CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – I

REVIEWER

PART I

POLITICAL LAW
 Subjects Covered by and included in the Study of Philippine Political Law
 People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil 887

FACTS: Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, discovered that
documents which consists of records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil
companies had disappeared from his office.The day after he had informed the Senate body of
the loss of documents in the session called by the Governor-General, an article against the
Senate, which was edited by the herein defendant, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, was publishedin the
newspaper La Nacion. Mr. Perfecto was accused to have violated the Article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code (SPC) which punishes “any person who, by *** writing, shall defame, abuse, or
insult, any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority”.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in effect despite
the change of sovereignty from Spanish to United State.

RULING: No, the Article 256 of the SPC is not in effect and cannot be applied in this case. First,
the article was enacted to protect the Spanish officials who were representatives of the King.
However, there are no longer Kings nor representatives of the Kings to protect at present and
“Minister of the Crown” does not exist in the current government.Second, the Philippine Libel
Law (Act No. 227) had repealed so much in the provision that relates to written defamation,
abuse and insult in the SPC and based on the facts, the defendant violatedneither of the two
laws. Lastly, the change from Spanish to American sovereignty of the Philippines.As stated as a
general principle of public law, the laws that regulates the relations of the inhabitants of the
acquired territory to the previous sovereign are abrogated. Therefore, the judgment was
reversed, and the defendant-appellant was acquitted.

 Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77

Facts:    
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of
an appeal.

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of
lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as
Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of
certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a
portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.

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On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn
Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and
his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the
corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the
following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against
Asuncion.

Issue: 
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

Ruling: 
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge"
but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on
March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in
Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property was no
longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to
the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines,
Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have
been abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New
Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers
cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official
capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their
respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by
or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance
from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to
its incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation
contravenes against Canon 25.

 Scope and Divisions of Political Law

[1] Constitutional law;

[2] Administrative law;
[3] Law on municipal corporations (law on public corporations);

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 [4] Law on public officers (accountability laws); and
[5] Election laws.

Constitutional law is the study of the maintenance of the proper balance between authority as
represented by the three inherent powers of the State and liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
(Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., p. 1, cited by Nachura [2014]) On the other hand, political law
proper (in law school, also called Political Law 1) deals with the structure of government, focusing on the
three Great Branches of Government and the constitutional commissions.

Administrative la is that branch of public law which fixes the organization of government, determines
the competence of the administrative authorities who execute the law, and indicates to the individual
remedies for the violation of his rights. It is "that branch of modern law under which the executive
department of government acting in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity, interferes with the
conduct of the individual for the purpose of promoting the well-being of the community, as under laws
regulating public corporations, business affected with a public interest, professions, trades and callings,
rates and prices, laws for the protection of the public health and safety and the promotion of the public
convenience and advantage." (Popularized by Carlo Cruz, in his book on administrative law)

The law on public corporations (municipal corporations) focuses on the Local Government Code (RA
7160) and amendments there, especially those relating to local governments such as provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays (villages). The law on public officers revolves around the constitutional
principle that public office is public trust. Election laws are, as the name suggests, those relating to the
people's power of suffrage, the exercise thereof, remedies relating thereto and other matters such as
the powers of the Commission on Election (Comelec).

Source: Nachura 2014

RATIFICATION – 1973 Constitution

 Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 33

FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain respondents from implementing
any of the provisions of the proposed constitution not found in the present constitution. Javellana
maintained that the respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing
proposed constitution and that the president is without power to proclaim the ratification of the
constitution. Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo Roxas, among others. Petitioners pray for
the nullification of Proclamation 1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any order, decree, and proclamation
which are similar in their objectives.

ISSUES:
1.    Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 justiciable?
2.    Was the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention ratified validly in compliance
with applicable laws?
3.    Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the people?
4.    Are the petitioners entitled to relief?
5.    Is the proposed Constitution in force?

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HELD:
Whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to an existing constitution is
a judicial question as it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has
been amended in the manner required by the constitution. The Constitution proposed by the 1971
Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
which provides only one way for ratification (election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and only
with qualified voters). Due to the environmental and social conditions in the Philippines (i.e. martial
law), the Court cannot honestly say that the people acquiesced to the proposed Constitution. The
majority ruled to dismiss the cases as the effectivity of the proposed Constitution is the basic issue
posed by the cases which considerations other than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new
constitution is in force as there are not enough votes to say otherwise.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

 Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil 552

FACT
In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax
upon his salary as member of the Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted an
action in Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being
taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
It provides in its Article VIII, Section 9 that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts “shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office.

ISSUE
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary  in 1946 amount to a diminution.

HELD
Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary of Justice Perfecto amount to a diminution
thereof. The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed against all
diminution, whether for one purpose or another. The fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit
diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the independence of the judges as of far
greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing the salary
of a judge as a part of his income is a violation of the Constitution.

 Endencia v. David, 93 Phil 696

FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugo’s salaries. A
case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial
officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of
salaries from the said judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers.  

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

RULING:

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No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial officers is
considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation
shall not be diminished during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no
salary received by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific
part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.

 Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 152 SCRA 284

FACTS:

Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively,
of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit
and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer
of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said
Constitution."

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to
representations that the Court shall direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes
from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, it was reaffirmed by the Court en banc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HELD:

No. 

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question
until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. 

The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by
the framers.

The ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution", in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared

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discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear
and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that
they have adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the
cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably. 

Therefore, the petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed. 

 Francisco v. House of Representative, G.R. No. 160261

Facts:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution... which directed the Committee
on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the... manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint[4] (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices[5] of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."[6]
The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.

Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,[7] and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003[8] in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form,"[9] but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint [11] was filed with the

Secretary General of the House[12] by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and
Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the... alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of

Representatives.[13]

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that

"[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year."

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Issues:

Issue no. 1

Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.

Issue no. 2

Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.

Issue no. 3

Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is
an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

Issue no. 4

Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

Issue no. 5

Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Ruling:

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is... a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of
these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that... the framers could find
no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or
even a standard therefor.[114] Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non- justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Principles:

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has

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exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,... and is supreme within its own sphere. But it
does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an... elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its...
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained.

A Republican form of government rests on the conviction that sovereignty should reside in the people
and that all government authority must emanate from them. It abhors the concentration of power on
one or a few, cognizant that power, when absolute, can lead to abuse, but... it also shuns a direct and
unbridled rule by the people, a veritable kindling to the passionate fires of anarchy.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which

were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Constitution should be interpreted as a whole. Supreme court tries to establish interpretation of the
constitution:

1. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary
2. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
3. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus,
in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared: x x x [T]he
members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. 43 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317

Ex Officio Officials – EO 284

On 25 July 1987, Cory issued EO 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions
subject to limitations set therein. The CLU excepted this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional for

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it violates Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by
CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Art 7 other than those provided in the
Constitution; CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in
the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: Sec 13, Art 7 provides:

"Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office."

It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in
the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with
respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called
Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all
appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution's manifest intent and the people's understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

OPINION No. 155, Series of 1988 by the Secretary of Justice - construed that the limitation imposed by
EO 284 are not applying to ex-officio positions or to positions which, although not so designated as ex-
officio are allowed by the primary functions of the public official, but only to the holding of multiple
positions which are not related to or necessarily included in the position of the public official concerned
(disparate positions).

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No.
284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being

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appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in
those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice
being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS
 Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts,
the MPHC matched the bid price  in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS
has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila
Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).

ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

RULING:

Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule
by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

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We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the
common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom,
love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

SECTION 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction
and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

The second paragraph is self-executing.

 Gamboa v. Teves, GR 176579

Facts:

The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12
million shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific.
Thus, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby
increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner
contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of public utility, stated in Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a
public utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of the petitioner,
hence this new case, resolving the motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the
respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term ‘capital’ in its 2011
decision?

Lex prospicit, non respicit 

Held/Reason: The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of developing an
economy  ‘effectively controlled’  by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals that our Constitution’s Preamble want
to achieve, that is –  to conserve and develop our patrimony , hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-
controlled economy. In the 2011 decision, the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the term
‘capital’ which refers to the ‘shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership’ (Art. 12,

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sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with benefits, is
tantamount to an effective control. Therefore, the Court’s interpretation of the term ‘capital’ was not
erroneous. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
 Lawyers League v. Aquino, GR 73748

FACTS: 1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. 2. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units
of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that: 1. The people have
accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;

2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Q. How are governments classified according to their legitimacy?

A. According to legitimacy, governments are either de jure or de facto merely.
A government de jure is one established by authority of the legitimate
sovereign whereas a government de facto merely is one established in
defiance of the legitimate sovereign.
Q. Classify de facto governments.
A. There are several kinds of de facto governments.
The first is that government that gets possession and control of, or
usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority.
• The second is that which is established and maintained by invading
military forces. .r
And the third is that established as an independent government by
the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent
state, such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt
against the Union during the war of secession. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez
Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113 (1945).

 In re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160

FACTS: 

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Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief before the SC, asking the same Court to clarify exactly
who were being referred to in Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution. Said provision
reads in part: "The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February
7, 1986 election is, for the purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June
30, 1992."

ISSUE: 

Does Section 5, Art. XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution pertain to incumbent President Corazon
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or to elected President Ferdinand Marcos and Vice-President
Arturo Tolentino?

HELD: 

Petition has no merit and should be dismissed outright for the following reasons:

 petitions for declaratory relief do not fall within the jurisdiction of the SC;
 petitioner does not have the legal standing to sue;
 although no respondent is impleaded, the instant petition amounts to a suit against  incumbent
President Corazon Aquino, who is immune from suits during her incumbency; 
 it should be fairly obvious -- mutatis mutandis, there should be no question --  that the
aforecited provision pertains to incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador
Laurel. The Aquino administration is legitimately recognized by other nations, and all eleven members of
the SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the land under her government; and
 the people of the Philippines have accepted her government as the one in effective control of
the country, such that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. 
___

De facto means "actual" or "in reality." Therefore, a de facto government is one that exercises power as
if legally constituted even though it is not formally recognized. De jure means "by right" or something
that is based on laws or actions of the State. 

 In re: Letter of Reynato Puno, June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA

Facts:

         Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals (CA), wrote a letter dated Nov.
14, 1990 addressed to the Supreme Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. It
appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed as associate justice of the CA on June 20,
1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary
Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.” He was then appointed as appellate justice and

Page 13 of 24
later accepted an appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa
Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including the judiciary.
A Screening Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No. 33, as an
exercise of her legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11 from
being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner’s ranking changed from no. 11, he now
ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority ranking would be contrary to the provisions
of issued order of Pres. Aquino. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno’s request. A motion for
consideration was later filed by Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking.
They contend that the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had previously
been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.

Issue:

        Whether the present CA is a new court or merely  a continuation of the CA and IAC that would
negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by the petitioner  existing prior to said EO No. 33.

Held:

        The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in
the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in
the people power. A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it as as sudden, radical, and
fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence.  A
government as a result of people’s revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family
of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. In the new government
under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is the
present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

 Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution : De Leon vs Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602

FACTS:
Alfredo De Leon was elected Barangay Captain in the elections on May 17, 1982. On February 9, 1987,
petitioner received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, but signed by OIC Governor Esguerra
on February 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores Taytay,
Rizal. Petitioners pray that the memorandum is null and void in accordance with Section 3 of Barangay
Election Act of 1982. Petitioner further that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent
OIC governor no longer has authority to designate successors and replace them.

ISSUE:
Is the dismissal order of De Leon et. Al. by respondent OIC Governor valid?

HELD:

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The constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional
Constitution has been superseded. As such, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2
Article III of said Constitution. The Memoranda was declared to be of no legal force and the writ of
prohibition enjoining respondents from proceeding with the take-over was granted.

Republic vs Sandiganbayan 2003

FACTS:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”) creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (“PCGG”). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power “(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary
in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order” and the power “(h) to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order.” Accordingly, the
PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”)
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in
the active service or retired. 2
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (“Ramas”). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a
Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (“RA No.
1379”) against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended
Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines (“petitioner”), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff
and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano (“Dimaano”) as
co-defendant.

After so many postponements due to inability of petitioner to show further evidence, private
respondents filed their motion to dismiss based on Republic vs. Migrino. In the Migrino case, the Court
held that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of
mere position held without showing that they are “subordinates” of former President Marcos. The
Sandiganbayan dismissed the amended complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to
respondent Dimaano. It remanded the records of the case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate
action as the evidence warrants and also referred the case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Dimaano. The petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review seeking to set aside the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against
Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
2. Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure

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3. Wether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during
the interregnum or Whether or not the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was operative during
the interregnunm.

HELD:

1. NO. The Court ruled that the PCGG had no jurisdiction to investigate Ramas as he was not a
“subordinate” of President Marcos as contemplated under EO No. 1, which created PCGG. Mere position
held by a military does not make him a “subordinate” as this term was used in EO No. 1, absent any
showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos.

The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGG’s powers are
specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGG’s sole task is only to
recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.  Without these elements, the
PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for
violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan. 32 The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject
to prescription, laches or estoppel.

|||
2. No.The Court also ruled that the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized the subject
items. The search warrant did not particularly describe the items seized. The Constabulary raiding team
seized items not included in the warrant. The seizure of these items was therefore, void, and unless
these items are contraband per se, which they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom
the raiding team seized|||them.

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own
authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items
could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority
when it seized these items.
Court held that the seized items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

3. NO. Court held that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, the court ruled that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.

Page 16 of 24
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme
law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the
abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution
nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato
S. Puno:

A revolution has been defined as “the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it” or as “a sudden, radical and fundamental
change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of
violence.” In Kelsen’s book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which “occurs
whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not
prescribed by the first order itself.”

||| However, the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during
the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under
the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the
Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human
beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant.

SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

 Mutuc v. Comelec 36 SCRA 228

Facts:

Petitioner Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
He alleged that respondent Commission on Elections gave his certificate of candidacy due course but
prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound system and loud speakers.
According to him, this violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech. Petitioner filed a case
against Commission on elections seeking a writ of prohibition and at the same time praying for a
preliminary injunction. The respondent argued that this authority was granted by the Constitutional
Convention Act.

Issues: 

Was the prohibition imposed by respondent a violation of the right to freedom of speech of the
petitioner?

Ruling: 

Supreme Court ruled that there was absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose
such ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The respondent commission failed to manifest

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fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being
consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. The
Constitution prohibits abridgement of free speech or a free press. According to the Supreme Court, this
preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What the
respondent Commission did was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this
constitutional right is directed.

The respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing
or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles.

G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

Imbong vs Ferrer

FACTS:

On March 16, 1967, the Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly passed Resolution No. 2 calling for a
Constitutional Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution that will be composed of 2
delegates from representative districts that shall have the same qualification as those of congressmen.
The resolution was passed accordingly by the congress acting as a legislative body by RA No. 4914. 2
years later, the congress as a constituent assembly amended Resolution 2 and passed Resolution 4,
which states the convention “shall have 320 members apportioned among the existing district according
to the number of their respective inhabitants, who shall have the same qualification as the members of
the House of Representatives…” The resolution was enacted by RA No. 6132 on August 1970.

ISSUE/S NOTED:

The validity of RA No. 6132, particularly Sec. 2, 4, 5 was questioned by Raul M. Gonzales, while the Sec. 8
par. 1 was contested by both Gonzales and Manuel B. Imbong.

HELD/DECISION:

1. The proposal of the Congress, as a constituent assembly carry with it the, by virtue or
necessary implication, the powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal
power granted (which includes qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation
of the delegates and the appropriation of funds). The power to enact the implementing
details, however, does not rest to the congress as a constituent assembly, but rather to
the congress as a legislative body. Gaps that may be found on the implanting rules of the
constituent assembly may be filled by the Congress as a legislative body. The following
was met by the Congress.
2. On Sec. 2 of RA No. 6132 which states the apportionment of delegates. Petitioner
Gonzales argued that the apportionment which states that the assembly shall have 320
members apportioned among the existing district according to the number of their
respective inhabitants, with each district entitled to have at least 2 representatives. The
fixing of 2 representatives was based to the latest preliminary census on 1967, with the

Page 18 of 24
 Congress adopting their own formula for an equitable distribution. The court argued
however, that absolute proportional apportionment is impractical and impossible due to
the movement of the population, which is very dynamic and constant. Though the court
accept that there may be other ways to reach a more reasonable apportionment, they
also ascertain that the congress did not act unconstitutionally, as the Constitution only
states “as nearly as maybe according to their respective inhabitants” and therefore does
not require absolute apportionment. Further, the court said that each district, each will
have 2 delegates are not treated fairly and just.
3. On Section 4of RA No. 6132 which states that all public officers and employees, whether
elective or appointive as resigned from the date of the filing of their certificate of
candidacy. The petitioner argued that the following denied the following concerned due
process. However, the court said that the following provision is an application of Section 1
of Article XII of the constitution and therefore within the realm of the law.
4. Section 5 states that any elected delegate is disqualified from running for any public office
in any election or from assuming any appointive office or position in any branch of
government until the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention. The court
argued that the following did not violate due process as the state, as the constitution or
the legislative body can create an office and define the qualification accordingly. It is the
view of the court that the following inhibitions are imposed so that the delegate can serve
the constitutional assembly full-time and dedicate all his time and talents to the
convention. This will also avoid the delegate to use his position to exert undue influence
that would have benefited certain sectors or any public office on drafting the supreme
law of the land. After all, the constitution states that public officers should serve the
people with “utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency” which includes
working with his full potential and avoiding conflict of interest.
5. Section 8(a) Par. 1 prohibits any candidate for delegate from representing or allowing
himself to be represented of any political party or any other organization. Political party,
political groups, civic, religious, professional or other organizations are not allowed to
intervene in the nomination or from giving support favorable or against his campaign for
election. The rationale with Section 5 (see no. 4) can also be applied here, as any political
party or group may be benefited one their supported candidate was chosen as a delegate
(“For the constitutional system means, not the predominance of interest, but the
harmonious balancing thereof”). The court also ascertained that the prohibition was also
implemented to avoid any advantage to a delegate that may be brought by the support of
a group, therefore equal chance on being a delegate is protected by Section 8(a) Par. 1 as
the court stated that “candidates must depend on their individual merits and not on the
support of any organization.”

AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS

 Article XVII
 Steps in the Amendment or Revision of the Constitution
 Lambino v. Comelec, GR 174153

FACTS:

Page 19 of 24
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC
election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding
Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and

HELD:

1.       The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment”
should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated
that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass
it around for signature.”

Page 20 of 24
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that
the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment,
the full text of the proposed amendments.

The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a
signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on
11 October 2006.

2.       A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the
Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
Constitution.

 Read RA 6735 – Initiative and Referendum Act

 Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, GR 134577
 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1

FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by
senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the
lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House
Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the
Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill
by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As
a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these
members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed
or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents

Page 21 of 24
argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness
of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said
resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an
authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of
the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment
of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended.
The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself
with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled
copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals
and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between
the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified
copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the
proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by
the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding
officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of
the due enactment thereof.”

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In
case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

 Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774

 Doctrine of Proper Submission, Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702

FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the
convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the

Page 22 of 24
Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on
November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

ISSUE:
1.    Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2.    Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:
1.    The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue of whether or not a
resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and
thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention
but they are both subject to the Constitution.

2.    The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1
violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to
the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and
ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately
but together.

 Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333

 Almario v. Alba, 127 SCRA 69

POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

 Article VIII, Sec. 1, Sec. 4(2)
 Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792
 Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
 Political v. Justiciable Question
Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333
Estrada v. Arroyo, GR 146738
Brillantes v. Concepcion, GR 163193
 Presumption of Constitutionality
Lim v. Pacquing, GR 115044

 Requisites of Judicial Review

1. Actual Case or Controversy
Board of Optometry v. Colet, GR 122241
Guingona v. CA, GR 125532
John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, GR 119775
Mariano v. Comelec, 242 SCRA 211
Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489
La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Assn. v. DENR Secretary, GR 127882

Ripeness
Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141

Page 23 of 24
 Montesclaros v. Comelec, GR 152295

Mootness
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396

2. Proper Party
Locus standi
Tatad v. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436
Kilosbayan v. Morato, 246 SCRA 540
Kilosbayan v. Morato (Recon), GR 118910
People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56
IBP v. Zamora, GR 141284
David v. Macapagal- Arroyo, GR 171396
Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization, GR 112399
Bayan v. Zamora, GR 138570
Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835

3. Questions must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

Matibag v. Benipayo, GR 149036
Estarija v. Ranada, GR 159314

4. Constitutional question must be the very “lis mota” of the case

Planters Products v. Fertiphil Corporation, GR 166006

Doctrine of Purposeful Hesitation

Drilon v. Lim, GR 112497

Doctrine of Operative Fact

Republic v. CA, GR 79732

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