Introduction

This paper argues that the armed conflict between the Philippine government and the Bangsamoro
people is rooted in the government's assertion of sovereignty and the Bangsamoro's assertion of their
right to self-determination, and that finding solutions that take into account both positions will be the
most viable and long-term way to achieve peace in the Bangsamoro homeland.

The Conflict's Nature

The war between the Philippine government and the Bangsamoro people in Mindanao is viewed from
various angles. The challenge for the government is integrating national cultural communities into the
body politic (Republic Act 1888), while the problem for the Bangsamoro is the central government's
failure to acknowledge and allow the exercise of their right to self-determination. Some Filipinos see the
matter as a fight between Muslims and Christians.

The Integration Issue

The government describes the Bangsamoro people's status as "backward," "poor, and lacking in
education and training" (House of Representatives 1954:85). (1977, Abueva) "From available written
sources and the responses of the delegates who were polled for this paper, one is struck by the sense of
relative deprivation, neglect, exploitation, misunderstanding, discrimination, and thus of a degree of
elimination, felt by informed members of the cultural minorities," Abueva (1977) wrote, summarizing his
findings on the perceived problems of the cultural minorities. Executive Director of the Institute of
Bangsamoro Studies in Cotabatao City is Abhoud Syed M. Lingga.

Government policymakers feel that this deprivation is what causes the violence in Mindanao (House of
Representatives 1954). Magdalena (1983-1984:55) explains the relationship between deprivation and
aggression as follows:

"...communities with higher levels of deprivation and displacement encounter more violence than those
with lower levels of these. The combined impacts of the two factors are far more strongly related to the
occurrence of violence than either variable's effects alone."

In response to this dreadful condition, the central government implemented an integration policy. The
goal of the government's national integration policy toward the Bangsamoro, who were previously
classified as Non-Christian Filipinos until being reclassified as National Cultural Minorities, is to achieve
actual, complete, and permanent integration into the Philippine political system. Their integration must
be achieved "by all appropriate means, in a systematic, quick, and comprehensive manner," and must
involve their "moral, material, economic, social, and political advancement." (RA 1888, Sec. 1)
After President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, the integration policy was reframed. The new
policy prioritized the preservation and development of Muslim Filipinos' culture, customs, institutions,
and well-being, all while adhering to the country's laws and promoting national unity and growth. (EO
295 as revised by Executive Order 122-A) With the passage of the law establishing the National
Commission on Muslim Filipinos, state policy has been reformed with the goal of "ensuring the rights
and well-being of Muslim Filipinos while taking into account their beliefs, customs, traditions, and
institutions, as well as ensuring their contribution to national goals and aspirations and making them
active participants in nation-building." (Ref. 9997) Self-determination

The Bangsamoro have a unique perspective on the issue. They want to exercise their right to self-
determination, but the government won't let them. They attempted to employ peaceful and democratic
measures but were unsuccessful. The Bangsamoro and the government both suffered severe losses in
human life and property when they resorted to armed conflict to defend their communities from
military incursions.

The Bangsamoro attempted to secede from the Philippines multiple times after realizing that the costs
of being a part of the country significantly outweighed the benefits. Representative Ombra Amilbangsa
filed House Bill No. 5682 in the Fourth Congress, which aimed to give and recognize Sulu's
independence. When the law was consigned to the archives without action, Datu Udtog Matalam, the
then-provincial governor of Cotabato, made a daring move, announcing the Mindanao Independence
Movement (MIM) manifesto, advocating for Mindanao and Sulu to be renamed the Republic of
Mindanao and Sulu. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) issued a manifesto in 1974 declaring
that "the Bangsamoro people...are disbanding all their political, economic, and other bonds with the
oppressive government of the Philippines" and pleading with the international community to accept the
"Bangsamoro Republik as one of the world's family of independent and sovereign nations." (Manifesto
of the MNLF, 1974)
"Essentially, the problem, to the MILF, is about giving the Moros their (right to self-determination) RSD
as enunciated in international law, which will in the end determine which of the various shades of self-
governance they freely choose: associative, federative, or any other form of self-governance, although
the most natural meaning or expression of RSD is in associative self-governance," writes Salah Jubair
(2007:11).

Even scholars from the Bangsamoro see the issue as one of self-determination. Prof. Carmen Abubakar
(1987:134) of the University of the Philippines made it plain in her recommendations for improving
relations between Moros and Christians that "understanding the Moros' claim to self-determination and
demand for self-rule is vital to this effort." This is a moral, legal, and historical imperative that can't be
ignored or withheld on the basis of colonial prerogatives."

The Bangsamoro claim to self-determination is based on historical precedent and an assessment of the
costs of being a part of the Philippine republic. The Bangsamoro is made up of 13 Muslim ethnolinguistic
tribes living in Mindanao's contiguous areas. They had sovereign control over two-thirds of Mindanao
prior to their absorption into the Philippines. After decades of being a part of the Philippines, only about
a third of their ancient homeland is still in their control.

In comparison to Filipinos, the Bangsamoro claim to have significant early experience in state
development and governance. Sultan Shariff ul-Hashim founded the Sulu Sultanate in the middle of the
15th century, while Shariff Muhammad Kabungsuwan founded the Magindanaw Sultanate in the early
16th century. Following it, the Sultanate of Buayan and the Pat a Pangampong ko Ranao were
established (Confederation of the Four Lakebased Emirates). Before the establishment of the Republic of
the Philippines, these governments had already established economic and diplomatic contacts with
other countries, notably China. Those states had administrative and political systems depending on the
realities of the period. Indeed, it was the existence of well-organized administrative and political
structures that allowed the Bangsamoro people to endure the centuries-long military war waged by
Western colonial powers against them and to maintain their political and social identity.

The Bangsamoro leaders expressed their strong opposition to being a member of the Philippine republic
when the US administration offered to grant independence to the Philippines. Unfortunately for the
Bangsamoro, their land was included in the United States' 1946 handover to the Philippines. The
annexation of the Bangsamoro country is seen by the Bangsamoro as illegitimate and unethical because
it was done without their plebiscitary permission.
Despite their objections, some Bangsamoro leaders cooperated with the Philippine government in the
hopes of benefitting Bangsamoro society, while many Bangsamoro have had a negative experience
under Philippine administration.

• Studies have shown that the Christian majority is prejudiced against Muslims.

1 According to the Philippine Human Development Report, prejudice has contributed to the exclusion of
the Bangsamoro from chances in jobs, education, housing, and business (PHDR 2005).

According to the PHDR 2005 study, a significant percentage of Filipinos (33 percent to 39 percent) are
prejudiced against Muslims. The percentage of people who are unable to find work is extremely high.
For example, a Christian male worker would be preferred by 46% of Christians, whereas a Christian
female domestic assistant would be preferred by 40%. Only 4% of respondents said they would prefer a
Muslim male worker, while 7% said they would prefer a Muslim female domestic helper. The majority of
Christians have difficulties tolerating Muslims as neighbors; according to a research, 57 percent of Metro
Manila residents would prefer a home with a higher rent but further away from a Muslim population.

MuslimFilipinos were found to be the "least likeable group" in a previous study conducted by the
Filipinas Foundation in 1975. Fifty-four percent of individuals who replied to the question on Muslims
used derogatory phrases like "treacherous" and "killers" to describe them.

"The majority (91 percent) of Christians displayed larger biases and prejudices against Muslims than the
Muslims," according to a study of Mindanao adolescents.

1 See Philippine Development Network (1975) and Filipina Foundation (1975). (2005)

2 For more information, see Alfaras (2004)

3 Refer to Rodil (2007)

"Christians had for Muslims." In terms of acceptance, the study found that "more than 90% of Muslim
youth respondents were more inclined to accept Christians as colleagues or to work or live together, but
the majority (87%) of Christians are not." 2

• The Bangsamoro lost significant swaths of their territory and became a minority in their own country.
Rodil (Rodil, 1994)

The Philippine government made Mindanao's whole territory available for resettlement and economic
investment. All land gifts given by traditional authorities like as sultans, datus, and tribal leaders without
government authorization were declared null and illegal by the Philippine Commission in 1903. The
government has established public land regulations that discriminate against the Bangsamoro and other
indigenous peoples of Mindanao while favoring Filipino settlers and companies over the years. 3 The
adoption of public land laws based on Regalian theology "provided an opportunity for the colonized
north-Filipino elites to possess or lease considerable landholdings as well as a possibility for the Muslims
to engage in 'legal' or systematic land-grabbing of traditional lands" (Fianza 2004:5).

NARRA (National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration) was founded in 1954. From 1954 to
1958, over 23,400 Christian Filipino families were resettled in Cotabato as part of this program. Mastura
(1984, p. 245)

The Bangsamoro have become a minority in their original homeland as a result of official policies on
property ownership and promotion of Christian congregations to settle in Mindanao. The Bangsamoro
retains control of lands in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and tiny sections in
other provinces.

• The administration failed to provide basic services and development to the Bangsamoro people. The
ARMM, which includes provinces where the Bangsamoro are the majority, has the highest poverty rate
in the country. In 2000, 60 percent of the population was poor, 52.8 percent in 2003, and 61.8 percent
in 2006, compared to 33 percent, 30 percent, and 32.9 percent at the national level. The region's
functional literacy rate is 62.9 percent (2003), compared to 84.1 percent nationally. The ARMM has the
greatest percentage of out-of-school children and teens (23.1%), compared to the national average of
14.7 percent. The ARMM's under-five mortality rate (UFMR) and child mortality rate (CMR) are also
extremely high, at 45 and 12 deaths per thousand live births, respectively, compared to 32 and 8 deaths
per thousand live births in 2006.

• The government also failed to protect the Bangsamoro people.

There have been reports of Muslim massacres and property devastation, but the government has failed
to provide not just safety but also punishment. In many of these cases of human rights breaches, no real
investigations were conducted and no one was held accountable. Conflict between Muslims and
Christians

The conflict has been dubbed "MuslimChristian conflict" by some who see religious considerations at
play. This moniker is applied by observers who focus solely on the conflict's actors rather than the issues
at hand.

The bulk, if not all, of the soldiers fighting the Bangsamoro forces, including the militias that the military
backs, are Christians, as can be observed. The majority, if not all, of the Bangsamoro soldiers, on the
other hand, are Muslims. It is also true that religious lectures are occasionally exploited to gain support.
These factors, however, do not render the conflict religious.

Efforts to Resolve the Issue and Programs for integration

The Commission on National Integration (CNI) was established in 1957 to carry out the central
government's national integration program. Its mission is to "foster, accelerate, and accomplish by all
adequate means and in a systematic, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social,
and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos, hereinafter called national cultural minorities,
and to render real, complete, and penetrating integration of the non-Christian Filipinos, hereinafter
called national cultural minorities, The Commission had a broad range of powers and responsibilities.
The CNI was dismantled when the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) was established.
The Ministry of Muslim Affairs was founded after a while. By Executive Order No. 969, this ministry was
abolished and replaced with the Office for Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities (OMACC).

In 1987, during Corazon Aquino's presidency, Executive Order No. 122-A was issued, establishing the
Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA). With the formation of the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos,
OMA was recently abolished (NCMF).

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines was passed into legislation in 1977 to appeal to
Muslims' religious sensibilities. These rules on person and family were derived from Islamic
jurisprudence. In Muslim communities, Shariah courts were established, and Shariah judges were
appointed to hear cases involving marriage and inheritance. President Marcos established the Philippine
Amanah Bank in 1973, with the mission of adhering to Islamic banking standards. Congress approved its
charter as an Islamic bank in 1989.

The central government has been unable to integrate the national cultural communities into the nation's
body politic after half a century of adoption of the integration program. The failure of the Philippine
state to generate a strong feeling of nationhood among its population, according to Quilop and Villamin
(2009:9) of the AFP research tank, is the problem in Mindanao.

"The situation in Mindanao highlights a basic challenge that the Philippines suffers as a society–a lack of
sense of nationhood and the Philippine state's or government's incapacity to foster among the
archipelago's residents a sense of belonging to the Filipino country."

Programs for development

The Mindanao Development Authority (MDA) was founded in 1961 to speed up Mindanao's
development. "Through the leadership, guidance, and assistance of the government, nurture the fast
and balanced expansion of the Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan region...within the context of national
plans and strategies for social and economic development." (RA 3304

In the early 1970s, after the conflict escalated into an armed conflict between government and MNLF
forces, the government established a Presidential Task Force for Reconstruction and Development,
whose mission was to "pool all government resources from its economic development, financial,
welfare, and health agencies, as well as military units" (Mastura 1984:248) in order to assess the
conflict's damage and prepare an integrated plan for the full reconstruction of the country. Under Letter
of Instruction No. 30, the Special Program of Assistance for the Rehabilitation of Evacuees (SPARE) was
established to meet the needs of evacuees.

President Corazon Aquino established the Mindanao Economic Development Council (MEDCO) in 1992,
with the mission to "encourage and organize the active and widespread participation of all sectors in the
socioeconomic development of Mindanao." With the enactment of RA 9996, which established the
Mindanao Development Authority, MEDCO was terminated in 2010. (MinDA). Experiment with
autonomy

Despite the fact that the Marcos regime did not accept the Bangsamoro people's right to self-
determination, after the MNLF began talks in 1975, the government began to devolve power to Regions
9 and 12, which had large Muslim populations.

President Marcos established the Office of the Regional Commissioner (ORC) for Regions 9 (Sulu, Tawi-
Tawi, Basilan, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur) and 12 (Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur,
North Cotabato, Maguindanao, and Sultan Kudarat) on July 7, 1975, by Presidential Decree No. 742.
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1628 on March 25, 1977, declaring autonomy in 13 Mindanao
provinces in accordance to the provisions of the December 23, 1976 agreement made in Tripoli, Libya,
between the government and the MNLF. Following the proclamation, a plebiscite was held to determine
which of the 13 provinces named in the Tripoli Agreement would join the autonomous zone, with only
10 provinces, including the areas that make up Regions 9 and 12, voting in favor. Instead of having one
autonomous unit, Marcos kept the old arrangement of having two autonomous regions, with the
Muslim population divided into two regions. The MNLF objected to and essentially invalidated this
arrangement.

Regions 9 and 12 transitioned from administrative autonomy to political autonomy in 1979, when Batas
Pambansa Blg. 20 and Presidential Decree 1618 granted the regions limited executive and legislative
powers.

Changes were made under Corazon Aquino's administration in accordance with the new constitution's
provision for the development of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera. In
Mindanao, an autonomous area was established for the Muslim community, but it consisted of only four
provinces this time. In comparison to the former Regions 9 and 12, the ARMM, which was founded in
1989 by Republic Act No. 6734, had stronger powers. Despite its expanded powers, the MNLF
questioned the ARMM's legality because it was constituted without their consent.

The government and the MNLF signed a final agreement on the execution of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement
on September 2, 1996. The MNLF consented to the ARMM as the Tripoli Accord's form of autonomy, on
the condition that its charter be changed to accommodate parts of the agreement not present in
Republic Act 6734. On February 1, 2001, Congress passed Republic Act No. 9054, amending Republic Act
6734.

The national government endeavored for over three decades to establish political institutions in Muslim
areas to address the Bangsamoro's problems, but the performance of the former Regions 9 and 12, and
now the ARMM, was not encouraging. "Thirty years into the movement, the Muslim Autonomy has not
taken off," a long-time resident of Cotabato City noted. (Diaz, 1998, p. 144.) "The ARMM is still
struggling," a member of the ARMM regional assembly said. It has yet to take off in the direction of true
development." Naraga (2004), p. 140.

The autonomous region failed to fulfill its promise as a political structure that would embody the
Bangsamoro's political aspirations. Vitug and Gloria's (2000:82) insight is illuminating:

"The ARMM's worth rests in recognizing a people's yearning for a separate identity and in providing a
platform for them to rule themselves." However, given the poor circumstances in the area–poverty, a
lack of essential amenities, and inattentive leadership–the autonomy experiment is doomed." The
establishment of the autonomous government did not bring an end to the violent war in the country.

Mindanao. The ARMM was "unable to tackle the Mindanao problem as an institution." (Naraga, 2004, p.
139.) Despite the fact that both parties signed a definitive agreement in 1996, it failed to prevent the
resumption of bloodshed between the government forces and the MNLF.
In the last three decades, the population's social well-being in the autonomous zone has remained
unchanged. The ARMM's poor performance can be attributed to a number of factors.

• ARMM is not accepted as expression of Bangsamoro self-determination

A political institution must be acknowledged as a manifestation of the Bangsamoro's right to self-

determination in order to gain widespread political support. This is understandable, given that their fight
is based on their right to self-determination. "Rather than a well-thought-out autonomy initiative," the
ARMM is seen as "a type of political accommodation aimed to satisfy a restive Moro people." Bernabe,
2003, p. 4)

The problem with the ARMM, as with the regional governments of Regions 9 and 12 before it, is that it
has been opposed by the MNLF from the start. The central government's unilateral attempt to push

The creation of the ARMM was viewed as an imposition rather than an exercise of the right to self-
determination. Its poor performance in providing services to its people only adds to the perception that
it was "doomed from the start." Bernabe, 2003, p. 4)

• Negative perceptions towards autonomy

Self-governance is referred to as autonomy. The term of autonomy encompasses any political

arrangement that isn't complete independence. Autonomy becomes a "weary phrase" when used in the
context of the struggle between the government and the Bangsamoro because it has been opposed by
liberation fronts for years and the government's autonomy project has failed to bring peace and
development to the area of autonomy.
A governing institution must avoid using the term to avoid the baggage of a bad view of autonomy. As a
result, a new name must be devised. It is vital to repackage politics in some way. To achieve this goal,
free association or any other word that suggests power sharing between the central and regional
governments would be beneficial.

• Lack of participation by the Bangsamoro in the drafting of the Organic Act

If done in a participatory manner without intervention from the central government, the creation of an
organic charter of a Bangsamoro political institution will be an opportunity to create broad political
support from the Bangsamoro.

The Regional Consultative Commission (RCC) was established in 1988, before to the foundation of the
ARMM, to develop the ARMM Organic Act. The Muslim commissioners expressed dissatisfaction with
national leaders' intervention in their work, claiming that they "did not have a free hand charting the
RCC processes." (1987:45) Basman, Lalanto, and Madale

To promote a sense of ownership, the creation of an organic charter of a political institution must be
free of outside intervention and should incorporate all elements of the Bangsamoro society. All ethno-
linguistic groups, especially indigenous peoples, and all segments of Bangsamoro society should be
represented fairly in the selection process for participation in a body that would create the organic
charter.

• Problem of representation

Several ethnolinguistic groups make up the population of the ARMM. The ARMM's geographical layout
is extremely dispersed but connected. Many people living on the islands and in isolated places find it
difficult to get to the center of political power because of this.

To generate political support, a system of representation in the legislative branch and the bureaucracy
for each ethno-linguistic community is required when building a governing organization. Because ethnic
groups are more cohesive and often live in adjacent locations, ethnic representation must be prioritized.
Their participation in the bureaucracy is also required to ensure that essential services are provided to
their areas.

Interfaith Conversations

Interfaith dialogue is promoted by those who regard the problem as misunderstanding, mistrust, and
prejudice between Muslims and Christians. American missionary Robert D. McAmis, one of the pioneers
of Muslim-Christian dialogue in Mindanao, sees dialogue as a way to avert violence and conflict. "In
order to avoid additional violence and conflict as a result of the Moro Problem, dialogue is required at all
levels to understand and satisfy the legitimate concerns of the Muslim minority." (McAmis, 1987, p. 42)

On September 19-21, 1974, Zamboanga City hosted the first national Muslim-Christian dialogue in
Mindanao. Representatives from major Muslim groups were among the Muslims, while Catholics and
Protestants made up the Christians. Various Muslim-Christian dialogues have taken place since then.

The goal of dialogue is to increase understanding. It's a good way for opposing parties to grasp one
other's point of view. The issue with interfaith dialogue as it is done in Mindanao is that it has been used
for counter-insurgency at times. In July 1996, then-Defense Secretary Renato De Villa convened a
meeting of ulama and bishops at the Ateneo de Manila University in Quezon City, founding the Bishop-
Ulama Forum (BUF). The goal of the dialogue, according to De Villa, was to "outflank Salamat (Hashim),
who was attempting to unite the ulama and all religious leaders of the Muslim South." "(i)f he were able
to attract all of the ulama into his fold, it would be dangerous," he continued. Without the politicians
and Nur Misuari, he would have been in charge of the Muslims. First and foremost, we required a
religious counterweight. Second, we needed a way to look at Muslim-Christian interactions." Vitug and
Gloria (Vitug and Gloria, 2000:150)

Negotiations
Negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MNLF began in
January 1975 and lasted until September 1996, thanks to the Organization of Islamic Conference's (OIC)
intervention. The 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976
Tripoli Agreement were signed by the GRP and the MNLF. Both aimed to meet the Bangsamoro people's
desire for self-government.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which sat out the GRP-MNLF talks, assessed the Final Agreement on
the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and concluded that it fell short of the Bangsamoro
people's ambitions to exercise the greatest form of self-governance. In January 1997, the MILF began
negotiations with the goal of obtaining the highest form of self-governance for the Bangsamoro through
power sharing and equitable resource sharing between the government and the Bangsamoro State. The
GRP and the MILF signed the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), which
outlined the power relationship between the government and the planned Bangsamoro Juridical Entity,
after more than a decade of talks (BJE). MOA-AD also defined Bangsamoro identity, identified their
homeland, and established a formula for sharing the Bangsamoro nation's resources. In July 2008, both
parties initialed the contract, but the Supreme Court prevented the GRP peace panel from formally
signing it, and the accord was later found invalid. The talks had gotten off track. Although the talks have
resumed, the two parties' stances are diametrically opposed.

Challenges

The following difficult topics will always emerge from conversations about the struggle between the
Philippine government and the Bangsamoro, possibly in the same language as in this paper or couched
in more ambiguous terms. Sovereignty for the Philippines and self-determination for the Bangsamoro

The problem stems from the Bangsamoro's assertion of sovereign rights over territory that the
Philippine Government currently exercises sovereign power over and considers to be part of its national
territory. The Philippine claim is based on the fact that the region was part of what the United States
gave to the Philippine State when it declared independence on July 4, 1946. The Bangsamoro claim that
their region was incorporated into the Philippines without their consent, a clear violation of their rights
provided by multiple UN protocols safeguarding peoples' freedom to select their political status.

The Philippine government is adamant on reclaiming its sovereignty, even if it means going to war. The
Philippine Armed Forces conducted war on the MILF in 2000 because "it was the government's course of
action in asserting its sovereignty." Pobre and Quilop (2008), p. 117.

The Supreme Court rejected the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) in order
to prevent government peace negotiators from making any concessions to the Bangsamoro people that
they may utilize to continue their liberation struggle. That is why, in the GRP peace panel's post-MOA-
AD formulations, the Supreme Court judgement is invariably cited.

The government is concerned that if given the chance, the Bangsamoro people will opt to secede from
the Philippines. In actuality, the projected Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) and the central government
had planned to form an associated connection rather than an autonomous Bangsamoro state. Despite
this, the Supreme Court ruled that the idea is unconstitutional because it "presupposes that the
connected entity is a state and suggests that the same is on the verge of independence."

Former Supreme Court spokesperson Ismael G. Khan Jr. (2008) explains why the Supreme Court
imposed the interim restraining order against MOA-AD: "In light of recent global political developments,
there is little doubt that if the Supreme Court had not issued its TRO at the time it did, an unstoppable
chain of events would have been set in motion, culminating in the secession of the Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity from the Republic of the Philippines." In the following terms, he commented on his fear:

"The GRP negotiators' gratuitous description of the Bangsamoro as the 'First Nation,' with 'a defined
territory and a system of government that has entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign
nations,' would have made it difficult for other countries, particularly unfriendly ones, not to recognize it
as an independent state once the MILF intensified its 'liberation' war against a 'central government' that
had, in the first place, already been recognized as an independent
Despite the fact that the MNLF accepted the OIC formula for solving the problem within the context of
the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that the MILF demands do not include
independence for the Bangsamoro, but rather self-governance for the Bangsamoro as well as an
equitable distribution of power and resources between the Bangsamoro State and the central
government, this fear persists.

The Bangsamoro, on the other hand, are adamant about gaining acknowledgment for their right to self-
determination. The MILF attempted to incorporate the words "Bangsamoro right to self-determination"
in the accord during discussions. However, the negotiators were forced to use creative phraseology,
such as "the observance of international humanitarian law and respect for internationally recognized
human rights instruments, as well as the protection of evacuees and displaced persons in the conduct of
their relations reinforce the Bangsamoro people's fundamental right to determine their own future and
political status," due to stiff resistance from the government peace panel. (Accord of Tripoli, 2001)

Although independent political independence is a manifestation of self-determination, the MILF is

pursuing the highest form of self-governance. Only defense, foreign affairs, and currency, according to
the Armed Forces of the Philippines' Office of Strategic and Special Studies, are non-negotiable, while all
other issues are (Pobre and Quilop 2009:216). This is an encouraging viewpoint in the search for a
solution to the problem, particularly because it comes from the military establishment. According to all
indications, the Bangsamoro can accept an arrangement in which the central government will be in
charge of defense, foreign affairs, and currency, while the Bangsamoro State will be in charge of all
other powers. Identity and homeland of the Bangsamoro

The Bangsamoro desire to be known as Bangsamoro, a name by which the Philippine government and
the international community will acknowledge them. The Bangsamoro also want to be in charge of the
preservation and maintenance of their land. This is understandable given that they lost most of their
lands under the Philippine government's stewardship and became a minority in their traditional
homeland. Because the Bangsamoro are a maritime people, the territory must include not just the land
mass but also what lies beneath and above it, as well as the bodies of water and oceans in between. The
delineation is required to determine the extent to which the Bangsamoro authority has preservation and
management responsibility over the Bangsamoro patrimony. Security
Security arrangements must be based on the idea that the central government and the Bangsamoro
State have a shared duty and responsibility. To put the notion of shared security into practice, the
central government's primary obligation will be national security, while the Bangsamoro authority's
primary duty and responsibility will be regional security.

Close cooperation between the Philippine Armed Forces and the Bangsamoro State is the most effective
way to combat lawlessness, terrorism, and criminality. For years, the Philippine Armed Personnel have
fought terrorists in the south with the help of US armed forces, but they have never been able to
eliminate the threat of terrorism. A future agreement should involve the professionalization of
Bangsamoro internal forces to international standards in order for Bangsamoro security forces to be
effective.

Governance

The power connection between the federal government and the Bangsamoro State must be part of the
agreed agreement in terms of governance. The Bangsamoro State and the Bangsamoro people must
decide on internal governance structures, policies, and administration.

The Bangsamoro have made a solid case for good government and the elimination of corruption. What
may be required is broad authority to restructure governance in order to meet the needs of the
population without having to go through the central government. Government structures, policies, and
programs are fluid and subject to change in response to changing circumstances. The Bangsamoro State
must be empowered to build, develop, and maintain political, judicial, administrative, financial and
banking, legislative, educational, civil service, electoral, police, and health institutions in order to have a
responsible, transparent, and caring government for the Bangsamoro.

The distribution of wealth

Without its income basis, a Bangsamoro entity will not be able to survive. Subsidies from the federal
government are incompatible with the notion of power sharing. That is why a Bangsamoro State must
have a larger share of the income generated within its borders, at least 75%. Bangsamoro, IPs, and
Filipino settlers' relations

Indigenous peoples and Filipino Christian settler communities do exist in other parts of Mindanao. These
lands are not claimed by the Bangsamoro. The Bangsamoro are only concerned with the preservation
and protection of regions where they are the majority.

The Bangsamoro are aware that these communities, particularly indigenous peoples, have grievances as
well, but their grievances differ from the Bangsamoro's. Indigenous peoples have the right to self-
determination, but it is expressed differently to them than it is to the Bangsamoro. The indigenous
peoples of Mindanao aspire to cultural self-determination, whereas the Bangsamoro seek territorial self-
determination.

The GRP-MILF Declaration on June 3, 2010 gave indigenous peoples who will be part of the
Bangsamoro's claimed territory equal rights with the Bangsamoro and guaranteed the protection of
their economic rights, culture, belief, and traditions.

To resolve the problems and grievances of indigenous communities and Filipino Christian settlers,
indigenous communities and Christian settlers may find it beneficial to seek the creation of new tracks of
discussions with the government, separate from those with the Bangsamoro. Advocates for indigenous
peoples' rights must assist indigenous communities in resolving their grievances through negotiation.
Putting the indigenous peoples' concerns, the Christians of Mindanao's grievances, and the
Bangsamoro's grievances together will only complicate matters and make solutions to the problems
more elusive.

Recommendations and Conclusions

The conflict between the Philippines and the Bangsamoro people is rooted in the Philippine
government's assertion of sovereignty and the Bangsamoro people's assertion of their right to self-
determination. To progress in the search for a solution to the conflict, the government and the Filipino
people must overcome their fear of the Bangsamoro breaking up. First, the MNLF has agreed to the OIC
formula of autonomy within Philippine sovereignty. Second, the MILF desires the maximum degree of
self-governance rather than independence. To prevent the Bangsamoro from seceding, the Philippine
government should allow them to govern themselves while ensuring their welfare and security through
a negotiated agreement.

The following suggestions may be useful in reaching a mediated settlement to the conflict:

• The GRP and the MILF should continue the negotiations.

Even the military think tank admits that a military solution will fail: "the question of rebellion or
secession is essentially a political one requiring a political solution, ideally through dialogue." Pobre and
Quilop (2008), p. 117. Military success isn't everything; "military measures must give way to the larger
goal of finding a more meaningful and durable solution to a complex internal conflict phenomenon,"
according to Pobre and Quilop (2008:118).

• While there is no easy solution to end a self-determination dispute, peace talks to resolve the
difficulties should not be allowed to drag on indefinitely. "Forever negotiations" and "forever ceasefires"
will not address the problem and will almost likely not lead to peace in the long run. Long-term
negotiations run the risk of people losing faith in the peace process, leading to radicalization of some
groups, notably the youth.

The sense of insecurity in Mindanao will persist until the discussions are completed, harming
investments and development initiatives. It will be in the best interests of the business sector and the
greater Filipino society if the ongoing talks are resolved quickly. The GRP, the MILF, the discussions'
facilitator, and the international community must find a means to bring the GRP-MILF talks to a close as
soon as possible.

• In terms of the GRP-MILF peace process, the Supreme Court ruling on the MOA-AD suggests a lack of
unity and coherence within the Philippine government. If the Philippine government can make the
peace effort a national agenda and bring important decision-makers on board, it will improve the
negotiations.

• Informing the public about the negotiations may not be enough.

What is required is for both the GRP and the MILF to educate their respective audiences on the
necessity of the peace process's success and the consequences they will bear if the conflict continues.

• In dealing with the conflict, the new administration must be willing to make constitutional changes.
Under the current constitution, forming a power-sharing arrangement between the Bangsamoro and
the central government is difficult due to the Supreme Court's decision on the MOA-AD. Negotiations
become a futile exercise if structural changes cannot be agreed upon. Both parties, but especially the
GRP peace panel, must devise a strategy for removing constitutional and institutional obstacles.

To satisfy concerns among some sectors that altering the constitution could jeopardize other articles
they want protected, adjustments can be made either surgically—that is, only a single clause will be
changed—or by adding an agreement between the GRP and the MILF to the constitution.

The constitution should not be utilized as a negotiating framework since it is restricting and restrictive.
Invoking constitutional limits during negotiations will lead to a dead end in the peace process.

• When the talks are restarted, the parties should resume where they left off under Malaysia's
continuous facilitation. Attempts to ignore the gains of 14 years of dialogue or to replace Malaysia as the
facilitator will undoubtedly sabotage the peace process

One of Southeast Asia's longest military confrontations is the Moro separatist movement's ongoing war
in the Philippines. The conflict's persistence stems from two contrasting concerns: the Moro separatist
movement's assertion of selfdetermination rights and the Philippines' sovereign right to territorial
integrity. However, behind these rights exist critical issues that both opposing groups have yet to
address—problems that are the source of internecine bloodshed and strife. This article claims that
people who have clearly established their national identity and concept of a nation can effectively
exercise their right to self-determination. Unfortunately, the Moro multiethnic national identity has yet
to emerge, and the concept of a Bangsamoro (Bangsa Nation) is still a work in progress. The state, on
the other hand, has yet to respond to the Moron's reasonable demands for political autonomy,
socioeconomic growth, social justice, and anti-discrimination legislation. The paper finds that weak
governance has prolonged, complicated, and further justified the Moros' drive to secede from the
Republic, without ignoring the racial component of secessionism..