CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

Module 1: Part 1 Cases – The Constitution

PEOPLE V. PERFECTO [43 Phil 887]
FACTS:
The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the
documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from
his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein
respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was
alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the
Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be applied in the case at bar?
HELD:
No.
REASONING:
The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish
officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have
Kings nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the
Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically
abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of
the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article
256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore,
respondent was acquitted.

Macariola V. Asuncion [114 SCRA 77]

FACTS:
On August 6, 1968, petitioner, Bernadita Macariola charged responded Judge Elias Asuncion of CFU of Leyte,
Now Associate Justice of CA, with “acts unbecoming of a judge” when the latter purchased a property that was
previously the subject of litigation on which he rendered the decision. The shares of interests in said property
were conveyed in the Trade Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares and interests in
said property were conveyed. According to the petitioner, the respondent allegedly violated Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce.
ISSUE:
Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in force?
RULING:
Article 13 partakes of the nature of a political law as ti regulates the relationship between the government and
certain public officers and employees like justices and judges. Said provision must be deemed to have been
abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are
automatically abrogated. As such Art. 14 is not in force.
The respondent was advised by the Court to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

FACTS:
Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against Macariola, concerning the properties left by their common
father, Francisco Reyes. Asuncion was the judge who rendered the decision, which became final for lack of an
appeal. A project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion after the finality of the decision. This project of
partition was only signed by the counsel of the parties, who assured the judge that they were given
authorization to do so. One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided
into 5 lots. One of these lots (Lot 1184-D) was sold to Anota, a stenographer of the court, while another (Lot
1184-E) was sold to Dr. Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the same lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife. A
year after, spouses Asuncion and Dr. Galapon sold their respective shares over the lot to Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion and his wife were both stockholders, with Judge
Asuncion as President and his wife as secretary of said company.
A year after the company’s registration with the SEC, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion
alleging: • that he violated Art. 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring a portion of the lot, which was one of
those properties involved in the partition case; and • that he violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce,
Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
by associating himself with a private company while he was a judge of the CFI of Leyte. This case was referred
to Justice Palma of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating
Justice recommended that Judge Asuncion should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the complaints
filed against him.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot 1184-E, which was among those properties involved in the partition case.
2. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA
3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics when he
associated himself with Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as stockholder and a
ranking officer
HELD:
1. NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits justices, judges among others from acquiring by
purchase the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court, the SC has ruled,
however, that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property. In this case, when Judge Asuncion purchased a portion of Lot
1184-E, the decision in the partition case was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within
the reglementary period. Thus, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, Judge
Asuncion did NOT buy the lot directly from the plaintiffs in the partition case but from Dr. Galapon, who earlier
purchased the lot from the plaintiffs. The subsequent sale from Dr. Galapon to Judge Asuncion is NOT a scheme
to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot as a consideration for the approval of the project of
partition. As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr.
Galapon acted as a mere dummy of Judge Asuncion. In fact, Dr. Galapon appeared to be a respectable citizen,
credible and sincere, having bought the subject lot in good faith and for valuable consideration, without any
intervention of Judge Asuncion.
Although Judge Asuncion did NOT violate Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, it was IMPROPER for him to have
acquired the lot in question. Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that judges’ official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety. It was unwise and indiscreet on the part of Judge Asuncion
to have purchased the property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to
a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. His actuations must
not cause doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice.
2. NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce prohibits justices of the SC, judges and officials of the
department of public prosecution in active service from engaging in commerce, either in person or proxy or
from holding any office or have an direct, administrative or financial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies within the limits of the territory in which they discharge their duties. However, this Code is the
Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, which was extended to the Philippines by a Royal Decree. Upon the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US to the Philippines, Art 14 of the Code of Commerce must be
deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new
sovereign. There appears to be no affirmative act that continued the effectivity of said provision.
Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019 provides for instances when public officers are considered to have committed corrupt
practices, which include having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest. Judge Asuncion cannot be held liable under said provision
because there is no showing that he participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or
transactions of Traders Manufacturing. In this case, the business of the corporation in which he participated
has obviously no relation to his judicial office.
Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules does NOT apply to members of the Judiciary, who are covered under
RA 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) and Art X (7) of the 1973 Constitution. Under Sec 67 of RA 296, the power to
remove or dismiss judges is vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the CSC, and only on 2 grounds—
serious misconduct and inefficiency. Under the 1973 Constitution, only the SC can discipline judges of the
inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary. Judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil
service officers or employees because the Commissioner of the CSC is not the head of the Judiciary department.
Moreover, only permanent officers in the classified service are subject to the jurisdiction of the CSC. Judges,
however, are not within this classification, as they are considered to be non-competitive or unclassified service
of the government as a Presidential appointee.
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics reminds judges to abstain from making personal investments in
enterprises, which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court. Judge Asuncion and his wife, however, had
withdrawn from the corporation and sold their shares to third parties only 22 days after its incorporation,
which indicates that Judge Asuncion realized that their interest in the corporation contravenes said Canon. The
Court even commended the spouses for such act.

De Leon V. Esguerra [G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987]

FACTS:
On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other
petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a
Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by
respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno
as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the
same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitioners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and
void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms
of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall
have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their
successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and
not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act
fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being
inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year
period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
RULING:
Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating
respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal
force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must
be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2,
Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1
of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years
provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

Manila Prince Hotel V. GSIS [G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997]

FACTS:
Respondent (GSIS) decided to sell 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation through public bidding as part of the Philippine government's privatization initiative under
Proclamation No. 50.
According to its terms, the winning bidder is to provide management expertise and/or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the
Manila Hotel.
Only two (2) bidders participated:
a) petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
corporation or 15.3M shares at P41.58 per share, and
b) Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
In a letter to respondent, petitioner matched Renong Berhad's bid price of P44.00 per share, pending the
designation of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder partner and the execution of the relevant contracts.
In a subsequent letter petitioner sent a manager's check for P33.000.000.00 as Bid Security to match the bid of
Renong Berhad which respondent refused to accept.
Because of this refusal by the respondent, petitioner came to the Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus.
The SC issued a TRO enjoining respondents from consummating and perfecting the said sale.
The petitioner hinged his arguments on Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution. It argued that :
I. Manila Hotel had become part of the national patrimony, having become a historical monument for the
Filipino nation; and
II. Because respondent GSIS, a GOCC, owns 51 percent of the corporation’s shares, the hotel business of
GSIS, which is part of the tourism industry, is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Hence, the
petitioner claimed that the corporation is clearly covered by the term national economy under the
contemplation of Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
The respondent, on the other hand, raised the following arguments:
a. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and
policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation

b. While the hotel is indeed historic, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony
c. But even if it is, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold
is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land
upon which the building stands
d. the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the disposition of 51% of Manila Hotel falls under the application of Sec. 10, par. 2, Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
II. Whether or not Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution may be invoked as a self-executing provision.
RULING:
I. Yes. Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an
earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its
power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony. Since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the
ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of
stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
1987 Constitution, applies. Hence, since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched
the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.
II. The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental and supreme law
of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. While the Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) may be
couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing, the legislature is not
precluded from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as it is
consistent with the Constitution. The SC remarked that Article 12, Sec. 10 (2) is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. The SC added further that there is a presumption that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing and minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the
self-executing nature of constitutional provisions. A provision which lays down a general principle, such
as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. However, a provision
which is complete and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law.
Summary of Principles:
1. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation— it is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme Iaw of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A constitution is a system of
fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious,
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. lt prescribes the permanent framework of a
system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties,
and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental
conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and
in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and
the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of
policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out
the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government providing for the
different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and
inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there
is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

3. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional

mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self- executing. As
against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate
directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.

4. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions. Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a
way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution.
Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
5. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing—the rule is
that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power
on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available. In self-executing constitutional provisions,
the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by
the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The
mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of
a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a
remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended
to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony
with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

6. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly
are not selfexecuting. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-
executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation
of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph
can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part
and non-self-executing in another.

7. When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.

8. When the Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances, an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject—such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance.

9. When the Constitution speaks of “national patrimony,” it refers not only to the natural resources
of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a
landmark—a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of
our national economy and patrimony. For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy
and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
 constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this
instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the
hotel edifice stands.

10. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as
it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding
rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional
law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which
violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.

Francisco V. House of Representatives [G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003]

FACTS:
On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven (7)
Associate Justices. However, it was dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on October 22, 2003, for
being insufficient in substance. Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide on October 23, 2003. Petitions arose against the House of
Representatives et al, who contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional,
violating the provision of Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution.
“no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than one within the period of
one year.” – Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution.
Senator Pimentel Jr. Filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court. and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment
court be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provision of Article XI of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint
pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution.
RULING:
The second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, the said provision should function to the full extent of its
substance and form and its terms, in conjunction with all other provisions of the Constitution.
Pursuant to Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution, “the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court.”
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights that are
legally demandable and enforceable. Also, to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on part of any branch of the government.
a) On the ground of culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.
b) ** On the ground of the alleged results of the legislative inquiry conducted on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by C.J. Davide, Jr. of the Judiciary Development Fund.
c) *** Const., Art. XI, Sec. 3: x x x x x x x x x (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof x x x (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to
either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. x x x x x x x x x x x x
d) **** The well-settled principles of constitutional construction: First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible,
the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced
the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished
 thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. (Francisco, Jr. v.
House of Representatives, et al., G.R. No. 160261 [2003])
e) ***** Following the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the term “cases” must be distinguished from the
term “proceedings.” An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate.
Under Sec.3(3), Art. XI, the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It
is in that sense that the House has “exclusive power” to initiate all cases of impeachment. On the other hand,
the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial
because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial.
(Ibid.)
f) ****** There was a preliminary issue on whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings. The Court ruled in the affirmative. Our Constitution, though vesting in the
House of Reps the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the
exercise of such power: the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official (Art. XI, Secs. 3 (2), (3), (4) and (5)). Where there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies, our courts are
dutybound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits pursuant to its expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Art. VIII, Sec. 1: the power to correct any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. (Id.) N.B. There are two
types of political questions: (1) justiciable and (2) non-justiciable. The determination of one from the other
lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. (Id.)
Module 1: Part 2 Cases – Amendments and Revision
Province of Cotabato V. GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain [G.R. No. 183591]
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
Aspect of the GRP -MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 (MOA) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This
public document would reach a consensus between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have
a Bangsamoro homeland. However, the Executive Department did not sign the document. Invoking the right
to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish
them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD and pray for the Court to enjoin the Executive
Department to enter into agreements similar to MOA in the future.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the MOA-AD is constitutional insofar as provisions on Articles XII of the Constitution is
concerned.
II. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final
draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered
that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft

III. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication
IV. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis-à-
vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5
V. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987
Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28)... including public consultation under Republic Act
No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)
a) Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING
itself... a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;...
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;...
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly
Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines
VI. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and
Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected
Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question... hether desistance from signing the MOA derogates
any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
RULING:
I. No. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional. The Executive branch would amend the Constitution
toconform to the MOA-AD as it violates(1) Section 2, Article XII on State ownership of all lands of
the public domain and of all natural resources in the Philippines. Under the MOA-AD, the
ancestral domaindoes not form part of the public domain. The ancestral domain of the
Bangsamoro refers to entire Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan land which they or their ancestors
continuously possessed since time immemorial. This negates the Regalian doctrine of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, since Bangsamoro people include indigenous minorities,MOA-ADwould
 violate Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997)which provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples.Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or
any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise;(2) Section 9, Article XII under the Constitution which provides thatthe
National Economic and Development Authority(NEDA) may head an independent economic and
planning agencyfor the country. Under the MOA-AD, however, the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) will have its own economic planning agency;(3) Section 20, Article XII which establishes the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas(BSP) as an independent monetary authority. Under the MOA-AD, however,
the BJE will have its own financial and banking authority.In sum, if theCourt did not stop the signing of
the MOA-AD, this country would have been dismembered because the Executive branch would have
committed to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD.
II. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to
the BJE. Right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination
- a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework... of
an existing state. A right to external self-determination... arises in only the most extreme of cases and,
even then, under carefully defined circumstances. External self-determination can be defined as in the
following statement from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek... relevant information, comments,
advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices
to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of... people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result
to the diaspora or displacement of a... great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-
cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws.
Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional , for the concept...
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent
with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does
not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative... relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions
From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the
clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary... amendments to the Constitution and the
laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized
to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves
through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. While the MOA-AD
would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines
under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a
constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally... defective.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process
committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation process, as mandated by
E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and
in excess of the legal authority,
and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The
MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with
the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a
state and implies that the same is
on its way to independence
III. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship (a state within a
state) envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that
the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present
legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its
defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the
BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the
President, dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is
worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will
eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make
such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent
powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the
process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the
people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
a) One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and
local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments,
advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

b) Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality,
is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally
vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.

c) Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or
any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to
carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic
 Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in
excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

IV. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on

the Peace Process
V. committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the
pertinent
VI. consultation process, as mandated by
E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,
and
VII. Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was
VIII. designed and crafted runs contrary to
and in excess of the legal authority,
IX. and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic
X. exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual
 XI. refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled
with
XII. the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the
very
XIII. concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned
XIV. between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept
XV. presupposes that the associated entity
is a state and implies that the same is
XVI. on its way to independence
XVII. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process
VIII. committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the
pertinent
XIX. consultation process, as mandated by
E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,
and
 XX. Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was
XXI. designed and crafted runs contrary to
and in excess of the legal authority,
XXII. and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic
XIII. exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual
XIV. refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled
with
XXV. the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the
very
XVI. concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned
XVII. between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept
VIII. presupposes that the associated entity
is a state and implies that the same is
 XIX. on its way to independence
XXX. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process
XXI. committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the
pertinent
XXII. consultation process, as mandated by
E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160,
and
XIII. Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was
XIV. designed and crafted runs contrary to
and in excess of the legal authority,
XXV. and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic
XVI. exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual
XVII. refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled
with
VIII. the present Constitution and laws. Not
only its specific provisions but the
very
XIX. concept underlying them, namely, the
associative relationship envisioned
XL. between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept
XLI. presupposes that the associated entity
is a state and implies that the same is
XLII. on its way to independence
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE
COURSE and hereby GRANTED.