G.V. Florida Transport vs.

Heirs of Battung
Liability of Carrier

FACTS:

 Respondent alleged that Battung boarded petitioner’s bus bound to Manila from Delfin
Albano, Isabela on March 22, 2003. When the bus driver, Duplio, stopped the bus and
alighted to check the tires, a man who was seated at the fourth row of the bus stood up,
shot Battung at his head, and then left with a companion.
 The bus conductor, Daraoay, notified the driver of the incident and thereafter brought
Battung at the hospital, but the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.
 Hence, respondents filed a complaint for damages based on a breach of contract of
carriage against petitioner before the RTC.
 Respondents contended that as a common carrier, petitioner and its employees are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the passengers; and
in case of injuries and/or death on the part of a passenger, they are presumed to be at
fault.
 Petitioner maintained that they had exercised extraordinary diligence and they claimed
that a common carrier is not an absolute insurer of its passengers and that Battung’s
death should be properly deemed a fortuitous event.
 The RTC found that the petitioner were unable to rebut the presumed liability of common
carriers in case of injuries/death to its passenger due to their failure to show that they
implemented the proper security measures to prevent passengers from carrying deadly
weapons inside the bus which resulted to the killing of Battung.
 The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision in toto.

ISSUE:

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of
the RTC finding petitioner liable for damages to respondent arising from culpa contractual.

HELD:

Petition granted. CA and RTC’s ruling reversed.

Since Battung's death was caused by a co-passenger, the applicable provision is Article 1763
of the Civil Code, which states that "a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers,
if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
familycould have prevented or stopped the act or omission." Notably, for this obligation, the law
provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a good father of a family, in assessing the
existence of any culpability on the common carrier's part.

Case law states that the concept of diligence of a good father of a family "connotes reasonable
care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when
confronted with a similar situation. The test to determine whether negligence attended the
performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence."26
In contrast, no similar danger was shown to exist in this case so as to impel petitioner or its
employees to implement heightened security measures to ensure the safety of its passengers.
There was also no showing that during the course of the trip, Battung's killer made suspicious
actions which would have forewarned petitioner's employees of the need to conduct thorough
checks on him or any of the passengers.

In this case, records reveal that when the bus stopped at San Jose City to let four (4) men ride
petitioner's bus (two [2] of which turned out to be Battung's murderers), the bus driver, Duplio,
saw them get on the bus and even took note of what they were wearing. Moreover, Duplio made
the bus conductor, Daraoay, approach these men and have them pay the corresponding fare,
which Daraoay did.31 During the foregoing, both Duplio and Daraoay observed nothing which
would rouse their suspicion that the men were armed or were to carry out an unlawful activity.
With no such indication, there was no need for them to conduct a more stringent search (i.e.,
bodily search) on the aforesaid men. By all accounts, therefore, it cannot be concluded that
petitioner or any of its employees failed to employ the diligence of a good father of a family in
relation to its responsibility under Article 1763 of the Civil Code. As such, petitioner cannot
altogether be held civilly liable.
Sarkies Tour v CA
Obligations of Common Carriers for Baggage

FACTS:

Fatima Fortades boarded petitioner Sarkies Tours’ De Luxe Bus in Manila on her way to
Legazpi City. Her three luggages were loaded in the baggage compartment of the bus.
 However, during a stopover at Daet, it was discovered that only one bag remained in the
open compartment. F
 atima and her family went to great lengths to recover the luggages but only one bag was
returned to them. They reported to the police, the NBI, and the regional and head offices
of petitioner. H
 er mother even sought the assistance of Philtranco bus drivers and the radio stations.
 After more than nine months of fruitless waiting, respondents filed a case to recover the
value of the remaining lost items, as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation.
 RTC rendered a favorable judgment.
 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, but deleted the award
of moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not carrier was responsible for the loss.
2. Whether or not respondents are entitled to the award of damages.

RULING:

1. It has been established that the carrier received the luggages.

From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound
to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them, and this
liability “lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively,
by the carrier to the person who has a right to receive them,” unless the loss is due to any of the
excepted causes under Article 1734 thereof.

The cause of the loss was petitioner’s negligence in not ensuring that the doors of the baggage
compartment of its bus were securely fastened. As a result of this lack of care, almost all of the
luggage was lost, to the prejudice of the paying passengers.

2. Yes. Under the circumstances, respondents are entitled to the award of damages.

It is not disputed that of the three pieces of luggage of Fatima, only one was recovered. The
other two contained optometry books, materials, equipment, as well as vital documents and
personal belongings. Respondents had to shuttle between Bicol and Manila in their efforts to be
compensated for the loss. During the trial, Fatima and Marisol had to travel from the United
States just to be able to testify. Expenses were also incurred in reconstituting their lost
documents. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals in awarding P30,000.00 for the lost
items and P30,000.00 for the transportation expenses, but disagrees with the deletion of the
award of moral and exemplary damages which, in view of the foregoing proven facts, with
negligence and bad faith on the fault of petitioner having been duly established, should be
granted to respondents in the amount of P20,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively.
Heirs of Ochoa v GS Transport
Due Diligence in Selection and Supervision of Employees

FACTS:
 At the Manila Domestic Airport, one evening, the late Jose Marcial K. Ochoa boarded
and rode a taxicab with Plate No. PKR-534, a passenger vehicle for hire owned and
operated by defendant corporation under the business name "Avis Coupon Taxi" (Avis)
and driven by its employee and authorized driver Bibiano Padilla, Jr. on his way home to
Teacher's Village, Diliman, Quezon City.
 The taxicab was cruising along Epifanio delos Santos Avenue [EDSA], in front of Camp
Aguinaldo in Quezon City at high speed. While going up the Boni Serrano (Santolan) fly-
over, it overtook another cab driven by Pablo Clave and tried to pass another vehicle, a
ten-wheeler cargo truck.
 Because of the narrow space between the left side railing of the fly-over and the ten-
wheeler truck, the Avis cab was unable to pass and because of its speed, its driver
(Padilla) was unable to control it. To avoid colliding with the truck, Padilla turned the
wheel to the left causing his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself off the fly-over and
fell on the middle surface of EDSA below.
 The forceful drop of the vehicle on the floor of the road broke and split it into two parts.
JMK Ochoa died.
 Jose Marcial's wife, Ruby Bueno Ochoa, and his two minor children, Micaela B. Ochoa
and Jomar B. Ochoa (the heirs), through counsel, sent G & S a letter demanding that the
latter indemnify them for Jose Marcial's death, his loss of earning capacity, and funeral
expenses in the total amount of P15,000,000.00.
 As G & S failed to heed the same, the heirs filed a Complaint for Damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was raffled to Branch 164 of said court.
 G&S defense: While passing the Santolan fly-over, however, the Avis taxicab was
bumped by an on-rushing delivery van at the right portion causing the taxicab to veer to
the left, ram through the left side of the railings of the fly-over and fall to the center of the
island below. The taxicab was split into two and Jose Marcial was thrown 10 meters
away. G & S posited that the proximate cause of Jose Marcial's death is a fortuitous
event and/or the fault or negligence of the driver of the delivery van that hit the taxicab. It
likewise claimed that it exercised the diligence required of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees including Padilla.
 RTC: Padilla NEGLIGENT.
 CA: Padilla Still NEGLIGENT. Based on said ruling, the CA in this case deleted the
award for lost income after it found the USAID Certification to be self-serving and
unreliable. hile said certification states that Jose Marcial was earning an annual salary of
₱450,844.49 at the time of his untimely demise, the CA noted that same is unsupported
by competent evidence such as income tax returns or receipts

ISSUE:

WON G&S’s defenses are tenable?

HELD:
NO. As a common carrier, G & S "is bound to carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard
for all the circumstances."

However, Jose Marcial was not able to reach his destination safely as he died during the course
of the travel. "In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is
negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court to
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary
diligence."

Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed to overcome this presumption. Both the trial court and the
CA found that the accident which led to Jose Marcial's death was due to the reckless driving
and gross negligence of G & S' driver, Padilla, thereby holding G & S liable to the heirs of Jose
Marcial for breach of contract of carriage.

As to the USAID certificate, It is an "independent federal government agency that receives over-
all foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of the State [of the United States]." Given this
background, it is highly improbable that such an agency will issue a certification containing
unreliable information regarding an employee's income. Besides, there exists a presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed. Clearly, the CA erred in deleting the award for
lost income on the ground that the USAID Certification supporting such claim is self-serving and
unreliable. On the contrary, we find said certification sufficient basis for the court to make a fair
and reasonable estimate of Jose Marcial's loss of earning capacity just like in Tamayo v. Señora
where we based the victim's gross annual income on his pay slip from the Philippine National
Police.