F
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ifC INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF STATUES

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aohe 1.TAX LAWS
-As a general rule: inasmuch as revenue laws impose special burden upon taxpayers, the same should be strictly

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construed against the government and in favor of the taxpayer, if the intent or meaning of the tax statute is
doubtful.

How are tax refunds construed?

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 are strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.

Statutes granting tax exemptions

• Law frowns against exemption from taxation because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation
• Laws granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris (strictest letter of law) against the taxpayer

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and liberally in favor of the taxing authority
• Burden of proof – on the taxpayer claiming to be exempted
• Basis for strict construction – to minimize the different treatment and foster impartiality, fairness, and equality
of treatment among taxpayers

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• Tax exemptions are not favored in law, nor are they presumed.

rem CASE NO. 1: La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez

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Issue: W/N the importation of the fertilizers are covered by the exemption (provided by Section 1 and 2 of
Republic Act No. 601, as amended by Republic Acts 1175, 1197 and 1375).

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m Facts:
- Sometime in September, 1955 La Carlota Sugar Central, which was under the administration of Elizalde,

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imported 500 short tons of ammonium sulphate and 350 short tons of ammonium phosphate.
- When the fertilizers arrived in the Philippines, the Central Bank imposed 17% exchange tax from the Central in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 601.
- On 18 November 1955 the Central filed ,through the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, a petition
for the refund of the P20,872.09 paid (the 17% tax), claiming that it had imported the fertilizers mentioned

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heretofore upon request and for the exclusive use of 5 haciendas owned and managed by Elizalde, and therefore
the importation was exempt from the 17% exchange tax in accordance with Section 2, RA 601, as amended by
RA 1375.

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- On 2 July 1956, the Auditor of the Central Bank denied the petition. The Central requested the Auditor to
reconsider his ruling, but after a re-examination of all pertinent papers the reconsideration was denied. The
Central then appealed to the Auditor General of the Philippines.
- On 18 January 1957, the Auditor General affirmed the ruling of the Auditor of the Central Bank upon the

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ground that the importation of the fertilizers does not fall within the scope of the exempting provisions of
Section 2 of RA 601, as amended by RA 1375; and thus affirming the decision of the Auditor, Central Bank of
the Philippines.
- The Central and Elizalde filed the petition for review in the Supreme Court.

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Ruling:
The law is, therefore, clear that imported fertilizers are exempt from the payment of the 17% tax only if the same

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were imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The exemption covers exclusively

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fertilizers imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The word “directly” has been interpreted
to mean “without anything intervening”.
- Consequently, an importation of fertilizers made by a farmer or planter through an agent, other than his
cooperative, is not imported directly as required by the exemption.
- When the issue is whether or not the exemption from a tax imposed by law is applicable, the rule is that the
exempting provision is to be construed liberally in favor of the taxing authority and strictly against
exemption from tax liability, the result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes are strictly
construed in favor of the State and against the taxpayer.
- Exempting from the 17% tax all fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through any agent other than their
cooperatives, this would be rendering useless the only exception expressly established in the case of fertilizers
imported by planters or farmers through their cooperatives.

From Notes:

• Statute: tax provided shall not be collected on foreign exchange used for the payment of “fertilizers when
imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives”
• The importation of fertilizers by an entity which is neither a planter nor a farmer nor a cooperative of planters
or farmers is not exempt from payment of the tax, even though said entity merely acted as agent of planter or
farmer as a sort of accommodation without making any profit from the transaction, for the law uses the word
“directly” which means without anyone intervening in the importation and the phrase “through their
cooperatives” as the only exemption

Construction in relation to other statutes

Statutes in pari materia (a rule of statutory interpretation, says that laws of the same matter and on the same
subject must be construed with reference to each other. The intent behind applying this principle is to promote
uniformity and predictability in the law).

- Two or more statutes relate to the same specific subject matter.

- Relate to the same person or thing, or have the same purpose or object, or cover the same specific or particular
subject matter
- Presumption: Laws are consistent with each other.
- Whenever a legislature enacts a law, it has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, and
in the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the new statute is deemed enacted in accord with the
legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes.
- Maxim: interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus (every statute must be
so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence)

Construing statutes in pari materia Ask the question: Does the later act impliedly amended or repealed the earlier
statute?

General rule: A statute will not be construed as repealing a prior act on the same subject. In case of doubt, it will
be resolved against implied amendment or repeal and in favour of harmonization of all laws on the subject
matter

Exceptions:
1. Unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between them and harmonization or reconciliation is not possible

2. The new law evidently intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter to comprise itself the sole and
complete system of legislation on the subject

If harmonization is impossible:
- If there has been an implied repeal, the latter statute should be construed as to modify the prior law no further
than may be necessary to effect the specific purpose of the latter enactment
- If cannot be possibly harmonized, the earlier one must yield to the later one, it being the latest expression of
legislative will

Phrases:
- Statutes must be construed not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the
same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent, intelligible, and uniform system of jurisprudence
- The best method of interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with each other
- Two or more statutes on the same subject were enacted at different times and under dissimilar circumstances or
conditions, their interpretation should be in accordance with the circumstance or conditions peculiar to each
(distinguire tempora et concordabis jura or distinguish times and you will harmonize laws)

Statutes in pari materia

1. General and special statutes
2. Reference statutes
3. Supplemental statutes
4. Reenacted statutes
5. Adopted statutes

On Reenacted statutes:
- The provisions of an earlier statute are reproduced in the same or substantially the same words
- Two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should, each in its own field, have a like
interpretation, unless in particular instances there is something peculiar in the question under consideration, or
dissimilar in the terms of the act relation to it, requiring a different conclusion
- If a statute has been construed by the court of last resort and the same is re-enacted, the legislature may be
regarded as adopting such construction (adoption of contemporaneous construction)
- Applies only when the statute is capable of the construction given to it when the construction has become a
settled rule of conduct
- Reenactment may also be done by reference

CASE NO. 2: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos

From Reviewer:
MCIAA was created by virtue of RA 6958 and enjoyed tax exemption under Sec. 14 of its Charter. The City
Treasurer demanded for payment of real estate tax. It was contended that, aside from Sec. 14, the Local
Government Code exempted the National Government and its agencies, and the MCIAA is an instrumentality
of the government performing governmental functions.

Held: Congress did not expand the scope of the exemption to include instrumentalities or agencies of the
government-owned and controlled corporations. The reproduction of the source of exemption in Sec. 40(a) of
PD 464 (Real Property Tax Code) in the Local Government Code excluded the GOCCs.

From Digest:
FACTS:
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created to “principally undertake to economical,
efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport… and such
other airports as may be established in the province of Cebu…” Section 14 of its charter excempts the Authority
from payment of realty taxes but in 1994, the City Treasurer demanded payment for realty taxes on several
parcels of land belonging to the other. MCIAA filed a petition in RTC contending that, by nature of its powers
and functions, it has the same footing of an agency or instrumentality of the national government. The RTC
dismissed the petition based on Section 193 & 234 of the local Government Code or R.A. 7160. Thus this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MCIAA is exempted from realty taxes?
RULING:
With the repealing clause of RA 7160 the tax exemption provided. “All general and special in the charter of the
MCIAA has been expressly repeated. It state laws, acts, City Charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations
and administrative regulations, or part of parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of the
Code are hereby repeated or modified accordingly.” Therefore the SC affirmed the decision and order of the
RTC and herein petitioner has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties effective January 1, 1992 up to the
present.

*check on MIAA v. CA – different ruling

LABOR LAWS
Rule on the construction of labor laws
- the rule on construction of labor laws shall be resolved in favor of Labor.

CASE NO. 3 Manahan v. Employee's Compensation Commission

Issue: W/N the intent of the Workers’ Compensation Act applies in claiming the death benefit of the
petitioner’s decease

Facts:
- The petitioner, Maria Manahan was the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of “enteric fever” while
employed as a classroom teacher in Las Piňas Municipal School, Las Piňas, Rizal, on May 8, 1975.
- The petitioner filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for death benefit under
Presidential Decree 626.
- On June 19, 1975, the GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of Nazario Manahan, Jr. was not an
occupational disease.
- The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the deceased was in perfect health when
admitted to the service and that the ailment of said deceased was attributable to his employment.
- GSIS affirmed the denial of the claim on the ground that “enteric fever” or “paratyphoid” is similar in effect to
“typhoid fever,” in the sense that both are brought about by ‘salmonella organisms.”
- Petitioner appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) which affirmed the decision of the
GSIS. - Now, petitioner filed a petition to review the decision of the ECC.
Ruling:
Yes. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social legislation – like Women’s
Compensation Act and the Labor Code – should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, in other
words, to give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should die or
sustain an injury.
- In this case, applying the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the presumption of compensability
subsists in favor of the claimant.
- The decision of ECC was set aside and the GSIS was ordered to pay the petitioner the amount of P600 as death
compensation benefit and P600 as attorney’s fees; to reimburse the petitioner expenses incurred for medical
services, hospitalization and medicines of the deceased, Nazario Manahan , Jr., duly supported by paper receipts,
and to pay administrative fees.

STATUTES LIBERALLY CONSTRUED

General social legislation
• General welfare legislation:
 To implement the social justice and protection-to- labor provisions of the Constitution
 Construed liberally
 Resolve any doubt in favor of the persons whom the law intended to benefit
 Includes the following – labor laws, tenancy laws, land reform laws, and social security laws

CASE NO. 4: Del Rosario and Sons v. NLRC

Facts:
- On 1 February 1978, Del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. entered into a “Contract of Services” with Calmar Security
Agency whereby the latter undertook to supply the former with security guards at the rate of P300.00 per month for each
guard.
- Thereafter, Paulino Mabuti, Napoleo Borata and Silvino Tudio filed a Complaint against the Security Agency
and petitioner, for under payment of salary, non-payment of living allowance, and 13th month pay.
- Thereafter, five other guards filed their complaint for the same causes of action. Petitioner contended that
complainants have no cause of action against it due to absence of employer-employee relationship between
them.
- They also denied liability alleging that due to the inadequacy of the amounts paid to it under the Contract of
Services, it could not possibly comply with the payments required by labor laws. Assigned for compulsory
arbitration, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for want of employer-employee
relationship.
- When the case was appealed to the NLRC, the decision was modified by holding that petitioner is liable to pay
complainants, jointly and severally, with the Security Agency on the ground that the petitioner is an indirect
employer pursuant to Articles 106 and107.
- Hence, the appeal. The petitioner contended that NLRC erred in giving due course to the appeal despite the fact
that it was not under oath and the required appeal fee was not paid; in holding it jointly and severally liable with
the Security Agency; and in refusing to give due course to its Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether the security guards from the agency are entitled to benefits claimed from the company.

Held:
- As provided for by Article 221 of the Labor Code "in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the
Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in Courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the
spirit and intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities
of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process."
- Petitioner's joint and several liability with the Security Agency was correctly adjudged. When petitioner entered
into a Contract of Services with the Security Agency and the latter hired complainants to work as guards for the
former, petitioner became an indirect employer of respondents-complainants pursuant to the unequivocal terms
of Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code, as amended:
Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor .— ... In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay
the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shag be jointly and severally liable with
his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the
same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.
Art. 107. Indirect employer. —The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply
to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an
independent contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.

The joint and several liability imposed on petitioner and affirmed herein, however, is without prejudice to a
claim for reimbursement by petitioner against the Security Agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to
pay to complainants. The Security Agency may not seek exculpation by claiming that petitioner's payments to it
were inadequate. As an employer, it is charged with knowledge of labor laws and the adequacy of the
compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principal concern and not any other's.

INSURANCE LAW
Ambiguous provision interpreted against insurer
- where the terms of the policy are ambiguous, uncertain and doubtful, they should be interpreted strictly
and most strongly against the insurer, and liberally in favor of the insured.

CASE NO. 5: Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union

Issue: W/N the insurance contract is void.
Facts:
Qua Chee Gan owns four warehouses in Albay. He was using these warehouses to house crops like copra and
hemp. All warehouses were insured by Law Union and Rock Insurance for the amount of P370,000.00. The
insurance states that Qua Chee Gan should install 11 hydrants in the warehouses’ premises. Qua Chee Gan
installed only two, but Law Union nevertheless went on with the insurance policy and collected premiums from
Qua Chee Gan. The insurance contract also provides that “oil” should not be stored within the premises of the
warehouses.
In 1940, three of the warehouses were destroyed by fire. The damage caused amounted to P398k. Qua Chee Gan
demanded insurance pay from Law Union but the latter refused as it alleged that after investigation from their
part, they found out that Qua Chee Gan caused the fire. Law Union in fact sued Qua Chee Gan for Arson.
Qua Chee Gan was acquitted in the arson case. He then demanded that Law Union pay up. This time, Law Union
averred that the insurance contract is void because Qua Chee Gan failed to install 11 hydrants; and that gasoline
was found in one of the warehouses.

Ruling:
No. Law Union cannot exempt itself from paying Qua Chee Gan because it is estopped from invoking the same.
It is a well settled rule of law that an insurer which with knowledge of facts entitling it to treat a policy as no
longer in force, receives and accepts a premium on the policy, estopped to take advantage of the forfeiture.
Also, gasoline is not one of those items specifically prohibited from the premises of the warehouses. What was
mentioned was the word “oil” which could mean anything (from palm oil to lubricant and not gasoline or
kerosene). This ambiguity is to be interpreted against Law Union because a contract of insurance is a contract of
adhesion. Further, oil is incidental to Qua Chee Gan’s business, it being used for motor fuel.

Other Rulings
On false and fraudulent claims
CFI found that the discrepancies were a result of QCG’s erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the
insurance policies and claim forms, caused by his imperfect English, and that the misstatements were innocently
made and without intent to defraud. The rule is that to avoid a policy, the false swearing must be willful and
with intent to defraud which was not the cause.

On the storage of gasoline

Ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly interpreted against the party that caused them. This rigid
application of the rule has become necessary in view of current business practices. In contrast to contracts
entered into by parties bargaining on an equal footing, a contract of insurance calls for greater strictness and
vigilance on the part of courts of justice with a view to protect the weaker party from abuses and imposition, and
prevent their becoming traps for the unwary. The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith (uferrimal
fidei) not for the insured alone, but equally so for the insurer; in fact, it is more so for the latter, since its
dominant bargaining position carries with it stricter responsibility.
QCG admitted that there were 36 cans of gasoline in Bodega 2. Gasoline is not specifically mentioned among
the prohibited articles listed in the hemp warranty. The cause relied upon LU speaks of oils. In ordinary parlance,
“oils” means “lubricants” and not gasoline or kerosene. The prohibition of keeping gasoline could have been
expressed clearly and unmistakably.

On fire hydrants warranty

LU is estopped from claiming that there was a violation of such warranty, since it knew that from the start, the
number of hydrants it demanded never existed, yet it issued policies and received premiums.

CORPORATE LAW

Corporate Law Rule on the interpretation of Corporate Law provisions?

- must be given a reasonable, not an unduly harsh, liberal interpretation which does not hamper the development
of trade relations and which foster friendship and commercial intercourse among countries.

CASE NO. 6: Home Insurance v. Eastern Shipping

Issue: W/N the plaintiff, being a foreign insurance company. Has the capacity to sue through the
Philippine courts.

Facts:
- The plaintiff is a foreign insurance company duly authorized to do business in the Philippines through its
agent Victor H. Bello.
- On January 13, 1967, 2,361 coils of “Black Hot Rolled Copper Wire Rods” from Osaka, Japan were shipped to
Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation of the Philippines.
- The vessel used was owned by the defendant Eastern shipping Lines. The shipment was insured with the
plaintiff, Home Insurance Company against all risks. When the shipment arrived, some of the coils were cut
loose, some were entangled, partly cut and had to be considered as scrap. There was a shortage of 593.13 kilos
from the invoiced weight according to the claims presented by the Phelps Dodge against the plaintiff and the
transportation company.
- For the loss and damages, the plaintiff paid Phelps Dodge. When the plaintiff made demands to reimburse the
payment against the transportation company, Eastern Shipping Lines, they refused to pay.
- The plaintiff then filed a petition to the Court of First Instance of Manila, but was denied due to their inability
to prove their capacity to sue.

Ruling:
Yes. It has the capacity to sue. The Corporation Law should be given an interpretation that would foster friendly
commercial intercourse among countries. The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the
jurisdiction of our courts. The lack of capacity to sue at the time of the execution of contracts was cured by the
subsequent registration in the country.
- Counsel for appellant contends that at the time of the service of summons, the appellant had not yet been
authorized to do business. But, the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contracts was cured by
the subsequent registration is also strengthened by the procedural aspects of the case.
- The court find the general denials inadequate to attack the foreign corporations lack of capacity to sue in the
light of its positive averment that it is authorized to do so.
- Section 4, Rule 8 requires that "a party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the
capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity shall do so by specific denial, which shall
include such supporting particulars as are particularly within the pleader's knowledge. - At the very least, the
private respondents should have stated particulars in their answers upon which a specific denial of the
petitioner's capacity to sue could have been based or which could have supported its denial for lack of
knowledge. And yet, even if the plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue was not properly raised as an issue by the
answers, the petitioner introduced documentary evidence that it had the authority to engage in the insurance
business at the time it filed the complaints.

STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED

1. Penal statutes
2. Statutes in derogation of rights
a. Statutes authorizing expropriations
b. Statutes imposing taxes and custom duties
c. Statutory grounds for removing officials
3. Statutes granting privileges
a. Legislative grants to local government units
b. Naturalization laws
c. Statutes granting tax exemptions
d. Statutes prescribing formalities of will
4. Statutes concerning the sovereign
a. Statutes authorizing suits against the government
5. Exceptions and provisos

Statutes granting privileges

- Viewed with suspicion because grants of advents created special privileges or monopolies for the grantees
- Strict construction requires that those who invoke the grant should strictly comply with the provisions
- Maxim: privilegia recipient largam interpretationem voluntati consonam concedentis (privileges are to be
interpreted in accordance to the will of him who grants them)

NATURALIZATION LAW
• Naturalization laws are strictly construed against the applicant and rigidly followed and enforced
• Naturalization is statutory than a natural right -
Reason: The right of an alien to become a citizen is a statutory and not a natural one. It does not become vested
until he files a petition and establishes by competent and satisfactory evidence that he has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications specified by law.

CASE NO. 7: CO V. REPUBLIC

Facts:
- Petitioner was born in Abra and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the Nationalist
Government of China.
- He is married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic church of Bangued. He speaks
and writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and
finished his primary studies in the “Colegio” in Bangued, both schools being recognized by the government. He
has a child two months old. He has never been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not
opposed to organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does not believe in,
nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He mingles with the Filipinos.
- He prefers a democratic form of government and stated that if his petition is granted he would serve the
government either in the military or civil department. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco.
- He also is part owner of a store in Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of P10,000.00
which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to civic and charitable organizations like
the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas.
- He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he has resided in the Philippines for a long time.
- During the year 1956, he claims to have earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of
which he claims to be a part owner, he stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing
one-fourth of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00 as a
salesman therein.
- He took a course in radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He claims
that he has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file his income tax
return when he allegedly received an amount of not less than P3,000 from his father which he claims to have
invested in his tobacco business.
- Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court.
- After hearing, the court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner after the lapse of
two years from the date the decision becomes final and all the requisites provided for in RA 503.
- The government appealed the decision of the trial court, raising the facts that did not state what principles of
the Constitution he knew, although when asked what laws of the Philippines he believes in, he answered
“democracy.; that he stated that his father had already filed his income tax return, when asked why he did not file
his income tax returns; and that he presented his alien certificate of registration, but not the alien certificates of
registration of his wife and child.

Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to
become a Filipino citizen.

Held:
The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the constitution, which is the
fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the principles underlying our constitution.
- Further, Philippine law requires that an alien to conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well
as with the community in which he is living.
- In the present case, in so stating that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those
principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law; the belief in democracy or in a
democratic form of government is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must
believe in the principles underlying our constitution.
- Further, petitioner failed to show that he has complied with his obligation to register his wife and child with the
Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Act;
- And further failed to file his income tax return despite his fixed salary of P1,440.00 a year and his profit of
P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and received an amount less than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the
proceeds of the sale of the store, the total of which is more than what is required by law for one to file an income
tax return.
- The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, hold that the trial court erred in granting the
petition for naturalization, without pronouncement as to costs.
Liberal construction
- Equitable construction as will enlarge the letter of the statute to accomplish its intended purpose, carry out its
intent, and promote justice
- Expand the meaning of the statute to meet cases which are clearly within the spirit orreason of it

Exceptions:
If the statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, enlargement of the provision is prohibited. Nor does it mean that
the words be forced out of their natural meaning.

*Liberal construction is not engrafting upon a law something which the Court believes ought to be there. Liberal
construction is a valid exercise of judicial power, the latter is judicial legislation that is forbidden by the doctrine
of separation of powers. 145

*In interpreting the law, the following should be taken into account:

1. Social justice
- The constitutional mandate on social justice is addressed not only to the legislative branch but also to the two
other departments of the government
- If the provision is susceptible of two interpretations, they now have to be construed to promote and achieve
social justice.

2. General welfare or growth of civilization

Maxim: salus populi est suprema lex (public good is the highest in law)

statuta pro public commodo late interpretantur (statutes enacted for the public good are to be construed liberally)

- Statutes and judicial decisions alike come into being out of the same common roots, the supreme good of
society

- Statutes are not isolated from the drama of life as it unfolds, hence, they must be interpreted in the light of the
growth of civilization and varying conditions.

CASE NO. 8: Guerrero v. CA

Narrating the Facts:

1. Petition for review of CA decision
a. reinstatement of Benitez on the 10 hectare portion of the land (possession and cultivation)
b. ordering Latigays to vacate the said 10 hectare portion and deliver to Benitez
c. defendants (Sps. Guerrero) to pay damages to reinstate Benitez to the 10-hectare portion
d. denying Benitez's prayer for reconstruction of copra cottage
e. defendant spouses to pay Php200 as litigation expenses
2. Benitez
 taken by the spouses in 1969 to take care of the cows in the 21 hectare coconut plantation
 allowed to build a hut in the plantation where he and his family lived
 gets 1/3 of the proceeds during coconut harvest time as he performs works for harvesting
 1973, refrained to gather nuts in the 10-hectare portion
  felt aggrieved, filed complaint at the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President
 arrived at an agreement to let him work as tenant thereon, guided by Republic Act No. 1199. The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
 July 1973, asked again to refrain with threats of bodily injury; assigned Latigays to it instead
 Part of his house was demolished

3. Sps. Guerrero
 Benitez is merely a farmland or laborers; lower court established that he is tenant as per law definitions
 The two courts below applied erroneous definitions of "tenancy" found in repealed laws. They assert
that the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code have been superseded by the
Code of Agrarian Reforms, Rep. Act 6389, which the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to cite
and apply.

Laws Involved:
RA 1199 - The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. (1954)
RA 3844 – Agricultural Reform Code (1963) – shared tenancy
RA 6389 – Code of Agrarian Reforms (1976) – under PD 1038

Lower Court / CA's basis:

The law defines "agricultural tenancy" as the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture,
belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of
the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest
with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both (Section 3,
Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural tenancy Act, as amended.)

Elements:
1. Sharing of profits
2. Construction of house
3. Cultivation

With petitioner reference to this case, "share tenancy" exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking
for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the
landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25) RA
3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).

In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is "any agricultural salary or piece worker but is not limited to
a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code expressly provides otherwise, and any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor
practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment" (Sec. 166(15) RA 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code).
Issue:

I- Whether or not with the passage of Presidential Decree 1038 only last October 21, 1976, Republic Act 6389
otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms has repealed in their entirety the Agricultural Tenancy Act
(Republic Act 1199) and the Agricultural Reform Code (Republic Act 3844) abrogating or nullifying therefore
all agricultural share tenancy agreements over all kinds of lands, as the one involved in the case at bar-over
coconut plantation-and hence, the complaint below as well as the challenged decision by the courts below, based
as they are on such share tenancy agreements, have lost their validity cessante ratio legis, cessat ipsa lex. (When
the rationale of the law ceases, the law also ceases.)
II Assuming arguendo that said laws have not thus been repealed, is respondent Benitez hereunder the
undisputed fact of the case as found by the courts below a share tenant within the purview of the said laws, i.e.,
Republic Acts 1199 and 3844, or a mere farmhand or farm worker as such relationship were extensively
discussed in Delos Reyes vs. Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574. (Copied verbatim from Petition, p. 31- rollo)

SC Ruling:

There is no question that the latest law on land and tenancy reforms seeks to abolish agricultural share tenancy as
the basic relationship governing farmers and landowners in the country.

On August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural
leasehold system.

On September 10, 1971, Republic Act 6389 amending Republic Act 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as
contrary to public policy. On the basis of this national policy, the petitioner asserts that no cause of action exists
in the case at bar and the lower court's committed grave error in upholding the respondent's status as share tenant
in the petitioners' landholding.

The petitioners' arguments are regressive and, if followed, would turn back the advances in agrarian reform law.
The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the movement
not only towards the leasehold system but towards eventual ownership of land by its tillers. The phasing
out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or hired
laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever. It is important to note that the Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA
1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) have not been entirely repealed by the Code of
Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) even if the same have been substantially modified by the latter.

However, even assuming such an abrogation of the law, the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions
pending under the repealed statute is a mere general principle. Among the established exceptions are when
vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired. (Aisporna vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA
481).

SC Closing:
The respondent's status as agricultural tenant should be without question.

Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to continue working until such relationship is
extinguished according to law.

The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic Act 1199), the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963
(Republic Act 3844), the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Republic Act 6389) and Presidential Decree 1038
(Strengthening the Security of Tenure of Tenant Tillers in Non-Rice/Corn Producing Agricultural Lands) all
provide for the security of tenure of agricultural tenants.

Ejectment may be effected only for causes provided by law, to wit:

l) Violations in complying with tenancy terms and conditions (Agricultural Tenancy Act);
2) Tenant's failre to pay rental / landholder's share unles caused by fortuitous event;
3) Use by the tenant of the land for purposes other than that specified by the agreement of the parties;
4) Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm practices:
5) Serious injury to the land caused by the negligence of the tenant;
6) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate family or farm household of a
crime against the landholder or a member of his immediate family. (Section 50, Rep. Act 1199).
None of the above causes exists in the case at bar. The respondent has been unlawfully deprived of his right to
security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian Reforms did not err in ordering the reinstatement of respondent as
tenant and granting him damages therefor.

Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate that the respondent's right as share tenant do not end with
the abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to "uplift the farmers from poverty, ignorance and stagnation to
make them dignified, self-reliant, strong and responsible citizens ... active participants in nation-building",
agricultural share tenants are given the right to leasehold tenancy as a first step towards the ultimate status of
owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be achieved by the government program of land reform.

It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut lands and sugar lands has not yet been implemented. The policy
makers of government are still studying the feasibility of its application and the consequences of its
implementation. Legislation still has to be enacted. Nonetheless, wherever it may be implemented, the eventual
goal of having strong and independent farmers working on lands which they own remains. The petitioners'
arguments which would use the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code as the basis for setting back or
eliminating the tenurial rights of the tenant have no merit.

DISMISSED. LOWER COURT / APPELLATE DECISION AFFIRMED.

CASE NO. 9: BELLO V. CA

FACTS:
*On August 25, 1970, spouses Bello were charged with estafa for allegedly having misappropriated a lady’s ring
with a value of P1, 000.00 received from them from Atty. Prudencio De Guzman for sale on commission basis.
After trial, they were convicted and sentenced. They then filed an appeal to the Court of First Instance and after
that to the respondent city court which was also dismissed and ordered for execution of judgment “for having
been erroneously addressed to this court”. Petitioner spouses then filed for prohibition and mandamus against the
People and respondent city court to elevate their appeal to the Court of Appeals which was again dismissed after
finding that the city court’s judgment was directly appealable to it. Still, the couple moved for reconsideration
and stressing the merits of their appeal and of their defense but was again denied “for lack of sufficient merit”.

*Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance, which should have been taken directly to
Respondent Court. The Prosecutor filed a petition to dismiss appeal. Petitioners invoked an analogous
provision(Rule 50, Sec. 3) directing the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to
the proper court. The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismissal of the appeal. Petitioners then filed their
petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit the execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to
Respondent Court. They dismissed the petition. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First
Instance may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court, it held that Petitioners did
not implead the Court of First Instance as “principal party respondent” and thus it could not “grant any relief at
all even on the assumption that Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities”.
* Rule 50, section 3 directing that the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it "shall not dismiss the
appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court, with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor,"
prayed of the court of first instance if it should find the appeal to have been wrongly brought before it, to certify
the same "to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court."
ISSUE: W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of judicial decision.

HELD: Yes. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court cautions
against narrowly interpreting a statute, defeating its purpose and stressed that “it is the essence of judicial duty to
construe statutes as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity”. The provision should also be
taken within the context and spirit of Rule 50, Sec. 3 as an analogous provision. The Supreme Court finds no
reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and justice to be bound by the same rule.

Other Issue and Ruling:

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case due to wrong procedure.
Whether or not the execution of judgment will be issued a mandamus

Ruling:
Decision of CA to dismiss petition is set aside. Mandamus is issued for the execution of its judgment of
conviction. And, said city court is commanded to elevate petitioner’s appeal from its judgment to the Court of
Appeals for the disposition on the merits.

The Court of Appeals should have not dismissed the appeal but should have certified the case to the proper court.
It is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such deplorable result of injustice and
absurdity and that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.

Strictly Construed:
2. Statutes in derogation of rights
- In the exercise of the police power, the legislature may enact laws curtailing or restricting rights of the people
- Because they are in derogation of common or general rights, they are strictly construed and confined within
their scope

a. Statutes authorizing expropriations

- Same as the above but based on the power of eminent domain
- Strictly construed against the expropriating authority and liberally in favour of the property owners

b. Statutes imposing taxes and custom duties

- Power to tax is incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in range. That is why it is regarded that the “power to
tax involves the power to destroy”
- Taxation is a destructive power which interferes with personal and property rights of the people
- Strictly construed against the government and liberally in favour of the taxpayer
 c. Statutory grounds for removal of officials
- Those referring to suspension or removal of public officials are to be construed strictly
- Must be confined within the limits prescribed: causes, manner, conditions

Reason: Removal is a drastic action that would result to injustice and harm to public interest

CASE NO. 10 City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila

Facts:
The City of Manila asked the CFI in Manila to expropriate the land for the purpose of constructing a public
improvement. The respondents contend that it was one of the owners of the parcels of land.

Held:
Expropriation statutes are strictly construed against the expropriating authority. This is because of a derogation
of the right. The right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it
intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions.

Another digest:
Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for
the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public
improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemeteryand that the said lands are within their
jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available.
They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and
to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in
question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the
courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or
entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the
authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminentdomain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation
or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question that the courts have the right to inquire to. 
 CASE NO. 11: Villanueva v. COMELEC

FACTS:
On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of  Dolores for  the January 30
elections  in substitution for  his  companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on
January 4. Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed
Respondent Candidate as  the winner  on the presumption that  Petitioner’s  candidacy was  not duly approved by
Respondent.  Petitioner  filed a petition for  the annulment of  the proclamation but  was  dismissed by
Respondent  Commission on the
grounds  that Mendoza’s  unsworn  withdrawal  had  no  legal  effect,  and  that  assuming  it  was effective,
Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4.

ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner  should be disqualified on the ground of  formal  or  technical defects.

HELD:
No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which should not be used to frustrate
the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the
substitute candidate.  Also,  his  withdrawal  right  on  the  very  same  day  that  he  filed  his candidacy should
be considered as  having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal  reading
of the provision by Respondent Commission.  The spirit  of  the law rather  than its literal  reading should have
guided Respondent  Commission  in  resolving  the  issue  of  last-minute  withdrawal  and substitution of other
persons as candidates.

WILLS

1. In RE: Tampoy

Whether the absence of the testator’s thumbmark in the first page is fatal to render the will void. Statutes
prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will must be
executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. Since the will suffers the
fatal defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the
three instrumental witnesses, the same fails to comply with the law and therefore cannot be admitted to probate.

CASE NO. 12: In Re Tampoy

In the matter of the TESTATE ESTATE of PETRONILA TAMPOY vs. DIOSDADA ALBERASTINE G.R. No.
L-14322. February 25, 1960

Facts: This concerns the probate of a document which purports to be the last will and testament of Petronila
Tampoy. After the petition was published in accordance with law and petitioner had presented oral and
documentary evidence, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the left hand margin of the first page
of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioners contend that the will expresses the true
intention of the testatrix to give the property to her whose claims remain undisputed. She wishes to emphasize
that no one has filed any opposition to the probate of the will and that while the first page does not bear the
thumbmark of the testatrix, the second however bears her thumbmark and both pages were signed by the three
testimonial witnesses. Moreover, despite the fact that the petition for probate is unopposed, the three testimonial
witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the document expresses the true and voluntary will of the
deceased. Petitioner appealed from this ruling but the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court
as it involves purely a question of law.

Issue: Petition to probate a will on the ground that the left hand margin of the first page of the document does not
bear the thumb mark of the testatrix.

Ruling: Section 618 of Act 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the will and each and every page
thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause. This
requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will (Rodriguez vs. Alcala,
55 Phil., 150). Thus, it has been held that "Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of
wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, 'A will must be executed in accordance with
the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void.' All these requirements stand as of equal importance and
must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in
them, either to superadd other conditions or dispense with those enumerated in the statutes" (Uy Coque vs.
Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 407; See also Saño vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho 50 Phil., 30;
Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil., 481). Since the will in question suffers from the fatal defect that it does not bear the
thumbmark of the testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, the
same still fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot be admitted to probate. The order appealed from is
affirmed.

CASE NO. 13 Capati v. Ocampo

VIRGILIO CAPATI, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DR. JESUS P. OCAMPO, defendant-appellee. G.R. No. L-28742
April 30, 1982

Facts: Plaintiff Virgilio Capati, a resident of Pampanga, entered into a sub-contract with the defendant Dr. Jesus
P. Ocampo, a resident of Naga City, for the construction of the vault walls, exterior walls, and columns of Feati
Bank building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. The defendant further bound himself to complete the said to complete the
said construction on or before June 5, 1967. Claiming that defendant finished the construction in question only
on June 20, 1967, plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga an action for recovery of
consequential damages. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action
was improperly laid. The motion was premised on the stipulation printed at the back of the contract which reads:
That all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City
of Naga. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, claiming that their agreement to hold the venue in the Court
of First Instance of Naga City was merely optional to both contracting parties. In support thereof, plaintiff cited
the use of the word "may " in relation with the institution of any action arising out of the contract. The lower
court dismissed the complaint. Hence, the plaintiff appealed.
Issue: Whether the use of “may” is restrictive or merely permissive.

Decision of the Court:

The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the courts of first instance is found in Section 2 (b), Rule 4
of the Rules of Court, which provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or
any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff." The said section is qualified by the following provisions of Section 3 of the same rule:
By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to
another. Defendant stands firm on his contention that because of the aforequoted covenant contained in par. 14 of
the contract, he cannot be sued in any court except the Court of First Instance of Naga City. It is well settled that
the word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary
circumstances, the term "may be" connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. "May" is an auxiliary verb
indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility. The court held that the stipulation as to venue in the
contract in question is simply permissive The order appealed from was set aside and the records be returned to
the court of origin for further proceedings.

CASE NO. 14 GMCR v. BELL TELECOM

GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.; ISLA

COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC., Petitioners, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and HON. SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official
capacity as Commissioner of the National Telecommunications, Respondents. [G. R. No. 126496. April 30,
1997]

FACTS: On October 19, 1993, Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc. (BellTel) filed with the National
Telecommunications Co. (NTC) an Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to
Procure, Install, Operate and Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services ad to charge rates
therefor and with further request for the issuance of Provisional Authority. Since BellTel was, at the time, an
unenfranchised applicant, it was excluded in the deliberations for service area assignments for local exchange
carrier service, thus, on April and May 1994, only the petitioners were beneficiaries of the formal awards service
area assignments . On March 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting BellTel a congressional
franchise which gave private respondent the right, privilege and authority carry business of providing
telecommunications system. On July 12, 1994, BellTel filed with the NTC a second application praying for the
issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. It moved to withdraw its earlier application, which
was ordered withdrawn on July 11, 1994. The NTC Commissioner Kintanar denied the request of BellTel for a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation of telecommunications equipment pursuant
to its congressional franchise to operate. The denial was promulgated despite the approval of the CCAD of its
feasibility and endorsement of Deputy Commissioner Dumlao and Perez. The petitioners claimed that pursuant
to prevailing policy and corresponding procedure and practice in the NTC, the Commissioner has the sole
authority to sign, validate and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC. Anxious
over the inaction of NTC, BellTel then filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the
issuance of provisional authority. No action was again taken by the NTC, to which BellTel filed a second Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion reiterating its earlier prayer. The petitions appealing the review and reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals declaring the NTC to heretofore sit and act en banc, i.e., with the concurrence of at least
two commissioners, for a valid dispensation of its judicial-functions.

ISSUE: Whether or the NTC is a collegial body or under the direct and sole control of Commissioner Kintanar.

RULING: Section 16 of Executive Order No. 546, the Commission is composed of a Commissioner and two
deputy commissioners x x x not the commissioner, alone, as pontificated by Kintanar. The conjunctive word is
not without any legal significance. It is not, by any chance, a suplusage in the law. It means in addition to
(McCaull Webster Elevator Company versus Adams, 167 Northwestern Reporter, 330, page 332). The word and,
whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full sentence[s], must be accepted as binding together and as
relating to one another x x x. In interpreting a statute, every part thereof should be given effect on the theory that
it was enacted as an integrated law and not as a combination of dissonant provisions. As the aphorism goes, that
the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed x x x. If it was the intention of President Marcos to constitute
merely a single entity, a one-man governmental body, instead of a commission or a three-man collegial body, he
would not have constituted a commission and would not have specifically decreed that the Commission is
composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and the two (2) deputy commissioners.
Irrefragably, then, the NTC is a commission composed not only of Kintanar, but Perez and Dumlao as well,
acting together in the performance of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, conformably with the Rules
of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC and applicable to the NTC. The Supreme Court dismissed
the instant consolidated petitions for lack of merit.

CASE NO. 15: Alfon v. Republic

Alfon v. Republic [GR L-51201, 29 May 1980] Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 4 concur
Facts:
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May 1952 at the UST Hospital to Filomeno Duterte
and Estrella. She was registered at the Local Civil Registrar s Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte. On 15 June 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de
Padua Church, Singalong, Manila. Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs.
Hector Alfon. She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years with her uncle, Hector Alfon. When Maria Estrella started
schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at
Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon. After graduating from high school she enrolled at the
Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Her scholastic records from elementary to
college show that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of
suffrage under the same name. She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor. She filed a verified petition
on 28 April 1978 praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S.
Alfon. The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioner s prayer on 29 December 1978, granting the change of
first name but not the surname. The Supreme Court modified the appealed order in as much as that petitioner is
allowed to change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as Estrella S. Alfon; without
costs. 1. Principally is not equivalent to exclusively The word principally as used in article 364 of the Civil Code
is not equivalent to exclusively so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose
to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.
In the case at bar, the lower court erred in reasoning that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella
Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father. 2. Grounds for change of name The following may be
considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of
name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2)
when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is
acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (1 Tolentino 660, Civil
Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed; Haw Liong v. Republic). In the case at bar, to avoid confusion, the petition of
name should be granted as the petitioner has been using the name of Estrella S. Alfon since childhood.

Words with technical or legal meaning •General rule: words that have, or have been used in, a technical sense or
those that have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense
in which they have been PREVIOUSLY used, although the sense may vary from the strict or literal meaning of
the words •Presumption: language used in a statute, which has a technical or well-known meaning, is used in that
sense by the legislature

CASE NO. 16: Rura v. Lopena

Rura v. Lopena
•Probation law - Disqualified from probation those: “who have been previously convicted by final judgment of
an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than 1 month & a fine of no less than Php 200.”
•Issue: “previously convicted”
•Held: it refers to date of conviction, not date of commission of crime; thus a person convicted on same date of
several offenses committed in different dates is not disqualified.

Rura v. Lopena [GR L-69810-14, 19 June 1985] Second Division, Abad Santos (p): 5 concur
Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as Criminal Case 523, 524,
525, 526 and 527. The 5 cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on 18 August 1983. Rura
was sentenced to a total prison term of 17 months and 25 days. In each criminal case the sentence was 3 months
and fifteen 15 days. Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
When the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. The
application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the ground that Rura is disqualified for probation
under Section 9 (c) of PD 968 or the Probation Law (i.e. applicable to those who have previously been convicted
by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than 1 month and 1 day and/or a fine of
not less than P200). The court denied the application for probation. A motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Hence the instant petition.
The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed the judge to give due course to the petitioner s application
for probation; without costs. 1. Previous applies to date of conviction, not to date of commission of a crime The
statute relates previous to the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime. When the
accused applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment. When he applied for probation
the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of his application. Conviction does not
retroact to the day of the commission of the crime
Technical or legal meaning - Words used in technical sense, or have been judicially construed to have a certain
meaning, or has a well-known legal meaning105 Exception: Legislative intent or qualification to the contrary
Examples: 1. “Proper action” is an ordinary suit which prosecutes another for the enforcement of a right106 2.
“Acquitted” is the finding of not guilty based on merit, hence, different from dismissal (insufficiency of
evidence)107

3. “Previously convicted” refers to the date of conviction and not date of commission of crime

CASE NO. 17: NHA V. JUCO

National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985)

F: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was
dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned corp. and jurisdiction over its
employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor
arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the SC ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing
Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing
the civil service? HELD: Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service
embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government
owned and controlled corporation. The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil serv¬ice shows a
deliberate effort at the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences
of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the government are covered. This consti provision has been
implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC belong to the civil service and subject to
civil service requirements. "Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It
does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings.
xxx For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt- owned or controlled corps. whether
created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the Labor Code, and
the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that
such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service. xxx The infirmity of the resp's
position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1, Art. XII-B [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)]
of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to create a host of subsidiary corps. under the
Corp. Code funded by a willing legislature. A govt-owned corp. could create several subsidiary corps. These
subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged
individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Dec. and the regulations of the COA.
Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraint in the open market nor to the terms and
conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all govt-owned or controlled corps. could be created, no
longer by special charters, but through incorp. under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including
such corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot
be allowed.
 CASE NO. 18: APARRI V. CA

Facts:

On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution # 13, hereby appointing Mr. Bruno
Aparri, as general manager of NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives and compensations to take effect on
January 116, 1960.
On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which stating thereat that the incumbent
general manager shall perform his duty up to the close of office hour on March 31, 1962. In accordance with the
provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes the term of office of the incumbent general
manager until march 31, 1962. Petitioner file a mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first instance
court. The petition pray for the annulment of the resolution of NARRA board.

Issue:
Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.

Held:

It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is necessary in each case to
interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to
the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix
the term is rested in the board of directors subject to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination
and the approval of the president of the philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of
the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if
the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention of the legislative
must be determined from the language employed and where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for
construction.

The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right to hold office
ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.

DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION

Surplusage and superfluity disregarded
• Where a word, phrase or clause in a statute is devoid of meaning in relation to the context or intent of the
statute, or where it suggests a meaning that nullifies the statute or renders it without sense, the word, phrase or
clause may be rejected as surplusage and entirely ignored
• Surplusagium non noceat – surplusage does not vitiate a statute • Utile per inutile non vitiatur – nor is the
useful vitated by the non-useful
 CASE NO. 19: Demafiles v. COMELEC

Demafiles v. Comelec Case No. 91 G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967) Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page
159
FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to reject returns. Petitioner
challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. Respondent
Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members
in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as municipal. In light of
this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision.

ISSUES:
1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from Precinct 7.
2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board in its
capacity as a municipal board of canvassers.
3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return.

HELD: RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected
in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified. The Supreme Court ruled that and shall
have qualified is devoid of meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of January
following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality. No, a canvassing board
may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass
made and proclamation should be annulled. The law states any member of a provincial board or of municipal
council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent to act on the said body. Since
Respondent Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to
why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular. 

Other Digest:
Demafiles v. COMELEC
• Issue: whether a pre-proclamation election case has become moot because the proclaimed winner had
immediately taken his oath pursuant to Sec 2 RA 4870 which provides that the “first mayor, vice-mayor and
councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall
have qualified”
• It was contended that “shall have qualified” begins immediately after their proclamation!
• Court held that this is wrong!
o The said phrase is a jargon and does not warrant the respondent’s reading that the term of office of the
first municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their proclamation
o The King in ‘Alice in Wonderland’: if there is no meaning in it, that saves a world of trouble, you
know, as we need not try to find any
o Apply the general rule when such term begin – the term of municipal officials shall begin on the 1st
day of January following their election
Construction as to give life to the law
- Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends of which they are enacted.127
- They should be given reasonable and practical constructions will give life to them 128
- It should not be construed as to allow the doing of an act prohibited by law129

CASE NO. 20: ARABAY V. CFI OF ZAMBOANGA

Arabay Inc. v. CFI of Zamboanga Case No. 16 G.R. No. L-37684 (September 10, 1975) Chapter VI Page 259,
Footnote No. 43
FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax for the selling and distribution
of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and petroleumbased products. Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and
other petroleum products, contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a
municipality to levy under Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that municipalities may not impose tax on
articles subject to specific tax except gasoline.

ISSUE: W/N Arabay Inc. is entitled to a refund.

HELD: The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the ordinance as a sales tax
ordinance, but also because the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax
on sale. It is evident from the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon to
the volume of sales. Since Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the municipality from imposing sales and
specific tax, with the exception of gasoline, there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. to a refund. The reasonable
and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that Congress, in
excluding gasoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power of such local governments to
impose whatever type or form of taxes.