Prelim - 339

Separation of Church and State
Austria v. NLRC; G.R. No. 124382
FACTS: The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The
petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were
terminated. On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several
communications form Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit
accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Thelma
Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was Pastor
Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very
ill to be able to do the collecting. A fact-finding committee was created
to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing:
Misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and
habitual neglect of duties; and Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly
authorized representative as grounds for the termination of his services. Petitioner filed a
complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA
for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner.
SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair,
as such, involves the separation of church and state?
RULLING: No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is
involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee,
which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor
Code.
MAIN POINT: The rationale of the principle of the separation of church and state is advocated
by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid
encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their
respective exclusive jurisdictions.
CASE NO.1
POLITICAL LAW
People v. Perfecto; 43 PHIL 887
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero,
discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil
companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate,
the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an
article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256
of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the
Crown.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be
applied in the case at bar?
RULING: No, the Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was
enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains
that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to
protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it
means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. Hence, Article
256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case.
Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
MAIN POINT: The law is always current and prospective as to the impact so long superseded
by an amended and adopted provisions as the Constitution is supreme. Every nation must hold
it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the
government preceding.
CASE NO.2
POLITICAL LAW
Macariola v. Asuncion; AM No. 133-J, May 31, 1982
FACTS: Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition.
Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge
rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. On October 16, 1963 a project of
partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23,
1963, later amended on November 11, 1963. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of
the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by
respondent Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries Inc., Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte,
now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals “with acts unbecoming of a judge.” Macariola
alleged that Asuncion violated, among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code and
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce.
ISSUE ; Whether or not the actuation of Judge Macariola in acquiring by purchase a portion of
property in a Civil Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge?
RULLING ; No, Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or
assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein.
The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E,
the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final
because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence, the lot in
question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965,
respondent’s order date October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963
approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision,
had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders.
MAIN POINT ; There is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines,
nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or
having interest in any lawful business.
CASE NO.3
INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
Francisco v. House of Representatives; GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003
FACTS: On 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings. On 2002, the House of Representatives
adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President
Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient
in form,” but insufficient in substance. The second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. It was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at
least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al.,
most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by
the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
RULING: Yes, The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment
to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” These rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover,
Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
MAIN POINT: All rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law
otherwise deemed unconstitutional.
CASE NO.4
INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
Civil Liberties Union v. ES; 194 SCRA 317
FACTS: Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan
T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both
petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of
the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 which according to the petitioners
allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold
other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The
petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to
Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes, In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII,
Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their
primary position to not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
MAIN POINT: Any extension of the Constitution’s interpretation must be aligned to the
spirit of construction of the law and must never in any way contravene to the letters of
the law of the land.
CASE NO.5
EFFECTIVITY AND RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
De Leon vs. Esguerra; G.R. No. L-78059, August 31, 1987
FACTS: Alfredo M. De Leon was elected barangay captain of Barangay Dolores,

Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election on May 17, 1982. On
February 9, 1987, he received a memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 signed by
then OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on designating Florentino G. Magno as the new
Barangay Captain along with new barangay councilmen of Barangay Dolores.
Petitioners prayed to the supreme court that the memoranda be declared null and void
pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of
office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue
until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988.
It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. On Feb 2, 1987,
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate
their successors. and that the people appointed by the OIC governor be prohibited by
taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the OIC Governor has the authority to appoint Barangay Officials.
RULING: No, the authority for the then OIC governor to appoint public officials already lapse
when the constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. The antedated memorandum which was
received by the petitioner on February 09, 1987 has no legal force or effect.
MAIN POINT: The memorandum has no effect the because the provisional constitution that was
used to justify the respondent’s memorandum had been ratified.
CASE NO.6
PREAMBLE
Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Halls of Justice
Building in Quezon City, AM No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017 (Include Dissenting Opinion
of Justice Leonen)
FACTS: This controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and
addressed to the Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of
Justice of Quezon City had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with
Catholic religious icons and other instrument for religious activities. He believes that such
practice violated the constitutional provisions on the separation of Church and State and the
constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money and property for the benefit
of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. He further averred that the
holding of masses at the basement of Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor the Catholic
litigants; that the rehearsals and other activities caused great disturbance to the employees; and
that court functions are affected due to the masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in the
afternoon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the holding of religious rituals at the hall of justice is a prohibition against
the preamble of 1987 constitution
RULLING: No, The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA and denies
the prayer of Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals of any of the world's religions in the
QC Hall of Justice or any halls of justice all over the country be prohibited. The Filipino people
in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied
in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so
far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.
MAIN POINT: The State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have some form of
belief system, whether such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an
outright rejection of religion.
CASE NO.7
ARTICLE I: THE NATIONAL TERRITORY
Sovereignty; Reagan v. Commissioner
FACTS: William Raegan, the petitioner, a citizen of the United States of America. An Employee
of the Bendix Radio, Division of Bendix Aviation Corporation that caters to provide technical
assistance to the United States Air Force designated in Clark Air Base Pampanga. About nine
months ago, before his visa expires here in the Philippines, Mr. Raegan imported Tax-free 1060
Cadillac car that estimated for $6,443.82. For two months after the car was imported in the
Philippines, Mr. Raegan requested a permit to sell the 1960 Cadillac car, it was then granted.
On July 11, 1960, He then sold the car to a certain Willie Johnson, Jr. a Private first
class, United States Marine Corps, Sangley Point, Cavite, Philippines, as shown by a Bill of
Sale at Clark Air Base for $6,600.00. On the same day, Willie Johnson, Jr. sold his car for P32,
000 to an alleged Fred Meneses as the deed of sale was done in Manila.
After the transaction was made, the respondent of Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(CIR), after deducting the landed cost of the car as well as the personal exemption to which
petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net taxable income arising from such transaction the amount
of P17,912.34, rendering him liable for income tax in the sum of P2,979.00. After paying the
sum, he sought for a refund since the said location is under the foreign soil.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Clark Air Base is under the Philippine territory and the power to
taxation could be exercised on the sale
RULING: Yes. The Clark Air Base is located in Pampanga; it is a military base under the
Philippine territory and does mean that it follows that Philippine constitution. The Philippine’s
jurisdictional rights certainly is not excluding the power to tax.
MAIN POINT: The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency.
The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein.
CASE NO. 8
SOVEREIGNTY AS AUTO LIMITATION

The people of the Philippines v Loreta Gozo, 53 SCRA 476
FACTS: Loreta Gozo seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales,
requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a
building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She
questions its validity, or at the very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due
process, citing the case of People v. Fajardo. She asserts that her house was
constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces located inside
the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City
and therefore shall be exempted from the Municipal Ordinance No. 14.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property of the Appellant shall be exempted from the
application of the Municipal Ordinance.
RULING: Yes. The Appellant’s assertion that because her property was located within
the naval base leased to the American armed forces located inside the United States
Naval Reservation, she must be entitled of the exemption from complying with the
ordinance was not given to merit. Though the property yielded within the naval base of
United States, it is clear doctrine that the Philippines still possesses the sovereignty
over that area, given the record that it is still part of the territory.
MAIN POINT: Sovereignty is auto-limitation. The decision is affirmed as it found the

accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal
Ordinance No 14.
CASE NO. 9
SOVEREIGNTY
Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476
FACTS: In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines
ratified on February 27, 1984. Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA
9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
It opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions. RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. Hence,
petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying
the baseline regime of nearby territories.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional
RULING: No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the
Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine
Territory. It is a vital step in safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and
continental shelf. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not
affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air
space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.
MAIN POINT: Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to
mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight
or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime
zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not
be any clearer:
CASE DIGEST 10
I. CASE NUMBER: G.R. No. 206510
II. TOPIC: Sovereignty
III. CASE TITLE: Most Rev Pedro Arigo v. Scott Swift
IV. FACTS:
- In December of 2012, A US Navy Ship was held to enter and exit the territorial
waters of the Philippines for routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew
liberty, US Embassy in the Philippines requested for a clearance from the Philippine
Government. On January 15, 2013, the said navy ship was called to depart from
Subic Bay for next port in Makassar, Indonesia, it was later reported to ran aground
on the northwest side Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs while it was transiting the Sulu
Sea. However, no cine was injured and no reports of leaking fuel or oil. On January
20, 2013, U.S. Counterparts Vice Admiral Scott Swift and US Ambassador to the
Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr expressed regrets for the incident and assured the
DFA Secretary Albert F. del Rosario to provide appropriate compensation for the
damages that the ship caused. Immediately after the incident, the US Navy-led
salvage team completed to retrieve the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral
reef.
- Petitioner most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo together with other representatives of different
organizations and sectors, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed a case
against Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet and other
crews. Petitioners further claimed that the operation of the US Navy-led salvage
team caused continuous environmental damage to the nearby provinces of Palawan,
Antique, Aklan, and among others, which violates their constitutional rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology.
V. ISSUE:
VI. Whether or not US Government would held be liable for the damages in Tubbataha Reef
VII. RULING:
No. The doctrine of state immunity from suit suggests that a state cannot be sued
without its consent. In similar view thereof, the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium
expresses that all states are sovereign equals and therefore no state cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. In this case, petitioner filed a complaint against US
Commander Scott H. Swift in his individual capacity which barred him from the doctrine
of the state immunity thus court ruled that liability should held over him.
FACTS CASE DIGEST 11
I. CASE NUMBER:
II. TOPIC: Sovereignty
III. CASE TITLE: The South China Sea Arbitration: Philippines v. China
IV. FACTS:
China claims sovereignty and historic rights over the islands and other maritime features
in the South China Sea. It further asserts the nine-dash line. The Philippines contested
these claims on the ground that they were incompatible with the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea. It initiated arbitration under Annex VII of the (UNCLOS) for a declaratory
judgment to that effect. China rejected the arbitral procedure in part because of its 2006
Declaration which excludes all such disputes from the compulsory dispute settlement
procedure of the Convention.
V. ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippines has sovereign rights over the South China Sea.
VI. RULING:
Yes. UNCLOS comprehensively allocates rights to maritime areas There is no legal
basis for China to claim historic rights to waters in the South China Sea (so, to the extent
that is what the nine-dash line means, it is invalid)
CASE DIGEST 13
I. CASE NUMBER: G.R. No. L-36409

II. TOPIC: Concept of Auto Limitation
III. CASE TITLE: People vs. Gozo
IV. FACTS:
The accused Loreta Gozo, a residential owner located inside the US Naval Reservation
in Olongapo City, demolished and rebuilt the house without being issued a construction
permit from Olongapo City Mayors Office, because she was allegedly told by a City
Mayor Assistant Ernesto Evalle and her neighbours that such permit was not necessary.
Illegal construction was later discovered by the City Engineers office and apprehended
the four carpenters working on the house construction. After the investigation, Loreta
Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with the City
Fiscal's Office. The City Court found her guilty and sentenced her to imprisonment as
well as a pay for the costs. The same ruling was applied to the matter when an appeal
reached to the Court of Instance but sentenced the latter a fine of P200.00 and
demolishment of the house erected. The appellant brought the case to the court of
appeals assailing the validity of such ordinance on constitutional ground or the
applicability to her considering the house was tended within the naval base.
V. ISSUE:
Whether or not the city ordinance requiring for construction permit applies in an
American naval base.
VI. RULING:
Yes. The Philippine Government merely consents the United States to exercise
jurisdiction in certain cases and it was given as a matter of comity, courtesy, or
expediency. However, it cannot be implied that the Philippine Government has submitted
to US Government its jurisdiction over the bases. The concept of auto limitation
suggests that Philippine Government has the exclusive power to determine and restrict
its sovereign rights. The Philippines still retains its sovereignty and authority over its
entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Its laws govern
therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. Thus, appellant Gozo,
despite being located in a US base, should submit to the laws governing the area.
VII. MAIN POINT:

- The case suggests that in view of the concept of the auto limitation, the state has the
exclusive power to determine and restrict its sovereign rights. Therefore, American
bases should retain their status as native soil adhering the governing laws of the
land.
CASE DIGEST 14-15

II. TOPIC:
Concept of Auto Limitation
Archipelagic Doctrine
III. CASE TITLE: Magallona, et. al. vs. Ermita

IV. FACTS:
Congress in faithful compliance with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522.
Petitioner, Prof. Merlin M. Magallona and among others questioned the constitutionality
of RA. 9522 on the following grounds:
(1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10
embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and
(2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage
by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
(3) RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s
archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
V. ISSUE:
Whether or not the ammended RA 9522 or Philippine Baseline Law is constitutionally
valid.
VI. RULING:
- Yes. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. The statue was a vital step to
safeguard the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic
waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an
archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is
further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the
status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air
space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the
UNCLOS III to precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the
international family of states and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like
enlargement or diminution of territories.
VII. MAIN POINT:

The provision of Art I 1987 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we
connect the outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the
waters enclosed thereby as internal waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the
Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an
explicit definition in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.
CASE DIGEST 16
I. CASE NUMBER: G.R. No. L-409

II. TOPIC: Concept of State
III. CASE TITLE: Laurel vs. Misa
IV. FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for Habeas Corpus based on a theory that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of
Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
V. ISSUE:
Whether or not the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese
occupation
VI. RULING:
No.The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by
the enemy of their legitimate government on the sovereign is not abrogated or severed
by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de
jure is not transferred to the occupier. There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
CASE DIGEST 17

II. TOPIC: State Immunity from Suit
III. CASE TITLE: Lansang vs. Court of Appeals
IV. FACTS:
Private respondents were allegedly given office space and kiosk area to sell food and
drinks through the so-called awarded “verbal contract of lease” by the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC), a government initiated civic body engaged in the
development of national parks, including Rizal Park. According to the private respondent
General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI), 40 percent of the profits derived from the
operating kiosk are remitted to NPDC. However, no record supported as to who received
the share of the profits or how they were used or spent.
With the change of governance after the EDSA Revolution, the new chairman of NPDC,
sought to clean up Rizal Park. Thus terminated the alleged verbal agreement between
GABI and the previous NPDC administration and ordered the GABI to vacate the
premises. On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and
injunction in the Regional Trial Court against petitioner, Villanueva, and "all persons
acting on their behalf". RTC eventually ruled in favor to the petitioner, Villanueva
asserting the doctrine of state immunity. However the rule was reversed when it
escalated in the court of appeals.
V. ISSUE:
Whether there is a valid cause of action against the petitioner for his order to terminate
the accommodation extended to GABI.
VI. RULING:
No. Although the doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against
the public officer in the faithful performance of his duties where the satisfaction of the
judgement requires the state to perform positive act, the immunity restricts to a
complaint filed against a public officer due to his personal or individual capacity. Public
officials are also not exempted from the liability arising from his bad faith.
The court finds however no evidence of such abuse of authority on record. As earlier
stated, Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of
a lease contract. Admittedly, there was no written contract. That private respondents
were allowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of
accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so, also admittedly, petitioner
may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may
be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and does not
claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.
CASE No. 18
ARTICLE I, Sec. 1. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
AMIGABLE v. CUENCA [G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972]
FACTS: The appellant Victoria Amigable, a registered owner of a lot in Cebu, was
allegedly taken a portion of her lot for Mango and Gorordo Avenue construction without
prior expropriation or negotiated sale. On March 27, 1958, Appellant through her
counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of her lot which had
been appropriated by the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts
of the case.
RULING: YES. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at

the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance
of any portion of her lot to the government, appellant remains the rightful owner of the
whole lot. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is
neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for
road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago. In addition, the
government should pay for attorney’s fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the
trial court after hearing.
MAIN POINT/RATIO: Although the doctrine of immunity from suit protects the state
from being sued without its consent, it however cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
CASE No. 19
ARTICLE I, Sec. 1. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
CITY OF CALOOCAN v. JUDGE ALLARDE [G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003]
FACTS: On October 5,1992,the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134,
Series of 1992, which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by respondent
Santiago as back salaries, plus interest. After which, Judge Allarde immediately ordered
Norberto Azarcon of City Treasurer of Caloocan to deliver the manager's check to
Regional Trial Court pursuant to the final and executory decision in these cases.
However, then Caloocan Mayor, Macario A. Asisto refused to sign the check. Judge
Allarde directed Sheriff Castillio to garnish the funds of the City Government of
Caloocan.
ISSUE: WoN the garnishment of the Government funds in PNB was valid.
|||
RULING: YES. The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in
the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government
funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding
appropriation as required by law.|||
In the instant case, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed
Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14 for
respondent Santiago's back salaries plus interest. Thus this case fell squarely within the
exception. For all intents and purposes, Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, was the
"corresponding appropriation as required by law.
MAIN POINT/RATIO: The rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception,
that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Otherwise
stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not
apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law
specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment against the government. In such
a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes.||
CASE NO. 20
ARTICLE I: The National Territory
State Immunity from Suit
Air Transportation Office v. Ramos
FACTS:
Respondents David and Elisea Ramos discovered that a portion of their land registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land records with an
area of 985 square meters was used for Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air
Transportation Office (ATO). The respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the
affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of
P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written
demands. Respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO. In their answer,
the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as defense the issuance of President Marcos
that had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents’ affected portion
for use of the Loakan Airport, that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action
without the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in
the performance of governmental functions. On November 10, 1998, the RTC denied
the ATO’s motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense. After the RTC
likewise denied the ATO’s motion for reconsideration on December 10, 1998, the ATO
commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to assail the RTC’s orders. The
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, upon its finding that the assailed
orders were not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner ATO can be sued without the State’s consent.
RULING:
No. The Section 3 Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution states that the State may not be
sued without its consent. This is based on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. In the case at bar, the State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the
petitioner ATO because it is an agency of the State engaged in an enterprise that is far
from being the State’s exclusive prerogative. The CA correctly appreciated the juridical
character of the ATO as agency of the Government not performing a purely
governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved, in the management and
maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of
the State. The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat
a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and
without proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiff’s property.
MAIN POINT: Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are
immune from suits. The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to agencies of the
State engaged in an enterprise not performing a purely governmental or sovereign
function.
CASE NO. 21
ARTICLE II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Legal Value of Article II
Tondo Medical v. CA
FACTS:
The Health Sector Reform Agenda was launched by the Department of Health in 1999,
which provided five areas of general reform. The petitioners alleged that the
implementation of the aforementioned reform had resulted in making free medicine and
free medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantage Filipinos. On May 24,
1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
“Redirecting the functions and Operations of the Department of Health”, which provided
for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. The
petitioners contented that a law, such as E.O. No. 120, which effects the reorganization
of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative function.
They argued that E.O. No. 102 is void, as this was enacted ultra vires on the part of the
President. The CA denied the petition due to a number of procedural defects, which
proved fatal. It also ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating the
various sections of Article II, III, XIII and XV of the 1987 Constitution. A motion for
reconsideration of the decision was filed by the petitioners but the same was denied in a
resolution dated March 7, 2005.
ISSUE:
Whether the HSRA is void for violating various provisions of the Constitution.
RULING:
No. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing,
and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. However, some provisions
have already been categorically declared as non self-executing. In the present case,
some of the constitutional provisions invoked were taken from Article II of the
Constitution, which are non self-executing and do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights.
MAIN POINT:
Non self-executing provisions merely lay down a general principle and cannot give rise
to a cause of action in the courts.
CASE NO. 22
Legal Value of Article II
Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. COA
FACTS:
The Congress approved RA 7227 creating the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA), in which Section 9 states that the BCDA Board of Directors (Board)
shall exercise the powers and functions of the BCDA. Under Section 10, the functions of
the Board include the determination of the organizational structure and the adoption of a
compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP). Accordingly, the Board determined the organizational structure of the
BCDA and adopted a compensation and benefit scheme for its officials and employees.
On 20 February 2003, State Auditor IV Corazon V. Españo of the COA issued Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-0047 stating that the grant of year-end
benefit(YEB) to Board members was contrary to DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated
2 January 2002 (disallowing YEB to Board Members/consultants.
On 20 February 2003, State Auditor IV Corazon V. Españo of the COA issued Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-004 stating that the grant of year-end
benefit to Board members was contrary to Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2 January 2002. In Notice of Disallowance (ND)
No. 03-001-BCDA-(02) dated 8 January 2004, Director IV Rogelio D. Tablang (Director
Tablang), COA, Legal and Adjudication Office-Corporate, disallowed the grant of year-
end benefit to the Board members and full-time consultants.
ISSUE:
Whether Sections 5 and 18 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution are binding as a legal
basis for the claim of granting year-end benefit.
RULING:
No. Article 2, based on its title, is only a statement of general ideological principles and
policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights. Sections 5 and 18 are not self-executing
provisions. The said provision of Article 2 is not a source of enforceable rights. In a
previous similar case (Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of
Appeals), the court held that Sec. 5 and 18, Art. 2 of the Constitution are not self-
executing provisions. Thus, the said provisions are not a legal basis for the said claim.
MAIN POINT: Article II of the 1987 Constitution is only a statement of general

ideological principles and policies. It cannot be a source of enforceable rights.
CASE NO. 23
Fundamental Principles and State Policies
Tañada vs. Angara
FACTS:
Petitioners Senators Tañada and others questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the
WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the
“national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and
products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in
contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless
the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the WTO contravene Section 19, Article II and Sections 10
and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
RULING:
No. Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. These
are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. The provisions of Sec. 10 and 12, Article XII of the Constitution, general
principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, is enforceable only in regard
to “the grants or rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony” and not to every aspect of trade and commerce.
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor
and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.
In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy.
MAIN POINT:
The general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony are enforceable
only in regard to “the grants or rights, privileges and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony” and not to every aspect of trade and commerce.
CASE NO. 24
Legaspi v. CSC
FACTS:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government
employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles that passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
ISSUE:
Whether the CSC should release the information.
RULING:
Yes. The constitutional right to information on matters of public information is grounded
on Sec. 7, Article III and Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These are self-
executory. In the case at bar, the government agency Civil Service Commission does
not have the discretion to prohibit the access to information sought. It only has the
authority to regulate the manner of examination.
These constitutional guarantees, however, are not absolute as they are subject to the
limitations as may be provided by law. The information sought must not be exempted by
law. In the case at bar, the information is within the enumerations provided by law since
(1) the information sought relates to a public office which can be considered as a
legitimate concern of citizens; (2) respondent failed to cite any provision in the Civil
Service Law which would limit the petitioner’s right to know who are and who are not
civil service eligible; and (3) the Civil Service Examinations results are released to the
public.
MAIN POINT:
Government agencies such as the Civil Service Commission do not have the discretion
in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern because the
Constitution guarantees access to information of public concern – a recognition of the
essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy.
CASE NO. 25
Oposa v. Factoran
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing
their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against
Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country and
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs; and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises. Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the
same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant constitutes
a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust
for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner-minors have a cause of action which is based on the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations
to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation
of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
MAIN POINT:
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.
CASE NO. 26
Imbong v. Ochoa
FACTS:
The Congress enacted RA 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family
planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples’ right to
reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement
measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health
and population control. Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved
to assail the constitutionality of RH Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RH law is unconstitutional in violation of the right to life as a natural
law.
RULING:
No. In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. The Constitution affords protection to the unborn from
conception. It is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the
State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the
earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm
and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended
that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when
life begins. The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in
protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to also prevent the Legislature
from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly
mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization
MAIN POINT:
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is
inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom,
or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
CASE NO. 27
Espina v. Zamora
FACTS:
On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law RA 8762, also known as
the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed RA 1180, which
absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. RA
8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now
reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as
Filipino citizens. On October 11, 2000 petitioners, all members of the House of
Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on
the ground that it violates Sections 9, 19 and 20 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
They stressed that the presence of foreign nationals would result in alien control and
monopoly of the retail trade.
ISSUE:
Whether RA 8762 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It found no showing that RA 8762
has contravened any constitutional mandate and that it would eventually lead to alien
control of the retail trade business. The Court noted that while the Constitution
mandates a bias in favor Filipino goods, services, labor, and local enterprises, it also
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the basis of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. The Constitution does not impose a
policy of Filipino monopoly.
The Court also pointed out that Congress has the discretion under Article XIII, sec. 10 of
the Constitution to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investment upon
recommendation of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and when
the national interest requires; and that in this case Congress has decided, without
opposition from NEDA, to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign
investments.
MAIN POINT:
The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our
economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of
development.
CASE NO. 28
ARTICLE II, Section I: Philippines as a Democratic and Republican State
Functions of Government
Bacani v. NACOCO
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Bacani and Matoto are both court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the
Court of First Instance of Manila. The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid
the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said
transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to
reimburse said amounts by virtue of a Department of Justice circular which stated that
NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in
question. For reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount of
P25 per payday be deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10 from the salary of
Matoto. Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a
government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. On
the other hand, the defendants set up a defense that NACOCO is a government entity
within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence; it is
exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
Whether NACOCO is included under the term “Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.”
RULINGS:
No. NACOCO is not a government entity. The term “Government of the Republic of the
Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers to that
government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as an
attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political
authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local
government. They do not include government entitles which are given a corporate
personality separate and distinct from the government and which are governed by the
Corporation Law, such as the National Coconut Corporation. Their powers, duties and
liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters. It
was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the government, as it was
made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other
private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.
MAIN POINT:
Corporations which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the
government do not acquire government status since they do not come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation.
CASE NO. 29
ACCFA v. CUGCO
FACTS:
ACCFA, a government agency created under RA 821, as amended was reorganized
and its name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration under the Land Reform
Code or RA 3844. While the ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers'
Association are labor organizations referred to as Union in the ACCFA. The ASA and
ACCFA entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective for a period of one
year. However, after a few months, ASA, together with the CUGCO, filed a complaint
against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practices and
non implementation of said agreement. Court of Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA to
cease from committing further acts tending to discourage the Union members in the
exercise of their right to self-organization, to comply with and implement the provisions
of the CBA, and to bargain with good faith with the complainants. ACCFA moved to
reconsider but it was turned down in a resolution. ACCFA appealed by certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether ACCFA exercised governmental functions.
RULING:
Yes. The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to
Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function; and
for that purpose Executive Order No. 75 has placed the ACA under the Land Reform
Project Administration. The law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with
the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of
Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself
a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws
and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of
doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.
MAIN POINT:
The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals,” continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
increasing social challenges of the times.
CASE NO. 30
PVTA v. CIR
FACTS:
Private respondents alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in
excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them
overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration denied the allegations and raising the special defenses
of lack of a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The respondent Court issued an
order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services and directing
petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. There was a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the respondent Court. Petitioner Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration contends that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court
as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
RULING:
Yes, the Petitioner discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. The
Supreme Court ruled that a reference to the enactments creating Petitioner Corporation
suffices to demonstrate the merit of petitioner’s plea that it performs governmental and
not proprietary functions. It also ruled that petitioner is exempt from the operation of CA
No. 444.
But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government
has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA
2264 in providing for a distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is
irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The growing complexities of
modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
government obsolete.”
MAIN POINT:
The distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is now irrelevant, thus
obsolete.
CASE NO. 31
PHHC v. Court of Industrial Relations
FACTS:
The Philippine government and World Food Program (WFP) entered into an agreement
in a plan for the Sapang Palay resettlement area in the PHHC proposing a self-help
project to be undertaken by the squatter families for the construction of two dams. The
participants were assigned to work on canals and roads; however, the projects agreed
between the PHHC and WFP were never fully implemented.
However, the participants went to the Department of Labor complaining about their work
and compensation. Secretary Ople suggests that the workers in the said project must
be paid in minimum wage law. The petitioner answered before the CIR that they were
exercising governmental functions and that they did not hire private respondents and
CIR had no jurisdiction over them. The Court dismissed the action of the petitioner since
there was no evidence that private respondents rendered overtime work. The petitioner
moved to reconsider before the CIR but denied the claims. Thus, they elevated the case
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the CIR has jurisdiction over PHHC, a government owned and/or controlled
corporation performing governmental function.
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over labor disputes
involving GOCC performing proprietary functions, but not those performing
governmental functions. Since the National Housing Association was created, the
Philippine government has carried mass housing and resettlement program to meet the
needs of Filipinos. The PHHC is governmental institution performing governmental
functions through a ministrant function.
MAIN POINT:
An instrumentality of government to accomplish governmental policies and objectives
and extend essential services to the people performs governmental and not proprietary
functions.
CASE NO. 32
Spouses Fontanilla v. Hon. Maliaman
FACTS:
National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for
damages resulting to the death of the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the
fault and/or negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that it is not liable
for the act of its driver because the former does not perform primarily proprietorship
functions but governmental functions.
ISSUE:
Whether NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.
HELD:
Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct
from the government, because its community services are only incidental functions to
the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency with proprietary
functions governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their employees.
Section 2(f) of PD 552 provides that NIA also has its own assets and liabilities and has
corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. It provides that NIA may sue
and be sued in court and is governed by Corporation Law and is liable for actions of
their employees.
MAIN POINT:
A government corporation with a juridical personality performing proprietary functions
assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which is responsible for the damages
caused by its employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence
in the selection and supervision of the driver.
CASE NO. 33
VFP v. Reyes
FACTS:
The Veteran Federation of the Philippines is a corporate body organized under RA
2640. Sometime in August 2002, petitioner received a letter from the Undersecretary of
the Department of National Defense to conduct a Management Audit pursuant to RA
2460, where it stated that VFP is under the supervision and control of the Secretary of
National Defense. Petitioner complained about the broadness of audit and requested
suspension until issues are threshed out, which was subsequently denied by DND. As a
result, petitioner sought relief under Rule 65 assailing that it is a private non-government
corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether the VFP is a private non-government corporation.
RULING:
No. The VFP is not a private corporation, but a public corporation. The functions of the
VFP are executive functions, designed to implement not just the provisions of RA 2640,
but also, and more importantly, the Constitutional mandate for the State to provide
immediate and adequate care, benefits and other forms of assistance to war veterans
and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans.
MAIN POINT:
Public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for
a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
CASE NO. 34
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Petitioners Ramiscal, et. al. were charged with Malversation through Falsification of
Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The Information alleged that Ramiscal,
et. al. misappropriated and converted the amount of P250,318,200.00 for their personal
use from the funds of AFP-RSBS. Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an “Urgent
Motion to Declare Nullity of Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.” He
argued, that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-
RSBS is a private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and
Satuito. The Urgent Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution issued, the Sandiganbayan sustained
Ramiscal, et. al.’s contention that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it
reconsidered its earlier Resolution and ordered the dismissal of their criminal case.
Upon denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special
civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the AFP-RSBS is not a government entity.
RULING:
No, the AFP-RSBS is a government entity. It was created by Presidential Decree 361.
Its purpose and functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the
system that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military service.
Soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally employees of the Government, rely
on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for their retirement, pension and separation
benefits. Its enabling law further mandates that the System shall be administered by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines through an agency, group,
committee or board, which may be created and organized by him and subject to such
rules and regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of National Defense, promulgate from time to time. The funds of the AFP-
RSBS, except for the initial seed money, come entirely from contributions and that no
part thereof comes from appropriations. While it may be true that there have been no
appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the Government is not
precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide additional benefits to
them. As such, we hold that the same is a government entity and its funds are in the
nature of public funds.
MAIN POINT:
The AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and controlled corporation and that its funds
are in the nature of public funds. The Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses committed by presidents, directors, trustees or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations.
CASE NO. 35
Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
4 Informations for violation of RA 3019 were filed against petitioners Alzaga, et al
(relative to alleged irregularities which attended the purchase of 4 lots in Batangas by
the AFP-RSBS or Armed Forces of the Phils Retirement and Separation Benefits
System). Alzaga was the Head of the Legal Department during the purchase of one of
the lots. Bello succeeded Alzaga, and it was during his tenure when the other 3 lots
were purchased. Both were Vice Presidents of AFP-RSBS. Satuito was Chief of
Documentation and Asst VP. Petitioners filed their respective Motions to Quash alleging
that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them because the AFP-RSBS is a
private entity created for the benefit of its members.
ISSUE:
Whether the AFP-RSBS a GOCC falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
Yes, the AFP-RSBS was established by virtue of PD 361 in December 1973 to
guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system, as
provided for in RA 340. It is similar to the GSIS and SSS since it serves as the system
that manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military. The AFP-RSBS
is administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through a Board of Trustees and
Management Group, and funded from congressional appropriations and compulsory
contributions from members of the AFP. This Court has ruled that the character and
operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest, thus the same is a
government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds. The AFP-RSBS is a
GOCC under RA 9182, otherwise known as the Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002.
Since AFP-RSBS is a GOCC, the SB has jurisdiction over the persons of the
petitioners.
MAIN POINT:
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundation, are under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
CASE NO. 36
Javier v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
RA 8047, also known as the “Book Publishing Industry Development Act,” was enacted
with the primary goal of to promote the continuing development of the book publishing
industry, through the active participation of the private sector, so that adequate supply
of affordable and high-quality books are ensured for the domestic and export market. A
Governing Board, the NBB, was created to achieve the purpose of the law. It works
under the administration and supervision of the Office of the President. Petitioner Javier
was appointed to the Board as the private sector representative. Part of her functions is
to attend book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing bodies.
On September 29, 1997, the Office of the President issued Petitioner Javier an authority
to travel to Madrid, Spain to attend a book fair. She was given P139, 199.00.
Unfortunately, Petitioner Javier was not able to attend the book fair. She was asked to
return the money, but she failed to do so. The Ombudsman indicted her of corrupt
practices. She was also filed a case against Sandiganbayan due to malversation of
public funds. She filed a Motion to Quash Information (i.e. disregard allegations against
her because of defectiveness and insufficency), averring that the Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction of the case because she was not classified as a “public official who has a
salary grade of 27 or higher”. She claims that she is not apublic officer and that she
belongs to the Board only as a private sector representative.
ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner Javier is subject to the sanctions of the Ombudsman and/or
Sandiganbayan even if she was merely a private sector representative to the Governing
Board?
RULING:
Yes. The Governing Board is the government agency mandated to develop and support
Philippine book publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency (i.e. an agency
created by law). It partakes public functions, thus whoever is appointed to be part of it is
considered a public officer. Even if the petitioner was a private sector representative,
she was nevertheless given “sovereign function” of the government to achieve the goal
of RA 8047 (“Book Publishing Industry Development Act”), which is to ensure full
development of the book publishing industry of the State.
MAIN POINT:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
CASE NO. 37
MIAA v. CA
FACTS:
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) is the operator of the Ninoy International
Airport located at Parañaque City. The officers of Parañaque City sent notices to MIAA
due to real estate tax delinquency. MIAA then settled some of the amount. When MIAA
failed to settle the entire amount, the officers of Parañaque City threatened to levy and
subject to auction the land and buildings of MIAA, which they did. MIAA sought for a
Temporary Restraining Order from the CA but failed to do so within the 60 days
reglementary period, so the petition was dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with
the Supreme Court a day before the public auction and was granted the same but
unfortunately, the TRO was received by the Parañaque City officers three hours after
the public auction.
MIAA claims that although the charter provides that the title of the land and building are
with MIAA still the ownership is with the Republic of the Philippines. MIAA also contends
that it is an instrumentality of the government and as such exempted from real estate
tax. That the land and buildings of MIAA are of public dominion therefore cannot be
subjected to levy and auction sale. On the other hand, the officers of Parañaque City
claim that MIAA is a government-owned and controlled corporation therefore not
exempted to real estate tax.
ISSUES:
Whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and
thus cannot be the subject of levy and auction sale.
RULING:
Yes. Since the airport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and international travel
and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its operation and for
regulation and does not change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA as part
of the public dominion. To subject them to levy and public auction is contrary to public
policy. Unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport land and
buildings from public use, these properties remain to be of public domino and are
inalienable. As long as the land and buildings are for public use, the ownership is with
the Republic of the Philippines.
CASE No. 38
ARTICLE II, Sec. 1. PHILIPPINES AS A DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN STATE
FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY v. COA [G.R. No. 169752. September 25, 2007]
FACTS: The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years
ago by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by
the Philippine Commission.
At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No.
1459, was not yet in existence. Act No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and
the constitution of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
On December 1, 2003, an audit team from respondent Commission on Audit (COA)
visited the office of the petitioner to conduct an audit survey pursuant to COA Office
Order No. 2003-051 dated November 18, 2003 addressed to the petitioner. The
petitioner demurred on the ground that it was a private entity not under the jurisdiction
of COA.
ISSUE: WoN the petitioner qualifies as a government agency that may be subject
to audit by respondent COA.
RULING: NO. Petitioner is DECLARED a private domestic corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The respondents are
ENJOINED from investigating, examining and auditing the petitioner's fiscal and
financial affairs.
MAIN POINT/RATIO: The amendments introduced by C.A. No. 148 made it clear that
the petitioner was a private corporation and not an agency of the government. As a
curative statute, and based on the doctrines so far discussed, C.A. No. 148 has to be
given retroactive effect, thereby freeing all doubt as to which class of corporations the
petitioner belongs, that is, it is a quasi-public corporation, a kind of private domestic
corporation.
CASE No. 39
ARTICLE II, Sec. 1. PHILIPPINES AS A DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN STATE
FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT
SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [542 SCRA 224 (2008]
FACTS: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP-Cebu.
She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on
December 31, 2000.
On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the
SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of
the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave
P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The
source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President. The
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.
The succeeding student regent consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public
Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found
probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa and
filed the case to the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an estafa case?
Ruling: YES. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an estafa case (1) Section 4(B) of
P.D. No. 1606 which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan reads: “Other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection(a) of this section in relation to
their office.”
MAIN POINT: The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive
a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Every section,
provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in
order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. Evidently, from the
provisions of Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is
one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements
that the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section
4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that the offense is committed in relation to their
office.
CASE NO. 40
SEC 1: Philippines as a Democratic and Republican State
Shipside Inc v. CA, GR 143377, Feb 20, 2001
FACTS: Original certificate of titles were issued in favor of Rafael Galvez over four
parcels of land. Lots 1 and 4 were conveyed by Galvez to Mamaril, who later sold the
same Order declaring Original certificate of titles null and void. Lepanto sold Lots 1 and
4 to herein petitioner. Galvez filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the Order
declaring his Original certificate of titles null and void. The motion was denied. On
appeal, the Court of appeals ruled in favor of the Republic and issued a writ of
execution. The order was not executed. After twenty-five years, the Sol Gen filed a
complaint for revival of judgment and cancellation of tittles.
ISSUE: Whether the Republic of the Philippines can maintain the revival of judgment
RULING: No. While it is true that prescription does not run against the State, the same
may not be invoked by the government in this case since it is no longer interested in the
subject matter. With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the bases of conversion
development authority, the government no longer has a right or interest to protect.
Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the
instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility.
MAIN POINT: Prescription of action does not against the State. It is not applicable to
artificial bodies created by the State for special purpose.
CASE NO. 41
PVTA v. CIR, GR L-32052, July 25
Facts: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime
services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA
No. 444. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) denied the allegations for
lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an
order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that the
corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from
Commonwealth Act No. 444. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent
Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation
of Commonwealth Act No. 444.
ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions
and is exempt from CA No. 444.
RULING: Yes, the Petitioner discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
This case explains and portrays the expanded role of government necessitated by the
increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare. The Court held that the
distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions, which the Chief Justice
points out, is already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He said, "The
growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government obsolete." The distinction between constituent and
ministrant functions is now considered obsolete.
The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
be denied.
MAIN POINT: The traditional classification of governmental functions into constituent

and ministrant are now obsolete. The constitutional policy on social justice now make
the traditionally ministrant functions obligatory.
CASE NO. 42
Rosas v. Montor GR 204105, October 14, 2015
Facts: On December 7, 2004, two Iranian nationals arrived in the Philippines at the
Mactan-Cebu International Airport (MCIA). After staying in a hotel in Cebu City for a few
days, they left for Narita, Japan on December 14, 2004. On December 16, 2004,
Japanese immigration authorities discovered that they had counterfeit or tampered
Mexican and Italian passports and used falsified names. As a result, the Japanese
immigration authorities denied entry and sent them back to the Philippines. They arrived
at MCIA on the same day at 6:45 p.m. and admitted at the detention cell of the Bureau
of Immigration (BI) Cebu Detention Center. Thereupon, an Exclusion Order was issued
against Taromsari and Ziveh on grounds of "Not Properly Documented" and "No Entry
Visa." Having admitted that they knowingly entered the country with the use of
fraudulent passports and false representations when they arrived on December 7 ,
2004, Taromsari and Ziveh should have been ordered arrested and formally charged
with violation of Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45(c) and (d). Deportation
proceedings should have been initiated forthwith against these aliens.
ISSUE: Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of gross misconduct
warranting the petitioner’s dismissal from service.
RULING: Yes. The petitioner displayed a blatant disregard of established immigration

rules making him liable for grave misconduct that warrants his removal from the service.
The petitioner had toe duty to initiate criminal and deportation proceedings under
section 45 of the PIA of 1940. Having admitted that they knowingly entered the country
with the use of fraudulent passports and false representations when they arrived on
December 7,2004, the Iranian nationals should have been ordered arrested and
formally charged with violation of Section 37(a)(9) in relation to Section 45(c) and (d).
Deportation proceedings should have been initiated forthwith against these aliens.
MAIN POINT: The petitioner had the jurisdiction to oversee the filing of criminal actions
and deportation proceedings against the two Iranian nationals. In allowing them to
deport for Malaysia and escape criminal charges, the showed gross lack of discretion,
which led to an evasion of his positive duty.
CASE NO. 43
People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil 887
Facts: Fernando Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate discovered that
certain documents which constituted the records of testimony by witnesses in the
investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Later on, the newspaper
La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article criticizing the Senate
and its members in general. As a result, he was charged guilty of violating Article 256 of
the Penal Code by the CFI of Manila. Petitioner filed an appeal to the Supreme Court
praying for the dismissal of the case on the ground that said Article is no longer in force.
ISSUE: Is Article 256 of the Penal Code still in force despite the change of Spanish
sovereignty to American sovereignty over the Philippines?
RULING: No. Article 256 was enacted to protect Spanish officials, which were
representatives of the King. It is completely against the nature of the American System
of Government, which states that every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and
has equal right with every other man. As such, Article 256 is deemed abrogated and the
case is consequently dismissed and judgment reversed.
MAIN POINT: It is a general principle of the public law that the previous political
relations of the ceded region are much abrogated. All laws, ordinances, and regulations
in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new
government are at once displaced.
CASE NO. 44
Vilas v. City of Manila, 229 US 345
Facts: Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183,
petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action
to recover the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of Manila that incurred
the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by
the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the
Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished.
ISSUE: Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability
of the City of Manila to its creditor?
RULING: No. The city, acting as a corporation, possesses two kinds of powers:
governmental and public. In view of the dual character of municipal corporations, there
is no public reason for the presuming their total dissolution because of military
occupation or territorial cession. The present city is, in every legal sense, the successor
of the old. As such, it is entitled to the property and property rights of the predecessor
corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of its liabilities. All three of plaintiffs in error are
entitled to judgment.
MAIN POINT: The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily
dissolve the municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City
of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to
all property and property rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities.
Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city,
it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila
CASE NO. 45
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856
Facts: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the
accused adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he
cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that
time. In addition, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over
the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth, which was replaced already
by the Republic.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines
was then suspended.
RULING: No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to
the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the
sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which
governs a body politic or society which constitute the state).
MAIN POINT: Sovereignty is not abrogated (and thus the allegiance thereto is not
transferred) during belligerent occupation. This, the law on treason is still in effect during
such times.
CASE NO. 46
De Jure and De Facto Government
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 PHIL 113 (1945)
FACTS: Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case initiated during the Japanese
occupation with the CFI of Manila. After the liberation of the Manila and the American
occupation, respondent Judge Dizon refused to continue hearings, saying that a
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all
judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government organized by the Japanese is a de facto

government. Whether or not the MacArthur Proclamation invalidating “all laws,
regulations and processes” of the Occupation government is also applicable to judicial
decision.
RULING: Yes, the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established
by the military forces or occupation and therefore a de facto government. And no, it is
well-known principle of international law that all judgments and judicial proceedings
which are not of a political complexion of a de facto government remain good and valid
even after the occupied territory had come again into power of the titular sovereign.
Only legislative, constitutional and administrative processes are affected, and these are
the “processes” McArthur’s proclamation was construed to refer to.
MAIN POINT: International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and
civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. MacArthur annulled
proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings
because such a construction would violate the law of nations. Since the laws remain
valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
CASE NO. 47
De Jure and De Facto Government
In re Letter of Associate Justice Puno, 210 SCRA 588
Facts: Through a letter, the petitioner addressed to the Supreme Court about the
correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. He was first appointed as associate justice
of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of office on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was
reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. He was then appointed as appellate justice and later accepted an
appointment to be a deputy minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa
Revolution in Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government including
the judiciary. A Screening Committee was created. When Pres. Cory Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 33, the Screening Committee assigned the petitioner to rank no. 11
from being the assoc. justice of the NEW CA. However, the petitioner's ranking changed
from no. 11, he now ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority
ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order of Pres. Aquino. The court
en banc ranted Justice Puno's request. A motion for consideration was later filed by
Campos and Javelliano who were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that
the petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he had previously
been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would
negate any claim to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the
Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court which existing prior to Executive
Order No. 33.
RULING: The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or the IAC,
for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the
revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. A government as a
result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it is already accepted by the family
of nations or countries like the US, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. In the
new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the
Filipino power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice
Puno concerning his seniority ranking.
MAIN POINT: The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate
Court existing prior to E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by
the 1987 Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was established under E.O. No. 33 is
considered as an entirely new court.
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, Petitioners, vs.
ANGARA, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 118295, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts:
The Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of Trade
and
Industry Rizalino Navarro signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to
submit to its respective competent authorities the World Trade Organization (WTO)
approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures and to adopt the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
The members of the Philippine Senate concurs, in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
The President of the Philippines signed the Instrument of Ratification.
Issues:
The Petitioners seeks to nullify the WTO agreement, questioning the concurrence of the
Senate in the ratification of the agreement by the President of the Philippines.
The petitioners also believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National
Economy and against the Philippine economic sovereignty. The WTO opens access to
foreign markets, especially its major trading partners.
Ruling:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Supreme Court Ruled that the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of the
law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. Although the
constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.
Main Point: The constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national
economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the
international community.”
AGUSTIN, petitioner, v. HON. ROMEO F. EDU, et al, respondents.

G.R. No. L - 49112, 88 SCRA 195, February 2, 1979
Facts:
This case is a petition questioning the validity of the constitutionality of a Letter of

Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle
owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance
away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of
instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Memorandum
Circular Order No.32 directing the compliance thereof.
The petitioner alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order
are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal
protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.
Issues:
Whether the Letter of Instruction No. 229 issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
the subsequent Memorandum Circular Order No. 32 issued by The Land Transportation
Commissioner Romeo F. Edu is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition.
Petitioner’s contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may
interfere with personal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety, health and
prosperity of the State. In addition, such letter of instruction is intended to promote
public safety and it is indeed a rare occurrence that such contention was alleged in an
instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to present the factual
foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In cases where
there is absence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed that constitutionality
shall prevail. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals
and the United Nations Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for
the installation of road safety signs and devices.
Main Point: It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance, between the International law and municipal law in
applying the rule municipal law prevails.
JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC), petitioner, vs.
RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.
G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983
Facts:
The Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought
a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally starting from the
Luneta, to the gates of the United States Embassy, requesting for the Removal of All
Foreign Military Bases held in Manila. However, Respondent Mayor Ramon Bagatsing
denied the request in accordance with the recommendation of the police authorities due
to intelligence reports which affirms the plans of subversive/criminal elements to
infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or congregations. However, the latter suggested
that a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any
other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general
public may be ensured.
Issues:
Whether or not the denial of request of a public rally in the US Embassy is a violation of
constitutional guarantee to free speech and assembly.
Ruling:
Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the
implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law
that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of
access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an
individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent of clear and present
danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta and US Embassy as the place for
the peaceful rally. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Moreover,
denial of permit for a rally in front of the US Embassy is justified only in the presence of
a clear and present danger to life or property of the embassy.
Main Point: The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test.
The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does
not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief assured that they have taken all
the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied
yet because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius
(besides, there’s also the question of whether or not the mayor can prohibit such rally –
but, as noted by the SC, that has not been raised as an issue in this case).
TAÑADA, Petitioner vs. ANGARA, Respondent
G.R. No. 118295 , 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997
Facts:
The Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of Trade

and Industry Rizalino Navarro signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to
submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) to
seek approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures and to adopt the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
The members of the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which concur with the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization.
The President of the Philippines signed the Instrument of Ratification.
Issues:
The Petitioners questions the validity of Resolution No. 97. Whether or not ratifying the
WTO Agreement is constitutional or unconstitutional.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Supreme Court ruled
that Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. That the Senate, after deliberation and
voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it "a part of the law of the land" is a legitimate exercise of its power. We find no
"patent and gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or personal
hostility" in such exercise.
Main Point: In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all
nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own
laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken.
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

RONALDO ZAMORA, respondents.
G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
Facts:
The United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia
Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs
Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing
strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.
Negotiations by both panels on the Visiting forces agreement (VFA) led to a
consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and
negotiations that culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on
February 10, 1998.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of

Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA which was approved by the Senate, by a two - thirds
(2/3) vote.
Issues:
Was ratifying the VFA Unconstitutional?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting
the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of the
powers vested in him by the Constitution. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a
grave, patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the President in his
act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of
complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental law.
Main Point: President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a

prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. The President may not be
faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in
some patent, gross, and capricious manner.
BAYAN MUNA vs. ALBERTO ROMULO, respondents.

G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011
Ruling:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party - list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto
Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J.

Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement,
hereinafter) between the USA and the RP. The RP, represented by then DFA Secretary
Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy
Note adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the
Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as "persons " of the RP and US
from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals. It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense
partnership between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements
have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.
Issues:
The petitioners sought to void the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement ab initio, for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally
recognized principles of international law.
Rulling:
Petition is DISMISSED.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender
agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, "is an assertion by the
Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The agreement
is recognition of the primacy and competence of the country’s judiciary to try offenses
under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously."
Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape

criminal trial and punishment is manifestly incorrect.
Main Point: Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute
can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of
the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities
necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met.
ARTHUR D. LIM, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

respondents.
G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002
Facts:
The Petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise involving Filipino and
American troops commonly known as Balikatan. They were joined subsequently by
SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both Party-List organizations, who
filed a petition-in-intervention. Lim and Ersando filed suit in their capacities as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO, on the other hand, aver that certain
members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be
directly affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao.
Issues:
Whether or not the VFA is constitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. The VFA permits the US personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in

activities, the exact meaning of which was undefined. The permit under VFA grants US
personnel a wide scope of undertaking subject only to approval of the Philippine
Government. In general US personnel must abstain from any activities inconsistent with
the agreement, and in particular, from an political activities.
The Balikatan exercises are designed to maintain and develop the security relationship
between the two countries' armed forces through crisis-action planning, through
enhanced training to conduct counterterrorism operations, and through promoting
interoperability of the forces.
Main Point: US Armed Forces are prohibited from engaging war on the Philippine
territory. This limitation is explicitly provided for in the Terms of Reference of the
Balikatan exercise.
Shangri-La International Hotel Management, Ltd. (SLIHM), petitioner Vs. Developers

Group of Companies, Inc. (DGCI), respondent
G.R. No. 159938, March 31, 2006
Facts:
Respondent DEVELOPERS GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC. [DGCI] claims

ownership of the "Shangri-La" mark and "S" logo in the Philippines on the strength of its
prior use thereof within the country since May 1983. On the other hand, the Kuok family
owns and operates a chain of hotels with interest in hotels and hotel-related
transactions since 1969. As far back as 1962, it adopted the name "Shangri-La" as part
of the corporate names of all companies organized under the aegis of the Kuok Group
of Companies (the Kuok Group). The Kuok Group has used the name "Shangri-La" in
all Shangri-La hotels and hotel-related establishments around the world, which the Kuok
Family owned.
The petitioners filed with the BPTTT a petition, praying for the cancellation of the
registration of the "Shangri-La" mark and "S" logo issued to respondent DGCI on the
ground that the same were illegally and fraudulently obtained and appropriated for the
latter's restaurant business. They also filed in the same office praying for the registration
of the same mark and logo in their own names.
Issues:
Whether the petitioner rightfully claims the Shangri-La" mark and "S" logo in the
Philippines.
Ruling:
No. judgment is hereby in favor of respondent [DGCI].
Although Albeit the Kuok Group used the mark and logo since 1962, the evidence
presented shows that the bulk use of the tradename was abroad and not in the
Philippines (until 1987). Since the Kuok Group does not have proof of actual use in
commerce in the Philippines (in accordance with Section 2 of R.A. No. 166), it cannot
claim ownership of the mark and logo.
While the Paris Convention protects internationally known marks, R.A. No. 166 still
requires use in commerce in the Philippines.
Main Point: On the premise that international agreement must yield to a municipal law,
the question on the exclusive right over the mark and logo would still depend on actual
use in commerce in the Philippines.
CASE No. 58
ARTICLE II, Sec. 2. GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW
EQUAL STANDING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW
PHILIP MORRIS, INC., petitioners, vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,
respondent. [G.R. No. 158589, June 27, 2006]
Facts:
Petitioner Philip Morris, Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Virginia, United States of America is the registered owner of the trademark MARK VII
for cigarettes. Similarly, petitioner Benson & Hedges (Canada), Inc., a subsidiary of
Philip Morris, Inc., is the registered owner of the trademark MARK TEN for cigarettes.
On the other hand, respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation, a company organized in
the Philippines, manufactures and sells cigarettes using the trademark MARK.
Issues: Whether or not petitioners, as Philippine registrants of trademarks, are entitled

to enforce trademark rights in the country.
Ruling: No. Accordingly, and on the premise that international agreement must yield to
a municipal law, the question on the exclusive right over the mark and logo would still
depend on actual use in commerce in the Philippines. The fact that petitioner admit in
their Complaint that they are not doing business in the Philippines, hence, admitting that
their products are not being sold in the local market. It clearly gives the right to fortune
tabacco corporation the right to own the trademark since they are a company organized
in the Philippines.
MAIN POINT: The court ruled that while the Paris Convention protects internationally
known marks, R.A. No. 166 still requires use in commerce in the Philippines.
CASE No. 59
ARTICLE II, Sec. 2. GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
MIJARES, petitioner vs. RANADA, respondents [G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005]
Facts: Ten petitioners filed a case to the estate of the deceased former president
Ferdinand Marcos as the petitioners were violated of their human rights during his
regime. They suffered abuses such as detention, torture and rape. As a result, they
used the estate of to get monetary awards from the US District of Hawaii consisting of
$1,964,005,859.90 from the damages they incurred. Afterwards, the petitioners filed a
complaint to Makati RTC so that a final judgment can be enforced.
However, Marcos Estate contended that the PHP 410 filing fee was incorrectly
computed for they argue that the amount is too small to constitute damages amounting
to $2.25 billion. Makati RTC estimated the correct amount of filing fees of PHP472
despite petitioners claiming that an enforcement of a foreign deliberation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Issue: What provision, if any, then should apply in determining the filing fees for an
action to enforce a foreign judgment?
Ruling: A proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a foreign

judgment in this jurisdiction.
The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment have remained unchanged.
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a

foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In
case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the
title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title;
MAIN POINT: In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of
a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem
and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive
upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is
presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors
in interest by a subsequent title.
CASE NO. 0060

MILK CODE
PHARMACEUTICAL vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
FACTS: On October 1986, Executive Order No. 51 was issued by President Corazon
Aquino virtue of the Legislative Powers granted to the President under the Freedom
Constitution. Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules
and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O.51 (Milk Code). The WHA also adopted several
resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence the Court is not
convinced that the definition of "Milk Company" provided in the RIRR would bring about
any change in the treatment or regulation of "distributors" and "manufacturers" of breast
milk substitutes, as defined under the Milk Code. The petition is partially granted.
Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are
declared null and void for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents
are prohibited from implementing said provisions
ISSUE: Whether the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations issued by the
Department of Health is Constitutional
RULING: Yes. Since under the 1987 Constitution international law can become part of
the Domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. Treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be
transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. The ICMBS
and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of
the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot
be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.
MAIN POINT:
Legislation is necessary to transform the provision of the WHA Resolution into
domestic law.
CASE NO. 0061

TREATY OBLIGATION
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION
FACTS: Department of Justice had received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of
the United States a request for the extradition of Private respondent Mark Jimenez to
the. Since he committed a violation of conspiracy to commit offense, attempt to evade
tax, fraud by wire radio and television, false statement and election contribution in the
name of another. During the evaluation process of the extradition, the private
respondent requested the petitioner, Secretary of Justice to provide him copies of the
extradition request from the US government that he should be given ample time to
comment regarding the extradition request against him after he shall have received
copies of the request paper, and to suspend the proceedings in the meantime.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent Mark Jimenez is entitled to the basic rights of due
process over the government’s duties under treaty?
RULING: Yes. He will be entitled to all the rights accorded by the Constitution and the
laws to any person whose arrest is being sought. As between the Philippines and the
United States, it must be presumed that the contracting states perform their obligations
under it with uberrimae fidei, treaty obligations being essentially treated with mutual
respect. In the status of Jimenez, there is really no threat of any deprivation of his liberty
at the present stage of the extradition process. Hence, the constitutional right to due
process particularly the right to be heard finds no application. To grant Jimenez request
for copies of the extradition documents and for an opportunity to comment will constitute
"over-due process" and unnecessarily delay the proceedings.
MAIN POINTS: Treaty obligations are treated with mutual respect every citizen is
entitled with their rights.
CASE NO. 0062

TREADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
PHILIP MORRIS INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner Philip Morris, Inc., a corporation in State of Virginia, U.S.A, is the
registered owner of the trademark “MARK VII” for cigarettes. Fortune Tobacco
Corporation, who is the respondent is s a company organized in the Philippines,
manufactures and sells cigarettes using the trademark “MARK.” Petitioners had filed a
complaint against Fortune Tabacco Corp for Infringement of Trademark and Damages.
ISSUES: Whether respondent has committed trademark infringement against

petitioners by its use of the mark “MARK” for its cigarettes hence liable for damage
RULING: No. Since the striking dissimilarities are significant enough to warn any
purchaser that one is different from the other. This is upon considering the entire
markings. Since it lacks convincing proof on the part of the petitioners of actual use of
their registered trademark prior to respondents use of its mark and for petitioner’s failure
to demonstrate confusing similarity between said trademarks, the dismissal of their
basic complaint of infringement and the plea for damages are affirmed. The petition is
denied. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
MAIN POINT: International Agreements are honoured but subject to limitation in

Philippine Laws
CASE NO. 0063

FILIPINO COMFORT WOMEN
VINUYA vs. ROMULO
FACTS: Petitioners further argue that the Court has confused diplomatic protection
with the broader responsibility of states to protect the human rights of their citizens
hoping that the court reconsider its 2010 decision and declare that first rape, sexual
slavery, torture, and other forms of sexual violence committed against the Filipino
Women. The Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the
waiver if the claims of the Filipina Comfort Women against Japan is concerned. The
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort woman and that
petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
respondents. Petitioners also wish the court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and
the Executive Secretary to support the claims of Filipino Comfort women for an official
apology, legal compensation, and other forms of reparation from Japan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipino Comfort women for an official
apology, legal compensation, and other forms of reparation from Japan?
RULING: No. The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct
of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim
against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of
the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of
the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot
direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our
foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.
MAIN POINT: The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of
foreign relations by the Executive Department
CASE NO. 0064

ENHANCED DEFENCE COOPERATION AGREEMENT
SAGUISAG vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PQUITO OCHOA
FACTS: The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an executive

agreement that gives U.S. troops, planes and ships increased rotational presence in
Philippine military bases and allows the U.S. to build facilities to store fuel and
equipment there. President Benigno Aquino III ratified the same on June 2014. It was
not submitted to Congress on the understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.
Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the
constitutionality of the agreement. Herein petitioners now contend that it should have
been concurred by the senate as it is not an executive agreement. The Senate issued
Senate Resolution No. 105 expressing a strong sense that in order for EDCA to be valid
and binding, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence.
ISSUE: Whether ECDA is a treaty
RULING: ECDA is not a treaty despite the presence of the provisions. The very nature
of ECDA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably categorize it as executive
agreement. EA may dispense with the requirement of senate concurrence before of the
legal mandate with which they are concluded.
MAIN POINT: Executive agreement and does not need the Senate's concurrence.
CASE NO. 0065

ENHANCED DEFENCE COOPERATION AGREEMENT
BAYAN VS. DND SEC. GAZMIN
FACTS: The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an executive

agreement that gives U.S. troops, planes and ships increased rotational presence in
Philippine military bases and allows the U.S. to build facilities to store fuel and
equipment there .Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing
the constitutionality of the agreement. Herein petitioners now contend that it should
have been concurred by the senate as it is not an executive agreement. The Senate
issued Senate Resolution No. 105 expressing a strong sense that in order for EDCA to
be valid and binding, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and
concurrence.
ISSUE:Whether or not the EDCA between the Philippines and the U.S. is constitutional.
RULING: YES. The EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need the Senate's
concurrence. As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws and
treaties that it purports to implement.
MAIN POINT: Executive agreement and does not need the Senate's concurrence.
CASE NO. 0066

JOINT VISIBLE PATROL
IBP vs. ZAMORA
FACTS: Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
as commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, directed the AFP Chief
of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in Crime Prevention. The President declared
that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature. Subsequently, the IBP filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on
constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine Marines (the “Marines”) to join the Philippine National
Police (the “PNP”) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
ISSUES:
Whether the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the
civilian character of the PNP
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the President’s discretion in calling of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines is not subject to judicial review. The discretion
exercised by the president is a question of wisdom, and not the legality of law. There is
no provision under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution dealing with the revocation
or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places
the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners failed to
establish that the calling of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to be deployed in Metro
Manila for peacekeeping purposes was not without factual basis. There was escalating
crime and lawlessness in the city.
MAIN POINT: The discretion exercised by the president is a question of wisdom, and
not the legality of law.
CASE NO. 067

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
KULAYAN vs. TAN
FACTS:
Three member from the international Committee of the Red Cross were
kidnapped in the province of Patikul, Sulu . Sulu Crisis Committee was formed to
investigate the kidnapping incident under the leadership of the respondent
Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Tan declared state of
emergency where he called out AFP and Civilian Emergency Force to take actions
for public safety.Petioners filed Certiorary and Prohibition. Petitioners claim that the
Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces
under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own
private army.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor can exercise the calling out powers of the
President
RULING: No. Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed
with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the
assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a
state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own
Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he
is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation
of Section 465 of the Local Government Code, as will be discussed subsequently.
MAIN POINT: An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive,
is ultra vires
CASE NO. 0068

BILL OF RIGHTS
ALIH vs. CASTRO
FACTS:
Two hundred marine and defense forces raided the compound of the petitioners in
search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. Residents of the compound
were arrested, forced to get finger printed, paraffin tested and photograph despite
objections. The military confiscated their firearms, and several round of ammunition
found on the premises.Petitioners filed injunction suit with a prayer for the return of the
articles alleged to have been illegally seized.The respondents admitted the absence of
warrant during the operation but acted under superior orders. There was also the
suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace
and order problem generated by the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco.
ISSUES:
 Whether the confiscated items shall be considered admissible.
 Whether taking the photographs, fingerprints, paraffin test are violating the bill of
rights.
RULING: The items seized were considered inadmissible since the operation were
done without a warrant so the items confiscated will not be acknowledge in the court. As
to the issue of photographs, fingerprints, paraffin test is a violation of self-incrimination.
The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As
Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, The prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use.
MAIN POINT:
Illegal possession of evidence is not acknowledge in the court. It prohibits against self-
incrimination.
CASE NO. 0069

NATIONAL DEFENSE LAW
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TRANQUILINO LAGMAN
FACTS:
Tranquilino Lagman is charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth
Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. The appellant has already reached the
age of Twenty but refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of
April of 1936, notwithstanding the fact that he had been required to do so. The appellant
was notified to appear before the acceptance board to file his registration for military
service but failed to do so. Lagman argued that he did not registered in the military
service because he also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not
wish to kill or be killed. The appellant was sentenced by the court of first instance one
month and one day of imprisonment, with the cost.
ISSUE:
Whether the National Defense Law is constitutional
RULING:
Yes , The National Defense Law, established compulsory service does not go
against the constitutional provisions. Since the duty of the government to defend the
state is through the army. Appellant having dependent families to support cannot be an
excuse to comply with the duties provided in Section 2, Article II of the Philippine
Constitution. Nevertheless, The National Defense Law entitles him to secure an
allowance to attend his families needs.
MAIN POINT:
The defense of the state is a prime duty of government regardless of
circumstances.
CASE NO. 070, G.R. No. L-45892

ARTICLE II SEC. 4: DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE
People v. Primitivo De Sosa
FACTS: Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of
section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. Lagman
and De Sosa, both having reached the age of twenty by the year 1936 refused to
register in the military service between April 1st to 7th, 1936 even when they were
required to do so; Despite being notified by the corresponding authorities to appear
before the Acceptance Board to register in accordance with the law, the two defendants
still failed to register for military services in grounds that:
 Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and an eight year old
brother to support.
 Tranquilino Lagman has a father to support, has no military learnings, and
does not wish to kill or be killed.
ISSUE: Whether the National Defense Law is valid.
RULING: Yes, the National Defense Law is valid, Art.II Sec. 2 of the Constitution of the
Philippines states that:
The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty
all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.
Meaning, it is not against the constitutional provision that the defendants are subjected
to compulsory military service. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot
be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will
of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be
no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
MAIN POINT: The defendants, De Sosa and Lagman, are not excused from having to
register in Military Service as the National Defense Law is valid and is in faithful
compliance with Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines.
CASE NO. 071

ARTICLE II SEC. 4: DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE
Presidental Decree No. 1706, The National Service Law
 Presidential Decree No. 1706, otherwise known as the "National Service Law",
was signed by President Ferdinand Marcos on 8 August 1980.
 It made national service obligatory for all Filipino citizens and specified three
categories of national service: civic welfare service, law enforcement service
and military service.
 That in order to attain and preserve a just and orderly society, it is our duty to
vontribute to our county’s development and welfare and cooperate with the
authorities.
 That in order to fulfill the prime duty of depending the state, as is our
responsibility along with the government, we may be required by law to render
military or civil service.
 Commonwealth Act Number One males it obligatory for all citizens to render
military service.
 The citizens of our country, particularly its youth, as the most valuable resource
of our nation, need to be motivated, trained, developed, organized, mobilized
and utilized in regard to their responsibilities as citizens particularly their
commitment to civic welfare, their respect for the law and lawfully constituted
authorities and the fulfillment of their military or civil obligations
 Section 1. This Decree shall be known as "The National Service Law."
 Section 2. National service shall be obligatory for all citizens of the Philippines.
As used in this decree, "National service" shall consist of three main programs
namely: civic welfare service, law enforcement service; and military service.
 Section 3. Each citizen shall render national service in any of the three main
programs stated in Section 2 of this decree or a combination thereof: Provided,
That such service shall be credited in his favor for the purpose of fulfilling
educational requirements established by law.
 Section 4. The terms "military service" and "military training" referred to in
Commonwealth Act Number One, as amended, shall mean "national service"
and "training for national service", respectively, as herein defined.
 Section 5. The Minister of National Defense, in coordination with the Ministers
of Human Settlements, Education and Culture, and Local Government and
Community Development, shall issue rules and regulations to implement this
Decree, subject to the approval of the President.
 Section 6. All provisions of Commonwealth Act Number One, as amended,
laws, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with
this Decree are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
 Section 7. This Decree takes effect immediately.
CASE NO. 072, G.R. No. 118910

ARTICLE II SEC. 5: MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND ORDER
Kilosbayan v. Morato
FACTS: The PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation made a
“formal commitment not to ask for a reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case
and instead submit a new agreement that would be in conformity with the PCSO
Charter.
A new contract was entered into which the majority of the court finds has been purged
of the features which made the first contract objectionable. Moreover, what the PCSO
said in its manifestation in the first case was the following:
1. They are no longer filing a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of

this Honorable Court dated May 5, 1994, a copy of which was received on May 6,
1994.
2. Respondents PCSO and PGMC are presently negotiating a new lease
agreement consistent with the authority of PCSO under its charter (R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) and conformable with the pronouncements of
this Honorable Court in its Decision of May 5, 1995.
The PGMC made substantially the same manifestation as the PCSO.
It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are
assailing.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have standing?
RULING: No, The petitioners do not have a standing. The previous ruling sustaining the
petitioners standing is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest
because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing
lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are
assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of
contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise.
MAIN POINT: Since it is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude
determination of the petitioner's standing
CASE NO. 073, G.R. No. 187298

ARTICLE II SEC. 5: MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND ORDER
Kulayan v. Tan
FACTS:
Three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were
kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu on January 15, 2009.
These were:
 Andres Notter – a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga City.
 Eugenio Vagni – an Italian national and ICRC delegate.
 Marie Jean Lacaba – a Filipino engineer.
Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan, on March 31, 2009, issued Proclamation 1-09
declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Governor’s office distributed
copies of the Guidelines for the implementation of the proclamation declaring the state
of emergency on April 4, 2009.
ISSUE: Whether the proclaimed state of emergency in the province of Sulu is valid.
RULING: No, the state of emergency declared in the province of Sulu is invalid. Under
Article VII Sec. 1 which states that the executive power shall be vested in the President
of the Philippines. Therefore, the Governor does not have the power to implement the
state of emergency and that only the President has the authority as commander-in-chief
to do so.
MAIN POINT: The Governor has overstepped his authority upon declaring the state of
emergency; the President is the only one vested with such legal power.
CASE NO. 074, G.R. No. 171905

ARTCLE II SEC. 6: SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. v. Bradford United Church of
Christ, Inc.
FACTS: United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious

corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. Bradford
United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) is also a religious corporation. Disputes started
when BUCCI started constructing a fence that encroached upon the right of way
allocated by UCCP for CCI and Visayas jurisdiction. The dispute further increased after
Cebu Conference Judicial Commission rendered a decision in favor of CCI on April 7,
1990. This led to the disaffiliation of BUCCI from UCCP in a Church Council Resolution
on June 21, 1992.
Relief from civil courts was sought when the incident of disaffiliation occurred and after
failing to obtain a favorable judgment from the SEC and Court of Appeals, UCCP
questions if the determination of membership in UCCP is a purely ecclesiastical affair.
ISSUE: Whether the disaffiliation of BUCCI from UCCP is purely an ecclesiastical affair.
RULING: No, the disaffiliation of BUCCI from UCCP is not purely an ecclesiastical
affair. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A provides that Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision, and control
over all corporations. Even with their religious nature, SEC may exercise jurisdiction
over them in matters that are legal and corporate. UCCP and BUCCI are corporate
entities and are therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.
MAIN POINT: BUCCI and UCCP are both corporate entities meaning they are under
the jurisdiction of SEC therefore making the matter not purely ecclesiastical.
CASE NO. 075, G.R. No. 151445

ARTICLE II SEC. 7: INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POICY
Lim v. Executive Secretary
FACTS: Balikatan exercises are the largerst combined training operations involving
Filipino and American troops, these exercises support the Mutual Defense Treaty’s
(MDT) objective to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed
forces through joint training with its American counterparts. It is this treaty to which the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) adverts and the obligation thereunder which it seeks
to reaffirm, it is the VFA which gives continued relevance to MDT despite the passage
of years, its primary goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between
American and Philippine military forces in the event of an attack by a common foe,
under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition
for certiorari and and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.
ISSUE: Whether the Balikatan 02-1 is inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution.
RULING: No, the Balikatan 02-1 is not inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution.
Under the Terms of Reference of the Balikatan Exercise;
The Exercise shall be consistent with the Philippine Constitution and all its activities
shall be in consonance with the laws of the land and the provisions of the RP-US
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
MAINPOINT: The Balikatan 02-1 is in compatibility with our constitution and agrees with
the provisions of the VFA.
CASE NO. 076 & 077, G.R. No. 212426 & G.R. No. 212444
ARTICLE II SEC. 7: INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POICY
Saguisag v. ES & Bayan v. DND Sec. Gazmin
FACTS: Petitioners ask that the Honorable Court reconsider its decision dated January
12, 2016 and issue a new decision declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
(EDCA) unconstitutional and invalid. Petitioners claimed that the court made a mistake
when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty and moved that EDCA must be a treaty in
order to comply with the constitutional restriction.
EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been
authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA). Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) led
this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was well
within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.
ISSUE: Whether or not EDCA be considered unconstitutional

RULING: No, EDCA is not to be considered unconstitutional. There is no reason for
EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines' legal regime
through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued policy to
enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues
that may arise.
MAIN POINT: EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement, it remains

consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.
CASE NO. 078, G.R. No. 138570

ARTICLE II SEC. 8: FREEDOM FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Bayan v. Zamora
FACTS: Upon the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991 led to the
discussion of the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that led to a
consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and
negotiations that culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public
respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on
February 10, 1998.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of

Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.
On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443
recommending the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a
Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate,
by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-
numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18.
ISSUE: Whether the VFA violate the prohibition against nuclear weapons.
RULING: No, VFA does not violate the prohibition against nuclear weapons. Under the
Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 that the committees have submitted;
WHEREAS, by virtue of Article II of the VFA, the United States commits to respect the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines, including the Constitution, which declares in
Article II, Section 8 thereof, a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons consistent with
the national interest;
MAIN POINT: The United States conforms to our constitution and therefore follows thru
and abides by it.
CASE NO. 079, G.R. No. 47800

ARTICLE II SEC. 10: SOCIAL JUSTICE
Calalang v. Williams
FACTS: National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works and
to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30
p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; these rules and regulations were made to
promote safe transit on the national roads and avoid obstructions in the interest and
convenience of the public, this was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is a menace to public safety.
ISSUE: Whether the rules and regulations implemented by the Director of Public Works
promote social justice.
RULING: Yes, the rules and regulations implemented by the Director of Public works
promoted social justice. It is in connection with Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
548, given in the interest of public safety. The schedule for prohibition of animal-drawn
vehicles passing through certain areas was made to ensure that no accidents happen
due to congestion of traffic in the interest of public safety.
MAIN POINT: The rules and regulations implemented were made in the interest of
public safety and therefore promotes social justice.
80
Roe v. Wade
410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
Privacy of Abortion
Flores
Facts:
In 1969, a pregnant woman by the name of Norma McCorvey whom resided in Texas
had sought to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. During that time, abortion was only
legal in Texas by the means of saving a woman’s life. McCorvey had tried to attain an
illegal abortion but was unsuccessful. McCorvey had gain the interest of two Texas
attorneys who had wanted to test the anti-abortion laws. To conceal her identity,
McCorvey was identified as Jane Roe.
By 1970, Roe had brought a suit that had tested the anti-abortion statutes in Texas. The
suit was brought on the grounds that the pregnant woman had the constitutional right to
end her own pregnancy within the first trimester. The suit was filed against Henry Wade,
the district attorney of Dallas County and later on preceded to the Supreme Court.
Roe had mentioned that at that present time the abortion law had gone against the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The
Fourteenth Amendment allows the given right to privacy in regards to protecting a
women’s privacy to have the decision on whether or not to abort.
Issue:
Whether the prohibition of abortion denied Roe the rights of the Fourteenth Amendment
from the United States Constitution?
Ruling:
Yes, the prohibition of abortion for Jane Roe under the Texas’ anti-abortion statute
denied Roe’s rights to the Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due
Process of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no state can produce or enforce any
law that can diminish the privileges or protection of any citizen. All women have the right
to privacy towards their own pregnancy and have the right to make the decision to abort
or not to abort.
Main Point:
No state in the United States of America can choose the decision of abortion among
women. The women of the state have the right to choose the decision of abortion for
her.
81
Meyer v. Nebraska
262 U.S. 390 107 Neb. 657, reversed
Prohibition of teaching children any language except the English language
Flores
Facts:
Meyer whom was a resident of Nebraska was convicted of violation of Nebraska’s
statute. In accordance to an act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the
State of Nebraska that was approved on April 9,1919, Section One states that no
person, as individual or as a teacher in an educational institute such as a private,
denominational, parochial or public school of any modern language besides the English
language. Section Two states that languages other than the English language are
allowed to be taught as language only if those who are taught has attained and
successfully passed the eighth grade which is proven through the provision of the
certificate of graduation issued by the county superintendent from where the child
resides. The law was passed by the legislature in regards that German immigrants in
Nebraska will not be able to learn English first and may not be able to adapt to a
Nebraskan way of living and go forth towards an allegiance towards Germany.
Meyer had violated the Nebraska’s statue through teaching children among the age of
ten years old German in a parochial school. Meyer was caught in violation of the
Nebraska statute through the possession of a bible study book that was written in the
German language. Meyer had claimed that he had sought this as his obligation and duty
to teach the children their religious history through the German language.
Issue:
Whether Nebraska’s statute denied the right of liberty with accordance to the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled this case unconstitutional through the violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment through the limitation of teachers and parents to teach what he
or she may think is appropriate in terms of language learning.
Main Point:
Any state of the United States of America should not limit the ability to learn any
language provided that the main language of the state is the English language.
82
Pierce v. Society of Sisters
268 U.S. 510
Parental jurisdiction of choosing education for their children
Flores
Facts:
The case dealt with the United States of America’s Supreme Court handling an Oregon
Law (1925) that had been supported by the KKK (Ku Klux Klan). The Oregon law had
sought to eliminate any private school with a direct aim towards Catholic schools. The
Oregon law was to be distinguished as an anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant law with the
initiative to rid all private schools under the assumption that through attendance of
private schooling students would become indoctrinate students possessing anti-
American Values.
Issue:
The removal of parental jurisdiction of choosing their children school through the
issuance of the Oregon Law.
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court had ruled that the usage of issuance of the Oregon Law (1925)
to be unconstitutional based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
which indicates the protection towards civil liberties. The civil liberties within this case
were applicable to the jurisdiction of parents choosing education for their children.
Main Point:
The state of Oregon provides authority to the parents and guardians on the upbringing
and education of their own children.
83
40 LW 4476
Wisconsin v. Yoder
Amish parents opposing the attendance of secondary education for its children
Flores
Facts:
The respondent Jonas Yoder was convicted with the violation of the Wisconsin’s
compulsory school attendance law that requires a child to attend school until the age of
sixteen. Yoder was in violation of said law through declining to send children to any
public or private school once the child has graduated from the eighth grade. The
evidence of Yoder has shown that as Amish children are continuing informal vocational
education for the purpose of preparation of life in the rural Amish community. An
inclusion to the evidence would be that the Amish religion and lifestyle sought that
attendance in high school for children would endanger the child’s and parent’s salvation.
The State of Wisconsin has claimed to oppose the Respondent on grounds of parens
patriae, to accept the benefit of a secondary education to children regardless to the
parent’s wishes. Through the attendance of a secondary education there would be no
impairment on the child’s physical and mental health, or not be capable to be self-
supported or to not take part of duties and responsibilities in regards to their citizenship,
or even interfere from the welfare of society.
Issue:
Whether the Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law may have been in violation
of the First Amendment by criminalizing parents who oppose the attendance of a
secondary education?
Ruling:
Yes, the Court has found that the case is unconstitutional on the grounds of the First
Amendment which emphasized the freedom of religion. In return this outweighed the
State’s law of requiring children to attain a secondary education. The Court had seen
that the requirements within a secondary education may contradict the Amish way of
life.
Main Point:
Freedom of Religion under the First Amendment is a major contributor to a child’s

learning and therefore should be taken under strong consideration.
84
390 U.S. 629

Ginsberg v. New York
Obscene material purchases by minors
Flores
Facts:
Sam Ginsberg and his wife had operated a business called Sam’s Stationary and
Luncheonette located in Bellmore on Long Island in New York. Within the facility of
Ginsberg’s business, a lunch counter had become the place in which minors (children
under the age of seventeen) were able to obtain the purchase of obscene material such
as girlie magazines.
On October 18, 1965 one customer at the age of sixteen years old had purchased two
adult magazines entitled Sir and Mr Annual which was planned by the boy’s parents
under the motive to lay grounds for Ginsberg’s prosecution. On October 26, 1965 the
same minor was sold two more adult magazines which were then instigated by a police
officer.
Issue:
Whether the sales of obscene material to minors was a justifiable act under said
business?
Ruling:
No, the Nassau County District Court had ruled that this case was unconstitutional
based from the selling of obscene material among minors was prohibited under Section
484-h of New York’s Penal Law. Ginsberg’s action had violated two counts of Section
484-h which stated that under Section 484-h of New York’s Penal Law prohibits the
selling to individuals less than seventeen years old (1) pictures in regards to nudity or
sexual conduct or (2) literature accounts involving narrative or sexual excitement, if
these materials have been harmful to minors. Harmful to minors in accounts that the
description or representations on sexual excitement, nudity, sexual conduct or
sadomasochistic abuse appear 1) for the most part shameful, prurient, or morbid
towards the interest of the minors, 2) clearly offensive towards the presentation of the
standards within the adult community and 3) does not provide social importance for
minors.
Main Point:
The existence of obscene material should not be attainable to minors on the grounds
that involvement with such material can provide a misinterpretation towards the doings
and motives of adults.
85
GR 190779
Orceo v. COMELEC
Airsoft guns under the term firearm during the election period
Flores
Facts:
Section 2 of Resolution No. 8714 the term firearm has an inclusion on air guns and
airsoft guns alongside their replicas or imitations due to the presence of these objects
would appear to ordinary persons as a real fire arm. The usages of these objects have
been postponed in the gun band from January 10, 2010 to June 9, 2010.
The Petitioner Attorney Reynante B. Orceo had claimed he is a real party-in-interest
due to avidly playing airsoft ever since 2000. The continuance of the implementation of
Resolution No. 8714 can place Orceo in danger of sustaining direct injury or leave him
liable to election offense when caught in possession of an airsoft gun alongside its
replica or imitation during the time of going to and from the game site and playing the
sport within the duration of the election period.
The Petitioner had argued that COMELEC had abused their judgement towards the
lacking or excess jurisdiction in the inclusion of airsoft guns and its replicas or imitations
towards the definition of firearm as mentioned in Resolution No. 8714 in regards to R.A.
No. 7166 not mention anything in regards to airsoft guns and its replicas or imitations.
The Petitioner asserts that on the basis of R.A. No. 7166 the term firearm is only
associated to real firearm in condition to it being common and ordinary usage alongside
the support of the Senate deliberation on the bill which stated that any unauthorized
persons caught in possession of a firearm in the duration of the elections would be
found guilty of an election offense under Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abuse its judgement on the inclusion of airsoft guns
and its replicas or imitations in defining fire arm in accordance to Section 2 (b) of R.A.
No. 8714.
Ruling:
No, the Court has ruled constitutional on the basis that the COMELEC did not gravely
abuse the case and repeated the original definition of the term firearm is associated with
airsoft guns.
Main Point:
All objects that may appear as a firearm such as the airsoft gun should be prohibited
from any usage and appearance due to ordinary persons interpreting said object as a
firearm.
86
GR 204819
Imbong v. Ochoa
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
Flores
Facts:
The Philippine Nation has conflicts towards population growth control, contraceptives
and abortion. From these unsolved conflicts Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354 known
as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 on December 21,
2012.
Petitioners James M. Imbong and Lovely-Ann C. Imbong have petitioned against R.A.
No. 10354 on the grounds of:1) violation on the right to life for an unborn due to the
authorization of purchasing hormonal contraceptives, injectable and intra-uterine
devices that violates Section 12 Article II of the Constitution from protection of both the
mother and the unborn from conception; 2) violation of the right to health and the right
for protection from hazardous products such as the contraceptives provided through the
RH Law that could cause potential cancer and other health problems;3) violation of
religious freedom through the RH law respecting religion in order to obtain public funds
for the retrieval of contraceptives; 4) violation on constitutional provision on involuntary
servitude in which the medical practitioners would comply involuntary servitude in order
to be accredited by PHILHealth;5) violation of the right to equal protection through
discriminating the poor; 6) violation of due process clause of the constitution since
indicating penalty but not establishing the actions that would result to penalty; 7)
violation of the right to free speech through establishing a family planning requirement;
8) violation of one subject under Section 26(I) Article VI of the Constitution; 9) violation
of the Natural Law; and 9) violation of the principles of LGUs and ARMM.
Issue:
Whether the involvement of R.A. No. 10354 known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health had to be a requirement in regards to all family planning?
Ruling:
No, the Court had issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) which allowed the concept
of family planning to be chosen by the family themselves under the provision of R.A. No.
9710 that had brought provisions of comprehensive health services and programs such
as family planning and sex education.
Main Point:
Although population growth control, contraceptives and abortion is a growing concern
the final arrangement of family planning should reside to the families.
87
GR 190779
Orceo v. COMELEC
Airsoft guns under the term firearm during the election period
Flores
Facts:
Section 2 of Resolution No. 8714 the term firearm has an inclusion on air guns and
airsoft guns alongside their replicas or imitations due to the presence of these objects
would appear to ordinary persons as a real fire arm. The usages of these objects have
been postponed in the gun band from January 10, 2010 to June 9, 2010.
The Petitioner Attorney Reynante B. Orceo had claimed he is a real party-in-interest
due to avidly playing airsoft ever since 2000. The continuance of the implementation of
Resolution No. 8714 can place Orceo in danger of sustaining direct injury or leave him
liable to election offense when caught in possession of an airsoft gun alongside its
replica or imitation during the time of going to and from the game site and playing the
sport within the duration of the election period.
The Petitioner had argued that COMELEC had abused their judgement towards the
lacking or excess jurisdiction in the inclusion of airsoft guns and its replicas or imitations
towards the definition of firearm as mentioned in Resolution No. 8714 in regards to R.A.
No. 7166 not mention anything in regards to airsoft guns and its replicas or imitations.
The Petitioner asserts that on the basis of R.A. No. 7166 the term firearm is only
associated to real firearm in condition to it being common and ordinary usage alongside
the support of the Senate deliberation on the bill which stated that any unauthorized
persons caught in possession of a firearm in the duration of the elections would be
found guilty of an election offense under Section 261(q) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abuse its judgement on the inclusion of airsoft guns
and its replicas or imitations in defining fire arm in accordance to Section 2 (b) of R.A.
No. 8714.
Ruling:
No, the Court has ruled constitutional on the basis that the COMELEC did not gravely
abuse the case and repeated the original definition of the term firearm is associated with
airsoft guns.
Main Point:
All objects that may appear as a firearm such as the airsoft gun should be prohibited
from any usage and appearance due to ordinary persons interpreting said object as a
firearm.
88
197 SCRA 252
Basco v. PAGCOR
Petition against a Government agency or instrumentality
Flores
Facts:
The Petitioners Attorneys Humberto Basco, Edilberto Balce, Socrates Maranan and
Lorenzo Sanchez had filed an instant petition under the motive to declare the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869 invalid based on
opposing morals, orders and public policies as well as:
A. Inclusion of a waiver of a right with a third person and waived the Manila City
Government’s right to demand taxes and license fees, both recognized by law.
B. The right for the government to demand taxes and license fees conflicts the
constitutionally enshrined principle for local autonomy.
C. Violation of the equal protection clause through the conduction of gambling by
which most forms of gambling are to be considered outlawed.
D. Violation of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy
going for free enterprise and privatization.
The Petitioner’s second amended petition claimed that PD 1869 opposed the national
policy of the new restored democracy as well as people’s will in reference to the 1987
Constitution. The motive behind the second amended petition was the involvement of a
gambling objective.
Issue:
Whether the PD 1869 could be terminated based on the Petitioners’ grounds.
Ruling:
No, the Court has found that the Petitioners’ behaviour towards PD 1869 is ruled as
unconstitutional for the petition was dismissed for the lack of merit. Based from the
petitioner’s grounds, the court has ruled that 1) only the National Government may have
the jurisdiction on issuance of licences or permits for gambling purposes; 2) PAGCOR
has two roles which are to operate and regulate gambling casinos which is then
categorized as an agency or instrumentality of the Government. PAGCOR being an
instrumentality would be exempted from paying local taxes; 3) PD 1869 is in no violation
of the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution; and 4) the Petitioners have ignored
the meaning of the clause, “equal protection of the laws”.
Main Point:
As petitioners, do not further petition Government agencies or instrumentalities under
the basis of violation of laws unless the transparency of the agency or the
instrumentality behaviour is clearly not law abiding.
89
GR 177131
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA
Separation of Boy Scouts of the Philippines from the COA\
Flores
Facts:
The Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) whom are the petitioner of this case had filed
against the respondent COA (Commission on Audit), for the jurisdiction of the BSP filed
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The petition stated the BSP had sought for
the COA to terminate the implementation of its June 18, 2002 Decision, its Februrary
21, 2007 Resolution, and including other arising issuance, to where all mentioned would
be considered as null and void.
The origins of the case dated back to August 19, 1999 where the COA issued
Resolution No. 99-0115 entitled the COA Resolution, the subject matter was on the
"Defining the Commission’s policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines”. In the clauses of the subject matter the BSP was now referred as a
government controlled corporation in accordance to the Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the
Constitution. BSP was then distinguished as a government instrumentality under the
1987 Administrative Code.
The petitioner BSP had reconsidered the COA Resolution through a letter on November
26, 1999 that was signed by the BSP National President Jejomar C. Binay. The letter
expressed BSP should no longer be in the jurisdiction of the COA under the grounds
that the ruling of the case Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al. (G.R. No. 80767) that the classification of the BSP as a government
controlled operation was firmly fixed by the “substantial Government participation” within
the National Executive Board of the BSP. The petitioner had requested 1) the removal
of the President of the Philippines and other executive secretaries except the Secretary
of Education 2) the removal of the power of the President of the Philippines as Chief
Scout over the BSP members. The BSP had referred to R.A. No. 7278 which indicated
the alteration of the composition for the National Executive Board of the BSP.
Issue:
Whether the legal separation of the BSP from COA would be referred as a government
controlled corporation?
Ruling:
No, the Court has ruled that the legal separation of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines
from the COA as a government controlled corporation is not called for. It is however
considered for BSP to be a public corporation with the COA still remaining its function.
Main Point:
The separation of an original government agency from the government is uncalled for.
Case No.: 90
Topic: Health
Case Title: Imbong v. Ochoa
Facts: James M. Imbong and Lovely-Ann C. Imbong issued a petition against Paquito
N. Ochoa, Jr. upon the legislated R.A. No. 10354 (RH Law) and its enactment has
introduced family planning, contraceptives, women’s health and reproductive health
education, especially to the poor and marginalized communities. The petitioners
castigate its constitutionality on the grounds of violating the following: (a) Right to Life;
as it violates the protection of the life of the unborn from conception, (b) Right to Health;
as availability of purchasing contraceptives may be detrimental, (c) Freedom of
Religion; as it violates the ability to practice according to one’s belief, (d) Involuntary
Servitude; as it violates the free will of medical practitioners, (e) Equal Protection
Clause; as it discriminates against the poor, (f) Due Process Clause; as it suffers from
“vagueness” and unclear words, (g) The Family; as it violates the privacy of the basic
social institution of the State
Issue: Whether the RH Law can be considered unconstitutional.
Ruling: No, the RH Law is not unconstitutional. First, the right to life has not been
violated as conception would refer to “fertilization” and contraceptives would prevent
such fertilization from occurring. Second, the right to health has not been violated as
contraceptives are checked before being issued by a qualified medical practitioner.
Third, freedom of religion has not been violated as the RH Law can be enforced even if
it is against the petitioner’s belief due to the Establishment Clause. Fourth, involuntary
servitude has not been violated as the accreditation of medical practitioners is a
privilege issued the government. Fifth, equal protection clause has not been violated as
the RH Law prioritizes couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children and those who do not have those service readily available to them. Sixth, the
due process clause has not been violated as “private health care service providers” and
“private health care institutions” are synonymous to each other. Lastly, the family has
not been violated as parents are free on whether to accept or reject the information on
family planning and apply or not apply it to their families.
Main Point: The RH Law is not a law constricted to the function of reducing population
or other extremes but instead, it is an extension and stricter implementation of the
existing laws centred on contraceptives and reproduction.
Case No.: 91
Topic: Environment
Case Title: Oposa v. Factoran
Facts: Juan, Anna and Jose Oposa issued a petition against the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Fulgencio S. Factorian for
issuing TLAs (Timber License Agreement) to corporations, covering 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging. The petitioners asserted that such issuance violated
their right to a "balanced and healthful ecology" stated in Article II, Section 16 of the
Philippine Constitution.
Issue: Whether the issuance of TLAs is unconstitutional.
Ruling: Yes, the issuance of TLAs is unconstitutional. The act violates the petitioners'
right to a “balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature” as stated in the Constitution and is supported by the Book IV, Title XIV, and
Section 1 of the 1987 Administrative Code “….consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of
such natural resources equitably assessable to the different segments of the present as
well as future generations”.
Main Point: The present generation as well as the generations unborn has the
unalienable responsibility to see to a “balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature”.
Case No.: 92
Topic: Environment
Case Title: Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals
Facts: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) issued two petitions (1994 and
1995) for the jurisdiction of Laguna Lake due to the two questionable acts committed by
the Local Government of Caloocan: (a) First, they operated an 8.6 hectare open
garbage dumpsite, thereby effectively polluting the water and, (b) Second, they issued
fishing privileges and fish pen permits, resulting in numerous unregulated fish pens.
Issue: Whether Laguna Lake Development Authority has the jurisdiction over Laguna
Lake.
Ruling: Yes, the Laguna Lake Development Authority has the jurisdiction to see to the
“development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces, cities and towns” as stated in Section I of the RA No. 4850.
Main Point: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)’s sole purpose is “to carry
out the development of Laguna Lake” to which it is given the jurisdiction to act upon that
purpose.
Case No.: 93
Topic: Environment
Case Title: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Residents of Manila Bay
Facts: The residents of Manila Bay issued a petition against the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) for the poor water quality of Manila Bay. The MMDA,
however, disputed that cleaning and rehabilitating the waters of Manila Bay was not part
of their ministerial duties and they cannot be forced – even with the issuance of a
mandamus.
Issue: Whether the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority is required to clean and
rehabilitate the waters of Manila Bay by mandamus.
Ruling: Yes, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority is compelled by mandamus

to clean Manila Bay. According to the MMDA’s charter, RA 9003 and PD 1152 of the
Environmental Code, they are responsible for the proper solid waste disposal,
rehabilitation, protection and preservation of Manila Bay and denying their obligation
would be to act against the law.
Main Point: The role of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority is to respond to
cases of proper solid waste disposal and act upon it as it is their duty.
Case No.: 94
Topic: Environment
Case Title: Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan
Facts: The Boracay Foundation, Inc. issued a petition against the Province of Aklan for
the inappropriate construction of a restoration and rehabilitation project in Barangay
Caticlan and Manoc-manoc. While citing the lack of permits, insufficient forms,
unapproved updates, they also reasoned about lack of public consultation at the start of
the project.
Issue: Whether the Province of Aklan complied with all the needed requirements for the
construction of their project.
Ruling: No, the Province of Aklan did not submit the needed requirements and is in
direct violation with Article II, Section 16 and Section 17 of the Philippine Constitution as
well as Section 4 of the PD No. 957. The construction of the restoration and
rehabilitation project becomes unlawful without the permission that is needed by
government authorities, leaving the public unsuspecting of the changes and possible
occurrence of pollution in their area.
Main Point: The establishment of any project or program will be considered illegal when
there is a lack of the appropriate documents and proper consultation with the parties
affected by it.
Case No.: 95
Topic: Timber License Agreement (TLA)
Case Title: C&M Timber v. Alcala
Facts: C&M Timber Corporation issued a petition against the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Angel C. Alcala, to null the no-
force-and-effect TLA (Timber License Agreement) No. 106, in order to request for their
TLA license. The petitioner denies the claim of “mediocre performance” in reforestation
and that to deny its petition would be in violation of due process of law.
Issue: Whether the nullification of the TLAs can be considered unconstitutional.
Ruling: No, it cannot be considered unconstitutional to nullify the TLA as there was no
presence of breaching the due process of law of the C&M Timber Corporation.
Documents such as licenses and permits are granted as privileges by the government
and can be revoked when the individual or establishment is no longer qualified or if
national interest calls for amendment, instatement, modification or removal.
Main Point: The important documents issued by the Government are considered
privileges to civilians, and they can also be taken away in the interest of the country.
Case No.: 96
Topic: Environment
Case Title: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Residents of Manila Bay
Facts: The residents of Manila Bay issued a petition against the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) for the poor water quality of Manila Bay. The MMDA,
however, disputed that cleaning and rehabilitating the waters of Manila Bay was not part
of their ministerial duties and they cannot be forced – even with the issuance of a
mandamus.
Issue: Whether the MMDA is required to clean and rehabilitate the waters of Manila Bay
by mandamus.
Ruling: Yes, the MMDA is compelled by mandamus to clean Manila Bay. According to
the MMDA’s charter, RA 9003 and PD 1152 of the Environmental Code, they are
responsible for the proper solid waste disposal, rehabilitation, protection and
preservation of Manila Bay and denying their obligation would be to act against the law.
Main Point: The role of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority is to respond to
cases of proper solid waste disposal and act upon it as it is their duty.
Case No.: 97
Topic: Environment
Case Title: Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan
Facts: The Boracay Foundation, Inc. issued a petition against the Province of Aklan for
the inappropriate construction of a restoration and rehabilitation project in Barangay
Caticlan and Manoc-manoc. While citing the lack of permits, insufficient forms,
unapproved updates, they also reasoned about lack of public consultation at the start of
the project.
Issue: Whether the Province of Aklan complied with all the needed requirements for the
construction of their project.
Ruling: No, the Province of Aklan did not submit the needed requirements and is in
direct violation with Article II, Section 16 and Section 17 of the Philippine Constitution as
well as Section 4 of the PD No. 957. The construction of the restoration and
rehabilitation project becomes unlawful without the permission that is needed by
government authorities, leaving the public unsuspecting of the changes and possible
occurrence of pollution in their area.
Main Point: The establishment of any project or program will be considered illegal when
there is a lack of the appropriate documents and proper consultation with the parties
affected by it.
Case No.: 98
Topic: Environment
Case Title: Paje V. Casino
Facts: Teodoro A. Casino issued a petition against Secretary of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Ramon Jesus P. Paje for plans to build a
coal power plant in Subic. He argued that there was no need to construct a coal power
plant as an energy source when there are cleaner and safer alternatives of power
present.
Issue: Whether the ecological right of the petitioner was violated by the construction of
the coal power plant.
Ruling: No, the ecological right of the petitioner was violated in any way and the Court
stated that RP Energy did not begin the construction of the power plant and has not
caused any recent environmental damage to the area.
Main Point: The petition is premature and does not have enough evidence to prove that
the construction of the coal power plant is against the law.
Case No.: 99
Topic: Environment
Case Title: International Service V. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
Facts: The Greenpeace Southeast Asia issued a petition against as the International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. for violating their right to
health and ecological imbalance by introducing genetically modified food products.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia also argued there is a lack of scientific studies stating that
the Bt gene used in the product is safe for human consumption and the environment.
The respondent responded that they had followed all the conditions and requirements of
law and that there is no evidence that the Bt gene has caused any harm to the health of
an individual or the individual’s environment.
Issue: Whether genetically modified food products violate the petitioner’s right to health
and a balanced ecological environment.
Ruling: Yes, bioengineered food products violates the right to health and balanced
ecological environment as stated in Article II, Section 16 of the Philippine Constitution,
“The State shall protect and promote the right of the people and instil health
consciousness among them”. The Court recognizes the great scientific discoveries that
go with it; however, they cannot allow the supply of genetically modified food when the
side effects of consuming and growing it have yet to be found.
Main Point: The Court cannot disregard the unknown effects of bioengineered food
products towards human consumption and the environment.
JUMDAIN, ALCAFF AGGA

JD I
CONSTI I
CASE DIGEST
100. WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309,
Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all
agricultural entities within Davao City. The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
Association, Inc., and two of its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and
Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation, filed their petition in the RTC to
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance. They alleged that the ordinance
exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection
clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked
publication pursuant to Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160
ISSUES:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive and an invalid exercise of
police power in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao
City.
RULING: Yes. Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause. In order to
declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable. In the State's exercise of police
power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the Government. A local government unit is considered to
have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to
wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive. The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Ordinance No.
0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause. Equal treatment neither requires
universal application of laws to all persons or things without distinction, nor intends to
prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which
it is to operate. In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial
distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class. The petitioners correctly
argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein. Under the rational
basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the
purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against
aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable
classification includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose
of the law.
101. VICTORIA SEGOVIA v. CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION GR No. 211010, Mar

07, 2017
FACTS: Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the
Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. This body
was reorganized through EO 774, which designated the President as Chairperson, and
cabinet secretaries as members of the Task Force. EO 774 expressed what is now
referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing Principle." Later that same year,
Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change Commission
which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead policy-making body of
the government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs
and action plans of the government relating to climate change. Herein petitioners wrote
respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road Sharing Principle,
demanding the reform of the road and transportation system in the whole country within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the said letter-foremost, through the bifurcation of roads
and the reduction of official and government fuel consumption by fifty percent
(50%). Claiming to have not received a response, they filed this petition. Petitioners are
Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in tum
represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if
good public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable".
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition.
RULING: No. Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (RPEC), respondents argue that the petitioners failed to show that they have the
requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather amorphous sector
of society and without a concrete interest or injury. Petitioners counter that they filed the
suit as citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that the rules on standing had been
relaxed following the decision in Oposa v. Factoran; and that, in any event, legal
standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion.
102. WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION v. FIRST PHILIPPINE
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, GR No. 194239, 2015-06-16
FACTS: First Philippine Industrial Corporation (FPIC) operates two pipelines since
1969, (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System and (b) the Black Oil. In May 2010, a
leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower
Condominium (WestTower). On July 10, 2010 within the condominium premises led to
the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its inability to
control the flow, WestTower’s management reported the matter to the Police
Department of Makati City, which in turn called the city’s Bureau of Fire Protection. On
November 15, 2010, West Tower Corp. interposed the present Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of
the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. On November 19,
2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of
Directors to file their respective verified returns. The TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to:
(a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further orders; (b) check the
structural integrity of the whole span of the 117-kilometer WOPL while implementing
sufficient measures to prevent and avert any untoward incident that may result from any
leak of the pipeline; and (c) make a report thereon within 60 days from receipt thereof.
ISSUE: Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to
direct the respondents to perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect,
preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment.
RULING: No. To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the
November 19, 2010 TEPO into a Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PEPO)
pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. For its
part, respondent FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are
already in place, will sufficiently address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL. The
CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and
insufficient for purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence,
considering the necessary caution and level of assurance required to ensure that the
WOPL system is free from leaks and is safe for commercial operation, the CA
recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is already
safe for commercial operation. This certification, according to the CA, was to be issued
with due consideration of the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection
systems to monitor sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need to replace portions of the
pipes with existing patches and sleeves. Sans the required certification, use of the
WOPL shall remain abated.
103. PILAR CAÑEDA BRAGA v. JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA GR No. 223076, Sep 13,
2016
FACTS: The Port of Davao is a seaport located in Mindanao. It is compose of several

ports, all within the gulf of Davao, but its base port is the Sasa Wharf located at
Barangay Sasa, Davao City. In 2011, the Sasa Wharf was pegged for privatization
under the PPP scheme. The DOTC study served as one of the primary considerations
for current Sasa Wharf expansion period. On December 21, 2014, the Regional
Development Council for Region XI endorsed the project through Resolution No. 118
subject to conditions. On April 15, 2015, the DOTC published an invitation to pre-qualify
and bid for the Project. On March 15, 2016, the petitioners – all stakeholders from
Davao City and Samal, Davao del Norte – filed this Urgent Petition for a Writ of
Continuing Mandamus and/or Writ of Kalikasan. The Petitioner seeks to restrain the
implementation of the Project – including its bidding and award – until the respondents
secure an ECC and comply with the LGC. The respondents, through the (Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) argue that the allegations do not warrant the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan because the petitioners failed to prove the threat of environmental damage
of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition warrant a Writ of Kalikasan.
RULING: No. The court cannot issue a writ of kalikasan based on the petition. The writ
is a remedy to anyone whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
violated or threatened with violation by an lawful act or omission. However, the violation
must involve environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health,
or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces in order to arrant the
issuance of the writ. The petitioners allege that the respondents have begun the
process of transgressing their right to health and a balanced ecology through the bidiing
process. They cite The Competitiveness of Global Port-Cities: Synthesis Report to
identify the four major negative impacts related to port operations; 1) environmental
impacts, 2) land use impacts, 3) traffic impacts, and 4) other impacts. The synthesis
report claims that most of these impacts affect the surrounding localities.
104. Republic v. Court of Appeals and RRZC, November 25, 1998
FACTS: RA No. 1899 which was approved on June 22, 1957 authorized the reclamation
of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. Invoking RA 1899, the Pasay
City passed Ordinance No. 121 for the reclamation of 300 hectares of foreshore lands
along the seaside in Pasay City. The Ordinance was amended authorizing Republic
Real Estate Corporation (RREC) to reclaim foreshore lands in Pasay City under certain
terms and conditions. Republic of the Philippines (RP) filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Damages questioning subject Agreement between Pasay City and
RREC on the grounds that the subject matter of such Agreement was executed without
any public bidding. It alleged that what Pasay City has are submerged of offshore areas
outside the commerce of man which could not be proper subject matter of Agreement
between Pasay City and RREC in question as the area affected is within the National
Park, known as Manila Bay Beach Resort, established under Proclamation No. 41,
dated July 5, 1954, pursuant to Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has been in
open, continuous and peaceful possession since time immemorial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance passed by Pasay City is Valid.
RULING: No. Foreshore land does not include submerged areas. Foreshore lands refer
to the strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately
wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The duty of the court is to interpret the
enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen
the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it
should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the
exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands”. The subject matter of
Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement
under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
therefore ultra vires and null and void.
105. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Del Rio 131 SCRA 532 (1984)
FACTS: The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the shores of
Laguna de Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio. After the death of
Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The private oppositors in
this case sought and obtained permission from Santos Del Rioto construct duck houses
on said land. The private oppositors, however, violated their agreement and instead
constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit against the
private oppositors and later on sought to register the land. Meanwhile, private
oppositors simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with Bureau of Lands,
and they opposed Santos del Rio’s application for registration. The CFI of Laguna
dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favourable
judgment from the Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors
filed their respective petitions for review on said decision to the Supreme Court. The
Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is covered with water four to
five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it
cannot be the subject of registration.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and
2. Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.
RULING: The court says that inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and
reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land
and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant
proves that he has a registerable title. The purpose of land registration under the
Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which
applicant already possesses over the land. While it is true that by themselves tax
receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Applicant
by himself and through his father before him has been in open, continuous, public,
peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than thirty
(30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts. Applicant has more
than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his
favor of said land.
106. Resident Marine Mammals vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015
FACTS: On 13 June 2012, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the
Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration
Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX). The
studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and
magnetic data. Geophysical and satellite surveys as well as oil and gas sampling in
Tanon Strait was conducted. On 12 December 2004, DOE and JAPEX coverted GSEC-
102 to Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and
production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 sqm.
Offshore the Tanon Strait. On 17 December 2007, two separate original petiotioners
were filed commonly seeking that the implementation of SC-46 be enjoined for violation
of 10987 Constitution. The petitioners are the “Resident Marine Mammals” which inhibit
the waters in and around the Tanon Strait., joined by “Stewards” Gloria Estenzo Ramos
and Rose-Liza Osorio as their legal guardians and friends seeking their protection. The
respondents in both petitions are: the late Angelo T. Reyes, SOE Secretary; Jose L.
Atienza, DENR Secretary; Leonardo Sibbaluca, DENR-Region VII Director and
Chairman of Tanon Strait PAMB; JAPEX, a Japanese company; and Supply Oilfield
Service, Inc. as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners have a legal standing.
RULING: Yes. In our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a
more liberalized approach. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a
“citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violation of our environmental law on the principle that human are stewards of nature:
“Section 5. - Citizen Suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others,
including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or
obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court
shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the
relief sprayed for, requiring all i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s t o m a n i f e s t t h e i r i n t e r e s t
t o i n t e r v e n e i n t h e c a s e within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff
may publish the o r d e r o n c e i n a n e w s p a p e r o f g e n e r a l c i r c u l a t i o n i n t h e
P h i l i p p i n e s o r furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
107. Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014
FACTS: On 6 April 2010, Congress passed R.A. No. 10067, otherwise known as the
“Tubbahata Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009”. to ensure protection and
conservation of the Tubbahata Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and
future generations. Under the “no take” policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly
regulated and many human activities are prohibited, penalized or fined, including
fishing, gathering, destroying and distributing the resources within TRNP. In December
2012, the Us Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the USS
Guardian (the ship) “to enter and exit territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at
the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberly.” On 17 January 2013, while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground
on the northwest side of South Shoal of Tubbahata Reefs, No one was injured in the
incident and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. On 30 March 2013, the
US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship
from the coral reef. On 17 April 2013, petitioners Arigo' et.al. on their behalf
and in representation of their respective sector/organization and others,
including minors or generations yet unborn filed a petition for the issuance of
a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has become moot.
RULING: Yes. The salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restricted had already
been accomplished. However, insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to
protect and rehabilitate the coral reef structure and marine habitat adversely affected by
the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs
notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef.
The court is mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed
readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of components for the settlement of
environmental cases is not prescribed by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases.
108. Guingona v. Carague G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
FACTS: Petitioners are Senators of the Republic of the Philippines who brought this case to
raise the question of constitutionality of the said automatic appropriation for debt service which is
authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty(4860), as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177,
entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations
of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of
Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The 1990 budget
consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation with P86.8 Billion for debt service
Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of
then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986.And
upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative
power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was
ratified by the people. Therefore, a new legislation by the Congress providing
for automatic appropriation should lie, but Congress up to the present, has not approved
any such law and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an
administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot been forced. Whereby bills
have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize
said automatic appropriation. Petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(l) of Article VI
of the Constitution which provides as –– Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the
Treasuryexcept in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Automatic Appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget
violates Sec. 29 (1) Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore unconstitutional?
RULING: No. Because there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or

prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that
be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the
questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be
made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal
year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may
be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No.
4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No.1967 constitute lawful
authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by
Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.
109. Philconsa v. Enriquez: S5, Art14 which provides for the highest budgetary priority to
education is merely director
FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GABof 1994), was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. It imposed
conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget
previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress
to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their
respective operating budgets. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into
law, making it as Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS
FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM
JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-
FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the
President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill
he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi.
RULING: Yes. The Court held that the members of Congress have the legal standing to
question the validity of acts of the Executive which injures them in their person or the
institution of Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause derivative
but nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by members of Congress. In
the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or
impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal
standing to institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.
Lakbao, Abdillasis S.
Labor Protection
CASE NO. 110
PNB v. Dan Padao
FACTS: Dan Padao was a credit and loan officer in PNB Dipolog who was allegedly
involved in the granting of behest loans, where the collateral was over appraised and
the credit standings of the loan applicants were fabricated allowing them to obtain larger
loans from PNB causing PNB to suffer millions in losses. After due investigation, PNB
found Padao guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duty and ordered him dismissed
from the bank. Padao appealed to the bank’s Board of Directors, but after almost 3
years of inaction Padao instituted a complaint against PNB with the NLRC. The
Executive Labor Arbiter (ELA) found the dismissal to be VALID, but the NLRC
REVERSED the decision and ordered Padao to be reinstated.
ISSUE: Whether Padao was illegally dismissed by PNB.
HELD: No. The PNB acted in accordance of the law by dismissing Padao, which it
deemed appropriate under Article 282, b. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee
of his duties and by the given circumstance that Padao failed to do what he was
employed to do but also repetitively and habitually causing millions of pesos damage to
PNB.
Labor Protection
CASE NO. 111
JMM Promotion v. CA
FACTS: The government created the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council
(EIAC) which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing
certification and deployment of performing artists abroad. As a result of
such guidelines, the Department of Labor issued department orders
requiring an Artist Record Book for performing artists for deployment
abroad.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed department orders violated the equal protection
guarantee of the constitution.
HELD: No. The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favour or
class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to
which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require
absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. The equal protection clause of the
constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on
real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all
members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the
classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.
Main Point: Protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under
the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full
employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government’s constitutional
duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.
Labor Protection
CASE NO.112
PASEI v. Drilon
FACTS: Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges
the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being
an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of
the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral
agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged
Department Order No. 1.
HELD: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the
Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of
the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1
applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the
constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. Dept.
Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban
has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects
among other things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law.
Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police
power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in
the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative
power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.
Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy
CASE NO. 113
Garcia v. BOI
Facts: Bataan Petrochemical Corporation formed by Taiwanese investors, applied for
registration with the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new domestic
producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally specified the province of
Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but later submitted an amended
application to change the site to Batangas. Congressman Enrique Garcia of the Second
District of Bataan requested a copy of BPC’s original and amended application
documents. The BOI denied the request on the basis that the investors in BPC had
declined to give their consent to the release of the documents requested, and that
Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protects the confidentiality of these
documents absent consent to disclose. The BOI subsequently approved the amended
application without holding a second hearing or publishing notice of the amended
application.
ISSUE: Whether BOI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application
of the investors without considering national interest.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ordered the original application of BPC to have its main
plant in Bataan and products maintained. The Court found that the inhabitants of
Bataan had an “interest in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst
[that] is actual, real, and vital because it will affect not only their economic life, but even
the air they breathe” (p. 4). The Court also ruled that BPC’s amended application was in
fact a second application that required a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing
to be held (p.3). The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information,
“the Constitution does not open every door to any and all information” because “the law
may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny”.

CASE NO. 114
Tanada v. Angara
FACTS: The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as a founding member with
the goal of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. The Philippines agreed to submit
the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization that require the Philippines,
among others, “to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products”. To that effect, the President ratified and
submitted the same to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section21, Article VII
of the Constitution. This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO
agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant
and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for
the “Filipino first” policy.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly
contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections
10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices
that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of
the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry
of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair.

CASE NO.115
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. PCA
FACTS: The PCA is in charge of issuing license to would- be coconut plant operator,
however, the PCA issued a Board Resolution which no longer require those wishing to
engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such
business. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate
PCA's Administrative Order.
ISSUE: Whether the PCA is in conflict against its very nature of creation.
HELD: Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated
laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free
enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not
call for the removal of “protective regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This
is so because under Art 12, Sec 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves
the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when
the public interest so requires.

CASE NO. 116
Pharmaceuticals v. Duque
FACTS: Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino
by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by
the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which RIRR
imposes a ban on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes. The petitioners filed
against respondents whether respondents officers of the DOH acted in violation of the
provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR.
ISSUE: Whether the RIRR is in accord with the provisions of Executive Order No. 51
(Milk Code).
HELD: No. Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the
Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the coverage of said law. However what
may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Code which in turn is based on the
ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the land. The other WHA Resolutions
however cannot be imposed as they are not deemed part of the law of the land.
Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sport

CASE NO.117
Marine Radio Communications Association of the Philippines v. Reyes
MP: Self-Reliant and Independent Economic Order, Role of the Private Sectors
FACTS: The petitioners are self-described "Filipino entrepreneurs deeply involved in the
business of marine radio communications in the country" and also operators of "shore-
to-ship and ship-to-shore public marine coastal radio stations, 2 and are holders of
certificates of public convenience duly issued by the National Telecommunications
Commission. Among other things, they handle correspondence between vessel
passengers or crew and the public. The Department of Transportation and
Communications unveiled anP880-million project, designed to "ensure safety of lives at
sea (SOLAS) through the establishment of efficient communication facilities between
coast stations and ship stations and the improvement of safety in navigational routes at
sea. It was set out to provide, among other things, ship-to- shore and shore-to-ship
public corresponding, free of charge. The he petitioners brought the instant suit,
alleging, in essence, that Secretary Rainerio Reyes had been guilty of a grave abuse of
discretion and cited the provisions of Section 20, of Article II, of the Constitution, which
states that the “State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investment.”
ISSUE: Whether DOTC acted in violation of Art. II Sec 20 of the Constitution.
HELD: No. There is no merit in this petition. The duty of the State is pre-eminently "to
serve . . . the people, 9 and so also, to "promote a just and dynamic social order . . .
through policies that provide adequate social services. . . . and an improved quality of
life for all. There can hardly be any valid argument against providing for public
corresponding, free of charge. It is compatible with State aims to serve the people under
the Constitution, and certainly, amid these hard times, the State can do no less. The
petitioners can not legitimately rely on the provisions of Section 20, of Article II, of the
Constitution, to defeat the act complained of. The mandate "recognizing the
indispensable role of the private sector" is no more than an acknowledgment of the
importance of private initiative in building the nation.
Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sport
CASE NO. 118
Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan
FACTS: Boracay Foundation, Inc. (petitioner) is a duly registered, non-stock domestic
corporation. Its primary purpose is "to foster a united, concerted and environment-
conscious development of Boracay Island, thereby preserving and maintaining its
culture, natural beauty... and ecological balance, marking the island as the crown jewel
of Philippine tourism, a prime tourist destination in Asia and the whole world." The
Panlalawigan of Aklan Province issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito
Marquez to file an application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA)
to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan. In the same year, the
Province deliberated on the possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation
area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its
resources. In June 2006, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No.
543, delegating the power "to approve reclamation projects to PRA through its
governing Board, subject to compliance with existing laws and rules and further subject
to the condition that reclamation contracts to be executed with any person or entity
(must) go through... public bidding." Boracay Foundation, Inc. filed a petition for an
issuance of a writ of mandamus suspending the implementation of a land reclamation
project on the ground that the classification of the project was incorrect leading to the
failure to perform a full EIA as required by law and that there was a failure for proper,
timely and sufficient public consultation.
ISSUE: Whether there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the
project.
HELD: No. The law requires the Province, being the delegate of the PRAs power to
reclaim land in this case, to conduct prior consultations and prior approval. However,
the information dissemination conducted months after the ECC had already been issued
was insufficient to comply with the requirements under the LGC. Furthermore, the lack
of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent
endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and
the Sangguniang Bayan in 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging
and insistence of the Province. The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the
duties of national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance and
requires them to secure prior public consultations and approval of local government
units. In Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, the Court emphasized that, under the
Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that
affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be
implemented: (1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and (2) prior
approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. The absence of either of such
mandatory requirements will render the projects implementation as illegal. The Court
classified the reclamation project as a national project since it affects the environmental
and ecological balance of local communities.
Promotion of Comprehensive Rural and Agrarian Policy
CASE NO. 119
Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito Teves
FACTS: In 1928, PLDT is granted a franchise to engage in telecommunications.
Telecom companies must have 60% of Filipino ownership pursuant to Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution. Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving
almost 12 million shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT
increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%.Petitioner argued that the term
“capital" should only refer to common shares as only they are able to exercise voting
rights.
ISSUE: Whether the term “capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to
the total common shares only.
HELD: Yes. The Court partly granted the petition and held that the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in
the election of directors of a public utility, i.e., to the total common shares in PLDT.
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as
opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the
preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term
“capital” shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the
control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the
election of directors. In short, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
ATENEO DE ZAMBOANGA UNIVERSITY

ROMEO A. LAMBAYAN
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

ANGELES, respondent
G.R. No. 108461. October 21, 1996
Facts:
The Philippine International Trading Corporation, a government owned and controlled

corporation issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which application
to the PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of China (PROC) must be
accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of the Philippine Products to
China carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer
from PROC in an amount equivalent to the value of importation from PRC being applied
for, or simply at one-to one ratio.
Two domestic corporations, Remington and Firestone, both applied for authority to
import from PROC, which were granted, but later on were withheld for failure to comply
with the require one to one ratio of import and export.
They filed a complaint asserting that the administrative order is unconstitutional. The
RTC ruled that the order was a restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 and 19 of
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. PITC elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 is valid.
Ruling:
The order was not valid.
The PITC is a line agency of the Department of Trade and Industry which was the
primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of the government for
the country’s trade. The PITC as an integral part of the DTI was given the task of the
implementing the departments’ program. It has the authority to issue the questioned
order and may legally exercise that authority under the supervision of the DTI. The grant
t quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies are not unconstitutional. It has
become necessary to create more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its
activities. Because hey specializes in the field assigned to them, they can deal and
dispatch problems with more expertise than the legislature or the courts of justice.
In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue the Administrative Orders as a valid
exercise of a power ancillary to legislation; however, it does not imply that the order was
valid. First, it was never published, thus it is not effective. Second, the same is
inconsistent with the declared policy of the government to then effect that it will develop
and strengthen trade relations with the PROC. Since the order was a unnecessary
barrier to trade, the same is not a valid exercise of its authority.
case 130
G.R. No. L-50444 ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. THE NATIONAL

HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity as General Manager of
the National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as
Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON,
Facts:
Jose Hernando aquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot no. 15 block IV of
Ponderosa heights subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal.
With the consent of Antipolo Realty, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot 15 to
Virgilio Yuzon. Mr. Yuzon assumed the obligation under original contract including
payments of predecessor’s installment.
Antipolo Realty fail to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its under taking
under clause of the contrct to sell. (Improvement shall be complete within 2 years from
date of the contract. Thus, the failure shall permit the buyer to suspend his monthly
installment.
Antipolo realty rescind the contract to sell claiming the forfeiture of all installment made
by Mr. Yuzon.
Mr. Yuzon brought this matter then to the NHA through a letter of complaint. Antipolo
Realty filed motion to dismiss on case no. 2123. NHA denied Antipolo Realty’s motion
to dismiss. NHA ordered the reinstatement of account for the monthly amortization.
wherein Mr. Yuzon has 60 days to pay as shown in the statement of accounts.
Issue:
Whether or not NHA can authorize and reinstate the account on the contract to sell
between Antipolo Realty Estate and Mr. Yuzon.
Under Presidential decree No. 957, NHA is legally empowered to determine and protect
the right of the contracting parties.
Ruling:
NHA decision appealed is affirmed and clarified. Payment of installment nder contract to
sell shall continue to pay it’s monthly installment payments.
case 131
G.R. No. 108461 PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs.

HON. PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC, MAKATI;
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION; AND FIRESTONE CERAMIC,
INC.
Facts:
Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) issued administrative order no.

SOCPEC 89-08-01 for the importation of goods from China must be viable and
confirmed. This is to legitimate in amount the value equivalent.
Counterpart exports to People’s Republic of China must be confirmed and accompanied

in the export program. To ensure the commitment of the importereport performance
guarantee are thensubject to be submitted. The rejection of all pending and future
business will be applied when false statement are made by the importer.
Both Remington Industrial and Firestone Ceramic Inc. are granted to import from the
PROC. However, due to failure to comply on the reqirements of one to one ratio they
were then stopped.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) has the authority to
Bar company such as Remington and Firestone from importing goods from Peoples
Republic of China (PROC).
Ruling:
PITC can not exercise such regulation since none of the trade protocols of 1989, 1990,
1991, as has empowered PITC. The court declared administrative order to be null and
void since administrative order SOPEC 89-08-01 since the same was not published, as
mandated by law.
The President through the legal counsel Antonio T. Carpio, directed the Department of
trade and Industry and Philippine International Trading Company to lease implementing
administrtive order SOCPEC 89-08-01.
case 134
G.R. No. L-49112 LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN vs. HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity
as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as
Minister of National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in
his capacity as Minister of Public Highways
Facts:
Letters of Instuction no. 229 of President Ferdinand Marcos issued on December 2,

1974 states that in the interest of safety on streets. He hereby direct 1. owners or
drivers of motor vehicle shall have at least One (1) pair of early warning device
consisting of triangular in shape, collapsible, reflectorized plates in red and yellow
colors.
Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled, disabled or parked for 30 minutes or more.
Owners, drivers shall install at least Four (4) meters away from front and rear of the
motor vehicle.
The Petitioner Agustin claims that provision 229 violates the provisions & delegation of
police power. As an owner of a Volkwagen Bettle car, equipt with blinking lights, he
claim that such “blinkers” could then serve as an early warning device.
Issue:
Whether or not the letter of instruction is valid delegation of police power.
Ruling:
Yes, the law is valid. By the international bodies concerned, with traffic safety which was
ratified by the Philippine government under P.D. no 207 hazards posted by such
obstruction to trffic have been recognized. Enactment of the local legislation amended
as implementing on rules and regulations are constitutional and valid as measure to
police power.
case 138
G.R. No. 120880 FERDINAND R. MARCOS II, v. COURT OF APPEALS, THE

COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HERMINIA D. DE
GUZMAN
Facts:
Upon the death of the former President Marcos in September 29, 1989 in Honolulu Hawaii. The then
government created a Special tax audit team to conduct investigation and examine the tax liability and
obligation. The Marcoses failed to file notice of death on the former President Ferdinand Marcos.They
also violated the national internal revenue code (NIRC) where they failed to pay their estate tax returns,
and income tax return from the years 1982 to 1986. A criminal case was charged to the former first lady
Imelda Marcos before the regional trial court of Quezon for violation under the National Internal
Revenue Code. (NIRC) Commissioner of Internal Revenue prepared and filled against Imelda Marcos for
failure to pay Estate tax return and income tax return for the years 1985 – 1986. And Ferdinand “Bong
Bong” Marcos on the years 1982 to 1985. A memorandum was then issues in July 26, 1991 claiming that
the Marcoses failed to pay several tax returns.
Issue:
Whether or not BIR has the authority to collect the defiency on the Marcoses income tax a; estate tax
and also on the sale of the real properties? YES.
Ruling:
Denied on the present petition of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 on the deficiency on
the assesments on sales levy for real properties are final and unappeable.
Main point:
Marcos II petition for review on certiorati, because the BIR issued a deficiency on estate tax assesment
and deficiency income tax assesment against the said petitioner pertaining to his failure to settle his said
taxes from the years 1982 to 1986. On the other hand, Marcos then seek to nullify the levy claiming that
he questions the allegation made to him. He then also claim that the estate should be brought to the
probate court who should order the payment of taxes to the administrator.
case 139
G.R. No. 157870 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS)vs.

DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA)
G.R. No. 158633 ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR. vs.

DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
G.R. No. 161658 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
Sec. 36 authorize drug testing to be done on government forensic laboratory or on drug

testing laboratory that are accredited and monitored by the DOH. Sec. 36 (c) students
on secondary and tertiary school are than subject to a mandatory drug testing, with the
notice to the parents to undergo random drug testing. It shall have to be under the rules
and regulation of the school wherein the rules are contained in the students handbook.
Sec. 36 (d) Officer and employees in public and private offices whether domestic or
overseas should also be subject to mandatory random drug testing, where drug testing
must be contained in the company’s work rules and regulations. To reduce the risk in
work place. Sec. 36 (f) An individual charged before the prosecuors with criminal
offense having possible penalty of imprisnment not less than 6 years and 1 day shall
undergo mandatory random drug testing.Sec. 36 (g) Candidates running for public office
whether elected or appointment should be subject to mandatory drug testing. GR no.
161658 (Aquilino Pimentel Jr.) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under rule 65.
to nullify the sec. 36 (g) RA 9165 & COMELEC resolution no 6486 citing that COMELEC
issued a Resolution No. 6486 on candidate running for public office are subject to
mandatory drug testing is unconstitutional. Being that the are imposing qualification for
for candidates in addition to the 1987 constitution. He points out that under sec. 3 article
IV of the Philippine Constitution the qualifications for a candidate for senators are 1.
natural born citizen of the Philippines. 2. 35 years old 3. can read and write 4. registered
voter 5. resident of the Philippines not less than 2 years. Pimentel claims that the
constitution clearly prescribe these qualifications only therefor the creation of the
additional qualification is not in the provision. There are not authorization to the
COMELEC & congress to expand the requirements of candidates for senator.
(SJS v. DDM&PDEA / GR 157870) Social Justice Society seeks to prohibit Dangerous

Drugs Board (DDB) &Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing Sec.
36 (c)(d)(f)&(g) on rounds that it is infirm. The provisions is undue to delegation of
Legislative power. Discretion of schools, & employers can and might be used to harass
against to the student or employee whom are deemed undesirale to them.
(Atty. Laserna Jr. v. DDB & PDEA / GR 158633) Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr. seeks in his
petition for certiorari & prohibition under rule 65 (C)(D)(F)&(G) RA9165, as he deemed
unconstitutional on Right to privacy, Right against unreasonable searches seizure and
right against self-incrimation. Being contrary to equal protection & due process
Issues:(1) Do Sec. 36 (g) RA9165 & COMELEC resolution number 6486 impose
additional qualificationfor candidates for senate? Can congress prescribe qualification
for candidtes for senate in addtional to the constitution? (2) Are paragraphs
(c)(d)(f)&(g)unconstitutional? Do these violates the right to privacy, right against
unreasonable searches & seizure & equal protection clause? (3) Do they have
legislative power?
Ruling:
Yes. Sec. 36 (g) RA9165 COMELEC resolution 6486, impose additional qualificationfor
candidates for senate. No, congress cannot prescibe qualification for candidates for
senators in addition to the Philippine constitution. 2. The court ruled that sec. 36 (c) &
(d) of RA9165 constitutional. While Sec. 36 (f)&(g) Unconstitutional. These 2 sec. (f)&(g)
violates the right to privacy, right against unreasonable searches & seizure & equal
protection clause. 3. Congress cannot validly amend, modify qualification cannot
disregard, evade or weakend the contitutional mandate.
The petition made by Aquilino Pimentel on Sec 36 (g)RA 9165 COMELEC resolution
6486 imposed an illegal additional qualification for candidate for senate. The
constitution points that subject to nuisance candidate for senate needs to meet
qualifications on Sec. 3 article IV that 1. natural born citizen of the Philippines. 2. 35
years old 3. can read and write 4. registered voter 5. resident of the Philippines not less
than 2 years. Aside from these candidates for sente need not posses other
qualifications. Congress cannot validly amend, modify qualification, cannot disregard,
evade or weakend the constitutional mandate. Therefore it is declared unconstitutional if
the law or administrative rule violates the constitution. Then the issuance is null and
void. Constitution is the basic law which must conform. If there are conflicts, it shall be
invalid. SJS petition on drug testing in schools & for employees on both private and
public offices justifiable. The court notes that SJS has failed to show how Se. 36 (c) (d)
violates the right and privacy and constitutes unlawful &/or unconcented search under
the Art. III, secs. 1&2. drug testing on sec (c)(d) have factors that are reasonable
wherein 1. the goal is to discourge drug use. 2. stomp out illegal drug use to protect the
well beings of the citizens, most especially the youth. On Laserna petition on Secs.
(c)(d) RA9165 the court finds no valid jurisdiction for mandatory drug testing for persons
accused of crimes. Operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
“randomness”&”suspicionless”. People charged with crime peacefully submitted
themselves to drug testing is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution. Drug testing in this case violate a person’s right to privacy
guaranteed. An accused person are veritably force to incriminate themselves.
Main Point:
Comprehensive dangerous drugs act 2002, requires for those who are running for
candidates for public office, student from the secondary and tertiary schools, officers
and employees of public and private offices and persons charged before the
prosecutors office with certain offences are subject to Drug testing. Drug testing can be
done either on Government Forensic Lab or on accredited and monitored drug testing
laboratory by the DOH.
Sec.(c)(d) wherein students under secondary or tertiary school and also employees
whether it be public or private company are required on mandatory drug testing.
Provisions on RA9165 is constitutional. The goal of the provision is to discourage drug
use, and to stomp out illegal drug, it is to protect the wellbeings of the citizens especially
the youth.
Sec. (f) ruling is found to be unconstitutional. Mandatory on drug testing on persons

accussed of crimes to have mandatory drug testing can never be random. People
charged and peacefully submitting themselves to drug testing violates their right as the
accussed person is veritable force to icriminate themselves. Sec. (g) is unconstitutional,
as mandated by the constitution there are only five (5) qualifications written for people to
run in the senatorial seat. Congress cannot amend or modify such qualification, as the
constitution is the basc law which laws must conform.
Case Number: G.R. No. 165299 December 18, 2009
Topic: Completed in itself/Completeness Test
Title: Pacific Steam v. LLDA 608 SCRA 442
FACTS: Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry services. On 6 June 2001,
the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to
respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the inspection report on the complaint of black smoke emission
from petitioner’s plant located at 114 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. On June 22, 2001, LLDA conducted an
investigation and found that untreated wastewater generated from petitioner’s laundry washing activities was
discharged directly to the San Francisco Del Monte River.
Furthermore, the Investigation Report stated that petitioner’s plant was operating without LLDA clearance,
AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit from LLDA. On 5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of
LLDA conducted wastewater sampling of petitioner’s effluent. The result of the laboratory analysis showed non-
compliance with effluent standards particularly Total Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD),
Oil/Grease Concentration and Color Units. Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of Violation. Petitioner submitted
its application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and informed LLDA that it would undertake the necessary measures
to abate the water pollution. No compliance followed and it has been found that the water treatment equipment and facility
of Pacific steam was still under repair.
A Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against petitioner before the LLDA. Petitioner requested another test. This
time, it showed compliance. Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30 October 2001 and its
corresponding daily penalty beset aside and that the imposable penalty be reckoned from the date of actual hearing and not
on 5 September 2001. It is respondent’s position that the Notice of Violation and the
imposition of the penalty had no legal and factual basis because it had already installed the necessary wastewater treatment
to abate the water pollution.
This Public Hearing Committee finds respondent’s arguments devoid of merit. Presidential Decree No. 984
prohibits the discharge of pollutive wastewater and any person found in violation thereof shall pay a fine not exceeding five
thousand pesos (PhP5,000.00) [sic] for every day during which such violation continues.
ISSUE: Whether Laguna Lake Development Authority has the power to impose fines and penalties.
RULING: Yes, The mere discharge of wastewater not conforming with the effluent standard is the violation referred to in
PD No. 984.CA held that LLDA has the power to impose fines. LLDA is granted additional powers and functions to effectively
perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring, licensing and enforcement. Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA
may "exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities."
Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such power to impose penal sanctions. Presidential Decree
No. 984 (PD 984) created and established the NPCC under the Office of the President. EO 192, which reorganized the DENR,
created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and functions
of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927),
Case Number: G.R. Nos. L-46076 and L-46077, June 12, 1939
Topic: Fixes a Standard/Sufficient Standard Test
Title: People v. Rosenthal 68 Phil 628
FACTS: Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O. Oil
Company. The main objects and purposes of the company are to mine, refine, market, buy and sell
petroleum, natural gas and other oil products. Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty by the RTC in
two cases of selling their shares to individuals without first obtaining the corresponding written permit
or license from the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. This is in violation of
Sections 2 & 5 of Act No. 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law.
The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially depended upon a promise of future
promotion and development of the oil business, rather than on actual tangible assets. On appeal,
Rosenthal & Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes undue
delegation of legislative authority to the Insular Treasurer.
Issue: Whether there is undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular Treasurer.
RULING: The maxim “delegatus non potest delegare” has been made to adapt itself to the complexities
of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
“subordinate legislation”, in practically all modern governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and
extent of the authority. While courts have undertaken to laydown general principles, the safest is to
decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative
purpose intended to be achieved.
The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the
issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act
must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor “has complied
with the provisions of this Act”, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of
the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions
of Act 2581 have been complied with.
Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly
conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in the public interest.” In view of the intention and
purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public against “speculative schemes which have no more basis than
so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock infly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells,
distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”, the Supreme Court held that “public
interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a
matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.
Also, Act 2581 allows appeal from the decision of the Treasurer to the Sec of Finance. Hence, it cannot
be contended that the Treasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence.
Case Number: G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
Title: Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA 166 SCRA 533

FACTS: Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow
filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum
Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of
an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular.
Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers
RULING: No, Supreme Court held that there was valid delegation of powers. In questioning the validity
of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to
promulgate the regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
“power of subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by “filling
in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.
Case Number: G.R. No. 78164 July 31, 1987

Title: Tablarin v. Gutierez 152 SCRA 730
FACTS: The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and
administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,
the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5
(a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23
August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT
and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the
petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
ISSUES: Whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the
constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish
the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education
RULING: No, standard is established. In this case, the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of
the 1959 Medical Act: “the standardization and regulation of medical education” and in Section 5 (a)
and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rulemaking authority by an
administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. The
standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met,
the standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public
safety.
Case Number: G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995

Title: Conference v. POEA 243 SCRA 666
FACTS: Petitioner, Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., is an incorporated association

of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies who hire and
recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of the irrespective foreign ship-owner-principals, seek to annul
Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular
No. 05.
The petitioners contended that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate
rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels;
only Congress can.
Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board resolves to amend and increase the
compensation and other benefits as specified under Part II, Section C, paragraph 1 and Section L,
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers
ISSUE: Whether the POEA can create rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power.
RULING: Yes. The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA based on
impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by the public
respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.
The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations
to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious not to say, specific
solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless,
the latter may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement
a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if
not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.
That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further amended the
previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and
equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed.
Case Number: G.R. No. 99886 March 31, 1993
Title: Osmeña v. Orbos 220 SCRA 703
FACTS: Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as amended by EO
137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or impose
additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil companies in the event of sudden price increases. The
petitioner avers that the collection on oil products establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of
legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected
through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the
special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is
premised primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of
the nature of the taxation power of the State.
ISSUE: Whether there is undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation.
RULING: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in
the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover,that the OPSF as a special fund is plain from the
special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the
law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of
the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special
fund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision
conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a
sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to
protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes
the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.
Case Number: G.R. No. 115844. August 15, 1997
Title: Viola v. Alunan 277 SCRA 409
FACTS: Viola, as a barangay chairman, filed a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of the Art
III, Sec.1-2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng
mga Barangay Officers insofar as they provide for the election of first, second, and third vice presidents
and for auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.
He contended that the questioned positions are in excess of those provided in the LGC Sec.493 which
mentions as elective positions only those of the president, vice president, and five members of the
board of directors in each chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision,
and national levels and thus the implementing rules expand the numbers in the LGC in violation of the
principle that implementing rules and regulations cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law
LGC,. Sec. 493. Organization – The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the
board of directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions
as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter. A secretary-general shall be elected from
among the members of the national liga and shall be charged with the overall operation of the liga on
the national level. The board shall coordinate the activities of the chapters of the liga they are designed
to implement.
ISSUE: Whether the positions in question are created without the authority of law
RULING: Yes. The creation of additional positions is authorized by Sec. 493 of the LGC which in fact
requires – and not merely authorizes – the board of directors to “create such other positions as it may
deem necessary for the management of the chapter”. To begin with, the creation of these positions was
actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga barangay which was adopted by the
First Barangay National Assembly.
There is no undue delegation of power by Congress in this case. SC decisions have upheld the validity of
reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish, or merge offices
in the executive management.
While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions to provide for the needs
of the chapter, the board of directors of the National Liga must be deemed to have the power to create
additional positions not only for its management but also for that of all the chapters at the municipal,
city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. Otherwise the National Liga would be no
different from the local chapters. The fact is that Sec. 493 grants the power to create positions not only
to the boards of the local chapters but to the board of the Liga at the national level as well.
Case Number: G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
Title: Abakada v. Ermita 469 SCRA 1
FACTS: Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on
importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of
properties. These questioned provisions contain uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006,
after any of the following conditions have been satisfied: (1) Value-added tax collection as a percentage
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (2)
National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 ½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its
exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contends that delegating to the
President the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountability,
responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not pass to the
President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively nullified the
President’s power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her
subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
RULING: There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution
of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority;
in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. In this
case it is valid because it fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to
take effect. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
Case Number: G.R. No. 133640 November 25, 2005
Title: Beltran v. Secretary of Health 476 SCRA 168
FACTS: Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April
2, 1994. This act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood
donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V Ramos
on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994.The law
took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995,
constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent
Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al.,
seeking the annulment of the following: (1) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; for a mandatory
injunction ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health to grant, issue or renew petitioners’ license
to operate free standing blood banks (FSBB).
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health
(DOH).Section 7 of R.A. 7719 7 provides: Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood
banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a
maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary."
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of R.A. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of Legislative Power
RULING: No, the fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to
be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution. The
ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood
Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption of the constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act
constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to
determine.
As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the contention
of petitioners that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is unconstitutional because
it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was
incomplete when it was passed by the legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the
Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the
two-year extension period that may be granted by Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial
blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting
undue delegation of legislative power.
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee
or delegate of Legislature.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the
provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and
has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial
blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the
Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a
safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation.
The Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and
inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between non-profit blood
banks/canters and commercial bloods.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the State’s police power.
Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both necessary
and reasonable for common good. Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare.
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners, namely,
deprivation of personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-impairment clause to be
unmeritorious.
As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve the general
public considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by petitioners, the court
maintain that the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be
inquired into by the Court.
In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provisions of the
National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Case Number: G.R. No. 169838
Title: Bayan v. Ermita 488 SCRA 226
FACTS: The first petitioners, BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS

(KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr., Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima
Tajar, allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005
was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 is an act ensuring the free exercise by the people of their right peaceably
to assemble and petition the Government [and] for other purposes. This Act shall be known as "The
Public Assembly Act of 1985
Petitioners Bayan and company, contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit
before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the
expression is sought.
Respondents are Eduardo Ermita, as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor Lito Atienza, Chief, of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Gen. Arturo Lomibao, National Capital Region Police Office
(NCRPO) Chief, PNP Maj. Gen. Vidal Querol, and Manila Police District (MPD) Chief Gen. Pedro
Bulaong.
Batas Pambansa No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires the
statement of the public assembly’s time, place and manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to
prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce
and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the denial of a permit on the basis of a
rally’s program content or the statements of the speakers therein, except under the constitutional
precept of the "clear and present danger test." The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral
regulation has been recognized in Osmeña v. Comelec.7
ISSUE: Whether Batas Pambansa No.880 is unconstitutional.
RULING: No, Batas Pambansa No. 880 is constitutional. The Bayan… claim that it is unconstitutional
because of the “No Permit, No Rally” policy that is implemented and that the Mayor has the power to
turn down the eligibility of the gathering thus creating a great, if not complete, hindrance to the cause
of the gathering. The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent. "Clear and convincing
evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public
safety, public convenience, public morals or public health" and "imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil" both express the meaning of the "clear and present danger test.
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies On the other hand,
B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict
freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies.
Case Number: G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Title: Abakada v. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251 (2008)
FACTS: Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it
lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and
BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at
least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of
revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be
easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC
personnel.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of
being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions –
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of
the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully
satisfy the demands of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
RULING: No, there is an established standard that specifies the authority of the President. R.A. 9335
adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act.
Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and
equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC is infused with public interest.
In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection
falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level
of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws The action for removal is also subject to
civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and
equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare."33 In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC is infused with public interest.
G.R. No. 166715

Fixes a Standard/Sufficient Standard Test
Abakada vs. Purisima
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition that seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing R.A. 9335 which optimizes the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through
the creation of a Reward and Incentive Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 9335,
claiming that it violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection and petitioners
assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as
it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 9335 unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President
Ruling:
No. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in
fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of
the law. Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. For
it to be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented. For this case, the determination of revenue targets does not rely solely on
the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee (DBCC). Moreover, the Court recognized the following as sufficient
standards: “public interest”, “justice and equity”, “public convenience and welfare” and
“simplicity, economy and welfare.” R.A. 9335 lays down a reasonable yardstick for
removal of officers and employees with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection.
Main Point:
The completeness test and the sufficient standard test determine the validity of
delegation of legislative power. Not only there are sufficient standards to delegate the
power to the President to fix revenue targets, the Court also finds that the determination
of revenue targets does not solely rely on the President, but also on the scrutiny of the
DBCC.
G.R. No. 116418
Filling in the Details
Fernandez vs. Sto. Tomas
Facts:
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Inspection
and Audit (OPIA) while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the
Personnel Relations (OPR) at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in
Quezon City. While serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by respondents was issued.
Petitioners questioned the validity of Resolution 94-3710 of the Civil Service
Commission and the authority of the Commission to issue the same. In the resolution,
the office of the petitioners, OPIA and OPR, together with the Office of Career Systems
and Standards (OCSS), are merged to form the Research and Development Office
(RDO) thus assigning the petitioners to regional offices. Moreover, the resolution shows
that the Commission re-arranged some of the administrative units, renamed some of the
Offices of the Commission, and re-allocated certain functions moving some functions
from one Office to another.
Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has the legal authority to issue Resolution
No. 94-3710
Ruling:
Yes. The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710
were described as “effecting changes in the organization to streamline the operations
and improve delivery of service”. The order assigning petitioners to regional offices was
mainly because the incumbent Regional Director of Office No. 3 of Pampanga is set for
retirement and the incumbent Direction in Region V was under investigation and needed
to be transferred immediately to the Central Office. The court was convinced that the
Commission’s order is valid as it promotes administrative efficiency and convenience.
Additionally, the changes introduced – re-naming, re-allocation, and re-arrangement-
are precisely the kind of internal changes which are referred to in Section 17 of the 1987
Revised Administrative Code.
Main Point:
The Resolution issued by the Civil Service Commission promotes administrative
efficiency and convenience and the changes made were necessary in the provincial
offices of the Commission, thus making it valid.
G.R. No. 96754

Chiongbian vs. Orbos
Facts:
Petitioners, at the time of the filling of their petition, members of Congress representing
various legislative districts in South Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del
Norte and Zamboanga City. They challenged the validity of a provision of the Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. 6734) authorizing the
President of the Philippines to “merge” by administrative determination the regions
remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region. Petitioners contend that
there is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within
the existing regions and restructure them to new administrative regions. Petitioners also
contend that while the authority necessarily includes the authority to merge, the
authority to merge does not include the authority to reorganize. Thus, the President’s
authority under R.A. 6734 to “merge existing regions” cannot be construed to include
the authority to reorganize them.
Issue:
Whether or not Article XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
No. R.A. No. 5435, authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the help of a
Commission on Reorganization, to organize the different executive departments,
bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or
financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it, was already passed at
the time of filing and the purpose was to promote “simplicity, economy and efficiency in
the government”. Moreover, the law provided that any reorganization plan submitted
would become effective only upon the approval of Congress. Thus the creation and
subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President
pursuant to authority granted to him by law. The Congress merely followed the pattern
set in the previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative
regions in 1972. It was also stated in the case of Abbas vs. COMELEC that while the
power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution,
it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. No abdication by
Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge
administrative regions because the regions themselves are not territorial and political
divisions but are “mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes”.
The regrouping made by the law involves no more than a redefinition of the lines
separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative
supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery
of essential services.
Main point:
The power to merge administrative regions is a power that has traditionally been lodged
with President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments. R.A. 6734 cannot be held unconstitutional as it “merge existing regions”
for administrative purposes.
G.R. No. 125498
Rodrigo vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Petitioners move for a reconsideration of the decision that Petitioner Mayor’s position
has been classified as Grade 27 in accordance with R.A. No. 6758 and having been
charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) prepared the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and
Salary Grades where the position of Municipal Mayor was assigned Salary Grade 27.
Petitioners contend that the authority of the DBM was limited to the “preparation” of the
Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Moreover,
petitioners also alleged that the authority conferred upon the DBM constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative powers resulting in the executive branch, through the DBM,
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6758 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
Ruling:
No. Congress delegated the administration of the System to the DBM because it
relieves itself of this task, leaving to the DBM the preparation of the Index to “fill in the
details”. It is said that this is the very rationale for the delegation of powers by the
legislature to administrative agencies. With their specialized knowledge, administrative
agencies are more up to tasks involving their expertise. It was also clarified that the
Congress delegated to the DBM is the administration of the Compensation and Position
Classification System, and not the determination of the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. When the DBM assigns a position a certain Salary Grade, it does so
pursuant to its authority under R.A. No. 6758.
Main Point:
There are exceptions to the rule on the principle of separation of powers. Congress can
delegate their power to local administrative agencies to “fill in the details” in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law since all administrative agencies have
their own specialized knowledge, thus they can deal with the tasks involving their
expertise more efficiently.
G.R. No. 167324

Tondo Medical vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for Review on Certiorari on the decision promulgated by the
Court of Appeals denying a petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform
Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and
Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department
of Health”. E.O. No. 102 provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under this Order, the DOH refocused its mandate
from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health
services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local
government units. Petitioners argue that the said Order should be enacted by Congress
in the exercise of its legislative function, and that the Order is void, having been issued
in excess of the President’s authority.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 102 was issued by the President in excess of his
authority
Ruling:
No. The President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of
government entities under the Executive Department. It is already stated under Section
17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution that “the president shall have control of all
executive departments, bureaus, and offices” and in the Administrative Code of 1987
that the “President, in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President.” Moreover, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments mainly tasked
with the functional distribution of the work of the President. To sum, the President,
under the Administrative Code, has the authority to reorganize the Office of the
President and this includes the DOH.
Main Point:
The President has the discretion to control the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. No. 12 was issued
for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH and
the President has the authority to reorganize this Office under the Administrative Code.
G.R. No. 196425

Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
Facts:
Petitioner seeks to declare Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), entitled, “Abolishing the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring its Investigative, Adjudicatory and
Recommendatory Functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs, Office of the President” as unconstitutional. Before the said Order, Executive
Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) has been issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to
investigate or head administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption
against presidential appointees. On November 15, 2019, President Benigno Aquino III
issued E.O. 13 abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division- Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (IAD- ODESLA).
Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to
create a public office
Ruling:
No. The Administrative Code of 1987 vests in the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
It was highlighted in the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora that “the
President, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure
of the Office of the President.” It was further highlighted in the case of Domingo v.
Zamora “To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable
of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out
his directives and policies”. Therefore, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its
functions to IAD-ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his
continuing “delegated legislative authority to reorganize” his own office pursuant to the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Main Point:
E.O. 13 did not totally abolish PAGC and did not create a new public office. The Order
was only issued for the purpose of Abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to
IAD-ODESLA. It was already mentioned in numerous cases that the President, under
the Administrative Code of 1987, has the authority to reorganize the offices under him in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
G.R. No. 199082

Arroyo vs. Department of Justice
Facts:
A massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007
National elections occurred. On August 2, 2011, the Comelec issued Resolution No.
9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ),
which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and
anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections. On August 15, 2011, the
Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team. This was composed of officials from DOJ and
the Comelec.
Issue:
Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 is unconstitutional as it violates the principle of
separation of powers
Ruling:
No. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Comelec has the power to investigate and
prosecute election offenses. This power is reflected in the Omnibus Election Code
wherein “Comelec has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. In the same
provision, Comelec is given the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ. The Joint Committee and Fact-
Finding Team by the Comelec and DOJ was made for the purpose of conducting a
thorough investigation of the alleged massive electoral fraud and the manipulation of
election results in the 2004 and 2007 national elections. In addition, it was ruled that the
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team are not new public offices, but merely
collaborations between two existing government agencies sharing concurrent
jurisdiction. DOJ is tasked to administer the criminal justice system specifically to
“investigate the commissions of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system”. Together with the Comelec, it is undoubtedly that it is
the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of Court and not the Joint Order which gives
the DOJ and the Comelec the power to conduct preliminary investigation.
Main Point:
Joint Order No. 001-2011 did not make a new public office. It’s simply a collaboration
between Comelec and DOJ for the purpose of conducting a thorough investigation on
the electoral fraud that occurred in the 2004 and 2007 elections. Moreover, the two
existing government agencies share the share concurrent jurisdiction as one has the
power to prosecute election offense and the other is taked to administer the whole
criminal justice system.
G.R. No. 45685
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
People of the Philippines vs. Vera
Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng has been convicted under the criminal case entitled “The People of
the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al”. The information in this criminal
case was filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila on October 15, 1931. The
same court convicted the defendant and sentenced him. The Defendant filed a motion
for reconsideration and four more motions for new trial but were denied. Thereafter, the
defendant sought to have his case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States but the same was denied. Then again, the defendant filed a second
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and remanded the case to the court of
origin. The Defendant applied for probation before the trial court, under the provisions of
Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature and claimed that he is innocent. The
CFI of Manila referred his probation application to the Insular Probation Office which
denied the same. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, presided by Judge
Jose Vera, finally set the petition for hearing. However, the Fiscal of the City of Manila
filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the respondent. In its supplementary
opposition, the private prosecution elaborated on the alleged unconstitutionality of Act
No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of
several provinces.
Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
Ruling:
Yes. All three branches of the government have their own powers and responsibilities
and each may not escape its duties by delegating that power to any other body or
authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void. However,
there are exceptions such as the Congress has the authority to delegate legislative
power to local authorities. Courts can also delegate legislative power to the people at
large and also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. However,
this case does not fall under any of the exceptions. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
incomplete, thus invalid, if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which
the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it. Act No. 4221 does not fix and impose upon the provincial boards
any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted is a
“roving commission” as used by Justice Cardozo, which enables the provincial boards
to exercise arbitrary discretion. To sum, the applicability and application of the Probation
Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards.
Main Point:
Act No. 4221 was declared unconstitutional mainly because the applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely place in the hands of the provincial boards.
The Act itself is incomplete and invalid as it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it.
G.R. No. 4349
The United States vs. Ancieto Barrias
Facts:
Defendant was charged within a violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397
of the Insular Collector of Customs in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila.
Barrias was navigating the Pasig River by bamboo poles without steam, sail of any
other external power and was liable under Paragraph 83 where he was liable to a fine of
not more than P500, in the discretion of the court. In Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397,
it is clearly stated that “no heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be
permitted to move in the Pasig River without being tower by steam or moved by other
adequate power.
However, it is stated under Act No. 1136 that the Collector has the authority to make
and publish rules and regulations to carry this law and violators shall be deemed guilty
of misdemeanor and shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months or
by a fine of not more than $100.
The Defendant challenged the validity of Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 on the
grounds that if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of
authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an
illegal delegation of legislative power.
Issue:
Whether or not the authority given to the Collector to carry out the Circular constitutes
an invalid delegation of legislative power
Ruling:
Yes. The collector cannot impose penalties higher than the penalties stated under Act
No. 1136 and the collector doesn’t have the authority to charged Barrias of a fine more
than 500 pesos under the Circular because only a fine of not more than $100 dollars is
stated under the Act. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to
anybody or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority,
there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made
until the constitution itself is changed.
Main Point:
Act No. 1136 was already enacted to fine the violator of not more than $100 and
Circular cannot impose penalties higher than the penalties mentioned in the Act as the
legislative power of the Congress cannot be delegated to anybody. In this case, the
Collector has no authority to collect the penalty higher than the Act as this is an invalid
delegation of legislative power.
G.R. No. L-9876
The United States vs. Adriano Panlilio
Facts:
Panlilio was convicted for violating the law relating to the quarantining of animals
suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to
pay a fine of P40. On February 22, 1913, an authorized agent of the Director of
Agriculture notified the defendant in writing that all of his carabaos had been exposed to
the dangerous and contagious disease known as rinderpest and that said carabaos
should be duly quarantined in a corral in a barrio in the Province of Pampanga and were
ordered to be kept in the corral and were to remain there until released by further order
of the Director of Agriculture. However, the accused illegally took the carabaos from the
corral while the quarantine was still in force and together with this servants and agents,
took the said carabaos and drove them from one place to another for the purpose of
working them. The accused raised the defense that the facts alleged in the information
do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not Panlilio is liable for the violation of the order of the Director of Agriculture
Ruling:
No. The defendant did not violate any order of the Bureau of Agriculture. The only
sections of Act No. 1760 which prohibits acts and pronounce them unlawful are 3, 4 and
5 and this case does not fall within any of them. There is also no section under the Act
punishing the violators of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture. The Act itself does not
prohibit any act, does not compel an act nor does it really punish or impose a criminal
penalty. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to
have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statues. Nowhere in Act
No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense,
nor is such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused constitute a
violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code which punishes any person who
violate the regulations, ordinances, or proclamations issues with reference to any
epidemic disease among animals, the extermination of locusts, or any other similar
plague.
Main Point:
The defendant did not violate the order of the Bureau of Agriculture but he was still
sentenced to pay a fine of P14 for the violation of the Penal Code which punishes any
person who violate the regulations with reference to any epidemic disease among
animals. Act No. 1760 does not prohibit any act nor punish the violator but a law under
the Penal Code punishes the violators, thus the defendant is still liable.
Macapugay, Valorree F.
AdZU College of Law
Case No. 160

Case Topic: Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Case Title: People of the Philippines vs. Maceren, M., et. al
G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977
FACTS:
In 1969, Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were accused of violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1
which prohibits any person to engage in electro fishing in fresh water fisheries in the
Philippines. The Fisheries Law does not expressly punish electro fishing. It only
prohibits the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing. For this reason,
the lower court dismissed the complaint. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries,
promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 prohibiting electro fishing in all
Philippine waters which was later on amended to restricting the ban against electro
fishing to fresh water fisheries.
ISSUE:
Whether the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries, by promulgating Administrative Order No. 84 and 84-1constitute an invalid
delegation of legislative power.
RULING:
Yes. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Commissioner of

Fisheries constituted an invalid delegated of legislative power by exceeding beyond
their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. The power cannot be extended to amending
or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statue. Promulgating an administrative order penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in
accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the
law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
MAIN POINT:
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
neither can assert issuance of regulations inconsistent with the provisions of the law nor
can state what act constitute an offense. The former is permitted to carry out issuances
provided it encompasses the law itself.
Case No. 161
Case Title: People vs. Dacuycuy, A., et.al.
G.R. No. L-45127, May 5, 1989
FACTS:
Celestino Matondo, Segundino Caval and Cirilo Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte,
were charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers. At the arraignment, they pleaded not guilty to the
charge and immediately moved to quash the complaint but the municipal court denied
the motion to quash for lack of merit. The respondents again filed a motion of
reconsideration but with the further allegation that the offense under Section 32 of the
the said Act is null and void for being unconstitutional, but then again this was denied.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and alleged the additional ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense since Section 32 of said law is
unconstitutional because it imposes a cruel punishment where the term of imprisonment
is unfixed and it also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration
of the penalty of the imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the
latter were the legislative department of the Government.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional thus constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power, the term of imprisonment being solely left to the
discretion of the court
RULING:
No. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is declared unconstitutional. Section 32 of the
said act also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power because the term of
imprisonment was solely left to the discretion of the court as if the judicial department is
a legislative department. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no
points of reference have been provided by the legislature.
MAIN POINT:
The discretion of imprisonment delegated by the legislative body to the court is invalid
as it defies the rules of the separation of powers. The legislative body should stated a
point of reference on imprisonment.
Case No. 162

Case Title: Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. vs. Drilon, F., et.al.
G.R. No. 82849, August 2, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene and
Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining
agreement covering the years 1986 to 1988. The company agrees to grant to all regular
covered employees salary increases. On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640
was passed increasing the minimum wage. Additionally, the Secretary of Labor issued
the pertinent rules implementing the provisions of the said Act. Section 8 of the
implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases
negotiated under a CBA against such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No.
6640.
ISSUE:
Whether the implementing rules issued constituted an undue delegation of legislative
power.
RULING:
Yes. The rules issued by the Secretary of Labor implementing the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6640 constitute an undue delegation of legislative power. This is in line
with the fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the
provisions of law it is designed to implement and the rules cannot provide for such a
prohibition not contemplated by the law. Moreover, Republic Act No. 6640 or any other
law cannot be expanded by such regulations because an administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress.
MAIN POINT:
Executive body cannot issue an implementing rule that does not encompass with the
law itself. Administrative Orders should be consistent with the provisions of the law and
not unduly expand it as it is the sole power of the legislative body to amend a law.
Case No. 163

Case Title: Restituto Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
FACTS:
Executive Order No. 626 is already an existing law which prohibits the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. The said Executive Order was
amended such that it also prohibits the transportation of carabeef from one province to
another. On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo and the said carabaos were confiscated for violation of Execution
Order 626-A. The Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the executive order as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries. He claimed that it is unconstitutional because the owner has the
right to be head before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
ISSUE:
Whether Executive No. 626-A is constitutional.
RULING:
No. Executive No. 626-A is unconstitutional because it violates due process. The
president can exercise his legislative authority provided that whenever in his judgment
there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the
legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment
required immediate action, he could in order to meet the exigency, issue decreed,
orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. In this case,
there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercises of that power by the
president and the petitioner has the reason to question the validity of the executive
order. This executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment which was carried out immediately thus denying the
petitioner the right to be heard. There are exceptional cases where the summary action
may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not
necessarily judicial only, however, cases are excepted if there is a justification for the
omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought
to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In this case, no urgency was
found.
MAIN POINT:
The conviction and immediate imposed punishment denied the petitioner of his right to
be heard. The act suppresses the due process, thus made the executive order
unconstitutional.
Case No. 164

Case Title: Pharmaceutical vs. DOH (2007)
FACTS:
E.O No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued in 1986 under the freedom constitution. The order
states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code for
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitute (ICMBS), a code adopted by World Health
Association (WHA) in 1981. The latter adopted resolutions in view of the importance of
breastfeeding, however pronounced that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
for breastmilk substitute. The Philippine consented with the International Convention on
the Rights of the Child. Article 24 duly stated the state parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant mortality, and ensure that all segments of the society,
especially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
Thereafter, in 2006, the Secretary of DOH, et.al. issued a Revised Implementing Rules
and Regulations which was contested by the petitioner, Pharmaceutical and Health
Care Association of the Philippines, representing member of breastmilk substitute
manufacturers, stating that the regulation exceeds the provisions of the Milk Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the Secretary of DOH, et.al., by issuing RIRR constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power.
RULING:
The Court partially granted the petition and specified Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 null and
void for being ultra vires. The respondents are incapable from implementing such
provisions as it amends and expands the provisions of Milk Code. The Milk Code per se
is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other
forms of promotion to the general public of products.
Case No. 165

Case Title: Abakada vs. Purisima
FACTS:
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status. Petitioners seeks to prevent
respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 also invoking
their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a
tax reform legislation. In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the
power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that
matter.
ISSUE:
Whether there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the
President.
RULING:
The determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also
undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC. To determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative
policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
Case No. 166

Topic: Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Case Title: Philippine Coconut vs. Republic
G.R. 178193, January 24, 2012
FACTS:
COCOFED proposes to constitute a trust fund to be known as the “Coconut Industry
Trust Fund (CITF) for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers,” with respondent Republic,
acting through the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), as trustee. As proposed, the
constitution of the CITF shall be subject to terms and conditions which, for the most
part, reiterate the features of SMC’s conversion offer, albeit specific reference is made
to the shares of the 14 CIIF companies. For consideration is the Urgent Motion to
Approve the Conversion of the SMC Common Shares into SMC Series 1 Preferred
Shares dated July 24, 2009 (Motion) interposed by petitioners Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc., et al. (collectively, COCOFED). COCOFED seeks the
Court’s approval of the conversion of 753,848,312 Class “A” and Class “B” common
shares of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) registered in the names of Coconut Industry
Investment Fund and the so- called “14 Holding Companies” (collectively known as
“CIIF companies”) into 753,848,312 SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares (hereinafter, the
Conversion). Republic filed its Comment questioning COCOFED’s personality to seek
the Court’s approval of the desired conversion. Respondent Republic also disputes
COCOFED’s right to impose and prescribe terms and conditions on the proposed
conversion, maintaining that the CIIF SMC common shares are sequestered assets and
are in custodia legis under PresidentialCommission on Good Government’s (PCGG’s)
administration.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan, with grave abuse of discretion, issued its Order dated
February 20, 2001 enjoining PCGG from voting the sequestered shares of stock in
UCPB.
RULING:
No. "Petitioner has failed to make out a case of grave abuse or excess of jurisdiction in
respondents' calling and holding of a stockholders' meeting for the election of directors
as authorized by the Memorandum of the President * * (to the PCGG) dated June 26,
1986, particularly, where as in this case, the government can, through its designated
directors, properly exercise control and management over what appear to be properties
and assets owned and belonging to the government itself and over which the persons
who appear in this case on behalf of BASECO have failed to show any right or even any
shareholding in said corporation." This Court holds that the government should be
allowed to continue voting those shares inasmuch as they were purchased with coconut
levy funds – that are prima facie public in character or, at the very least, are "clearly
affected with public interest." The Court granted PCGG the right to vote the sequestered
shares because they appeared to be "assets belonging to the government itself."
Case No. 167

Topic: Executive Misapplication
Case Name: Tatad v. Secretary DOE
281 SCRA 330 (1997) and MR 282 SCRA 337 (1997)
FACTS:
On December 1992, the Congress created R.A. No. 7638 or the Department of Energy,
to be able to take charge of energy related government projects. On March 1996, the
Congress created the R.A. No. 8180 or Downstream Oil Industry Act of 1996 as a
means of deregulating the downstream oil industry in terms of crude oil and petroleum.
Francisco Tatad, petitions for the annulment of R.A. No. 8180 after the undue
delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy by not
providing a determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The
respondents responded that the said petitioners have no locus standi, as they did not
sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No.
8180. However, the Court issued a cease and desist order towards the respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation
of power.
RULING:
No. There were no violations present when considering the prohibition on undue
delegation of legislative power. According to the Court, determining the validity of the
delegation of legislative power would rely on; first, the completeness and sufficiency
test. The purpose of both tests is to prevent interference with the legislative authority to
the delegate and Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 passes both tests by having the proper
documents and by leaving it in the President’s choice as how to deal with it.
MAIN POINT:
The Court ruled that there cannot be undue delegation of power without passing the two
tests of validity: completeness and sufficiency.
Case No. 168

Topic: Mere Directive
Case Title: Dagan, W., et.al vs. Philippine Racing Commission, et. al.
G.R. 175220, February 12, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners, William Dagan, et.al. refused to comply with the directives of Philippine
Racing Commission (Philracom) which directed Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and
Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) to formulate club house rule to address Equine
Infectious Anemia (EIA) on race horses. MJCI and PRCI instructed horse owners to
submit their race horses for blood sample and Coggins Test. Copies of guidelines to
monitor and eradicate EIA were issued by Philracom. Petitioners were non-compliant
which made their horses banned from races, non-renewal of their license, and eviction
from stables. They filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) contesting on the
implementation of guidelines. The court ruled the case moot and academic because all
horse owners except from Dagan subjected their horses to the guidelines. Petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) yet the decision still affirmed RTC in toto. They
filed the case with the Supreme Court (SC) and contested that Philracom has
unconstitutionally delegated its rule making power to other respondents MJCI and PRC,
however, the court dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Whether Philracom’s directive is a delegation of its rule making power to MJCI and
PRCI.
RULING:
No. Philracom did not delegate rule making power to MJCI and PRCI in addressing EIA.
The directive made was simply to instruct MJCI and PRCI to manage EIA. The directive
given by Philracom is part of the mandate for MJCI and PRCI.
Case No. 169

Case Topic: Qualifications of Senator
Case Title: Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC and Elamparo
G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016
Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, Tatad, Contreras, and Valdez

G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-LLamanzares ran for the senatorial
election and presidential election in 2012 and in 2016, respectively. She is the legally
adopted daughter of the late presidential candidate Ronald Allan Kelly Poe and tv
personality Susan Sonora Poe. Prior to the adoption, the petitioner was under the foster
care of Edgardo Militar, her foundling parent. The petitioner is a naturalized American
citizen and is married to Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a Filipino-American
citizen, where she has three children in which two were born in the Philippines. After her
adoptive father died in 2004, she and her husband decided to permanently reside in the
Philippines thereby transferred her children in Philippine schools, filed an ITR, acquired
a home in San Juan City, and took an oath of allegiance pursuant to RA 9225.
The petitioner was appointed as the Chairman of the MTRCB in 2010. Before assuming
the office, she renunciated her allegiance and citizenship to United States of America
which effected in the same year. In 2013, she filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for Senator and in 2016, she also filed her COC for President. In 2016 election, Estrella
Elamparo filed a petition questioning her citizenship and residency. Likewise, Francisco
V. Tatad, Antonio P. Contreras, and Amado D. Valdez also filed a petition to disqualify
her on the grounds of citizenship, residency, and material misrepresentation.
COMELEC issued a resolution to cancel her COC. Out of the unfavorable ruling, she
filed a petition in the Supreme Court which ruled in favor of her.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares, a foundling, is qualified to

run for president?
RULING:
1. Yes. The Court reiterated that under the international law, foundling is presumed
to have the nationality of the country of birth (Article 14, 1930 Hague Convention)
and is presumed born of citizens of the country where the child is found (Article
2, 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness). Foundlings in the
Philippines are regarded to have citizenship. Hence, if the foundling is presumed
natural-born Filipino citizen and wants to repatriate in the Philippines, he may
reacquire his natural-born status under R.A. 9225.
MAIN POINT:
Under jurisprudence, foundlings have the right for citizenship on the country of birth or
of which she is found, thus qualifies the Poe-Llamanzares as a candidate for
presidential election.
CASE NO.170
ARTICLE VI, Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives; Apportionment;

Party List, Par. 2
Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC
FACTS:
On March 26, 2001, the COMELEC issued Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 approving the
participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioner Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a petition before the COMELEC seeking the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to
benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented'

sectors and organizations.
RULING:
1. Yes. Under the RA 7941, Section 3, "party" is defined as "either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties." Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution also provides that
members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." Therefore private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they
are political parties.
2. No. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however,
that any political party—or any organization or group for that matter—may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system as laid down under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Party-List System Act
(RA 7941).
MAIN POINT:
The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life and is not
exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations. Political parties may
participate in the party-list elections but must still be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system.
CASE NO.171

Party List, Par. 2
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
FACTS:
On 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve
(12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system.
Petitioners filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution." They alleged that the filling up of the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided
under the Constitution, was mandatory, thus additional representatives shall be proclaimed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the constitutional provision under Section 5 (2), Article VI which provides twenty
percent allocation for party-list representatives mandatory.
RULING:
No. The twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives merely provides a ceiling for the
party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily
conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define
and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution
explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
MAIN POINT:
The twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives merely provides a ceiling for the
party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
CASE NO.172

Party List, Par. 2
AKLAT v. COMELEC
FACTS:
On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification as a party-list
organization for purposes of the May 2004 elections. The COMELEC dismissed the petition
stating that Aklat cannot be considered as an organization representing the marginalized and
underrepresented groups.
According to the COMELEC, Aklat’s statement that it has re-organized itself does not cure this
defect as "there is nothing in the petition which will help us identify what particular marginalized
and underrepresented group AKLAT is now representing."
ISSUES:
Whether or not AKLAT is consistent with the purpose of a party-list system for it to be qualified
as candidate in the elections.
RULING:
No. In Bagong Bayani case, the court set guidelines for screening party-list participants, i.e.,
that "the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of R.A. The court held that an organization, for
it to qualify as a representative of marginalized and underrepresented group must show—
through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and
track record—that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
The general averments contained Aklat’s articles of incorporation in that it supposedly
represents marginalized groups such as the youth, indigenous communities, urban poor and
farmers/fisherfolk but these do not measure up to the purpose of the party-list system.
MAIN POINT:
The purpose of party-list system is to represent and seek to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.
CASE NO.173

Party List, Par. 2
Partido ng Manggagawa v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Several party-list participants sent queries to the respondent COMELEC regarding the formula
to be adopted in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners in the May 10, 2004
elections. Petitioners assert that they are entitled to additional on seat each in the House of
Representatives.
The confusion in the petition at bar must have been created by the way the Veterans formula
was cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6835, adopting the simplified formula of "one additional seat
per additional two percent of the total party-list votes." The resolution reads: Considering that
the simplified formula has long been the one adopted by the Commission and is now the
formula of choice of the Supreme Court in its latest resolution on the matter, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the simplified formula of one additional seat per
additional two percent of the total party-list votes in the proclamation of the party-list winners in
the coming May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioners are entitled to one additional seat each.
RULING:
No. The ruling in the above-mentioned case expressly qualified as pro hac vice cannot be relied
upon as a precedent to govern other cases. It was therefore erroneous for respondent
Commission to apply the November 20, 2003 Resolution and rule that the formula in Veterans
has been abandoned.
Applying said formula to the undisputed figures in Party-List Canvass Report, the COMELEC do
not find petitioners entitled to any additional seat.
MAIN POINT:
A party-list only entitled to one additional seat each only if shall reach the required two percent
mark of the total votes provided that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
CASE NO.174

Party List, Par. 2
Citizens v. COMELEC
FACTS:
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all
the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first
seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second
nominee, Rep. Kho. Later, David Kho tendered his resignation letter as representative which
was followed by a board resolution of Senior Citizen accepting such resignation in accordance
with the term-sharing agreement made between the nominees of the party-list. However
COMELEC refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of
Rep. Kho.
The term of public officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private parties for
public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject to any
private agreement. COMELEC resolved to cancel the registration of the Senior Citizens as
party-list. On December 11, 2012, SC initially granted status quo ante orders of Senior Citizens
and directed COMELEC to include the name of Senior Citizens in the printing of official ballots
for the May 2013 elections. The party-list won one seat in the HOR. SC later ruled that the
cancellation of registration was in order. Thus, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner’s term-sharing is valid.
RULING:
No. COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender
of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite
the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing,
the term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on
this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Having established that the COMELEC En
Banc erred in ordering the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its
registration and accreditation, said organization is entitled to be proclaimed as one of the
winning party-list organizations in the recently concluded May 13, 2013 elections.
MAIN POINT:
There can be no term-sharing in holding a seat in the party-list system. There can only be two
representatives when the party-list wins additional seat.
CASE NO.175

Party List, Par. 2
Bantay v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners Bantay and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms seek to cancel the accreditation
accorded by the COMELEC to some party-list groups set to run on the forthcoming May 2007
elections on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified. They assailed that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
granted the assailed accreditations even without simultaneously determining whether the
nominees of herein private respondents are qualified or not, or whether or not the nominees are
likewise belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they claim to represent in
Congress prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang Bagong Bayani case which states
that, "not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees."
ISSUES:
Whether or not it is necessary that not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees.
RULING:
No. Petitioners’ posture that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their
nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the
qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization.
MAIN POINT:
It is not necessary that the nominees of a party-list must belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.
CASE NO.176

Party List, Par. 2
Phil. Guardians v. COMELEC
FACTS:
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a motion for
reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated
October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009.
These resolutions delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. According to Section 6(8) of
Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List System Act, COMELEC, upon verified complaint of
any interested party, may remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to participate in the last
two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did
not participate in the 2007 elections.
ISSUES:
Whether or not PGBI can still participate in the elections.
RULING:
Yes. In an exercise as important as an election, the COMELEC cannot make a declaration and
impose a deadline, and, thereafter, expect everyone to accept its excuses when it backtracks on
its announced declaration
An equally important aspect of a democratic electoral exercise is the right of free choice of the
electorates on who shall govern them; the party-list system, in the words of Ang Bagong
Bayani–OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,24 affords them this choice, as it gives the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors the opportunity to participate in governance. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the COMELEC took this freedom of choice away and effectively disenfranchised the
members of the sector that PGBI sought to represent when it did not include PGBI in the list of
qualified parties vying for a seat under the party-list system of representation.
MAIN POINT:
The purpose of party-list system is to represent and seek to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and the courts protect this purpose.
CASE NO.177

Party List, Par. 2
BANAT v. COMELEC
FACTS:
In the May 2007 elections, the COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under
the Party-List System. BANAT filed petition as quoting the COMELEC of using the Panganiban
formula used in Veterans case in allocating party-list seats. BANAT contends that Article VI
Section 5 (2) should be followed and that 20%of party-list representatives shall be proclaimed.
COMELEC denied said petition. BANAT filed mandamus for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Article VI Section 5
(2) of the Constitution mandatory.
RULING:
No. The twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives merely provides a ceiling for the
party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The party-list election has four inviolable
parameters stated in Veterans. First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list; Second, the two percent threshold
only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-
list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat
limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats; Fourth, proportional
representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes.
MAIN POINT:
Four parameters of the Philippine party-list system:
1. the twenty percent (20%) allocation

2. the two percent (2%) threshold
3. the three-seat limit
4. proportional representation
CASE NO.178

Party List, Par. 2
Abayon v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Respondents Lucaban, Jr., Dela Cruz, Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo
warranto with against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon. They claimed that
Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did
not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. They also pointed out she did not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent
congressional district representative. Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-
sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly
and that she belonged to the women sector.
Petitioner Palparan, Jr. on the other hand is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group.
Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of
Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented or sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels,
Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Abayon and Palparan are qualified to represent a party-list group.
RULING:
Yes. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent." It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of
this particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a
representative of his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that characterize
petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.
MAIN POINT:
There is no qualification as to the nominees of the party-list but only the as to the party-list that it
represents.
CASE NO.179

Party List, Par. 2
Layug v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Rolando D. Layug, in his capacity as a taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to
Disqualify Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike
from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere "extension of the El
Shaddai," which is a religious sect. In their Answer thereto, Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike
claimed that Buhay Party-List is not a religious sect but a political party possessing all the
qualifications of a party-list. It is composed of groups for the elderly, the women, the youth, the
handicapped, as well as the professionals, and Brother Mike belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented elderly group.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Buhay Party-List belongs to a religious sector.
RULING:
No. Article VI. Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall
be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
MAIN POINT:
Sectoral parties or organizations may participate in the party-list elections but not the religious
sector.
Case No. 180

Party-List Representation
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 673 SCRA
651, G.R. No. 190793
FACTS: Magdalo filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its
registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National
Capital Region for participation in the May 10 2010 National and Local Elections.
COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO where it held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused
registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2 (5) of the Constitution. It is common
knowledge that the party’s organizer and Chairman, Trillanes and some members
participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center,
Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held
hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny
clearly show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve
their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies. The Petition is hereby
denied.
MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En
Banc for resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution
dated December 23, 2009, in which it clarified its intention to participate in the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group. COMELEC En Banc denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
petition for registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve
its goals through violent or unlawful means?
RULING: No. COMELECS Resolutions are sustained.
MAIN POINT: The COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization
seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as
violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
Case No. 181

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. 203766, APRIL 12, 2013
FACTS: 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with
the Supreme Court in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the COMELEC
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The COMELEC, in its assailed
resolutions, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come
from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or
groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
The COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine

whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in
the May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of
R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong
Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the organizations from participating in the May
2013 party-list elections.
ISSUE: Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang
Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the
coming May 2013 party-list elections.
RULING: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT.
MAIN POINT: We remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC
to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate
in the coming May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.
Case No. 182

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its
Secretary-General GEORGE "FGBF GEORGE" DULDULAO v COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. 190529, APRIL 29, 2010
FACTS: The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for
certiorari and in the motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify COMELEC
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the
Resolution dated December 9, 2009 denying PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP
No. 09-004 (MP). Via these resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the
party-list system.
Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, provides:
Section 6: Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration – The COMELEC may motu

proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(8) It fails to participate in the last two preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did
not participate in the 2007 elections.
ISSUES: Whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.
RULING: Yes. The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it fails to participate in the
last two preceding elections or if it fails to obtain at least two per centum of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.
MAIN POINT: The plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two
separate reasons for delisting.
Case no. 183

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO v
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 190582, April 08, 2010
FACTS: Ang Ladlad LGBT Party filed a petition against the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections. The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to
accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Ang Ladlad is an organization composed
of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-
gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on
the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17,
2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized
and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and
violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide
their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC. Ang
Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. After admitting the
petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC dismissed the Petition on moral grounds. ANG
LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else. Petitioner
should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but
likewise for not being truthful when it said that "any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections."
ISSUE: Whether the petition is accredited.
RULING: Yes. The Petition is granted. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, "the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
MAIN POINT: Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the
belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under
any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.
Case no. 184

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD) v COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013
FACTS: Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Mandamus, seeking to compel the
Commission on Elections to canvass the votes cast for petitioner Alliance for
Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) in the recently held 2013 Party-List Elections.
On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution canceling

petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation. Petitioner ANAD does not
belong to, or come within the ambit of, the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
enumerated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 and espoused in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.
ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007
National and Local Elections as required by Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166. The
COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or
Accreditation and disqualified it from participating in the 2013 Elections. The COMELEC
held that while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined
political constituencies, its disqualification still subsists for violation of election laws and
regulations, particularly for its failure to submit at least five nominees, and for its failure
to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections.
ISSUES: Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
RULING: No. Grave abuse of discretion, under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the
arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or
the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or a
refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.
For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.
MAIN POINT: As such, even if petitioner is declared qualified and the votes cast for it
are canvassed, statistics show that it will still fail to qualify for a seat in the House of
Representatives because lack of nominees. The Court Resolves to DISMISS the
Petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections.
Case No. 185

Party-List representation
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First
Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr. v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R.
206844-45, JULY 23, 2013
FACTS: The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-
list organization, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. that are
now praying for essentially the same reliefs from this Court.
One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza, the organization's incumbent

representative in the House of Representatives - Arquiza Group. The other group is led
by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the organization's erstwhile third nominee - Datol Group.
SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the
organization failed to get the required two percent of the total votes cast. Thereafter,
SENIOR CITIZENS were granted leave to intervene in the case of BANAT v.
COMELEC. In accordance with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of
additional seats under the party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS were allocated one
seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, the organization's first nominee, served as a member of
the House of Representatives. Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS were allowed to
participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second
among all the party-list candidates and were allocated two seats in the House of
Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while
the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho. SENIOR CITIZENS’ third
nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as the organization’s
Chairman. Thereafter, in an opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR
CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were allied with Rep. Arquiza. Rep. Arquiza
informed the office of COMELEC that the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep.
Kho, had tendered his resignation. The fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to
assume the vacant position in view of the previous expulsion from the organization of
the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr. Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing
agreement among nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be
allowed.
ISSUE: Whether respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it concluded that petitioner violated
public policy on term sharing.
RULING: Yes. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Statutes are prospective.
MAIN POINT: Public office is not a property right. Public office is a public trust.
Case No. 186
WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES v COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 191998, December 07, 2010
FACTS: Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) filed with the COMELEC its Manifestation
of Intent to participate in the May 2010 elections. Subsequently, AGPP filed its
Certificate of Nomination together with the Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8807 which prescribed the rules of procedure
applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-list nominee for purposes of the May 2010
elections.
Section 6 of the Resolution provides that the party-list group and the nominees must
submit documentary evidence to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, and to the sectoral party, organization,
political party or coalition they seek to represent. Under Section 10 of the same
Resolution, the COMELEC may motu proprio effect the disqualification of party-list
nominees who violate any of the limitations. The COMELEC may also cancel motu
proprio the registration of any party registered under the party-list system for failure to
comply with applicable laws, rules or regulations of the Commission.
Petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List, represented by Neri Colmenares, filed with the
COMELEC another petition for disqualification against Arroyo. It alleged that Arroyo is
not qualified to be a party-list nominee because he does not represent or belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector, has not been a bona fide member of AGPP
ninety days prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, a member of the House of
Representatives; and that AGPP is not a legitimate and qualified party-list group and
has no authority to nominate him. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the
petitions for disqualification against Arroyo. It noted that Section 9 of RA 7941 merely
requires the nominee to be "a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety days preceding the day of the elections."
ISSUES: Whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s qualifications
as AGPP’s nominee after his proclamation and assumption to office as a member of the
House of Representatives.
RULING: Yes. HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list
nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all intents and
purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives although the entity
directly voted upon was their party.
MAIN POINT: The HRET has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon
Arroyo’s qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.
Case No. 187
ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST v COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011
FACTS: On May 25, 2010, private respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition with
the COMELEC for the cancellation of registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC
Party-List on the ground that petitioner is a front for a religious organization; hence, it is
disqualified to become a party-list group under Section 6 (1) of Republic Act No. 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
Private respondent contends that ABC is a front for a religious group called the Children
of God International, which is more popularly known as Ang Dating Daan. Private
respondent also alleged that ABC made an untruthful statement in its petition for
accreditation, as it stated that it does not possess any of the disqualifications provided
by the Party-List System Act when it is disqualified for being, in reality, a religious
organization.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc no longer had jurisdiction to entertain
the petition for cancellation of registration and accreditation of ABC Party-List after it
was already proclaimed as one of the winners in the party-list elections of May 10,
2010. Further, petitioner submits that Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which states that the
COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party remove
or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition, is applicable only to a non-winning party-list
group.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the instant petition for cancellation
of the registration of the ABC Party-List.
RULING: Yes. In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that
has jurisdiction over contests relating to their qualifications. Although it is the party-list
organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and
becomes a member of the House of Representatives,21 but it is the party-list
nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives.
MAIN POINT: COMELEC has jurisdiction over Party-List Registration while HRET has
jurisdiction over distract and party-list representatives qualification.
Case No. 188
Abang Lingkod Party-List v COMELEC, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013
FACTS: ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of

peasant fanners and fisher folks, and was registered under the party-list system on
December 22, 2009. It participated in the May 2010 elections, but has failed to obtain the
number of votes needed for a seat in the House of Representatives. Hence, ABANG
LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate again in the May 2013
elections. After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Bane in a Resolution dated November
7 2012, cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that
ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the
marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged
activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bane further opined
that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and
underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight
of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent. On April 2, 2013,
the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v COMELEC, laid down new parameters to be observed
by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or associations seeking registration
and/or accreditation under the party-list system. On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC affirmed
the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system. ABANG
LINGKOD submitted pictures showing a seminar held on 10 July 2010, Medical Mission on
11 November 2010, Disaster Management Training on 21 October 2011, Book-giving on 28
June 2011, and Medical Mission on 1 December 2011. The photographs submitted appear
to have been edited to show in the banners that ABANG LINGKOD participated in the
activities. ABANG LINGKOD's name and logo was superimposed on some banners to feign
participation in the activities. Under the party-list System Act, a group registration may be
cancelled for declaring unlawful statements in its petition. Photo shopping images to
establish a fact that did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on
this ground that the Commission cancels ABANG LINGKOD s registration.
On the other hand, the COMELEC avers that the instant petition should be dismissed for
utter lack of merit. It asserts that ABANG LINGKOD was not denied due process when the
COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of its registration since it was given every reasonable
opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC further claims that it did not abuse its discretion
when it cancelled ABANG LINGKOD’s registration on the ground that it failed to establish a
track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Further, the
COMELEC alleges that its finding of facts may not be passed upon by this Court as the
same is supported by substantial evidence.
ISSUES: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG
LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system?
RULING: Yes. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on requiring
ABANG LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group's track record is no
longer required pursuant to the Court's pronouncement in Atong Paglaum.
MAIN POINT: R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list
system to submit proof of their track record as a group.
Case No. 189
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., v COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 207026
FACTS: Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED)

is an organization and sectoral party whose membership comes from the peasant sector,
particularly the coconut farmers and producers. COCOFED manifested with the COMELEC
its intent to participate in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted the names
of only two nominees – Atty. Emerito S. Calderon and Atty. Domingo P. Espina.
The COMELEC cancelled COCOFED’s registration and accreditation as a party-list

organization on several grounds. Notably, the Concurring Opinion of Commissioner
Christian Lim cited, as additional ground, that since COCOFED submitted only two
nominees, then it failed to comply with Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 that
requires the party to submit to COMELEC a list of not less than five nominees.
On December 4, 2012, COCOFED submitted the names of Charles R. Avila, in substitution

of Atty. Espina, as its second nominee and Efren V. Villaseñor as its third nominee.
COCOFED, among several others, questioned the COMELEC’s cancellation of its
registration and accreditation before this Court, with a prayer for the issuance of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order. By reason of the status quo ante order issued
by the Court, COCOFED’s name was included in the printing of the official ballots for the
May 13, 2013 elections.
On April 2, 2013, the Court rendered its Decision in Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC. The
Court remanded all the petitions to the COMELEC to determine their compliance with the
new parameters and guidelines set by the Court in that case.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued its assailed resolution, maintaining its earlier ruling
cancelling COCOFED’s registration and accreditation for its failure to comply with the
requirement of Section 8 of RA No. 7941, to submit a list of not less than five nominees.
COCOFED moved for reconsideration only to withdraw its motion later. Instead, on May 20,
2013, COCOFED filed a Manifestation with Urgent Request to Admit Additional Nominees
with the COMELEC.
On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the cancellation of
COCOFED’s accreditation final and executory.
ISSUES:
1. Does the petition is already moot and academic?
2. Does the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed resolution
cancelling the COCOFED’s registration?
RULING:
1. No. The petition is not moot. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
2. No. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants the
cancellation of its registration.
MAIN POINT: Almost all of the petitioners in Atong Paglaum were disqualified on the
ground that the nominees failed to "qualify," as this word was interpreted by the COMELEC.
In other words, the Court in no way authorized a party-list group's inexcusable failure, if not
outright refusal, to comply with the clear letter of the law on the submission of at least five
nominees.
CASE NO. 190

ARTICLE VI SEC 5: COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES;
APPOINTMENT; PARTY LIST
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATION
Milagros Amores v HRET
FACTS: Milagros petition for certiorari challenging the decision on May 4, 2009 and
Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (public respondent), which respectively dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Quo
Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the party-list organization Citizens’
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives, and denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Villanueva was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since he was
already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 at the time of the filing of his
certificates of nomination and acceptance (pursuant to Section 9 of (RA) No. 7941
known as the Party-List System Act. Due to disqualification to represents the youth,
Villanueva change his affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families
ISSUE: Whether or not the Villanueva (private respondent) is eligible to hold office as a
member of House of Representatives representing the party-list organization of CIBAC,
even changing his affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers
and their families sector.
RULING: No. It is not eligible for Villanueva to hold an office in the house of
representative representing the party-list organization CIBAC, changing affiliation from
CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not
effected at least six months prior to the election (Section 15 of RA No. 7941).
MAIN POINT: Changing affiliation should be within six months prior to the election.
CASE NO. 191

RULES OF APPORTIONMENT
REAPPORTIONMENT THROUGH SPECIAL LAW
Tobias v Abalos
FACTS: This case is a petition of Tobias to assail the constitutionality of the R.A. 7675
known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”. Before the enactment of the Act,
Mandaluyong and San Juan belong to one legislative district. A plebiscite was held in
pursuant to the Local Government Code of 199. The plebiscite resulted to 18,621 voted
"yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." And so, the act was deemed ratified.
Petitioners went to court and contend R.A. No. 7675 that it contravenes the "one
subject-one bill" rule, converting Mandaluyong to highly urbanized city and separating it
from San Juan will violate the Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution. Petitioners
also contend that Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, in which House of
Representative shall be composed of not more 250 members, unless fix by law. And,
within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.
This is because separating San Juan and Mandaluyong will result to additional
Representative. Petitioner also defended that division was not made pursuant to any
census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the R.A. 7675 violates the Art VI Sec 26(1), Sec 5(1and 4)
RULING: No. The R.A.7675 did not violate those article mentioned above. Statutory
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less
than two hundred fifty thousand complied with the "one city-one representative" Article
VI, Section 5(3). As of the article VI sec 5(1) shows that the present limit is no absolute.
There is also no proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not quality to have its
separate legislative.
MAINPOINT: Apportionment of through plebiscite.
CASE NO. 192

Mariano v COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners assailed certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as

unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled “Converting Municipality of Makati into a
Highly Urbanized City”. This certain provisions of the R.A. 7854 that petitioners criticized
are sec 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, 51
attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in
violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution, and 52,
increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of
the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by
Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census; increase in
legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill, and the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at
only 450,000.
ISSUE: whether or not the assailed provisions questions the constitutionality of the RA
7854.
RULING: No. There must be an actual case. The questions of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements.
The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
CASE NO. 193

Sema v COMELEC
FACTS: The ARMM’s legislature and ARMM Regional Assembly on August 2006
exercise its power to create provinces under Article VI, Section 19 of RA 9054, enacted
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) thereby making the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
Out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, three new
municipalities were carved bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what
was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative
district. Cotabato City, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao, even though it is part
of Maguindanao’s first legislative district.
Sema was a candidate of May 14, 2007 for elections for Representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato prayed to nullify the COMELEC Resolution No. 7902. and the
exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. And
contended Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution.
The COMELEC’s Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) did not merit the said case and
contended that the petitioner availed wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the
exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power.
Sema is estopped from COMELEC because in her filed CoC she was seeking as
representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City according to respondent
Dilangalen. He further added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional
because it merely renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district and could not
reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole
component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with
Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population
requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a
legislative district within a city.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 0954 is constitutional and whether or not the Resolution No.
7902 is valid.
RULING: No. The petition submitted by Sema R.A. 9054, under Section 19, Article 6 is
unconstitutional and the resolution No. 7902 is valid.
CASE NO. 194

IN ACCORDANE WITH THE NUMBER OF THEIR RESPECTIVE INHABITANTS AND
ON THE BASIS OF A UNIFORM AND PROGESSIVE RATIO
Montejo V COMELEC
FACTS: Cirilo Montejo, a petitioner, representing First District of Leyte, prayed to annul
the Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC under section 1 to redistrict certain
municipalities in Leyte for violating the principle of equity of representation in each
district and seeking to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District of the said province.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction to proclaim the Resolution
No. 2736.
Ruling: No. The COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
jurisdiction when promulgated Resolution No. 2736 under Section 1. Thereby Section 1
is annulled and set aside. The petitioner’s prayer to transfer municipality of Tolosa from
First District to Second District of the province of Leyte is hereby denied.
CASE NO. 195
IN ACCORDANE WITH THE NUMBER OF THEIR RESPECTIVE INHABITANTS AND
ON THE BASIS OF A UNIFORM AND PROGESSIVE RATIO
Herrera V COMELEC
FACTS: The case is a petition for centiori to annul Resolution No. 2950 promulgated on
November 3, 1997 by respondent Commission on Elections which amended its
Resolution Nos. 2379, 2396 and 2778 on the districting and adjustment of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and Panglungsod seats in connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, on
the alleged ground of grave abuse of discretion tainting the same. In particular,
petitioners, as taxpayers, assail the portion of subject Resolution dividing the Province
of Guimaras into two provincial districts and apportioning eight (8) elective Sangguniang
Panlalawigan seats.
Comelec apportioned the Province of Guimaras with first district composed of 56,218
and 3 seats from Sangguniang Panglalawigan while, the Second district will have a
70,252 and 5 seats from Sangguniang Panglalawigan.
Petitioners, suggested an apportionment of Guimaras Province with the First district

composed of 63,002 voters (4 seats) while Second district is 63,468 voters (4 seats)
ISSUE: Whether or not the allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to the Province
of Guimaras are in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.
RULING: Yes. In accordance with R.A. 7166 Sec 3 (b) which states, for the provinces
with only one legislative district for provinces should be divided into 2 district in order to
elect the Sangguniang Panlalawigan according to the number of inhabitants.
MAINPOINT: Apportionment of Sangguniang Panlalawigan should be propotionate with

the number of inhabitants/voters.
CASE NO. 196

POPULATION SIZE
Samson V Aguirre
FACTS: RA 8535 was signed by President Ramos into law, thereby creating the City of
Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Samson, challenged the
constitutionality of the RA and an incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City.
He also sought to enjoin its implementation, holding of the plebiscite, and disbursement
of funds as RA 8535 failed to conform to the criteria in the LGC as to population, land
area, income, seat of government, having no adverse effect to its mother city, and
furnishing a copy of the barangay resolution. As well as, he said the law would amend
the Constitution.
The respondents claimed that Samson failed to substantiate said allegations with
convincing evidence to overcome the legal presumption that Congress considered all
the legal requirements under the Local Government Code of 1991 in passing the R.A.
8535. Moreover, there is no proof supporting the unconstitutionally claim.
ISSUE: whether or not the RA 8535 unconstitutional.
RULING: No. Samson only alleged but failed to present any proof like certification.
Allegation cannot be a substitute for evidence.
CASE NO. 197
POPULATION
Herrera V COMELEC
FACT: The petitioners filed a certiorari to annul and set aside respondent Commission
on Elections’ Resolution No. 2950 the resolution promulgated on November 3, 1997.
Petitioners assail the subject resolution for the division of the Province of Guimaras into
2 districts as well as apportioning 8 elective seats for the Sanggunian Panlalawigan.The
two district of Guimaras will be divided as follows: First district will be composed of
56,218 and 3 seats from Sangguniang Panglalawigan while, the Second district will
have a 70,252 and 5 seats from Sangguniang Panglalawigan.
Petitioners aver that the apportionment of the Province of Guimaras into two districts is
not equitable due to disproportionate representation and will result to disparity of
representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issued subject under Resolution No. 2950 of the COMELEC
regarding the districts’ population is fair, even if the number of inhabitants of two
districts is not equal. And, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Resolution No. 2950 was issued.
RULING: Yes. It is fair. One of the rules and guidelines of the COMELEC in
apportioning the districts is within the jurisdiction of R.A. 7166, even if the number of two
districts is not equal, the Resolution 2950 is plausible. COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion because all it made was according to the law.
MAINPOINT: Apportionment should be proportionate with the number of inhabitants.

CASE NO. 198
RULES ON APPORTIONMENT: POPULATION SIZE
Aldaba V COMELEC
FACTS: The case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, the
R.A. 9591 that creates a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, violated the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before
1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four
legislative districts. But on 1 May 2009, RA 9591 reversed into law, which amended
Malolos City Charter, to create a separate legislative district for the city. Before the Act
passed through House Bill 3162 (later changed to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill No.
1986, the city of Malolos had just a population of 223,069 in the year 2007. The House
Bill no. 3693 depend on the undated certification issued by the Regional Director
Miranda of the of the (NSO) National Statistics Office to mayor Danilo A. Domingo, in
which, by the year of 2010, there will be a projected population of be 254,030 in
Malolos Municipality. The petitioners defended that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for
failing to meet the required minimum of 250,000 populations in order for a city to
establish a separate legislative district and merit a representation in Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not Malolos, Bulacan creating a legislative district is unconditional

(R.A. 9591), and if whether the City of Malolos has an actual or projected population
size of 250,000.
RULING: No. The court declares that RA 9591 unconstitutional for violating the Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance added to the
1987 Constitution, that states the population size should be at least 250,000.The
issuance of certification by Regional Director Miranda is without legal effect because he
has no basis and authority to issue a certification, it does not also corresponds to the
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 135 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos, which states
that, the certifications on demographic projections can only be made by National
Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) which in this case is not indicated if the
certification was declared NSCB. Certifications based on demographic projections can
be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, which
Regional Director Miranda has no authority. Certification issued is undated resulting to
violation the intercensal population projection which conducted as of the middle of every
year.
MAIN POINT: In accordance to 1935 constitution, the aim of legislative apportionment

is to equalize the population and voting power among districts. District should have
minimum populations of 250,000.
CASE NO. 199

RULES ON APPORTIONMENT: POPULATION SIZE
Aquino V COMELEC
FACTS: In this case Senator Benigno III and Jessi Robredo seeks to nullify the
Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “the Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First
(1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur”, and they
want to create a new reapportionment to the first and second district. Petitioner defend
that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard because according to Article VI Sec 5 that states each district
should composed of at least 250,000 population sizes, It shows that before the R.A.
9716 the fist district has a population of 417,304 while second district had 474,899. But
after the enactment of R.A. 9716 population of first district went low (176,383) and
second district went down (276,777) and cut almost half of its populations.
ISSUE: whether or not the reapportionment of districts in the Province of Camarines Sur
that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the district is
below the required population.
RULING: Yes. The apportionment of populations in the province of Camarines Sur is

valid. Because, number of inhabitants in the district is not always the matter, there are
several factors to consider like the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities, the
size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities, the
natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the
reconfigured District One, and the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting
from the redistricting of Districts One and Two.
MAINPOINT: There are other factors to be considered in apportionment of the district
not just the population itself.
CASE NO. 200

ARTICLE VI, SEC. 5: COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
RULES ON APPORTIONMENT (3)
Navarro v. Ermita
FACTS: On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic
Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006,
the COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of
the province under the Local Government Code. The plebiscite yielded 69,943
affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both
the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands, Dinagat
Islands was created into a separate and distinct province. On November 10, 2006,
petitioners Navarro and other former political leaders of Surigao del Norte filed before
the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9355. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat
had a land area of only 802.12 square kilometers and a population of only 106,951,
failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and of Section 461
of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE: Whether RA 9355 is constitutional.
RULING: Yes. When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or
more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in
Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a
municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption was absent under
Section 461 of the LGC, but such was expressly stated under Article 9 (2) of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code (LGC-IRR). This inclusion
was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to
reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the
validity of Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
MAIN POINT: The Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to
become a full-fledged province, enacted Republic Act No. 9355, following the exemption
from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can
only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary
legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9
(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating
the Province of Dinagat Islands.
CASE NO. 201

ARTICLE VI, SEC. 5: COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
RULES ON APPORTIONMENT (4)
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC
FACTS: On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s Congressman Jaraula filed and
sponsored “House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone
Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro” to increase Cagayan de Oro’s
legislative district from one to two. On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC promulgated a
resolution for Republic Act No. 9371. Petitioner Bagabuyo filed a petition seeking to
nullify RA 9371 and Resolution No. 7837, contending that the COMELEC cannot
implement a law without the commencement of a plebiscite which is indispensible for
the division and conversion of a local government unit as required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether RA 9371 involves the division and conversion of a local government
unit, thus requiring a plebiscite.
RULING: No. RA 9371 only increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro in the
House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod. Creation, division, merger,
abolition, and alteration of boundaries under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
requires the commencement of a plebiscite, while legislative reapportionment under
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution need not. Such law also did not bring about any
change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population, income and classification, hence no
plebiscite is required. There was only a reapportionment of a single legislative district
into two legislative districts. It did not have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de
Oro into two political and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide, the effect is
merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say,
both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
MAIN POINT: The reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative
districts does not require a plebiscite as it does not have the effect of creation, division,
merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries.
CASE NO. 202
ARTICLE VI, SEC. 6: QUALIFICATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVES
CITIZENSHIP
Bengzon v. Cruz
FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in
San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz
enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1 (4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” On March 17, 1994, respondent
reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.
He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan
in the May 11, 1998 elections. Subsequently, petitioner Bengzon filed a case for Quo
Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
claiming that respondent was not qualified to become a Member of the House of
Representatives on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen under Article VI,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether respondent, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,

can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
RULING: Yes. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. Respondent lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, but
subsequently reacquired his Philippine citizenship under RA 2630. Having thus taken
the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.
MAIN POINT: Natural-born Filipinos who are deemed to have lost their citizenship may
reacquire the same through repatriation by taking an oath of allegiance and filing the
same with the civil registry. The act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his
original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
CASE NO. 203
DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
Aquino v. COMELEC
FACTS: On March 20, 1995, petitioner Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City,
providing that he was a resident in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for
ten (10) months. Respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed a petition to disqualify
petitioner’s certificate on the ground for lack of residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which, under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a
period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the elections. Petitioner filed
another Certificate of Candidacy and provided that he had resided in the constituency
where he seeks to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days. The COMELEC
dismissed the petition for disqualification and declared Aquino eligible. Respondents
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution. The COMELEC issued an Order
suspending the petitioner’s proclamation until the motion for reconsideration shall be
resolved. On June 2, 1995, the COMELEC granted the Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was declared ineligible and was disqualified as a candidate for the Office of
Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995
elections for lack of the residence qualification as provided in the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the meaning of the word “residence” in regard to the qualifications of a
candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of the word “domicile.”
RULING: Yes. The place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home," where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the 1987 Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. Petitioner, in his
Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated that he was a resident
and registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for 52 years immediately
preceding that election. Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of
Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of condominium unit in the area. The
intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. The fact that petitioner himself claims that he
has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to
be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in
Tarlac) “indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical
residence” is not to acquire new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City."
MAIN POINT: The term “residence” is regarded to have the same meaning with the
word “domicile” for the purposes of election under the Constitution. Intent and actual
presence in the district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time
prescribed by the fundamental law to comply with the residency requirement.
CASE NO. 204
Marcos v. COMELEC
FACTS: On March 8, 1995, petitioner Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of

Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the
Provincial Election Supervisor, providing that her residence in the constituency she
sought to be elected for seven (7) months. Private respondent Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed
a petition to disqualify petitioner’s certificate alleging that the latter did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. Petitioner filed an amended Certificate of
Candidacy, changing the entry “seven months” to “since childhood.” However, said
amended certificate was not accepted on the ground that it was filed out of time, the
deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed. Petitioner averred that the
entry of the word “seven” was the result of an “honest misinterpretation” and that she
has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
RULING: Yes. Petitioner satisfied the one-year residency requirement and is eligible to
run for the following reasons:
(1) Minor follows domicile of parents. Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of
origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte.
(2) Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a
new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of such, domicile
of origin should be deemed to continue.
(3) It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in
1952 for there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
“domicile” and “residence.” When petitioner married the former President, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
(4) Assuming that petitioner gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired a right to choose a new one only after the death of the former President, her
actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
MAIN POINT: A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the
term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. The word
“residence” is used synonymously with “domicile” only for purposes of elections in
regard to the qualifications of a candidate for Congress under the Constitution.
CASE NO. 205
Domino v. COMELEC
FACTS: On March 25, 1998, petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani
indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where
he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the
election. Private respondents Grafilo and others filed with the COMELEC a Petition to
cancel petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy, alleging that the latter, contrary to his
declaration in the certificate, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the
province of Sarangani where he seeks election. Petitioner maintains that he had
complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he has been residing in
Sarangani since January 1997. The COMELEC promulgated a Resolution declaring
petitioner disqualified as candidate for lack of the one-year residence requirement and
likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration of the Resolution. The COMELEC denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was a resident in the Province of Sarangani for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.
RULING: No. Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur
and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St.
Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his “residence” in Quezon
City and has established a new “domicile” of choice at the Province of Sarangani. A
person’s “domicile” is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new
one is established by an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one,
or acts which correspond with the purpose. The lease contract entered into sometime in
January 1997 does not adequately support a change of domicile. It may indicate
petitioner’s intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere
absence from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to
abandon it, does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the contract
of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani cannot be used, in the
absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence
requirement. Petitioner is declared ineligible and his election to office is null and void.
MAIN POINT: The term “residence,” as used in election laws, means the same thing as
“domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. In
showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in
the district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
fundamental law.
CASE NO. 206
Perez v. COMELEC
FACTS: On March 26, 1998, private respondent Aguinaldo filed his certificate of
candidacy for Representative of the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998
elections. Four days later, on March 30, 1998, petitioner Perez, as a voter and citizen,
filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent as a
candidate on the ground that he had not been a resident of the district for at least one
(1) year immediately before the day of the elections as required by Art. VI, Section 6 of
the 1987 Constitution. On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a
unanimous resolution, dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding private
respondent qualified to run as representative for the Third District of Cagayan.
ISSUE: Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition
for certiorari and eventually pass upon private respondent’s eligibility for the office of
Representative of the Third District of Cagayan.
RULING: No. As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private
respondent was decided by the First Division of the COMELEC on May 10, 1998. The
following day, May 11, 1998, the elections were held. Notwithstanding the fact that
private respondent had already been proclaimed on May 16, 1998 and had taken his
oath of office on May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration on May
22, 1998, which the COMELEC denied on June 11, 1998. Clearly, this could not be
done. Section 6 of RA 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for
disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. The
COMELEC had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of
private respondent barred further consideration of petitioner’s action.
Even assuming that the Court has jurisdiction to resolve the instant petition
for certiorari, we find no merit in petitioner’s allegation that private respondent is
ineligible for the office of Representative of the Third District of Cagayan. There is
substantial evidence supporting the finding that private respondent had been a resident
of the Third District of Cagayan and there is nothing in the record to detract from the
merit of this factual finding. Although private respondent declared in his certificates of
candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran,
Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third District not just for one
(1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since July
1990. His claim that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible
considering that he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be
convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of the
province of Cagayan.
MAIN POINT: It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy,

which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement.
CASE NO. 207
Fernandez v. HRET
FACTS: Petitioner Fernandez filed for candidacy as Representative of the First

Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, indicating that he is a resident of Sta.
Rosa City, Laguna. Private respondent Vicente filed a petition for the cancellation of
petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy and his disqualification as a candidate for alleged
material misrepresentation regarding his place of residence. In all of Fernandez’s
previous certificates of candidacy in the past elections, he declared under oath that his
permanent residence is Pagsanjan, Laguna, which was located in the Fourth Legislative
District of the Province of Laguna. However, the petition was dismissed by the
COMELEC for lack of merit. Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected
Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private
respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as
a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First Legislative District of
the Province of Laguna, and that the petitioner’s election and proclamation be declared
null and void on the ground that petitioner lacked the one-year residency requirement
provided in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner satisfied the one-year residency requirement to be a

Member of the House of Representatives.
RULING: Yes. There are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta.
Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other
previous domicile. Petitioner and his wife have owned and operated businesses in Sta.
Rosa since 2003. Their children have attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005.
Although ownership of property should never be considered a requirement for any
candidacy, petitioner had sufficiently confirmed his intention to permanently reside in
Sta. Rosa by purchasing residential properties in that city even prior to the May 2007
election, as evidenced by certificates of title issued in the name of petitioner and his
wife. It is held that petitioner had adequately shown that his transfer of residence to Sta.
Rosa was bona fide and was not merely for complying with the residency requirement
under election laws.
MAIN POINT: There is nothing in the residency requirement that prohibits candidates
from owning property and exercising their rights of ownership thereto in other places
aside from the address they had indicated as their place of residence in their certificate
of candidacy.
CASE NO. 208
ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
Maquera v. Borra
FACTS: In compliance with Republic Act No. 4421, the COMELEC had decided to
require all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices to post a surety
bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a
candidate to prevent or disqualify from running for national, provincial, city and
municipal offices those persons who, although having the qualifications prescribed by
the Constitution therefore, cannot file the surety bond aforementioned, owing to failure
to pay the premium charged by the bonding company and/or lack of the property
necessary for said counter-bond. It also has the effect of property qualifications in order
that a person could run for a public office and that the people could validly vote for him.
Petitioner Maquera files a petition assailing the constitutionality of RA 4421 on the
ground that it is undemocratic and contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution to
which he is a candidate.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4421 is unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes. RA 4421 imposes property qualifications. Such are inconsistent with the
nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the
principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon
the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for
shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social
justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly,
no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public
office. Such an objective is indeed within the competence of the legislature to provide
for. Although the purpose of such law was to curb the practice of so-called nuisance
candidates, the purpose alone does not resolve the constitutionality of a statute. The
Court declared said RA 4421 unconstitutional and hence, null and void.
MAIN POINT: The effect of RA 4421 to require candidates for Congress a substantial
property qualification and to disqualify those who do not meet the same goes against
the provision of the Constitution which, in line with its democratic character, requires no
property qualification for the right to hold said public office. The Constitution, in
providing for the qualifications of Congressmen, sets forth only age, citizenship, voting
and residence qualifications.
CASE NO. 209
ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board
FACTS: The constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is challenged by
three consolidated cases.
The constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is likewise challenged as
it implements Section 36 (g) of RA 9165.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose
an additional qualification for candidates for senator.
2. Whether Congress can enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Court agrees that both the Congress and the COMELEC create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as
drug free by requiring senatorial aspirants to undergo a mandatory drug test as
provided by RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486. Accordingly, Section 36 (g) of RA
9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional for having infringed
the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for
one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
2. No. The legislative cannot create a qualification in addition to those that are
required by the Constitution as they do not have the power to do so. Congress
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter
or enlarge the Constitution. Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense
that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe
both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid
if it conflicts with the Constitution.
MAIN POINT: The inherent legislative powers of Congress, broad as they may be, are
subject to certain limitations. It cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
CASE 210
Term of Representatives
202 SCRA 779
Dimaporo v. Mitra
Facts:
Mohammad Ali Dimaporo is the representative of the 2 nd district of Lanao, he assumed

office in 1987. On January 15, 1990 he filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of
Regional Governor on the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the election was
scheduled on February 17, 1990 upon learning of this development the House
Secretariat exclude the petitioners name from the Rolls of the member of the
representative by an administrative act pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code, Article
IX, Section 67. reads: Any elective official whether national or local running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for
President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. The petitioner lost his bid and wrote a
letter to the speaker expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress." Petitioner admits that he filed a COC,
however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution,
being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of
Congress.
Issue:
Whether section 67, of Article IX of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is still operative under the
present constitution.
Ruling:
Yes, Section 67, of article IX, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is still operative under the
present constitution. Section 1 Article XI on Accountability of Public Officers in the 1987
constitution states that “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.” This
provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by
discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their
tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy; they cannot go back to
their former position. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.
Main Point:
Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and
are bound to obey it. The basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created
for the interest and benefit of the people.
CASE 211
G.R No. 147387
Farinas v Executive Secretary
FACTS:
The R.A No. 9006 (The fair election act) was signed into law on February 12, 2001, R. A
9006 seeks to amend the Omnibus Election Code and repeal Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code. According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14
repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a
proscribed rider. The petitioners assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the
Omnibus Election Code. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for
office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public
office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On
the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials
remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy. The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and
void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only
Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void.
.
ISSUES:
Whether section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
Rulings:
No, The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code
be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content . The
purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding,
to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one title" rule.
This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title,
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.
Main Point:
An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
CASE 212
G.R. No. 189698
Terms of Representatives
Quinto v COMELEC
Facts:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled "AN
ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED
ELECTION SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND
IN SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Congress then amended the law
on January 23, 2007 by enacting R.A. No. 9369, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436. In preparation for the 2010 national elections,
the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 8678 to govern the filing of
Certificates of Candidacy for national and local positions. The petitioners Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino holds appointive positions in the government who intend
to run in the coming elections. petitioned for certiorari and prohibition to nullify sec. 4(a)
of Resolution 8678. According to them, imposing automatic resignation against
appointive officials who file their certificates of candidacy is offensive to the equal
protection clause of the Constitution of the Philippines because it gives an undue
advantage to elective officials who are allowed to remain in office despite the filing of
their certificates of candidacy..
Issues:
Whether the COMELEC resolution 8678 was valid.
Ruling:
No, the original decision declared not only sec. 4(a) of Resolution 8678, but also sec. 13
of R.A. 9369 and sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code as unconstitutional. In nullifying
these provisions, Justice Antonio Eduardo Nachura’s ponencia extensively quoted
Mancuso vs. Taft (476 F.2d 187, March 20, 1973), a 1973 decision of the United States
Court of Appeals involving Kenneth Mancuso, a police officer who was nominated to the
legislature of the State of Rhode Island. In that case, the U.S. appellate court ruled in
favor of Mancuso and nullified the law which required a civil service official to vacate his
post upon nomination to another public office. It held that the right to run for public office
is a fundamental right protected by the Bill of Rights, and being so, any restriction
thereto has to be subjected to strict equal protection review.
The new Decision upheld sec. 4(a) of Resolution 8678, sec. 13 of R.A. 9363 and sec.
66 of the Omnibus Election Code. Nine other justices adopted Justice Puno’s view that
these provisions satisfy the requisites of the equal protection test, especially the second
requirement that it must be germane to the purposes of the law. It was emphasized that
the purpose of the law is to defer to the sovereign will of the people by letting elective
officials serve until the end of the terms for which they were elected notwithstanding the
filing of their certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, the automatic resignation rule
was imposed upon appointive officials because unlike elected politicians, "appointive
officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging in any partisan political activity or from taking part in any election, except to
vote" (Sec. 55 of the Administrative Code of 1987).
The Chief Justice underscored the fact that Mancuso vs. Taft, the U.S. Court of
Appeals case that was heavily relied upon by the Nachura's ponencia, had already been
overturned by prevailing jurisprudence in the United States. The Court cited several
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court stating that the right to express one’s views
through candidacy is not a fundamental right and is neither covered by the freedom of
expression nor the right to association. More importantly, it was ruled that the resign-to-
run rule on appointive officials does not violate a person’s right to run for public
office because such right must give way to the substantial public interest being
protected by the rule—to maintain a civil service that is impartial and free from the evils
of partisan politics.
Main Point:
The right to express one’s views through candidacy is not a fundamental right and is
neither covered by the freedom of expression nor the right to association. Appointive
officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging in any partisan political activity or from taking part in any election, except to
vote.
CASE 213
Section 8. Regular Elections
GR. No. 150605
Codilla v Devenecia
Facts:
Eufrenion M. Codilla and Ma. Victoria Locsin were both candidates for the position of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte for the May 14, 2001 elections. A concerned citizen
filed a disqualification case against the petitioner. The initial result showed that the
petitioner was winning the election, the respondent then filed for a motion to suspend
the proclamation of the petitioner on the grounds that he has a pending disqualification
case, the COMELEC second division granted the respondents petition and release an
ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. COMELEC second division
later on resolved that petitioner was guilty and disqualified him. Despite only garnering
the second highest number of votes Respondent Locsin was still proclaimed winner.
The petitioner then filed for a motion for reconsideration and the ex parte order was
reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void.
Respondent made her defiance and disobedience to the COMELEC en banc resolution
publicly by giving a speech in the house of representative while petitioner asserted his
right to the seat he won.
Issue:
Whether the Proclamation of the respondent is valid.
Ruling:
No, the proclamation of Ma. Victoria Locsin was invalid as it was done prematurely
given that the disqualification case against petitioner had not yet been disposed with
finality. The COMELEC Second Division ordered the proclamation of respondent
Locsin after granting her motion for reconsideration and disqualifying the petitioner but
the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the
proclamation of the petitioner. The respondent garnering only the second highest
number of votes could not take the seat in the office as it does not represent the
electorates choice. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged
before the Court by the respondent Locsin and the said Decision has become final and
executory.
Main Point:
The duly elected official is the one who garnered the most number of votes on the
election regardless if there is a pending disqualification case against him/her.
CASE 214
G.R. No. L-34150
Special Elections
Tolentino v COMELEC
Facts:
On January 2001 after becoming president through the EDSA II, Gloria Arroyo
nominated Senator Teofista Guingona as vice-president. After confirmation as VP, on
February 8, 2001 the senate passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the
vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections
on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in
that election. The resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering
the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former
Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004. On June 5, 2001, The
COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators
to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3
years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th. Arturo
Tolentino and Arturo Mojica as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and nullification of the resolution.
Issue:
Whether the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 is valid.
Ruling:
Yes, the special election held on may 14, 2001, Section 2 of R.A. 6645 states that the
COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if necessary, and state among others, the office/s
to be voted for.
Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election
on May 14, 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in
Resolution No. 84.
Main Point:
the COMELEC can “fix the date of election,” and hold special elections if necessary
CASE 215
18 SCRA 300
Salaries
Philconsa v. Mathay
Facts:
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134. Philippine Constitution
Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of
the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to
permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the
increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took
part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while
the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act
expired on December 30, 1965.
Issue:
Whether the increase of the senators’ salary violates the section 14, of Article VI of the
1935 constitution?
Ruling:
Yes, the increase of the senators salary violates the constitution. The Court agreed with
petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until
December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it will have expired.
Main Point:
No increase in the salaries of the Senators and Members of the House of

Representative shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
CASE 216
G.R. No. 132875-76
Privileged from Arrest
Jalosjos v. People
Facts:
The Accused-Appellant Romeo Jalosjos was convicted of 2 counts of statutory

rape, and six counts of acts of lasciviousness by the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 62 in 1997. The victim of the rape was a 12-year-old. The victim was peddled for
commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father, the acts of
Rape were preceded by several acts of lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions.
Romeo Jalosjos was then a congressman and inspite of being convicted was still re-
elected as a congressman. The Accused-appellant file for a “motion to be allowed to
discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives” including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need
for his constituents to be represented.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant be allowed to attend sessions and committee

hearings of the house of representatives as he is an elected official.
Ruling:
No, the accused-appellant cannot be allowed to attend sessions and committee

hearings of the house of representatives. The court dismisses his appeal on the counts
that allowing him to attend the session will basically make him a free man. The immunity
from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives,
arises from a provision of the Constitution “Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution
provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years’ imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session”. Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been
elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not
inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the
requirement of obedience rather than exemption. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.
Main point:
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him/her
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and
apply to all those belonging to the same class and Members of the House of
Representative is not exempted from the statutes and Laws.
CASE 217
Privilege from Arrest
G.R. No. 179817
TRILLANES V. PIMENTEL
Facts:
The petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades in 2003,
with coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."
almost four years later the petitioner ran for the senate and won, before the
commencement of his term the petitioner file the RTC, Makati City “"Omnibus Motion for
Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related
Requests"4 (Omnibus Motion). He had 6 request all of which were denied by the RTC.
He filed for a reconsideration and trimmed down his request into three and still the trial
court denied his petition. Thus the petitioner filed for an appeal citing citeria and
mandamus. petitioner submits that the fact that the people, in their sovereign capacity,
elected him to the position of senator of the republic provides the proper legal
justification to allow him to work and serve his mandate as a senator. He tried to make a
distinction on his case with that of Jalosjos and unlike Jalosjos who was already
convicted the petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos)
was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, as a mere detention
prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the
presumption of innocence is still in his favor.Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos
was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and
six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d’etat which is
regarded as a "political offense."
Issue:
Whether or not as an elected member of the senate an accused who is detained is

exempted from rules and laws and be allowed to work and serve his mandate as a
senator.
Ruling:
No, The Rules state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s
application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that
the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for
bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an
accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the
criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public
self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos. while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights
upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those
of the public. Presumption of Innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil
and political rights. Being a senator does not exempt the petitioner from rules and laws.
Main Point:
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all
those belonging to the same class and those who won a seat on the senate is not
exempted from the statutes and Laws.
CASE 218
Parliamentary Freedom of Speech
SCRA 876
Jimenez v. Cabangbang
Facts:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives when he

published an open letter to the Philippines on Nov. 14, 1958, the said letter alleged that
there had been plans by some ambitious AFP, some civilian political strategist and
“planners” unwittingly use as tools to stage a coup d’état. Nicanor Jimenez a Col. of
NICA was named as one of the said planners. He immediately filed a case against
Cabangbang for damages saying that the said letter was libelous. Cabangbang
petitioned for the case to be remove as a member of the house of representative saying
he is covered by the privileged communication and the said letter is not even libelous.
The lower court dismisses the plaintiffs’ claims but he appealed.
Issues:
Whether or not the open letter in question is a Privileged communication.
Rulings:
No, The publication in question is not a privileged communication because it does not
fall on “the speech therein” clause of the Artcile VI, Sec 15 but the letter in question is
not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says that
plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners",
and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs
"probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant,
likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the
plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very
document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might
be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely
unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the
plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are
officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question
seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2)
high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the
defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to
expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them
from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent
with the contents of said letter and cannot prevail over the same, it being the very basis
of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said
communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the
alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners".
Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs
were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be
"tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners". Wherefore, the order
appealed from is hereby affirmed
Main Point:
The allegations should be consistent with the “speech” in question.
CASE 219
Parliamentary Freedom of Speech
ANTONINO v VALENCIA
FACTS:
Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the Nacionalista Party
in the election for governor in Davao. Then Senator Antonino issued a statement that
the loss was caused by the support given by Valencia, the Secretary of Public Works, to
the independent LP candidate Maglana which caused a division in LP votes. Antonino
was quoted in various newspapers that had Valencia not “Sabotaged” and “double-
crossed” them, the LP would have won. Antonino then proceeded to file requests to
have Valencia investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on alleged
anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment.
Valencia retaliated by issuing a press release that he will also file charges with the Blue
Ribbon Committee regarding anomalous acts of the Senator. This release was
published in newspapers. Antonino filed this case of damages. Valencia filed a counter-
claim. Lower court ruled in favor of Antonino. Valencia appealed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Press Release issued by Valencia was libelous.
Ruling:
Yes, The court ruled that Vilencia’s statements were defamatory and libelous in nature
as they imputed upon him certain corrupt practices. Also, because the statement was
not issued privately or officially, malice is presumed and such presumption was not
overcome as Valencia did not prove the truth of his statements or that they were
published with good intentions and with a justifiable motive or that they were made in
the exercise of the right of fair comment on the character, good faith, ability and
sincerity of public officials. The court said that had Valencia not been motivated with
malice he would have filed charges against Antonino with the Senate seeing as
Antonino was not a candidate forelection and that his term as senator was no yet to
expire. Also, Valencia cannot claim that his actions were justified in that Antonino was
first in making libelous statements. The anomalous transactions charge was duly filed
with the Blue Ribbon. Also, the statement on sabotage and double crossing cannot be
considered libelous as contemporary politics shows that no stigma of disgrace or
disrepute befalls one who changes political parties.
Main Point:
Any anomalous charge against Senators should be filed with the blue ribbon committee.
Case Number: A.C. No. 7399
Topic: Parliamentary Freedom of Speech
Title: Pobre v. Defensor Santiago
Facts:
Herein complainant, Antero J. Pobre asked the court for disbarment proceedings
or other disciplinary actions against Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago after her speech on
the Senate floor on December 22, 2006. The said speech is alleged to contain
statements and insults that reflected disrespect against Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and other members of the court. The complainant assailed that this speech
constitutes direct contempt of the court. Sen. Defensor-Santiago, through counsel,
argued that the statements she made was covered by the doctrine of parliamentary
immunity as it was part of a speech she delivered in her performance as member of
Congress or its committee. She also stated that the purpose of her is speech is for
future legislation as she only wanted to expose what she believes is an unjust act of the
Judicial and Bar Council which sent out public invitation for the soon to-be vacated
position of Chief Justice and later inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the
Supreme Court would qualify for the nomination.
Issue: Whether or not Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech is covered by the

Doctrine of Parliamentary Immunity and free speech.
Ruling:
Yes, the respondent’s speech is covered by the Doctrine of Parliamentary Immunity and
free speech. Courts does not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner
their functions are performed in legislative floor or in committee rooms. The said
privilege is not destroyed even if the said manner has unworthy purpose, falsity, or
conducted in bad faith. It is only the disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters
that can discourage such speeches with respect to the Doctrine of Parliamentary
Immunity.
In the present case, the excerpt of the respondent’s speech containing

demeaning and denigrating words against the Chief Justice and member of the court
are declared part of her speech in performance of her duty in the legislation. It is also
stated that while in fact the respondent has violated the provision on Unparliamentary
Acts and Language of the Senate which prevents senators to use offensive and
improper language against other senators or any public institution, the Senate President
have not called her to order and her fellow senators avoided on imposing the said
provision against her.
Main Point: The Doctrine of Parliamentary Immunity only applies when an alleged
defamatory speech of a member of the congress is made as a part of his/her
performance as member of the congress.
Topic: Parliamentary Freedom of Speech
Title: Trillanes v. Castillo-Marigomen
Facts:
Antonio F. Trillanes proposed investigation regarding the overpricing of two

Makati City infrastructure against Vice President Jejomar Binay. Makati Vice Mayor
Ernesto Mercado then testified during a Senate Blue Ribbon Sub-Committee (SBRS)
hearing on how he helped VP Binay to acquire and expand a 350-hectare estate in
Batangas. Antonio L. Tiu then claimed absolute ownership of the estate through
Sunchamp Real Estate Corporation and entered a Memorandum of Agreement with
Laureano R. Gregorio Jr. who is the alleged owner of the consolidated estate and its
improvements. During media interviews, Trillanes expressed his opinion that Tiu
appears to be acting as a dummy of Vice President Binay. Antonio L. Tiu then filed a
complaint for moral damages against Trillanes for his alleged defamatory statement that
accuses him to be a dummy before the media. Tiu alleged that he is a legitimate
businessman and Trillanes’ statement caused his reputation to be tarnished, and that
there has been deep drop in the stock prices of his publicly listed companies. Trillanes
then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that his statement was part of an ongoing
debate with matter that concerns the public, and that Tiu, having entered the debate,
gains the status of a public figure or quasi-public figure which allows Trillanes to
possess constitutionally guaranteed rights to free speech and freedom of expression
and of the press. Trillanes further argued that his statements are covered by his
parliamentary immunity under Article VI Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution on the grounds
that the speech was delivered as performance of his duty as a senator. Hon. Evangeline
C. Castillo Marigomen as the presiding judge denied the Motion and Motion for
Reconsideration thus the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Senator Trillanes’ alleged Defamatory Speech against Antonio L. Tiu
before the media is covered by the Doctrine of Parliamentary Immunity as state in Art.
VI Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
No, the defamatory speech given by Sen. Trillanes is not covered by the Doctrine of
Parliamentary Immunity. Article VI Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution states that:
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses

punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in any
committee thereof.
In the present case, Sen. Trillanes’ defamatory speech was not delivered in Senate or
any of its committees. The speech was also not given in an on-going debate therefore it
was not given as a part of the senator’s performance of duty as the speech was not part
of any legislative process.
Main Point: The Doctrine of Parliamentary Immunity only applies when an alleged
defamatory speech of a member of the congress is made as a part of his/her
performance as member of the congress and does not apply when it is given outside
the session of congress.
Case number: G.R. No. 175352
Topic: Prohibitions on Members of Congress
Title: Liban v. Gordon
Facts:
Petitioners Dante V. Liban and other officers of the Board of Directors of the
Quezon City Red Cross Chapter filed a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon
who was then the chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors as having forfeited his seat in the Senate. They alleged that by being the
elected Chairman of the PNRC, Gordon ceased to be a member of the senate in
accordance to Art. VI Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution. Gordon then argued that the
PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation since volunteer service to
the PNRC is neither an office or employment therefore the provisions under Art. VI Sec.
13 of the Constitution cannot be invoked.
Issue: Whether or not Sen. Gordon must forfeit his seat in the senate having been
elected as the Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors on the ground Art. VI Sec. 13
of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
No, Sen. Gordon must not forfeit his seat in the Senate. Art. VI Sec. 13 of the 1987
Constitution provides that:
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other

office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
In the present case, the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation

instead it is classified to be a Private Organization performing Public Functions, and a
non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization. Sen. Gordon who holds
a position at the PNRC and a seat in the Senate therefore cannot be subjected to the
provisions of Art. VI Sec. 13 of the 1897 Constitution and should retain his seat in the
Senate.
Main Point: A member of the senate must only forfeit his seat in the senate if he holds
other office or employment in government-owned or controlled corporations.
Case number: G. R. No. 51122
Topic: Prohibitions Related to the Practice of Profession
Title: Puyat v. De Guzman
Facts:
The International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) held an election for eleven
(11) Board Directors. Puyat Group won six (6) seat while the Acero Group won only five
(5) seat. By default, it will be the Puyat Group that will control the management of the
company. The Acero group then questioned the election in a quo warranto proceedings
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on grounds that the stockholders’
votes were not properly counted. At the conference if the parties, Justice Estanislao A.
Fernandez orally entered his appearance as counsel for the Acero Group. Justice
Fernandez was then member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. The Puyat group then
objected on the grounds of Art. VIII Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution which states that
no Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any
administrative body. The provision prohibited Justice Fernandez to appear as counsel.
On May 15, 1979, Estanislao A. Fernandez have purchased ten (10) shares of stocks
and then filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention at the SEC which was then granted.
The court en banc then issued a temporary restraining order preventing SEC associate
commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor at the proceeding of the
SEC Case however it was reconsidered by the Court of First Instance. Hence the
present petition for Certiorari and Preliminary Injuction.
Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez appearing as counsel before an

administrative body a violation of Art. VIII Sec. 11 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
Yes, Assemblyman Fernandez Appearing as a counsel before an administrative body a

violation of the Art. VIII Sec. 11 of the Constitution. A provision of the said Section reads
as:
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court
without appellate jurisdiction… or before any administrative body.
In the present case, Assemblyman Fernandez acquired only ten (10) out of 262,843
shares and acquired it after the quo warranto suit has been filed. Fernandez also
signified his intention to appear as counsel for Acero but was objected by the Puyat
Group. Realizing the validity of the objection, he then decided to intervene instead on
the ground of legal interest as an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings. The steps taken by Fernandez shows that he indirectly appears as
counsel before an administrative body. Therefore, he is still in violation of the provision
of Art. VIII Sec. 11 of the Constitution.
Main Point: A member of the Batasang even though appearing indirectly as counsel by
other means before any administrative body is still covered by the provision of Art. VIII
Sec. 11 of the Constitution.
Topic: Officers of Congress
Title: Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona
Facts:
The election of officers for the senate was held on July 27, 1998. In the said
election Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was elected as Senate President against Sen. Tatad,
Sen. Ople as Presidest Pro-tempore, and Sen. Drilon as majority leader. Sen. Tatad
then manifested that he was assuming position of a minority leader and that those who
voted for Sen. Fernan is member of the majority. Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that
the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party had chosen Sen. Guingona as
the minority leader. No consensus was arrived. On July 20, 1998, majority leader
informed that he was in receipt of a letter by the seven (7) Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
electing Sen. Guingona as the Minority Leader which was recognized by the senate
president. This then led to the present petition for a quo warranto proceedings on the
grounds that Sen. Guingona have been exercising a position that is alleged to rightfully
belong to Sen. Tatad. Sen. Santiago contended that in determining the majority as
provided by the constitution also carries with it the selection of minority.
Issue: Whether the members violated the constitution by selecting Sen. Guingona as
their minority leader.
Ruling:
No, there was no violation in the constitution made when Sen. Guingona was elected as
Minority leader. While the constitution provides that in the Senate president must be
chosen by more than half of the members, the constitution is silent with regards to the
senate’s process of choosing their officer such as the minority leader. The constitution
gives the congress a prerogative to choose their own officers. In the present case, the
notion that Sen. Tatad should be the minority leader is not supported by any
constitutional provision and the selection of Sen. Guingona as minority leader is an
exercise of the prerogative given by the constitution to the congress. Therefore, no
violation of the constitution was made.
Main Point: While the constitution provides that the Senate president be selected by
more than half its members, the senate is given the prerogative on how to choose their
other officers.
Case number: G.R. No. L-2821
Topic: Meaning of “a quorum to do business” and “compulsion to attend”
Title: Avelino v. Cuenco
Facts:
On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada requested that his right to
formulated charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved and
was approved. On February 21, 1949, Sen. Tañada and Sen. Sanidad filled a resolution
listing the charges against Sen. Avelino. Sen. Avelino and his colleagues Sen.
Francisco and Sen. Tirona had taken steps to delay the privilege speech of Sen.
Tañada. These delaying tactics led to the creation of a huge commotion in the Senate
Floor. Suddenly, Sen. Avelino banged the gavel and hurriedly walked away from the
session hall followed by his partisans. Sen. Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore took
the chair and proceeded with the session and made it of record that the abandonment
of chair by the petitioner allows Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the
remaining senators to continue the session. Sen. Tañada was recognized by the chair
and was able to deliver his privileged speech of the resolution which succeeded in
removing Sen. Avelino as the Senate President and designated Sen. Mariano Jesus
Cuenco as the new Senate President. Sen. Avelino then petitioned for a quo warranto
proceeding to oust Sen. Cuenco and reinstate him as the Senate President.
Issue: Whether or not there is a quorum in the continuation of the session validly
assembled with twenty-two (22) senators in the morning.
Ruling:
Yes, there is a quorum in the continuation of the session. Art. VI Sec. 16 provides:
A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller

number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide
In the present case, there were at least fourteen senators present in the beginning of
the said session, and that the absence of from the country of Sen. Tomas Confesor
makes twelve (12) members of the house out of twenty-four (24) a majority and
constitutes a constitutional majority of the senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Main Point: A majority of each house in the congress is enough to constitute a quorum
for the purpose of conduct business and hold sessions.
Case number: G.R. No. 132875-76
Title: People v. Jalosjos
Facts:
Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-pledged member of congress who is confined at the

national penitentiary while his conviction of multiple non-bailable crimes are pending
appeal. He filed a motion asking that he be allowed to perform his duty as a
congressman. He argues that having been re-elected by his constituents, he has duty to
perform and that a procedural restraint must not hinder him from performing such
functions. One of the grounds for the motion is that A precedent-setting U.S. ruling
allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress as reflected on
the Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
Issue: Whether or not Romeo Jalosjos is allowed to attend Congress Session by virtue
of the Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.
Ruling:
No, Romeo Jalosjos is not to be allowed to attend Congress Session by virtue of

Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution because the member of the congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations specifically state on Sec. 11 Art VI of the constitution.
Main Point: The provision of Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution does not apply
if a member of the congress is absent for legitimate reasons. More so if the reasons for
the absences are has constitutional foundations.
Title: Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines
Facts:
Art. X, Sec. 15-22 mandated the creation of the autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao. Section 18 of the same Article directed Congress to enact an organic act for
these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy. This led
to enactment of RA No. 6743 which scheduled the first regular elections for the regional
officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its
ratification. Then came the enactment of RA No. 9054 which resets the regular elections
for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. Enactment of
RA 9140 then followed and reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under
RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054
to not later than August 15, 2001 which was ratified on August 14, 2001. RA No. 9333
was then passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday
of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Following the
enactment of these acts, the Regional Election for ARMM should have been held on
August 8, 2011 which the COMELEC has prepared for however RA 10153 was then
enacted resetting the elections again to May 2013 so that it coincides with regular
national and regional elections. Passage of the said law led to the filing of different
petitions against its constitutionality. The court then issued a Temporary Restraining
Order to prevent RA 10153 to be enacted and order incumbent officials to perform their
functions if the case is not resolve by the end of their term. The petitioner argued that
RA 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153, having amended RA 9054 requires to
comply with the super majority vote.
Issue: Whether or not the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments to RA

No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?
Ruling:
Yes, the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments to RA No. 9054 violate
Section 1 and Section 16 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The provisions of the
said article states that the majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business which means the mere majority of the members of the House of
Representative or Senate is enough to do business and hold sessions more so to enact
laws or approve acts.
Main Point: A majority of each house in the congress is enough to constitute a quorum
for the purpose of conduct business and hold sessions. This include enacting and
approving acts and policies.
Case No: G.R. No. 127255
Topic: Internal Rules and Discipline
Title: Arroyo vs De Venecia
Facts:
Republic Act 8240 was an act created to amend provision of the National Internal
Revenue Code imposing specific taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes. The republic act was originally from the House of the Representatives which
was approved on the 3rd reading and was sent to the senate who also approved it with
some amendments. This pushed the creation of a Bicameral Conference to resolve the
disagreeing provisions between the two versions of the Republic Act. On November 21,
1996 the bicameral conference transmitted its report to the house. During the
conference, Rep. Exequiel Javier proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech which
was then interpellated by Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento. Sarmiento’s interpellation was
however interrupted by Rep. Arroyo who moved to adjourn the session due to a lack of
quorum which was objected by Rep. Antonio Cuenco and asked for a head count. After
head count, Raul Daza declared the presence of the quorum. The interpellation then
went on and Raul Daza moved to approve and ratify the said report, Mr. Diokno stood
up and objected but Mr. Daza went on approving the report. A petition for certiorari and
prohibition to challenge the validity of Republic Act No. 8240 was then filed by Joker
Arroyo on the grounds that Jose de Venecia and other respondents violated Rule VIII,
§35, Rule XVII, §103, Rule XIX, §112, Rule XVI, §97, Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI,
§123, and Rule XVIII, §109 of House Rules in the passage of the Republic Act.
Petitioner asserts that the violation of House Rules is coequal to violation of the
Constitution as the House Rules are constitutionally mandated. The petitioner said that
the court should not rely on the certification of the speaker of the house that the law has
been passed and review the same as part of their power to pass claims on grave abuse
of discretion by other departments as stated in Article VIII, Sec.1 of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General and Jose De Venecia then argued that the court is not the proper
forum for enforcement of the rules of the House on the ground of the separation of
power doctrine, and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill
doctrine.
Issue: Whether or not the court can declare an act of legislature void due to the
violation of their own internal rules by the power given to the courts on Article VIII, Sec.1
of the Constitution.
Ruling:
No. The court cannot declare an act of legislature void due to their violation of their own
internal rules.
The rules violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a
law. The court ruled that the notion of Article VI Sec. 6 (3) of the constitution which
states that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings is to support claims
of autonomy without the interference of the courts, or to prevent invocation of a judicial
review. This denies the courts the power to rule on allegation on the ground of violation
of own internal rules whereas no right of a private individual was violated.
In the present case, the Jose de Venecia and other representatives only violated
internal rules of the house which succeeded to prevent petitioner to question the
presence of a quorum, therefore the courts cannot declare the passage of Republic Act
No. 8240 null and void.
Main Point: The courts cannot interfere on issues regarding internal rules of the
congress. Mere violation of internal rules of the house in a legislative act cannot be held
as ground to declare the said act as null and void.
Case number: G.R. No. L-17144
Topic: Internal Rules and Discipline
Title: Osmeña, Jr. vs Pendatun
Facts:
On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., delivered a one-hour

privileged speech which was allegedly made maliciously and recklessly and would
constitute serious assault upon the dignity of the Office of the President which is a
symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people. A speciate committee of fifteen
members was then created to investigate on the truth of the charges given in his
speech. After allowing Osmeña to defend himself, the committee submitted a report
finding Congressman Osmeña guilty of serious disorderly behavior and suspended him
for fifteen months. Osmeña then filed for a petition for certiorari, declaratory relief, and
prohibition with preliminary injunction. One of Osmeña’s argument is that the House has
no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Issue: Whether or not the House of Representative has the power to suspend one of its
members pursuant to Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution.
Ruling:
Yes, the House of Representative has the power to suspend one of its members
pursuant to Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution. The provision of the said article
states that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the
House of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place. This means that
the power to decided on disciplinary cases should be done in the congress and the
member of the same.
Main Point: It is only the congress that has the power to decide on cases on the
discipline and behavior of their members.
CASE NO. 230
ARTICLE VI SECTION 16. OFFICERS OF CONGRESS; QUOROM; DISCIPLINE;
JOURNAL/RECORDS
Internal Rules and Discipline
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan in ordering the
preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in
connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In Oct 1988, Santiago approved the application for
legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted
with bad faith. Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were also filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
The Sandiganbayan issued an order for the arrest of the petitioner with a fixing
the bail at Fifteen Thousand Pesos. After a long series of appeals and court battles
between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of
Santiago from office who was already a senator by then. Sandiganbayan ordered that
Santiago be suspended from office for 90 days.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate
without violating the Constitution.
Ruling: YES. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of
an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. The order of suspension prescribed by
Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution. The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons
indicted upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective
officials; or permanent or temporary employees or pertaining to the career or non-career
service.
Main point: It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an
order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it.
Once the information is found to be enough in form and substance, the court is bound to
issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and
buts about it.
CASE NO. 231
JOURNAL/RECORDS
Duty to Keep Journals and Records
US v. Pons
Facts: The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with
the crime of illegal importation of opium. Beliso and Pons both appealed. Beliso later
withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has become final.
The court erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion, dated May 6, 1915, and
reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the legal evidence of record
establishes the guilt of the appellant, Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt. In his
motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the
special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that
Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty was not passed or
approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the
same is null and void.
Issue: Whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals.
Ruling: YES. Provided, that in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers
and the secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such
Act and of the due enactment thereof.
Main point: The Court would take notice of the legislative journals with regards to
adjournment of the Legislature and it is assumed as valid and have been signed.
CASE NO. 232
JOURNAL/RECORDS
Casco Phil. Commercial Co. v. Gimenez
Facts: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim
for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
The Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the
ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate
importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Section 2,
paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2069. On appeal taken by petitioner, fie Auditor
General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this
petition for review.
Issue: Whether "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the
aforesaid margin fee.
Ruling: NO. The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde"
instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor
of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
Main Point: The Congress intended to exempt "urea", and "formaldehyde" separately
as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue.
CASE NO. 233
JOURNAL/RECORDS
Morales v. Subido
Facts: The respondent Commission of the Civil Service, Abelardo Subido, approved his
designation but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum educational
and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. The pertinent rule cited is
that of sec. 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (RA 4864). The respondent, instead certified
other persons as qualified for the post and called the attention of the Mayor of Manila to
fill the vacancy within 30 days as required by sec. 4 of the Decentralization Act.
The petitioner requested for a mandamus from the Court to compel the
respondent to include him in the list of eligible persons to the post of Chief of Police of
Manila for the consideration of the City Mayor. He contended that he is qualified despite
lacking a college degree under the statement of the afore mentioned rule:
“has served in the police department of any city with the rank of captain or
its equivalent therein for at least three years”
Issue: Whether the petitioner is qualified or eligible based on the enrolled bill.
Ruling: No. The petition for mandamus to compel the respondent Commissioner of Civil
Service to include the name of the petitioner will not be granted since taking the present
state of the law, he is neither qualified nor eligible. Even if ,as noted by the Court, there
may be a possibility of omission of a phrase, when the bill was passed by the Congress
to the Senate, that may permit the interpretation that he is qualified, the enrolled bill in
possession of the legislative secretary of the President, is signed by the Presidents of
both the Lower and Upper Houses together with their respective secretaries and the
President and therefore must be deemed valid and binding to the Court.
Main point: The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of
the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially
published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. We cannot go behind the enrolled Act
to discover what really happened.
CASE NO. 234
JOURNAL/RECORDS
Astorga v. Villegas
Facts: The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266,
which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of
the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten
and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise
Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
Although the fact that it was the Tolentino ammendment that was approved only
the Roxas ammendment was included and therefore has been approved by the
Congress and the President. However, when the error was discovered, both the Senate
President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures.
Issue: Whether or not the entries in the journal should prevail over the enrolled bill.
Ruling: YES. It has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and
the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals
and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law,
which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the
Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein.
Main point: The majority of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it
cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and that the decision therein
constitutes a binding precedent.
CASE NO. 235
JOURNAL/RECORDS
Phil. Judges Assn. v. Prado
Facts: The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official
functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. It is asserted by
the petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular
they are here challenging.
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1)
its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did
not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill
in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
Issue: Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
Ruling: NO. It is unconstitutional. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the
body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement. The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate
shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both
chambers. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the
enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered
in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Main point: Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners'
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2)
of the Constitution.
CASE NO. 236
JOURNAL/RECORDS
Abakada v. Ermita
Facts: ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27,
2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5
imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on
sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a
uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006.
Preliminarily, respondents contend that R.A. No. 9337 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality and petitioners failed to cast doubt on its validity.
Issue: Whether there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
Ruling: NO, since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively made in the
House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to
introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No.
1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, are hereby dismissed.
Main point: The Court is neither blind nor is it turning a deaf ear on the plight of the
masses. But it does not have the panacea for the malady that the law seeks to remedy.
As in other cases, the Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply
because of its yokes. Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong
there is a remedy, and that the judiciary should stand ready to afford relief.
CASE NO. 237
ARTICLE VI SECTION 17. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal, Nature and Power
Angara v. Electoral Commission
Facts: This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara,
for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission,
one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro
Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the
respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province
of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7,1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the
petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having
received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the. National Assembly in session assembled
Issue: Whether the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Ruling: NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction
in taking knowledge of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly. The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take knowledge of the protest filed by the
respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier
resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election
protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest
within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. The Court
denied the petition.
Main point: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
CASE NO. 238
Pre-proclamation controversies v. Election Contests; Scope of inquiry; When proper
election contest
Vera v. Avelino
Facts: In May 25, 1946, The Philippine Senate passed a resolution excluding Senators-
elect Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero —shall not be sworn, nor
seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest lodged
against their election. The protest involved that during the election there have been
certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in Pampanga, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija,
and Tarlac.
Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues
responsible for the resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling
respondents to permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial
prerogative.
Issue: Whether the respondents act of jurisdiction over the petitioners are valid.
Ruling: No, because the facts alleged in the petition show that petitioner’s fundamental
rights have been trampled upon in open defiance of the law and the Constitution; that
respondents, in adopting the resolution and trying to enforce it, usurped constitutional
functions exclusively entrusted to the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate.
Main Point: The Supreme Court has no actual jurisdictions over the case, due to the
separation of powers therefore holding that the case was not a contest and affirmed the
inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.
CASE NO. 239
Pre-proclamation controversies v. Election Contests; Scope of inquiry; When proper
election contest
Roces v. HRET
Facts: On January 5, 2004, a registered voter of Manila named Alejandro Gomez

questioned Mr. Ang Ping’s candidacy before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
through a petition to deny due course or cancel his Certificate of Candidacy. He was
disqualified for the position for misrepresenting himself to be a natural-born citizen.
The Spouses Ang Ping appealed the Board resolution to the COMELEC and filed
a petition to annul the proclamation of Roces’ win but was dismissed. Therefore, Mrs.
Ang Ping filed an Election Protest with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
The petitioner immediately filed a motion to dismiss the protest, assailing in the
main the personality of Mrs. Ang Ping to file the protest.
Issue: Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction to

review a resolution or order of the COMELEC and/or declare the same as void and
disregard or set it aside.
Ruling: Yes, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the jurisdiction to
review the resolution and there is no doubt that the COMELEC’s resolution are void for
violating Mrs. Ang Ping’s constitutional right to due process.
Main point: The respondent of the case was denied due process and was forced to
seek justice in the House of the Electoral Tribunal and the petition was dismissed.
SEÑERES V. COMELEC
G.R.NO. 178678 APRIL 16, 2009
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
In 1999, private respondent Robles was elected president and chairperson of Buhay , a party-
list group duly registered with COMELEC. The constitution of buhay provides a three-year term
for all its party officers, without re-election. Buhay participated in the past two elections (2001
and 2004) with Robles as its president. On March 29, 2007, Robles signed and filed a
Certification of Nomination of BUHAY’s nominees for the 2007 elections containing the
following names: (i) R. Velarde, (ii) M.C. Coscolluela, (iii) W.I. Tieng, (iv) M. R. Monsod, and (v).
T.B.. Villarama. However, On March 27, 2007, petitioner Hans Christian Señeres , holding
himself up as acting president and secretary –general of Buhay, also filed a Certificate of
nomination with the Comelec, nominating : (i) himself, (ii) H. Dumlao,(iii) A. Baustista, ( iv) V.P.
C. Trinidad, and (v) E. Solangon, Jr. Señeres, as the petitioner, filed with the Comelec a
petition to Deny due course to certificates of nomination of Robles. Señeres asserts that He was
the acting-president and secretary- general of BUHAY, when Robles vacated the position since
August 17, 2004. He claimed the nominations made by Robles were null and void due to lack of
authority and expiration of term. He added, under the constitution, Robles was disqualified
from being an officer of any political party and as the acting Administrator of the light Railway
Transport Authority (LRTA), a government-controlled corporation. Señeres asserts that Robles
was into a political partisan activity while being a civil public servant. On the other hand, Robles
filed for the recognition of Jose D . Villanuva as the new representative of BUHAY in the House
of Representatives for the remaining term until June 30, 2007. He also filed on the same day
an “ urgent motion to declare Null and Void the certificate of nomination and acceptance filed
by Dr.Hans Christian M. Señeres, and companions.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not that Mr. Robles ‘s position as president of Buhay while the
acting Administrator at LRTA is unconstitutional?
RULING: NO. It was not unconstitutional. ON July 19, 2007, the COMELEC issued the assailed
resolution declaring “ Melquiades A. Robles as the duly authorized representative of Buhay and
to act in behalf pursuant to its Constitution and By-laws.”. His Connection with LRTA COULD
NOT BE CONSIDERED as a factor invalidating the nomination process. MAIN POINT: Since
Señeres failed to file a petition for quo warrant before the HRET within 10 days from receipt of
the July 19, 2007 resolution declaring the validity of Roble’s certificate of nomination, said
resolution has become final and executor. This petition has become moot and had dismissed.
LIMKAICHONG V. COMELEC
G.R. NOS. 178831-32 July 30, 2009
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: Jocelyn Sy- Limkaichong as petitioner.
 Which the court granted her petition for certiorari ( GR.NO. 178831-320.
The court dismissed all other petitions ( GR. NO. 179132-33) and
GR.NO. 179240-41) including Louis C. Biraogo as respondent also
petition for oral argument in GR. NO. 179120 which has denied for lack of
merit in the decision dated April 1, 2009.
ISSUES: Whether or not qualification requirement( Citizenship) would disqualify
Limkaichong to run, be elected to, and assume and discharge as the position for the
first district of NEGROS ORIENTAL.
RULINGS: No. She was not disqualify. After the COMELEC has rendered its Joint
Resolution. LImkaichong was proclaimed by the provincial Board of Canvassers, she
has taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assusme the office on July
23, 2007. The Comelec’s jurisdiction ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
The questioning party may now present his case in a proper proceeding before the
HRET. Section 17.Article Vi of the 1987 Constitution provides: “ The senates and the
House of representatives, shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members. The motion for reconsideration with prayer for oral argument filed
by petitioner Louis C. Biraogo in GR. No. 179120 is denied with finality.
MAIN POINT: The 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on
citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and
must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the entire tenure.
AQUINO V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120265 SEPTEMBER 18, 1995
KATIPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: March 20, 1995- petitioner Agapito A. Aquino files his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Representative for the new second Legistlative District of Makati City.
His current address: 284 Amapola cor.adalla sts., Palm Village, Makati.
Residence disqualification case = filed by Move Makati ( Political party) and Mateo
Bedon ( chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of brgy. Cempo, Makati City on April 24,
1995. A period not less than a year= residence requirement for candidate under section
6, Art.VI of the 1987 the Constitution. 1 year and 13 months = details restated in item 8
of his second filing of Certificate of Candidacy on April 25, 1995. He stated “ 10 months”
in his first filing of COC. On May 2, 1995- Aquino filed his answer dated April 25, 1995
praying for dismissal for disqualification case, and presented his lease of contract and
testified during hearing in the same day. His affidavit dated May 2, 1995, lease contract
between the petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated Aprll 1, 1995. After hearing, the
Comelec ( second division)= promulgated a resolution dated May 6, 1995, “resolves to
dismiss the instant petition for disqualification and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the
OFFICE OF REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SECOND LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF
MAKTI CITY. But on May 10, 1995= private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed
an urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to suspend proclamation of petitioner.May 15, 1995=
COMELEC en banc issued an order suspending petitioner’s proclammation.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS ELIGIBLE FOR THE ELECTIVE

POSITION OF REPRESENTATIVE OF MAKATI CITY’S SECOND DISTRICT.
RULINGS: No. The petitioner is not eligible.THE Constitution requires that a person
seeking election to the house of Representatives should be a resident of the district in
which he sees election for a period of not less than one (1) year Prior to elections. On
June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of
Second Division Dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows: “ Agapito A. Aquino Is
declared ineligible and disqualified as a candidate for the office of Representative of the
Second Legislative District of Makati City, in May 8, 1995 elections, for the lack of
constitutional qualification of residence.. MAIN -POINT: While property ownership is not
and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, petitioner himself
claims that he has other residences in Manila, he claims to be resident of condominium
unit in Makati. Indicate in transferring is physical residence or domicile is not to acquire
new residence “ but only to qualify as a candidate for representative of the Second
district in Makati.
PEREZ V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133944 October 28, 1999
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS: Marcita Mamba Perez ( Petitioner) petitions for the disqualification of private
respondent Rodolfo E. Aquinaldo as a candidate for representative of the Third District
of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections, as well as the resolution of the COMELEC
en banc, dated June 11, 1998, denying motion for reconsideration. March 26, 1998,
private respondent Aquinaldo files his COC for representative of the 3rd district of
Cagayan in May 11 1198 elections. March 30, 1998, Petitioner Perez petition for
disqualification of Aquinaldo as candidate representative for 3 rd district on the following
grounds: Respondent’s Certificate of Candidacy (For Governor);Voter’s affidavit which
He used in 1987,1988,1992,1995 and 1997 elections ;and his voter’s registration record
dated June 22, 1997, In all of which stated that he is a resident of Barangay Calaogan
Dackel, Municipality of Gattaran( outside of 3rd district of Cagayan.Petitioner Perez
asserts that private respondent Aquinaldo filed a n application for the transfer of his
registration as voter from Gattaran, Cagayan ( First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (
#rd district) only on Dec. 17, 1997 and was approved on January 7, 1998. Respondent
Aquinaldo presented a n affidavit of the owner of apartment, where He lived together
with her mistress in Tuguegarao, Cagayan; contract of lease of another residential unit
in Kamias St., Tuguegarao Cagayan from July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996 to proved;
Marriage certificate to his wife; and Birth certificate of their daughter; and various letters
had showed that he had been a RESIDENT OF TUGUEGARAO, CAGAYAN at least
one year before the May 11, 1998 elections. He succeeded and proclaimed elected on
May 16, 1998.
ISSUES: Whether or not the dismissal of Perez’s petition for the disqualification of
private respondent Rodolfo E. Aquinaldo is constitutional? Yes it’s constitutional.
RULINGS: Petitioner Perez argued that the proclamation of private respondent was
not a legal impediment to the continuation of the hearing on her motion was, however,
denied by the COMELEC en ban it its resolution of June 11, 1998. Art VI SEC6 OF THE
constitution staes “ no person shall be a member of House of representatives unless he
is a natural –born citizen of the Philippines; at least 25 years old; able to read and write,
registered voter in the district( for party-list representatives) and a RESIDENT FOR A
PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN A YEAR immediately preceding the day of the election...
The contention of the petitioner has no merit. The petition is dismissed.
MAIN-POINT: This case explained permanent residency as requirement for

candidacy. No personal reasons “ like having aresident with mistress/ non-legitimate
family ” stated in Art VI, Sec6.as ground to invalidate/disqualify respondent Aquinaldo.
AGGABAO V. COMELEC
G.R.NO. 163756 JANUARY 26, 2005
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Georgidi B. Aggabao and private respondent Anthony Miranda

were rival or running candidates for Congress for the 4th District of Isabela during the
May 10, 2004 elections.
On June 14, 2004, Miranda was proclaimed as the duly elected Congressman for th 4 th
Disrtict of Isabela.
Two days after the proclamation, Aggabao filed this petition claiming that COMELEC en
Banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered and has not yet resolved.
Issues: The basis issue is whether or not the proclamation of Miranda is valid.
Ruling: Article Vi. Sec !7 of the 1987. Constitution provides the senate and the house of
representatives shall have an electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.
Thus , once the winning candidate has been proclaim, taken his oat, and assumed
office as a member of the house of the representatives. Comelec’s jurisdiction ends.
And HRET”S own jurisdiction begin.
This instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Main –point: Separation of power and authority happens when Comelec’s jurisdiction
ends after the election. And begins with HRET.
BARBERS V. COMELEC
FACTS: Robert Z. Barbers and Rodolfo Biazon were candidates for re-elction to the
Senate in the Philippines in the May 10, 2004 in a synchronized and NATIONAL
ELECTION.Barbers filed a petition to the proclamation of Biazon as senator.
Issue: Whether the supreme court can take cognizance on this petition.
Held: NO. It is the Sante Electoral Tribunal that has the exclusive jurisdictionto entertain
this kind of petition.
Ruling: Article VI Sec. 17 of the 1987 Consttitution.
RASUL V. COMELEC
G.R.NO. 134142 August 24, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari under rule 64 in relation to rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to set aside resolution No.3047-a PROMULGATED ON May 29,
1998 of the Commissions of Elections en banc proclaiming the 12 winning the senatorial
candidates, particularly the proclamation of private respondent Terea Aquino- Oreta.
ISSUES: Whether or not the issuance of a writ of Mandamus against the respondent
Commission to compel it to canvass and to conduct special elections.
RULINGS: Resolution no. 3047-A “ The commission on elctions sitting en banc as the
Nationan Board of Canvassers for the election of senators of the Philippines, officially
canvasses in open and public proceedings the certificates of cancass of votes cast
nationwidw for senators in the national and local elections conducted on May 11, 1998.
Petitioner argues that the commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amoumnting
to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. The instant petition is dismissed.
GUERRERO V. COMELEC
G.R.NO. 137004 JULY 26, 2000
FACTS: On May 8, 1998, Farias filed his certificate of candidacy with the comelec
substituting candidate chevylle V. Farras.
On May 9, 1998, Ruiz filed an “ UrgentEx-parte motion to resolve petition”with the

Comelec, attaching thereto a copy of the certificate of candidacy of Farias.
Petitioner Guerrero argues that the refusal of the COMELECTO RULE THE
VALIDITYOR INVALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF Farias amounted to grave
abuse.
ISSUES; Whether or not the Comelec committedgrave abuse of discretion in holding
that the determination of the validit of thecertificate of candidacy of respondent Farias.
Ruling: COC is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ElectoralTribunal of the
house of Representatives, and whether or not the COMELEC failed in its constitutional
duty and enforce all las relativeto elections. Wherefore , the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
VILLAROSA V. HRET
G.R.No. 143351 September 14, 2000
DAVIDE, JR., j.:
Facts: Consolidated case ( ordered on 15 Aug. 2000) ( Case no. 98-030)

- An election protest filed by private respondent Ricardo V. Quintos ( Henceforth
Quintos) against petitioner : Amelita C. Villarosa ( hereafter Villarosa) before the
house of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( Hereafter HRET).
- Villarosa and Quintos were the only candidates running for the office of
representatives of the lone Legislature District of Occidental Mindoro on May 11,
1998 in a suynchronized national and local election.
-
ISSUES: Whether or not the votes using initials “ JTV” will be counted in favor of the
protestee.
RULING: In May 11, 1998 resolution, the Comelec En Banc unanimously grantedthe
petition in election matter # 98-044, it ruled that the prostestee “ annot use the nickname
“JTV” considering, tht initials brings misconceptions knowing that the same initial is not
here real name to which she was known as “ GIRLIE” in her locality.
ABAYON VS. HRET
G.R.No. 189466 February 11, 2010
Abad, j.:
FACTS: Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayonis the first nominee of the Angat Tayo
Party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007
elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl s. Dela Crus, and Agustin C. Doroga, all
registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against
Aangat tayo and its nominee.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Aangat Tayo party-list as eligible party-list to seat in the
House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors,
RULING: Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET hadno jurisdiction over the
petition quo warranto since respondednt Lucaban and the others with him attacked the
registration of AAngat Tayo as a party- list organization, a matter that fell within the
jurisdiction of the Comelec. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the the House
of representatives, and not Abayon was just its nominee. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, were internal concerns of AAngat Tayo.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order,dismissing the petitionas against
Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.
The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET DENIED.
CASE NO. 250 G.R. NO. 134792

ARTICLE 6 SEC 17: ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES VS. ELECTION CONTESTS
Garcia vs. HRET
Facts: On May 29, 1998, petitioners filed a petition for quo warranto before the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against newly elected Congressman
Harry Angping. Petitioners questioning the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold
office in the House of Representatives on the grounds that he was not natural-born
Filipino citizen, which is one of the requirements for running for said position in public
office. On June 10, 1998, the HRET issued a resolution dismissing the petition for quo
warranto for failure to pay the Php 5,000.00 cash deposit required by its rules. After
receiving a copy of the mentioned resolution, petitioners paid the P5,000.00 cash
deposit on the 26th of June 1998 and attached the corresponding receipt to the Motion
for Reconsideration they filed with the HRET on the same day. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was, however, denied, in view of Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules
which required a Php 5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees for quo warranto
cases. Therefore, another petition was filed under the notion that the HRET committed a
grave abuse of discretion by denying the earlier petition despite of the actual payment of
the Php 5000.00 cash.
Issue 1: Whether the court can acknowledge the petition for certiorari.
Issue 2: Whether the HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the
petition for quo warranto.
Ruling 1: Yes, the court, under this circumstance, can acknowledge the petition for
certiorari. In Robles vs. HRET (181 SCRA 780), the Court explained that while the
judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial interference. However, the Court may only
practice its extrajudicial jurisdiction only upon a determination that the decision of HRET
was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling 2: No, the HRET did not commit a grave abuse of discretion through dismissal
of the earlier petition. As recorded, petitioners filed their petition for quo warranto on
May 29, 1998. However, the required cash deposit of Php 5,000.00 was paid only on
June 26, 1998, which was after the dismissal of the petition and only after an
unreasonable delay of 28 days. In dismissing the petition, the HRET acted judiciously,
correctly, and certainly within its jurisdiction under its rules.
Main Point: While it is true that the function of this Court is merely to check whether
grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the HRET in the dismissal of the
petition for quo warranto. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will
prosper only if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in
excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent tribunal. In the absence of such a
showing, there is no reason for this Court to annul the decision of the respondent
tribunal or to change it.
CASE NO. 251 G.R. NO. 84297
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES V. ELECTION PROTESTS
Lazatin v. HET
Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative
of the first district of Pampanga during the elections of May 11, 1987. During the
canvassing of the votes, private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain election
returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he
brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC
ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning
candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC
ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes
and to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as
Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare
petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to
prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second
petition so petitioner was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15,
1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner argues
that even assuming that the period to file an election protest was suspended by the
pendency of the petition to annul his proclamation, the petition was filed out of time,
considering that he was proclaimed on May 27, 1987 and therefore private respondent
had only until June 6, 1987 to file a protest; that private respondent filed a petition to
annul the proclamation on May 28, 1987 and the period was suspended and began to
run again on January 28, 1988. Private respondent therefore only had nine days left or
until February 6, 1988 within which to file his protest; but that private respondent filed
his protest with the HRET only on February 8, 1988.
Issue 1: Whether the initial petition of the respondent was on time according to the
rules of the HRET
Ruling 1: Yes. Basing off the foregoing rule, the protest should have been filed within
fifteen days from November 22, 1987, or not later than December 7, 1987. However, on
September 15, 1987, the COMELEC acting upon a petition filed by the Protestant
(private respondent herein), promulgated a Resolution declaring the proclamation void
ab initio. This resolution had the effect of nullifying the proclamation, and such
proclamation was not reinstated until Protestant received a copy of the Supreme Court's
decision annulling the COMELEC Resolution on January 28, 1988. For all intents and
purposes, therefore, petitioner’s term became effective only on January 28, 1988, and
the fifteen-day period for Protestant to file his protest must be reckoned from that date.
Main Point: According to the HRET rule no. 17, electoral protests shall be made within
15 days from the proclamation of the winning candidate and can only be filed by the 2 nd
or 3rd highest vote garnering rival.
CASE NO. 252. 211 SCRA 315
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
Chavez vs. COMELEC
Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 104704,
disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for the Office of
Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner, Francisco Chavez, filed an urgent
motion with the COMELEC hoping that it would disseminate through the fastest
available means to all regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, city
and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the 6 accredited political
parties and the general public; Also, petitioner also hoped the COMELEC order said
election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of
candidates tally sheets, election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified
Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued
Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of
qualified candidates.
Issue 1: Whether the law allows for pre-proclamation controversy involving the election
of the members of the Senate
Issue 2: Whether the votes under the disqualified candidate, Melchor Chavez, be
counted in favor of Francisco Chavez under the notion that the COMELEC failed to
remove/delete the name of Melchor Chavez from ballots thus leaving room for error and
confusion on the part of Francisco Chavez voters?
Ruling 1: No. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation
controversies involving local elective officials, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in
elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives: For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator
and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be.
Ruling 2: No. In this instance, the petitioner's allegation that Melchor Chavez votes
were either invalidated or declared stray has no relation to the correctness or
authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Otherwise stated, petitioner has not
demonstrated any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or election returns before
the Comelec which would warrant their correction. Premises considered, the Court
resolved to dismiss the petition due to lack of merit.
Main Point: No pre-proclamation controversies shall be allowed for matters stated in
ruling 1 of the election returns when said cases are about the president, vice-president,
senator, and member of the house of representatives. Furthermore, as the authenticity
of the certificates of canvass or election returns are not questioned, they must be prima
facie considered valid for purposes of canvassing the same and proclamation of the
winning candidates.
CASE NO. 253. 166 SCRA 651
COMPOSITION
Abbas vs. SET
Facts: On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11,
1987 congressional elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent Tribunal
was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators, On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada
but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been designated Member of the
Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal Party and
resigned as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent
Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from
the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them are
interested parties to said case, as respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene
Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case, had filed a Petition to Recuse and
later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on
essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in the
same contest, thereafter, filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the
motion for disqualification or inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and
oral arguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards issuing
the Resolutions now complained of.
Issue 1: Whether it is constitutional to inhibit all 6 senators, whom all are part of the
Tribunal?
Ruling 1: No. The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in
its disposition of the incidents referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it
acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or
inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The petition for certiorari is dismissed due to lack of
merit.
Main Point: The Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations of for the substitution of senators designated to the Tribunal. Litigants must
simply place their trust and hopes for the vindication in the fairness and sense of justice
of the Tribunal. On the other hand, a senate member may voluntarily inhibit himself from
the SET if he feels that his personal interests and biases will stand against objective
and impartial judgment. In the context of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally
function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of
its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
CASE NO. 254 G.R. NO. 141489
COMPOSITION
Pimentel vs. HRET
Facts: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in
accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included,
for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations
whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14
party-list representatives from 13 organizations. Due to the votes it garnered, the APEC
party was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list
groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives
belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Commission on Appointments (CA)
contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice,
the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who
are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA. From records, it does not appear that after
the 11th of May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their
representatives to the HRET or the CA. As the date of filing, the House contingents to
the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the
different political parties. On 18 January 2000, the petitioners filed motions to the then
senate president (who was acting as the CA chairman) and associate justice, Jose Melo
(acting HRET chairman at the time), to restructure of the CA and the HRET,
respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Under the Constitution and the Party-List System
Act, party-list representatives should have at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in
the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue 1: Whether the present composition of the HRET violate the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list
representatives in the HRET?
Issue 2: Whether he refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to
include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion?
Ruling 1: No. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and
party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the
HRET and the CA.
Ruling 2: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the
CA in response to the petition made by Senator Pimentel because the decisions made
are under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal
rules.
Main Point: Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate
and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the
12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on
Appointments.
CASE NO. 255. 201 SCRA 792
INDEPENDENCE
Bondoc vs. Pineda
Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio
Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the 4th District
of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of
whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over
Pineda with a margin of 107 votes. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the
SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the
contest. On the evening of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman
Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for
allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for
allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day
of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing
the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the HRET.
Issue: Whether the House of Representatives may change the its representation in the
HRET due to partisan changes to intervene in the decision made by the tribunal
beforehand.
Ruling: No. The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral
Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination
of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As judges, the
members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the
political party to which they belong. the House of Representatives committed a grave
abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Main Point: Loyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. Membership in the HRET may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member‘s congressional term of
office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents
in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid
cause.
CASE NO. 256. 181 SCRA 780
ACTION / DECISION
Robles vs. HRET
Facts: Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were
candidates for the position of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the
May 11, 1987, congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed the winner on
December 23, 1987. Romeo Santos then filed an electoral. contest with HRET on
grounds of electoral fraud and irregularities. Mr. Santos called for reappreciation of
votes. Santos filed motion to withdraw contest but later filed urgent motion to recall his
previous motion. The 1st Motion was not acted upon by HRET, while the 2nd Motion
granted. Robles claimed that the 1st motion divested HRET of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether the HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion by acting with or
without excess of its jurisdiction?
Ruling: No. The HRET did not commit a grave abuse of discretion because the
petitioner was not deprived of due process and the tribunal only acted according to the
established HRET rules.
Main Point: It is an established doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at
the instances of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. The Tribunal
retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective
only when the motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the
Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired.
CASE NO. 257. 246 SCRA 384
ACTION / DECISION
Arroyo vs. HRET
Facts: After the May 11, 1992 elections, Arroyo was declared as the duly elected
Congressman of the lone district of Makati. Arroyo won by 13,559 votes over his
opponent. His opponent Syjuco protested the declaration before the HRET. Syjuco
alleged that Arroyo won due to massive fraud hence he moved for revision and
recounting. HRET gave way but during the process some HRET employees and
personnel conducted some irregularities. After some paper battles between the two,
Syjuco, realizing that mere revision and recounting would not suffice to overthrow the
more than 12,000 votes lead of Arroyo over him, revised his complaint by including and
introducing in his memorandum cum addendum that his complaint is actually based on
a broader and more equitable non-traditional determination of the existence of the
precinct-level document-based anomalies and that the revision he initially sought is just
incidental to such determination. The 3 justices of the HRET ruled that such amendment
is already beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the 6 representative members ruled
otherwise. Consequently, by a vote of 6-3, the HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by
Syjuco and the HRET later declared Syjuco as the winner.
ISSUE: Whether HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Ruling: No. However guised or justified by Syjuco, this innovative theory he introduced
for the first time in his memorandum cum addendum indeed broadened the scope of the
election protest beyond what he originally sought-the mere revision of ballots. From his
initial petition for revision which lays primary, if not exclusive emphasis on the physical
recount and appreciation of ballots alone, private respondent’s belated attempt to inject
this theory at the memorandum stage calls for presentation of substantial evidence
aside from, or other than, the ballots themselves. By having done so, Syjuco in fact
intended to completely abandon the process and results of the revision and thereafter
sought to rely on his brainchild process he fondly coined as “precinct-level document-
based evidence.”
Main Point: The decision of the HRET to award the win to the respondent was well
within the internal rules of the tribunal. As long as the tribunal has grounded its
decisions based on credible evidences or justifications and are within its rules, then no
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction will occur.
CASE NO. 258. 202 SCRA 808
ACTION / DECISION
Lerias vs. HRET
Facts: Petitioner Rosette Lerias filed her certificate of candidacy as the official
candidate of the UPP-KBL for the position of Representative for the lone district of
Southern Leyte in the May 11, 1987 elections. Roger Mercado was the administration
candidate for the same position. During the canvass of votes for the congressional
candidates by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Southern Leyte, it appeared that,
excluding the certificate of canvass from the Municipality of Libagon which had been
questioned by Mercado on the ground that allegedly it had been tampered with, the
candidates who received the 2 highest number of votes were Roger Mercado with
34,442 votes and Rosette Y. Lerias with 34,128 votes, respectively. In the provincial
board's copy of the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Libagon, Lerias received
1,811 votes while Mercado received 1,351. Lerias had a winning margin of 146 votes.
But, the provincial board of canvassers ruled that their copy of the certificate of canvass
contained erasures, alterations and superimpositions and therefore, cannot be used as
basis of the canvass. The provincial board of canvassers rejected the explanation of the
members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon that said corrections were
made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did not affect the integrity of the
certificate and said corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of all the 9
candidates for the position, including those of Mercado who offered no objection. Lerias
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for the annulment of the Comelec's June 6, 1987
resolution and the subsequent proclamation of Mercado. In her protest, Lerias
contested the results of the election in Precinct Nos. 6, 10, 18 & 19 of Libagon asserting
that the total votes credited to her in the said four precincts (1,411 votes) were less than
or short by 400 votes from that actually obtained by her (1,811 votes) and if the
provincial board of canvassers' copy of the certificate of canvass for Libagon were to be
used as basis of the canvass instead of the Comelec copy, she would have garnered
35,930 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes or a winning margin of 146 votes.
Issue: Whether the decision made by the HRET to proclaim Mercado the winner
constituted a grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling: Yes. It became too apparent that the majority part succeeded in altering the
figures that reflect the outcome of the election and thus intervening the true winner of
Southern Leyte. Therefore, the court reserves the decision and declares Lerias as the
winner.
Main Point: The decision made by the HRET can be overruled if it was shown that a
grave abuse of discretion through excess or lack of jurisdiction was made on the
tribunal’s part. Only then can the court practice its extrajudicial powers.
CASE NO. 259 G.R. NO. 149380
ACTION / DECISION
Sandoval vs. HRET
Facts: Petitioner Sandoval and respondent Oreta were candidates for the lone
congressional district of Malabon-Navotas during the May 14, 2001 elections. The
canvass of the election returns yielded 92,062 votes for petitioner while respondent
obtained 72,862 votes, or difference of 19,200 votes. On 22 May 2001 petitioner was
proclaimed duly elected representative by the District Board of Canvassers of Malabon-
Navotas. After taking his oath of office, he assumed the post at noon of 30 th June 2001.
On June 1, 2001 respondent Oreta filed with HRET an election protest against the
petitioner, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-027. The protest assailed the alleged
electoral frauds and anomalies in 1,308 precincts of the Malabon-Navotas District.
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this electoral protest?
Ruling: Yes. While the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress.
This however does not bar this Court from entertaining petitions where the threshold of
legitimate review is breached. Indeed, it is well-settled that judicial guidance is
appropriate where jurisdictional issues are involved or charges of grave abuse of
discretion are presented in order that we may vindicate established claims of denial of
due process or correct veritable abuses of discretion so grave or glaring that no less
than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.
Main Point: The Supreme Court can overrule the decision made by the tribunal if a
grave abuse of discretion was shown to be present. Furthermore, cases, such as the
aforementioned one, where the veritable abuse is glaring and imminent, the court can
and always call to the petition of certiorari.
CASE NO. 260
ARTICLE VI, Section 17. Electoral Tribunal ; Action|Decision
Lokin vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On May 7, 2007, CIBAC submitted an amended list of nominees to COMELEC withdrawing

Lokin, Galang and Tugna and new nominee Borje. The results of the polls on June 20, 2007
revealed a second seat for CIBAC and Lokin filed a motion seeking to be proclaimed as the
second nominee. However, on July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10
whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and
hearing and subsequently proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee on September 17,
2007. Lokin filed a petition for Certiorari and mandamus against the COMELEC on the claim of
the eligibility as the second nominee for CIBAC contrary to the ruling of the COMELEC on
Resolution 8219,10 and that COMELEC have no legislative authority to set forth under RA 7941
Party List Act.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the
Party-List System Act; and COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC
and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact
or law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate
in nature.
RULING:
1. Yes, it does not meet all the 4 essential requisites for an IRR to be valid. Therefore, the
resolution 7804 was beyond the scope and was not reasonable as deemed by the court
making it unconstitutional. Yes, the case of replacement of Lokin, Tugna and Galang were
not in any way part of the 3 allowable circumstance of the law for substitution. Inference is
unconstitutional
MAIN POINT:
The COMELEC have the ministerial duty to proclaim winners from elections and to promulgate
resolutions within the IRRs of the law. However, they must be cautious on interpreting the law
as to avoid any violation on the procedure of the matter and abuse of discretion when the law is
clear and unambiguous.
CASE NO. 261
Sema vs. HRET
FACTS:
On 1 June 2007, when the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Shariff Kabunsuan proclaimed
protestee Didagen P. Dilangalen as Representative of the Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City. Protestant Sema is protesting a total of 195 precincts of the Municipality of
Datu Odin Sinsuat of the Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, based on
multiple grounds and petitions for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that
the Decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), dated September 10,
2009, and its Resolution dated November 12, 2009, be declared null and void ab initio.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by relying on election returns and other election documents,
instead of the ballots themselves, in determining who actually won in the May 14, 2007
congressional elections for the Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City?
RULING:
1. No, the petitioner failed to give substantial proof and merit to the claim of abuse of
discretion as there was no capricious or whimsical exercise of judgement done by the
BEI in the course of the Election proceeding. Election returns as examined are intact and
the alleged tampered ballots are not presented for evidence. Hence the HRET was able
to carry out the duty to assess circumstance and review the procedure in question and
such result of May 2007 is affirmed and concurred by Supreme Court.
MAIN POINT:
The HRET is a tribunal body that assess the procedure and the authenticity of electoral
documents only as presented. Any claim of abuse of discretion or misconduct must be
substantiated with proofs and tangible evidence by the protestant as his onus probandi.
CASE NO. 262
Duenas vs. HRET
FACTS:
On October 21, 2008 the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R.
No. 185401, seeking the nullification of said order of revision, alleging that it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion. On July 21, 2009, the Court promulgated a Decision dismissing the
petition. Said Decision became final and executory and the HRET continued the proceeding in
the electoral protest case. The petition failed as founded to be unmerited by the court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not HRET decision and resolution dated February 25, 2010 and March 10,
2010, respectively, are unconstitutional and grave abuse of discretion?
RULING:
1. No, the decision of the HRET in petition for certiorari is valid as the procedure of review for
the ballots for appreciation is followed and furthermore, there is no grave abuse of discretion
as HRET was acting well within the rules when it ordered the continuation of revision of
ballots.
MAIN POINT:
The petition for certiorari to HRET is based on procedural review and presentation of facts
deviated from standard, as necessary. There can only be abuse of discretion when there are
clear and willful evasion of the procedure ruling over the opposite party in question.
CASE NO. 263
ARTICLE VI, Section 18. Commission on Appointments
Daza vs Singson
FACTS:
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the
Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. He argues that
the reorganization of the LDP is a political nature and that it is not a duly registered political
party therefore it must not be recognized and be represented in the sudden change of affiliation
of members of House of Representative.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the legality, and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner
of filling the Commission on Appointments in line as prescribed by the Constitution under
Article VI Section 18?
RULING:
1. Yes, the House of Representative within the prescribed period and with the
reorganization of the party affiliation carried out the legal percepts on the Constitution
under Art Vi, Sec 8 for appropriation of seats based on percentage of affiliates.
MAIN POINT:
The court does not contemplate any inference of intent if political or justiciable. It would simply
review merits of the case and if there are procedural or substantive evidence that will result to a
petition certiorari to prosper.
CASE NO. 264
Coseteng vs Mitra
FACTS:
On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra

requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission
on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman
Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (which may
be considered as a petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying this Court to declare as null
and void the election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as
provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Coseteng’s claim is
invalid?
RULING:
1. Yes, the members of the Commission on Appointments were nominated and duly
elected by their political parties in relation to the Constitution under Art VI, Sec 8 for
appropriation of seats based on percentage of affiliates. Coseteng’s claim is invalid
despite the recommendation as the law states nominated and elected.
MAIN POINT:
The seat in the Commission on Appointment is based on representation and that there would be
no one validly seated due to appointment. The law prescribes the members to be nominated
and duly elected by their political parties.
CASE NO. 265
Guingona vs Gonzales
FACTS:
In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Tañada on October 27,

1992 and respondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on
October 30, 1992, they moved for a reconsideration of the decision dated October 20, 1992 as
to the violation of Article VI, Sec 18 of the Constitution in various grounds.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there should be 12 complete members of the House in the Commission
on Appointments as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution for it to be
functional and election of Sen Tanda and Romulo in Commission on Appointment valid?
RULING:
1. No, the constitution only suggests the 12 as the maximum seat for appropriation of
representation. However, majority vote of the members will suffice the functionality of the
Commission therein. No, it is not valid as there was an abuse of grave abuse of
discretion and violation of Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.
MAIN POINT:
The Constitution provides for the number of representations in the Commission of Appointment
but does not require the 12 seats filled prior it is functional. Majority of the seats and attainment
of the majority of the members would suffice.
CASE NO. 266
Drilon, et al vs Speaker
FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
MAIN POINT:
CASE NO. 267
ARTICLE VI, Section 21. Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Senate vs Ermita
FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
MAIN POINT:
CASE NO. 268
Gudani vs Senga
FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
MAIN POINT:
CASE NO. 269
Romero vs Estrada
FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
MAIN POINT:
NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND

INVESTIGATIONS, G.R. NO. 180643, MARCH 25, 2008
FACTS
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $326, 381, 290 (approximately
16 billion pesos), a project which was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
Thereafter, four resolutions questioning the legality of this project were introduced in the
Senate. To instigate the investigation, invitations were sent out to the involving parties
of the NBN project, one of whom was the petitioner Romulo L. Neri. He was summoned
to appear on four different dates but was only present in the third scheduled hearing
with an excuse that he was unable to attend the two previous hearings because he was
out of town.
On that same hearing, Neri disclosed that the Commission on Election (COMELEC)
Chairman bribed him with 200 million pesos in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He informed this bribery attempt to then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,
who then responded that he was not to accept the bribery. When the petitioner was
asked three questions, namely (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up on the
NBN project (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve, he refused to answer on the grounds of “executive privilege.”
According to the petitioner, his claim of executive privilege was upon the order of the
President, and he further stressed that his conversations with President Arroyo were
“candid discussion meant to explore options in making policy decisions.”
Moreover, he claimed that these discussions “dwelt on the impact of the bribery
scandal involving high government officials on the country’s diplomatic relations
and economic military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign
investors and lenders in the Philippines.”
The Respondent Committees strongly asserted the contrary, and argued the following
points: (a) petitioner’s testimony is pertinent to the investigation (b) there is no valid
justification to the petitioner’s claim of executive privilege (c) there was no abuse of their
authority to order petitioner’s arrest and (d) petitioner has not come to court with clean
hands.
The petitioner did not appear on the scheduled hearings on the grounds that he had
already complied to the exhaustive investigation of the Committee, which was an 11-
hour long hearing on September 26, 2007 and had already answered all the questions
save those which were protected by the executive privilege. He asserts that he is
precluded from disclosing communications made to him in official confidence under
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 and Section 24 of Rule 130 of Rules of Court.
In response to this, the Committee ordered the arrest of the petitioner on the grounds
that he failed to appear and testify before the Courts. In view of this issuance, the
petitioner filed on February 1, 2008 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent
Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) seeking to restrain the implementation of the
said contempt order.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the communications between the President and petitioner Neri
are covered by the principle of 'executive privilege.’ (YES)
2. What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege?
3. Whether or not the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering
the arrest of petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena. (YES)
RULING
1. The communications between petitioner and the President are covered by the
principle of "executive privilege."
2. Petitioner was not summoned by respondent Senate Committees in accordance
with the law-making body's power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation as laid
down in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution and Senate v. Ermita.
3. Respondent Senate Committees gravely abused its discretion for alleged non-
compliance with the Subpoena dated November 13, 2007.
GARCILLANO V. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON PUBLIC

INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, AND
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, G.R. NO. 170338, DEC. 23, 2008
FACTS
In 2005, tapes on the controversial conversation between President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and a high-ranking official of Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced.
These tapes, which is infamously referred to as “Hello Garci,” contain the President’s
instruction to COMELECT Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor
the results of the 2004 presidential elections.
These recordings became the subject of heated legislative hearings, one of which
occurred on June 8, 2005, where a joint congressional investigation was being made. In
the span of this investigation, several versions of the wiretapped conversations were
submitted. Alarmed by these events, Garcillano filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 170338. The purpose of this petition was to restrain the
House of Representatives Committees from utilizing these “illegally obtained” tapes.
Moreover, he implored that the recordings and any other references be stricken off the
records of the inquiry.
Randa and Agcaoili (in G.R. No. 179275) filed a petition for Prohibition to bar the
Senate from from conducting its schedule legislative inquiry on the basis that the inquiry
violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3 of Article III.
Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of ISAFP and one of the resource persons
summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings moved to intervene as
petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.
Both petitions revolve around the “Hello Garci” tapes but have different objectives: first,
to prevent the playing of the tapes in the House of Representatives and their
subsequent inclusion in the Committee reports, and the second sought to prevent the
Senate from conducting further inquiry on the wiretapped conversations.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing. (YES)
2. Whether or not there is an actual case of controversy. (NO against the House of
Representatives, and YES against the Senate)
RULING
The Court dismisses G.R. 170338 for being moot and academic. The purpose of the
petition was to prevent the tape from being played in the House of Representatives,
however the Court notes that the proceedings have already been played in the House
and have already been heard by its members. Having been overtaken by these events,
the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all,
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and
not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., PATERIO TORRES and
ARTURO UMBAC
vs.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE, THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE and ANTONIO S. RAMAS
UYPITCHING, G.R. No. 72492, Nov. 5, 1987
FACTS
Petitioner Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac were both invited to an investigation to be
conducted by the respondent’s Committee in connection with the operations of public
utilities specifically the Negros Orriental Electric Cooperative II. Due to their failure to
appear at the said investigation, petitioners were reproving for legislative contempt.
ISSUE
Whether the Sanguniang Panlungsod has the power to mandate the testimony of
witnesses and order arrests who fail to observe the subpoena. (NO)
RULING
The Constitution and the Local Government Code do not express its provision the
granting of power to subpoena and punish contempt for witnesses. Local legislative
bodies do not have the contempt power of the legislature since it is sui generis. The
said power does not attach to its legislative function but to its character as a distinct and
individual power of one of the branches of the government. The same would not be
applied to the local legislative bodies which are creations of law. To allow such local
legislative bodies to exercise such power without statutory basis would deem be conflict
in the doctrine of the separation of power.
WHEREFORE, the requiring of attendance and testimony of the petitioners at an

investigation should not be punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience of
said subpoena, is declared null and void for being ultra vires. Thus, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Ad-Hoc Committee are without power to punish non- members for
contempt.
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE
MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ,
ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and
CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP
vs.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by
and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S.
SANDEJAS, G.R. 89914, Nov. 20, 1991
FACTS
Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the
Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several
government corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the
transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it
and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly
prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond
the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the
case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for
intervention. The Court granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Blue Ribbon Case is in aid of legislation. (NO)
RULING
There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be
conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was
conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr.
Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided
therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill
of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled to testify against one's self.
The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe
and inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue sought
to be investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the
inquiry to continue would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between
the legislative committee and a judicial tribunal.
Finally, a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations

placed by the Constitution on governmental action ‘including the relevant limitations of
the Bill of Rights. One of these rights is the right of an individual to against self-
incrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to respondents in administrative
investigations but only if it partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous
to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the petitioners may not be compelled by respondent
Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it because the inquiry is not
in aid of legislation and if pursued, it would be violative of the principle of separation of
powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of the government as
ordained by the Constitution.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch), PAUL SIMON MORRIS,
SUNDARA RAMESH, OWEN BELMAN, SANJAY AGGARWAL, RAJAMANI
CHANDRASHEKAR, MARIVEL GONZALES, MA. ELLEN VICTOR, CHONA G.
REYES, ZENAIDA IGLESIAS, RAMONA BERNAD, MICHAELANGELO AGUILAR,
and FERNAND TANSINGCO
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES,
as represented by its Chairperson, HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA, G.R. No. 167173,
Dec. 27, 2007
FACTS
Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech reproving SCB-Philippines for selling

unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799)
and urging the Senate to immediately organize an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to
prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of
Senator Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent, which through its
Chairperson Senator Angara, set an initial hearing and invited petitioners herein to
attend the hearing. Petitioners via letter stressed that there were pending cases in court
allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a
challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent committee to proceed with the inquiry.
Legislative investigation commenced but with the invited resource persons not being all
present, Senator Enrile moved for the issuance of subpoena and an HDO or to include
such absentees to the Bureau of Immigrations’ Watch List. During the hearing, it was
apparent that petitioners lack proper authorizations to make disclosures and lack the
copies of the accusing documents being mentioned by Senator Enrile. Thus, when
hearing adjourned, petitioners were later served with subpoenas by respondent.
Petitioner now seeks that respondent committee be enjoined from proceeding, citing
Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, claiming that since the issue is already
preempted by the courts, the legislative investigation is an encroachment upon the
judicial powers vested solely in the courts.
ISSUE
Whether or not the investigation in aid of legislation by respondent committee

encroaches upon the judicial power of the courts. (NO)
RULING
The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution,
exposes the error in petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege
speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply “to denounce the illegal practice
committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities.” This fallacy is
made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech,
Senator Enrile urged the Senate “to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation,
so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.”
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a

quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation.
Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress
through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint.
Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative
inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation.
Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent
Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as resource persons were
officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the
respondent relative to their separate findings on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign
securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective of the investigation was
the quest for remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly
fraudulent activity.
Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SPOUSES PNP DIRECTOR ELISEO D. DELA PAZ (RET.) AND MARIA FE C. DELA
PAZ
VS.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE SENATE SERGEANT-
AT-ARMS JOSE BALAJADIA, JR., G.R. NO. 184849, FEB. 13, 2009
FACTS
Petitioner Gen. dela Paz was detained by the local authorities at the Moscow departure
area for the failure of declaration and the discovery of 105,000 euros (approximately
6,930,000 pesos) in his luggage. In addition, he was found to have in his possession
45,000 euros (approximately 2,970,000 pesos). Waiting upon his arrival in Manila is a
subpoena from the Senate Committee for an investigation with regards to the incident in
Moscow.
ISSUE
Whether the Senate Committee has jurisdiction over a matter involving state to state
relations? (YES)
RULING
The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that is to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. The Senate
has the capacity to set its own rules of proceedings as the provision of the Philippine
Constitution. The exercise of its power is exempted from any interference and
supervision from the Judiciary.
The Senate Rules provide that the Senate Committee shall cover in its jurisdiction all
matters relating to the relations of the Philippines with other nations generally;
diplomatic and consular services; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the
United Nations Organization and its agencies; multi-lateral organizations, all
international agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas Filipinos.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being moot and
academic.
REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS M.

ROMERO III, MICHAEL L. ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, AND JEROME R.
CANLAS
VS.
SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, G.R. NO. 174105,
APRIL 2, 2009
FACTS
Petitioners Romero II and other members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc.,
were invited on an investigation with regards to the investment of Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The said
investigation will aid the Senate in determining possible amendments of Republic Act
8042 other known as the Migrant Workers Act to craft a much-needed legislation
relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the aforementioned Resolutions.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Senate Committee’s inquiry is sub judice to the subject raised at
hand. (YES)
RULING
The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess
it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

GARCILLANO V. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, AND
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, G.R. NO. 170338, DEC. 23, 2008
FACTS
In 2005, tapes on the controversial conversation between President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and a high-ranking official of Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced.
These tapes, which is infamously referred to as “Hello Garci,” contain the President’s
instruction to COMELECT Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor
the results of the 2004 presidential elections.
These recordings became the subject of heated legislative hearings, one of which
occurred on June 8, 2005, where a joint congressional investigation was being made. In
the span of this investigation, several versions of the wiretapped conversations were
submitted. Alarmed by these events, Garcillano filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 170338. The purpose of this petition was to restrain the
House of Representatives Committees from utilizing these “illegally obtained” tapes.
Moreover, he implored that the recordings and any other references be stricken off the
records of the inquiry.
Randa and Agcaoili (in G.R. No. 179275) filed a petition for Prohibition to bar the
Senate from from conducting its schedule legislative inquiry on the basis that the inquiry
violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3 of Article III.
Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of ISAFP and one of the resource persons
summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings moved to intervene as
petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.
Both petitions revolve around the “Hello Garci” tapes but have different objectives: first,
to prevent the playing of the tapes in the House of Representatives and their
subsequent inclusion in the Committee reports, and the second sought to prevent the
Senate from conducting further inquiry on the wiretapped conversations.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing. (YES)
2. Whether or not there is an actual case of controversy. (NO against the House of
Representatives, and YES against the Senate)
RULING
The Court dismisses G.R. 170338 for being moot and academic. The purpose of the
petition was to prevent the tape from being played in the House of Representatives,
however the Court notes that the proceedings have already been played in the House
and have already been heard by its members. Having been overtaken by these events,
the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all,
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and
not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.
NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, G.R. NO. 180643, MARCH 25, 2008
FACTS
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $326, 381, 290 (approximately
16 billion pesos), a project which was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
Thereafter, four resolutions questioning the legality of this project were introduced in the
Senate. To instigate the investigation, invitations were sent out to the involving parties
of the NBN project, one of whom was the petitioner Romulo L. Neri. He was summoned
to appear on four different dates but was only present in the third scheduled hearing
with an excuse that he was unable to attend the two previous hearings because he was
out of town.
On that same hearing, Neri disclosed that the Commission on Election (COMELEC)
Chairman bribed him with 200 million pesos in exchange for his approval of the NBN
project. He informed this bribery attempt to then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo,
who then responded that he was not to accept the bribery. When the petitioner was
asked three questions, namely (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up on the
NBN project (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve, he refused to answer on the grounds of “executive privilege.”
According to the petitioner, his claim of executive privilege was upon the order of the
President, and he further stressed that his conversations with President Arroyo were
“candid discussion meant to explore options in making policy decisions.”
Moreover, he claimed that these discussions “dwelt on the impact of the bribery
scandal involving high government officials on the country’s diplomatic relations
and economic military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign
investors and lenders in the Philippines.”
The Respondent Committees strongly asserted the contrary, and argued the following
points: (a) petitioner’s testimony is pertinent to the investigation (b) there is no valid
justification to the petitioner’s claim of executive privilege (c) there was no abuse of their
authority to order petitioner’s arrest and (d) petitioner has not come to court with clean
hands.
The petitioner did not appear on the scheduled hearings on the grounds that he had
already complied to the exhaustive investigation of the Committee, which was an 11-
hour long hearing on September 26, 2007 and had already answered all the questions
save those which were protected by the executive privilege. He asserts that he is
precluded from disclosing communications made to him in official confidence under
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 and Section 24 of Rule 130 of Rules of Court.
In response to this, the Committee ordered the arrest of the petitioner on the grounds
that he failed to appear and testify before the Courts. In view of this issuance, the
petitioner filed on February 1, 2008 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent
Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) seeking to restrain the implementation of the
said contempt order.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the communications between the President and petitioner Neri
are covered by the principle of 'executive privilege.’ (YES)
2. What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege?
3. Whether or not the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering
the arrest of petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena. (YES)
RULING
1. The communications between petitioner and the President are covered by the
principle of "executive privilege."
2. Petitioner was not summoned by respondent Senate Committees in accordance
with the law-making body's power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation as laid
down in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution and Senate v. Ermita.
3. Respondent Senate Committees gravely abused its discretion for alleged non-
compliance with the Subpoena dated November 13, 2007.
JEAN L. ARNAULT
VS.
LEON NAZARENO, SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, AND
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, G.R. NO. L-3820, JULY 18,
1950
FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known
as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to
resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a
non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest
in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have
forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for
and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions,
was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the
investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to
whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5
million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the
custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the
questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme
Court questioning the validity of his detention.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the 440,000.00
pesos. (YES)
2. Whether or not the Senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for
a term beyond its period of legislative session. (YES)
3. Whether or not the petitioner can rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination. (NO)
RULING
The question on whom the petitioner gave the 440,000 pesos to was pertinent to the
subject-matter of the inquiry. Because Arnault refused to provide the name and proper
information to this question, the legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner,
requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties
responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the
name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is
pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The
contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it
has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for
contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating
the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without
impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed
during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing
investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. There is no
limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power
may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
According to the witness, the transaction was legal and that he gave the 440,000.00
pesos to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we
find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person
might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of
the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved
from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but
rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
CASE NO: 280
SECTION 21. INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION
Power to Punish a Person under Investigation
Subio v. Gordon
Facts: On February 28, 1986, former President Corazon Aquino issued an Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 1 that is the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to
recover the ill-gotten wealth during the Marcos regime. On February 20, 2006, Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate
Res. No. 455),4 "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors”. On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under
the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote to Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, one of the petitioners. As the resource
persons in the public meeting conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. It was the
deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455. However, on May 9, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C.
Inocencio declined the said meeting and same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1:
“No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence
in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance.” Subio was then arrested.
Issue: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 has the immunity to testifying in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.
Ruling: No. Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 declared repealed by the 1987 Constitution. The
power of Congress is broad and it encompasses all the existing laws.
Main Point: With the point above, based on “No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” As with
respect to the law, obedience to the rule of law. Moreover, Sec. 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 has
been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional
provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public
accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right
of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Case No: 281

SEC. 22 APPEARANCE OF HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS IN CONGRESS
Appearance of Heads of Departments in Congress
Senate v. Ermita
Facts: On April 20, 2006, Senate of the Philippines, as the petitioner. For the petition to
review decision of the lower court for being unconstitutional. The President Arroyo has
abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for
the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. To exercise their legislative power, the
senators then issued investigations with the help of officials and employees of the
executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government
Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and
the Philippine National Police (PNP).
Issue: Whether or not they violate the importance of public information
Ruling: Yes. It is the right of the people to be able to know that information. With the
Executive Order No. 464, made during the former President Gloria Arroyo “such other
officers as may be determined by the President" to attend congressional hearings
unless the President gives permission to those who will attend the said proceedings.
Main Point: When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Case No: 282
SEC. 23. DECLARATION OF A STATE OF WAR; EMERGENCY POWERS
Delegation of Emergency Powers/Military Powers
SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary
Facts: On July 27, 2003, in the middle of the night the Oakwood Premiere apartments
in Makati City, three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) went inside Armed with high-powered ammunitions and
explosives. SANLAKAS, represented by Rep. J.V. Bautista, and Partido ng
Manggagawa, represented by Rep. Renato Magtubo, petitioners. Executive Secretary
Secretary Angelo Reyes, General Narciso Abaya, Dir. Gen. Hermogenes Ebdane,
respondents. There is a Violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and by virtue
of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under
the State of Rebellion.
The Proclamation and General Orders were lifted on August 1, 2003 and Proclamation
No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
Issue: Whether or not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
unconstitutional?
Ruling: No. Both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional.
The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the
Constitution executive powers. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit
declaring state or rebellion. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the
petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President
acted without factual basis.
Main Point: The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be
subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. Laws also
contain changes to procedural rules—which are designed to ensure that the justice
system provides due process—that jeopardize basic human rights and fair trial
guarantees. In declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, the
President was merely exercising the right of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief Powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections
1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2), Article VI.
Case No: 283

SEC. 23. DECLARATION OF A STATE OF WAR; EMERGENCY POWERS
Delegation of Emergency Powers/Military Powers
Ampatuan v. Hon. DILG Sec. Puno
Facts: Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, Regie Sahali-Generale,

petitioners. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, in his Capacity as secretary of The Department Of
Interior And Local Government And Alter-Ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
and anyone acting in his Stead and on Behalf of the President of the Philippines, Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), or any of their units operating in the Autonomous
Region In Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), And Philippine National Police, or any of their
Units Operating In ARMM, Respondents. On 24 November 2009, the day after the
gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, including some news reporters
Maguindanao Massacre, former President Gloria Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,
placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato
under a state of emergency.”
They also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of
emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato,
where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the deployment of troops and the
taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s emergency
powers. Then instructed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be
allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence” in the named places.
Three days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from
the Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which
amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to
“delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).
Issue: Whether or not the President had valid bases for her actions
Ruling: The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned. The petitioners failed to show that the
declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat
and Cotabato City, as well as the President's exercise of the "calling out" power had no
factual basis.
Main Point: The then President needed to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the
situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces
to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that
continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
Case No: 284
SEC. 24. BILLS ORIGINATING IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Bills Originating in the House of Representatives
Guingona v. Carague
Facts: Teofisto T. Guingona, JR. and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., petitioners. Hon.
Guillermo Carague, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management, Hon. Rozalina
S. Cajucom in her capacity as National Treasurer and Commission on Audit,
respondents.
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as
the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for
the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for
debt service, it being higher than the budget for education; therefore, it is against
Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, which mandates to “assign the highest
budgetary priority to education.”
Issue: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional
Ruling: No. under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
“assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the
hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the
imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or
objectives.
Main Point: It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the
country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the
process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation could not be
thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
Case No: 285

Topic: Bills Originating in the House of Representatives
Case Title: Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
Fact: On October 30, 1995, Arturo M. Tolentino, petitioner, vs. The Secretary of
Finance and The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondents.
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks
to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on
the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange
of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of
goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale
or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of
the Constitution.
Ruling: No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the
revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of
the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the
requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
Main Points: Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds
of property of the same class taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority
to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this
requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons,
forms and corporations placed in similar situation. (City of Baguio v. De Leon, supra;
Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, supra)
Case No: 286

Alvarez v. Guingona
Facts: On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,”
was filed in the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817,
Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of
Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the
amendments proposed by the Senate.
Issue: Whether or not the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB No.
8817, into Republic Act No. 7720 be said to have originated in the House of
Representatives as required?
Ruling: Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import,
SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that
HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was
filed in the Senate.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application
should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act
thereupon until it receives the House bill.
Main Point: Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or
tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as
they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are
elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby, made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
Case No: 287

Southern Cross Cement v. Phil. Cement
Facts: The state power to impose safeguard measures to protect domestic industries
and producers from increased imports that result in or threaten serious injury to the local
industry.
Southern Cross Cement Corporation ("Southern Cross"), Petitioner is a domestic
corporation in the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and
exportation. Taiheiyo Cement Corporation and Tokuyama Corporation, purportedly the
largest cement manufacturers in Japan are its principal stockholders. Philippine Cement
Manufacturers Corporation ("Philcemcor") respondent, an association of domestic
cement manufacturers.
In 2001, the Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor), an association
of domestic cement manufacturers, filed with the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) an application for the imposition of a definitive safeguard measure on the
importation of gray Portland cement. Philcemcor alleged that gray Portland cement was
being imported in increased quantities, thus causing declines in domestic production,
capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment, as well as depressed local
prices.
Issue: Whether or not the safeguard measure was appealable to Court of Tax Appeals
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the CTA had the jurisdiction to review the DTI
secretary’s Decision, even if that Decision did not impose any safeguard measure.
Main Point: The matter of safeguard measures was of such national importance that a
decision either to impose or not to impose them could have had ruinous effects on
companies doing business in the Philippines.
CASE NO: 288

Topic: Appropriation of Public Revenue for Public Purpose
Case Title: Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works
FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal, petitioner, ordering anything be done

under RA No. 920, funds for the improvement of the city which appropriates funds for
public works particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road
terminals. Antonio Subdivision, which belongs to Zulueta, located at Pasig, Rizal. Some
of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to
the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet
constructed. The projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or
any important premises to the main highway. The primary purpose of the project is that
there is a public purpose to be benefited by everyone from the construction of the roads,
and the government gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the
streets, made by its owner to the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not, considered as public purpose to justify the expenditures of the
government?
RULING: No. the public funds should be used in appropriate ways that should be
benefited by everyone in the community. It does not justify their use of public funds.
MAIN POINT: The use of public funds should be to provide and promote public interest.
It should not be used for the benefit of one self. The test of the constitutionality of a
statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote
the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals,
although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.
CASE NO: 289

SEC. 25. RULES ON APPROPRIATION
Rules on Appropriation
DPWH v. Quirino
Facts: In 1991, a tragedy happened at Mt. Pinatubo. DPWH engaged a number of

contractors for the urgent rehabilitation of the affected river systems. Save for Chiara
Construction and Ardy Construction, respectively owned by Efren N. Rigor and Romeo
R. Dimatulac, the contractors signed written agreements with Engineer Philip Meñez,
Project Manager II of the DPWH.
Upon completing their assigned rehabilitation works, the DPWH refused to pay the
contractors. As said, the contracts were invalid due to non-compliance with legal
requirements. The contractors filed against DPWH for their sum of money, the contracts
were valid and payment of compensation to the contractors as stated by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, in Civil Case No. 96-77180, DPWH appealed to the Court
of Appeals (CA), ruled that the respondents are entitled to their claim of compensation.
Issue: Whether or not, the DPWH caused fraud to the other party?
Ruling: Yes. Bad faith and fraud are allegations of fact that demand clear and valid
proof. The government is unjustified in denying what it owes to contractors and in
leaving them uncompensated after it has benefitted from the already completed work.
Main Point: Given with the circumstances, contractor’s entitlement to compensation is

fair since they did complete their job. Petitioner unsuccessfully established the
applicability of the clean hands doctrine

Topic: General Appropriations Act On Recall Petition
Case Title: Goh v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Alroben J. Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition, docketed
as SPA EM No. 14-004 (RCL), against Mayor Bayron due to loss of trust and
confidence brought about by "gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other related gross
inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and emotional
immaturity as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City." After which, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 9864. Resolution No. 9864 found the recall petition sufficient in form and
substance, but suspended the funding of any and all recall elections until the resolution
of the funding issue.
ODEDO recommends to the Commission the issuance of a Resolution certifying to the

SUFFICIENCY of the petition for recall of the respondent. Stated in the Local
Government Code, Section 75, All expenses incidental to recall elections shall be borne
by the COMELEC. For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act a contingency fund at the disposal of the COMELEC for the conduct
of recall elections.
Respondent filed with the COMELEC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
Clarification which pleaded for the dismissal of the recall petition for lack of merit. After
which, the petitioner filed a comment which prayed for the COMELEC’s denial of the
respondent’s motion wherein it promulgated Resolution No. 9882 in which suspends
further proceedings on recall and as stated in the resolution, it does not have an
appropriation or legal authority to commit public funds for the recall process.
Issue: Whether or not the 2014 GAA provides for an appropriation or line item budget to
serve as a contingency fund for the conduct of recall elections.
Ruling: Yes. The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the
COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is
no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall
elections for 2014.
Main Point: The line item appropriation for the "Conduct and supervision of x x x recall
votes x x x" in the 2014 GAA is sufficient to fund recall elections. There is no
constitutional requirement that the budgetary appropriation must be loaded in
"contingent funds."
Conclusion: Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the conduct
of recall elections in the 2014 GAA, the Supreme Court sees no reason why the
COMELEC is unable to perform its constitutional mandate to "enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of x x x recall. Should the funds
appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed insufficient, then the COMELEC Chairman
may exercise his authority to augment such line item appropriation from the
COMELEC's existing savings, as this augmentation is expressly authorized in the 2014
GAA.

Topic: Limits of Appropriation
Case Title: Brilliantes v. COMELEC
Facts: In 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to
use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes
and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also
required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer
equipment, devices and materials and adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation during the May 11,
1998 presidential elections, particularly in counting the votes collected from the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the failure of the
machines to correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued its
implementation.
The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual voting and
counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with companies
Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the computerized voting/counting machines)
were discontinued. Despite this impediment, the COMELEC nevertheless continued the
electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for national,
provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."
Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the
COMELEC in authorizing the use of election funds in consolidating the election results
for the May 10, 2004 elections should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional.
Ruling: Yes. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said Resolution No. 6712
preempts the sole authority of the Congress to canvass the votes of the election returns
for the President and the Vice-President. Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the
accredited citizen’s arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a
copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of the votes,
whether for the national or the local elections. In addition, the second or third copy of
the election returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC under the said
laws, are not intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The said copies are
archived and unsealed only when needed by to verify election results in connection with
resolving election disputes that may be established.
Main Point: No other entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to
use a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an "unofficial" count.
Conclusion: Any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions
would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President,
which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but would also be
lacking of any constitutional authority.
Case Number: GR No. L-33713

Topic: Prohibition on Riders in Appropriation Acts
Case Title: Garcia v. Mata
Facts: In 1969, the petitioner Eusebio B. Garcia brought an action for "Mandamus and
Recovery of a Sum of Money" in the court a quo to compel the respondents Secretary of
National Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to reinstate
him in the active commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to
him from the time of his reversion to inactive status.
 Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until his reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960, pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 2332.
 June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a
total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned
service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
 On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600 took effect, petitioner had an
accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
 Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to
the provisions of Republic Act 2334, and such reversion was neither for cause, at
his own request, nor after court-martial proceedings;
 From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status
and as such, he has neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, nor was he ever employed in the Government in any capacity; As
a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the necessary
petition.
Issue: Whether or not paragraph 11 RA 1600 is unconstitutional. Does it contain rider in

an appropriation bill?
Ruling: Yes. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation
item. RA 1600 is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation of the government
while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty
and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP. Hence, it was indeed
a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the
constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the general appropriation act." It was indeed a
new and completely unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation Act.
Main Point: A provision not related to the Appropriation Act is prohibited.
Conclusion: Whether the Special Provision in question is constitutional or not,
petitioner cannot complain about his reversion to inactive duty, considering the
provisions of Republic Act 2334 by virtue of which, according to the stipulation of facts,
it was ordered by respondents.
Case Number: GR No. 143374

Topic: Prohibition of Riders in Appropriation Acts
Case Title: Atiwtiw v. Zamora
Facts:
The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enacts the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact organic acts
pursuant to section 18 of article X of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual
powers of President Cory Aquino, she promulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the
congress enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organic act for the cordillera
autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was not approved by the people. The
court declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or
amended. Later on February 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the General
Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) which includes the assailed special provisions,
then issued an E.O 270 to extend the implementation of the winding up of operations of
the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O 328
Petitioners Nestor G. Atitiw, Maylene D. Gayo, Florencio Kigis, and Modesto Sagudang
have brought to this Court the instant petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
declaratory relief as taxpayers and officers and members of the various units of the
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). They seek, among others, the declaration of
nullity of paragraph 1 of the Special Provisions of Republic Act No. 8760, otherwise
known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000, directing that the appropriation
for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay the separation and
retirement benefits of all affected officials and employees.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed special provisions in R.A No. 8760 (2000 GAA) is a
rider and as such is unconstitutional.
Ruling: No. In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court said that xxx
an appropriations bill covers a broader range of subject matter and therefore includes
more details compared to an ordinary bill. The title of an appropriations bill cannot be
any broader as it is since it is not feasible to come out with a title that embraces all the
details included in an appropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1 of the RA8760
does not constitute a rider; it follows the standard that a provision in an appropriations
bill must relate specifically to some particular appropriations.
Main Point: A rider is constituted when provision in an appropriation bill does not relate
specifically to some particular appropriations.
Conclusion: The creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of
a sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only "within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines." Under the 1987 Constitution, the creation of the
autonomous regions shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. In the case of the Cordilleras,
the overwhelming majority of its people had voted against regional autonomy.

Topic: Prohibition on Riders in Appropriation Acts
Case Title: Farinas v. Executive Secretary
Facts: Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 entitled "An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through
Fair Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in expressed
in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point
out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily
deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the
elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they
are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject
matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
Issue: Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
Ruling: No. Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," is so
broad that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election exercise, including
the filing of certificates of candidacy by elective officials. The Court is convinced that the
title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that
the title be a complete index of its content.
Main Point: An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain
any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.
Conclusion: The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one
they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting
of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one
subject-one title" rule.
Topic: Authorization in Transferring Funds
Case Title: Demetria v. Alba
Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Said
paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity
of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.”
Petitioners as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National

Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with
general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers on the
primary ground that the Section 44 of PD infringes upon fundamental law by authorizing
illegal transfer of public funds, amounts to an undue delegation of legislative powers to
the executive and allows the President to override safeguards, form and procedure
prescribed by the Constitution in approving appropriations.
Issue: Whether or not Budget Reform Decree of 1997 is constitutional.
Ruling: No. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the
privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item
from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof and
safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds.
Main Point: The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was
explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, the constitution allowed
the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting
an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body concerned.
Conclusion: General rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also
taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised
by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys.
Topic: Transfer of Funds
Case Title: Liga v. COMELEC
Facts: In 1994, petitioner Liga Ng Mga Barangay, an organization of barangays,

represented by petitioner Alex L. David, its president and secretary general as well as a
taxpayer, filed this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(G.R. No. 114809). Petitioners question what they perceive as "the threatened illegal
transfer, disbursement and use of public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution
and the law" 1 relative to the conduct of the forthcoming barangay elections (scheduled
for 9 May 1994).
In their comment, respondents claim that petitioners acted solely on the basis of reports
made in a newspaper, not bothering to confirm the veracity of the said reports either
from the COMELEC, the DILG, and/or any of the respondents, particularly on whether
respondents are indeed officially initiating the alleged transfer of funds for the barangay
elections.
Issue: Whether or not there is illegal transfer, disbursement and use of public contrary
to in the barangay elections.
Ruling: No. Funds of local government units may also be used to help defray the cost
of the forthcoming barangay elections. Under Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code,
local government units are required to appropriate funds for barangay elections.
Moreover, Article IV of the same Code dealing with "Election of Barangay Officials"
provides as follows:
Sec. 50. Funding. — Local governments shall appropriate such funds to defray
such necessary and reasonable expenses of the members of the board of election
tellers, board of canvassers and the printing of election forms and procurement of other
election paraphernalia, and the installation of polling booths.
Undoubtedly, under the foregoing provisions, while the Comelec answers for all
expenditures relative to political exercises of the province, city and municipality, local
governments are mandated to share in the expenses of the election for barangay
officials through appropriation of funds for the purpose.
Main Point: The threat to pursue the scheme, if ever there was one, existed only in
newspaper reports which could have misled the general public, including the petitioners,
into believing that the same emanated from an unimpeccable sources.
Conclusion: The Court acknowledges that petitioners have displayed vigilance and
acted with the best of intentions when they filed the present petitions. Yet, it would have
been more prudent for them to have first obtained an official statement or at least
confirmation from respondents as to the veracity of the reports contained in the said
news item — which could itself have been quoted out of context by the reporter
concerned or simply abbreviated to meet the day's deadline .

Case Title: Nazareth v. Villar
Facts: On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy
of the State to provide a program for human resources development in science and
technology in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and
manpower that would sustain the drive for total science and technology mastery.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefits
(Magna Carta benefits) to the covered officials and employees of the DOST Funds shall
be appropriated from GAA of the year.
DOST RDIX Brenda Nazareth released the Magna Carta for covered officials and
employees covering CY 1998 despite absence of specific appropriation in GAA.
Subsequently COA issued several notice of disallowance disapproving payment of
Magna Carta benefits. Provision for use of savings of GAA was vetoed by the President.
DOST Sec Dr. Filemon Uriarte Jr requested from the Office of the President for
authority to utilize DOST’s savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits which executive
secretary Ronaldo Zamora approved.
Nazareth thereafter lodged an appeal with COA urging the lifting of disallowances of the
magna Carta Benefits for CY 1998 to 2001. Her appeal was anchored by Memorandum
from Exec Sec Zamora.
Issue: Whether or not the act or "approval" made by the Executive Secretary on April
12, 2000 on the request for authority to use savings of the agency to pay the benefits,
was valid.
Ruling: No. The law in point is Article VI, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which
aptly provides that:
"(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations."
Main Point: Only the President has the power to augment savings from one item to
another in the budget of administrative agencies under his control and supervision. This
is the very reason why the President vetoed the Special Provisions in the 1998 GAA
that would authorize the department heads to use savings to augment other items of
appropriations within the Executive Branch.
Conclusion: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit but covered officials and
employees of the Department of Science and Technology who received the Magna
Carta benefits for calendar year 2001 are not required to refund the disallowed benefits
received.

Topic: President’s Authority of Reorganization
Case Title: Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
Facts: In 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13
(E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-
established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). In 2011, Finance Secretary
Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave
misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). In defense, Pichay filed a
Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the
same transaction and charge of grave misconduct is already pending before the Office
of the Ombudsman. Alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is
available to him in the ordinary course of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition assaulting the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 13.
Issue:
1. Whether or not E.O. 13 is constitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to
create a public office and appropriate funds.
Ruling: Yes. E.O 292 is constitutional.
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive
Department under E.O. 292. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292),
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.
There is an express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President’s authority to "direct changes in the
organizational units or key positions in any department or agency." there may be
no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President,
the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the
President's own office budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After
all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when the
President simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by
Congress for his office.
Main Point: Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one.
Conclusion: Petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of
E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the President's continuing authority to
reorganize the Office of the President.

Case Title: PHILCONSA v. Enriquez
Facts: In 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE
TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered
his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on
which he imposed certain conditions.
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.

GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the
Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said
allocation is not exceeded.
PHILCONSA claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not
the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain
provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to
augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987
Constitution.
Ruling: Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to
approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually
savings, and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures
to which said transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of Sections
25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be
authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given
authority.
Main Point: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;

however, the President, the President of Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the
Constitutional Commissions may.
Conclusion: Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, and under Section 29(1), no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5) allows as an
exception the realignment of savings to augment items in the general appropriations law
for the executive branch, such right must and can be exercised only by the President
pursuant to a specific law.
TATAD V. SEC. OF DOE – 281 SCRA 330 (1997)
FACTS :
Petitioner alleges that Sec(5) (B) which includes imposition of tariffs on crude oil under RA 8180
entitled downstream oil deregulation act of 1997 violates “Art. VI Sec. 26 of the 1987 constitution which
states that only one subject shall be expressed in the title passed by the congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A 8180 violates Article VI Section 26 of the 1987 constitution.
Ruling:
The court does not concur with this contetntion. The Court has adopted a liberal construction of
the one title- one subject rule. The Court hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is
germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The
section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them
rely less on imported petroleum.
De guzman v. Comelec, GR 146319, October 26, 2001
Facts:
Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voter’s registration act. The
act prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city or municipality for more than 4 years.
Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal protection clause because not all election officials were
covered by theprohibition. Petitioners contend that RA 8189 Section 44 is unconstitutional as it violates the
equal protection clause enshrined in the constitution; that it violates constitutional guarantee on security
of civil servants; that it undermines the constitutional independence of comelec and comelec’s constitutional
authority; that it contravenes the basic constitutional precept; that it is void for its failure to be read on 3
separate readings
Issue: Whether or Not section 44 of RA 8189 is unconstitutional
Ruling: No, RA 8189 Sec 44 is not unconstitutional. It has not violated the equal protection clause. It is
intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with
the people of their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried
out without the complicity of election officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or
municipality
Abakada v. Ermita
Facts:
Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased
emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits were the reasons
why R.A. 9337 was enacted. Reasons, the wisdom of which, the Court even with its extensive
constitutional power of review cannot probe. The petitioners in these cases, however, question not only the wisdom
of law, but also perceived constitutional infirmities in its passage. RA 9337 is a consolidation of three (3)
legislative bills namely, HB 3555 and 3705, and SB 1950. Because of the conflicting provisions of the
proposed bills, the Senate agreed to request the House of Representatives for a committee conference. The
Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill recommended the approval of its report, which
the Senate and the HOR did. On 24 May 2005, the President signed into law the consolidated House and
Senate versions as RA 9337. Before the law took effect on 1 July 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning
the constitutionality of the new law.
ISSUES:
Procedural-Whether RA 9337 violated the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and

b. Article VI, Section 26(2).
Substantial
a. Whether Sections 4, 5, and 6 of RA 9337, amending Sections 106, 107, and 108 of the NIRC,
violated the following provisions of the Constitution:
i. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
ii. Article VI, Section 28(2)
RULING:
1. R.A No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in the
House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce
amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending
corporate income taxes, percentages, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of
the constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extend of the
amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution
of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope
of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward.
BANAT v. Comelec
Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)filed before the National Board of
Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However,
the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot
and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc.
BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to
proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution.
The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it
would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the
Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing the resolution of
the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling.
2. Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional.
RULING :
1. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-listr epresentatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of Representatives
2. Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
ARROYO V. DEVENECIA
Facts:
An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced to the House
of Representatives involving taxations on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. This was later
passed accordingly and brought to the House of Senate. Upon the interpellation on the second reading,
herein petitioner moved for adjournment for lack of quorum which is constitutionally needed to
conduct business. Petitioner’s motion was defeated and was railroaded. The bill was then signed into
law by President Fidel Ramos.
Issue:
1. Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed n violation of the rules of the House.
2. Whether or not the law was passed on violation on the constitutional mandate.
Ruling:
1. After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A No. 8240. This case is therefore
dismissed.
2. There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be determined by viva voce
or nominal voting. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be
taken every time a House has to vote, except only on the following instances ± upon the last
andthe third readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the Members present and in re passing
a bill over the veto of the President. Second, there is obviousness on the part of the petitioner
to delay the business of the House, thus eliminating the alleged skullduggery on part of the
accused. Third, the enrolled bill doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus
legally binding provided it is in harmony with the constitution. Lastly, the court upheld principle
of separation of powers, which herein, is applicable for the legislative branch for it has exercised
its power without grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ARROYO V. DEVENECIA
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a
roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill
was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.
Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject
to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the
legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a
quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
CIR vs CTA
Facts
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue V. Manila Hotel Corporation, SC overruled Court of Tax Appeals decision that caterer’s
tax under R.A 6110 is illegal because it was vetoed by Former President Marcos and Congress had not taken steps to override
the veto. SC ruled in this case that the law has always imposed a 3% caterer’s tax, as provided in Par 1, Sec 206 of the Tax
Code. Presently, Manila Golf and Country Club, a non-stock corporation claims that it is exempt from the 3% on gross receipts
because President Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A of RA 6110 (Omnibus Tax Law).President Marcos vetoed Sec 191-A because
according to him it would 1) shift the burden of taxation to the consuming public and 2) restrain the development of hotels
which are essential to the tourist industry. The protestation of the club was denied by petitioners saying that
Sec 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words “hotels, motels ,rest houses.” House of Ways and Means concurred
with petitioners stating that veto message only seems to object with certain portions of 191-A and that can be gleaned by the
reasons given by the President.
Issue:
WON veto referred to the entire section or merely the 20% tax on gross receipts of operators and proprietors of eating places
within hotels, motels and rest houses.
Held and Ratio

President does not have the power to repeal an existing tax. Therefore, he could not have repealed the 2%
caterer’s tax. CTA agreed with respondent club that president vetoed only a certain part. CTA mentioned that President
can veto only an entire item, and not just words. The President intentionally only vetoed a few words in Sec 191-A. Assuming
that the veto could not apply to just one provision but all would render the Presidential veto void and still In favor of
petitioner. Inclusion of “hotels, motels, rest houses” in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket are items. President has the right to veto
such item, that which is subject to tax and tax rate. It does not refer to an entire section. To construe item as an entire section
would be to tie his hands to either completely agree with a section he has objections with or to disagree with an entire
section where he only has a portion he disagrees with.
GONZALES v. MACARAIG
Facts:
December 16, 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 aka General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal
Year 1989. December 29,1988, President signed the Bill into law and had become Rep. Act No 6688. In the
process, seven special provisions and Section 55 on “General Provision” were vetoed.
Senate issued Resolution No. 381 expressing the veto by the president were unconstitutional.
"SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations

Disapproved and/or Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the President in
the Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been
disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized
for other purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the
President in the Budget shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation
for the specific purpose is provided in this Act."
Issue:
Whether or not veto made by the president is constitutional
Held:
Yes.
1. Article 6 Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution has 2 parts, 1) President generally can veto the
entire bill as exercise of her power and 2) president shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue of tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
2. General provisions made in an appropriations bill shall ultimately refer to a specific
appropriation for it to take effect; Section 55 did not refer to any appropriations involved in the
entire bill. Similarly, the contents of this section is concerned on Appropriation Disapproved
and/or reduced by Congress that is not included on the face of the bill.
Court ruled the constitutionality of the presidential veto and the petition was DISMISSED
BENGZON v. DRILON
Facts:
On 15 January 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the
Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court
providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the
increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of appeals as well as
members of the constitutional commission.
Issue: whether or not the veto of the President on that porion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
Held: The justices of the court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of
the Supreme Court neither does not the president have the power to enact or amend statutes
promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional
since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not
grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.
CASE NO. 330
ART. VI Sec. 28. TAXATION
Delegated Tax Legislation
SPOUSES CONSTANTINO v. CUISIA [G.R. No. 106064. October 13, 2005.]
FACTS: All respondents were members of the Philippine panel tasked to negotiate with
the country's foreign creditors pursuant to the Financing Program. On 28 February
1992, the Philippine Debt Negotiating Team, chaired by respondent Pelaez, negotiated
an agreement with the country's Bank Advisory Committee, representing all foreign
commercial bank creditors, on the Financing Program which respondents characterized
as "a multi-option financing package."
According to petitioners even assuming that the contracts under the Financing Program
are constitutionally permissible, yet it is only the President who may exercise the power
to enter into these contracts and such power may not be delegated to respondents.
ISSUE: WoN the power of the President to enter into these contracts may be delegated.
RULING: While the Court refused to uphold the broad construction of the grant of power
as preferred by the DTI Secretary, it nonetheless tacitly acknowledged that Congress
could designate the DTI Secretary, in his capacity as alter ego of the President, to
exercise the authority vested on the chief executive under Section 28(2), Article VI. 62
At the same time, the Court emphasized that since Section 28(2), Article VI authorized
Congress to impose limitations and restrictions on the authority of the President to
impose tariffs and imposts, the DTI Secretary was necessarily subjected to the same
restrictions that Congress could impose on the President in the exercise of this taxing
power.
MAIN POINT/RATIO: In cases where the main purpose is to nullify governmental acts
whether as unconstitutional or done with grave abuse of discretion, there is a strong
presumption in favor of the validity of the assailed acts. The heavy onus is in on
petitioners to overcome the presumption of regularity. The Secretary of Finance or any
designated alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latter's prior consent to or
subsequent ratification of his acts. In the matter of contracting or guaranteeing foreign
loans, the repudiation by the President of the very acts performed in this regard by the
alter ego will definitely have binding effect. Had petitioners herein succeeded in
demonstrating that the President actually withheld approval and/or repudiated the
Financing Program, there could be a cause of action to nullify the acts of respondents.
CASE NO. 331

Exemptions
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE v. AQUINO [G.R. No. L-39086. June 15, 1988.]
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly

incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to
annul and declare void the "Notice of Seizure" and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and
building. The only issue left for the Court to determine and as agreed by the parties, is
whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational
purposes.
ISSUE: WoN the college lot and building of the petitioner are exempt from property
taxes.
RULING: NO. Due to its time frame, the constitutional provision which finds application
in the case at bar is Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine
Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the
conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built should be taxed,
not because the second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family
for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial
purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair
that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.
MAIN POINT/RATIO: The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for
purposes mentioned in the Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City Treasurer of Baguio,
71 Phil. 547 [1941]). The phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" was
further clarified by this Court in the cases of Herrera vs. Quezon City Board of
Assessment Appeals, 3 SCRA 186 [1961] and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Bishop of the Missionary District, 14 SCRA 991 [1965].
CASE NO. 332
Exemptions
BAYAN v. ZAMORA [G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000.]
FACTS: On July 18, 1997, the United States panel met with the Philippine panel to
exchange notes, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA for brevity).
Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a consolidated draft text, which in turn
resulted to a final series of conferences and negotiations 3 that culminated in Manila on
January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA,
which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and United
States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
ISSUE: WoN the VFA violate Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution.
RULING: NO. It is the Court's considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA
and in submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and
limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no moment that the
President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and in the honest belief that
the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution, referred the
VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the aforementioned provision.
MAIN POINT/RATIO: EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER TO ENTER INTO
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT;
CASE AT BAR. — As regards the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the
concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the
negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive
acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive
and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the
field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it. Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President involving the VFA —
specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and those necessary or
incidental to the exercise of such principal acts — squarely fall within the sphere of his
constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by
this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion
CASE NO. 333

Exemptions
REPUBLIC v. CITY OF KIDAPAWAN [G.R. No. 166651. December 9, 2005.]
FACTS: On March 24, 1992, the government through the Office of Energy Affairs (now
Department of Energy, DOE) entered into a service contract 6 with PNOC-EDC, a
government owned or controlled corporation created and existing under the Corporation
Code, 7 to exclusively conduct geothermal operations within the Mt. Apo Geothermal
Reservation Area MAGRA.
Subsequently, the City Treasurer of Kidapawan, Cotabato notified PNOC-EDC of its tax
delinquency after which, he issued a warrant of levy on the 701-hectare MAGRA 9 for
failure to pay real property taxes, covering the tax period from 1993-2002.
PNOC-EDC avers that under Section 234, paragraph (a) of the LGC, MAGRA, which is
a real property owned by the government, can only be subjected to real property tax if
its beneficial use is transferred to a taxable person.
ISSUE: WoN PNOC-EDC is exempt from paying the real property taxes
RULING: NO. The exemption claimed by PNOC-EDC hinges on Section 234,
paragraph (a) of the LGC which reads:
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. — The following are exempted from
payment of the real property tax: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person;
The above provision exempts from real property taxation properties of the government,
provided the beneficial use of the property was not transferred to a taxable person.
Conversely, if the beneficial use has been transferred to a taxable entity, such as
PNOC-EDC, then the real property owned by the government, which in this case is the
MAGRA, is subject to real property tax.
MAIN POINT/RATIO: The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the
Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. 18 Under Section
28(4), Article VI of the Constitution, no law granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority off all Members of Congress. Thus the exemption
provided in the service contract cannot be given effect because the DOE, representing
the government in the execution of the contract, has no authority to grant the same.
CASE NO. 334

Exemptions
JOHN HAY PEOPLE’S ALTERNATIVE COALITION v. LIM [G.R. No. 119774.
October 24, 2003.]
FACTS: The controversy stemmed from the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then
President Ramos declaring a portion of Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone
(SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within the John Hay Special Economic
Zone. The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the present petition for
prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief which was filed on April 25, 1995
challenging, in the main, its constitutionality or validity.
ISSUE: WoN Proclamation No. 420 granting tax exemption is constitutional.
RULING: NO. The Court declares that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax
exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is void for being violative of the
Constitution.
MAIN POINT/RATIO: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HAS THE FULL POWER TO
EXEMPT ANY PERSON OR CORPORATION OR CLASS OF PROPERTY FROM
TAXATION, UNLESS LIMITED BY A PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. — It is the
legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state constitution that has full power to
exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to
exempt being as broad as its power to tax. Other than Congress, the Constitution may
itself provide for specific tax exemptions, or local governments may pass ordinances on
exemption only from local taxes. The challenged grant of tax exemption would
circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must
have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.
TAXATION; TAX EXEMPTION; CANNOT BE IMPLIED AS IT MUST BE
CATEGORICALLY AND UNMISTAKABLY EXPRESSED. — [T]he claimed statutory
exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable
from the language of the law on which it is based; it must be expressly granted in a
statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken. Tax exemption cannot be implied
as it must be categorically and unmistakably expressed. If it were the intent of the
legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption and incentives given
to the Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227.
|||
CASE NO. 335

Exemptions
LUNG CENTER v. QC [G.R. No. 144104. June 29, 2004.]
FACTS: The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit
entity established on January 16, 1981 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1823. 2 It is
the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Quezon City,
Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the
Philippines. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for
canteen and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use
the same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their
professional services. On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the
petitioner were assessed for real property taxes in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City
Assessor of Quezon City.
ISSUE: WoN petitioner is entitled to realty tax exemptions.
RULING: NO. The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of
its real property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While
portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of patients and the dispensation of
medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are
being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen. We hold that the
portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital
leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes.
MAIN POINT/RATIO: Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in
order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and
unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are
ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. "Exclusive"
is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from
participation or enjoyment; and "exclusively" is defined, "in a manner to exclude; as
enjoying a privilege exclusively." 40 If real property is used for one or more commercial
purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation.
41 The words "dominant use" or "principal use" cannot be substituted for the words
"used exclusively" without doing violence to the Constitutions and the law. 42 Solely is
synonymous with exclusively.
CASE No. 336

Exemptions
GARCIA v. EXEC. SEC. [G.R. No. 101273. July 3, 1992.]
FACTS: On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all
articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem
. This additional duty was subsequently increased from five percent (5%) ad valorem to
nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the promulgation of Executive Order No. 443, dated 3
January 1991. Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President on 15 August 1991
reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to
five percent (5%) ad valorem.
ISSUE: WoN Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 violate Section 24, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
RULING: NO. There is explicit constitutional permission (Section 28[2] of Article VI of
the Constitution) to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and
other duties or imposts . . . ." The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions
thereof.
MAIN POINT/RATIO: Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
"(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates , import and
export quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government."(Emphasis
supplied) There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to authorize the
President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix
"within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ."
Case No. 337
Exemptions
LLADOC v. CIR & CTA, [G.R. No. L-19201. June 16, 1965]
EN BANC
FACTS: Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., of Bacolod City, donated P10,000.00
in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and
predecessor of herein petitioner, for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the
locality. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift tax return. Under
date of April 29, 1960, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued as
assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros
Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including
surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from May 15, 1958 to June 15, 1960, and the
compromise for the late filing of the return.
ISSUE: WoN the donation is subject to gift tax.
RULING: YES. In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax;
the assessment was not on the properties themselves. It did not rest upon general
ownership; it was an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of
the privilege of receiving the properties (Phipps vs. Com. of Int. Rev., 91 F [2d] 627.)
Manifestly, gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of Section 22(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution of the Philippines. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed
on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property
used exclusively for religious purposes, do not constitute an impairment of the
Constitution.
MAIN POINT/RATIO: 1. TAXATION; CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION FOR
RELIGIOUS PURPOSES REFERS ONLY TO PROPERTY TAXES. — Section 22 (3),
Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines. The exemption is only from the payment of
taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra-
distinguished from excise taxes.
2. GIFT TAX ON PROPERTY USED FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES NOT VIOLATION
OF CONSTITUTION. — A gift tax is not an assessment on the properties themselves. It
is not, therefore a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by
way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which a property used exclusively for religious
purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
CASE NO.338
Exemptions
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY v. DAR [G.R. No. 100091. October 22, 1992.]
FACTS: The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run
by the estate located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province.| In the early 1960's, it
was converted into a college with campus at Musuan, until it became what is now
known as the CMU, but still primarily an agricultural university. ||| Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB for brevity) dated September 4, 1989 and
to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the
decision of the DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable,
compact and contiguous portions of the Central Mindanao University (CMU for brevity)
land and their inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP for
brevity) for distribution to qualified beneficiaries, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the land area of the CMU
to its present needs or to a land area presently, actively exploited and utilized by the
university in carrying out its present education program with its present student
population and academic facility — overlooking the very significant factor of growth of
the university in the years to come.|||
ISSUE: WoN Respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review on
Certiorari and affirming the decision of DARAB.|||
RULING: YES. |As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be
necessary for use by the CMU, the school is in the best position to resolve and answer
the question and pass upon the problem of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives
for which the land was given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of
Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or discretion on this matter, unless the
evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU has no real need for the land.
To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational
purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the
authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.|||
MAIN POINT/RATIO: Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear
that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation
of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies
involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not
include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up
experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc. Consequently,
the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it
involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land
reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by
the school to be necessary for its purposes.
CASE NO. 339
Exemptions
CIR v. CTA & YMCA [G.R. No. 124043. October 14, 1998.]
FACTS: Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which

conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the
young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives.
On July 2, 1984, the commissioner of internal revenue (CIR) issued an assessment to
private respondent, in the total amount of P415,615.01 including surcharge and interest,
for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and
professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages.
ISSUE: WoN Rental Income of the YMCA Taxable.
RULING: No. Private respondent is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not
income tax on the rentals from its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a non-
stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the
payment of income tax. For the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the
aforecited provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the
classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution ; and (2) the income it seeks to
be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes. However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by
private respondent to prove that it met the said requisites.
MAIN POINT/RATIO: TAX EXEMPTION; COURT HAS ALWAYS APPLIED THE
DOCTRINE OF STRICT INTERPRETATION IN CONSTRUING THEREOF;
APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the
Court has always applied the doctrine of strict interpretation in construing tax
exemptions. Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be
manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the
claimed exemption "must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too
clear to be mistaken." In the instant case, the exemption claimed by the YMCA is
expressly disallowed by the very wording of the last paragraph of then Section 27 of the
NIRC which mandates that the income of exempt organizations (such as the YMCA)
from any of their properties, real or personal, be subject to the tax imposed by the same
Code. Because the last paragraph of said section unequivocally subjects to tax the rent
income of the YMCA from its real property, the Court is duty-bound to abide strictly by
its literal meaning and to refrain from resorting to any convoluted attempt at
construction.

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Separation of Church and State

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