CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

G.R. No. 83896,

February 22, 1991

FACTS:

In July 1987, the President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which
allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to
hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject
to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that
such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU
on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the
Constitution which provides:

“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“,
the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are
those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as
a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice
is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD:

No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in
those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to
posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members
(then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general
rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal
opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s
understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-
B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number
of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold
in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
 Francisco V. House of Representatives
GR No. 160261
Nov. 10 2003

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide
Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal
of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in
form,” but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance.
On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.”
ISSUE:
WON Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.
HELD:
No. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ, which can
be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is
in truth all that is involved in what is termed “judicial supremacy” which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature
is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.
Facts – Francisco vs House of Representatives Case
Digest
On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario Davide
and seven (7) Associate Justices. However, it was dismissed by The House Committee on
Justice on October 22, 2003, for being insufficient in substance.

Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide on October 23, 2003.

Petitions arose against the House of Representatives et al, who contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional, violating the provision of Section 5,
Article XI of the Constitution.

“no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than one
within the period of one year.” – Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution.

Senator Pimentel Jr. Filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court. and that the sole power, authority and
jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court be recognized and upheld pursuant to the
provision of Article XI of the Constitution.

Issue

Whether or not the Court has the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution.

Ruling

The second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, the said provision should function to the full
extent of its substance and form and its terms, in conjunction with all other provisions of the
Constitution.

Pursuant to Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution, “the judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court.” Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable. Also, to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on part of any branch of the government.

CASE DIGEST: KILOSBAYAN v. MORATO

G.R. NO. 118910, 246 SCRA 540
JULY 17, 1995

Facts
The SC invalidated the Contract of Lease between PCSO and Phil Gaming Mgt Corp (PGMC)
on the ground of violation PSCO’s charter. Then, the parties negotiated a new agreement
that would be consistent with such a charter.

(Jan 1995) The parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) where PGMC leased
online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. Rental is 4.3% of the gross ticket sales of
PCSO. Term is 8 years.

A month after, this case was filed by Kilosbayan et al. that described themselves as
“taxpayers and concerned citizens.”, composed of civic-spirited citizens and religious people
committed for the truth and renewal.

They are seeking to declare ELA as invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as
the Contract of Lease nullified in the first case – still violative of the PCSO’s Charter.

PCSO and PGMC questioned their standing to bring this suit.

Issue
Are Petitioners Kilosbayan Inc., and certain persons and politicians entitled to bring this
suit or to be a party to this case?
Ruling
No. Because the issue, in this case, is no longer about “standing” (which was the standing in
the previous case) but WON they are “real parties in interest” within the meaning of Section
2.

This case involves an action for annulment of contracts, hence, the parties must be those
who will be prejudiced in their rights with respect to the contract.

Parties in interest require that “Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name
of the real party in interest.”

The question as to the real party in interest is whether he is the party who would be
benefitted or injured by the judgment or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’

The kind of interest that is concrete and will entitle him to recover (if the evidence is
sufficient) must be→present substantial interest.

Kilosbayan et al have legal standing but are not a real party in interest. The former is
sufficient legal interest and injury. The latter is present substantial interest (injury or
benefit) in the contract.
 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL
G.R. No. 122156, 03 February 1997
Bellosillo, J.

FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, Respondent Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding shares of the Manila Hotel.
There were two entities who participated in the bidding: Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel (MHC),
a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy the shares at ₱ 41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm, which bid for the shares at ₱ 44.00 per share. Eventually, MHC matched the
bid price of Renong Berhad at ₱ 44.00 per share. MHC even sent a manager’s check to GSIS
which the latter refused. Apprehensive about the GSIS’ refusal, MHC filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court.

MHC invokes Paragraph 2, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (commonly known
as the “Filipino First Policy”) where it states that in grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos. In the same vein, MHC submits that Manila Hotel has become a part of the national
patrimony for its importance in the national Filipino heritage. Also, the ownership of shares by
the GSIS shows that they are engaged in the hotel business, which makes them part of the
national economy. Thus, the aforementioned constitutional provision can be invoked. Further,
MHC should be considered the preferred bidder since the bidding rules provide that the shares
must be awarded to qualified bidders in case the highest bidder cannot be awarded the same,
provided that the qualified bidders matched the highest bid.

On the other hand, GSIS maintains that Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution cannot be
invoked because it is not self-executing and would require an implementing legislation. Granting
that the said provision is self-executing, the Manila Hotel cannot be considered a part of the
national patrimony because it only refers to lands of public domain, waters, minerals, etc.
Further, granting that Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony, GSIS is not selling its land
or the building, but its shares of ownership.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution may be invoked as a self-
executing provision.

2. Whether or not Manila Hotel can be considered part of the national patrimony in order for
the aforementioned provision to be applicable.

RULING

1. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It admits that a provision which lays down the
basic principle, such as those found in Art. II of the Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
However, the Court also held that a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without aid of an enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus, a constitutional provision
is self-executing if the nature or extent of right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by
the constitution itself. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution is mandatory, positive
command, which is complete in itself and requires not further implementing laws for its
enforcement. Thus, it may be invoked by MHC in the present case.

2. The Court also ruled in the affirmative. It held that national patrimony includes the national
resources of the Philippines, which necessarily includes those which are considered cultural
heritage of the Filipinos. Since, Manila Hotel itself has become a landmark of many events in the
Philippine history, with its existence impressed with public interest. Thus, the contested
constitutional provision is applicable.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
GSIS, MHC, Committee on Privatization, and the Office of Government Corporate Counsel
were directed to CEASE and DESIST the selling of shares to Renong Berhad, and to ACCEPT
the matching offer of Manila Prince Hotel Corp.

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG v. COMELEC, GR No. 161872, 2004-04-13

Facts:
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not
wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not... nominated by a political party or are not supported by a
registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for
petitioner.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly
rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section
26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,[1] by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to
those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so
doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the
electoral... process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders
Issues:
No.1... seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to
"equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution,[1] by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage
a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties.
No. 2... whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not

Ruling:
No.1

First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.

Implicit in the petitioner's invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to
opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public
office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is... none. What is recognized is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution
neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is
nothing in the plain language of the provision... which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing,[2] and there is no plausible reason for... according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the
provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a
guideline for legislative or executive... action.[3] The disregard of the provision does not give rise to
any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide
amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of... a
desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of
positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its
effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly... written, the myriad of claims that can
be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended.[8] Words and phrases such as "equal
access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to
their inherent... impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the
people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be
sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in
the provisions[9] of the Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452[10] dated December 10, 2002 outlining
the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal
access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the
limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of... candidacy. In the
case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which
they create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their
presumed validity stands and has to be accorded due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner's reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution is misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of
candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State
has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational,... objective, and orderly.
Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections.
Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion,
not to mention the increased allocation of time... and resources in preparation for the election. These
practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated
electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical
hardships, whenever... necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a
textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions.
No. 2

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis
of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception
of further evidence is in order.
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioner's aspiration and offer to serve in the
government. It deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of
due process.
As to petitioner's attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say
that the form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision
specifically enumerates what a certificate of candidacy should contain, with... the required
information tending to show that the candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the position
aspired for as established by the Constitution and other election laws.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded
to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the
Omnibus
Election Code.