G.R. No.

L-20761             July 27, 1966

LA MALLORCA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL., respondents.

When does Contract of Carriage End?

FACTS:
On December 20, 1953, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their minor daughters,
boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, owned and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando,
Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them four
pieces of baggages containing their personal belonging.

After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers
bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. Mariano led his
companions to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four or five meters
away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his
other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him,
unnoticed by her father.

While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to
hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor
was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip,
notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to
start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran.
Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had travelled about ten
meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.

Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the
running board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the
road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children. At that precise
time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the
ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel,
who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents.

For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit against the
defendant. The trial court rendered judgement in favor of plaintiffs holding the defendant liable
for breach of contract of carriage. On appeal, the CA held that the contract of carriage had
already ceased but nevertheless, the defendant was still held guilty of quasi-delict.

ISSUE:
Whether as to the child, who was already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away
from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under the contract of carriage also
persisted.

RULING: NO.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the
moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the
point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a
reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.

In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not
unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed
the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for
the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the
father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who
must be near the bus, was run over and killed.

In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost
diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed
by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the
first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine.
Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go
and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran
and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are,
therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under
their contract of carriage.
G.R. No. 116110 May 15, 1996
BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ANTONIO GARCIA & LETICIA GARCIA, A & J TRADING,
AND JULIO RECONTIQUE, respondents.

Statutory Obligations of a Carrier (In General)

FACTS:
On July 31, 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her five-year old son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit
Bus No. 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind
the driver.

At about 7:30 in the evening, the bus passengers saw a cargo truck parked at the shoulder of
the national highway. Its left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road
was too narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the
road obviously to serve as a warning device. The truck driver, Julio Recontique, and his helper,
Arturo Escala, were then replacing a flat tire. The truck is owned by respondent A & J Trading.

Bus driver Santiago was driving at an in ordinately fast speed and failed to notice the truck and
the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiago's passengers urged him to slow down but
he paid them no heed. Santiago even carried animated conversations with his co-employees
while driving. When the danger of collision became imminent, the bus passengers shouted
"Babangga tayo!". Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed into the
stalled cargo truck. It caused the instant death of Santiago and Escala, and injury to several
others. Leticia and Allan Garcia were among the injured passengers.

Leticia suffered a fracture in her pelvis and right leg. She underwent an operation for partial hip
prosthesis. Allan, on the other hand, broke a leg. He was also given emergency treatment at the
provincial hospital.

Spouses Antonio and Leticia Garcia sued Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio
Recontique for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. Leticia sued as an injured
passenger of Baliwag and as mother of Allan.

Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique disclaimed responsibility for the mishap. Baliwag alleged
that the accident was caused solely by the fault and negligence of A & J Trading and its driver,
Recontique. On the other hand, A & J Trading and Recontique alleged that the accident was the
result of the negligence and reckless driving of Santiago, bus driver of Baliwag.

The RTC held Baliwag and A & J Trading liable. On appeal, CA modified the RTC decision
absolving A & J Trading from liability.

ISSUE:
Should Baliwag Transit be held liable?
RULING: YES.
As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it failed to deliver its
passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destination safe and sound. A common carrier is
bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. In a
contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when
a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. 

The records are bereft of any proof to show that Baliwag exercised extra ordinary diligence. On
the contrary, the evidence demonstrates its driver's recklessness and wanton disregard for the
physical safety of his passengers, which makes Baliwag as a common carrier liable for damages
under Article 1759 of the Civil Code.

Baliwag cannot evade its liability by insisting that the accident was caused solely by the
negligence of A & J Trading and Julio Recontique. It harps on their alleged non use of an early
warning device. However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a kerosene
lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to serve as an early
warning device. This substantially complies with Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code which clearly allows the use not only of an early warning device of the triangular
reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away.
G.R. No. 157658               October 15, 2007
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and VIRGILIO J. BORJA, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), CORAZON C. AMORES, MA. EMILIE A. MOJICA,
CECILE C. SISON, DINO C. AMORES, LARISA C. AMORES, ARMAND JINO C. AMORES and
JOHN C. AMORES, Respondents.

Statutory Obligations of a Carrier (As to Equipment and Facilities)

FACTS:
On April 27, 1992, Jose Amores (Amores) was traversing the railroad tracks in Kahilum II Street,
Pandacan, Manila. Before crossing the railroad track, he stopped for a while then proceeded
accordingly. Unfortunately, just as Amores was at the intersection, a Philippine National
Railways’ (PNR) train with locomotive number T-517 turned up and collided with the car.

At the time of the mishap, there was neither a signal nor a crossing bar at the intersection to
warn motorists of an approaching train. Aside from the railroad track, the only visible warning
sign at that time was the defective standard signboard "STOP, LOOK and LISTEN" wherein the
sign "Listen" was lacking while that of "Look" was bent. No whistle blow from the train was
likewise heard before it finally bumped the car of Amores. After impact, the car was dragged
about ten (10) meters beyond the center of the crossing.

Amores died as a consequence thereof. On July 22, 1992, the heirs of Amores filed a Complaint
for Damages against petitioners PNR and Virgilio J. Borja (Borja), PNR’s locomotive driver at the
time of the incident, before the RTC of Manila. In their complaint, respondents averred that the
train’s speedometer was defective, and that the petitioners’ negligence was the proximate
cause of the mishap for their failure to take precautions to prevent injury to persons and
property despite the dense population in the vicinity. They then prayed for actual and moral
damages, as well as attorney’s fees.

In their Answer, the petitioners denied the allegations, stating that the train was railroad-
worthy and without any defect. According to them, the proximate cause of the death of
Amores was his own carelessness and negligence, and Amores wantonly disregarded traffic
rules and regulations in crossing the railroad tracks and trying to beat the approaching
train. PNR stressed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of the locomotive driver and train engineer, Borja, and that the latter likewise
used extraordinary diligence and caution to avoid the accident. Petitioners further asserted that
respondents had the last clear chance to avoid the accident but recklessly failed to do so.

ISSUE:
Should PNR be held liable for negligence?

RULING: YES.
It was ascertained beyond quandary that the proximate cause of the collision is the negligence
and imprudence of the petitioner PNR and its locomotive driver, Borja, in operating the
passenger train.
As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant provision is Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code.

Negligence has been defined as "the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." Using the aforementioned philosophy, it
may be reliably concluded that there is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and
vigilance is calibrated; it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a person finds himself.
All that the law requires is that it is perpetually compelling upon a person to use that care and
diligence expected of sensible men under comparable circumstances.

The transcript of stenographic notes reveals that the train was running at a fast speed because
notwithstanding the application of the ordinary and emergency brakes, the train still dragged
the car some distance away from the point of impact. Evidence likewise unveils the inadequate
precautions taken by petitioner PNR to forewarn the public of the impending danger. Aside
from not having any crossing bar, no flagman or guard to man the intersection at all times was
posted on the day of the incident. A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a
dilapidated "Stop, Look and Listen" signage because of many years of neglect, is needed to give
notice to the public. It is the responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to
keep the signal devices in working order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence.

As held in the case of Philippine National Railway v. Brunty, it may broadly be stated that
railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid
injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both to the operation
of trains and to the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing or
operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public
road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings, and erect at such points, at sufficient elevation from
such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct
letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the
necessity of looking out for trains. The failure of the PNR to put a cross bar, or signal light,
flagman or switchman, or semaphore is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of
the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it, because public safety demands that
said device or equipment be installed.

It is true that one driving an automobile must use his faculties of seeing and hearing when
nearing a railroad crossing. However, the obligation to bring to a full stop vehicles moving in
public highways before traversing any "through street" only accrues from the time the said
"through street" or crossing is so designated and sign-posted. From the records of the case, it
can be inferred that Amores exercised all the necessary precautions required of him as to avoid
injury to himself and to others. The witnesses’ testimonies showed that Amores slackened his
speed, made a full stop, and then proceeded to cross the tracks when he saw that there was no
impending danger to his life. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that Amores did
everything, with absolute care and caution, to avoid the collision.