Ronald Satorre BPA 1-A Oct, 22, 2021

Phil. Consti.
Preamble – Article 1 & 2
Preamble Case Digest
Jacobson v. Massachusetts - 197 U.S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358 (1905)
RULE:
The police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable
regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health
and the public safety. The mode or manner is within the discretion of the state, subject
only to the condition that no rule prescribed by a state, nor any regulation adopted by a
local governmental agency acting under the sanction of state legislation, shall
contravene the Constitution of the United States. A local enactment or regulation must
always yield in case of conflict with the exercise by the general government of any
power it possesses under the Constitution, or with any right which that instrument gives
or secures.
FACTS:
Cities in Massachusetts could require that all residents be vaccinated, as authorized by
a state statute. This type of regulation was adopted by the city of Cambridge.
ISSUE:
In order to protect public health and safety, does the scope of the state’s police power
include the authority to enact reasonable regulations to do so?
ANSWER:
Yes.
CONCLUSION:
In order to protect public health and safety, the scope of the state’s police power
includes the authority to enact reasonable regulations to do so. The Constitution
secures liberty for every person within its jurisdiction, but does not give an absolute right
for each person to be free from restraint at all times and in all circumstances. Every
person is required to be subject to various restraints for the common good. The efforts
by Cambridge to stamp out smallpox are substantially related to the protection of public
health and safety. There has been nothing to clearly justify the Court holding the statute
to be unconstitutional. Affirmed.
Brief Discussion:
 > This explains how police power are obliged to protect the safety and welfare of
the citizens under the Constitution. Vaccination for the intent to promote the well-being
of the citizens is under the scope of police power of the state under the law and the
citizens have the right to know its full purpose to participate the imposed medical
intervention. It is required for all citizens to be vaccinated but they can also decline with
medical valid reason and through legal process.

CO KIM CHAN v. VALDEZ TAN KEH

75 PHIL 113
FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the
proceedings in petitioner’s case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October
23, 1944 by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgments of court during the Japanese occupation. Respondent
contends that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue pending judicial
proceedings and that the government established during the Japanese occupation was
no de facto government.
ISSUE:
1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese occupation
remain good and valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of said court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts?
HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government
established by military forces and thus a de facto government of the second kind.
Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto governments, which are not of political
complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed that the proclamation of
General MacArthur did not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not
invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese
regime. The existence of the courts depend upon the laws which create and confer
upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in nature, are not abrogated by a
change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed by legislative acts. It is thus
obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases not of
political complexion.
Brief Discussion:
 > The cases that have been left untouched during the Japanese regime until now
may continue under the sovereignty power that the legislative as well as jurisdiction
hold. The nullification in which General MacArthur had signed did not specifically refer
to judicial process and it is in the nature of politics to counterfeit this agreement.

Marcos v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211)

October 27, 1989 | 177 SCRA 668
Ferdinand Marcos, et al., petitioners
Hon. Raul Manglapus, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, et al.,
respondents

FACTS:
On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition of the Marcos family to
allow the return of former President Ferdinand Marcos from Honolulu, Hawaii to the
Philippines. The Court held that President Corazon Aquino did not act arbitrarily with
grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and
his family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national
interest and welfare.
The decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's prior refusal,
fearing the instability and security issues that may arise once the remains of former
President Marcos were to be brought back to the country. In a statement, she said:
"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and
passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the
remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until
such time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one,
shall otherwise decide."
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Marcos'
remains.
2. Whether or not President Aquino's refusal to allow the return of Marcos' remains is
tantamount to dictatorship.
HELD:
1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the
grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are
expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution.

This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses
under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power. Among the duties of the President
under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and
promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the
Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under
present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.
2. No, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be
confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate
pursuant to Amendment No. 6. Whereas the residual powers of the President under the
1987 Constitution are implied, Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution refers to an
express grant of power.
Brief Discussion:
> In the nature of this case, the president has the right to deny and refuse the
remains of someone under the clause of its power vested by the Constitution. Marcos’
remains had been denied from returning to the Philippines from Hawaii. Upon
president’s careful refusal, it was legally valid because the Marcos regime had caused a
lot of threat and damage to the public safety and welfare of its citizens. By such
reasoning, the president’s decision is ethically lawful and the president Aquino did not,
as stated in 1987 Constitution, cover tantamount to dictatorship.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution,
then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”) creating
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”). EO No. 1 primarily
tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1
vested the PCGG with the power “(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in
order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order” and the power “(h) to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of
this order.” Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,
created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”) tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active
service or retired. 2Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of
alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
(“Ramas”). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No.
1379 (“RA No. 1379”) against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
filed an Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines (“petitioner”),
represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended
Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano (“Dimaano”) as co-defendant.

After so many postponements due to inability of petitioner to show further evidence,

private respondents filed their motion to dismiss based on Republic vs. Migrino. In the
Migrino case, the Court held that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without showing that
they are “subordinates” of former President Marcos. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the
amended complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent
Dimaano. It remanded the records of the case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate
action as the evidence warrants and also referred the case to the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent
Dimaano. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition for review seeking to set aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a
forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No.
1379.
2. Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure

3. Wether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution during the interregnum or Whether or not the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution was operative during the interregnunm.

HELD:
1. NO. The Court ruled that the PCGG had no jurisdiction to investigate Ramas as he
was not a “subordinate” of President Marcos as contemplated under EO No. 1, which
created PCGG. Mere position held by a military does not make him a “subordinate” as
this term was used in EO No. 1, absent any showing that he enjoyed close association
with former President Marcos.

The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it.
PCGG’s powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the
President, PCGG’s sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses,
their relatives and cronies. Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction
over a case.

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to
conduct the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper
preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor
General may file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan. 32 The right of the State
to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or
estoppel.

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2. No. The Court also ruled that the raiding team exceeded its authority when it
seized the subject items. The search warrant did not particularly describe the items
seized. The Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the
warrant. The seizure of these items was therefore, void, and unless these items are
contraband per se, which they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom
the raiding team seized|||them.

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team
confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding
team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to
seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless
search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized
these items.
Court held that the seized items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

3. NO. Court held that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative
during the interregnum. However, the court ruled that the protection accorded to
individuals under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the
interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were
the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives
and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution,
there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary
right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno:

A revolution has been defined as “the complete overthrow of the established

government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it” or as “a
sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence.” In Kelsen’s book, General
Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which “occurs whenever the legal order of
a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the
first order itself.”

||| However, the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have
repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter
and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as
part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper
subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant.

Brief Discussions:
> In the reign of president Cory, her one of the first service to the public was
establishing an order as stated in this case. It was entirely made to investigate the ill-
wealth of the Marcos family and confiscate these through legal actions. As the
interregnum took place, it did not cover wide range of political power. It was limited and
specific to Marcos’ family, relatives, and his subordinates at his time of regime. The
PCGG went to its sole objective and went beyond from it. It did not follow its legal
agreement. It also did not practice the Bill of Rights from 1973 Constitution which is not
also qualified to do so.