People v.

Perfecto
G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

"The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any
person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is
still in force."
public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by
the inhabitants to the sovereign.
FACTS:
This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in
the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an
article about it to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate
have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery."
Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information
alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.
The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
ISSUEs:
Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty
Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel
HELD:
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the
inhabitants to the sovereign.
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander, and
byproclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and
property and providing for the punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in
so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to
protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new
government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown
or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article is
contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. It was crowded
out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.
"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive
officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial
officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an
agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials
are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The
American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is
due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people
any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks."
DECISION:
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the
judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION
114 SCRA 77

FACTS:
1. Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition.
2. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola.
3. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal.
4. On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated
October 23, 1963, later amended on November 11, 1963.
5. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. 3010, was
acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries Inc.,
6. Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals
“with acts unbecoming of a judge.”
7. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated , among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce.

ISSUE:
Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him
an act unbecoming of a Judge?

HELD:
Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of
litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or
assignment must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.

In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the
reglementary period hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on
March 6, 1965, respondent’s order date October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the
October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long been final for there was no
appeal from said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after
the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.

Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of
the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the
pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of
the Philippines, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a
change of sovereignty , the political laws of the former sovereign , whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Casibang v. AquinoGR L-38025 August 20, 1979
Makasiar, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales,Pangasinan in the
1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, hereinpetitioner, Dante Casibang who
seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1)anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting
and consideration of votes inspecified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying;
(4) open voting orballoting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971
ElectionCode.Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided by respondent Judge, who initially took
cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy. In the meantime or on September 21,
1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the
entire country under Martial Law;
and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional
Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same
was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January
17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court declared that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect" (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 [1973]). The
petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu
moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction
over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally
(Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI) — a political question has
intervened in the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the case is under the purview of political question and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the
judiciary.

Ruling:
No, the case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been
interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be
indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political
question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity;
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure. The trial under the Court of First Instance should proceed.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives

Facts:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President
Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court
for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three
weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice
voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.
2. Whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled

Held:

1. Yes. The power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.
2. Yes. The essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled

Ratio Decidendi:

1. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The Constitution sets forth in
no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels, the possession of this moderating power of the courts,
power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
 Judicial Supremacy - is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
 Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.
 Rules of Interpretation
 Verba Legis (The ordinary meaning, not primarily a lawyer’s document) the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,
 Ratio legis est anima (Where there is ambiguity) The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought
to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason
and calculated to effect that purpose.
 Ut magis valeat quam pereat. (The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole). It is a well-established rule in
constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to
be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two
can be made to stand together Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary.
2. Essential Requisites of Judicial Revieew:
 An actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power. Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution
enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust,
elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that
the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut
definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
 "Political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
 The person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Locus
standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. At all events,
courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Court opts to
grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the
Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public
funds.
 Standing - is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties
who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest
 Real party in interest - is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.
 The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. In Tan v. Macapagal, this
Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture." Only then may the courts pass on the the futility of seeking remedies from either or both
Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the
House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested
in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a
body which is bereft of power to grant it. Validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.
 The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. x It is a well-established rule that a court
should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such
question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised,if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable. Sotto v. Commission
on Election. This Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis
mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5)
of Article XI of the Constitution.

Disposition: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House
of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
 Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article
XI of the Constitution.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

I.      THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public
auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the
bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

II.    THE ISSUES

1.   Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does
not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2.     Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3.    Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the Constitution; and
4.   Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino
corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation.

III.   THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1.    YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.

Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is
non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style.  But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution.  Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not
self-executing. The argument is flawed.  If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing
because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and
exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph,
then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by
its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.  A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement.  From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.  It is per se judicially enforceable.  When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.  And when
our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings.  Where there is a right there is a remedy.  Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2.    YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the

Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines,
as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and  failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its
own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.   Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.  For sure, 51% of the equity of
the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel.  In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.  Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim
that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building
stands.

3.    YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to implement §10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization.  [T]his fact alone makes
the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a “state action.”  In constitutional jurisprudence,
the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered “state action” covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and,
(3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.  It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third
categories of “state action.”  Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State.  After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of
power - legislative, executive and judicial.  Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State
is correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government.  It is undeniable that in this case
the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

4.    YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the
winning bidder.  The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the
winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals.  Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder
will be declared the winning bidder.  Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet,
nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder.  For in choosing the awardee
respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which
are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason  the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award
the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid.  In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional
injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match
the bid of the foreign entity.  And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go
to the Filipino.  It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of
the 1987 Constitution.  For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the
bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded.  To ignore it would be to
sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
Due Process

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, GR 139465 (Jan. 18, 2000)

FACTS:

Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. a request for the extradition
of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of Conspiracy to Commit Offense, Attempt to Evade Tax,
Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television, False Statement, and Election Contribution in Name of Another.

During the evaluation process of the extradition, the private respondent, requested the petitioner, Secretary of
Justice, to furnish him copies of the extradition request from the U.S. government, that he be given ample time to
comment regarding the extradition request against him after he shall have received copies of the requested papers, and
to suspend the proceeding in the meantime.

The petitioner, Secretary of Justice denied the request in consistent with Art. 7 of the RP – US Extradition Treaty
which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the U.S. in any proceedings arising from
an extradition request.

The private respondent filed with the RTC against the petitioner Hon. Ralph Lantion (presiding judge RTC Manila
Branch 25) a mandamus, a certiorari, and a prohibition to enjoin the petitioner, the Secretary of DFA, and NBI from
performing any acts directed to the extradition of the respondent, for it will be a deprivation of his rights to due process
of notice and hearing.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Mark Jimenez is entitled to the basic rights of due process over the
government’s duties under a treaty?

RULING:

Yes. According to the principle of “Pacta Sunt Servanda”, parties to a treaty should keep their agreements to
good faith. However, Sec. 2 of Art. 2 of the Constitution (incorporation clause) provides that the Philippines “adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land”.

Incorporation clause is applied when there is a conflict between the international law and local/municipal law.
However, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal court.

The fact that the international law has been made part of the law of the land does not imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. Rules of international law are given an equal
standing with, but not superior to, the national legislative enactment. The principle of “Lex Posterior Derogat Priori”
clarifies that a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. And the Republic of the Philippines
considers its Constitution as the highest law of the land, therefore, both statutes and treaty may be invalidated if they
are conflict with the constitution.
RULING IN MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of
the 1987 Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is
no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not
to make it appear that it is not self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce
the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions.

Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable.
GAMBOA VS. TEVES DIGEST
 WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA v. EDGARDO ANGARA
SUBJECT MATTER: Constitutional construction; Self-executing provisions

CASE SUMMARY:

DOCTRINE/S:
The principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.

FACTS:
The Philippines, through then Pres. FVR, is a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The President
saw the country’s membership to WTO as a means to improve Philippine access to foreign markets and as an opening for
new opportunities in the services sector

On April 15, 1994, DTI Sec. Rizalino Navarro, representing the Philippine Government, signed the Final Act (The Act
that promulgates the creation of WTO, and is the result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations) in Marakesh
and agreed on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines to:

a.) submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a
view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
b.) adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

On Aug. 12, 1994, the members of the Senate received from the President a letter dated Aug.11, 1994 stating among
others that the Uruguay Round Final Act is submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. VII
of the Constitution. However, on Aug. 13, 1994, the members of the Senate received another letter from the President
also dated Aug. 11, which stated among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the
WTO, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services
are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. Art. VII of the Constitution.

On Dec. 4, 1994, the President certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled
“Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.” On Dec. 14, 1994, the Senate concurred with
the ratification by the President of the WTO Agreement. On Dec. 16, 1994, the President signed the Instrument of
Ratification.

To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President is composed of the Agreement Proper and “the associated
legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Sec. Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes
aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services.

On December 29, 1994, the petitioners (Senators Tañada & Coseteng), filed for a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus praying for the nullification of the ratification by the President with the concurrence of the Philippine Senate
of the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) with the contention among others, that the
WTO Agreement contravenes/violates the letter, spirit and intent of Sec. 19, Art. II & Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution which provides that the State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy and shall
promote the preferential use of Filipino labor. In particular, “the national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO
Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipino and local products which is
in the contravention with the “Filipino First Policy” posited by the Philippine Constitution.
ISSUE/S: (Other issues not pertaining to self-executing provisions not discussed here)
1. WON the principles and state policies enumerated in Art. II and some sections of Art. XII are self-executing
provisions and therefore should render the WTO Agreement null and void – NO

HOLDING/RATIO:
1. NO. The principles and state policies enumerated in Art. II and Art. XII are not self-executing provisions. By its very
title, Art. II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” These principles in Art. II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as
aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

Furthermore, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the
national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article,
especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof.

As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in
Art. II and some sections of Art. XII are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause
of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”

In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor that broad constitutional principles need legislative enactments
to implement them. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and
the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but political. The
electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of
the ballot.

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced
from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade “into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy making.” Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs.
Factoran, Jr., explained these reasons as that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right
—a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Art II (15) of the Constitution—that is or
may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the
trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. The legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification
in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words,
there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second par. of Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution.

It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS this Court held that “Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.” However, as the constitutional provision itself
states, it is enforceable only in regard to “the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy
and patrimony” and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue
here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a
rule,
there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in
the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
Facts:

Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution,
they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735.
Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the
constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7
and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameralparliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and
invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative. Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in
Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group’s petition.

Held:

According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a people’s initiative.
The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of
the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives The framers of
the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is intended that the third mode of
stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative
and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result
because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before
complying with RA 6735 Petition is dismissed.
 GUINGONA VS. COURT OF APPEAL
GR NO. 125532 JUL 10 1998

PETITIONER: SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR

STATE PROSECUTORS JUDE ROMANO, LEAH ARMAMENTO, MANUEL TORREVILLAS,
JOAQUIN ESCOVAR, MENRADO CORPUS
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND POTENCIANO ROQUE
RESPONDENT:COURT OF APPEALS
RODOLFO PINEDA
PANGANIBAN, J.:

I. FACTS
 Last QTR of 1995 – NBI conducted investigation on the alleged participation and involvement of
national and local government officials in jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling which was also
subject of legislative investigation by the Congress,
 NOV 1995 – Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to the network of illegal gambling
applied for admission in the Government’s Witness Protection Program. He allegedly gained first-
hand information in his capacity as Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling from the time of
President Corazon Aquino until his resignation in 1989.
 He was eventually admitted into the program by the DOJ after complying with the requirements of
RA 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act
 Roque executed a sworn statement before NBI agents alleging that certain politicians, including
Pineda, offered him bribes which he accepted upon agreeing to cease raids conducted on the said
politicians gambling operations.
 On the basis of Roque’s sworn statement which was corroborated by Angelito Sanchez and Gen.
Lorenzo Mateo, the NBI recommended the filing of charges against Pineda and others involved.
 JAN 5 1996 - Pineda filed a Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of Roque to the Witness
Protection Program which the DOJ Secretary denied. This prompted Pineda to file a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction with the
Court of Appeals.
 The Court of Appeals ruled that Roque participated in the commission of the crimes imputed to
Pineda by accepting bribe money. Thus, his admission to the Program fell under Section 10, which
requires that he should not appear to be the most guilty of the imputed crimes.

II. ISSUE
 Whether or not a witness’ testimony requires prior or simultaneous corroboration at the time he is
admitted into the witness protection, security and benefit program
III. RULING - WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby DENIED
 Court of Appeals is assailed by petitioners for opining that admission to the Program requires prior
or simultaneous corroboration of the material points in the witness’ testimony.
 Without going into the merits of the case, the Court finds the petition fundamentally defective. The
Constitution provides that judicial power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.” According to Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist, courts are mandated to settle disputes between real
conflicting parties through the application of the law. Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of
judicial power, demands the following:
(1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be
ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have “standing”; that is, he has personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury.
 MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO
FACTS:

On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s EID by then Comelec
Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed
Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim
appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring
petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the
EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are
prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said
Memo Circular.

Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed an
administrative and criminal complaint16 with the Law Department17against Benipayo, alleging that her
reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules
and regulations.

During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:

We find petitioner’s argument without merit.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer
be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution
itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac34 and
Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.35 The ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess
of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent" 36, this provision should be
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of
the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This is
contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also
run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.
 DRILON VS LIM
Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code 1. The Secretary of
Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and
void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary
to law and public policy.

The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as
unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed.
(Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it
anyway.)

Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC

Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind
the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation
of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation
before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the
legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved.
To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was
indeed an infraction of the Constitution.

Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional

Held:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance
and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he
is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code
should be.. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the
petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment
of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an
act not of control but of mere supervision.

1
 PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. Vs FERTIPHIL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 166006               March 14, 2008

FACTS:
-Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine
laws. They are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural
chemicals.
-On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No.
1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the
domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. The LOI provides:

“3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing
formula a capital contribution component of not less than  P10 per bag. This capital
contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such
capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the
Philippines.”

-Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and Trust
Company, the depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused
to accede to the demand.
-Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages 8 against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It
questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an
unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. 9 Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely
favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer
industry.
-In its Answer,10 FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a
valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country.
It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by the levy
fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.
- On November 20, 1991, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Fertiphil
- On November 28, 2003, the CA handed down its decision affirming that of the RTC
ISSUE:

WON the law constitutes a valid legislation pursuant to the exercise of taxation and police power for public
purposes.
HELD:

The P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is an exercise of the power of taxation. Taxes are exacted only for a
public purpose. The P10 levy is unconstitutional because it was not for a public purpose. The levy was imposed
to give undue benefit to PPI.

An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. Taxes are exacted only for a public
purpose. They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. 46 The
reason for this is simple. The power to tax exists for the general welfare; hence, implicit in its power is the
limitation that it should be used only for a public purpose. It would be a robbery for the State to tax its citizens
and use the funds generated for a private purpose. As an old United States case bluntly put it: "To lay with one
hand, the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon
favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is nonetheless a robbery because
it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation."

Here, We do not find anything iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil under
LOI No. 1465. It unduly benefited from the levy. It was proven during the trial that the levies paid were
remitted and deposited to its bank account. Quite the reverse, it would be inequitable and unjust not to order
a refund. To do so would unjustly enrich PPI at the expense of Fertiphil. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides that "every person who, through an act of performance by another comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground shall return the same to him." We cannot
allow PPI to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity dictate that PPI must refund the amounts
paid by Fertiphil.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.