Macariola V.

Asuncion
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

Definition of Political Law

FACTS:

On August 6, 1968, petitioner, Bernadita Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias

Asuncion of CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of CA, with “acts unbecoming of a
judge” when the latter purchased a property which was previously the subject of
litigation on which he rendered the decision. Respondent and his wife were also
members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares
and interests in said property were conveyed. According to the petitioner,
respondent allegedly violated Article 1491 (5) of the New Civil Code and Article 14
(1) and (5) of Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Sec. 12 XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of Canons of Judicial Ethics.

ISSUE:

Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in force?

HELD:

No. Article 14 is no longer in force.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with
the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and
define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People
vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law
embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law
including the law on public officers and elections.

Article 14 partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship

between the government and certain public officers and employees like justices
and judges. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and
later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this
Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there
is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether
compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Makasiar declared that the
respondent is not found to have violated the articles invoked by the petitioner but
respondent was advised by the Court to be more discreet in his private and
business activities.

1
 Marcos V. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

Theoretical Bases of Constitution (The Social Contract Theory)

FACTS:

On September 15, 1989, President Corazon Aquino barred the return of former
President Ferdinand Marcos from Honolulu, Hawaii to the Philippines, fearing the
instability and security issues that may arise once the remains of former President
Marcos were to be brought back to the country, especially at a time when the
stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is
just beginning to rise and move forward.

In a statement, she said:

"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in
widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and
order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be
brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this
administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide."

ISSUES:

WON President Aquino acted arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in barring
the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines.

HELD:

The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Cortes held that President Corazon
Aquino did not act arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of former President Marcos and his family, at the present time and
under present circumstances, pose a threat to national interest and welfare.

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses
to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained
to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. The Supreme Court
speaking through Justice Cortes held that President Corazon Aquino did not act
arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former
President Marcos and his family, at the present time and under present
circumstances, pose a threat to national interest and welfare. More than that,
having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the
obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution,
aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the
people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common
good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated
by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the

2
Constitution reminds everyone that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]

(Clarified by Atty Ralph Sarmiento)

3
 Francisco V. House of Representatives
GR No. 160261, 10 November 2003

Interpretation of the Constitution |

Ut Magis Valea Quam Pereat (The Constitution is to be Interpreted as a Whole)

FACTS:

On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide and seven (7) Associate Justices. However, it was dismissed by The House
Committee on Justice on October 22, 2003, for being insufficient in substance.
Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide on October 23, 2003.

Petitions arose against the House of Representatives et al, who contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional, violating the
provision of Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution:

“No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than one within the period of one year.”

Senator Pimentel Jr. Filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and that the sole power,
authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court be recognized
and upheld pursuant to the provision of Article XI of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. WON Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by

the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution; and
2. WON, as a result, the second impeachment should be barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

HELD:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court, speaking through Carpio Morales, held that Sections 16
and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional; consequentially

2. Yes. The second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.

4
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly revealed that the
framers intended “initiation” to start with the filing of the complaint. The second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The said provision should function to the full extent of its substance
and form and its terms, in conjunction with all other provisions of the
Constitution. One of the well-settled principles of constitutional construction:
ut magis valeat quam pereat states that the Constitution is to be interpreted
as a whole. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution
and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together. In other words, the
court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which
may make the words idle and nugatory. Both are integral components of the
calibrated system of independence and interdependence that ensures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial
review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Pursuant to Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution, “the judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court.” Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally
demandable and enforceable.

5
 Civil Liberties Union V. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 83896 February 2, 1991

Interpretation of the Constitution: Ratio Legis Est Anima (Intent of the

Framers)

FACTS:

This petition is about the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order

No. 284 issued by President Aquino on July 25, 1987.
The said EO 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries, and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to
their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs
counter to Section 13, Article VII of 1987 Constitution, which provides as follows:

"Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other professions, participate in
any business or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct
of their office."

The DOJ however in its issued Opinion No. 73 construed Section 13 of Art. VII
together with Sec. 7, paragraph 2 of Art. IX-B which provides that:

"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no

appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries."

ISSUE:

Whether the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar
as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad
exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2),
Article IX-B.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Fernan, teaches us that the
Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied.

6
Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the
holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both
elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see
it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting
the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies, and
assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.

The intent of the framers of the constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition
on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. As compared to other
prohibition found in the Constitution which provides restriction only to office or
employment in the government and GOCC's or their subsidiaries, Article VII Section
13 provides absolute disqualification embracing and covers both public and private
office or employment unless otherwise provided by the Constitution itself.

This prohibition is proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class
stricter prohibitions. The reason is that because they exercise more powers and,
therefore more cheeks and restraints on them are called for because there is more
possibility of abuse in their case.

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold
other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by
the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down
the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applies only
to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies, and
assistants.

The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution
itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet
under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances
provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of
Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

7
 Manila Prince Hotel V. GSIS
GR No. 122156 February 3, 1997

Self-executing Provisions | Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy | Verba Legis

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).

In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation

(MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share for the
same, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the
execution of the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS.
MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS
refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on
prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution:
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and
has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture.

Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:

WON the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Bellosillo, held that Sec 10, Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles.

Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes
8
of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the
different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a
general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation,
or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and
the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to

enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and

administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under
the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law
of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Furthermore, in its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to
the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.

While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it
immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has
since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
9
Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of
the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as
the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries
and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

Art. 2 of the Constitution “Declaration of State Principles and Policies” – Not

Self-executing | Ratio Legis Est Anima

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President.

Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates
who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national
constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming
that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public
service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the
number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly
erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential
candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the
office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to
wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and
he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

WON there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office, and in the case
at bar, for presidency.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Tinga, held that what is
recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in
the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies
and interpretation of the sort.

10
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution,
entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the
rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give
rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded
as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in
the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this
rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations
owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the
framers to inflict upon the people operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to

limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective
office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance
Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not
sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be
borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that any person in exempt from the limitations or the
burden which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run
for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections.
Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources
in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide
candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no
serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair
the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by
irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably
posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless
sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal

and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus,
the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC
11
remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the
question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Victoriano vs. Elizalde Ropeworker’s Union

GR No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

Constitutional Supremacy

FACTS:

Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. As such employee, he was a
member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union which had a closed shop agreement with the
Company that membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for
all its permanent employees.

Prior to its amendment, Section 4(a)(4) of Republic Act No. 875 allows the employer to
require as a condition of employment membership in a labor organization, if such
organization is the representative of the employees. However, the provision was later
amended by the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, which reads: “ x x x but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization”.

Being a member of a religious sect known as the “Iglesia ni Cristo,” that prohibits the
affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Victoriano presented his resignation
to the Union. In turn, the Union asked Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. to dismiss Victoriano from
the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. This
prompted Victoriano to file an action to enjoin the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. and the Union
from dismissing him. The Union assails the constitutionality of RA No. 3350, contending that
it infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights.

ISSUE:

WON RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing on the fundamental freedom to form
associations.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Zaldivar, ruled that RA No. 3350 merely
excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the

12
employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with
any labor organization.

What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of
said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore,
that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of
association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious
sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the
power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious
beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can
do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do
so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining;
and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.

Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom
of association.

The Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy states that the Constitution is the basic and
paramount law to which all laws must conform and to which all persons, including the
highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions,
if it conflicts with the Constitution.

Obiter Dictum: If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions
of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The
Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one
exercising it.

13
 Chavez V. JBC
GR No. 202242 April 16, 2013

Constitutional Supremacy | Verba Legis | Doctrine of Operative Fact

FACTS:

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from
the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half
(1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and
2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned
in this petition. it should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “ a
representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one
representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both
houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8
of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only
with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:

WON the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as
provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Mendoza, held that the practice
is unconstitutional.

The phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed as to having only

one representative that would come from either house, not both. That the framers
of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative. The singular letter "a" to describe "representative of the Congress," the

14
Filipino people through the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended Congress to
just have one representative in the JBC.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its

primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.
The term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only
one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in
accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as
a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law
by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.

15
 Judge Caoibes V.Ombudsman and Judge Alumbres
GR No. 132177, July 19, 2001

CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

FACTS:

Alumbres and Caoibes were both RTC Judges stationed in Las Pinas City. The
two were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office
furniture.

Judge Alumbres filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a criminal complaint
for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainant’s
eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. He prayed that criminal charges
be filed before the Sandiganbayan against Judge Caoibes.

Judge Alumbres also lodged an administrative case with the SC praying for the
dismissal of Judge Caoibes from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or
conduct unbecoming a judicial officer.

The Office of the Ombudsman required Judge Caoibes to file a counter-affidavit

but instead of filing a counter-affidavit, he filed on an "Ex-Parte Motion for
Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the Office of the
Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case, and refer the same to the SC which
is already investigating the case. Judge Caoibes contended that the SC, not the
Office of the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination
of the respective culpability of petitioner and respondent, both being members of
the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.

The Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion stating that it is within its
jurisdiction to investigate on the criminal charges. Invoking Section 15 of R.A.
6770, the Office of the Ombudsman refuses to refrain from taking cognizance of
Case No. MB-0-97-0903 in favor of this Court on the ground that, allegedly, the
accusations therein against petitioner constitute simple criminal charges falling
within the parameters of its constitutional power and duty to investigate and
prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee which appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
16
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case
pending resolution of the administrative case.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Buena, held that under Section
6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding
from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself
whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an
administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against
judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for
determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This
rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the
act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the
Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter
unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the
administrative authority of the Court. In determining whether an administrative
matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but
also other administrative concerns.

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case
before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive
the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto
itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which
impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.

By virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts

and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to
the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers.

17
 Hacienda Luisita vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
GR No. 171101 Nov. 22, 2011

FACTS:

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to

DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court
noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the
Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the
SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of
the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether
they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It
thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule
meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences
and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be
asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their
signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed
names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
Court decision.

ISSUES:

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita
18
cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by
Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares
covered by HLI’s SDP?

(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation
payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?

(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP
coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs
should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third
parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?

(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the
qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be
reconsidered?

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents

PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-
beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which
option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier
decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the
qualified FWBs.

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in
this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not
limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made
by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of
laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced
acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the
operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted
from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The
majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court
in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only
were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the
stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.

19
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the
earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.
Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer
one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its
July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31
of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of
the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda
Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by
HLI’s SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of
the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has.,
then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of
agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate
under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform
other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not
transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision
appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and
other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers,
and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be
awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR
leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of
actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of
agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which
shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-
hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial
use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate
80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the
coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the
unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and
of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.

20
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is

November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time
that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in
Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform
coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP,
that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage
ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority
(Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation
of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation
that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases
cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said
cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it
bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any
means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an
original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just
compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in
the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be
allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP)
or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs
have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the
issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under
CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to
sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian
reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will
just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will
never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of
shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital

21
stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously
vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the
hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share
of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI
stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is
295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1]
HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC
substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire
control over HLI.

Malabang V. Benito
GR No. L-28113 March 28, 1969
Castro, J.:

Doctrine of Operative Fact

The municipality of Malabang in Lanao del Sur was created by virtue of EO 386.
Later on, SC declared in a case that the statute which organized it was
unconstitutional. The main issue that SC had to resolve is whether or not
Malabang is a de facto corporation. SC held that it is not, following the principle
that the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had
not been invalidated cannot make it a de facto corporation, as there is no other
valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of EO 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia,
which created the Municipality of Balabagan out of barrios and sitios of Malabang.
Petitioner relied on the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General while respondent
contended that that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in this
case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of
Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of
a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either
elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate
functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is
contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally
attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at
the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.

ISSUES:
WON EO 386 is constitutional.

HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Castro, held that EO 386 in
unconstitutional. In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was
recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later
invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that
there was some other "valid law" giving corporate vitality to the organization.
Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time
when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto

22
corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question,
there is "no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.”
In Norton v. Shelby Count, Mr. Justice Field said: "An unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed."
Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts
done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a
nullity because the executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed." For the existence of Executive, Order 386 is "an
operative fact which cannot justly be ignored." As Chief Justice Hughes explained
in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank:
The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect
to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private
and official.
There is no basis for the respondents’ apprehension that the invalidation of the
executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an
act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality.

23
 Sanidad v. Comelec
GR No. L-36142 March 31, 1973
Martin, J.:

FACTS:

On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and
son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree
Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as
well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on
Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.

Petitioners contend that the President has no power to propose amendments to

the new constitution, as such, the referendum has no legal basis.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to sue.

2. WON the issue on the validity of the decrees is justiciable.

3. WON during the present stage of a transition period, and under martial law,
the President possess the power to propose amendments to the Constitution
as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for
ratification of his proposals by the people.

4. WON submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time
frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission.

24
HELD:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Martin, teaches us that it
is now an ancient rule that the validity of Presidential Decrees may be
contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.

The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful

expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them
with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating
said funds.

2. Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a

judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the powers normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
propose amendments the constitution resides in the interim National
Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After
that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the
power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the
regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling
the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the
incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted
the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity
of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue.

The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as
invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable
one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article
X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be

25
 declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members."
(if political question = lying outside the domain of judicial review)

The Court cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his
theory of non-justiciability question of the President's authority to propose
amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of
the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the people; a
Descartes fallacy of vicious circle.

3. Yes. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the
incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when
he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly.

The power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National

Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of
that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent
President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to
defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference.
Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to
the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by
the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the
dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim
National Assembly.

It is within the bounds of the Constitution and of the law for the President
to assume that constituent power of the Interim Assembly.

4. No. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is

not too short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite
issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The
people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law
four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of
martial law.

It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision

as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states
that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such
amendment or revision."

The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time
within which the people may act.

The petitions are dismissed.

26
 Javellana v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. L-36142 March 31, 1973
Concepcion, C.J

1973 Constitution Ratification

FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain
respondents from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed constitution
not found in the present constitution. Javellana maintained that the respondents
are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing proposed
constitution and that the president is without power to proclaim the ratification of
the constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo Roxas, among
others. Petitioners pray for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 (Citizens
Assemblies) and any order, decree, and proclamation which are similar in their
objectives.

ISSUES:

1. WON the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable, or a

political and therefore non-justiciable, question. (justiciable = within the
power of this Court to inquire into)

2. WON the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was

ratified validly in accordance to applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions.

3. WON the proposed Constitution was acquiesced by the people.

4. WON petitioners are entitled to relief.

27
 5. WON the proposed Constitution is in force.

HELD:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Concepcion, held
that the issue on the validity of said Proclamation is a justiciable one and
non-political nature. Whether a constitutional amendment has been
properly adopted according to an existing constitution is a judicial question
as it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the
Constitution has been amended in the manner required by the constitution.
It is not only subject to judicial inquiry, but, also, that it is the Court's
bounden duty to decide such question.
2. No. The Constitution proposed by the 1971 Convention was not validly
ratified in accordance with Section 1, Article XV, of the 1935 Constitution
which provides only one way for ratification i.e., "in an election or
plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified
and duly registered voters.

The elections contemplated in Article XV, 1935 Constitution, at which the

proposed constitutional amendments are to be submitted for ratification,
are elections at which only qualified and duly registered voters are
permitted to vote, whereas, the so called Citizens' Assemblies were
participated in by persons 15 years of age and older, regardless of
qualifications or lack thereof, as prescribed in the Election Code.

Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the
Commission on Elections, and without complying with the provisions of the
Election Code of 1971.

Elections or plebiscites for the ratification of constitutional amendments

contemplated in Article XV of the 1935 Constitution have provisions for the
secrecy of choice and of vote, which is one of the safeguards of freedom of
action, but votes in the Citizens' Assemblies were open and were cast by
raising hands.

The election were held a viva voce, thus depriving the electorate of the
right to vote secretly — one of the most, fundamental and critical
features of our election laws from time immemorial — particularly at a
time when the same was of utmost importance, owing to the existence
of Martial Law.

3. Due to the environmental and social conditions in the Philippines (i.e.

martial law), the Court cannot honestly say that the people acquiesced to
the proposed Constitution.

It is urged that the present Government of the Philippines is now and has
been run, since January 17, 1971, under the Constitution drafted by the
1971 Constitutional Convention; that the political department of the
Government has recognized said revised Constitution; that our foreign
28
 relations are being conducted under such new or revised Constitution; that
the Legislative Department has recognized the same; and that the people,
in general, have, by their acts or omissions, indicated their conformity
thereto.

4. Majority ruled to dismiss the petition, as the effectivity of the proposed

Constitution is the basic issue posed by the cases which considerations other
than judicial are relevant and unavoidable.

5. The Supreme Court held that by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of
Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with
the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar,
Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby
dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

There was, however, no ruling that the 1973 Constitution was validly
ratified, because 6 out of 10 justices held that there was no valid
ratification, but the votes were not enough to declare that the Constitution
was not in force.

29
 Planas V Comelec
GR No. L-35925 January 22, 1973
Concepcion, C.J.:

Presidential Decree No. 73- Plebiscite Case

FACTS:
While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the
president issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under martial law.
On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its proposed constitution. The
next day the president issued PD No. 73, submitting to the people for ratification
or rejection the proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a petition with the Supreme Court
against the Commission on Election and others to enjoin said respondents and their
agents from implementing PD No. 73 in any manner, until further orders of the
court, upon the grounds, that said Presidential Decree has no force and effect as
law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct
of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be
answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose are,
by Constitution, lodged exclusively in the Congress, and that there is no proper
submission to the people of said proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973,
there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no
sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.

On December 17, 1972, the president issued an order temporarily suspending the
effects of PD 1081 for the purpose of the free and open debate on the proposed
constitution. On December 23, the president announced the postponement of the
plebiscite, as such, the Court refrained from deciding the cases. On January 12,
the petitioners filed for an “urgent motion” praying that the case be decided “as

30
soon as possible”.

ISSUES:
1. WON the validity of PD 73 is justiciable.
2. WON the PD 73 is valid.
3. Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the
proposed constitution.

HELD:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Concepcion, ruled
that the issue on the validity of PD 73 is manifestly a justiciable one. The
Solicitor General's contention that said question is a political one is
untenable. The contested decree purports to have the force and effect of a
legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a
justiciable one, on the authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the
Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the
Executive, but, also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2,
Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the
authority of this Court to review cases involving said issue.

2. The validity of the decree itself was declared moot and academic by the
Court. (a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value because
the Proclamation No. 1102—ratification—was already issued on January 15,
1973)

While the case was being heard on January 17, 1973, noontime, Secretary
of Justice delivered to Chief Justice Conception, upon the instruction of the
President, a copy of the Proclamation No. 1102. Because of the
Proclamation, the Court dismissed the several petitions questioning the
validity of the PD No. 73.

3. Regardless of the wisdom and moral aspects of the contested provisions of

the proposed Constitution, the Convention was legally free to postulate any
amendment it may deem fit to propose — so long as it is not inconsistent
with Jus Cogens (from Latin: compelling law; from English: peremptory
norm) refers to certain fundamental, overriding principles of international
law) — not only because the Convention exercised sovereign powers
delegated thereto by the people — although insofar only as the
determination of the proposals to be made and formulated by said body is
concerned — but, also, because said proposals cannot be valid as part of our
Fundamental Law unless and until "approved by the majority of the votes
cast at an election at which" " said proposals "are submitted to the people

31
 for their ratification," as provided in Section 1 of Art. XV of the 1935
Constitution.

Santiago v. COMELEC
GR No. 127325 March 19, 1997

FACTS:

Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution by people’s initiative. He
proposed to lift the term limits of elective officials. COMELEC acted on the petition. Santiago
et al. now petitions to prohibit COMELEC from further acting on the petition. They aver that
the constitutional provision on people’s initiative (Art XVII, Sec 2) has no implementing law
16
yet notwithstanding RA 6735, and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it seeks
to govern the conduct of initiative on the amendments to the Constitution, is ultra vires.

ISSUES:

1. Is RA 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum Act) a sufficient statutory implementation

of Art XVII, Sec 2 of the Constitution?
2. May COMELEC validly take cognizance of the Delfin Petition?

HELD:

1. No. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate and wanting in essential terms and

conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. The
inclusion of the word “Constitution” in Sec 2 of RA 6735 (section on the “Statement
and Policy”) was a delayed afterthought. It is neither germane or relevant to that
section. While the Act provides subtitles for initiative on national laws and local laws,

32
 no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national
and local laws [only]. RA 6735 merely paid lip service to the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution in contrast to the utmost diligence and care exerted
in providing for the details of that for the national and local legislation.
2. No. The lacunae of RA 6735 on the foregoing substantive matter (the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution) are fatal and cannot be cured by
“empowering” the COMELEC “to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes [the] Act” Therefore, COMELEC Res. No. 2300,
insofar as it promulgates such rules and regulations, is void.

Lambino v. COMELEC
GR No. 174153 October 25, 2006

FACTS:

Lambino et al. sought to propose amendments to the Constitution by People’s

initiative through RA 6735. The sheet used to gather signatures from the people
contained only the questions “Do you approve of the Amendment of Articles VI and
VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of the government from the
present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of
government in order to achieve greater efficiency xxx; and providing an Article
XVIII as Transitory Provisions xxx?” The signature sheet further provides a table
wherein the personal data of the person signing shall be indicated. Subsequently,
Lambino et al. filed with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to ratify their proposal.
They have in fact gathered signatures of >12% of all registered voters with each
district represented by 3% at least (6,327,952 voters). COMELEC invoked Santiago
v. COMELEC and denied the petition.

ISSUE:

Did the Lambino petition comply with Art XVII, Sec 2 of the Constitution?

HELD:

No. Firstly, for the amendment to be “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition”, two elements must be complied with:

33
1) the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal (no agent or
representative can sign on their behalf); and

(2) the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

The deliberations in the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the framers
mean to adopt the American Jurisprudence on the matter which in particular
reveals that the intention is that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign, and the people must sign the petition
containing such full text. The said elements are present only if the foregoing has
been shown. In the Lambino petition, the proposed changes were not incorporated
with or attached to the signature sheets.

Secondly, American Jurisprudence outlaws logrolling—when the initiative petition

incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. In the Lambino
petition, the proposed changes include a provision empowering the interim
Parliament to convene and propose amendments/revisions to the Constitution,
which the Court finds as logrolling.

Thirdly, a shift from a bicameral-presidential to a unicameral- parliamentary

system xxx constitute, beyond doubt, a revision. It is clear the Constitution only
sanctions “amendments” and not revisions thereto by people’s initiative.

From the foregoing, it is plain that even if RA 6735 is valid, Lambino’s initiative
will still fail. There is no need to revisit the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as the
outcome of this case will not be changed thereby.

34
 Republic v. Sandoval
GR No. 84607 March 19, 1993

FACTS:

Following the “Mendiola Massacre”25 in 1987, Pres. Aquino created the Citizen’s
Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the
disorder. She also joined the farmers-marchers days after the ill-fated incident as
an “act of solidarity” and promised that the government would address the
grievances of the rallyists. The Mendiola Commission recommended, among others,
that the victims be compensated by the government. Whereupon, the petitioners
filed a formal letter of demand for compensation. Due to the apparent inaction by
the government, the petitioners sued for damages against the Republic. The
Solicitor General contends that this is a case of the State being sued without its
consent. Petitioners countered and maintained that the State consented to suit
when the Commission recommended that the victims be indemnified. They
likewise contend that the actuations of Pres. Aquino following the incident
constitute a waiver of the State immunity. Judge Sandoval upheld the State.

ISSUES:

1. Did the State waive its immunity from suit?

2. Does this case qualify as a suit against the State?

35
HELD:

1. No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission regarding

indemnification of the victims of the incident by the gov’t does not in any
way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. Notably, A.O.
No. 11 which created the Commission expressly states that its purpose was
to conduct an “investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took
place.” Evidently, it is only a fact-finding committee so that whatever may
be its findings, the same shall only serve as the cause of action in the event
that any party decides to litigate his claim. Its recommendations cannot in
any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having been
final and executory. The President’s actuations likewise cannot be taken as
a waiver of State immunity. The act of jointing the marchers days after the
incident, to borrow the words of the petitioners, was but “an act of
solidarity by the government with the people”. Her promise to address the
rallyists’ grievances cannot in itself give rise to the inference that the State
has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred therefrom that it has
consented to the suit.
2. No. While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability
does not pertain to the govt. Although the anti-riot forces were discharging
their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased
to be official the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the
Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the government
forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the members of the anti-riot forces
committed an unlawful act as there was unnecessary firing by them in
dispersing the marchers.26 An officer cannot shelter himself by the plea
that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts
are wholly without authority.

36
 United States of America v. Guinto
GR 76607, 182 SCRA 644 [Feb 26, 1990]

FACTS:

Here are 4 cases consolidated because they all involve the same issue on the
doctrine of State immunity.27 In the 1st case, private respondents, who had been
concessionaire inside Clark Air Base, are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force
stationed in Clark in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts
for barbering services in the said base.

The bidding was won by another over the objection of private respondents, who
claimed that he made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area,
which was not included in the invitation to bid. Private respondents sued individual
petitioners.

In the 2nd case, private respondent Genove filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the
John Hay Air Station in Baguio. It has been ascertained after investigation that
Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served
to the club customers whereupon, he was dismissed. Genove sued individual
petitioners.

In the 3rd case, private respondent Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’Donnell, an
extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy- bust operation
conducted by individual petitioners. Bautista was charged with violation Dangerous
37
Drugs Act whereupon Bautista was dismissed from his employment. Bautista sued
individual petitioners.

In the 4th case, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners (except
the U.S.A.) for injuries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the
defendants. Accdg to plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, and handcuffed
them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their body
causing extensive injuries.

The United States, though not formally impleaded in the complaints, join all
individual petitioners in moving to dismiss on the ground that the cases are suits
against the State to which it did not consent.

ISSUE:

Are the 4 cases suits against the State without its consent?

HELD:

No, in the 1st case. The petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint
filed by the private respondents. The barbershops subject of the concessions
granted by the U.S. gov’t are commercial enterprises operated by private persons.
They are not agencies of the U.S. Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable
as a matter of right by the American servicemen. xxx No less significantly, if not
more so, all the barbershops concessionaires are, under the terms of their
contracts, required to remit to the U.S. gov’t fixed commissions.

No, in the 2nd case. This is a suit against the State with its consent. The restaurant
services offered partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the
U.S. gov’t in its proprietary capacity. xxx All persons availing themselves of this
facility pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants.
Such services are undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not
governmental activity. Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of
state immunity xxx for the reason that by entering into the employment contract
with Genove, in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested
itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But considerations notwithstanding, [the
Court] held that the complaint must still be dismissed. While suable, the
petitioners are nevertheless not liable, and the complaint for damages cannot be
allowed on the strength of the evidence.

Yes, in the 3rd case. It is clear that the individually-named petitioners were acting
in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operation against complainant and thereafter testified against him at his trial. Said
petitioners were in fact connected with the Air Force Office of Special
Investigators and were charged precisely with the function of preventing the
distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of
such acts.

38
No, in the 4th case. The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study of
what actually happened to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if
the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually
exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. Lacking this
information, the Court cannot directly decide the case.

Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

GR 91359, 214 SCRA 286 [Sept 25, 1992]

FACTS:

A memorandum of agreement (MOA) was executed between Philippine Association

of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) and the PC Chief,
which fixed the monthly contract rate per guard for 8 hours of security service per
day at P2,250.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.
Thereafter, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing
petitioner Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) of cut-throat
competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), to which the latter was
found to be guilty by the former and was recommended for expulsion from PADPAO
and the cancellation of its license. As a result, VMPSI request for a
clearance/certificate of membership from PADPAO was denied. VMPSI wrote to the
PC Chief requesting to set aside the findings of PADPAO but to no avail. VMPSI filed
a complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA but the latter filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the case is against the State which had not given
consent thereto.

ISSUE:

39
Is the VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA a suit against the State
without its consent?

HELD:

Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent. The PC Chief and PC- SUSIA
contend that, being instrumentalities of the national govt exercising a primarily
governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private
detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (PC-Chief) and
agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the govt’s consent, especially in this
case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to
act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks damages from said public
respondents. xxx A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or
private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being
called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official
duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had
against them in their private capacities.

Amigable v. Cuenca
No. L-26400, 43 SCRA 360 [Feb 29, 1972]

FACTS:

Petitioner Amigable is the registered owner of a lot in Banilad Estate in Cebu City.
Without expropriation or negotiated sale, the govt used a portion of said lot for
the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Amigable requested payment
for the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the govt but the Auditor
general disallowed it. Amigable thus sued the Republic. Defendants contended,
among others, that the action was a suit against the State without its consent. CFI
upheld the State and dismissed the case.

ISSUE:

Is this a case of a suit against the State without its consent?

HELD:

No. The doctrine of State immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure
indicated by the law Amigable would not be in the sad plaint she is now. It is
40
unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the
law requires, the government would stand to benefit. Needless to say, when the
government takes any property for public use, it is conditioned upon the payment
of just compensation, which [in this jurisdiction] is to be judicially ascertained.28
It thereby makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no
thought then that the Doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
invoked.

United States of America v. Ruiz

GR No. L-35645, 136 SCRA 487 [May 22, 1985]

FACTS:

Private respondent responded to the United States’ invitation to submit bids for
the repair of the wharves or shoreline of its Naval Stations. Subsequently, private
respondent received from the U.S. 2 telegrams requesting it to confirm its price
proposals and for the name of its bonding company to which they complied. This to
them signifies that the U.S. has accepted their bid. Later, private respondent was
notified that it was not awarded the projects. Private respondent sued U.S.
Individual petitioners question the jurisdiction of the court on the ground of State
immunity from suit.

ISSUE:

Is the U.S. immune from suit?

HELD:

No. No such consent can be drawn from the language of the it to proceedings that
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
41
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.30 In
this case, the projects—the repair of wharves or shoreline—are an integral part of
the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the U.S. and the Phils.,
indisputably a function of the gov’t of the highest order; they are not utilized for
nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

The Holy See v. Rosario, Jr.

GR No. 101949 December 1, 1994

The ultimate test to determine to whether the act is jure imperii or jure
gestionis: whether the state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If not and it is in pursuit of a sovereign activity or an incident
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.

Where the plea of immunity is affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty
of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of
the govt in conducting the country’s foreign relation.

FACTS:

The petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land, Lot 5-A, located in the
Municipality of Paranaque. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D registered
in the name of Philippine Realty Corp. The three lots were sold to Licup through an
agent. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to respondent Starbright
Enterprises (Starbright). In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate said lots,
a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and
clearing the land of squatters. Thereafter, the Holy See (a foreign state exercising
sovereignty over the Vatican City31) through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio,
42
sold Lot 5-A to a third person (Tropicana Corp.). Lot 5-A was previously acquired
by the Holy See by donation from the Archdiocese of Manila for constructing
thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. In subsequently selling
the lot, no profit was intended. The Holy See merely wanted to dispose of the
same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for them to
use it.

Starbright filed a complaint against the Holy See who pled sovereign/diplomatic
immunity. Starbright insists that the doctrine of non- suability does not apply for
the Holy See has divested itself of such cloak when, of its own free will, it entered
into a commercial transaction for the sale of parcel of land located in the Phils.
The trial court upheld Starbright. Hence this petition. Meanwhile, the DFA moved
to intervene in behalf of the Holy See, and officially certified that the Embassy of
the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Phils
exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and
immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country.

ISSUE:

Is the Holy See entitled to sovereign immunity?

HELD:

Yes. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test [as to whether it is acting jure imperii or jure
gestionis]. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the
activity in the regular course of business. If not, the particular act or transaction
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or
an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit.

In the case at bench, the Holy See did not buy and sell the lot in the ordinary
course of a real estate business. Lot 5-A was in fact donated to it for constructing
thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio [which is necessary for
the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission]. In subsequently selling
the lot, no profit was intended.

Moreover, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently

established by the Certification of the DFA. Where the plea of immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to
accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the govt in
conducting the country’s foreign relation.

43
 Villacencio v. Lukban
GR No. 14639 march 15, 1919

Ours is a “government of laws and not of men”

FACTS:

170 women who lived in the segregated district for women of ill repute in Manila
were, by orders of respondent Mayor Lukban and the chief of Police, isolated from
society; and without their consent and opportunity to defend their rights, the 170
women were forcibly hustled on board vessels for deportation to Mindanao. Such
order was given for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice. Deportees
petitioned for habeas corpus and contended that they were illegally restrained of
their liberty.

ISSUE:

Does Mayor Lukban who is acting in good faith have the right to deport said women
of ill-repute against their privilege of domicile in restraint of their liberties?

44
HELD:

No. No law, order or regulation authorized Mayor Lukban to force citizens of the
Philippines to change their domicile. No official, no matter how high is above the
law. The courts shall not permit a government of men, but instead a government
of laws. Petition granted.

Ichong v. Hernandez
GR No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

FACTS:

Petitioner asks for invalidation of RA 1180 which is the Retail Trade Nationalization
Act on the ground, among others, that it contravened several treaties namely the
Charter of the UN and the Declaration of Human Rights, and the Treaty of Amity
between RP and Rep. of China.

ISSUE:

May RA 1180 be declared invalid on the ground that it contravened several treaties
which adhere to generally accepted principles of international law?

HELD:

No. The court found no treaties or international obligations infringed. But even
supposing that the law infringes upon said treaties, a treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail
45
or restrict the scope of the police power of the State. There is no question that RA
1180 was approved in the exercise of police power. Petition denied.

People v. Lagman
GR No. L-45892 July 13, 1938

FACTS:

Respondents Lagman and de Sosa are charged with violation of the National
Defense Law which establishes compulsory military service. Both refused to
register to military service. Lagman avers he has a father to support, has no
military leanings and does not wish to kill or be killed. Sosa reasons he is
fatherless, and has a mother and an 8 year-old brother to support. Respondents
question the constitutionality of said law.

ISSUE:

Is the National Defense Law unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The National Defense Law, insofar as it establishes compulsory military

service, does not go against Art II, sec 2 (now sec 4) of the Constitution but is, on
46
the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the govt to defend the
State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of
an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the govt
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. The
right of the govt to
require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the
State.

Taruc, et. Al. v. Bishop de la Cruz, et al.

GR No. 144801 March 10, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners Taruc, et al. were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church
(PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. They have been clamoring for the transfer of
respondent Fr. Florano, their parish priest. Their Bishop (respondent Bishop de la
Cruz) refused to transfer Fr. Florano.38 Meanwhile, over the objections of Bishop
de la Cruz, Taruc organized an open mass celebrated by a certain Fr. Ambong who
was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and whose credentials as
a parish priest, in the view of Bishop de la Cruz, were in doubt. Whereupon, Bishop
de la Cruz expelled/excommunicated Taruc, et al. for disobedience to the duly
constituted authority of the PIC and for inciting dissention, among others. Claiming
their expulsion to be illegal for having been done without trial allegedly in
violation of their right to due process, Taruc, et al. filed a complaint for damages
against Bishop de la Cruz, et al. Bishop de la Cruz, et al. allege lack of jurisdiction.

47
ISSUE:

Do the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the

expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution?

HELD:

No. In our jurisdiction, we hold the Church and the State to be separate and
distinct from each other. “Give to Ceasar what is Ceasar’s and to God what is
God’s.” In a form of government where the complete separation of civil and
ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves
to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature. In disputes involving
religious institutions or organizations, there is one area which the Court should not
touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences. The power of excluding from the
church those allegedly unworthy of membership are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.

Calalang v. Williams
GR No. 47800 December 2, 1940

FACTS:

The National Traffic Commission, under the direction of respondent Williams,

resolved to recommend to the Dir. of Public Works and to the Sec. of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
parts of Rosario St. and Rizal Ave. during certain periods of time. Resolution was
approved and executed. Petitioner Calalang, in his capacity as private citizen and
as a taxpayer, prayed for a writ of prohibition against respondents contending,
among others, that CA 548, under which said resolution was acted upon, infringe
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice.

ISSUE:

Is CA 548 an infringement of social justice?

48
HELD:

No. The promotion of social justice xxx is to be achieved not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice therefore must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of

interdependence among xxx units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups xxx consistent with the fundamental
objective xxx of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

Oposa v. Factoran
GR No. 101083 July 30, 1993

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

FACTS:

Concerned over the continued deforestation of the country, petitioners, all minors
represented by their parents, instituted a civil complaint as a taxpayers’ class suit
“to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforest” and
“arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth.” They pray for the cancellation of all existing
timber license agreements (TLA) in the country and to order the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to cease and desist from approving new
TLAs. On motion of then DENR Sec. Factoran, the RTC dismissed the complaint for
lack of a cause of action. Factoran avers that the petitioners raise an issue
political (whether or not logging should be permitted) which properly pertains to
49
the legislative or executive branches. Petitioners, claiming to “represent their
generation as well as the generation yet unborn”, allege their fundamental right to
a balanced and healthful ecology was violated by the granting of said TLAs.

ISSUE:

1. Do petitioners have a cause of action “to prevent the misappropriation or

impairment of Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage
of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth”?
2. Do the petitioners have a locus standi to file suit?

HELD:

1. Yes. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment. xxx Thus, the right of the
petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty to
protect and advance the said right.

2. Yes. The case is a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common
and general interest to all citizens of the Philippines and the petitioners are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests. Hence, all the requisites for filing of a valid class suit44 are present. We
find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality
to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. We find enough averments to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights on which reliefs may be granted. The case cannot be thus
said to raise a political question. What is principally involved is the enforcement of
a right vis-à-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. Petition
granted.
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
GR No. 110120 March 16, 1994

The 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5(2), Art VI
of the Constitution is only a ceiling; it is NOT mandatory to fill the entire 20%
allocation.
constitutional?

The 3-seat limit imposed by RA 7941 was adopted to promote and encourage
a multiparty system of representation.

FACTS:

Following the May 1998 elections, respondent COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list

reps from 13 parties and organizations in accord with the 2% qualifying threshold
vote in Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 and the principle of proportional representation of

50
qualified parties. PAG-ASA party-list, which did not obtain the 2% qualifying vote,
filed a petition with the COMELEC to fill up the 20% allocation for party-list reps
provided by the Constitution (52 seats in the current Congress). COMELEC granted
the petition and ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents party-list
candidates which were next in rank to fill all 52 seats, ignoring the 2% qualifying
threshold vote. The party-list candidates which obtained the 2% qualifying
threshold vote now file the instant petitions. Though petitioners party-list
candidates agree that the 20% allocation must be filled up, they aver that the
remaining seats should be allocated to only them proportionally.

ISSUE:

1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5(2), Art
VI of the Const. mandatory?
2. Is the 2% threshold vote to qualify a party-list to congressional seats
prescribed by Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the three-seat limit limit provided in the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941
Constitutional?
4. How shall the seats for party-list representatives be allocated?

HELD:

1. No. A simple reading of Sec 5, Art 6 of the Const easily conveys the message
that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution
explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the
House of Reps reserved for party-list reps. In the exercise of its
constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. Considering the
requirements under Sec 11(b) thereof, it will be shown presently that Sec
5(2), Art VI of the Const. is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for
party-list seats in Congress.
2. Yes. In imposing a 2% threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those
parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed
bill. Even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote
requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly
determine. The 2% threshold is consistent also with the very essence of
“representation” [in a republican government]. To have meaningful
representation [in a republican government], the elected persons must have
the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, the result might
be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of
Congress.
3. Yes. An important consideration [taken by the framers of the Constitution]
in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty
system of representation. Consistent therewith, Congress set the three-seat
limit to ensure the entry of various interest-representations into the

51
 legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership,
would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
4. The initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its
votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system.
All parties with at least 2% of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each.
Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional
seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be
referred to as the first party.
The next step is to determine the number of additional seats the first party
is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. If
the proportion of votes received by the first party relative to the total votes
for the party-list system without rounding it off is equal to at least 6%, then
the first party shall be entitled to 2 additional seats or a total of 3 seats
overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or
greater than 4%, but less than 6%, then the first party shall have 1
additional or a total of 2 seats. And if the proportion is less than 4%, then
the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties (parties garnering at least 2% of the votes for the party-list
system) are entitled to. This is equal to the product of the number of
additional seats allocated to the first party and the proportion of the
number of votes of the concerned party relative to the number of votes of
the first party.

Banat v. COMELEC
GR No. 179271 April 21, 2009

The 2% threshold vote for additional seats in RA 7941, Sec 11(b) is

Unconstitutional.

How the seats for party-list representatives are to be allocated.

FACTS:

Following the May 2007 elections, petitioner Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before respondent COMELEC a
petition to proclaim the full number of party-list representatives provided by the

52
Constitution, i.e. 20% of the total number of representatives (55 seats in the
current Congress). Meanwhile,

COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 07-60 proclaiming all party-list candidates

garnering at least 2% of the total party-list votes (13 party-list candidates).
COMELEC en banc thus declared the BANAT’s petition moot and academic and
declared further that the total number of seats of each winning party-list will be
resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC
assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.

In the other petition, petitioners party-list candidates Bayan Muna, Abono, and A
Teacher assail the validity of the Veterans formula.

ISSUE:

1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5(2), Art
VI of the Const. mandatory?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the 2% threshold vote to qualify a party-list to congressional seats
prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the seats for party-list representatives be allocated?
5. May major political parties participate in the party-list elections?

HELD:

1. No. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling;

party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates
the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found
in the Constitution. The Constitution, in Sec 5(1) of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress.

2. Yes. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a

qualified party-list organization may occupy, is a valid statutory device that
prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

3. Yes, as to the guaranteed seats; but no, as to the additional seats. The 2%
threshold vote for additional seats makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number
of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2%
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House
of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. It presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5(2), Art VI of the
Const. and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

53
 4. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under
Sec 11 of RA 7941, the following procedure67 shall be observed:

4.1 The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.

4.2 The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.

4.3 Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in

4.1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4.4 Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be

included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to
every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in RA allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the 2% threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our

allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of
votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by the total number of votes cast
for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available
seats. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the
remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining
available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. Finally, we
apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified
party-list candidate is entitled.

5. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue to disallow major

political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly. Notably however, neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibit
major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral
wings.

54
 Romuldez-Marcos v. COMELEC
GR No. 119976 September 18, 1995

For purposes of the Election law, “residence” is the same as “domicile”.

Successfully changing residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment of the old one.

FACTS:

55
Petitioner Imelda Marcos, whose alleged legal residence is in Tacloban, Leyte, ran
for Congress representing the 1st district of Leyte. Her adversary, Montejo, sought
to disqualify her candidacy on the ground that, among others, she is not a resident
of at least 1 year of Tacloban and therefore she did not satisfy the residency
requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution as she in fact wrote in
her Certificate of Candidacy that she resided “in the constituency where” she
sought “to be elected” for only “seven months”. She later claimed it to be an
honest mistake brought about by confusion and asserted that it is in fact her
domicile “since childhood”. However, COMELEC resolved in favor of Montejo and
contended that Imelda’s domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last
few decades except Tacloban. In its resolution, COMELEC cited San Juan, Metro
Mla. and San Miguel, Mla. as places where she resided and served certain positions.
Mention was even made of her residence in Malacañang and Honolulu, Hawaii.

ISSUE:

Is Tacloban, Leyte the legal residence of Imelda thereby satisfying the residence
requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution?

HELD:

Yes. The honest mistake in the Certificate of Candidacy regarding the period of
residency does not negate the fact of residence if such fact is established by
means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. It is settled that
when the Constitution speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually means only
“domicile.” It was held that Tacloban, Leyte was in fact the domicile of origin of
Imelda by operation of law for a minor follows the domicile of her parents (which
was the same). In its Resolution, COMELEC was obviously referring to Imelda’s
various places of actual residence, not her domicile (legal residence). An individual
does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. Successfully changing residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment,80 and Imelda has clearly always chosen to return to her domicile of
origin. Even at the height of the Marcos Regime’s powers, she kept her close ties
to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating
important personal milestones there, instituting well-publicized projects for its
benefit and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close
relatives held positions of power always with either her influence or consent.

Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago
AC No. 7399 August 25, 2009

FACTS:

In a speech delivered on the Senate floor, respondent Sen. Miriam Defensor-

Santiago, a member of the IBP, uttered the following: “x x x I am not angry. I am
irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
56
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
[C.J.] Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the [SC], I am no longer interested in
the position [of C.J.] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the SC of idiots x x x”. Complainant Pobre asks
that disciplinary action be taken against the Senator for her total disrespect
towards then C.J. Panganiban and other members of the SC which Pobre believes
constituted direct contempt of court. The Senator invokes parliamentary immunity
under Sec 11, Art VI of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

May disciplinary action be taken against Sen. Defensor-Santiago?

HELD:

No. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the
statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege
[of parliamentary immunity]. The disciplinary authority of the assembly, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on

Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter
disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal
circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without
any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind
of disposition.

People v. Vera
GR No. 45685 November 16, 1937

A law must have a sufficient standard to guide the exercise of the delegated
legislative power.

57
A law delegating legislative power must be complete. Nothing must be left to
the judgment of the delegate.

FACTS:

Respondent Unjieng was convicted. Under the Probation Act (Act No. 4221), he
later applied for probation. Judge Vera granted the probation. Petitioners filed
this action to the end that Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in
accordance with the final judgment of conviction. Petitioners aver, among others,
that said Act is unconstitutional as it is an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to provincial boards. The challenged provision thereof reads: “[t]his Act shall apply
only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for
the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals x x x”

ISSUE:

Does the Probation Act constitute an invalid delegation of legislative powers?

HELD:

Yes. Act No. 4221 is thereby unconstitutional and void. The effectivity of the Act
was made to depend upon an act to be done by the provincial boards, that is, the
appropriating of funds for the salary of the probation officer. But the Act does not
xxx fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise
of this discretionary power. What is granted is a “roving commission” xxx. It thus
leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the Act upon the provincial boards.
The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. This is a
virtual surrender of legislative power to them.

Pelaez v. Auditor General

GR No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

The completeness test and sufficient standard test must be applied

concurrently, not alternatively.

58
FACTS:

The President, purporting to act pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative

Code (RAC), issued EOs 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating 33 municipalities.
Soon after, VP Pelaez, instituted the present special civil action challenging the
constitutionality of said EOs on the ground, among others, that Sec 68 of the RAC
relied upon constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President.
The challenged Sec 68 provides: “the President x x x may by executive order
define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality,
[township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or
diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more
subprovinces, separate any political division x x x into such portions as may be
required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another x x x”

ISSUE:

Does Sec 68 of the RAC constitute an undue delegation of legislative power?

HELD:

Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in

nature. Sec 68 of the RAC, insofar as it grants to the President the power to create
municipalities does not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation
of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate
any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Indeed, without a
statutory declaration of policy xxx, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope
of his authority.58 It is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that the law: (a) be complete in itself x x x and (b) x x x fix
a standard to which the delegate must conform x x x.

Arroyo v. De Venecia
GR No. 127255 August 14, 1997

FACTS:

59
HB 7198 was transmitted by the House of Reps to the Senate and was thereafter
approved with amendments. Upon being sent back to the House of Reps, Rep.
Albano moved to ratify the bicameral conference committee report. Dep. Speaker
Daza approved Albano’s motion after apparently hearing no objection thereto
although petitioner Rep. Arroyo had in fact stood up and asked “What is that, Mr.
Speaker?” at the instant. Notably, Arroyo did not request to be recognized in
accordance to the House Rules. The Dep. Speaker then called the session
adjourned upon Albano’s motion notwithstanding the pending query of Arroyo.
Petitioners aver these are violative of the Rules of the House and that RA 8240,87
the law which evolved from HB 7198, is thereby null and void. Petitioners contend
that the Rules embody the “constitutional mandate” in Art. VI sec 16(3) that “each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings” and that consequently,
violation of House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself.

ISSUE:

Is RA 8240 unconstitutional because it was passed in violation of the Rules of the

House?

HELD:

No. Arroyo did not have the floor when he just stood up without being recognized,
so as a result, he was not heard. The Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240. Even
assuming arguendo that petitioners’ allegations are true, it is clear that what is
alleged to have been violated in the enactment of RA 8240 are merely internal
rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements.
Jurisprudence, both here and abroad, xxx all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules xxx. A legislative act will not be declared invalid for
noncompliance to such.

Gudani v. Senga
GR No. 170165 August 15, 2006

60
The President as Commander-in-Chief may prevent a member of the AFP from
appearing in legislative inquiries (even those in aid of legislation); however,
Congress may seek recourse with the SC.

FACTS:

Allegations of massive cheating over the 2004 presidential elections and the “Hello
Garci” scandal103 had just emerged, and the Senate resolved to investigate the
matter. Petitioners B/Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan were invited by the Senate
to appear in its inquiry. Gudani and Balutan were designated respectively as
commander and member of the “Joint Task Force Ranao” which was tasked with
the maintenance of peace and order during the elections in Lanao del Norte and
del Sur. The night before the hearing, AFP Chief of Staff Senga ordered (per
instruction of Pres. Arroyo) that no AFP personnel shall appear before any
Congressional or Senate hearing without her approval. Gudani and Balutan testified
before the Senate nonetheless. They were charged before General Court Martial
for willfully disobeying a superior officer, and now they file this petition.

ISSUE:

May the President prevent a member of the AFP from appearing in a legislative
inquiry?

HELD:

Yes, but Congress may seek recourse with the SC. The President could, as a
general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before
appearing before Congress. This is based foremost on the notion that a contrary
rule unduly diminishes the prerogative of the President as commander-in-chief.
However, the Constitution also recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is
the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. We hold that our constitutional and
legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be
compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a
modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-
in-chief: the remedy lies with the courts.104 If the President refuses to allow a
member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such
testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. Such judicial action
should be directed at the heads of the executive branch or the armed forces, the
persons who wield authority and control over the actions of the officers
concerned. The legislative purpose of such testimony, as well as any defenses
against the same would be accorded due judicial evaluation. And once the courts
speak with finality, both branches of government have no option but to comply for
the Judicial branch of the government is empowered by the Constitution to compel
obeisance to its rulings by the other branches.

Guingona v. Carague
GR No. 94571 April 22, 1991

61
FACTS:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for foreign

debt service in the 1990 budget. Petitioners contend that the 3 presidential
decrees authorizing such automatic appropriation violate Sec 29 (1), Art VI of the
Constitution. It is asserted, among others, that it did not meet the alleged
required definiteness, certainty, and exactness in appropriation, and so it is an
undue delegation of legislative power as the President, by virtue of which,
determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.

ISSUE:

Is the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget violative of Art
VI, Sec 29 (1) of the Constitution?

HELD:

No. Our Constitution does not require a definite, certain, exact or “specific
appropriation made by law” unlike the Nebraska Constitution invoked by
petitioners. Our Constitution simply states that moneys paid out of the treasury
must be made pursuant to an appropriation made by law. More significantly, our
Constitution does not prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in
which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it
be “made by law” such as precisely the authorization under the questioned
presidential decrees. In other words xxx an appropriation may be made impliedly
(as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal
year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress). The Congressional
authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations
act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned
decrees.

Senate v. Ermita
Gr No. 169777 April 20, 2006
62
FACTS:

The Committee of Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the

Executive Dept. to be the resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail
Project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise invited
AFP officials to appear on its own hearing on various issues.99 Exec. Sec. Ermita
requested for the postponement of the hearing in order to afford the officials
ample time to prepare for the issues; however, Sen. Pres. Drilon replied by saying
that the Senate cannot accede to the request as the letter was sent belatedly.
Meanwhile, Pres. Arroyo issued EO 464 which prohibits officials of the of the
government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be
conducted in executive session.

ISSUE:

Is EO 464 unconstitutional for contravening the power of inquiry vested by the

Constitution in Congress?

HELD:

Yes, partially. The legislative’s power of inquiry during question hour (under Art
VI, Sec 22) is different from its power of inquiry in aid of legislation (under Art VI,
Sec 21). The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveal that while
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory
in inquiries in aid of legislation.101 Hence, in view of Section 1’s specific reference
to Art VI, Sec 22 of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries
in aid of legislation (pertaining to that in Art VI, Sec 21), Section 1 of EO 464 is
valid but it can be invoked only during question hour. Verily, Section 1 of EO 464
cannot be applied to appearances of dept heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.

Section 3 and section 2(b), which is related to the former, are invalid. Section 3 in
relation to section 2(b) evinces that the determination by a head of office [that
such official invited for appearance in the legislative inquiry is covered by
executive privilege] underlies the consent to be given by the President prior to
appearance before such inquiries. Thus, this determination by such heads of office
then becomes the basis for the officials not showing up in the legislative
investigation. However, executive privilege is an extraordinary power as it
constitutes an exemption to the high prerogative of Congress to conduct
legislative inquiries. As such, it may only be invoked or wielded by the highest
official of the executive hierarchy—the President. The President may not authorize
her subordinates to exercise such power. In view thereof, Sec 2(b) and 3 must
therefore be declared invalid.

Lawyers League For A Better Philippines v. Aquino

GR No. 73748 May 22, 1986
63
FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1

announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. 2. On March 25,
1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court
further held that: 1. The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in
effective control of the entire country;

2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure

government; and

3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new

government.

Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability

GR No. 180643 March 25, 2008

64
FACTS:

Respondent Senate Committees were conducting an investigation on the

controversial NBN-ZTE deal.107 Petitioner former NEDA Director- General Neri was
invited to testify on the matter to which he obliged. He was grilled for 11 hours.
He disclosed relevant information,108 answering all questions propounded to him,
but when pressed on 3 questions,109 he refused to answer invoking executive
privilege. He was sent another invitation to appear and testify before the Senate.
Exec. Sec. Ermita replied by requesting the respondent Committees to dispense
with Neri’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. When Neri did not
appear, the Senate cited him in contempt and was ordered arrested. Petitioner
then filed a petition assailing said order of respondents contending that his claim
of executive privilege is upon the order of the President and within the parameters
laid down in Senate v. Ermita. Respondent, on the other hand, argued by saying
among other things that petitioner’s testimony is material and pertinent in the
investigation conducted in aid of legislation.

ISSUE:

1. Did Neri correctly invoke executive privilege?

2. Are the 3 questions Neri refused to answer covered by executive privilege?
3. Are the 3 questions material and pertinent in the investigation conducted in
aid of legislation?
4. Did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt order?

HELD:

1. Yes. Jurisprudence teaches that for the executive privilege to be properly

invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter (i.e. the President). A formal
and proper claim of executive privilege requires a “precise and certain
reason” for preserving their confidentiality.
The Letter of Exec. Sec. Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the
formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that “this Office is
constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined
in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.” Obviously,
he is referring to the Office of the President.
2. Yes. Exec. Sec. Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall
under conversation and correspondence between the President and public
officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision- making process”
and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of
China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and
executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered
by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
65
 relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e.
the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the
President. Under the “operational proximity” test, Neri can be considered a
close advisor, being a member of Pres. GMA’s cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
3. No. The record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent
Committees to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the
three (3) questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer
more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Sec 22
of Art VI rather than Sec 21 of the same Article. In drawing the line between
an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight
function, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner
the inquiry is conducted.
4. Yes. Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the contempt Order in view of five (5) reasons. xxx Second, respondent
Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v.
Ermita that the invitations should contain the “possible needed statute
which prompted the need for the inquiry,” along with “the usual indication
of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof.” Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under Secs
21 and 22 of Art VI of the Constitution. This must be so to ensure that the
rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry are respected
as mandated by the Constitution. Unfortunately, despite Neri’s repeated
demands, respondent Committees did not send him an advance list of
questions. xxx Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that
respondent Committees likewise violated Sec 21 of Art VI of the
Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the “duly
published rules of procedure.”

Pimentel v. Aguirre
GR No. 132988 July 19, 2000

FACTS:
66
In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government
departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and
implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by
at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items
(Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) .
On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43, reducing to 5% the amount
of IRA to be withheld from LGU.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering

all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal
autonomy
2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their
internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general
supervision over local governments

HELD:
1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal
autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by
way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise,
are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional
fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government, primarily
responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and
integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country.
However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such
policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public
agencies, various private sectors, and local government units." The President
cannot do so unilaterally. Consequently, the Local Government Code provides: "x x
x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector
deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation
with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the
liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local
government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent
(30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year x x x." There are therefore several requisites
before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public
sector deficit of the national government;

2) Consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance,
Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of
the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding
the current one. Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these
requisites before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very
67
least, they did not even try to show that the national government was suffering
from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having
conducted consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without
these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce,
unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment. AO 372, however, is merely
directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of
supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government
agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help
maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties.
Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely
an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the
President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be
characterized as an exercise of the power of control. 2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot
be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than
the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release
shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every
quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term
"shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, imperative.

Saguisag v. Ochoa
68
 GR No. 212426 January 12, 2016

FACTS:

EDCA or Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between the

Philippines and America wherein it authorizes the U.S. military forces to have
access to and conduct activities within certain “Agreed Locations” in the country.
After eight rounds of negotiations for two years, the Secretary of National Defense
and the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014.
President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014. It was not
transmitted to the Senate on the executive’s understanding that to do so was no
longer necessary. Senators file Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105.91. The resolution
expresses the “strong sense” of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and
effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and
concurrence

ISSUE:

Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities.

HELD:

he manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not expressly granted by
the law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the President must
"take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law”. It is the
President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense
interests (commander-in-chief powers). EDCA is considered an executive
agreement, therefore may be bound through the President without the need of
senatorial votes for its execution. The right of the Executive to enter into binding
agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been
confirmed by long usage.

69
 Spouses Renato Constantino Jr v. Jose Cuisia
GR No. 106064 October 13, 2005

FACTS:

During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with a scheme to
reduce the country’s external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign
debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for
foreign debts, they are basically buyback programs and bond-conversion programs.
The spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino, as a taxpayers, and
in behalf of their minor children who are Filipino citizens, together with FFDC
(Freedom From Debt Coalition) averred that the buyback and bond-conversion
schemes were onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or
“guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming
that the President has such power, unlike other powers which may be validly
delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved
by the Constitution in the person of the President, hence, the respondents herein,
Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia et al, cannot incur debts for the Philippines nor
such power can be delegated to them. Constantino argued that the gravity by
which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the
President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of
prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution, the
Monetary Board, reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President
“alone and personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like
Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the said scheme.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly delegate her debt
power to the respondents.

HELD:

Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the
President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country with
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever, and
the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the
President can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency
of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to
execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of
establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep
within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to
raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and
meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to
personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would
have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-
consuming detailed activities, the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans,
studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this
end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining
the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated
70
deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would
negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which
the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s
effectivity in running the government. The act of the Cuisia et al are not
unconstitutional.

71
 Lagman v. Medialdea
GR No. 231658 July 4, 2017

FACTS:

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring
Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written
report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required
by the Constitution). The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the
Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is
an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City
(and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the
ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privelege of writ of habeas corpus.

HELD:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension,

the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior
to or at the time of the declaration. The determination by the Court of the
sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information
mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. The Court held that the President, in
issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that
actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable
cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified
news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to
have affirmed the contents thereof. As the Court has consistently ruled, news
articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative
value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter
asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and
parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other
independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.

72
 Datu Zaldy Ampatuan v. Puno
GR No. 190259 June 7, 2011

FACTS:

On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and
women, including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, placing "the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency." She directed the
AFP and the PNP "to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the
Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence"
in the named places.

Three days later or on November 27, President Arroyo also issued AO 273
"transferring" supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the
DILG. But, due to issues raised over the terminology used in AO 273, the President
issued Administrative Order 273-A (AO 273-A) amending the former, by "delegating"
instead of "transferring" supervision of the ARMM to the DILG.

Claiming that the President's issuances encroached on the ARMM's autonomy,

petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-
Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They
alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary to
take over ARMMs operations and seize the regional government's powers, in
violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known as
the Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the DILG
Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but
control over the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace
them.

Petitioners alleged that the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM
constitutes an invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency powers. Hence,
petitioners prayed the nullity of Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A
and respondents, DILG Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from
implementing them.

In its comment for the respondents, the (OSG) insisted that the President issued
Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace
and order in subject places. She issued the proclamation pursuant to her "calling
out" power as Commander-in-Chief under the first sentence of Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution. The determination of the need to exercise this power rests
solely on her wisdom.10 She must use her judgment based on intelligence reports
and such best information as are available to her to call out the armed forces to
suppress and prevent lawless violence wherever and whenever these reared their
ugly heads.

On the other hand, the President merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-A her
supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any
73
way. These orders did not authorize a take over of the ARMM. They did not give
him blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials. The delegation was
necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings. Further, the assailed
proclamation and administrative orders did not provide for the exercise of
emergencypowers.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the aforementioned issuances are constitutional

2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City

HELD:

The AO Nos 273 and 273-A are constitutional.

The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood

under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in
the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by
Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power
that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.

The President's call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides -

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence

network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly
confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to
call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations
to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the
decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be
done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.

74
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in
the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the
President's exercise of the "calling out" power had no factual basis. They simply
alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of
emergency, it follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary
had no basis too.

Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal bloodshed are
members of the Mangudadatu family and the main perpetrators of the brutal
killings are members and followers of the Ampatuan family, both the military and
police had to prepare for and prevent reported retaliatory actions from the
Mangudadatu clan and additional offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.

In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President
issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent
further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also
indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms
and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears
and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called
out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle
the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the
affected places.

75
 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora
GR No. 141284 August 15, 2000

FACTS:

The President ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols
for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. On January 17, 2000, the IBP
filed the instant petition to declare the deployment of Philippines Marines
unconstitutional thus null and void alleging that no emergency situation would
justify the employment of soldiers for law enforcement work and that the same is
in derogation of Article II Section 3 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the joint visibility patrols violate the Constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy over the military

HELD:

The calling of the Marines, in this case, constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian enforcement and that it does not contravene Section 3, Article II
of the Constitution. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the LOI
itself which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority.
The deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. The real authority in these operations is lodged with
the head of a civilian institution and not with the military. What is in here is
mutual support and cooperation between the military and the civilian authorities,
not a derogation of civilian supremacy. Wherefore, the petition is hereby
dismissed.

76
 David v. Arroyo
GR No. 171396 May 3, 2006

FACTS:

Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon AFP
and the to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the
country. Permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments were
revoked. Rallyists were dispersed. The police arrested petitioner David and Llamas
without a warrant.
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist. Petitioners filed petitions with the SC, impleading Arroyo,
questioning the legality of the proclamation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

RULING:

No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as
prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, the SC ruled
that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence
of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only
partly unconstitutional.

77
 De Castro v. JBC
GR No. 191002 April 20, 2010

FACTS:

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting
of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
“automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of
the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio;
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales;
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo
B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the
incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice.

HELD:

Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The
records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the
Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement
of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by
the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their
vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is
devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers
vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment
is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to
78
extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not
have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and
surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article
VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Estrada v. Arroyo
GR No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001

FACTS:

On October 4, 2000, then President Joseph Estrada was embroiled in a corruption

scandal after a close friend, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson, revealed that
Estrada and his family allegedly received money from Jueteng lords.
The revelation prompted Senator Teofisto Guingona to deliver a privilege speech,
detailing the anomalies done by President Estrada. The public now calls for
Estrada’s resignation. Eventually, he had to face an impeachment trial in the
Senate by December 7.

On January 16, 2001, in a vote of 11-10, the Senator-Judges ruled against opening
the second envelope which allegedly contains evidence wherein Estrada held P3.3
billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.”

At this point, everyone snapped. The prosecutors tendered their resignation –

prompting the Senate to postpone the impeachment proceedings indefinitely.
People started marching towards EDSA to call for Estrada’s resignation. On January
19, both the AFP and PNP declared that they are withdrawing their support of the
Estrada administration.

On January 20, (12 noon), Chief Justice Davide administered Vice President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo’s oath as the new President of the Republic of the Philippines.
At around 2:30 PM, Estrada and his family hurriedly left Malacanang. Estrada then
issued the following statement:

“At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of
unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave
the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our
people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service
of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive

national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and
beloved people.

79
MABUHAY! (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following
letter (sent to House Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel):

“Sir: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office.
By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”

On January 22, now President Arroyo started discharging her functions as

President. She appointed new cabinet members, ambassadors and special envoys.
Foreign state leaders also expressed their recognition to Arroyo’s administration
(including then President George Bush from the White House). Congress issued
House Resolution 175 to express support to the new admin. The court also issued
the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:

“A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take
her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice —
Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by
a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative
matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12)
members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the
oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at
noon of January 20, 2001.

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed
by a proper party.”

The Senate then passed Resolution No. 83 which officially moved to terminate the
impeachment proceeding. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated “for the
record” that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the
grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that
the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run
for another elective post.
Estrada on the other hand is now facing charges of plunder, graft, and corruption
under the office of the Ombudsman. He then filed a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin the Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in or any
other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over.
Thru another counsel, Estrada filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment to
confirm him as the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent (Arroyo) to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity.

ISSUES:

1. WON Estrada officially resigned as a president.

80
 2. WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as president.
3. WON the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity.

HELD:

(1) YES.

We hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed
by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement: (1)
he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic
albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation.

He also called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive

national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of
farewell.
As to the second letter (addressed to Fuentebella and Pimentel), the court held
that it is wrapped in mystery since Estrada did not reveal the circumstances that
led to its preparation. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his
press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the
reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing.

Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the
resignation of Estrada. If it was prepared before the press release as a later act. If,
however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal
significance. Estrada’s resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a
changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result
of his reputation by the people.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative

investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. The court
held otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable.
Even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be
considered pending at the time Estrada resigned because the process already broke
down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the
second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public
prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the
proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment
case pending against Estrada when he resigned.

(2) NO.

By virtue of the said letter, Estrada has officially resigned and has in effect,
relinquished his powers as president.

81
Even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision
that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

(3) NO.

Estrada also contends that respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from

conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of
prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has
developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due
process.

The court held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity.

There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to
offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.

The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the
subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the
respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good
faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled.

82
 Poe v. Arroyo
P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005

FACTS:

Past midnight, in the early hours of June 24, 2004, the Congress as the
representatives of the sovereign people and acting as the National Board of
Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (GMA) the duly elected President of the Philippines. She obtained
12,905,808 votes, as against 11,782,232 votes for the second-placer, the movie
actor Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She took her Oath of Office before the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.

Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the elections, Mr. FPJ, filed
seasonably an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal on July 23, 2004. Mrs.
GMA, through counsel, filed her Answer with Counter Protest on August 5, 2004. As
counsels for the parties exchanged lively motions to rush the presentation of their
respective positions on the controversy, an act of God intervened. On December
14, 2004, the Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment at St. Lukes
Hospital.

However, neither the Protestee’s proclamation by Congress nor the death of her
main rival as a fortuitous intervening event, appears to abate the present
controversy in the public arena. Instead, notice may be taken of periodic mass
actions, demonstrations, and rallies raising an outcry for this Tribunal to decide
the electoral protest of Mr. FPJ against Mrs. GMA once and for all.

Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant, his counsel has
submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a MANIFESTATION with URGENT
PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT
FPJ, by the widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe claiming that because of the untimely
demise of her husband and in representation not only of her deceased husband but
more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an
urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the election
protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in
the 2004 elections.

In her Comment, the Protestee, Mrs. GMA, relying on Vda. de De Mesa v.

Mencias and subsequent cases including analogous cases decided by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), asserts that the widow of a deceased
candidate is not the proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public
office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs.

Protestee also contends Mrs. FPJ cannot substitute for her deceased husband
because under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered
candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may
contest the election of the president and patently, Mrs. FPJ did not receive the
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2nd and 3rd highest votes for she was not even a candidate for the presidency in the
election that is being contested.
Citing pertinent PET Rules, protestee also stresses that this Tribunal has no
jurisdiction over actions of surviving spouses to ascertain the vote of the
electorate as the Tribunal has jurisdiction only over election protests and quo
warranto cases.

ISSUE:

May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the
pendency of the latter’s protest case?

RULING:

NO. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is Rule 14 of

the PET Rules.

Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2 nd and 3rd placers, may contest the
election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined
the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a
scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the
electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rdhighest number of votes
would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.

This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention but
it does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court,
decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decision of the electoral tribunals.

Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows
substitution by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this
rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Section 16.
However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, we have every time
ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property
transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution
by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the
pendency of the protest.

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 Tecson v. COMELEC
GR No. 161434 March 3, 2004

Facts:

Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential

elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s)
certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his
parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe
was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec,
contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case
under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe
was a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification

of a candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are
held.
“Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal” in connection with Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the “President” or “Vice-President”, of the
Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
“candidates” for President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino

Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on

respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by

the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship
was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84,
Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence,
Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place
of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
“en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan—respondent’s father.

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Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an
American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced
by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not
make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the
allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only
before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of
the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

While the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

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