INHERENT POWERS

SATURNINO OCAMPO VS. REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:

Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a

Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R.
Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in
reference to the Verbal Order of President Duterte.

Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine
Army (PA) Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former
President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:

1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others,

in their capacities as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as
defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims
Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).

2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as
members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.

3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal

capacity, as member of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of
Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation
and organization of victims and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the
martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others, in their official
capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.

4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of

the Commission on Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-
sanctioned human rights violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.

5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator
of the Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and
several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several
others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.

7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson

of the Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
by himself and on behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights during the
martial law regime of Marcos.

8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the

Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.

ISSUE:

1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at

the LNMB poses a

RULING:

Justiciable controversy

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or

governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following
requisites for judicial inquiry are present:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance;

(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders
the discussion of the last two superfluous.
An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished
from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.

Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed
to the other branches of government. Those areas pertain to questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure, political questions
used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review.

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy.

Interment of President Marcos in the LNMB is a discretionary act of President Duterte

Executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines. Inherent in the executive

power is the duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land and is intimately related to
the other executive functions. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution embodies the
faithful execution clause. The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws
are faithfully executed. Thus, any act pursuant to the faithful execution clause should be
deemed a political question as the President is merely executing the law as it is. There is
no question as to the legality of the act but on its wisdom or propriety.

Indeed, the duty to execute the laws of the land is not discretionary on the part of the
President, in the same manner that it is not discretionary on the part of the citizens to
obey the laws. In Spouses Marquez v. Spouses Alindog, the Court drew a fine line between
a discretionary act and a ministerial one.

A clear line demarcates a discretionary act from a ministerial one. Thus:

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
The President may also exercise his judgment in the manner of implementing the laws.
For as long as he faithfully executes the law, any issue on the wisdom or propriety of
his acts is deemed a political question.

Moreover, the authority of President Duterte to allow the interment of President Marcos
in the LNMB is derived from the residual powers of the executive. In the landmark case
of Marcos v. Manglapus,[13] the Court had expounded on the residual powers of the
President, to wit:

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common
good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the
President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded
on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the
public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes,
President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall
promote national healing and forgiveness.

TERESITA TABLARIN VS HON. JUDGE ANGELINA GUTIERREZ

Facts:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school
year 19871988. However, the petitioners did not take the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM). They then filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to
enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education
and the CEM from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended,
and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the
NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering
the NMAT for the present school year and for the subsequent ones. The trial court
denied said petition. Petitioners accordingly filed this action for certiorari with this
Court to set aside the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. Specifically, Section 5(a) and (f) of RA No. 2382, known
as the Medial Act of 1959, specifies the functions of the Board of Medical Education “to
determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine” and “to accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school
and keep a register of those issued said certificate.” In addition, Section 7 of the same
act prescribes as a requirement for applicants to medical schools “a certificate of
eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education.” Then,
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, was issued by the Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports which established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of
eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the
school year 1986-1987. In relation to the afore-cited, petitioners raised before the Court
the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin
the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the
assailed statute and administrative order. The petitioners invoked a number of
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Notably, among these raised provisions are: (1)
Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress
and to promote total human liberation and development. "; (d) Article XIV, Section l:
"The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all
levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. "; (e) Article
XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." Based
on the constitutional provisions raised by the petitioners, the Court noted that the
petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact
clash with the said provisions. On the contrary, the Court noted that the statute and the
regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education"
at the level of professional schools. Further, according to the Court, the State is not
really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible
to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but
rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." Also, in relation to
one of their arguments, the Court noted that petitioners have failed to specify just what
factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable."

Issue:
Whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the
NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the
securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand

Held:
The Court held that the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by the
petitioners constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police power
is the pervasive and nonwaivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and
promote the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the
general community.   An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and well-being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny
is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Since the petitioners
have not made their case, even a prima facie case, the Court, as it deemed, is not
compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned as
unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed to by the
petitioners. Hence, the Court also deemed the above-mentioned issue as the only issue
that needs some consideration. Hence, the Court ruled that the government is entitled
to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools" and of
"improving the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use
today of such
admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America and
quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational resources than
our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even
attempt to prove otherwise, the Court considered itself entitled to hold that the NMAT
is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in
this area. That end is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma. The Court finally concluded that prescribing the NMAT
and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical
schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent
trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN VS. HON. ROMEO EDU

FACTS:
On December 2, 1974, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI)
No. 229, which required all motor vehicles to secure early warning devices (EWD)
consisting of a pair of triangular, collapsible, reflectorized plates in red and yellow to be
purchased from the Land Transportation Commission. The purposes of this LOI were to
prevent accidents caused by vehicular obstructions and to adhere to the road safety
standards outlined in the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals, which
the Philippines had ratified as per PD No. 207.

LOI No. 229 was later amended by LOI No. 479 issued on November 15, 1976. Unlike
before where owners of motor vehicles were required to purchase the reflectorized
plates from the Land Transportation Commission, LOI No. 479 now made it possible for
said owners to buy early warning devices anywhere so long as they adhere to the
standards prescribed by the Land Transportation Commissioner.

President Marcos issued a six-month suspension of said LOI, after which he issued
another LOI lifting its suspension. On August 29, 1978, Land Transportation
Commissioner Romeo Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, which contained LTC
Administrative Order No. 1 or the rules and regulations in the implementation of LOI
No. 229 as amended.

Leovilo Agustin, a private citizen and owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, filed a
petition before the SC, assailing the constitutionality of both LOI No. 229 as amended
and LTC Administrative Order No. 1. Among others, Agustin claimed that LOI No. 229
was violative of the provisions and delegation of police power, an oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, and unconstitutional order that was contrary to
the precepts of the New Society. Pending its final resolution, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order preventing agencies concerned from implementing both
LOI No. 229 as amended and LTC Administrative Order No. 1.

ISSUE:

Whether or not LOI No. 229 as amended violated the constitutional provision on undue
delegation of power.

HELD:

No, the Court ruled that LOI No. 229 as amended falls within the State's police power,
and President Marcos' issuance of the same was clearly an exercise of such power. The
intent of the law can be clearly seen in the WHEREASes of the assailed LOI (to prevent
accidents, safeguard the safety of the public, and adhere to the State's commitment to
public international law). The Court later went on a lengthy discourse in defining what
police power is:
 "Nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty." (Chief Justice Taney, US Supreme Court Chief Justice, 1847)
 "The State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus
be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to achieve the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State." (Calalang v. Williams)
 "The power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." (Primicias v. Fugoso)
 "Inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." (Justice Malcolm)
 "The totality of legislative power." (Morfe v. Mutuc)
 "A dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."