CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
MACARIOLA V. ASUNCION – CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNITY
POLITICAL LAW DEFINED
Facts: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by
respondent Hon. Judge Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of
Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of
partition was submitted to him which he later approved in an Order
dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was complainant
Bernardita R. Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot
1184. This lot according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion
was adjudicated to the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot
1184 into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who
later sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife
Victoria Asuncion. Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon
conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein Judge
Asuncion was the president.
Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed
as Civil Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion
with "acts unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in
acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491
par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte
rendered a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion.
After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by
Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she
recommended on her decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge
Asuncion be exonerated.
Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of
Appeals violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot
1184-E which he previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his
engagement in business by joining a private corporation during his
incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an "act
unbecoming of a judge"?
Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not
constitute of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be
more discreet in his private and business activities.
SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil
Code applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property.
Respondent judge purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6,
1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963
was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal
within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no
longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy
the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010
but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from
the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No.
3010.
SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US
and later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14
of Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because
where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign,
are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears no enabling or
affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision
of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent Judge Asuncion.
Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of
R.A. 3019 because the business of the corporation in which respondent
participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial
office.
SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation
for their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its
incorporation realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
PEOPLE V. PERFECTO – CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNITY
POLITICAL LAW DEFINED
Facts: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate,
Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the
testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of
Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent
Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the
Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
About August 20, 1920 Fernando Guerrero, the Secretary of the
Philippine Senate discovered that certain documents which constituted
the records of testimony by witnesses in the investigation of oil
companies had disappeared from his office. On September 7, 1920, the
day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion,
edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, the respondent, published an article
criticizing the Senate and its members in general. As a result, he was
charged guilty of violating Article 256 of the Penal Code – a provision
that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Petitioner
filed an appeal to the Supreme Court praying for the dismissal of the
case on the ground that said Article is no longer in force.
Issue: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is
still in force and can be applied in the case at bar?
Held: No. The Court stated that during the Spanish Government,
Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as
representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the
present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the
provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the
Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked
provision of the RPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court
determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is
about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court
emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is
considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case.
Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
VERA VS. AVELINO – JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL
QUESTIONS
Facts: The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the
President and the Congress a report regarding the national elections
held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of
terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva
Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the
accurate feedback of the local electorate.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was
approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the 16
candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as
proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor
seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the
protest filed against their election.
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their
colleagues who instituted the resolution, praying for its annulment and
allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial
duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.
Issues: Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the
jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces
are valid.
Held: The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of
separation of powers, holding that the case was not a “contest”, and
affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who
shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by
the Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and
therefore not under the juridical review of the courts.
MABANAG VS LOPEZ VITO
ENROLLED BILL THEORY
Facts: Three senators and eight representatives had been proclaimed by
a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected
senators and representatives in the elections held on 23 April 1946. The
three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening
of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of
alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since
their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to
take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although
they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension
had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution
had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the petition for
prohibition was filed. As a consequence these three senators and eight
representatives did not take part in the passage of the congressional
resolution, designated "Resolution of both houses proposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto," nor was their membership reckoned within the
computation of the necessary three-fourths vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-
fourths vote in either branch of Congress. The petition for prohibition
sought to prevent the enforcement of said congressional resolution, as it
is allegedly contrary to the Constitution. The members of the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor
General, and the Director of the Bureau of Printing are made
defendants. Eight senators, 17 representatives, and the presidents of the
Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the
approval of the resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution.
Held: It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities
that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary,
except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provision. This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation
of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or
citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters
fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible
of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full
harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the
courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the
government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution
also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which
leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps
complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single
objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in
section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of
(only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in
attaching political character to one and withholding that character from
the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political
function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity
and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of
this power is even in dependent of any intervention by the Chief
Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the
judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for
judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of a
ratification.
PLANAS VS. COMELEC - JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL
QUESTIONS
Facts: While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on
September 21, 1972, the president issued Proclamation No. 1081
placing the Philippines under martial law. On November 29, 1972 the
Convention approved its proposed constitution. The next day the
president issued PD No. 73 submitting to the people for ratification or
rejection the proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for
said ratification. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a petition
to enjoin respondents from implemented PD No. 73 because the calling
of the plebiscite among others are lodged exclusively in the Congress.
On December 17, 1972, the president issued an order temporarily
suspending the effects of PD 1081 for the purpose of free and open
debate on the proposed constitution. On December 23, the president
announced the postponement of the plebiscite, as such, the Court
refrained from deciding the cases. On January 12, the petitioners filed
for an “urgent motion” praying that the case be decided “as soon as
possible”.
Issues:
1. Is validity of PD 73 justiciable?
2. Is PD 73 valid?
3. Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass
the proposed constitution?
Held: The Court may pass upon constitutionality of PD 73 not only
because of a long list of cases decided by the Court but also of
subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution
which expressly provides for the authority of the Court to review cases
revolving such issue. The validity of the decree itself was declared
moot and academic by the Court. The convention is free to postulate
any amendment as long as it is not inconsistent to what is known as Jus
Cogens.
JAVELLANA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY – JUSTICIABLE
QUESTIONS
Facts: In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the
new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter
sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from
implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said
constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He
argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by
the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election
held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being
intimidation and fraud.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
Issue: Whether or not the validity of Proclamation No. 1102
justiciable?
Held: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority
of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the
ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise
of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence
to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be
assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973
Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a
political question which was left to the people in their sovereign
capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such
acquiescence.
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION (PBA) VS. COMELEC
1986 SNAP PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Facts: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of
BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986
(Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the
Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the special
election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional
“resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9,
Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of
a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the
regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the
President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective
only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and
qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his
proclamation.”
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the
cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually
resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang
Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any
suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the
scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate
his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.
Issue: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court
therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections
Held: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the
issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the
election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the
required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not
issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political
question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned
constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the
President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in
their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no
issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the
way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the
incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
LAWYERS LEAGUE VS. AQUINO - JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL
QUESTIONS
Facts: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel
were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued
providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by
stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise
of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed
Forces of the Philippines."
Issue: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Held: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people are the judge. The Court further held that the people have
accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the
entire country. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and
law a de jure government. The community of nations has recognized
the legitimacy of the new government.
IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ - JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL
QUESTIONS
Facts: Saturnino Bermudez, as a lawyer, questioned the validity of the
first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-
President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of
synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under
this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Bermudez claims that the said provision “is not clear” as to whom it
refers, he then asks the Court “to declare and answer the question of the
construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the
elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M.
Tolentino being referred to as the “incumbent president”.
Issue: Whether or not said provision is ambiguous.
Held: No. Bermudez’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the
aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of
public record and common public knowledge that the Constitutional
Commission refers therein to incumbent President Aquino and Vice-
President Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the
extension of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited
section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of
the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under
said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the
government of President Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned
with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by the Supreme
Court which held that: “Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people
have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and in
law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has
recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
BERMUDEZ VS ESGUERRA
FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain together with other
petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality
of Taytay, Pronice of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Barangay
Election Act of 1982.
Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin
Esguerra which provided the designation of respondent Florentino
Magno as Barangay Captain of the same barangay and the other
respondents as members of the barangay Council of the same barangay
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
and municipality. Petitioners maintain that Sec 3 of the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 provides that the terms of office shall be six (6)
years which shall continue until their successors shall have elected and
qualified. Also, in accordance with the recent ratification of the 1987
Constitution, it seems that respindent OIC Governor no longer had the
authority to replace them as well as designate successors.
Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared null and void and
that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions.
Issue: Whether or not designation of respondents to replace petitioners
was valid.
Held: The Court ruled in the negative. SC declared that the
Memorandum issued by respondent OIC Governor designating
respondents as Barangay Captain and Councilmen of Barangay Dolores
has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987.
By that date therefore, the provisional constitution must be deemed to
have been superseded. Effectivity of the Constitution is also
immediately upon its ratification.
MARBURY VS MADISON – POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
FACTS: Just before the end of his term the outgoing President of the
United States, John Adams, appointed 16 Federalist judges and 42
Federalist justices of the peace through the Judiciary Act of 1801 or the
Midnight Judges Act. Among these midnight judges was William
Marbury.
The appointments were approved by the Senate; however, the
commissions need to be delivered to those appointed for it to take
effect. The Acting Secretary of State, John Marshall failed to deliver a
few of the said commissions before the end of Adam’s term. When
Thomas Jefferson assumed office, he ordered his Secretary of State,
James Madison, not to deliver the remaining appointments. Jefferson
believed that the undelivered commissions were void, thus, the
appointees cannot assume the offices and duties to which they were
appointed.
William Marbury sought for a writ of mandamus or an order from the
Supreme Court to require James Madison to deliver his commission.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Marbury has the right to the said
commission.
(2) Whether or not the Supreme Court has the right to review the acts of
the Congress.
RULING: (1) Yes. Marbury has the right to the said commission.
President John Adams signed Marbury’s commission after his
confirmation, the appointment has been made, and Marbury has a right
to the commission. The order granting the commission takes effect
when the Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been
exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required
from the person possessing the power has been performed.
(2) Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of
Congress to know if they are constitutional or not.
It is the duty of the Judicial Department to interpret what the law is.
Those who apply the rule to particular cases must expound and interpret
the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on
the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the
Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the
Constitution must govern the case to which they both apply.
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS GUINGONA
G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
FACTS: The Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular
session of the 11th Congress for the election of officers. Senator
Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for
the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan
was duly elected President of the Senate.
Senator Tatad stated, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, that he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the
majority while those who voted for him, belonged to the minority.
However, the majority leader informed the body that 7 members of the
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, elected Teofisto T. Guingona as minority
leader. The Senate President then recognized him so.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad alleged that Senator
Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court have jurisdiction
over the petition.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution.
RULING:
(1) Yes. The Courts have jurisdiction over the petition.
Supreme Court took over the petition by stating that it is within the
powers and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether or not the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives.
(2) No. There was no violation of the Constitution.
The Court explained that the Constitution only stated that "…Each
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The
court held that the method of selection is set by the Senate and not by
the court.
The Court further explained that in the absence of
constitutional guideline or specific rules, the Court does not have any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. Thus, the Courts may not intervene in the internal
affairs of the legislature, as respect to the separation of powers.
FRANCISCO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Facts: The House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored
by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,
on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
Former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
of the Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was referred to the
House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form but insufficient in
substance. After the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the
first complaint, another impeachment complaint was filed against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., a period that is less than the one year bar
provided by the Constitution and the rules of the House of
Representatives.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
This resulted to many petitions by many individuals as well as
associations questioning the constitutionality of the move made by
Congress. The petitions contend that the second impeachment
proceeding was in culpable violation of the Constitution wherein there
is a one-year bar before one can initiate impeachment proceedings
against the same individual.
The Congress contended that the Supreme Court had no power to
inquire about the impeachment proceedings as it is the former which
has the power to facilitate or administer impeachment proceedings, as
provided by the Constitution. If the Supreme Court interrupts and
inquires about the proceedings, it will disturb the doctrine of separation
of powers as well as the doctrine of checks and balances. The
impeachment proceeding is in itself under the power of the Congress
and is a political question.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the
petition
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition.
The Constitution was equivocal in granting the courts the duty to settle
controversies that are legally demandable and enforceable. The Courts
conferred with the duty to check if there is any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or office of government. In this
case where the constitutionality of the impeachment proceeding is
questioned, no one has the power to interpret the fundamental law of
the land and answer the issue of constitutionality other than the
Supreme Court. Therefore, if the legislative commences and
administers impeachment proceedings, the courts has the right to
inquire about their actions especially if constitutionality is involved.
Moreover, the judicial power is not only a power, it is a duty, a duty
that cannot be barred by the political question doctrine. It has been
clarified that the constitution intended to do away with “truly political
question.” Truly political questions are those that are beyond judicial
review, thus, it respects that the doctrine of separation of powers must
be maintained. In the case at bar, it is considered as not truly political
questions by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII since the courts can
review such questions.
SANIDAD VS COMELEC – POLITICAL VS JUSTICIABLE
QUESTIONS
G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976
FACTS: President Ferdinand Marcos issued a Presidential Decree No.
991 which called for a national referendum for the Citizen Assemblies
or “barangays” to resolve the issues of martial law, interim assembly,
its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of
his present powers.
The President issued another decree, twenty days after, the PD. No
1031 which amended recent decree and declared the provisions of PD
No. 229 which provided the manner of voting and canvassing of votes
in barangays to be applicable to the national referendum.
Marcos issued another decree on the same date, PD No. 1033, the
decree recited that the people’s opposition to the convention of the
interim National Assembly showed the people’s desire to abolish and
replace the said body through a constitutional amendment, an
amendment that will provide a new interim legislative body. This will
be submitted directly to the people during the National Referendum
plebiscite.
Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction for the
Commission on Election to hold and conduct the Referendum
Plebiscite and to declare Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033
without force and effect since they propose amendments to the
Constitution. Sanidad also appealed that Presidential Decree No. 1031
be negated with regards to the directives given to the COMELEC to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite.
Petitioners content that the Constitution did not grant the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to
the new Constitution. And claimed that the Referendum-Plebiscite has
no constitutional basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the
Constitution
RULING:
Yes. President Marcos can propose amendments to the Constitution.
The amendment process is normally exercised by the legislature. The
power to propose amendments resides in the National Assemble but the
normal course was not followed. Instead of calling for the Interim
National Assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of
amendments and submitted the proposed amendments to the people
through Presidential Decree 1033. The validity of Presidential Decree
Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 was passed on the Supreme Court as stated
Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution. Therefore, the Supreme
Court has the last word in the construction of not only treaties and
statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other
powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence
a limited power, and the Supreme Court was given the authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
The petition was dismissed because the President at that time also
exercises legislative powers.
ESTRADA VS ARROYO – POLITICAL VS JUSTICIABLE
QUESTIONS
G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
FACTS: Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the
Philippines in 1998 and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice-
President.
In 2000, Chavit Singson alleged that he received money from Estrada
as payoff from jueteng. This caused controversies nationwide and
impeachment cases were filed against Estrada. The impeachment
proceedings were conducted and Estrada, despite the protests against
him held, pleaded not guilty.
When Estrada appeared in television, he called for a snap elections and
added that he will not run on the said elections. Because of this, the
Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant and
stated that Estrada constructively resigned his post. The same day of
SC’s declaration, Arroyo took her oath of office as the 14th President
of the Philippines.
ISSUES: Whether or not the question on Estrada’s resignation is a
political issue or a justiciable one.
RULING: For the president to be considered resigned, there must be
an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that
happened prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the press release he
issued regarding his acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as
president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on
leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that
Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
LIM vs. PACQUING – PRESUMPTION OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY
G.R. 115044, January 27, 1995
FACTS: On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued
transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to
the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila
nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An Ordinance
Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated
Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-
Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And
For Other Purposes.”
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then
President Marcos. The decree, entitled “Revoking All Powers and
Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or
Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And
Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of
Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to
operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and Amusement
Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which
expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all
forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments.
ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RULING: Yes. Presidential Decree No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State.
Gambling is essentially antagonistic. It encourages laziness and erodes
the value of good, honest and hard work. It is as very stated by PD No.
771, a vice and a social ill which government must minimize, if it
cannot eradicate, in pursuit of social and economic development.
Jai-alai is not a mere economic activity which the law seeks to regulate.
It is essentially gambling and whether it should be permitted and under
what conditions are primarily determined by the lawmaking authority
and to take into account national and local interests.
Here, it is the police power of the State that is overriding. The
government has the power to regulate and even prohibit operation of
businesses through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling
franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the
public welfare. ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-
alai therefore, it may not operate even if it has a license from the Mayor
to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.
BOARD OF OPTOMETRY VS COLET – JUDICIAL REVIEW
G.R. No. 122241 July 30, 1996
FACTS: Congress passed and enacted a law entitled “An Act
Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating
Optometrists, and for Other Purposes”, which is also known as the
Revised Optometry Law of 1995 or R.A. No. 8050.
In the examination of the petition of the respondents, the body of
petition revealed the members of the petition which were Anacbedo
Optical Co., Inc.; Optometry Practitioner of the Philippines (OPAP);
Cenevis Optometrist Association (COA); Association of Christian-
Muslim Optometrist (ACMO); and Southern Mindanao Optometrist
Association of the Philippines (SMOAP) and being represented by its
president. However, the body of petition gave no such details on the
juridical personality and the addresses of the associations except for
Acebedo Co., Inc. What is listed are the names of the presidents, their
profession and home addresses.
The petitioners filed an opposition to the application for preliminary
injunction and alleged that the respondents do not possess the right that
would entitle them to the relief sought; the respondents have not shown
legal existence or capacity to file a case; R.A. No. 8050 carries no
injurious effect and; and the respondents failed to overcome the
presumption of constitutionally in favor of R.A. No. 8050.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents have locus standi to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8050.
RULING: No. The private respondents have no legal standing or
capacity to question the constitutionality of the questioned law. The
Supreme Court has cited that under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an
association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a
personality separate and distinct from that of its members. If it is not to
be proven as such, it cannot bring any civil action. In the case at bar, it
was founded that the private respondents did not claim that they are
juridical identities as they chose to remain silent on the issue of the
juridical personality of their “associations”, having completely
disregarded Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Without juridical
entity, the private respondents are not considered to be a real party in
interest.
ANGARA VS ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL – JUDICIAL REVIEW
Facts: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and
the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly
for the first district of Tayabas.
On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara
as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he
took his oath of office.
On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,
which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things,
that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National
Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.
On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No.
6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara
contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested
elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore
has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon
the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the matter.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the
purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial
tribunal. The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance
of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
of the Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly cannot
toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent
the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
- census every 10 years. Baker, who lived in an urban part of the state,
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving
as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the
National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the
other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with,
when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of
the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies
of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justiciable and appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining
the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial
tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the
legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.
Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the
first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for
the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly
passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not
yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of
confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time
the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the
time for the filing of said election protests.
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of
its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the
herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time
for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests
within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.
BAKER VS CARR – JUDICIAL REVIEW
396 US 156
FACTS: Charles Baker was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee.
Baker filed suit against Joe Carr, the Secretary of State of Tennessee.
Baker’s complaint alleged that the Tennessee legislature had not
redrawn its legislative districts since 1901, in violation of the Tennessee
State Constitution which required redistricting according to the federal
asserted that the demographics of the state had changed shifting a
greater proportion of the population to the cities, thereby diluting his
vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the
remedy of reapportionment or at-large elections. The district court
denied relief on the grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a
political question and would therefore not be heard by the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts have the jurisdiction to hear a
constitutional challenge to a legislative apportionment
RULING: Yes. The courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional
challenge to a legislative apportionment.
The political question doctrine is based on the separation of powers and
whether a case is justiciable is determined on a case by cases basis. The
court held that the case at bar is justiciable and did not present a
political question. The case did not present an issue to be decided by
another branch of the government. The court noted that judicial
standards under the Equal Protection Clause were developed and it had
been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment
to determine if an act is subjective and unpredictable and reflects no
policy. When a question is involved with any of the other two branches
of the government, it presents a political question and the Court will not
answer it without further clarification from the other branches. The
Supreme Court rules that the equal protection challenge in this case is
separable from the political questions.
BRILLANTES VS CONCEPCION – POLITICAL OR JUSTICIABLE
QUESTION
GR 163193, June 15, 2004
Facts: Congress enacted RA 8436 which authored the Commission on
Elections to use an automated election system for the process of voting,
counting of votes and consolidation the results of national and local
elections. Comelec subsequently approved Resolution 6712 adopting
the policy that the precinct election results of each city and municipality
shall be immediately transmitted electronically in advance to the
Comelec in Manila.
Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and
usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for
President and Vice-President and would likewise violate upon the
authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the
"unofficial" quick count as provided under applicable election laws.
Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the exercise
of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections” and added that the issue is
beyond judicial determination.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of Resolution 6712
justified.
Ruling: No. The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712.
The contention of the COMELEC that the tabulation of votes is not
prohibited by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 8436 as such
tabulation is “unofficial,” is trivial and totally unacceptable. If the
Comelec is barred from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
for the President and Vice-President, the Comelec is prohibited from
making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes.
LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR (2004)
Facts: On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its
Decision granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of
certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire
FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the
finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987
Constitution.
The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to
service contracts, which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution,
were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of
sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign
control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice
of the Filipino nation.
Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils
limited to “technical” or “financial” assistance only?
Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements
may be entered into, and only for large-scale activities. Full control is
not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided
that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set
aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of
full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of
directors of a private corporation: the performance of managerial,
operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated
to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board
retains full residual control of the business.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES VS LYONS – RIPENESS AND ACTUAL
CONTROVERSY
Facts. In 1976, Lyons was pulled over by a Los Angeles police officer
for a traffic violation. Although Lyons offered no resistance, the officer
asked him to step out of the car, and proceeded to place Lyons in a
chokehold, rendering Lyons unconscious. Lyons sued the municipality
and sought damages and injunctive relief in District Court for the
Central District of California. He asked the court to issue an injunction
preventing the police department from using chokeholds in the future
unless circumstances were to result in death or serious bodily injury if
force was withheld. The District Court entered such an injunction. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The municipality
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue. Does this case present an “actual case or controversy” that can be
determined by the Supreme Court?
If so, does Lyons have standing to seek injunctive relief against the
municipality of Los Angeles?
Held. This case does not present an “actual case or controversy” as
required in the Constitution under Article III. Past illegal conduct, by
itself, is insufficient to establish an actual case or controversy for
injunctive relief. Even though Lyons was injured by the police in the
past, this act alone does not establish that Lyons is threatened with
immediate injury or that he will be pulled over and placed in a
chokehold again.
Lyons did not have standing to bring this case to the Supreme Court. In
order to have standing, a plaintiff must show 1) an actual or likely
injury in fact, 2) that the injury is sufficiently concrete and individually
affects the plaintiff, 3) that the challenged action is the “cause in fact”
of the injury, and 4) that the Court will be able to redress the injury by
its decision. In this case, injunctive relief against the municipality may
or may not address the injury suffered by Lyons. He could seek
damages for any injuries he sustained from the chokehold (i.e. hospital
bills, etc.), but he did not have standing to enforce an injunction where
it was not clear if others would be placed in a chokehold in the future.
Furthermore, it was speculative, at best, that Lyons himself would be
placed in a chokehold in the future, and therefore injunctive relief
would not clearly redress any potential injury.
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL ARROYO – MOOTNESS
Facts: Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President,
as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated powers. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-
out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may
call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.” But the President must be careful in the exercise of her
powers. Every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is
considered illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom of our
Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the EDSA People Power I, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in a
move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow the government, issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of
national emergency. She cited as factual bases for the said issuance the
escape of the Magdalo Group and their audacious threat of the Magdalo
D-Day; the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines; and the reproving statements from the communist leaders.
On the same day, she issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting
the standards which the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) should follow in the
suppression and prevention of acts of lawless violence.
The following were considered as additional factual bases for the
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5: the bombing of
telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan; the raid
of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three
soldiers;and the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines
ordering its front organizations to join5,000 Metro Manila radicals and
25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests. Immediately, the
Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs
andactivities related to the 20th People Power I anniversary celebration.
It revoked permits to hold rallies.Members of the Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU) and the National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo
Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various parts of Metro
Manila to converge at the EDSA Shrine, were violently dispersed by
anti-riot police. Professor Randolf David,Akbayan party-list president
Ronald Llamas, and members of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU were
arrested without a warrant.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) raided the Daily Tribune
offices in Manila and confiscated news stories, documents, pictures,
and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen were stationed inside
the editorial and business offices, as well as outside the building. A few
minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the
police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper,
Malaya , and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante .
The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that
would not follow “standards set by the government during the state of
national emergency. ”On March 3, 2006, exactly one week from the
declaration of a state of national emergency and after all the present
petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist and lifting PP1017. These consolidated
petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.
It is contended that respondent officials of the Government, in their
professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are
actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by
the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being
unconstitutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – POLITICAL LAW
ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021 rendered the
present petitions moot and academic; 2.) Whether or not the petitioners
have legal standing; 3.) Whether or not there were factual bases for the
issuance of PP 1017; 4.) Whether or not PP 1017 is a declaration of
Martial Law 5.) Whether or not PP 1017 arrogates unto the President
the power to legislate; 6.) Whether or not PP 1017 authorizes the
President to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest; and 7.) Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are constitutional
HELD: The Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
The issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and
academic because all the exceptions to the “moot and academic”
principle are present.
The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1)there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; (2)the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3)the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4)the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review. All these exceptions are present here.
It is alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution.
There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public
interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to the freedoms
of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has
the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts,
doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench
and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on
the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. Lastly,
the contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the present
petitions are subject to judicial review.
All the petitioners have legal standing in view of the transcendental
importance of the issue involved. It has been held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators
may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met: (a)the cases involve constitutional issues; (b)for
taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (c)for voters, there must be
a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question; (d)for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and (e)for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Being a mere procedural technicality, however, the requirement of
locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion. The question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger
question of proper exercise of judicial power. Undoubtedly, the validity
of PP No. 1017 and G.O
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – POLITICAL LAW No. 5 is a
judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino
people. In view of the transcendental importance of this issue, all the
petitioners are declared to have locus standi.
There were sufficient factual bases for the President’s exercise of her
calling-out power, which petitioners did not refute.
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora (338 SCRA 81 [2000]),
the Court considered the President’s “calling-out” power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. It is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. Nonetheless, the Court stressed that “this does not prevent
an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.” Under the expanded
power of judicial review, the courts are authorized not only “to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable,” but also “to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” As to how
the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of the power,
Lansang v. Garcia (42 SCRA 448 [1971]) adopted the test that “judicial
inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the
President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President did not act
arbitrarily.”
Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the
calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis.
A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Petitioners did not refute such events.
Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Judging the seriousness of the
incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms
and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In times of emergency, our Constitution
reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the
basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same
time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural
limitations.
PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law, but merely an invocation
of the President’s calling-out power.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated powers. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to
declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-
out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary, ”the President may
call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.” Considering the circumstances then prevailing, President
Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Office’s vast
intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual
condition of the country. But the President must be careful in the
exercise of her powers. Every act that goes beyond the President’s
calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires.
There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the
greater are the limitations. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, but also on Sec. 17, Art. XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to takeover privately-owned public utility and
business affected with public interest. It is plain in the wordings of PP
1017 that what President Arroyo invoked was her calling out power. PP
1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. As such, it cannot be used to
justify acts
That can be done only under a valid declaration of Martial Law.
Specifically, arrests and seizures without
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – POLITICAL LAW judicial warrants,
ban on public assemblies, take-over of news media and agencies and
press censorship, and issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers
which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only
where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus.
PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate decrees.
The second provision of the operative portion of PP 1017 states: “and
to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."
The operative clause of PP 1017 was lifted from PP 1081, which gave
former President Marcos legislative power. The ordinance power
granted to President Arroyo under the Administrative Code of 1987 is
limited to executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations,
memorandum orders, memorandum circulars, and general or special
orders. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by former
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which
are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they
were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power
during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency
can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be
enforced. She cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain
laws. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws
pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
PP 1017 does not authorize President Arroyo during the emergency to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without authority
from Congress.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. However,
knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the framers of
our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (a)there
must be a war or other emergency; (b)the delegation must be for a
limited period only; (c)the delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; and (d)the emergency
powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress. The taking over of private business affected with public
interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed
upon Congress. Thus, when Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution states
that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable
terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress
may delegate it to her
Pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. There is a
distinction between the President’s authority to declare a state of
national emergency and her authority to exercise emergency powers.
Her authority to declare a state of national emergency is granted by Sec.
18, Art. VII of the Constitution, hence, no legitimate constitutional
objection can be raised.
The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a
different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist
warranting the takeover of privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Nor can she determine when such
exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation,
the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected
with public interest that should be taken over.
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – POLITICAL LAW
The illegal implementation of PP 1017, through G.O. No. 5, does not
render these issuance unconstitutional.
The criterion by which the validity of a statute or ordinance is to be
measured is the essentialbasis for the exercise of power, and not a mere
incidental result arising from its exertion. PP 1017 islimited to the
calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end
desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021.
But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’
constitutional rights. But when in implementing its provisions, pursuant
to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate
the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such
acts unconstitutional and illegal. David, et al. were arrested without a
warrant while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly.
They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a
clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right.
Likewise, the dispersal and arrest of members of KMU, et al. were
unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis
of Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits to hold rallies. The
wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of
the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.” Furthermore, the
search of the Daily Tribune offices is illegal. Not only that, the search
violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. It cannot be denied that the
CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and
seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the
vicinity of the offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials
to media, are plain censorship. The “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O.
No. 5 is, however, unconstitutional. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and
the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence.”
The phrase “acts of terrorism” is still an amorphous and vague concept.
Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo
alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts
constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without
restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without
warrants, breaking into
Offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition
and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the
administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5.
These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President.
Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
WARTH VS. SELDIN – CONVENTIONAL STANDING
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs claimed that a local zoning ordinance
excluded persons of low and moderate income from living in a certain
community. Defendants responded by claiming that Plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring suit.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A plaintiff must generally allege a specific
“case or controversy” between herself and the defendant in order to
have standing.
Facts. The Plaintiffs were various organizations and individuals
residing in Rochester, New York (Rochester). The Plaintiffs brought
suit against the town of Penfield, New York (Penfield) and members of
Penfield’s Zoning, Planning, and Town Boards (Defendants). Plaintiffs
contended that Penfield’s zoning ordinance effectively excluded
persons of low and moderate income from living in the town, in
contravention of constitutional and statutory rights. The lower federal
courts held that none of the Plaintiff’s had standing.
Issue. Have the Plaintiff’s established that a “case or controversy”
exists between themselves and the Defendants within the meaning of
Article III of the United States Constitution (Constitution), in order to
have standing?
Held. Yes. Judgment affirmed.
In order for a federal court to have jurisdiction, the plaintiff himself
must have suffered “some threatened or actual injury resulting from the
putatively legal action.” Additionally, standing will generally not be
found when: a “generalized grievance” is shared in substantially equal
measure by all or a large class of citizens a plaintiff attempts to claim
relief on the legal rights of third parties.
Congress may create standing for individuals through statutes who
would otherwise lack standing, so long as the plaintiff alleges a distinct
and palpable injury to himself.
In the present case, the Plaintiffs claimed the enforcement of zoning
ordinances against third parties had the effect of precluding the
construction of housing suitable to their needs. For standing, a plaintiff
must allege that the challenged practices affect him specifically and that
court intervention would personally benefit the plaintiff.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
In order for an organization to have standing, it must claim that all or
any one of its members are suffering immediate or threatened injury as
a result of the challenged action. Plaintiffs in this case fail to do so.
Dissent. The Plaintiffs have submitted a sufficient pleading to avoid a
motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The majority’s opinion is based
instead on the merits of the claim.
Discussion. The purpose of the standing requirement is to prevent the
courts from being forced to adjudicate abstract questions of wide public
significance, which could better be determined in other forums.
CRAIG VS BOREN – JUS TERTII (RIGHT OF 3RD PERSONS)
Facts: Oklahoma passed a statute prohibiting the sale of
"nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 but allowed
females over the age of 18 to purchase it. The statute was challenged as
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violation by Curtis Craig, a
male who was over 18 but under 21, and by an Oklahoma vendor of
alcohol. The nominal defendant was David Boren, who was sued ex
officio by virtue of his serving as Governor of Oklahoma at the time of
the lawsuit.
Oklahoma defended the statute as a prophylactic against drunk driving,
offering statistics showing that arrests of males 18–20 outnumbered
those of females of similar age by a factor of nine for “drunk” driving
(2 percent vs. 18 percent), by a factor of eighteen for “driving under the
influence,” and by a factor of ten for public drunkenness.
Issue: Whether or not Oklahoma statute violate the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
Ruling: Yes. The said statute violated the Equal Protection clause and
is therefore declared unconstitutional.
Justice William J. Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
he was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Powell and Stevens Justice
Blackmun joined all but one part of the opinion; Blackmun, Powell,
Stevens, and Stewart wrote concurrences.
The Court held that the gender classifications made by the Oklahoma
statute were unconstitutional because the statistics relied on by the state
were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the statute
and the benefits intended to stem from it.
The court instituted a standard, dubbed "intermediate scrutiny",
whereby the state must prove the existence of specific important
governmental objectives, and the law must be substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives.
As to third party rights, the court, expanding on the doctrine of
standing, held that the vendors of 3.2% beer would be economically
affected due to the restrictive nature of the sales to males between 18
and 20. To have standing, one must show a "nexus" of the injury to
oneself and the constitutional violation of the statute. In this case, the
statute directly affected Whitener only economically, but the Supreme
Court explains that Whitener and other vendors have standing to assert
concomitant rights of other parties (such as Craig). The Court
acknowledged that parties economically affected by regulations may
challenge those regulations "by acting as advocates of the rights of third
parties who seek access to their market or function."
Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that a higher
standard of scrutiny was appropriate.
TATAD VS GARCIA – TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE
Facts: In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line
along EDSA. No bidding was made but certain corporations were
invited to prequalify. The only corporation to qualify was the EDSA
LRT Consortium which was obviously formed for this particular
undertaking. An agreement was then made between the government,
through the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium. The agreement was based on the
Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law (RA 6957,
amended by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium
shall build the facilities, i.e., railways, and shall supply the train cabs.
Every phase that is completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and the
latter shall pay rent for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it
was projected that the government shall have fully paid EDSA LRT
Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell the facilities
to the government for $1.00.
However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmeña, and Rodolfo Biazon
opposed the implementation of said agreement as they averred that
EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign corporation as it was organized
under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot own a public utility such
as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the nationalized
areas of activities. The petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his
capacity as DOTC Secretary.
Issue: Whether or not the petition shall prosper.
Held: No. The Supreme Court made a clarification. The SC ruled that
EDSA LRT Consortium, under the agreement, does not and will not
become the owner of a public utility hence, the question of its
nationality is misplaced. It is true that a foreign corporation cannot own
a public utility but in this case what EDSA LRT Consortium will be
owning are the facilities that it will be building for the EDSA railway
project. There is no prohibition against a foreign corporation to own
facilities used for a public utility. Further, it cannot be said that EDSA
LRT Consortium will be the one operating the public utility for it will
be DOTC that will operate the railway transit. DOTC will be the one
exacting fees from the people for the use of the railway and from the
proceeds, it shall be paying the rent due to EDSA LRT Consortium. All
that EDSA LRT Consortium has to do is to build the facilities and
receive rent from the use thereof by the government for 25 years – it
will not operate the railway transit. Although EDSA LRT Consortium
is a corporation formed for the purpose of building a public utility it
does not automatically mean that it is operating a public utility. The
moment for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the
entity applies for a franchise, certificate or any other form of
authorization for that purpose.
KILOSBAYAN VS GUINGONA – TRANSCEDENTAL IMPORTANCE
Facts: In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to
put up an on-line lottery system which will establish a national network
system that will in turn expand PCSO’s source of income.
A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) won it. A contract of lease was awarded in favor of PGMC.
Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as
it alleged that:
PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it is 75%
foreign owned (owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya Group Berhad);
PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from
holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any person, association, company or entity”;
The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a
telecommunications network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a
franchise is needed to be granted by the Congress before any person
may be allowed to set up such;
PGMC’s articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments
Act (R.A. No. 7042) does not allow it to install, establish and operate
the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona,
Executive Secretary and Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged
that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor for a piece of
work, i.e., the building of the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of
the network it will build as evidenced by the nature of the contract
agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease.
Issue: Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.
Held: Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.
On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMC’s foreign ownership
was reduced to 40% though.
On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” There is undoubtedly
a collaboration between PCSO and PGMC and not merely a contract of
lease. The relations between PCSO and PGMC cannot be defined
simply by the designation they used, i.e., a contract of lease. Pursuant to
the wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own expense shall build,
operate, and manage the network system including its facilities needed
to operate a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears no risk and
all it does is to provide its franchise – in violation of its charter.
Necessarily, the use of such franchise by PGMC is a violation of Act
No. 3846.
KILOSBAYAN VS MORATO - TRANSCEDENTAL
IMPORTANCE
246 SCRA 540
Facts: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and
accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or
at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is
allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its
own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of
lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21,
1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same
as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the
Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative
of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of
the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it
has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different
from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to
determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of
PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their
moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they
were not parties to the contract
Issues: Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
Held: NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling
sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled
rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues
were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since
the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be
regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases
are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue
actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot
again be drawn in question in any future action between the same
parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply
to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are
involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or
transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt
with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding
to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since
ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude
determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in
constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually
involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are
REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.
PEOPLE VS VERA
– STANDING OF GOVERNMENT TO QUESTION ITS OWN
LAWS
Facts: Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court
of Manila. He filed a motion for reconsideration and four motions for
new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court of
United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the
petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for new trial
and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of
the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of
the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same.
Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal
filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging,
among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been
repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless
violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also
filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1,
Art. VI, Constitution).
Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
Ruling: Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes
an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the
provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: "This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.
Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and
shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for
themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or
not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it
has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary
of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful
examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the
system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different
provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation
officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial fiscals.
Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation
officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the
provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and
it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces — and
this is the actual situation now — appropriate the necessary fund for the
salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be
illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither
can there be a probation officer without the probation system.
BAGATSING VS COMMITTEE ON PRIVITIZATION
STANDING OF MEMBER OF CONGRESS
Facts: PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1966 under the corporate name "Esso
Philippines, Inc." .ESSO became a wholly-owned company of the
government under the corporate name PETRON and as a subsidiary of
PNOC.PETRON owns the largest, most modern complex refinery in
the Philippines. It is listed as the No. 1corporation in terms of assets
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
and income in the Philippines in 1993.President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the exercise of her legislative
power under the Freedom Constitution. Implicit in the Proclamation is
the need to raise revenue for the Government and the ideal of leaving
business to the private sector by creating the committee on
privatization. The Government can then concentrate on the delivery of
basic services and the performance e of vital public functions. The
Presidential Cabinet of President Ramos approved the privatization of
PETRON as part of the Energy Sector Action Plan. PNOC Board of
Directors passed are solution authorizing the company to negotiate and
conclude a contract with the consortium of Salomon Brothers of
Hongkong Limited and PCI Capital Corporation for financial advisory
services to be rendered to PETRON. The Petron Privatization Working
Committee (PWC) was thus formed. It finalized a privatization strategy
with 40% of the shares to be sold to a strategic partner and 20% to the
general public The President approved the 40% — 40% —
20%privatization strategy of PETRON. The invitation to bid was
published in several newspapers of general circulation, both local and
foreign. The PNOC Board of Directors then passed Resolution No. 866,
S. 1993, declaring ARAMCO the winning bidder. PNOC and
ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement, the two companies
signed the Shareholders' Agreement. The petition for prohibition in
G.R. No. 112399 sought:(1) to nullify the bidding conducted for the
sale of a block of shares constituting 40% of the capital stock(40%
block) of Petron Corporation (PETRON) and the award made to
Aramco Overseas Company, B.V. (ARAMCO) as the highest bidder
and (2) to stop the sale of said block of shares to ARAMCO. The
petition for prohibition and
Certiorari in G.R. No. 115994 sought to annul the sale of the same
block of Petron shares subject of the petition in G.R. No.
112399.ARAMCO entered a limited appearance to question the
jurisdiction over its person, alleging that it is a foreign company
organized under the laws of the Netherlands, that it is not doing nor
licensed to do business in the Philippines, and that it does not maintain
an office or a business address in and has not appointed a resident agent
for the Philippines (Rollo, p. 240).Petitioners however, countered that
they filed the action in their capacity as members of Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a locus standi
DECISION: Petition is dismissed.
LOCUS STANDI
In Philippine Constitution Association v .Hon. Salvador Enriquez, G.R.
No. 113105, August 19, 1994, we held that the members of Congress
have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the Executive
which injures them in their person or the institution of Congress to
which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury which can be questioned by members of
Congress (Kennedy v. James, 412 F. Supp. 353 [1976]).In the absence
of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners
or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature,
petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action in their
capacity as members of Congress. However, petitioners can bring the
action in their capacity as taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).Under said ruling,
taxpayers may question contracts entered into by the national
government or government-owned or controlled corporations alleged to
be in contravention of the law. As long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on
locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and
uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the
present action.
PRIVATIZATION
The only requirement under R.A. No. 7181 in order to privatize a
strategic industry like PETRON is the approval of the President. In the
case of PETRON's privatization, the President gave his approval not
only once but twice. PETRON's privatization is also in line with and is
part of the Philippine Energy Program under R.A. No. 7638.Section
5(b) of the law provides that the Philippine Energy Program shall
include a policy direction towards the privatization of government
agencies related to energy.
BIDDING
On the claim that there was a failed bidding, petitioners contend that
there were only three bidders. One of them, PETRONAS, submitted a
bid lower than the floor price while a second, failed to pre-qualify.
Under said COA Circular, there is a failure of bidding when: 1) there is
only one offeror; or (2) when all the offers are non-complying or
unacceptable. In the case at bench, there were three offerors: SAUDI
ARAMCO, PETRONAS and WESTMONT. While two offerors were
disqualified, PETRONAS for submitting a bid below the floor price
and WESTMONT for technical reasons, not all the offerors were
disqualified. To constitute a failed bidding under the COA Circular, all
the offerors must be disqualified.
IBP VS ZAMORA – STANDING OF IBP
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art.
VII of the Constitution, President Ejercito Estrada directed the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff and Philippine National Police
Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of
the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature
and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation
shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed a
petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines
null and void and unconstitutional. Solicitor General contend that
petitioner has no legal standing to assail.
Issue: Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality
of calling the AFP to assist PNP to suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion?
Decision: IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart
from this declaration the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its
locus standi. While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit
standing. However, when the issues raised are of paramount importance
to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
The Court relaxed the rules on standing and resolved the issue now.
BAYAN VS ZAMORA – TAXPAYER’S SUIT
Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of
America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among
others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United
States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the
United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the
proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security
which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military
bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel,
headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific
Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign
Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on “the
complementing strategic interests of the United States and the
Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among
other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved
the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary
Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5,
1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President,
acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of
Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have
legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to
question the constitutionality of the VFA;
(2) and whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.
Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or
are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established
that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer’s suit
refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
(2) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal
controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then
without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs
purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the
Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the
metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of
government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially
conferred to it by law.
GONZALES VS NARVASA – TAXPAYER’S SUIT
Facts: Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on
December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the
positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was
created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of
Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and
recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987
Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner
disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it
is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43
Held: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing
only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown
that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury
attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress,
not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in this case since,
according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the
legislature’s powers to create a public office and to propose
amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has
sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim
that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated,
nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of
the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his
locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a
constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is
readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of
E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No.
43, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational
expenses “to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.”
Being that case, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest -
that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he
will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does
petitioner presume to make such a representation.
DRILON VS LIM – PURPOSEFUL HESITATION
Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section
187 of the Local Government Code3. The Secretary of Justice (on
appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance
No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance
with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The
RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It
declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the
Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of
local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that
the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the
Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition
originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true
copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
Held: Yes.
Ratio: BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil
cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests
in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and
orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower
courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in
mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the
stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It
is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged
with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully
studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined
By them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was
finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that
there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes.
Ratio: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only
the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to
revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies
or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his
own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted
the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code,
but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should
be.. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing
the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their
functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure
for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was
an act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-
done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187
appeared in the Local Autonomy Act. That section allowed the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES
Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in
his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise
of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or
not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed;
hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That
power was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the
Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187.
All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of
the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is
unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on
this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code
only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires
provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or
reasonableness, of the tax measure. The issue of non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code
is another matter. (allegations: No written notices of public hearing, no
publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public hearing, no posting,
no translation into Tagalog) Judge Palattao however found that all the
procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to
prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given
it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the
evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.
We agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have
indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to
interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearings are found
in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the
proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila
Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila
Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita. The only exceptions
are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not
affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive
issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It
has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been
translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the
approval of local development plans and public investment programs of
the local government unit and not to tax ordinances.
REPUBLIC VS COURT OF APPEALS – DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE
ACT
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of
certain portions of land owned by the private respondents for the
widening and concreting of the Nabua-Bato-Agos Section, Philippine-
Japan Highway Loan (PJHL) road. However, the private respondents
demanded that the just compensation for the property should be made
based on the fair market value and not which was set by Presidential
Decree No. 76. The said decree fixed the payment on the basis of the
assessment of the assessor or the declared valuation of the owner,
whichever is lower.
In Export Processing Zone Authority ("EPZA") vs. Dulay, etc. et al.,
the Court held that the determination of just compensation in eminent
domain is a judicial function, thus, it declared Presidential Decree No.
76, as well as related decrees, including Presidential Decree No. 1533,
as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of judicial
prerogatives.
Issue: Whether or not the effect of the Judicial Declaration of
Presidential Decree 1533 as unconstitutional should be applied
retroactively.
Ruling: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no right; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in
legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed. It is
therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have
existed at all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the
declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no one may
thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in
subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity.
It is not always the case, however, that a law is constitutionally faulty
per se. Thus, it may well be valid in its general import. But invalid in its
application to certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise
valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to
operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates
contractually vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive application
may be so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of contracts.
A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily
obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior
to such a declaration. Thus, in our decisions on the moratorium laws, 6
we have been constrained to recognize the interim effects of said laws
prior to their declaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have
likewise been unable to simply ignore strong considerations of equity
and fair play. So also, even as a practical matter, a situation that may
aptly be described as fait accompli may no longer be open for further
inquiry, let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity
of a governing statute. To that extent, its retroactive application may be
so declared invalid as impairing the obligations of contracts. A judicial
declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate
all the effects and consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a
declaration.
MAGALLONA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE
Facts: In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to
comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27,
1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as
they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national
territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as
follows:
RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach
of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and
ancillary treaties.
RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine
sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-
free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.
RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results
in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of
subsistence fishermen.
Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition
assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522)
adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the
baseline regime of nearby territories.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline
Law is unconstitutional.
Discussion: The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the
archipelagic doctrine, which we connect the outermost points of our
archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed
thereby as internal waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate
the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS
III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in congruent with the
archipelagic doctrine.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES

Ruling: No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory

Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf
Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital
step in safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.

Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into
archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the
Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign
power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated
that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the
status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over
waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms
for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the delimitations. It serves as
a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way affecting
or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.