Inc., G.R. No. 171741, [November 27,
2009], 621 PHIL 162-172
FACTS:

Lara’s Gifts and Decors Inc. (LGD) and Metro, Inc. are corporations engaged in the business of
manufacturing, producing, selling and exporting handicrafts. With Sps. Luis and Lara Villafuerte are
the president and vice president of LGD respectively. And Sps Juan and Liza Juan are the principal
officers of the Metro Inc.
Sometime in 2001, an agreement between the parties that LGD would endorse to Metro Inc. orders
received by respondents from their buyers in the United States of America in exchange for a 15%
commission, to be shared equally by respondents and James R. Paddon (JRP), LGD’s agent. The
terms of the agreement were later embodied in an e-mail labeled as the "2001 Agreement.

Respondent LGD filed with the RTC of Las Pinas against petitioner for sum and damages with prayer
for the issuance of writ of attachment. And was later amended and alleged that LGD was defrauded
for an amount of 500,000k Dollars and tey also prayed for a 1Million pesos as Moral damages.

the trial court granted respondents’ prayer and issued the writ of attachment against the properties
and assets of petitioners.

Metro Inc. filed a motion to discharge the writ of attachment rgued that the writ of attachment should
be discharged on the several grounds: one of which is that respondents failed to substantiate their
allegations of fraud with specific acts or deeds showing how petitioners defrauded them; and (4) that
respondents failed to establish that the unpaid commissions were already due and demandable.

The Writ of Preliminary attachment was hereby discharged or lifted.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but was later on denied by the lower court. And
eventually respondents file an appeal before the CA and was granted the same.

Hence this petition to the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that the writ of attachment was
improperly issued because respondents’ amended complaint failed to allege specific acts or
circumstances constitutive of fraud. Petitioners insist that the improperly issued writ of attachment
may be discharged without the necessity of filing a counter-bond.

ISSUE:

Whether the writ of attachment issued by the trial court was improperly issued such that it may be
discharged without the filing of a counter-bond.

HELD:

The supreme Court ruled that the petition has no merit. Citing the decision in Liberty Insurance
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was explained:

To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the
debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the
execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into
giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for
attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon
contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of
contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay,

Respondents’ allegation that petitioners undertook to sell exclusively and only through JRP/LGD for
Target Stores Corporation but that petitioners transacted directly with respondents’ foreign buyer is
sufficient allegation of fraud to support their application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Since the
writ of preliminary attachment was properly issued, the only way it can be dissolved is by filing a
counter-bond in accordance with Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore the Supreme Court explained that "when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground
which is at the same time the applicant’s cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or
dissolved is by a counter-bond"21 is applicable in this case. It is clear that in respondents’ amended
complaint of fraud is not only alleged as a ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment, but it is also the core of respondents’ complaint. The fear of the Court of Appeals that
petitioners could force a trial on the merits of the case on the strength of a mere motion to dissolve
the attachment has a basis.

5. Republic v. Estate of Lim, Sr., G.R. No. 164800, [July 22, 2009], 611 PHIL 37-
59
FACTS:

Republic, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed before the
Sandiganbayan, an Amended Complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages. In
it, the Republic averred that Alfonso Lim, Sr. (now deceased) and Alfonso Lim, Jr., acting by themselves and/or
in unlawful collusion with the then Pres Marcos and Imelda and taking undue advantage of their relationship,
influence, and connection with the latter, embarked upon devices and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves
at the expense of the Republic and the Filipino people.

The allegations are as follows;

1. Actively solicited and obtained, upon the personal behest of [the Marcoses] orporations beneficially
held and controlled by Alfonso Lim and Alfonso Lim, Jr., which, in addition to other areas already
awarded to TAGGAT and PAMPLONA,
2. actively solicited and obtained a management contract in favor of TAGGAT to operate and manage the
logging concessions of Veterans Woodwork, Inc. (VETERANS), Sierra Madre Wood Industries, Inc.
(SIERRA MADRE), and Tropical Philippines Wood Industries, Inc. (TROPICAL)
3. btained a permit to cut down a certain number of Narra and Amaciga trees, and exported the same
even if there still a ban on the export of aforesaid trees.
4. obtained, in favor of PAMPLONA, a syndicated loan in the amount of millions of US dollars from a
consortium of international banks, secured by the guarantee of the National Investment and
Development Corporation (NIDC),.

As its main prayer, the Republic asked for the reconveyance of all funds and property impressed with
constructive trust in favor of the Republic and the Filipino people, "as well as funds and other property acquired
with [respondents'] abuse of right and power and through unjust enrichment.
Meanwhile, Lim Sr. Died and his estate file a motion to lift the sequestration over the several real properties
mentioned in this case. They contend that the PCGG impleaded them owing to his alleged association with
former Pres. Marcos. the said motion to lift was was interposed by the PCGG alleging that the sequestered lots
and titles stand as security for the satisfaction of any judgment the Republic may obtain against the estate of
Lim, Sr., his family, or his group of companies.
The Sandiganbayan lifted the sequestration order citing that the pertinent provisions of Executive Order Nos. 1,
2 and 14 are explicit in saying that the properties that are supposed to be "sequestered" are those x x x
amassed during the regime of the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos and not before or later thereto.
the Republic sought but was later denied reconsideration of the sequestration-lifting resolution of the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan, in light of the denial of respondents demurrer to evidence, acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not considering that the evidence already on
record support the issuance of a writ or preliminary attachment.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court explained that the Attachment is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake
but to enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or
principal action; 19 it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such, it is available during the
pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and
interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects , of a final judgment in the case. As
a corollary proposition, an order granting an application for a writ of preliminary attachment cannot, owing to
the incidental or auxiliary nature of such order, be the subject of an appeal independently of the main action.
In the case at bar, the Republic has, to us, sufficiently discharged the burden of demonstrating the commission
of fraud committed by respondents Lims as a condition sine qua non for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment. Sandiganbayan unqualifiedly admitted in evidence. And the fraud or fraudulent scheme principally
came in the form of Lim, Sr. holding and/or operating logging concessions which far exceeded the allowable
area prescribed under the 1973 Constitution.

b. Requisites
1. An order of Attachment shall be granted only upon the filing of the requisite
affidavit and bond
2. The required affidavit need not be executed by the applicant. It may be executed
by other person who personally knows the facts
3. Aside from the affidavit executed, the party applying for an order of preliminary
attachment must post a bond in the amount which is fixed by the court and
executed by the adverse party.

c. Issuance and contents of order of attachment; affidavit and bond

Stages of issuance of writ of attachment

 the court issues the order granting the application
 the writ of attachment is issued pursuant to the order granting the writ
 the writ is implemented

Issuance of order of attachment

The writ of preliminary attachment may be issued
 Ex Parte and even before summons is served upon the defendant
 Upon motion and notice of hearing, by the court in which the action is pending and may even
be issued by the CA or the SC

Contents of the order of attachment

It must require the sheriff of the court to attach so uch of the property in the Philippines of the party
against whom it is issued, not exempt from the execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the
applicants demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond in an amount equal to that fixed
in order.

d. Rule on prior or contemporaneous service of summons

e. Manner of attaching real and personal property; when property attached is claimed by
third person
 Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara [Pangasinan], Inc. v. The Manila Mission of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc., G.R. No. 130223, [August 19, 2009], 613 PHIL
40-55

FACTS:

Sps Tomas and Maria Soliven were registered owners, under the TCT of a parcel of land in Sta
Barbara in Pangasinan. Sometime in 1992, the Sps Soliven sold the subject property to respondent
Manila Mission of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc. (Manila Mission). However the
TCT in the name of Solivens were cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of the
respondent.

petitioner Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Pangasinan), Inc. filed with the RTC a Complaint against the
spouses Soliven for a sum of money. The Complaint of petitioner included a prayer for the issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Which the RTC ordered the issuance of such Preliminary writ and
ordered to satidy the principal claim of 338, 000. And a bond of in the amount of 100k

Upon the filing by petitioner of the required bond, the RTC issued the Writ of Attachment. Acting on
the order, the sheriff attached the subject property, which was then still in the name of the spouses
Soliven.

f. Discharge of attachment and the counter-bond

A. G.B., Inc. v. Sanchez, G.R. No. L-7717, [April 27, 1956], 98 PHIL 886-892
B. Insular Savings Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123638, [June 15, 2005], 499 PHIL
116-125
g. Satisfaction of judgment out of property attached
III. Preliminary Injunction
Preliminary
A. Definitions and Differences: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order

a. Limitless Potentials, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164459, [April 24, 2007], 550
PHIL 250-271
b. Purpose - Preysler, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158141, [July 11, 2006], 527 PHIL
129-137
c. Scope - Mantile v. Cajucom, G.R. No. 5734, [August 17, 1911], 19 PHIL 563-574
B. Sufficiency of Complaint, Application and Other Requisites
a. Republic v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 156015, [August 11, 2005], 504 PHIL 115-125
C. Kinds of Injunction
a. Final Injunction
b. Preventive Injunction
c. Mandatory Injunction
i. Semirara Coal Corp. v. HGL Development Corp., G.R. No. 166854, [December
6, 2006], 539 PHIL 532-547
ii.
iii. China Banking Corp. v. Co, G.R. No. 174569, [September 17, 2008], 587 PHIL
380-390
D. When writ may be issued
a. Barayuga v. Adventist University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 168008, [August 17,
2011], 671 PHIL 403-423
b. Australian Professional Realty, Inc. v. Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas, G.R.
No. 183367, [March 14, 2012], 684 PHIL 283-295
 E. Against whom is injunction issued
a. Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131719, [May 25, 2004], 473
PHIL 27-64
b. Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140058 (Resolution), [August 1,
2002], 435 PHIL 112-120
c. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Majaducon, G.R. Nos. 136760 & 138378, [July
29, 2003], 455 PHIL 61-76
d. Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato, G.R. No. 118216, [March 9, 2000], 384
PHIL 252-263
e. Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66321, [October 31,
1984], 218 PHIL 143-151
F. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction
a. Republic v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 156015, [August 11, 2005], 504 PHIL 115-125
b. Land Bank of the Phils. v. Continental Watchman Agency Inc., G.R. No. 136114,
[January 22, 2004], 465 PHIL 607-618
G. Grounds for objection to, or for the dissolution of injunction or restraining order
a. Spouses Yap v. International Exchange Bank, G.R. No. 175145, [March 28, 2008],
573 PHIL 515-532
H. Duration of TRO
I. In relation to RA 8975, Ban on issuance of TRO or Writ of Injunction in cases involving
government infrastructure projects
a. Nerwin Industries Corp. v. PNOC-Energy Development Corp., G.R. No. 167057,
[April 11, 2012], 685 PHIL 412-429
J. Rule on prior or contemporaneous service of summons in relation to attachment
IV. Receivership
A. Definition
a. Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Pomar, G.R. No. 6305, [September
26, 1911], 20 PHIL 261-269
B. Receiver distinguished from a Sheriff
a. Pauco v. Siguenza, G.R. No. 29295, [October 22, 1928], 52 PHIL 241-244
C. Cases when receiver may be appointed
D. Requisites
E. Grounds for Appointment of Receiver
a. Calo v. Roldan, G.R. No. L-252, [March 30, 1946], 76 PHIL 445-456
b. Paranete v. Tan, G.R. No. L-3791, [November 29, 1950], 87 PHIL 678-682)
c. Rocha & Co. v. Crossfield, G.R. No. 3430, [August 7, 1906], 6 PHIL 355-360
F. Requirements before issuance of an Order
a. Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61508, [March 17, 1999], 364 PHIL 328-
352
G. Granted only in extreme situations
a. Vivares v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155408, [February 13, 2008], 568 PHIL 644-658
H. General powers of a receiver
I. Two (2) kinds of bonds
J. Effect of termination of main action
a. Berg v. Teus, G.R. No. L-2987, [February 20, 1951], 88 PHIL 173-177)
K. Termination of receivership
a. Martinez v. Graño, G.R. No. 27685, [December 24, 1927], 51 PHIL 287-302
b. Platon v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 49031, [August 28, 1944], 74 PHIL 731-734)
V. Replevin
A. Nature
 a. BA Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102998, [July 5, 1996], 327 PHIL
716-728)
B. When may writ be issued
C. Requisites
a. Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110048, [November 19,
1999], 376 PHIL 602-614
D. Affidavit and bond; Redelivery Bond
a. Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61508, [March 17, 1999], 364 PHIL 328-
352
b. Factoran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93540, [December 13, 1999], 378 PHIL
282-299
E. Sheriff’s duty in the implementation of the writ; when property is claimed by third party
Fernandez v. International Corporate Bank, G.R. No. 131283, [October 7, 1999], 374 PHIL
668-680
VI. Support Pendente Lite
A. Definition
B. Application
a. Francisco v. Zandueta, G.R. No. 43794, [August 9, 1935], 61 PHIL 752-759
b. Coquia v. Baltazar, G.R. No. L-2942, [December 29, 1949], 85 PHIL 265-267
c. Mangoma v. Macadaeg, G.R. No. L-5153, [December 10, 1951], 90 PHIL 508-512)
d. Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31897, [June 30, 1972], 150-A PHIL 996-
1006
C. Comment
D. Hearing
E. Order
a. Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, [June 30, 2006], 526 PHIL 505-525)
F. Enforcement of Order
G. Support in Criminal Cases
H. Restitution
a. Saavedra v. Estrada, G.R. No. 33795, [September 4, 1931], 56 PHIL 33-39)
S. Special Civil Actions
1. Nature of special civil actions
2. Ordinary civil actions versus special civil actions
3. Jurisdiction and venue
4. Interpleader
a. Requisites for interpleader
b. When to file
5. Declaratory Reliefs and Similar Remedies
a. Who may file the action
b. Requisites of action for declaratory relief
c. When court may refuse to make judicial declaration
d. Conversion to ordinary action
e. Proceedings considered as similar remedies
A. Reformation of an instrument
B. Consolidation of ownership
C. Quieting of title to real property
6. Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolution of the COMELEC and COA
a. Application of Rule 65 under Rule 64
 b. Distinction in the application of Rule 65 to judgments of the COMELEC and COA and
the application of Rule 65 to other tribunals, persons and officers
7. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
a. Definitions and distinctions
b. Requisites
c. When petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is proper
d. Injunctive relief
e. Certiorari distinguished from Appeal by Certiorari; Prohibition
and Mandamus distinguished from Injunction; when and where to file petition
f. Exceptions to filing of motion for reconsideration before filing petition
g. Reliefs petitioner is entitled to
h. Actions/Omissions of MTC/RTC in election cases
i. Where to file petition
j. Effects of filing of an unmeritorious petition
8. Quo Warranto
a. Distinguish from Quo Warranto in the Omnibus Election Code
b. When government commence an action against individuals
c. When individual may commence an action
d. Judgment in Quo Warranto action
e. Rights of a person adjudged entitled to public office
9. Expropriation
a. Matters to allege in complaint for expropriation
b. Two stages in every action for expropriation
c. When plaintiff can immediately enter into possession of the real property, in relation
to RA 8974
d. New system of immediate payment of initial just compensation
e. Defenses and objections
f. Order of Expropriation
g. Ascertainment of just compensation
h. Appointment of Commissioners; Commissioner’s report; Court action upon
commissioner’s report
i. Rights of plaintiff upon judgment and payment
j. Effect of recording of judgment
10. Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
a. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale
b. Sale of mortgaged property; effect
c. Disposition of proceeds of sale
d. Deficiency judgment
(1) Instances when court cannot render deficiency judgment
e. Judicial foreclosure versus extrajudicial foreclosure
f. Equity of redemption versus right of redemption
11. Partition
a. Who may file complaint; who should be made defendants
b. Matters to allege in the complaint for partition
c. Two (2) stages in every action for partition
d. Order of partition and partition by agreement
e. Partition by commissioners; Appointment of commissioners, Commissioner’s report;
Court action upon commissioner’s report
f. Judgment and its effects
g. Partition of personal property
h. Prescription of action
12. Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer
 a. Definitions and Distinction
b. Distinguished from accion publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria
c. How to determine jurisdiction in accion publiciana and accion reinvindicatoria
d. Who may institute the action and when; against whom the action may be maintained
e. Pleadings allowed
f. Action on the complaint
g. When demand is necessary
h. Preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction
i. Resolving defense of ownership
j. How to stay the immediate execution of judgment
k. Summary procedure, prohibited pleadings
13. Contempt
a. Kinds of contempt
b. Purpose and nature of each
c. Remedy against direct contempt; penalty
d. Remedy against indirect contempt; penalty
e. How contempt proceedings are commenced
f. Acts deemed punishable as indirect contempt
g. When imprisonment shall be imposed
h. Contempt against quasi-judicial bodies