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CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 - DIGESTS
A. (DAVID)
1 G.R. No. 187587               June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner, vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS
OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 187654
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by
its Board of Directors, Petitioner, vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES -
PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.
DOCTRIN Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
E discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature. The Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of
Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had
any legal force and effect.
FACTS  On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P.
Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation.
The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was
later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
 On 28 May 1967, President Marco) issued Proclamation No. 208,
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort
Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now
known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of
herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office (MSS-PVAO).
 Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded
barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition
under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
 At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a
handwritten addendum, which reads: "P.S. – This includes Western
Bicutan (SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"
 Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette on 3
February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
 On 16 October 1987, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172
which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but
this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition
under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
 Informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio
including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
 Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323
creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further
unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures
at Fort Bonifacio.
 Members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig,
Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of
Land Problems (COSLAP). The Petition prayed for the following: (1)
the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-
13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and
disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the
subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the
Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of
the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.
 Petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI)
filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same
reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the
former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western
Bicutan.
 On 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the
Petition and declaring the portions of land in question alienable and
disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General
dissenting.
 The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was
therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be
defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further,
considering that Proclamation No. 2476 was done while the former
President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended,
repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment.
 Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced
Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987
when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.
 Dissenting Opinion of Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar General
 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in
every case.
 When the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is
no occasion for the court to look into legislative intent, the law must be
taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.
 The Commission had no authority to supply the addendum
originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as
to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the
legislature.
 MSS-PVAO filed an MR which was denied by the COSLAP in a
Resolution dated 24 January 2007.
 MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the CA seeking to reverse the
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COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
 CA First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-
PVAO’s Petition.
 Both NMSMI and WBLOAI appealed the said Decision by filing their
respective Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE WON the CA erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the
publication of the said law.
RULING  The SC denies the Petitions for lack of merit.
 Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western
Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege
that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land
when he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation
No. 2476.
 However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not
included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette.
 The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as
reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of whether the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of
law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
“ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.”
 Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is
indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise
provided.
 "Unless otherwise provided" – a different effectivity date other than
after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in the
Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication
may be dispensed with.
 Tañada v. Tuvera
o Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened
or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in
his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code
which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in
the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general
rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
o It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may
be dispensed with altogether because such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that
are supposed to govern it.
o If the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication
(or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result;
and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but
simply because they did not know of its existence.
o Laws – all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some
that do not apply to them directly.
o We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
o Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
o Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
o Even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects
only the inhabitants of that place.
o All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements.
o The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they
are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the
Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
o The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
 Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot
rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and
effect.
 Under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the
publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the
Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority."
 Whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western
Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative.
 The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words appearing in the law. The courts exist for
interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be
violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole
function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where
gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not
arrogate unto itself the task of legislating."
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 The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation,
but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners'
lots in the reclassification. Denied for lack of merit.
2 G.R. No. 180705               November 27, 2012
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DOCTRIN Mere reference of an act of an agreement to a published statute does not make
E the act or agreement a part of the law.
FACTS  In 1971, R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment
Company ("CIC") to administer the Coconut Investment Fund ("CIF"),
which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy
on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra.
 Of the PhP 0.55 levy of which the copra seller was – or ought to be –
issued COCOFUND receipts, PhP 0.02 was placed at the disposition of
COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers declared by the
Philippine Coconut Administration ("PHILCOA" now "PCA") as having
the largest membership.
 Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or
indirectly to finance various projects and/or was converted into various
assets or investments.
 Relevant to the present petition is the acquisition of the First United
Bank ("FUB"), which was subsequently renamed as United Coconut
Planters Bank ("UCPB").
 FUB was the bank of choice which Pedro Cojuangco’s group
(collectively, "Pedro Cojuangco") had control of. The plan, then, was for
PCA to buy all of Pedro Cojuangco’s shares in FUB.
 However, a simple direct sale from the seller (Pedro) to PCA did not
ensue as it was made to appear that Cojuangco had the exclusive option
to acquire the former’s FUB controlling interests.
 Emerging from this elaborate, circuitous arrangement were two
deeds. The first one was simply denominated as Agreement, dated May
1975, entered into by and between Cojuangco for and in his behalf and in
behalf of "certain other buyers", and Pedro Cojuangco in which the
former was purportedly accorded the option to buy 72.2% of FUB’s
outstanding capital stock, or 137,866 shares (the "option shares," for
brevity), at PhP 200 per share. On its face, this agreement does not
mention the word "option."
 The second but related contract, dated May 25, 1975, was
denominated as Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for
the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers of the Philippines. It had PCA, for
itself and for the benefit of the coconut farmers, purchase from Cojuangco
the shares of stock subject of the First Agreement for PhP200.00 per
share. As additional consideration for PCA’s buy-out of what Cojuangco
would later claim to be his exclusive and personal option, it was
stipulated that, from PCA, Cojuangco shall receive equity in FUB
amounting to 10%, or 7.22%, of the 72.2%, or fully paid shares. And so as
not to dilute Cojuangco’s equity position in FUB, later UCPB, the PCA
agreed under paragraph 6 (b) of the second agreement to cede over to the
former a number of fully paid FUB shares out of the shares it (PCA)
undertakes to eventually subscribe. It was further stipulated that
Cojuangco would act as bank president for an extendible period of 5
years.
 It would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on
maintaining Cojuangco’s equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to
him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but unissued shares of
FUB and (b) the increase in FUB’s capital stock (the equivalent of
158,840 and 649,800 shares, respectively). In all, from the "mother" PCA
shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304 FUB (UCPB) shares
broken down as follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840 shares) + 10%
(649,800 shares) = 95,304.
 (PCA) was the "other buyers" represented by defendant Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. in the May 1975 Agreement entered into between Pedro
Cojuangco (on his own behalf and in behalf of other sellers listed in
Annex "A"of the agreement) and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
(on his own behalf and in behalf of the other buyers). Defendant
Cojuangco insists he was the "only buyer" under the aforesaid Agreement.
 Cojuangco, Jr. did not own any share in the x x x (FUB) prior to the
execution of the two Agreements x x x.
 Defendants Lobregat, et al., and COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al.
admit that in addition to the 137,866 FUB shares of Pedro Cojuangco, et
al. covered by the Agreement, other FUB stockholders sold their shares to
PCA such that the total number of FUB shares purchased by PCA …
increased from 137,866 shares to 144,400 shares, the OPTION SHARES
referred to in the Agreement of May 25, 1975.
 Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.
admit that the Agreement, described in Section 1 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 755 dated July 29, 1975 as the "Agreement for the Acquisition
of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of Coconut Farmers" executed by
the Philippine Coconut Authority" and incorporated in Section 1 of P.D.
No. 755 by reference, refers to the "AGREEMENT FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF A COMMERCIAL BANK FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE
COCONUT FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES" dated May 25, 1975
between defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and the PCA.
 As to whether P.D. No. 755 and the text of the agreement described
therein was published, the Court takes judicial notice that P.D. No. 755
was published in x x x volume 71 of the Official Gazette but the text of the
agreement x x x was not so published with P.D. No. 755.
 Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.
claim that the UCPB shares in question have legitimately become the
private properties of the 1,405,366 coconut farmers solely on the basis of
their having acquired said shares in compliance with R.A. No. 6260, P.D.
Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 and the administrative issuances of the PCA.
 Cojuangco, Jr. claims ownership of the UCPB shares, which he
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holds, solely on the basis of the two Agreements.
ISSUE By declaring the Cojuangco UCPB shares as "not supported by valuable
consideration, and therefore, null and void", did the Sandiganbayan
effectively nullify the PCA Agreement? May the Sandiganbayan nullify the
PCA Agreement when the parties to the Agreement concede its validity? If the
PCA Agreement be deemed "null and void", should not the FUB (later UCPB)
shares revert to petitioner Cojuangco (under the PCA Agreement) or to Pedro
Cojuangco, et al. x x x? Would there be a basis then, even assuming the
absence of consideration x x x, to declare 7.2% UCPB shares of petitioner
Cojuangco as "conclusively owned by the plaintiff Republic of the
Philippines"?
RULING  The agreement between PCA and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. dated May
25, 1975 cannot be accorded the status of a law for the lack of requisite
publication.
 It will be recalled that Cojuangco’s claim of ownership over the
UCPB shares is hinged on two contract documents the respective
contents of which formed part of and reproduced in their entirety in the
aforecited Orderof the Sandiganbayan dated March 11, 2003.
 The first contract refers to the agreement entered into by and
between Pedro Cojuangco and his group, on one hand, and Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., on the other, bearing date "May 1975" (hereinafter
referred to as "PC-ECJ Agreement"), while the second relates to the
accord between the PCA and Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25,
1975 (hereinafter referred to as "PCA-Cojuangco Agreement").
 The PC-ECJ Agreement allegedly contains, inter alia, Cojuangco’s
personal and exclusive option to acquire the FUB ("UCPB") shares from
Pedro and his group. The PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shows PCA’s
acquisition of the said option from Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
 Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 incorporated, by reference, the "Agreement
for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut
Farmers" executed by the PCA.
 The PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above in Section 1 of P.D.
755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. And it is
well-settled that laws must be published to be valid.
 While it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference,
Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the
contract in the decree. Neither was a copy thereof attached to the decree
when published.
 We cannot, therefore, extend to the said Agreement the status of a
law.
 Consequently, We join the Sandiganbayan in its holding that the
PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction
between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil
Code.
 Hence, the PCA-Cojuangco agreement is a valid contract for having
the requisite consideration, thereby, setting aside Sandiganbayan’s ruling
on the said matter.
 A perusal of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement disclosed an express
statement of consideration for the transaction: “NOW, THEREFORE, for
and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the other terms and
conditions hereinafter contained, the parties hereby declare and affirm
that their principal contractual intent is (1) to ensure that the coconut
farmers own at least 60% of the outstanding capital stock of the Bank,
and (2) that the SELLER shall receive compensation for exercising his
personal and exclusive option to acquire the Option Shares, for
transferring such shares to the coconut farmers at the option price of
P200 per share, and for performing the management services required of
him hereunder. x x x x”
 The option to purchase shares and management services for UCPB
was already availed of by petitioner Cojuangco for the benefit of the PCA.
The exercise of such right resulted in the execution of the PCA-ECJ
Agreement, which fact is not disputed. The document itself is
incontrovertible proof and hard evidence that petitioner Cojuangco had
the right to purchase the subject FUB (now UCPB) shares. Res ipsa
loquitur.
 While one may posit that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement puts PCA
and the coconut farmers at a disadvantage, the facts do not make out a
clear case of violation of any law that will necessitate the recall of said
contract. Indeed, the anti-graft court has not put forward any specific
stipulation therein that is at war with any law, or the Constitution, for
that matter. It is even clear as day that none of the parties who entered
into the two agreements with petitioner Cojuangco contested nor sought
the nullification of said agreements, more particularly the PCA who is
always provided legal advice in said transactions by the Government
corporate counsel, and a battery of lawyers and presumably the COA
auditor assigned to said agency. A government agency, like the PCA,
stoops down to level of an ordinary citizen when it enters into a private
transaction with private individuals. In this setting, PCA is bound by the
law on contracts and is bound to comply with the terms of the PCA-
Cojuangco Agreement which is the law between the parties. With the
silence of PCA not to challenge the validity of the PCA-Cojuangco
Agreement and the inability of government to demonstrate the lack of
ample consideration in the transaction, the Court is left with no other
choice but to uphold the validity of said agreements.
 Cojuangco is not entitled to the UCPB shared which were bought
with public funds and hence, are public property.
 The coconut levy funds were exacted for a special public purpose.
Consequently, any use or transfer of the funds that directly benefits
private individuals should be invalidated.
3 G.R. No. 164026             December 23, 2008
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. GMA
NETWORK, INC., respondent.
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DOCTRIN Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose
E is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
FACTS  GMA filed an application for collective approval of various
amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the
respondent SEC.
 The amendments applied for include, among others, the change in
the corporate name of petitioner from "Republic Broadcasting System,
Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate
term for another fifty (50) years from and after June 16, 2000.
 Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SEC’s
Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the application
for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized
capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00.
 On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its
intention to contest the legality and propriety of the said assessment.
However, the petitioner requested the SEC to approve the other
amendments being requested by the petitioner without being deemed to
have withdrawn its application for extension of corporate term.
 On February 20, 1996, the SEC approved the other amendments to
the petitioner’s Articles of Incorporation, specifically Article 1 thereof
referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as well as Article 2
thereof referring to the principal purpose for which the petitioner was
formed.
 On March 19, 1996, the petitioner requested for an official
opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and propriety of the
assessment for application for extension of its corporate term.
 The respondent SEC, through Associate Commissioner Fe Eloisa C.
Gloria, on April 18, 1996, issued its ruling upholding the validity of the
questioned assessment, the dispositive portion of which states: "In light
of the foregoing, we believe that the questioned assessment is in
accordance with law. Accordingly, you are hereby required to comply with
the required filing fee."
 An appeal was subsequently taken by the petitioner on the ground
that the assessment of filing fees for the petitioner’s application for
extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the authorized
capital stock plus 20% thereof is not in accordance with law.
 On September 26, 2001, SEC En Banc issued the assailed order
dismissing the petitioner’s appeal.
 GMA argued that its application for the extension of its corporate
term is akin to an amendment and not to a filing of new articles of
incorporation. It further averred that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1994, which the SEC used as basis for assessing P1,212,200.00
as filing fee for the extension of GMA’s corporate term, is not valid.
 CA – agreed with the SEC’s submission that an extension of the
corporate term is a grant of a fresh license for a corporation to act as a
juridical being endowed with the powers expressly bestowed by the State.
As such, it is not an ordinary amendment but is analogous to the filing of
new articles of incorporation. However, it ruled that Memorandum
Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is legally invalid and ineffective for not
having been published in accordance with law. The challenged
memorandum circular is not merely an internal or interpretative rule, but
affects the public in general. Hence, its publication is required for its
effectivity.
 SEC’s contention – it issued the questioned memorandum circular
in the exercise of its delegated legislative power to fix fees and charges.
The filing fees required by it are allegedly uniformly imposed on the
transacting public and are essential to its supervisory and regulatory
functions. The fees are not a form of penalty or sanction and, therefore,
require no publication.
 GMA’s contention – SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of
1986 refers to the filing fees for amended articles of incorporation where
the amendment consists of extending the term of corporate existence.
The questioned circular, on the other hand, refers only to filing fees for
articles of incorporation. It argues that the former circular, being the one
that specifically treats of applications for the extension of corporate term,
should apply to its case. Assuming that Memorandum Circular No. 2,
Series of 1994 is applicable, GMA avers that the latter did not take effect
and cannot be the basis for the imposition of the fees stated therein for
the reasons that it was neither filed with the University of the Philippines
Law Center nor published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation as required under existing laws.
ISSUE WON the imposition of the fee by the SEC based on the memorandum
circular is valid.
RULING  R.A. No. 3531
o Where the amendment consists in extending the term of corporate
existence, the SEC "shall be entitled to collect and receive for the filing of
the amended articles of incorporation the same fees collectible under
existing law as the filing of articles of incorporation."
o SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive the same fees it assesses and
collects both for the filing of articles of incorporation and the filing of
amended articles of incorporation for purposes of extending the term of
corporate existence.
o Effectuating its mandate, SEC issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1,
Series of 1986, imposing the filing fee of 1/10 of 1% of the authorized
capital stock but not less than P300.00 nor more than P100,000.00 for
stock corporations, and 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock but not
less than P200.00 nor more than P100,000.00 for stock corporations
without par value, for the filing of amended articles of incorporation
where the amendment consists of extending the term of corporate
existence.
o Several years after, the SEC issued Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of
1994, imposing new fees and charges and deleting the maximum filing fee
set forth in SEC Circular No. 1, Series of 1986, such that the fee for the
filing of articles of incorporation became 1/10 of 1% of the authorized
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capital stock plus 20% thereof but not less than P500.00.
o A reading of the two circulars readily reveals that they indeed pertain to
different matters.
o SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing fee for
the amendment of articles of incorporation to extend corporate life, while
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 pertains to the filing fee for
articles of incorporation.
o The clear directive of R.A. No. 3531 is to impose the same fees for the filing
of articles of incorporation and the filing of amended articles of
incorporation to reflect an extension of corporate term.
 If such mandate were the only consideration, the Court would have
been inclined to rule that the SEC was correct in imposing the filing fees
as outlined in the questioned memorandum circular, GMA’s argument
notwithstanding.
 However, we agree with CA that the questioned memorandum
circular is invalid as it does not appear from the records that it has been
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
 Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code,
provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided."
 Tañada v. Tuvera:
o All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
o Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature, or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
o Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation.
o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in the performance of their duties.
 The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been
filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register of the
University of the Philippines Law Center as required in the
Administrative Code of 1987.
 Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of
Labor and Employment – Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 of
the POEA, which provided for the schedule of placement and
documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority
holders, was struck down as it was not published or filed with the
National Administrative Register.
 In the case at bar, the questioned memorandum circular cannot be
construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531.
 This administrative issuance is an implementation of the mandate of
R.A. No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large.
 It cannot be considered a mere internal rule or regulation, nor an
interpretation of the law, but a rule which must be declared ineffective as
it was neither published nor filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register.
 A related factor which precludes consideration of the questioned
issuance as interpretative in nature merely is the fact the SEC’s
assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 is exceedingly unreasonable and
amounts to an imposition.
 A filing fee, by legal definition, is that charged by a public official to
accept a document for processing. The fee should be just, fair, and
proportionate to the service for which the fee is being collected, in this
case, the examination and verification of the documents submitted by
GMA to warrant an extension of its corporate term.
 Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been
delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws.
 However, the due process clause permits the courts to determine
whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the
bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily
infringes on a person’s right to property.
 Petition is denied. CA decision is affirmed.
B.
1 G.R. No. 189607          April 18, 2016
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs. LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO,
Respondent.
DOCTRIN Provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
E case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her
children. The Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment
of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of
petitioner and the children is patent.
FACTS  On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married
Benjamin Bautista (Bautista).
 On 6 January 1979, respondent Lea married herein petitioner
Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
 On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be
declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that
 Page 7 of 320
her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any
license and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which
the solemnizing officer belonged.
 On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first
marriage to Baustista void.
 On 22 January 2003, the RTC of Parañaque City rendered its
Decision declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null
and void ab initio. The same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying
that the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become final and executory.
 On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence
claiming that the proof adduced by petitioner was insufficient to warrant
a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was
bigamous.
 Petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of
respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly
managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not
deny that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous
marriage was valid and subsisting.
 In a Decision dated 23 March 2007, the RTC:
o Declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under
Article 41 of the Family Code.
o The fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she
married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato
bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio.
o The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a
judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage.
o The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the
prior marriage is valid and existing.
o Even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially
declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to
obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista
before contracting her second marriage with Renato.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of
their properties were concerned.  His motion, was denied by the RTC.
Both petitioner and Respondent filed their respective Notices of Appeal.
 In a Decision dated 20 April 2009, the CA:
o Reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the
validity of the parties' marriage.
o Since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is
the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages
were celebrated, and not the Family Code.
o CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
ISSUE WON the CA was correct in holding thus and consequentially reversing the
RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.
RULING  The SC denies the petition. CA did not err in upholding the validity
of the marriage between petitioner and respondent.
 The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
 In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both
marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born
while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985.
 The Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil
Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80,81, 82, and 83 (first
paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second
paragraph), 85 and 86.
 Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable
marriage in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e.,
there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage,
the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void
marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally
attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in
a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are
natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of
annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no
judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable
marriage there must be a judicial decree.
 This Court has held in several cases (Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon)
that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.
 However, with the enactment of the Family Code, the rulings in
Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is rendered inapplicable to marriages
celebrated after 3 August 1988.
 A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly
required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage.  A second marriage contracted prior to
the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and
void.
 The SC explained the policy behind the institution of the
requirement in Domingo v. Court of Appeals:
o Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such,
it "shall be protected by the State."
o The Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life."
o As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the
purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the
 Page 8 of 320
basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so
defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of
marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and
nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be
reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations
indeed
o For such a socially significant institution, an official state
pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract
of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone.
 The requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to
marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code,
particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code
was in force. Those cases continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza,
and Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule.
 In the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
entered into in 1979. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in
Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent
being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In
this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second
marriage to petitioner is valid.
 Provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner
and of her children. The Family Code has retroactive effect unless there
be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of
vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.
 The subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the
invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a
marriage license.
 That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was
void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as
this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
 Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City
declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the
conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
 Petition is denied.
2 G.R. No. 173632               September 29, 2014
AMBROSIO ROTAIRO (substituted by his spouse MARIA RONSA YRO
ROTAIRO, and his children FELINA ROTAIRO, ERLINDA ROTAIRO CRUZ,
EUDOSIA ROTAIRO CRIZALDO, NIEVES ROTAIRO TUBIG, REMEDIOS
ROTAIRO MACAHILIG, FELISA ROTAIRO LEGASPI, JOSEFINA ROTAIRO
TORREVILLAS, and CRISENCIO R. ROTAIRO, MARCIANA TIBAY,
EUGENIO PUNZALAN, and VICENTE DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners, vs.
ROVIRA ALCANTARA and VICTOR ALCANTARA, Respondents.
DOCTRIN “Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. In cases of subdivision lots or condominium
E units sold or disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be
incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium
project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the
preceding section within two years from the date of this Decree unless
otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond
is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof. Failure of the owner or developer
to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall
constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this Decree.”
FACTS  Civil Case No. 672 was filed by the respondent Rovira Alcantara
(Rovira) for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land in Barangay San
Andres, Cainta, Rizal, measuring 2,777 square meters and originally titled
under TCT No. 481018.
 Said property was formerly owned by Rovira’s father, Victor C.
Alcantara (Alcantara), and Alfredo C. Ignacio (Ignacio), who mortgaged
the property to Pilipinas Bank and Trust Company (Pilipinas Bank) in
1968.
 Two years after, the property was parcelled out by Alcantara and
Ignacio, through their firm Wilfredo S. Ignacio & Company (Ignacio &
Co.), and separately sold to different buyers.
 One of the buyers was Ambrosio Rotairo (Rotairo) who bought a
200-square meter portion on installment basis. Rotairo constructed his
house on the property identified as Lot C-1, and after completing
payments, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 25, 1979
in his favor by Ignacio & Co.
 Alcantara and Ignacio defaulted in their loan obligations causing
Pilipinas Bank to foreclose the mortgage on the entire property.
 Without redemption being made by Alcantara and Ignacio, title was
consolidated in the name of Pilipinas Bank, being the highest bidder
during the auction sale. Pilipinas Bank then sold the property in a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 6, 1975 to Rovira, who happens to be
Alcantara’s daughter.
 RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 672 in a decision dated December 27,
1996. It rules that the transaction between Ignacio & Co. and Rotairo was
covered by P.D. No. 957. Rovira, as "successor-in-interest of Wilfredo
S.Ignacio [and Victor Alcantara] was well aware of the condition of the
property which she bought from the Pilipinas Bank, because she lives
near the land, and at the time she purchased it she was aware of the
existing houses or structures on the land." She was, therefore, not entitled
to the relief prayed for in her complaint.
 CA set aside the RTC decision and ordered the turnover of
possession of the property to Rovira. CA held that P.D. No. 957 is not
applicable since the mortgage was constituted prior to the sale to Rotairo.
According to the CA, Section 18 of P.D. No. 957 protects innocent lot
buyers, and where there is a prior registered mortgage, the buyer
purchases it with knowledge of the mortgage. In the caseof Rotairo, P.D.
No. 957 does not confer "more" rights to an unregistered buyer like him,
as against a registered prior mortgagee like Pilipinas Bank and its buyer,
 Page 9 of 320
Rovira.
 Petitioners’ argument – P.D. No. 957 is applicable in this case, and
that the transaction between Rotairo and Ignacio & Co. should fall within
the protection of the law.
 Rovira’s argument – principally relies on the prior registration of the
mortgage and the sale in her favor vis-à-visthe petitioners’ unregistered
transactions.
ISSUE 1. WON PD 957 is applicable in the case at bar.
2. Who, as between the petitioners and Rovira, has better right to the
property in dispute?
RULING Retroactive application of P.D. No. 957 (July 12, 1976)
 In Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon, which involved a land purchase
agreement entered into in 1972, the Court stated that the unmistakeable
intent of the legislature is to have P.D. No. 957 operate retrospectively.
 The specific terms of P.D. No. 957 provide for its retroactive effect
even to contracts and transactions entered into prior to its enactment.
 Section 21 of P.D. No. 957 provides: “Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree.
In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of
prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the
owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project to
complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the
preceding section within two years from the date of this Decree unless
otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance
bond is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof. Failure of the owner or
developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding
provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and
39 of this Decree.”
 In this case, the contract to sell between Rotairo and Ignacio & Co.
was entered into in 1970, and the agreement was fully consummated with
Rotairo’s completion of payments and the execution of the Deed of Sale in
his favor in 1979.
 Clearly, P.D. No. 957 is applicable in this case.
 It was error for the CA to rule that the retroactive application of P.D.
No. 957 is "warranted only where the subdivision is mortgaged after
buyers have purchased individual lots."
 According to the CA, the purpose of Section 18 requiring notice of
the mortgage to the buyers is to give the buyer the option to pay the
installments directly to the mortgagee; hence, if the subdivision is
mortgaged before the lots are sold, then there are no buyers to notify.
 What the CA overlooked is that Section 21 requires the owner or
developer of the subdivision project to complete compliance with its
obligations within two years from 1976.The two-year compliance provides
the developer the opportunity to comply with its obligation to notify the
buyers of the existence of the mortgage, and consequently, for the latter
to exercise their option to pay the installments directly to the mortgagee.
 At the time of the enactment of P.D. No. 957 in 1976 and as early as
1974, Pilipinas Bank had already foreclosed the mortgage and bought the
properties in the foreclosure sale. There was, thus, no mortgage to speak
of such that Rotairo should be notified thereof so that he could properly
exercise his option to pay the installments directly to Pilipinas Bank.
Rovira is not a buyer in good faith
 Notwithstanding the preceding discussion, the Court finds that
Rovira cannot claim a better right to the property because she is not a
buyer in good faith.
 Rovira contended that the registered mortgage between Pilipinas
Bank and Alcantara and Ignacio is superior to the unregistered contract
to sell between Ignacio & Co. and Rotairo, which was sustained by the CA.
 The CA applied Section 50 of Act No. 496 or the Land Registration
Act and ruled that since the sale to Rotairo was unregistered and
subsequent to the registered mortgage, the latter was obligated to respect
the foreclosure and eventual sale of the property in dispute, among
others.
 The principal purpose of registration is merely to notify other
persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property
has been entered into.
 The rule, however, is not without recognized exceptions. "The
conveyance shall not be valid against any person unless registered, except
(1) the grantor, (2) his heirs and devisees, and (3) third persons having
actual notice or knowledge thereof."
 Moreover, "when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of
title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent
man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation, he
cannot find solace in the protection afforded by a prior registration.
Neither can such person be considered an innocent purchaser for value
nor a purchaser in good faith.”
 In this case, two factors work against Rovira as a buyer in good faith.
 One, she cannot be considered a third person for purposes of
applying the rule. Rovira does not deny that she is the daughter and an
heir of Victor C. Alcantara, one of the parties to the contract to sell (and
the contract of sale) executed in favor of Rotairo. "The vendor’s heirs are
his privies." Based on such privity, Rovira is charged with constructive
knowledge of prior dispositions or encumbrances affecting the subject
property made by her father. The fact that the contract to sell was
unregistered became immaterial and she is, therefore, bound by the
provisions of the contract to sell and eventually, the contract of sale,
executed by her father in favor of Rotairo.
 More than the charge of constructive knowledge, the surrounding
circumstances of this case show Rovira’s actual knowledge of the
disposition of the subject property and Rotairo’s possession thereof.
 It is undisputed that after the contract to sell was executed in April
1970, Rotairo immediately secured a mayor’s permit in September 28,
1970 for the construction of his residential house on the property.
 Page 10 of 320
 Rotairo, and subsequently, his heirs, has been residing on the
property since then. Rovira, who lives only fifty (50) meters away from
the subject property, in fact, knew that there were "structures built on the
property."
 Rovira, however, claims that "she did not bother to inquire as to the
legitimacy of the rights of the occupants, because she was assured by the
bank of its title to the property."
 But Rovira cannot rely solely on the title and assurances of Pilipinas
Bank; it was incumbent upon her to look beyond the title and make
necessary inquiries because the bank was not in possession of the
property. "Where the vendor is not in possession of the property, the
prospective vendees are obligated to investigate the rights of one in
possession."
 A purchaser cannot simply close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on guard, and thereafter claim that he acted in good faith
under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.
 Rovira cannot claim a right better than that of Rotairo' s as she is not
a buyer in good faith.
 Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith, and
does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud, or as a means to enrich oneself at the expense of others.
 Given Rovira's privity with her father Victor C. Alcantara and the
fact that she had actual knowledge of the disposition of the property and
Rotairo's possession thereof, her acquisition of the property cannot be
upheld.
 Petition is granted.
(DEMDAM)
3 GLORIA SANTOS DUEÑAS, petitioner, vs. SANTOS SUBDIVISION
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, respondent., G.R. No. 149417, June 4, 2004
DOCTRIN Retroactive applicability of laws: Basic is the rule that no statute, decree,
E ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless
explicitly stated.
FACTS  Petitioner Gloria Santos Dueñas is the daughter of the late Cecilio J.
Santos who, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land at Valenzuela City
subdivided into smaller lots, the whole forming the Cecilio J. Santos
Subdivision (for brevity, Santos Subdivision).
 The then Land Registration Commission (LRC) approved the
project and the National Housing Authority (NHA) issued the required
Certificate of Registration and License to Sell.
 At the time of Cecilio’s death in 1988, there were already several
residents and homeowners in Santos Subdivision.
 In 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a
resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for
recreational and other community activities, in accordance with the
provisions of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216.
 Petitioner, however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the
members of SSHA to seek redress from the NHA.
 HLURB opined that the open space requirement of P.D. No. 957, as
amended by P.D. No. 1216, was not applicable to Santos Subdivision.
 SSHA then filed a petition/motion for reconsideration which averred
among others that:
(1) P.D. No. 957 should apply retroactively to Santos Subdivision,
notwithstanding that the subdivision plans were approved in 1966;
and
(2) Gloria Santos Dueñas should be bound by the verbal promise made
by her late father during his lifetime that an open space would be
provided for in Phase III of Santos Subdivision, the lots of which
were at that time already for sale.
 Petitioner denied the allegations of SSHA and raised the following
affirmative defenses:
(a) It was her late father, Cecilio J. Santos, who owned and developed
the subdivision, and she was neither its owner nor developer;
(b) that this suit was filed by an unauthorized entity against a non-
existent person, as SSHA and Santos Subdivision are not juridical
entities, authorized by law to institute or defend against actions;
(c) that P.D. No. 957 cannot be given retroactive effect to make it
applicable to Santos Subdivision as the law does not expressly
provide for its retroactive applicability; and
(d) that the present petition is barred by laches.
 HLURB-NCR decision: Dismissed on the following grounds:
(1) there is no evidence showing Santos-Dueñas as the owner/developer
or successor-in-interest of Cecilio Santos, who was the
owner/developer and sole proprietor of Santos Subdivision;
(2) the LRC-approved subdivision plan was bereft of any proviso
indicating or identifying an open space, as required by P.D. No. 957,
as amended, hence there was no legal basis to compel either Cecilio
or his daughter Santos-Dueñas, as his purported successor, to
provide said space; and
(3) the alleged verbal promise of the late Cecilio Santos was
inadmissible as evidence under the dead man’s statute.
 HLURB Board of Commissioners affirmed the decision of the
HLURB-NCR. There was no basis to compel the petitioner to provide an
open space within the Subdivision since the approved subdivision plans
(approved July 8, 1966) did not provide for the said space and there was
no law requiring the same at that time. It further ruled that P.D. No. 957
could not be given retroactive effect in the absence of an express
provision in the law. Finally, it found the action time-barred since it was
filed nine (9) years after the death of Cecilio.
 Respondents appealed to the CA. CA granted the appeal and
reversed the decision of the HLURB Board.
 CA relied upon Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon, which held that while
P.D. No. 957 did not expressly provide for its retroactive application,
 Page 11 of 320
nonetheless, it can be plainly inferred from its intent that it was to be
given retroactive effect so as to extend its coverage even to those
contracts executed prior to its effectivity in 1976. CA also held that the
action was neither barred by prescription nor laches as the obligation of a
subdivision developer to provide an open space is not predicated upon an
oral contract, but mandated by law, hence, an action may be brought
within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues under
Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the equitable principle of laches
will not apply when the claim was filed within the reglementary period.
ISSUE WON PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, may be applied retroactively.
RULING  No, PD 957 and PD 1216 must not be applied retroactively.
 Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon is inapplicable. It is not on all fours with
the instant case. The issue in Eugenio was the applicability of P.D. No.
957 to purchase agreements on lots entered into prior to its enactment
where there was non-payment of amortizations, and failure to develop
the subdivision. We held therein that although P.D. No. 957 does not
provide for any retroactive application, nonetheless, the intent of the law
of protecting the helpless citizens from the manipulations and
machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers
justify its retroactive application to contracts entered into prior to its
enactment. Hence, we ruled that the non-payment of amortizations was
justified under Section 23 of the said decree in view of the failure of the
subdivision owner to develop the subdivision project. Unlike Eugenio,
non-development of the subdivision is not present in this case, nor any
allegation of non-payment of amortizations. Further, we have held in a
subsequent case30 that P.D. No. 957, as amended, cannot be applied
retroactively in view of the absence of any express provision on its
retroactive application.
 …Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary
that an express provision for its retroactive application must be made in
the law. There being no such provision in both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344,
these decrees cannot be applied to a situation that occurred years before
their promulgation…
 We have examined the text of P.D. No. 1216 and nowhere do we find
any clause or provision expressly providing for its retroactive application.
Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation
shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated. Hence, there is
no legal basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply retroactively.
4 ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent., G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010
DOCTRIN The rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
E initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC is not applicable:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to
March 15, 2003.
FACTS  On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
 The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such
license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the
marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage
license.
 He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who
had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties
acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real
party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn
the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time,
even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab
initio.
 RTC ruling: Dismissed.
1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and
2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and
solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
 CA ruling: Dismissed. While an action to declare the nullity of a
marriage considered void from the beginning does not prescribe, the law
nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper
party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the
marriage. In the instant case, the petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a
brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the marriage
contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
ISSUE WON the decision of the CA should be reversed based on EO 209 and existing
jurisprudence.
RULING  Yes, the decision of the CA must be reversed.
 The validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at
the time the marriage is contracted.
 As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated
cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. To
illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void
under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family
Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect
the void nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage
remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by
 Page 12 of 320
the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.
 Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (effective March
2003) explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of
the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to
marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3,
1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is
confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
 Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family
Code prior to March 15, 2003.
 Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil
Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having
the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the
petitioner.
 The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when.
 Various jurisprudence:
 Ninal vs Bayadog: children were allowed to file after the death of
their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their
father’s marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11,
1986 due to lack of a marriage license.
 Carlos vs Sandoval: plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for
it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the
party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action.
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or
an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in
interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.
 Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s
brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he
claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of
Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.
Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under
the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased
brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of
the Civil Code.
 The right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants,
or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was
the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be
made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
 Both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in
this case. We reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the
petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.
5 MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, vs. CA, et al, respondents, G.R. No. 163707,
September 15, 2006
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and
Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes
(Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC-
Makati City, Branch 138.
 Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on
October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting
of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse
Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all
surnamed Guy.
 Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They
likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of
the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate.
 Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and asserted the following:
1. that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be
settled without securing letters of administration.
2. that private respondents should have established their status as
illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to
Article 175 of the Family Code.
3. that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or
otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release
and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and
educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her
minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all
liabilities.
 RTC ruling: Denied the Motion to Dismiss. While the Release and
Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that
she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no
renunciation of right occurred.
 Page 13 of 320
 CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE WON the private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their
filiation.
RULING  Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for
recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to
wit:
 ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases:
 If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which
case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years
from the attainment of his majority;
 If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child.
 In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from
the finding of the document.
 Bernabe vs Alejo: illegitimate children who were still minors at the
time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during
their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to
four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not
impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
 Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded
Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
 ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
o The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
o An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
o In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by:
 The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
 Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
 ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties.
 ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate
children.
 The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of
the alleged parent.
 Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is
established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for
recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime.
However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules
or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
 It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription
depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in
proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the
same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet.
6 ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. ALEJO, respondent., G.R. No.
140500, January 21, 2002
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary
of twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son
was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal
Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3
of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint
praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate,
which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling
that under the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco
vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint is now barred x x x.
RTC Ruling: granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the
trial courts Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death
of the putative father had barred the action. Since the putative father had not
acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for
recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to
give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
CA Ruling: In the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that
he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in
1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an
action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained
the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not
take away that right.
 Page 14 of 320
ISSUE WON respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the
legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with
accounting after the putative fathers death in the absence of any written
acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had
four years from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as
provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by
the [express] provisions of the Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence
as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals
RULING Period to File Action for Recognition
Under the old rule, the action must be commenced within four years from the
finding of the document.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must
be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes
no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died.
Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the
claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in
secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x
The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny
the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x.
Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is
procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to
[or] arise from procedural laws.
We hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives
Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from
attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take
Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already
vested prior to its enactment.
Not limited to natural children
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned
upon by this Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to
file a case for recognition even if their parents were disqualified from
marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late Jose Aruego
Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this
relationship were born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action
for recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the
alleged putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of their conception,
the two children’s parents were legally disqualified from marrying each other.
The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed
almost a year after the death of the presumed father. At the time of his death,
both children were still minors.
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the
case of natural children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code,
applies to spurious children.
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights
over spurious ones.However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to
other rights, including the right to recognition granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the
Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority
are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil
Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested
right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors
who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their
putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum,the
State as parens patriae should protect a minors right. Born in 1981,
Adrianwas only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only
twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day
in court.
7 OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. CA, respondents., G.R. No. 127406, November
27, 2000
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila.Then they had a church wedding on
August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio
for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977,
was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria,
private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in
ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4,
1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
Private respondent prayed that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and
void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He
also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to
Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of
nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that
his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue.
The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took
place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as
null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private
respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.
RTC Ruling: sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his
marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio
 Page 15 of 320
ISSUE WON the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly?
RULING For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential.
At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second
marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary,
the Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect.Jurisprudence on
the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the
Family Code. Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the
vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of
Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested rights.
In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the
children is patent.
In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the
essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the
requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this
license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not
detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same
parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to
ratify but also to fortify the first.
(FAJARDO)
8 G.R. No. 125932 April 21, 1999
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners vs.
CLAUDE A. MILLER and JUMRUS S. MILLER, respondents.
DOCTRIN "A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend
E upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept
of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be
protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative
right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny." "Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from
new obligations created after the right has vested.
FACTS  On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller,
both American Citizens,  filed with the Regional Trial Court a verified
petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag
 Poverty and deep concern for the future of their son prompted the
natural parents who have no visible means of livelihood to have their
child adopted by respondents. They executed affidavits giving their
irrevocable consent to the adoption by respondents.
 The Department of Social Welfare and Development recommended
approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation that respondents
were morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents and
that the adoption would be to the minor's best interest and welfare.
 On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition
for adoption
 Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals.
 the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court
ISSUE whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the
prohibition under the Family Code, effective on August 3, 1988 when the
petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code 6 which allowed aliens to adopt
RULING Yes,  an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested
right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law
disqualifying him.
9 A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
28, Manila, respondent.
DOCTRIN Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
E previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage.
Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
FACTS  This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and
Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr.,
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila
 Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De
Castro and that the respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
 In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom,
complainant saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed.
Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had
been cohabiting with De Castro.
 respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko. He alleges
 Page 16 of 320
that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony on
April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a
marriage license
 Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in
Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good
faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single
because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family
Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took
place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines;
while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the
Family Code.
ISSUE Whether Article 40 may be given retroactive effect
RULING Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may
not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA
229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws
C. ARTICLE 8. STARE DECISIS; CASE LAW; ARTICLE 36, FC
1 November 21, 2016
G.R. No. 184841
GERINO YUKIT, DANILO REYES, RODRIGO S. SUMILANG, LEODEGARIO
O. ROSALES, MARIO MELARPIS,1MARCELO R. OCAN, DENNIS V.
BATHAN, BERNARDO S. MAGNAYE, LORENZO U. MARTINEZ, ANTONIO
M. LADERES, SOFIO DE LOS REYES BAON, MARIO R. MIGUEL,
RODOLFO S. LEOPANDO, EDGARDO N. MACALLA, JR., MARIANO
REYES, ALEJANDRO CUETO, VIRGILIO RINGOR and JASON R.
BARTE,Petitioners vs.
TRITRAN, INC., JOSE C. ALVAREZ, JEHU C. SEBASTIAN, and JAM
TRANSIT INC., Respondents
DOCTRIN  The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere requires courts "to
E adhere to precedents, and not unsettle things which are established.''
Following this directive, when a court has laid down a principle of law
applicable to a certain state of facts, it must apply the same principle to
all future cases in which the facts sued upon are substantially the same
 It must be emphasized that only final decisions of this Court are deemed
precedents that form part of our legal system. Decisions of lower courts
or other divisions of the same court are not binding on others.
FACTS  Petitioners were formerly employed as drivers and conductors of
Tritran.
 Respondent Tritran was a corporation engaged in the business of
transporting persons and property as a common carrier.8 As such, it
operated a fleet of buses in designated routes
 On 26 May 2004, Tritran sent a Notice of Closure/Cessation of
Business to the Regional Director, Regional Office No. IV of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE Regional Office), citing
irreversible business losses to justify the permanent closure of the
establishment. Despite its financial condition, however, Tritran
undertook to pay separation benefits to its employees
 In March and April 2004, petitioners filed complaints before the NLRC
against Tritran and it officers. petitioners alleged that they were illegally
terminated from employment as a result of the invalid closure of the
company and were thus entitled to reinstatement. They claimed that
Tritran never ceased its business as shown by the continued operation
of its buses on the same routes under the management of JAM Transit,
Inc., a company also owned by Alvarez and that the closure was a mere
ploy for the company to circumvent their security of tenure and avoid
its obligation to pay them separation benefits. They also  questioned the
fact that Tritran, a bus company, spent around ₱10 million for security
services, but paid only about ₱l.5 million for the salaries and wages of
its drivers and conductors
 respondents denied these allegations and asserted that the closure was
justified under Article 283 of the Labor Code. They cited the serious and
irreversible losses sustained by the company from 2000 to 2002.23 In
support of this allegation, they submitted the Audited Financial
Statements (AFS) of Tritran
 In a Decision dated 15 August 2005, LA Numeriano D. Villena ruled in
favor of petitioners. He observed that the AFS submitted by
respondents to substantiate their supposed losses contained "highly
suspicious" expenditures for security
 On appeal, the NLRC initially affirmed the foregoing ruling
 Respondents sought reconsideration of the NLRC Decision
 In a Resolution44 dated 18 August 2006, the NLRC granted the Motion
for Reconsideration.45 Reversing its earlier ruling, it declared that the
closure of Tritran was justified, given the serious business losses
suffered by the company.46 This time, the NLRC gave weight to the
AFS as well other supporting documents submitted by respondents.47
It also referred to its Decision in Antonio de Chavez, et al. v. Tritran,
Inc., et al.,48 in which it upheld the validity of the dismissal of certain
employees of Tritran on the basis of the closure of the company.49
Citing the principle of stare decisis, the NLRC declared that De Chavez
must be followed in this case
 Page 17 of 320
 On 5 February 2007, petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a
Petition for Certiorari. they challenged the application of De Chavez to
this case. They pointed out that (a) because De Chavez was issued two
months after the NLRC had promulgated the original Decision in this
case, the ruling cannot be used as binding precedent;53 and (b) stare
decisis only applies to final decisions of the Supreme Court.54
Petitioners also emphasized that there was no justification for the
reversal of the earlier Decision, as no new evidence or argument had
been submitted.55 They particularly questioned the sudden turnaround
of the NLRC on the issue of the credibility of the AFS.
 In a Decision57 dated 18 October 2007, the CA dismissed the Petition
for Certiorari
ISSUE Whether the principle of stare decisis was correctly applied by the NLRC
RULING  No. The doctrine of stare decisis was erroneously applied by the NLRC
to justify the reversal of its earlier Decision
 In this case, the NLRC referred to the principle of stare decisis in its
Resolution dated 18 August 2006 as one of the reasons for the reversal
of its original Decision affirming the LA ruling. As earlier discussed, it
cited the Decision in De Chavez v. Tritran, Inc,. in support of its finding
that Tritran 's closure was due to serious business losses
 It must be emphasized that only final decisions of this Court are
deemed precedents72 that form part of our legal system.73 Decisions of
lower courts or other divisions of the same court are not binding on
others.74 Consequently, it was incorrect for the NLRC to consider De
Chavez - a ruling rendered by the same NLRC division - as a binding
precedent applicable to the present case.
 We stress, however, that the erroneous application of the stare decisis
principle to this case does not automatically lead to the conclusion that
the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it reversed its
original Decision. The Court notes that the NLRC set aside its own
ruling only after taking a second hard look at the records; in particular,
at the documentary evidence submitted by respondents.75 Clearly, De
Chavez was not the only basis of the NLRC for reversing its original
ruling
2 June 22, 2016
G.R. No. 181369
TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP., INC., PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS
A. DUPASQUIER, DOLLY LIM, RUBENCITO M. DEL MUNDO AND
ELIZABETH H. PALMA, Petitioners, vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent.
DOCTRIN -stare decisis et non quieta movere, which literally means "to adhere to
E precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established,"
- The rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue
where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward
by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court
FACTS  On September 5, 1995, Banco Filipino filed a complaint4 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against Tala Realty Services
Corporation, Inc. (Tala Realty) and the individual petitioners. This was
one of the 17 reconveyance cases instituted by Banco Filipino against
Tala Realty
 The complaint alleged that the properties were covered by a trust
agreement between Banco Filipino, as trustor-beneficiary, and Tala
Realty, as trustee. The trust agreement was essentially a sale and lease-
back arrangement wherein Banco Filipino sold various properties to
Tala Realty, while the latter concurrently leased to Banco Filipino the
same property for a period of 20 years, renewable for another 20 at the
option of Banco Filipino.6 Banco Filipino admitted that the purpose of
the trust agreement was to "allow more flexibility in the opening of
branches and to enable the bank to acquire new branch [sites]," since at
that time, Banco Filipino was concerned about keeping within the 50%
capital asset threshold for banks under the General Banking Act. 7
However, sometime in August 1992, Tala Realty claimed the property
for itself and threatened to eject Banco Filipino.
 Petitioners moved to dismiss9 the complaint based on the following
grounds: forum shopping, lack of cause of action, and pari delicto.
 The RTC initially denied 10 the motion to dismiss but later reversed
itself. 11 It ordered the dismissal of the complaint against herein
petitioners except Tala Realty and ordered the suspension of the
proceedings in view of our decision in G.R. No. 137533. 12 Banco
Filipino moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied.
 Consequently, Banco Filipino elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA) via Rule 65. The CA granted the petition. 15 The CA also said that
the proceedings should not have been suspended because the matter
resolved in G.R. No. 137533, which originated from an ejectment suit, is
distinct and separate from the subject matter of the case for
reconveyance. 16The CA subsequently denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
 petitioners principally claim that Banco Filipino's action for
reconveyance is already barred by stare decisis and conclusiveness of
judgment considering the en banc decision in G.R. No. 137533, as
reiterated in the April 7, 2009 consolidated decision in G.R. Nos.
130088, 131469, 155171, 155201, and 16660818 and the June 27, 2012
decision in G.R No. 188302
 Banco Filipino counters that G.R. No. 137533 cannot apply because it
involved an ejectment suit, which is distinct from its action for
reconveyance
ISSUE Whether Banco Filipino can recover the Sta. Cruz property based on the same
trust agreement which we declared void in G.R. No. 137533
RULING No.
 Page 18 of 320
 we applied the time-honored principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere, which literally means "to adhere to precedents, and not to
unsettle things which are established," to settle the issue of whether
Banco Filipino can recover the properties subject of the void trust
agreement. The rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate
the same issue where the same questions relating to the same event
have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court.33 Thus, the Court's ruling
in G.R. No. 13753334 regarding the nullity of the trust agreement-the
very same agreement which Banco Filipino seeks to enforce in the
proceedings a quo-applies with full force to the present case.
Consequently, Banco Filipino's action for reconveyance of the Sta. Cruz
property based on the void trust agreement cannot prosper and must be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
 The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity
for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions
 In addition to the principle of stare decisis, the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, otherwise known as "preclusion of issues"
or "collateral estoppel," bars the re-litigation of Banco Filipino's claim
based on the void trust agreement. This concept is embodied in the
third paragraph of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure:
 Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.-The effect of a judgment
or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction
to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxx
 (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.(Emphasis supplied.)
 Conclusiveness of judgment is a species of res judicata and it applies
where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but there
is no identity of causes of action.40 Any right, fact, or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, and cannot again
be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the
claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the
same.
 In other words in , the question on the validity of the trust agreement
has been finally and conclusively settled in G.R. No. 137533. Hence, this
question cannot be raised again even in a different proceeding involving
the same parties. Although the action instituted in this case is one for
reconveyance, which is technically different from the ejectment suit
originally instituted by Tala Realty in G.R. No. 137533, "the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment still applies because under this principle,
the identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of
issues. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of
particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties
on a different claim or cause of action.
3 G.R. No. 166562               March 31, 2009
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent
DOCTRIN  The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
E doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based
on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.49
Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issues,50necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In
our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil
Code
 The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the
thing and do not disturb the calm."
 Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The
first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts
to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same
facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high
courts must follow its own precedents.  vertical stare decisis has been
viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed
as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is
not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
 It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare
decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis.
Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in
refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations.
 In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of
reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes
judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,
courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2)
it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings;
(3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the
hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for
future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
with them.
FACTS  -On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter
 Page 19 of 320
 Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated
 Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a
psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr.
Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the
latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in
South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr.
Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking, compulsive
gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that
petitioner suffers from a personality disorder
 -To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D.
Obra, a psychiatrist. Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with
petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good relationship with
his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist
 On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
 -petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision38 reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s
finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion
that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married
Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and
not on established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos
v. Court of Appeals40and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and
Molina
 Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina
guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision
was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years
after she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the
Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run
counter to the principle of stare decisis.
 Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration
 respondent filed a petition for certiorari;  this Court granted the petition
 - On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on
November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision46 reversing its first
ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision
ISSUE Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
RULING  No. the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a
part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a
prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith,
in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."
 The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by the Court in its final decisions It is based
on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument
D. (PACHECO)
1 G.R. No. 215723
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA
KOIKE," Petitioner
vs.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY,
METRO MANILA, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
DOCTRIN Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
E grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign
marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a
Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. The provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial
to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The starting point
in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense. in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the
alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the
divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Our law on evidence requires that both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven like any other fact.
FACTS Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent
Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married but later
divorced pursuant to the laws of Japan. Seeking to have the said Divorce
Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry.
No one appeared to oppose. RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an
action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the
Family Code, the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven. While the
 Page 20 of 320
divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be public
or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national
law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce."The Civil
Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections
24 and 25 of the said Rules.
ISSUE whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce
RULING Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and
Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter
are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented
before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question
of fact. The case was referred to CA for appropriate action including the
reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual
issues
2 January 12, 2016
G.R. No. 201614
SHERYL M. MENDEZ, Petitioner, vs.
Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a District, Cotabato City, Rasad G. Balindong
(Acting Presiding Judge); 1st Shari'a Circuit Court, 5th Shari'a District,
Cotabato City, Montano K. Kalimpo (Presiding Judge); and DR. JOHN O.
MALIGA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
DOCTRIN ShCC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions between parties who
E have been married in accordance with the Muslim law, involving disputes
relating to divorce under P.D. No. 1083. ShCC had jurisdiction to confirm the
talaq. ShDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving custody
under P.D. No. 1083. ShCC does seem to have ancillary jurisdiction over
custody issues as they relate to a divorce decree. Though Article 54 does not
directly confer jurisdiction to the ShCC to rule on the issue of custody, the
Court, nevertheless grants the ShCC ancillary jurisdiction to resolve issues
related to divorce.
FACTS Mendez and Maliga were married under Muslim rites in 2008. On November
2, 2010, Maliga filed with the ShCC a petition for the judicial confirmation of
talaq from Mendez, with a prayer for the grant of probational custody of their
minor child. According to Maliga, Mendez was a Roman Catholic and she only
embraced the Islamic faith on the date of their marriage. Shortly after being
married, he claimed that he started to doubt the sincerity of his wife's
submission to Islam, having noticed no changes in her moral attitude and
social lifestyle. She reverted to Christianity. Maliga filed his urgent motion
reiterating his plea to be awarded temporary custody of Princess Fatima
which the Sharia Circuit Court (ShCC) granted. ShCC also issued the order
confirming talaq and awarding the custody of Fatima. Sharia District Court
(ShDC) affirmed and ruled that in Shari'a Law, a mother might be legally
disentitled to the custody of her child if she turned apostate, and disqualified
until she returned to the Islamic faith; and that the father, as a Muslim, was
in a better position to take care of the child's well-being and raise her as a
Muslim. Mendez argues that the ShCC acted in excess of jurisdiction when it
ruled on Maliga's urgent motion for issuance of temporary custody,
considering that the motion was a mere scrap of paper for lack of notice of
hearing. She reiterates that she never received any summons in connection
with the urgent motion. Mendez goes on to contend that the ShCC had no
jurisdiction on the issue of custody as it should be the ShDC which has the
exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving custody.
ISSUE Jurisdiction of Shari’a courts as to divorce and custody issues
RULING The law which confers jurisdiction on the Shari'a courts is P.D. No. 1083.
Art. 143. Original jurisdiction. -
(1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity
and filiation arising under this Code;
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the
estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters
of administration or appointment of administrators or executors
regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property;
(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and for the
cancellation or correction of entries in the Muslim Registries
mentioned in Title VI of Book Two of this Code;
(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties
are Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern
their relations; and
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District Court shall
have original jurisdiction over:
(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home,
change of name and commitment of an insane person to an
asylum;
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1
(d) wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief
wherein the parties are Muslims or the property involved belongs
exclusively to Muslims.
xxxx
Art. 155. Jurisdiction. - The Shari'a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:
(1) All cases involving offenses defined and punished under this Code.
 Page 21 of 320
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or
have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes
relating to:
(a) Marriage;
(b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
(c) Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;
(d) Customary dower (mahr);
(e) Disposition and distribution of property upon divorce;
(f) Maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts, (mut'a); and
(g) Restitution of marital rights.
(3) All cases involving disputes relative to communal properties.
Article 78 states that the care and custody of children below seven whose
parents are divorced shall belong to the mother, and the minor above seven
but below the age of puberty may choose the parent with whom he/she wants
to stay.
A distinction must be made between case for divorce wherein the issue of
custody is an ancillary issue and a case where custody is the main issue. In the
former, jurisdiction lies with ShCC while the latter with ShDC.
3 September 23, 2015
G.R. NOS. 178382-83
CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC., Petitioner, vs.
JOSEPH BASSO, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
DOCTRIN Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-
E of-laws case may assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the
following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the
parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3)
that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
All these requisites are present here.
FACTS Petitioner Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign corporation (US)
with license to do business in the Philippines. Mr. Keith R. Braden (Mr.
Braden), Managing Director-Asia of Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental),
offered Basso the position of General Manager of the Philippine Branch of
Continental. Basso accepted the offer. Sometime after CMI took over the
Philippine operations of Continental, Basso received a letter from Mr. Ralph
Schulz (Mr. Schulz), who was then CMI’s Vice President of Marketing and
Sales, informing Basso that he has agreed to work in CMI as a consultant on
an "as needed basis" effective February 1, 1996 to July 31, 1996. Basso wrote a
counter-proposal but was rejected and thus terminated his employment.
Basso filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Moral and Exemplary
Damages against CMI. Alleging the presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
CMI and the subject matter of the controversy. Labor Arbiter granted the
Motion to Dismiss. Applying the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the Labor
Arbiter held that the terms and provisions of the employment contract show
that the parties did not intend to apply our Labor Code (Presidential Decree
No. 442). The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract
was executed in the US "since the letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead
and the acceptance of Complainant was returned there." Thus, applying the
doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply. Also, applying lex loci
contractus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to apply
Philippine laws. More specifically, the Philippine law on taxes and the Labor
Code were not intended by the parties to apply, otherwise Par. 7 on the
payment by Complainant U.S. Federal and Home State income taxes, and
Pars. 22/23 on termination by 30-day prior notice, will not be there. NLRC
agreed with the Labor Arbiter that Basso was dismissed for just and valid
causes on the ground of breach of trust and loss of confidence. However, the
NLRC found that CMI denied Basso the required due process notice in his
dismissal. CA reversed and ruled that there was illegal dismissal. CMI
maintains that there is a conflict-of-laws issue and alleges that the existence
of foreign elements calls for the application of US laws and the doctrines of
lex loci celebrationis (the law of the place of the ceremony), lex loci contractus
(law of the place where a contract is executed), and lex loci intentionis (the
intention of the parties as to the law that should govern their agreement) rule
of forum non conveniens should be applied to determine the propriety of the
assumption of jurisdiction by the labor tribunals.
ISSUE W/N Labor arbiter has jurisdiction
RULING There is a conflict-of-laws issue that must be settled to determine proper
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the case. Where the
facts establish the existence of foreign elements, the case presents a conflict-
of-laws issue. The foreign element in a case may appear in different forms,
such as in this case, where one of the parties is an alien and the other is
domiciled in another state. In resolving the conflicts problem, courts should
ask the following questions:
1. "Under the law, do I have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties to this case?
2. "If the answer is yes, is this a convenient forum to the parties, in light of
the facts?
3. "If the answer is yes, what is the conflicts rule for this particular
problem?
4. "If the conflicts rule points to a foreign law, has said law been properly
pleaded and proved by the one invoking it?
5. "If so, is the application or enforcement of the foreign law in the forum
one of the basic exceptions to the application of foreign law? In short, is
there any strong policy or vital interest of the forum that is at stake in
this case and which should preclude the application of foreign law?
This case stemmed from an illegal dismissal complaint. The Labor Code,
under Article 217, clearly vests original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
 Page 22 of 320
decide cases involving termination disputes to the Labor Arbiter. Considering
that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter of this case, these tribunals may proceed to try the case
even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a
foreign forum, this being an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country
where the case is filed. The next question is whether the local forum is the
convenient forum in light of the facts of the case. We disagree.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-
of-laws case may assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the
following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the
parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3)
that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
All these requisites are present here.
Basso may conveniently resort to our labor tribunals as he and CMI had
physical presence in the Philippines during the duration of the trial. CMI has
a Philippine branch, while Basso, before his death, was residing here.
Thus, it could be reasonably expected that no extraordinary measures were
needed for the parties to make arrangements in advocating their respective
cases.
The next question is what law should apply in resolving this case. The choice-
of-law issue in a conflict-of-laws case seeks to answer the following important
questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some
of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent
should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. These questions are
entirely different from the question of jurisdiction that only seeks to answer
whether the courts of a state where the case is initiated have jurisdiction to
enter a judgment. As such, the power to exercise jurisdiction does not
automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. An
essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting
factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual
relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting fact or
point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place
of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. We hold that the "test factors,"
"points of contact" or "connecting factors" in this case are the following
(1) The nationality, domicile or residence of Basso;
(2) The seat of CMI;
(3) The place where the employment contract has been made, the locus actus;
(4) The place where the act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties;
(5) The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern
their agreement, the lex loci intentionis; and
(6) The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or
done.52
Applying the foregoing in this case, we conclude that Philippine law is the
applicable law.
4 G.R. No. 193707            December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRIN Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. Insofar
E as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family
Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. Foreign laws do
not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.Under the doctrine of processual presumption,, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
FACTS Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland in 1990 but ended the marriage in
1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland. According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her
son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son. Respondent
came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since
then, have been residing thereat. Petitioner filed a complaint affidavit against
respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the
latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. Respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged. Lower court ruled
that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national
law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to give
support to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A.
9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively
established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support
tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which
mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the
court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the
case should be dismissed.
ISSUE 1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law; and
RULING Petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New
Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. Insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the
same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies
to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties. The obligation to give support to a child is a matter
 Page 23 of 320
that falls under family rights and duties. He is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippine law. In international law, the party who wants to
have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of
provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of
the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same. In view of respondent’s failure to prove the
national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.
5 G.R. No. 205487            November 12, 2014
ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner, vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
DOCTRIN Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property. Matters concerning the
E title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while
issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by
South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
FACTS Respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms.
Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking
slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam
Kang (Kang), a Korean national. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed
to reduce the price to ₱2,800,000.00. Suzuki issued Kang 2 BPI checks. Soon
after, Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and
commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles
to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez
(Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal
demands, Kang failed to deliver. Suzuki received a letter from Orion’s counsel
stating that Kang obtained another loan in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00.
When Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pago  in favor of Orion
covering Unit No. 536. Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages against Kang and Orion.RTC ruled infavor of Suzuki. Orion’s
petition is based on the following grounds/arguments: The Deed of Sale
executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any
conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both
spouses
ISSUE W/N the sale is valid
RULING It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively
subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility.
Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all
rights over them have their natural center of gravity there. All matters
concerning the title and disposition ofreal property are determined by what is
known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a
title canpass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can
be gained or lost. This general principle includes all rules governing the
descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect
and construction of wills and other conveyances, including the capacity of the
person making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its
nature may be. property relations between spouses are governed principally
by the national law of the spouses.26 However, the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The
foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.27 He is presumed to know
only domestic or the law of the forum.28
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country inwhich the record
is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. — Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court. Orion, unfortunately failed
to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It
merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not
qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no
showing that it was properly authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required
under Section 24 of Rule 132. Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of
presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play, i.e.,
where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
(SABER)
 Page 24 of 320
6 G.R. No. 195432               August 27, 2014
EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.
DOCTRIN Judicial recognition of foreign divorce
E
FACTS On 16 September 2001, petitioner Edelina Ando (Edelina) married Yuichiro
Kobayashi (Kobayashi), a Japanese National, in a civil wedding solemnized at
Pampanga. On 16 September 2004, Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was
granted under Japanese laws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with
Edelina. The Divorce Certificate duly issued by Consulate-General of Japan
and duly authenticated by DFA Manila. The divorce certificate was duly
registered with the Office of Civil Registry of Manila. Believing in good faith
that the divorce capacitated her to remarry, Edelina married Masatomi Y.
Ando (Ando) on 13 September 2005. On 27 November 2005, Kobayashi
married Ryo Miken. When Edelina applied for the renewal of her Philippine
passport to indicate her surname with Ando, she was told that the same
cannot be issued until she can prove by competent court decision that her
marriage with Ando is valid.
Therefore, on 29 October 2010, Edelina filed with the RTC a Petition for
Declaratory Relief. She impleaded the DFA and prayed for: (a) declaration of
validity of marriage between Edelina and Ando; (b) declaration of Edelina’s
entitlement to issuance of passport; (c) directing the DFA to honor
petitioner’s marriage to her husband Ando.
ISSUE Whether Edelina’s second marriage may be recognized.
RULING No. Petitioner should have filed a petition for the judicial recognition of her
foreign divorce from her first husband. In Garcia vs Recio, the Court has ruled
that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognize in Philippine
jurisdiction provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Both the divorce decree and governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven since our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment. While it has also been ruled in
Republic vs Orbecido III that a petition for the authority to remarry filed
before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, the
Court is still unable to grant the prayer since there appeared to be insufficient
proof or evidence presented on record of the validity of divorce decree under
that national law. Any declaration as to the validity of the decree can only be
made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree
and the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper
forum.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to
petitioner's recourse to the proper remedies available.
7 G.R. No. 188289               August 20, 2014
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
DOCTRIN Doctrine of Processual Presumption – The foreign law, whenever applicable,
E should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be
presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum. / Art. 16
FACTS David Noveras (David) and Leticia Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3
December 1988 in Quezon City. They resided in California, USA where they
acquire American citizenship. They then begot two children. During their
marriage, they acquired properties in the Philippines and in the USA. David
was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse. Due
to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in
2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2M.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition
for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA.
The court granted the petition. It granted to Leticia the custody of her two
children as well as the couple’s properties in USA.Upon issuance of the
decree, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property
before RTC of Baler, Aurora.
The trial court regarded the petition as petition for liquidation of property
since the marriage was already dissolved. It classified their property relation
as absolute community due to absence of marriage settlement before the
marriage. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of
processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court
cannot take judicial notice of US law since the parties did not submit any
proof of their national law. The court awarded the properties in the
Philippines to David, subject to the payment of children’s legitimes.
ISSUE 1. Whether or not the marriage was dissolved.
2. Whether or not the Philippine courts acquired jurisdiction over the
California properties.
RULING 1.
No. The Court quoted its decision in Corpuz vs Sto Tomas, where it ruled:
“The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, ‘no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
 Page 25 of 320
of another country’. This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself
or herself…”The requirements of presenting the foreign decree and the
national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence (Rule
132, Sections 24-25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 b). Under Section 24 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the record of public documents of a foreign
sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof.
Based on the records only, divorce decree was presented in evidence. The
required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as pertinent
California law on divorce was not presented. In this case, it appears
that there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption, the
recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because divorce is not
recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines.
The Court then ruled that the petition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property should be granted, which in effect, dissolved the
absolute community regime. [See: Article 135 (5) and (6), Article 99 (4),
Family Code].
(Doctrine of Processual Presumption – The foreign law, whenever applicable,
should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be
presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.)
2.
No. Article 16 of the Civil Code states that the real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus, in this
case, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties. (Under
Article 102, liquidation follows the dissolution of absolute community
regime).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
8 G.R. No. 171914            July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z.
LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
DOCTRIN Nationality Rule / Divorce / Bigamy / Co-ownership
E
FACTS Atty. Juan Luces Luna (Atty. Luna) married Eugenia Zaballera-Luna
(Eugenia) on September 10, 1947. They had seven children. In February 1966,
they agreed to live apart and to separation of property, to which end, they
entered into a written agreement dated November 12, 1975. On January 12,
1976, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican
Republic. Then, he married Soledad Lavadia (Soledad) in the said country.
Thereafter, they returned to the Philippines and lived as husband and wife
until 1987.
Sometime in 1992, the law firm (Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko) to
which Atty. Luna was a partner was dissolved. The partnership owned a
517.52 sqm condominium unit in Makati City. The partners agreed that Atty.
Luna’s share over the condominium unit would be 25/100. Thereafter, Atty.
Luna established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato Dela Cruz
and used a portion of the condominium unit as their office until the death of
Atty. Luna in July 1997.
After such death, Atty. Luna’s condominium, office furniture and equipment
found in the condominium were taken over by Gregorio Luna (son of Atty.
Luna with Eugenia). He then leased out the said portion of the unit belonging
to his father to Atty. Dela Cruz, who established another law firm.
These properties became the subject of complaint filed by Soledad against
heirs of Atty. Luna with the RTC Makati on September 10, 1999. Complaint
alleged that these properties were acquired during the existence of their
marriage through their joint efforts. Since they had no children, Soledad
became co-owner of the said properties upon death of Atty. Luna to the extent
of 3/4 pro-indiviso share consisting of here ½ share in the property plus her
½ share in the net estate of Atty. Luna which was bequeathed to her in Atty.
Luna’s last will and testament. She alleged that Gregorio Luna excluded her
from her share in the estate.       
She prayed that she be declared owner of the ¾ portion of said properties;
that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of rentals on the unit
pertaining to Soledad’s share be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to
preserve and administer the said properties; and that the heirs of Atty. Luna
be ordered to pay attorney’s fees and costs of the suit to Soledad.
The trial court adjudged that share in the condominium unit was acquired by
Juan Luna through sole industry. It found that plaintiff had no right as owner
or under any concept over the unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry if Deeds of Makati with respect to
the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from “JUAN LUCES
LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna” to “JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Eugenia Zaballero Luna”. However, plaintiff was declared the owner of the
books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, and Federal Supreme Court
Reports found in the unit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the 25/100 pro-indiviso share in
the condominium unit was acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of
 Page 26 of 320
Atty. Luna while of marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia was subsisting,
therefore, Soledad had no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit. The heirs of Atty. Luna and Eugenia were also declared
owner of the books.
ISSUE Whether the divorce had validly dissolved the first marriage.
RULING The first marriage was solemnized at the time when the Spanish Civil Code
was in effect. The Spanish Civil Code adopted the nationality rule, which
states that the Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition, and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, although living abroad. The Civil Code continued to follow
this rule. Pursuant to this rule, the Philippine laws governed this case because
both Atty. Luna and Eugenia remained Philippine citizens until the death of
Atty. Luna. From the time of the celebration on September 10, 1947 until the
present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in
the Philippines. Therefore, the divorce decree obtained in the Dominican
Republic did not dissolve the first marriage.
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or
subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous marriage is
considered void ab initio.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void
ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the
bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably
with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof
to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became
imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.
9 G.R. No. 189538            February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
DOCTRIN Clerical errors vs. Substantial errors
E
FACTS Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate
of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage
with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she
was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National. She denied
having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the
alleged husband. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the
Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. During
trial, she completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she
revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had
met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House.
She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a
travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to
obtain a passport. A document examiner testified that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
The RTC held in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar.
           
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision
on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation
of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in
effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
      
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding
required. Considering that respondents identity was used by an unknown
person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible
for respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in
effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
RULING Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
 Page 27 of 320
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be
adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the
Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108,
with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding. "An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the
trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity
to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or
motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure
laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons
who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or
correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file
their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as
the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections
and changes in entries of the civil register.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente
lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to
determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369),
as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may
be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
NO - While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to
determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been
given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had
already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not
the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate
of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in
any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated
August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
10 G.R. No. 196049            June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DOCTRIN Proper party / Lex nationalii
E
FACTS Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23
January 2004.
The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family
Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of
the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and
to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
 Page 28 of 320
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
RTC – Dismiss – only Maekara or Mahinay can file the petition – AM 02-11-
10 SC
ISSUE (1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his
or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
RULING 1. No, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy.
2. (Yes) Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in
the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction
of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the
civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive
right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. In any case,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by
limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Yes - The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is
the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
(ENRIQUEZ, K)
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void
from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone
can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in
the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more
reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the
purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
3.Yes, Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts
to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here
a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law."
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the
rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to
repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize
the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already
"presumptive evidence of a right between the parties."
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and
the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107,
Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
 Page 29 of 320
11 [G.R. No. 183622.  February 8, 2012.]
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, petitioner, vs. LOUELLA A.
CATALAN-LEE, respondent
DOCTRIN Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
E only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce,
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved.
FACTS Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly
obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he
contracted a second marriage Merope Enriquez (petitioner).
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Petitioner filed with the RTC (Spec Pro No.228) of Burgos, Pangasinan a
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. While the case was pending,
respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his
first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC (SP No 232). Hence, the 2
cases were consolidated.
Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the
estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a
criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner by Felicitas Amor, the
first wife, alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando
despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.  The trial
court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since
that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage
between him and petitioner was not valid.
RTC: dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed
by petitioner and granted that of private respondent.
Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the
marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting
when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her
acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial
court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration.
CA: Petition was dismissed.
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters
of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to
administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate,
like any other public document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was
acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal
marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before
the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper
proceedings.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. She alleged that the
reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was
acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage
with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of
bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
ISSUE WON the marriage between Merope and Orlando was valid and the letter
administration be granted in favor of Merope.
RULING At the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, under
the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of foreign nationality.
This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 7
wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorce, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage
In Garcia v. Recio, the burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
 Page 30 of 320
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the
validity of Orlando's divorce under the laws of the United States and the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to
remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to
establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent
marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate.
Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is
undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with
Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the
divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20
June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of
Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
12 [G.R. No. 186571.  August 11, 2010.]
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and
The SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
DOCTRIN The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with
E the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of petitioner. The
starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country."  This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together
with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on
the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
FACTS Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.
January 18, 2005 - Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding.
Upon his return to Philippines, he was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. He returned to Canada and filed a petition
for divorce.
The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert's
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
month later, on January 8, 2006. 5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Intending to remarry, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn's marriage certificate. But NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
RTC: denied the petition.
The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the
action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen.
It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to
be able to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent
behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; the provision
was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse."
ISSUE WON the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree. NO
WON the foreign divorce decree be recognized in our court - YES
RULING ISSUE 1:
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid
 Page 31 of 320
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to
the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in
limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision.
ISSUE 2:
However, the Court qualified the above conclusion — i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens
— with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient
basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC
for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48.            Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a)       In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b)       In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment
or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together
with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on
the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law
of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,  but failed
to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we
can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC
to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian
divorce law.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and
REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag
City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil
Registrar General. No costs.
13 G.R. No. 155635  November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, respondents.
DOCTRIN Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of
E divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had
been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure)
 Page 32 of 320
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
FACTS Vicente and Rebecca were married in 1979. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate identified Rebecca to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam,
USA. In 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican
Republic, pursuant thereto, the Dominican court issued a divorce decree.
Subsequently, Rebecca filed with the RTC Muntinlupa a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of
divorce.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her
Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
RTC held that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best
taken up during actual trial. On appeal, CA effectively dismissed Rebecca’s
case for failure to state a cause of action; anchored on the ground of res
judicata
ISSUE WON the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal
effects?
RULING Yes.
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be
one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The
following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American
citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus
soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to
those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an
American passport. Hence, when Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not
a Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One.
Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the
United States of America, a country which allows divorce.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven
as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.  Be this as it
may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured
the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of
the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied,
but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the
jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings
on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both
appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect
to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in
Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of
divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had
been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive
upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a
foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the
foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain
Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign
divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are
valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice
Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not,
standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at
the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would
come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the
reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.
 Page 33 of 320
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall
be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente
is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In
plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each
other.
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be
subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for
instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to Rebecca.
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code. In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the
twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Both elements obtain in the instant case.
14 Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
DOCTRIN The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
E 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
FACTS In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva. In 1986,
Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same.
The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. In this petition, the OSG
raises a pure question of law: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN
REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed
marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no
law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of
legislation and not of judicial determination.
ISSUE WON  Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
where one later acquired alien citizenship and obtained a divorce decree?
RULING Yes.
Section 26, par 2. Provides: Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
 Page 34 of 320
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
15 [G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DOCTRIN The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a
E valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
FACTS Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates in Bohol; however, they
lost contacts for a while, but after receiving a card from Barrete and various
exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990.
Subsequently, Lucia went back to Canada for work. In 1991, she filed petition
for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted.
In 1992, Lucio married Lumbago. He then filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony
that transpired between him and Lucia. In turn Lucia charged Lucio with
bigamy.
Arraignment was suspended in view of the civil case already pending, which,
posed a prejudicial question in the criminal case of Bigamy. Lucio pleaded
not guilty, he claims that his marriage with Lucia was void ab initio, and as
such, he contracted second marriage in good faith. RTC and CA held that the
divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian Court could not be
accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Art. 15 of the Civil Code,
and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction.
Under Art. 17 of the same Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be
rendered ineffectual by a judgement promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Further, subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia could
not acquit Lucio in the Bigamy case pending against him. The reason is that
what is sought to be punished by Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the
act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been
dissolved.
RTC of Bohol found accused Lucio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy. CA affirmed
ISSUE WON Lucio should have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with
Lucia before his second marriage.
RULING No.
There was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia
by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other
words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law,
never married.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the
time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of
 Page 35 of 320
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained
where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v.
Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already
celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as
void.[26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage
certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by
a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely
signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might
be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
(ENRIQUEZ, M)
16 WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ,
HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati
RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
DOCTRIN Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
E our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.
FACTS Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany,
married respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February
14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne
and Alexandra Kristine.
On August 28, 1996, Rodriguez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC of Makati. Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it
was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First
Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental
custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce
decree had already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public
Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case
proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and
the distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga
partially set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of
support and custody of their children.
ISSUE Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she
assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.
RULING No
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries
are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on
custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment,
such as the award of custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be
shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is
basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of
Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in
the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s
participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain
unclear.
The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the
proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office. 26
Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent
had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings. More importantly, the
divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code
provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the
marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the
issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private
respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was
 Page 36 of 320
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the
children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth
Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration
in all questions concerning his care and custody.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149,
issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over
the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the
care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine Roehr
17 GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
DOCTRIN A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
E provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence.
FACTS Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen,on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
"Certificate of Australian Citizenship". Petitioner, Grace – a Filipina – and
Rederick were married on January 12, 1994. In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino”.
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her. She claimed that she learned
of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
Respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to
marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the
suit for the declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure
a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
"marriage had irretrievably broken down."
Respondent prayed that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it
stated no cause of action.
ISSUE Whether or not the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent
ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
RULING No.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce
is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law." Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters.
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving
the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. It is well-
settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know
by reason of their judicial function.The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative.
 Page 37 of 320
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was
then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his
status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out
that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that,
then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon,
Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated
January 12, 1994.
The Supreme Court remands the case to the RTC of Cabanatuan City.
18 IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,  vs.HON. CORONA IBAY-
SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City
Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
DOCTRIN In prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file
E the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. It necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Thus,
the spouse who already obtained a valid divorce in his country has no legal
standing to commence an adultery case against the other spouse.    to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
FACTS On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino
citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national,
were married. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila
where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the
spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage
and that they had been living apart since April, 1982.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal
Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally
and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the
dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
Five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that,
while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983".
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice
asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the
cases against her be dismissed. The petition is anchored on the main ground
that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery,
which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint."
ISSUE Whether private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the
ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as
decree of divorce was already issued.
RULING No.
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the
time of the filing of the criminal action.
In this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the
latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned.  Thus, under the same consideration
and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and
has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture
that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
19 ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,  vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO,
 Page 38 of 320
JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
DOCTRIN Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
E Philippines, provided they are valid in their national law.
FACTS Petitioner Alice is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard is a citizen of the US. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines and
they begot two children. Subsequently, the parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982 and the petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this
time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner's
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property
of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting
of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982.
ISSUE Whether or not the foreign divorce between petitioner Alice and private
respondent Richard in Nevada is binding in the Philippines,   Enterprises," are wholesalers of softdrinks in Quezon City.
RULING Yes.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by
a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law.
When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall
not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby
ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
E.
1 COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE
R. BERNARDO AND LILIBETH R. BERNARDO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER
THE NAME AND STYLE "JOLLY BEVERAGE ENTERPRISES,"
Respondents.
DOCTRIN The use of unjust, oppressive, or high-handed business methods resulting in
E unfair competition gives a right of action to the injured party under Article 28
of the Civil Code.
FACTS Petitioner Coca-Cola is a domestic corporation engaged in the large-scale
manufacture, sale, and distribution of beverages around the country. On the
other hand, respondents, doing business under the name "Jolly Beverage
The business relationship between the parties commenced in 1987 when
petitioner designated respondents as its distributor.The parties formally
entered into an exclusive dealership contract for three years. Under the
Agreement, petitioner would extend developmental assistance to respondents
in the form of cash assistance and trade discount incentives. For their part,
respondents undertook to sell petitioner's products exclusively, meet the sales
quota of 7,000 cases per month, and assist petitioner in its marketing
efforts.11
For 13 years, the parties enjoyed a good and harmonious business
partnership. While the contracts contained a clause for breach, it was never
enforced.
Sometime in late 1998 or early 1999, before the contract expired, petitioner
required respondents to submit a list of their customers on the pretext that it
would formulate a policy defining its territorial dealership in Quezon City. It
assured respondents that their contract would be renewed for a longer period,
provided that they would submit the list. However, despite their compliance,
the promise did not materialize.
Respondents discovered that in February 1999, petitioner started to reach out
to the persons whose names were on the list. Respondents also received
reports that their delivery trucks were being trailed by petitioner's agents; and
 Page 39 of 320
that as soon as the trucks left, the latter would approach the former's
customers. Further, respondents found out that petitioner had employed a
different pricing scheme, such that the price given to distributors was
significantly higher than that given to supermarkets. It also enticed direct
buyers and sari-sari store owners in the area with its "Coke Alok" promo, in
which it gave away one free bottle for every case purchased. It further
engaged a store adjacent to respondents' warehouse to sell the former's
products at a substantially lower price.
Respondents claimed that because of these schemes, they lost not only their
major customers - such as Peach Blossoms, May Flower Restaurant, Saisaki
Restaurant, and Kim Hong Restaurant  but also small stores, such as the
canteen in the hospital where respondent Jose Bernardo worked. They
admitted that they were unable to pay deliveries worth P449,154.
(DAVID)
Respondents filed a Complaint for damages, alleging that the acts of
petitioner constituted dishonesty, bad faith, gross negligence, fraud, and
unfair competition in commercial enterprise.
Petitioner denied the allegations. It maintained that it had obtained a list of
clients through surveys, and that promotional activities or developmental
strategies were implemented only after the expiration of the Agreements. It
opined that the filing of the complaint was a mere ploy resorted to by
respondents to evade the payment of the deliveries.
ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages for abuse of rights and
unfair competition under the Civil Code?
RULING Yes.
Both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner had employed oppressive and
high-handed schemes to unjustly limit the market coverage and diminish the
investment returns of respondents. The CA summarized its findings as
follows:
This [cut-throat competition] is precisely what appellant did in order to take
over the market: directly sell its products to or deal them off to competing
stores at a price substantially lower than those imposed on its wholesalers. As
a result, the wholesalers suffered losses, and in [respondents'] case, laid off a
number of employees and alienated the patronage of its major customers
including small-scale stores.
It must be emphasized that petitioner is not only a beverage giant, but also
the manufacturer of the products; hence, it sets the price. In addition, it took
advantage of the information provided by respondents to facilitate its
takeover of the latter's usual business area. Distributors like respondents,
who had assisted petitioner in its marketing efforts, suddenly found
themselves with fewer customers. Other distributors were left with no choice
but to fold.
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the
award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever another person
commits an act in violation of some legal provision; or an act which, though
not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain
rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved. Meanwhile, the use of unjust,
oppressive, or high-handed business methods resulting in unfair competition
also gives a right of action to the injured party. This is provided under Article
28 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
2 G.R. No. 189516,                June 08, 2016
EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, JEFFREN M. OTAMIAS AND MINOR
JEMWEL M. OTAMIAS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER EDNA
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY COL. VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PENSION AND GRATUITY
MANAGEMENT CENTER (PGMC) OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DOCTRIN The benefit of exemption from execution of pension benefits is a statutory
E right that may be waived, especially in order to comply with a husband's duty
to provide support under Article XV of the 1987 Constitution and the Family
Code.
FACTS  Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel
Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel Otamias) were married on June 16, 1978
and had five (5) children.
 On September 2000, Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due to his
alleged infidelity. Their children remained with Edna.
 On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel
Otamias before the Provost Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Edna demanded monthly support equivalent to 75% of
Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits.
 Colonel Otamias executed an Affidavit, stating: “xxx That at this
point, I can only commit 50% of my retirement benefits to be pro-rated
among my wife and five (5) children; That in order to implement this
compromise, I am willing to enter into Agreement with my wife covering
the same; xxx”
 On February 26, 2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of
Assignment where he waived 50% of his salary and pension benefits in
favor of Edna and their children. The Deed of Assignment was considered
by the parties as a compromise agreement.
 Page 40 of 320
 The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006. Edna alleged
that AFP suddenly decided not to honor the agreement.
 In a letter dated April 3, 2006, the AFP Pension and Gratuity
Management Center (AFP PGMC) informed Edna that a court order was
required for the AFP PGMC to recognize the Deed of Assignment.
 In another letter dated April 17, 2006, the AFP PGMC reiterated that
it could not act on Edna's request to receive a portion of Colonel Otamias'
pension "unless ordered by [the] appropriate court."
 Edna filed before the RTC of CDO, Misamis Oriental an action for
support. Colonel Otamias was declared in default for failure to file a
responsive pleading despite order of the trial court. RTC ruled in favor of
Edna and ordered the automatic deduction of the amount of support
from the monthly pension of Colonel Otamias.
 The AFP Finance Center (AFP Finance Center), through the Office of
the Judge Advocate General, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution
and argued that the AFP Finance Center's duty to disburse benefits is
ministerial. It releases benefits only upon the AFP PGMC's approval.
 The trial court denied the Motion to Quash and held that: “Under
the law and existing jurisprudence, the "right to support" is practically
equivalent to the "right to life." The "right to life" always takes precedence
over "property rights." The "right to support/life" is also a substantive
right which always takes precedence over technicalities/procedural rules.
It being so, technical rules must yield to substantive justice. Besides, this
Court's Decision dated February 27, 2007 has long acquired finality, and
as such, is ripe for enforcement/execution.”
 CA – partially nullified the trial court's Decision insofar as it directed
the automatic deduction of support from the pension benefits of Colonel
Otamias.
o CA discussed that Section 31 of PD 1638, otherwise known as the AFP
Military Personnel Retirement and Separation Decree of 1979, "provides
for the exemption of the monthly pension of retired military personnel
from execution and attachment xxx" while Rule 39, Section 13 of the ROC
provides: “SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be
exempt from execution: xxx (1) The right to receive legal support, or
money or property obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity
from the Government[.]”
o CA also cited Pacific Products, Inc. vs. Ong wherein it held that: “Moneys
sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the
disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the
defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof.
And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it.”
o In addition, the AFP PGMC was not impleaded as a party in the action for
support; thus, it is not bound by the Decision.
 Edna’s contention
o Deed of Assignment Colonel Otamias executed Is valid and legal.
o Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 "does not include
support";hence, the retirement benefits of Colonel Otamias can be
executed upon.
o CA erred in granting respondent's Petition because it effectively rendered
the Deed of Assignment of no force and effect.
o AFP PGMC had already recognized the validity of the agreement and had
made payments to them until it suddenly stopped payment.
o They argue that the phrase "while in the active service" in Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638 refers to the "time when the retired officer
incurred his accountabilities in favor of a private creditor[,]" who is a
third person. The phrase also "serves as a timeline designed to separate
the debts incurred by the retired officer after his retirement from those
which he incurred prior thereto."
o The accountabilities referred to in Section 31 of Presidential Decree No.
1638 refer to debts or loans, not to support.
 AFP’s contention
o It was not a party to the case filed by Edna, et al. Thus, "it cannot be
compelled to release part of the monthly pension benefits of retired
Colonel Otamias in favor of [Edna, et al].
o Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 and Rule 39, Section 13(1) of the
Rules of Court support the Court of Appeals Decision that Colonel
Otamias' pension benefits are exempt from execution.
o Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 "does not deprive the survivor/s
of a retired or separated officer or enlisted man of their right to support."
Rather, "[w]hat is prohibited is for respondent [AFP PGMC] to segregate
a portion of the pension benefit in favor of the retiree's family while still
in the hands of the AFP".
ISSUE WON Colonel Otamias’ pension benefits can be executed upon for the
financial support of his legitimate family.
RULING  SC granted the petition.
 Article 6 of the Civil Code provides: “Article 6. Rights may be waived,
unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.
 The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court as a voluntary
and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal
right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver
the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender,
by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that
such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its
benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment
of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming
it.
 In determining whether a statutory right can be waived, this Court is
guided by the following pronouncement: “[T]he doctrine of waiver
extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the word
'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person
may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right
or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which
 Page 41 of 320
he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute,
or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in
the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the
rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege
is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the
principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to
waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed
with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without
detriment to the community at large[.]”
 When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he
effectively waived his right to claim that his retirement benefits are
exempt from execution. The right to receive retirement benefits belongs
to Colonel Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement
benefits does not infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects
the right of his family to receive support.
 In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law
between the parties, and its provisions should be respected in the absence
of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or defrauded in executing
it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between parties and
parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
 The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not
contrary to law; it was in accordance with the provisions on support in
the Family Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not to
recognize its validity.
 Based on the Family Code, Colonel Otamias is obliged to give
support to his family.
 However, he retired in 2003, and his sole source of income is his
pension. Judgments in actions for support are immediately executory, yet
under Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, his pension cannot be
executed upon.
 However, considering that Colonel Otamias has waived a portion of
his retirement benefits through his Deed of Assignment, resolution on the
conflict between the civil code provisions on support and Section 31 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638 should be resolved in a more appropriate
case.
3 G.R. No. 171303       January 20, 2016
ELIZABETH L. DIAZ, Petitioner,  vs. GEORGINA R. EN CANTO, ERNESTO
G. TABUJARA, GEMINO H. ABAD and UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DOCTRIN The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
E amount to a legal wrong. Situations like this have been appropriately
denominated damnum absque injuria.
FACTS  Elizabeth L. Diaz has been in the service of U.P. since 1963.
 During the second semester for Academic Year 1987-1988, she was a
full time member of the faculty and taught 12 units on full load. After 2 to
3 weeks of teaching, she applied for sick leave effective November 23,
1987 until March 1, 1988.
 On May 3, 1988, Diaz filed a letter-application directly with U.P.'s
"Office of the President (Abueva) for sabbatical leave with pay for one (1)
year effective June 1988 to May 1989, for "rest, renewal and study."
 In her May 2, 1988 letter, Diaz indicated her unwillingness to teach.
Considering the CMC's experience with Diaz who dropped her courses in
the previous semester, Lazaro, Chair of the Broadcast Department,
deleted Diaz's name in the final schedule of classes for the 1st semester of
A Y 1988-89 beginning June 6, 1988.
 Incidentally, Diaz received her salary for June 1988, indicating that
her sabbatical might be approved.
 Diaz’s salary was not given to her effective July 1, 1988 until further
notice considering that her sabbatical application has not yet been
approved and that she did not teach that semester. Consequently, Diaz's
name was deleted in the payroll from September 1988 to January 1989.
 On Diaz's request to teach for that semester, AY 1988-89, the Vice
Chancellor instructed that "Until Prof. Diaz officially reports for duty,
accomplishes the Certificate of Report for Duty, and the Dean of CMC
confirms her date of actual report for duty, she is considered absent
without official leave (AWOL) for the University."
 While Diaz was able to teach during the second semester of AY 1988-
89, she was not able to claim her salaries for her refusal to submit the
Report for Duty Form. She received her salaries for June to July 15, 1989,
but could no longer claim her salary after July 15, 1989, when Encanto
reminded the University Cashier, in a letter dated July 26, 1989, that Diaz
had to "accomplish the Report for Duty Form to entitle her to salaries and
make official her return to the service of the University." Diaz's name was
subsequently included in the payroll starting July 1990, when she
submitted a Report for Duty after her return from compulsory summer
leave.
 On January 3, 1989, Diaz filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against officials of UP for the alleged violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019, involving the legality of a Report for Duty Form as a
prerequisite to the payment of her salary.
 Ombudsman (May 4, 1989):
o Considering that Prof. Diaz was rightfully considered on leave without
pay during the first semester of A Y 1988-1989, to make official her return
to the service of the University, it is advised that she accomplish the
Report for Duty Form which will then be the basis to establish the date of
her actual return to the service.
o However, if possible, the University authorities can perhaps dispense
with the requirement and pay her salaries for actual services rendered
from November 3, 1988.
 On July 18, 1989, Diaz instituted a complaint against U.P., Abueva,
Encanto, Tabujara and Abad with the RTC praying that the latter be
adjudged, jointly and severally to pay her damages.
 Page 42 of 320
 She claimed, among others, that [respondents] conspired together as
joint tortfeasors, in not paying her salaries from July 1, 1988 in the first
semester of academic year 1988-89, for the entire period when her
sabbatical application was left unresolved, as well as the salaries she
earned from teaching in the second semester from November 1988 to
May 1989. She likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
 In a Decision dated April 1 7, 1996, the R TC ruled in favor of
petitioner Diaz. The RTC, ruling that a sabbatical leave is not a right but a
privilege, held that petitioner Diaz was entitled to such privilege and
found that the delay in the resolution of her application was unreasonable
and unconscionable.
 CA – reversed RTC decision. It found neither negligence nor bad
faith on the part of the respondents in their denial of petitioner Diaz's
sabbatical leave application and in withholding her salaries. It
emphasized that a sabbatical leave is not a right which could be
demanded at will, even by petitioner Diaz who has been a veteran
professor of 24 years at U.P. CA said that the eventual denial of her
sabbatical leave application was not actionable in view of the fact that (i)
it would be unfair to impute negligence to respondents in the regular
discharge of their functions; and (ii) assuming that there was delay in the
resolution of her application, she herself caused such delay. CA also held
that petitioner Diaz's own recalcitrance and defiance to comply with
certain documentary requirements was the reason her salaries were
withheld.
ISSUE WON respondents acted in bad faith when they resolved petitioner Diaz's
application for sabbatical leave and withheld her salaries.
RULING  Petitioner Diaz's complaint for recovery of damages before the RTC
was based on the alleged bad faith of the respondents in denying her
application for sabbatical leave vis-a-vis Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code.
 Articles 19 and 20 read as follows: “Art. 19. Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” And
“Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.”
 Article 19 of the Civil Code "prescribes a 'primordial limitation on all
rights' by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise
thereof."
 Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when the following elements
are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
 This Court, expounding on the concept of bad faith under Article 19,
held: “Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of
the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is
presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it
involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing
of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill
will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite
and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior
and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.”
 In this case, the respondents did not do its duty to resolve petitioner
Diaz's sabbatical leave application with bad faith or malice.
 The Ombudsman and all three courts, starting from the RTC to this
Court, have already established that a sabbatical leave is not a right and
therefore petitioner Diaz cannot demand its grant. It does not matter that
there was only one reason for the denial of her application, as the
approving authorities found that such reason was enough. Also, they have
ruled that the respondents did not act in bad faith when petitioner Diaz's
sabbatical leave application was denied.
 While the RTC declared that petitioner Diaz should have been
granted a sabbatical leave, it is important to note that the RTC awarded
damages to petitioner Diaz merely for the unreasonable and
unconscionable delay in the resolution of her sabbatical leave application,
and not its denial per se.
 Moreover, petitioner Diaz has failed to prove bad faith on the part of
the respondents. There is nothing in the records to show that the
respondents purposely delayed the resolution of her application to
prejudice and injure her.
 On the issue of her salaries, petitioner Diaz is entitled to her
withheld salaries from July 1, 1988 to October 31, 1988, and from
November 1, 1988 to May 31, 1989, and July 16, 1989 to May 31, 1990,
upon submission of the required documents.
 The denial of petitioner Diaz's salaries during the first semester of
Academic Year (AY) 1988-1989 was due to the fact that she did not teach
that semester.
 But when respondent Lazaro removed petitioner Diaz's name from
the final schedule of teaching assignments in CMC for the first semester
of AY 1988-89, it was without petitioner Diaz's prior knowledge.
 While petitioner Diaz was not consulted about the removal of her
name from the class schedule, she did not contest such upon the belief
that her application for sabbatical leave would be approved, as in fact, she
was given her salary in June 1988. As such, this Court believes, in the
interest of equity and fairness, that petitioner Diaz should be entitled to
her salary during the semester when her name was dropped from the
final list of schedule of classes, without her knowledge and consent, and
while action on her application for sabbatical leave was still pending.
 On the matter of her salaries from the second semester of A Y 1988-
89 up until A Y 1989-1990, the respondents legally withheld such for
petitioner Diaz's own refusal to comply with the documentary
requirements of U.P.
 Given that the respondents have not abused their rights, they should
not be held liable for any damages sustained by petitioner Diaz. "The law
 Page 43 of 320
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal wrong. Situations like this have been appropriately
denominated damnum absque injuria."
4 G.R. No. 199601,               November 23, 2015
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW BDO
UNIBANK, INC., Petitioner, v.JOSEPHINE D. GOMEZ, Respondent.
DOCTRIN “[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle
E of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and
to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human' relations and for the maintenance of social order, it
does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
FACTS  Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the Domestic Airport
Branch of the PCIB when a certain Colin R. Harrington opened Savings
Account No. 373-28010-6 with said branch in January 1985.
 Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts dated January 3,
1985, issued by the Bank of New Zealand. The first draft was in the sum
of US$724.57 payable to "C.R. Harrington," while the second draft was in
the sum of US$2,004.76 payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington."
 The PCIB, on the other hand, alleged that it was a certain Sophia
La'O, as a representative of Harrington, who presented the bank drafts
for deposit.
 Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate
supervisor, Eleanor Flores, whether the drafts payable to "Servants
C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the savings account of
Harrington. When Flores answered in the affirmative, and after receiving
from the bank's foreign exchange supervision a Philippine Currency
conversion of the amounts reflected in the drafts, Josephine received the
deposit slip. Thereafter, the deposits were duly entered in Harrington's
savings account.
 On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself
as Harrington withdrew the sums of P45,000.00 and P5,600.00.
Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who made the
withdrawals was an impostor. Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington
P50,600.00 representing the amounts of the bank drafts in his name.
 After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another
memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and liable for
performing acts in violation of established operating procedures. The
memorandum required Josephine to pay the amount of P-50,600.00
through deductions in her salary, allowance, bonuses, and profit sharing
until the amount is fully paid.
 Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its findings that she
was grossly negligent and liable to pay the amount of P50,600.00. During
trial, the RTC found that the PCIB did not even respond to this letter.
 PCIB, however, alleged that it had replied to Josephine's letter, and
explained that she was afforded due process and the deductions made
prior to January 15, 1986, were merely a withholding pending the
investigation.
 On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with
prayer for preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati City. She
claimed that the PCIB had abused its right by gradually deducting from
her salary the amount the bank had to pay Harrington.
 In its May 25, 1999 decision, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Josephine. The RTC considered the PCIB's manner of deducting from the
salary and allowance of Josephine as having been rendered in bad faith
and contrary to morals, good custom, and public policy. This was borne
out by the fact that the PCIB had already deducted from her salary before
Josephine received the memorandum finding her liable for the
P50,600.00. In addition, while there were other individuals involved in
this incident, it appeared that it was only Josephine who was made solely
responsible.
 In its May 23, 2011 decision, the CA affirmed the May 25, 1999 RTC
decision. It held that the PCIB was estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC because it had filed an answer with counterclaims
and even initiated a separate case before a different branch of the RTC. It
upheld the RTC's findings and conclusion in awarding damages and
attorney's fees to Josephine because there was no reason to disturb them.
ISSUE 1. WON CA gravely erred in ruling that its actions were in total and
wanton disregard of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code because the
courts a quo summarily imputed bad faith on how it had treated
Josephine.
2. WON CA gravely erred in awarding moral damages and attorney's
fees to Josephine absent any basis for it while averring that bad faith
cannot be presumed and that Josephine had failed to prove it with clear
and convincing evidence.
RULING  The SC denies the present petition for lack of merit.
 The civil courts have jurisdiction over a case when the cause of
action does not have a reasonable causal connection from the employer-
employee relationship.
 In the present case, Josephine filed a civil complaint for damages
against the PCIB based on how her employer quickly concluded that she
was negligent and hence arbitrarily started to deduct from her salary.
Clearly, without having to dwell on the merits of the case, Josephine
 Page 44 of 320
opted to invoke the jurisdiction of our civil courts because her right to fair
treatment was violated.
 The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil dispute because
it has something to do with Josephine's right under Article 19 of the Civil
Code, and does not involve an existing employer-employee relation
within the meaning of Article 224 of the Labor Code. Josephine's
complaint was, therefore, properly filed with and exclusively cognizable
by the RTC.
 Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties must act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
 The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly known
as the "abuse of right principle."
 The legal sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are
found in Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
 We explained how these two provisions correlate with each other in
GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona: “[Article 19], known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights
but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays
down a rule of conduct for the government of human' relations and for
the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper.”
 While the PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of
negligence, the right must not be exercised unjustly and illegally.
 In the instant case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary
even if the investigation was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a
memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent and requiring her to
pay the amount which the bank erroneously paid to Harrington's
impostor. When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the
finding of negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB
continued to make deductions on Josephine's salary, allowances, and
bonuses.
 The trial court and the CA also noted that while Josephine was
penalized, other employees of the bank involved in the subject
transactions were not. It was Josephine who was made solely responsible
for the loss without giving any basis therefor. It was emphasized that the
subject deposit could not have been received by the bank and entered in
Harrington's savings account without the participation of the other bank
employees. The PCIB could have exercised prudence before taking
oppressive actions against Josephine.
 We find the award of moral damages and attorney's fees in
Josephine's favor proper.
5 G.R. No. 187240               October 15, 2014
CARLOS A. LORIA, Petitioner, vs. LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, JR. Respondent.
DOCTRIN No person should unjustly enrich himself or herself at the expense of another.
E
FACTS  Muñoz alleged that he has been engaged in construction under the
name, "Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr. Construction." In August 2000, Loria
invited Muñoz to advance ₱2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a
₱50,000,000.00 river-dredging project in Guinobatan.
 Loria represented that he would make arrangements such that
Elizaldy Co, owner of Sunwest Construction and Development
Corporation, would turn out to be the lowest bidder for the project.
Elizaldy Co would pay ₱8,000,000.00 to ensure the project’s award to
Sunwest. After the award to Sunwest, Sunwest would subcontract 20% or
₱10,000,000.00 worth of the project to Muñoz.
 Muñoz accepted Loria’s proposal.
 The project to dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in
Guinobatan was subjected to public bidding. The project was awarded to
the lowest bidder, Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation.
 Sunwest allegedly finished dredging the Masarawag and San
Francisco Rivers without subcontracting Muñoz.
 With the project allegedly finished, Muñoz demanded Loria to
return his ₱2,000,000.00. Loria, however, did not return the money.
 Muñoz first charged Loria and Elizaldy Co with estafa. This criminal
case was dismissed by the MTC for lack of probable cause.
 Muñoz then filed the complaint for sum of money.
 Loria admitted receiving ₱481,800.00 from Muñoz but argued that
the complaint did not state a cause of action against him. According to
Loria, he followed up the project’s approval with the Central Office of the
Department of Public Works and Highways as the parties agreed upon.
He was, therefore, entitled to his representation expenses.
 RTC
o Muñoz established with preponderant evidence that Loria received
₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz for a subcontract of the river-dredging
project. Since no part of the project was subcontracted to Muñoz, Loria
must return the ₱2,000,000.00 he received, or he would be "unduly
enriching himself at the expense of [Muñoz]."
o On the claim of forum shopping, the trial court ruled that Loria’s
obligation to return the 2,000,000.00 did not arise from criminal
liability. Muñoz may, therefore, file a civil action to recover his
₱2,000,000.00.
 Page 45 of 320
o As to the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the trial
court denied the prayer for lack of sufficient basis.
 Loria appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Muñoz failed to
establish his receipt of the ₱2,000,000.00. Specifically, Muñoz failed to
establish that he obtained ₱3,000,000.00 from a certain Grace delos
Santos. Loria also appealed the award of attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and exemplary damages for having no basis in fact and in law.
 CA – sustained RTC’s factual findings.
o In ruling that Loria received the net amount of ₱2,000,000.00 from
Muñoz, CA referred to Muñoz’s testimony that he ordered Allied Bank to
release ₱3,000,000.00 from his joint account with Christopher Co to a
certain Grace delos Santos. Loria then obtained the money from delos
Santos and confirmed with Muñoz his receipt of the money. This
testimony was supported by a check voucher the trial court admitted in
evidence. Loria signed this check voucher and acknowledged receiving
₱1,200,000.00 on October 2, 2000 and ₱800,000.00 on January 10,
2001, ora total of ₱2,000,000.00.
o It ruled that Loria must return the money to Muñoz under the principle
of unjust enrichment.
o However, ruled that Muñoz failed to show his right to exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees.
o It affirmed the trial court’s decision but deleted the award of exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. The appellate court likewise denied Loria’s
motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated March 12, 2009.
 Loria’s argument – the principle of unjust enrichment does not
apply in this case. Muñoz paid Loria ₱2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a
government project. The parties’ agreement, therefore, was void for being
contrary to law, specifically, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the
Revised Penal Code, and Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594. The
agreement was likewise contrary to the public policy of public or open
competitive bidding of government contracts. Since the parties’
agreement was void, Loria argues that the parties were in pari delicto,
and Muñoz should not be allowed to recover the money he gave under the
contract.
ISSUE 1. WON Loria initially obtained ₱3,000,000.00 from a certain Grace
delos Santos
2. WON Loria is liable for ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz
RULING We rule for Muñoz and deny Loria’s petition for review on certiorari.
1. Whether Loria initially received 3,000,000.00 is a question of fact
not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. During trial, Muñoz
testified thathe ordered Allied Bank to release ₱3,000,000.00 from his
joint account withChristopher Co to a certain Grace delos Santos. Loria
then obtained the money from delos Santos and confirmed with Muñoz
his receipt of the amount. ₱1,800,000.00 was subsequently returned to
Muñoz, leaving a ₱1,200,000.00 balance with Loria. This testimony was
supported by Exhibit "C," the check voucher where Loria acknowledged
receiving ₱1,200,000.00 from Muñoz. We agree that these pieces of
evidence duly prove Loria’s initial receipt of ₱3,000,000.00.
2. Loria must return Munoz’s ₱2,000,000.00 under the principle of
unjust enrichment.
 Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "every person
who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him."
 There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit
to the loss of another, or when a person retains money orproperty of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience."
 The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a
person must have been benefited without a real or valid basis or
justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another person’s
expense or damage.
 In this case, Loria received ₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz for a
subcontract of a government project. However, contrary to the
parties’ agreement, Muñoz was not subcontracted for the project.
Nevertheless, Loria retained the ₱2,000,000.00.
 Thus, Loria was unjustly enriched. He retained Muñoz’s money
without valid basis or justification. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, Loria must return the ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz.
 Generally, parties to an illegal contract may not recover what they
gave under the contract. Under the doctrine of in pari delicto, "no
action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract. No suit can
be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the
property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be
paid, or damages for its violation[.]"Nevertheless, this court allowed
Tarnate, Jr. to recover 10% of the retention fee. According to this
court, “the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always
rigid." An exception to the doctrine is "when its application
contravenes well-established public policy." In Gonzalo, this court
ruled that "the prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized
public policy of the State." It is, therefore, an exception to the
application of the in pari delicto doctrine. This court explained:
 The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of
the State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
"[e]very person who through an act of performance by another, or
any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him."
 Article 22 "is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic
principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as golden
threads through society to the end that law may approach its
supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice."
 Page 46 of 320
 In this case, Loria never denied that he failed to fulfill his agreement
with Muñoz. Throughout the case’s proceedings, Loria failed to
justify why he has the right to retain Muñoz’s ₱2,000,000.00.
 Loria, therefore, is retaining the ₱2,000,000.00 without just or legal
ground. This cannot be done. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, he must return the ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz.
6 G.R. No. 176121               September 22, 2014
SPOUSES TEODORICO and PACITA ROSETE, Petitioners, vs. FELIX and/or
MARIETTA BRIONES, SPOUSES JOSE and REMEDIOS ROSETE, AND
NEORIMSE and FELICITAS CORPUZ, Respondents.
DOCTRIN Article 1236 of the Civil Code, which states that "whoever pays for another
E may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without
the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as
the payment has been beneficial to the debtor." They may also recover from
the NHA, applying the principle of solutio indebiti.
FACTS  The subject lot is a 152-square meter lot located at 1014 Estrada
Street, Malate, Manila which is owned by the National Housing Authority
(NHA).
 On July 30, 1987, the NHA conducted a census survey of the subject
lot, and the following information was gathered:
Tag No. 674
Ricardo Dimalanta, Sr. - absentee structure owner
Felix Briones - lessee
Neorimse Corpuz - lessee
Tag No. 87-0675
Teodoro Rosete - residing owner
Jose Rosete – lessee
 NHA awarded the subject lot to petitioner Teodorico P. Rosete
(Teodorico).
 Herein respondents, Jose and Remedios Rosete(the Rosetes),
Neorimse and Felicitas Corpuz (the Corpuzes), and Felix and Marietta
Briones (the Brioneses) objected to the award, claiming that the award of
the entire lot to Teodorico was erroneous.
 In 1990, a Declaration of Real Property was filed and issued in
Teodorico’s name. Thereafter, he made full payment of the value of the
subject lot and likewise paid the real property taxes thereon.
 In an August 5, 1994, NHA informed Teodorico that after
consideration of the objections raised by the Rosetes, the Corpuzes and
the Brioneses, the original award of 152 square meters in his favor has
been cancelled and instead, the subject lot will be subdivided and
awarded as follows:
1. Teodorico – 62 square meters
2. The Brioneses – 40 square meters
3. The Rosetes – 25 square meters
4. The Corpuzes – 15 square meters
5. Easement for pathwalk – 10 square meters
 In the same Letter-Decision, NHA likewise informed Teodorico that
his payments shall be adjusted accordingly, but his excess payments will
not be refunded; instead, they will be applied to his co-awardees’
amortizations. His co-awardees shall in turn pay him, under pain of
cancellation of their respective awards. NHA also informed Teodorico
that the matters contained in the letter were final, and that if he intended
to appeal, he should do so with the Office of the President within 30 days.
 In October 18, 1994, Teodorico protested and sought a
reconsideration of the decision to cancel the award, claiming that it was
unfair and confiscatory. He likewise requested that his co-awardees be
required to reimburse his property tax payments and that the subject lot
be assessed at its current value.
 In July 28, 1999 letter to the NHA, Teodorico, the Rosetes, and the
Corpuzes sought approval of their request to subdivide the subject lot on
an "as is, where is" basis as per NHA policy, since it appeared that the
parties’ respective allocations/awards did not correspond to the actual
areas occupied by them and thus could result in unwanted demolition of
their existing homes/structures.
 In a November 12, 1999 Letter-Reply, the NHA informed the parties
that the original awards/allocations were being retained; it also advised
them to hire a surveyor for the purpose of subdividing the subject lot in
accordance with such awards.
 The Office of the President denied Teodorico’s motion to subdivide
the subject lot on an "as is, where is" basis and to be reimbursed by his
co-awardees for his overpayments, with interest.
 CA – agree with OP’s decision as it has already been final and
executory.
 Petitioners’ argument – petitioner’s October 18, 1994 letter to the
NHA – which should be treated as an appeal to the OP – remains pending
and unacted upon, then his case is still pending as far as the OP is
concerned; that the dismissal of the appeal through the November 19,
1997 Decision in O.P. Case No. 5902 affected only the appellants therein,
or the Rosetes and the Corpuzes, but not Teodorico – whose appeal
remained pending as a result of the OP’s failure to act on his October 18,
1994 letter cum appeal. Moreover, petitioners argue that the NHA
committed error insubdividing the subject lot, as it failed to accurately
survey the same before making the awards; that the NHA failed to review
the sketch plans submitted by the NHA District Office which reflected
clearly the existing position of the structures built by the awardees; that
the NHA decision would result in the unwarranted destruction of such
structures in order to conform to the respective allocations of the
awardees; and that their overpayments should be returned to them by the
respondents, lest unjust enrichment results.
 Respondents’ arguments
o Rosetes argue that the NHA’s August 5, 1994 Letter-Decision is erroneous
and unjust, because only the Brioneses stand to unduly benefit therefrom
since their existing lot area would be increased while that of the others
 Page 47 of 320
would be decreased, thus resulting in the destruction of their existing
homes and structures.
o Corpuzes claim that Teodorico’s October 18, 1994 letter to the NHA
cannot be treated as an appeal to the OP, and the NHA’s inaction or
failure to act on the said letter should be construed as an implied denial
thereof which should have prompted Teodorico to take further legal steps
to protect his interests. They object to being required to pay for interests
on the purchase price and taxes advanced by Teodorico, claiming that this
was unjust. Finally, they maintain that the NHA is correct in allocating
the subject lot the way it did among the parties; they should observe and
yield to the law and policy of the NHA, even if it required the destruction
of their homes and structures.
O Brioneses adopt the decisions of the NHA, the OP and the CA.
ISSUE 1. WON CA erred in ruling that petitioner Teodorico Rosete did not file
an appeal from the decision of the National Housing Authority;
2. WON CA erred in ruling that the decision of the Office of the
President against the appeal of Remedios Rosete and Felicitas Corpuz
binds petitioner Teodorico Rosete;
3. WON CA erred in failing to look into the merits of petitioner
Teodorico Rosete’s claim over the subject lot.
RULING  The Court denies the Petition.
 With Teodorico’s failure to timely appeal the NHA’s August 5, 1994
Letter Decision and its November 12, 1999 Letter-Reply denying his
motion for reconsideration, and instead taking various erroneous courses
of action which did not properly direct his grievances at the right forum
and within the prescribed period, the NHA’s August 5,1994 Letter-
Decision became final and executory as against Teodorico – and the
petitioners for that matter. In contemplation of law, petitioners did not at
all file an appeal of the NHA’s August 5, 1994 Letter Decision.
 Petitioners' remaining point of contention is their claim for
reimbursement. However, this Court cannot order a refund of Teodorico's
overpayments.
 First of all, NHA - the recipient of the overpayment - cannot be
ordered to make a refund, since Teodorico never prayed to recover from
it; in all his submissions - from the NHA, the OP, the CA, and all the way
up to this Court - he consistently sought reimbursement only from his co-
awardees, not the NHA.
 Secondly, the specific amount of overpayment is not fixed or
determinable from the record; this being the case, it cannot be
determined how much exactly each of Teodorico's co-awardees owes him.
 Thirdly, this Court is not a trier of facts; it cannot go out of its way to
determine and analyze from the record what should be returned to
Teodorico, nor can it receive evidence on the matter.
 Suffice it to state that petitioners are indeed entitled to be
indemnified for paying for the value of the subject lot and the real
property taxes thereon over and above what was awarded to them,
pursuant to Article 1236 of the Civil Code.
(DEMDAM)
7 DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO, petitioner, vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO,
respondent. G.R. No. 175540. April 7, 2014
DOCTRINE
FACTS  At around 9:50 in the evening of March 1, 1988, Arnelito Logmao,
then eighteen (18) years old, was brought to the East Avenue
Medical Center (EAMC) in Quezon City by two sidewalk vendors,
who allegedly saw the former fall from the overpass near the
Farmers' Market in Cubao, Quezon City.
 Due to unavailability of facilities, Lagmao was transferred to NKI
where his name was changed to Arnelito Lugmoso.
 As Lugmoso had no relatives around, Jennifer B. Misa,
Transplant coordinator, was asked to locate his family by
enlisting police and media assistance.
 Dr. Enrique T. Ona, Chairman of the Department of Surgery,
observed that the severity of the brain injury of Lugmoso
manifested symptoms of brain death.
 Dr. Ona was informed that Lugmoso had been pronounced brain
dead by Dr. Abdias V. Aquino, a neurologist, and by Dr. Antonio
Rafael, a neurosurgeon and attending physician of Lugmoso, and
that a repeat electroencephalogram (EEG) was in progress to
confirm the diagnosis of brain death.
 Upon learning that Lugmoso was a suitable organ donor and that
some NKI patients awaiting organ donation had blood and tissue
types compatible with Lugmoso, Dr. Ona inquired from Jennifer
Misa whether the relatives of Lugmoso had been located so that
the necessary consent for organ donation could be obtained.
 Dr. Ona requested Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, Executive Director of
NKI, to authorize the removal of specific organs from the body of
Lugmoso for transplantation purposes.
 The medical team removed the heart, kidneys, pancreas, liver and
spleen of Lugmoso. The medical team then transplanted a kidney
and the pancreas of Lugmoso to Lee Tan Hoc and the other
kidney of Lugmoso to Alexis Ambustan.
 NKI issued a press release announcing its successful double
organ transplantation. Aida Doromal, a cousin of plaintiff, heard
the news aired on television that the donor was an eighteen (18)
year old boy whose remains were at La Funeraria Oro in Quezon
City. As the name of the donor sounded like Arnelito Logmao,
Aida informed plaintiff of the news report.
 Arlen Logmao, a brother of Arnelito, reported to Police Station
No. 5, Eastern Police District, Mandaluyong that the latter did not
return home after seeing a movie in Cubao, Quezon City
 Upon receiving the news from Aida, plaintiff and her other
 Page 48 of 320
children went to La Funeraria Oro, where they saw Arnelito
inside a cheap casket.
 Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages. Plaintiff alleged that
defendants conspired to remove the organs of Arnelito while the
latter was still alive and that they concealed his true identity.
 RTC Ruling: petitioner liable for a quasi-delict
 CA affirmed.
ISSUE WON the respondent's sufferings were brought about by petitioner's
alleged negligence in granting authorization for the removal or retrieval of
the internal organs of respondent's son who had been declared brain dead.
RULING A careful reading of the above shows that petitioner instructed his
subordinates to "make certain" that "all reasonable efforts" are exerted to
locate the patient's next of kin, even enumerating ways in which to ensure
that notices of the death of the patient would reach said relatives. It also
clearly stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and remove the
internal organs of the deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of
the applicable law had been complied with. Such instructions reveal that
petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all
reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not
have made his directives any clearer. He even specifically mentioned that
permission is only being granted IF the Department of Surgery has
complied with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not
have been faulted for having full confidence in the ability of the doctors in
the Department of Surgery to comprehend the instructions, obeying all his
directives, and acting only in accordance with the requirements of the law.
Furthermore, as found by the lower courts from the records of the case, the
doctors and personnel of NKI disseminated notices of the death of
respondent's son to the media and sought the assistance of the appropriate
police authorities as early as March 2, 1988, even before petitioner issued
the Memorandum. Prior to performing the procedure for retrieval of the
deceased's internal organs, the doctors concerned also the sought the
opinion and approval of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioner employed reasonable means to
disseminate notifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased.
The only question that remains pertains to the sufficiency of time allowed
for notices to reach the relatives of the deceased.
If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son's death
because the notices did not properly state the name or identity of the
deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner's door.
CONCURRI "What you leave behind is not what is engraved in stone monuments, but
NG what is woven in the lives of others." -Pericles
OPINION
(Justice Issue: WON Dr. Alano should be held liable for his alleged negligence in
Leonen) authorizing the removal and retrieval of Arnelito's internal organs without
Zenaida's consent.
Ruling: I agree with the ponencia that Dr. Alano should not be found
liable, but I take
this opportunity to further expound on the issues presented to this court.
Elements of quasi-delict:
(1) an act or omission; (2) the presence of fault or negligence in the
performance or non-performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a causal
connection between the negligent act and the injury; and (5) no pre-
existing contractual relation.
As a general rule, any act or omission coming under the purview of Article
2176 gives rise to a cause of action under quasi-delict. This, in turn, gives
the basis for a claim of damages.
Under the Civil Code, acts done in violation of Articles 19, 20, and 21 will
also give rise to damages. The provisions state as follows:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Yuchengco vs Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation: The principle of
abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code. This provision
of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one's rights
as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give
everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals: while
Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
The codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
social order."
[REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to
remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the
law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental
precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from
the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as
 Page 49 of 320
"guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through
society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the
sway and dominance of justice."
Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human
relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an actionable tort. Article 19
describes the degree of care required so that an actionable tort may arise
when it is alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21.
Article 20 concerns violations of existing law as basis for an injury. It
allows recovery should the act have been willful or negligent. Willful may
refer to the intention to do the act and the desire to achieve the outcome
which is considered by the plaintiff in tort action as injurious. Negligence
may refer to a situation where the act was consciously done but without
intending the result which the plaintiff considers as injurious.
Article 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries that may be caused by acts
which are not necessarily proscribed by law. This article requires that the
act be willful, that is, that there was an intention to do the act and a desire
to achieve the outcome. In cases under Article 21, the legal issues revolve
around whether such outcome should be considered a legal injury on the
part of the plaintiff or whether the commission of the act was done in
violation of the standards of care required in Article 19.
8 SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, petitioners, vs. ALEXANDER
CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents. G.R. No. 179736.
June 26, 2013
DOCTRIN
E of another's residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is
FACTS Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for injunction and damages with the
prayer of issuance of a Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction/TRO
against respondents.
Respondents (Aldo) claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence
without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall
of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners' property
Court denied Aldo’s application for preliminary injunction for failure to
substantiate its allegations
In order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13,
2005 illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec
two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners' property
Respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners,
also took pictures of petitioners' on-going construction in violation of the
petitioner’s right to privacy
As an answer, respondents claimed that they did not install the the video
surveillance cameras, nor did they order their employees to take pictures of
petitioners' construction. They also clarified that they are not the owners of
Aldo but are mere stockholders.
RTC Ruling: Granted the application.
CA Ruling: The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued
with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and
unmistakable right to an injunctive writ. The CA explained that the right to
privacy of residence under Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code was not violated
since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence. The
CA also said that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they
could not have installed video surveillance cameras. They are mere
stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality. Thus, they
are not the proper parties.
ISSUE WON there is a violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy
WON the respondents are the proper parties in this case
RULING The right to privacy under Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code covers business
offices where the public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals
are allowed to enter.
Article 26 (1) of the Civil Code protects an individual's right to privacy and
provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by
other individuals. It states: Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence
This provision recognizes that a man's house is his castle, where his right to
privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of
intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another
without the consent of the latter." 49(49) The phrase "prying into the privacy
entitled to privacy.
A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded
therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in.
The phrase "prying into the privacy of another's residence," therefore, covers
places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private.
And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not
infringe on his right to privacy.
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is used to determine whether
there is a violation of the right to privacy.
Reasonable expectation of privacy test: depends on a two-part test: (1)
whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of
privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable."
Hence, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.
 Page 50 of 320
The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where
there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the
individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor
should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another's residence or
business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a
crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a
residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly
facing petitioners' property or covering a significant portion thereof, without
their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the
issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified.
A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress
a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's act or omission
which had violated the legal right of the former.
The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does
not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video
surveillance cameras.
Although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its
stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by
the Choachuy family.
Notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed
the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents
are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect
themselves from this suit.
9 WILLEM BEUMER, petitioner, vs. AVELINA AMORES, respondent., G.R.
No. 195670. December 3, 2012
DOCTRIN
E personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed that his
FACTS Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March
29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared
the nullity of their marriage in the Decision dated November 10, 2000 on the
basis of the former's psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated
December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of the described properties
claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage.
Respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential
houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal
properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own
personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal
funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance.
Petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the
name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he
received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent
did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.
Respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots
came exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from
selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware. She
further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in 1996,
petitioner transferred to their second house and brought along with him
certain personal properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders,
clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and equipment have a total cost of
P500,000.00.
RTC Ruling: dissolving the parties' conjugal partnership, awarding all the
parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and
equipment in favor of
petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1
and 2142
as co-owned by the parties
CA Ruling: Affirming the RTC Ruling
ISSUE WON THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE PETITIONER'S
ATTEMPT AT SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF
HALF OR WHOLE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE USED IN THE PURCHASE
OF THE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
RULING The time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and
he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he
who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
Petitioner's statements regarding the real source of the funds used to
purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While
admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondent's
personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these
inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before
the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any
equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over
the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-
established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to
be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void,
vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have
the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he
had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an
 Page 51 of 320
illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed,
one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly
entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner's claim for reimbursement on the basis
of unjust enrichment.
"MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person
should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for
recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an
accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action
is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto
doctrine.
10 NESTOR N. PADALHIN and ANNIE PADALHIN, petitioners, vs. NELSON D.
LAVIÑA, respondent. G.R. No. 183026. November 14, 2012
DOCTRIN
E Plaintiff-appellant's testimony regarding the second raid was not of his own
FACTS Laviña and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as
Ambassador and Consul General, respectively.
In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Laviña was raided twice.
Prior to the raids, Bienvenido Pasturan (Pasturan) delivered messages to the
Filipino household helpers in the ambassador's residence instructing them to
allow the entry of an officer who would come to take photographs of the ivory
souvenirs kept therein.
Laviña received an information from the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) in Manila that an investigating team was to be sent to Nairobi to
inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of the
Philippine Embassy in Kenya, on one hand, and his own complaint against
the spouses Padalhin, on the other.
The team entered Laviña's residence unarmed with a search warrant, court
order or letter from the DFA Secretary. Laviña alleged that in the course of
the inspection, the team destroyed cabinet locks, damaged furniture and took
three sets of carved ivory tusks.
Subsequently, both Nestor and Laviña were recalled from their posts in
Kenya.
Laviña filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Nestor and his
wife, petitioner Annie Padalhin (Annie) Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and
Dizon. Laviña's complaint alleged the following causes of action, to wit: (a)
affront against his privacy and the sanctity and inviolability of his diplomatic
residence during the two raids conducted by the Kenyan officials, supposedly
instigated by Padalhin and participated by all the defendants as conspirators;
(b) infringement of his constitutional rights against illegal searches and
seizures when the investigating team sent by the DFA entered into his
residence without a warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary and
confiscated some of his personal belongings; and (c) bad faith, malice and
deceit exhibited by the defendants, including Padalhin, in conspiring on the
conduct of the raids, engaging in a smear campaign against him, and seizing
without authority his personal effects. Laviña sought payment of actual,
moral, exemplary and nominal damages, attorney's fees and costs of suits.
RTC Ruling: The RTC likewise found no sufficient evidence to render Annie
and Pasturan liable and to grant Nestor's counterclaims.
CA Ruling: Denied the appeal of the parties.
Defendat-appellant's affidavit constitute[s] as [sic] an admission against his
interest. Being an admission against interest, the affidavit is the best evidence
which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for
the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything
against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume
that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does
not. His affidavit likewise contained an apology for his lack of judgment and
discretion regarding the April 18, 1996 raid.
personal knowledge. Neither does the affidavit of defendant-appellant admit
that he had anything to do with the second raid. Plaintiff-appellant came to
know of the second raid only from the stories told to him by his household
helps and employees of the Philippine Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.
Defendant-appellant contends that there is no factual basis to conclude that
he was motivated by malice, bad faith or deceit, which would warrant the
award of damages in favor of the plaintiff-appellant.
Plaintiff-appellant's complaint is mainly anchored on Article 19 in relation to
Articles 21 and 26 of the New Civil Code.
The Comment of Tolentino on what constitute an abuse of rights under
Article 19 of the New Civil Code is pertinent: "Test of Abuse of Right. —
Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, although not unlawful, are
anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the
only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the
actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of
exercising a right. The principle does not permit acts which, without utility or
legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they violate the concept
of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just. . . . ."
Issue: WON defendant-appellant intended to prejudice or injure plaintiff-
appellant when he did the acts as embodied in his affidavit.
Defendant-appellant's participation in the invasion of plaintiff-appellant's
diplomatic residence and his act of ordering an employee to take photographs
of what was inside the diplomatic residence without the consent of the
plaintiff-appellant were clearly done to prejudice the latter. Moreover, we find
that defendant-appellant was not driven by legitimate reasons when he did
the questioned acts. As pointed out by the court a quo, defendant-appellant
made sure that the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Filipino
community in Kenya knew about the alleged illegal items in
 Page 52 of 320
plaintiff-appellant's diplomatic residence.
ISSUE WON NESTOR'S PARTICIPATION IN THE RAID CONDUCTED ON
LAVIÑA'S RESIDENCE WAS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE AS TO WARRANT THE AWARD OF MORAL, EXEMPLARY
AND NOMINAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE LATTER'S
FAVOR.
WON NESTOR'S COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED
CONSIDERING A CLEAR SHOWING THAT LAVIÑA'S SUIT WAS
GROUNDLESS.
RULING Nestor himself admitted that he caused the taking of the pictures of Laviña's
residence without the latter's knowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates that
he did so sans bad faith or malice. However, Nestor's surreptitious acts negate
his allegation of good faith. If it were true that Laviña kept ivories in his
diplomatic residence, then, his behavior deserves condemnation. However,
that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code
prescriptions concerning the privacy of one's residence and he cannot hide
behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion.
Hence, the award of damages and attorney's fees in Laviña's favor is proper.
11 ANITA CHENG, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY,
respondents. G.R. No. 174238. July 7, 2009
DOCTRIN
E view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article
FACTS Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7,
Manila against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her
Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for
P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored
upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.
RTC dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the
elements of the crime.
Petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a
complaint for collection of a sum of money with damages (Civil Case No. 05-
112452) based on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the
two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.
ISSUE Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the
filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the
present case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing
checks against the respondents was [based] on the failure of the prosecution
to identify both the accused (respondents herein)?
RULING Petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20,
1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated on
December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only prospective
application.
Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor
in the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.
Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in
1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already
pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigants' rights does not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application
of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he
is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for
this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws.
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of
BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of
the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the
separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate
civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when
separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the
criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil
and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner's rights may be fully adjudicated in
the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of
res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In
31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not
cast in stone, are for the speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice
and should therefore be adhered to in order to attain this objective.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2)
such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. This
doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich
himself inequitably at another's expense. One condition for invoking this
principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other
recourse based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other
provision of law.
Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal
interpretation and application of the rules which will give the parties the
fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth. The
dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be
barred by technicalities. For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the
complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where
courts of law, through the inflexibility
of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
 Page 53 of 320
circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so, 28(28) we thus rule, pro hac
vice, in favor of petitioner.
(FAJARDO)
12 G.R. No. 167017
SERAFIN CHENG, Petitioner,
- v e r s u s -   SPOUSES VITTORIO and MA. HELEN DONINI, Respondents
CORONA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and BERSAMIN, JJ.
DOCTRIN Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality," is applied
E only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of
procedure
FACTS  Petitioner Serafin Cheng agreed to lease his property located at 479 Shaw
Blvd., Mandaluyong City to respondents, Spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen
Donini, who intended to put up a restaurant thereon. They agreed to a
monthly rental of P17,000, to commence in December 1990.
 Bearing an Interim Grant of Authority executed by petitioner,
respondents proceeded to introduce improvements in the premises.;
lease agreement to take effect December 1, 1990
 However, before respondents business could take off and before any final
lease agreement could be drafted and signed, the parties began to have
serious disagreements regarding its terms and conditions. Petitioner
thus wrote respondents on January 28, 1991, demanding payment of the
deposit and rentals, and signifying that he had no intention to continue
with the agreement should respondents fail to pay. Respondents,
however, ignoring petitioners demand, continued to occupy the premises
until April 17, 1991 when their caretaker voluntarily surrendered the
property to petitioner
- RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioner
- Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which, in its
decision[5] dated March 31, 2004, recalled and set aside the RTC
decision and entered a new one ordering petitioner to pay respondents
the amount of P964,000 representing the latters expenses incurred for
the repairs and improvements of the premises.
- Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
award of reimbursement had no factual and legal bases,[7] but this was
denied by the CA
- Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;
petitioner arguing that THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY IN FAVOR OF THE
RESPONDENTS.
 respondents argued that they were possessors in good faith, hence,
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code applied and they should be
indemnified for the improvements introduced on the leased
premises.Respondents bewailed the fact that petitioner was going to
benefit from these improvements, the cost of which amounted to P1.409
million, in contrast to respondents rental/deposit obligation amounting
to only P34,000. Respondents also contended that petitioners rescission
of the agreement was in bad faith and they were thus entitled to a refund
- CA concluded that  respondents were entitled to reimbursement for the
cost of improvements under the principle of equity and unjust
enrichment. in ruling that respondents were entitled to reimbursement,
the CA did not provide any statutory basis therefor and instead applied
the principles of equity and unjust enrichment, stating:
 It would be inequitable to allow the defendant-appellee, as owner of the
property to enjoy perpetually the improvements introduced by the
plaintiffs-appellants without reimbursing them for the value of the said
improvements. Well-settled is the rule that no one shall be unjustly
enriched or benefitted at the expense of another
ISSUE Whether or not COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE
PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS
RULING  Petitioner, however, correctly argued that the principle of equity did not
apply in this case. Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice
outside legality," is applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.[18] Positive rules prevail
over all abstract arguments based on equity contra legem.[19] Neither is
the principle of unjust enrichment applicable since petitioner (who was
to benefit from it) had a valid claim.
o Contrary to respondents position, Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code
did not apply. the Court clarified that a lessee is neither a builder nor a
possessor in good faith
 Under Article 1678 of the Civil Code, the lessor has the primary right (or
the first move) to reimburse the lessee for 50% of the value of the
improvements at the end of the lease. If the lessor refuses to make the
reimbursement, the subsidiary right of the lessee to remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing suffers damage, arises
 As regards the ornamental expenses, respondents are not entitled to
reimbursement. Article 1678 gives respondents the right to remove the
ornaments without damage to the principal thing. But if petitioner
appropriates and retains said ornaments, he shall pay for their value
upon the termination of the lease
o Since petitioner did not exercise his option to retain these useful
improvements, then respondents could have removed the same. This
was the legal consequence of the application of Article 1678 under
ordinary circumstances.
 For another, it appears that as soon as respondents vacated the
premises, petitioner immediately reclaimed the property and barred
respondents from entering it. Respondents also alleged, and petitioner
did not deny, that the property subject of this case had already been
leased to another entity since 1991.[45] This is where considerations of
equity should come into play. It is obviously no longer feasible for
respondents to remove the improvements from the property, if they still
exist. The only equitable alternative then, given the circumstances, is to
 Page 54 of 320
order petitioner to pay respondents one-half of the value of the useful
improvements (50% of P513,301.90) introduced on the property, or
P256,650.95. To be off-set against this amount are respondents unpaid
P17,000 monthly rentals for the period of December 1990 to April 1991,
[46] or P85,000. Petitioner should, therefore, indemnify respondents
the amount of P171,650.95. This is in accord with the laws intent of
preventing unjust enrichment of a lessor who now has to pay one-half
of the value of the useful improvements at the end of the lease because
the lessee has already enjoyed the same, whereas the lessor can enjoy
them indefinitely thereafter
 The decision is hereby MODIFIED in that petitioner Serafin Cheng is
ORDERED to pay respondents, spouses Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini,
the amount of P171,650.95 as indemnity for the useful improvements
13 G.R. No. 158086
ASJ CORPORATION and ANTONIO SAN JUAN, Petitioners
-versus- SPS. EFREN & MAURA EVANGELISTA,
Respondents.
DOCTRIN Under Article 19[31] of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right if
E the following elements are present: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another
FACTS  Respondents, under the name and style of R.M. Sy Chicks, are engaged
in the large-scale business of buying broiler eggs, hatching them, and
selling their hatchlings (chicks) and egg by-products. For the incubation
and hatching of these eggs, respondents availed of the hatchery services
of ASJ Corp
 Initially, the service fees were paid upon release of the eggs and by-
products to respondents. But as their business went along, respondents
delays on their payments were tolerated by San Juan, who just carried
over the balance, as there may be, into the next delivery, out of keeping
goodwill with respondents
o respondent Efren went to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and by-
products covered by Setting Report No. 108, but San Juan refused to
release the same due to respondents failure to settle accrued service
fees on several setting reports starting from Setting Report No. 90.
Nevertheless, San Juan accepted from Efren 10,245 eggs covered by
Setting Report No. 113 and P15,000.00[8] in cash as partial payment
o Believing firmly that the total value of the eggs delivered was more than
sufficient to cover the outstanding balance, Maura promised to settle
their accounts only upon proper accounting by San Juan. San Juan
disliked the idea and threatened to impound their vehicle and detain
them at the hatchery compound if they should come back unprepared to
fully settle their accounts with him. respondents filed with the RTC an
action for damages
o On July 8, 1996, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents and made the
following findings 3) the retention of the chicks and by-products was
unjustified and accompanied by threats and intimidations on
respondents
o Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On April 30, 2003, the
Court of Appeals denied both appeals for lack of merit and affirmed the
trial courts decision
 petitioners contend that the retention was justified and did not
constitute an abuse of rights since it was respondents who failed to
comply with their obligation.
 Respondents, for their part, aver that all the elements on abuse of rights
were present. They further state that despite their offer to partially
satisfy the accrued service fees, and the fact that the value of the chicks
and by-products was more than sufficient to cover their unpaid
obligations, petitioners still chose to withhold the delivery.
ISSUE Was petitioners retention of the chicks and by-products on account of
respondents failure to pay the corresponding service fees unjustified?
RULING  petitioners act of withholding the chicks and by-products is entirely
different from petitioners unjustifiable acts of threatening respondents.
The retention had legal basis; the threats had none
 Respondents offer to partially satisfy their accounts is not enough to
extinguish their obligation. Under Article 1248[27] of the Civil Code,
the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial payments from the
debtor, unless there is an express stipulation to that effect. More so,
respondents cannot substitute or apply as their payment the value of
the chicks and by-products they expect to derive because it is necessary
that all the debts be for the same kind, generally of a monetary
character. Needless to say, there was no valid application of payment in
this case
 Nonetheless, San Juans subsequent acts of threatening respondents
should not remain among those treated with impunity. Under Article
19[31] of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right if the
following elements are present: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.[32] Here, while petitioners had the
right to withhold delivery, the high-handed and oppressive acts of
petitioners, as aptly found by the two courts below, had no legal leg to
stand on.
14 [G.R. No. 152411. September 29, 2004]
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. PHILAB INDUSTRIES,
INC., respondent
DOCTRIN  Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:
E  Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
 Page 55 of 320
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same
to him.
 In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements
must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the
plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is
without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other
action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.[43]
FACTS  Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to
construct an integrated system of research organization known as the
Research Complex. As part of the project, laboratory equipment and
furniture were purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology
and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baos.
Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF) came
forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture,
including the fabrication thereof
o FEMF, gave the go-signal to BIOTECH to contact a corporation to
accomplish the project.
 -BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc.
(PHILAB), to fabricate the laboratory furniture and deliver the same to
BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for the account of the
FEMF
o PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any contract regarding the
fabrication and delivery of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH.
o On October 16, 1982, UP executed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial support and donate
sums of money to UP
o President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986
EDSA Revolution. On March 26, 1986, PHILAB wrote BIOTECH
requesting for its much-needed assistance for the payment of the
balance already due plus interest
o Exasperated, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
against UP
 -In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no
cause of action against it because it was merely the donee/beneficiary of
the laboratory furniture in the BIOTECH; and that the FEMF, which
funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB for the purchase price of
the laboratory furniture. UP specifically denied obliging itself to pay for
the laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB
o the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint without
prejudice to PHILABs recourse against the FEMF
o PHILAB appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
o The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that
there was never a contract between FEMF and PHILAB. Consequently,
PHILAB could not be bound by the MOA between the FEMF and UP
since it was never a party thereto. The appellate court ruled that,
although UP did not bind itself to pay for the laboratory furniture;
nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim: No one should
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
 - UP, now the petitioner, filed its petition for review contending that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LEGAL
PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE MARCOS FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE
TO PHILAB
ISSUE Whether or not COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LEGAL
PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE MARCOS FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE TO
PHILAB
RULING  We reject the ruling of the CA holding the petitioner liable for the claim
of the respondent based on the maxim that no one should enrich itself
at the expense of another.
 Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits
from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown
that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly
could mean illegally or unlawfully.[39]
 Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant
must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received
something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of
affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the
benefit.[40] Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect
of failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received
under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to
account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer
benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.[41] Unjust enrichment
is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.[42]
 Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:
 Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same
to him. (Boldface supplied)
 In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements
must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the
plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is
without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other
action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.[43]
 An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action,
available only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-
contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under
any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to,
and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.[44]
 The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil
Code do not obtain in this case. The respondent had a remedy against
the FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact contract with the
FEMF for the payment of its claim. The petitioner legally acquired the
 Page 56 of 320
laboratory furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to
keep the laboratory furniture.
15 [G.R. No. 139789. July 19, 2001]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN
DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 139808. July 19, 2001]
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents.
DOCTRIN Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code; Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
E The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
FACTS -Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch, , filed a petition with the Court of
Appeals[1] for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium
- Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of
unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio
- Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari
-SC dismissed the petition for habeas corpus[4] for lack of merit, and granted
the petition[5] to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling[6] giving visitation
rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.
- The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio:
            - is her desire to have her husband's custody; she wanted Potenciano
Ilusorio to live with her
            - respondents Lin and Sylvia (daughters) were illegally restraining
Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure
greed. (Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and
Philippine Oversees Telecommunications)
            - her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano
Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide for himself.
            -Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles
68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they
(Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each
other
- The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the
Court of Appeals. Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by
his children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his
wife and other children whom he loved.
ISSUE Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus may be granted
RULING -We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated
to choose whether to see his wife or not.
- The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.[20] The sanction therefor is the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.[21]
-Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined
empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only
by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
-Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with
"amor gignit amorem respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution
- On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio died. the case has been rendered
moot by the death of subject
(PACHECO)
16 [G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000]
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA
K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm
[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA
ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
DOCTRIN the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the
E right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife
for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live
with his wife.
FACTS Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. They
separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and
at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. Upon Potencianos arrival from
the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in
Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this
time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg
Zoloft, an antidepressant drug. As a consequence, Potencianos health
deteriorated. After attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano
Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium, Makati. Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. CA denied
by but allowed visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorios wife,
 Page 57 of 320
ISSUE W/N writ should be granted.
RULING A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention,[13] or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from
the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be
unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there
is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but
are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later
become arbitrary.[14] It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices.
In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he
opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his
family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano.
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free
choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Court of
Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to
visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the
husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live
with his wife.
17 G.R. No. 132344        February 17, 2000
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
DOCTRIN The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there
E is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit.14 If mere fault or negligence
in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with
more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is,
when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse.
FACTS Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988.
In the first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take
the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an
incomplete grade. On the second semester, he took the exam for the removal
of the incomplete grade. He got a failing grade of 5. In the meantime, the
Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate on
who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The
plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation.
His name was also in the invitation for that occasion. Unaware of the
deficiency,  he attended the ceremony and tendered a blow-out. He thereafter
prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without
pay from his job and enrolled at the pre-bar review class. Having learned of
the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar
examination.Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages. Lower
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. CA affirmed. UE argued that it has no
liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and
immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out of his
own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his
removal exam.
ISSUE May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a
student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for
graduation when such is not the case?
RULING When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a
contract of education is entered into between said institution and the student.
The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered
merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's
commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school
and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents,
such as the professors with respect to the status or result of his grades.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal
examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced
preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful
prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19
of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from
taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities
of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts,
would render the transaction unconscientious.5 It is the school that has
access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its
professors to act and comply with its rules. In civilized society, men must be
able to assume that others will do them no intended injury — that others will
commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they
act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding
and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal
in the general course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the
theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society.9
Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be
indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
18 EN BANC
[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997]
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR.,
respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
 Page 58 of 320
DOCTRIN A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
E criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.[6] It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community
FACTS Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal profession averring that respondent and she had been
sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that
respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her. Respondent
was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because of the charges of
gross immorality made by complainant.
ISSUE W/N respondent is guilty of gross immorality sufficient to be denied
admission to law profession.
RULING Facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion
of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral
character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral
conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[6] It
is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community. Respondent and
complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual.Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively
pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be
easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle
permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out
the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which
should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.
F.
1 G.R. No. 195549            September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
G. (SABER)
DOCTRIN The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader
E than that covered by intellectual property laws. Under the present article,
which follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in American
jurisdictions, the term covers even cases of discovery of trade secrets of a
competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds,
interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s contracts, or any malicious
interference with the latter’s business.
FACTS [Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company filed this present complaint
for damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to
enjoin [petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation from manufacturing and
distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of
[respondent].Since its registration in 1992, [respondent] has been
manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the
Philippines plastic-made automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand,
which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items
made of plastic and metal.  [Respondent] further alleged that in view of the
physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent’s] office, and in view
of the fact that some of the [respondent’s] employees had transferred to
[petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondent’s]
products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts. [respondent]
discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing the
same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors
but was selling these products at a lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-made
automotive parts and to the same customers. [petitioner] claims that there
can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made automotive parts are mere
reproductions of original parts and their construction and composition
merely conforms to the specifications of the original parts of motor vehicles
they intend to replace. Further, respondent has no patent over these products.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. CA affirmed.
ISSUE whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
RULING the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on human relations,
and not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293 as the present suit is
a damage suit and the products are not covered by patent registration. A
fortiori, the existence of patent registration is immaterial in the present case.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby
suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is not
competitionper sebut the use of unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods
which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a
living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not
competition where the means usedare fair and legitimate.
1 SECOND DIVISION
November 23, 2016
G.R. No. 203770
MANUELA AZUCENA MAYOR, Petitioner vs.
EDWIN TIU and DAMIANA CHARITO MARTY, Respondents
 Page 59 of 320
DOCTRIN Separate and distinct personality
E estate of the decedent?
FACTS On May 25, 2008, Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan (Rosario), the widow of
the late Primo Villasin (Primo), passed away and left a holographic Last Will
and Testament, wherein she named her sister, Remedios Tiu (Remedios), and
her niece, Manuela Azucena Mayor (Manuela), as executors. Immediately
thereafter, Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for the probate of Rosario's
holographic will with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary (probate
proceedings).
On May 29, 2008, respondent Damiana Charito Marty (Marty) claiming to be
the adopted daughter of Rosario, filed a petition for letters of administration
before the RTC, but it was not given due course because of the probate
proceedings. Per records, this dismissal is subject of a separate proceeding
filed by Marty with the CA Cebu City
On June 12, 2008, in its Order, the RTC-Br. 9 found the petition for probate
of will filed by Remedios and Manuela as sufficient in form and substance and
set the case for hearing.
Consequently, Marty filed her Verified Urgent Manifestation and Motion,
dated June 23, 2008, stating that Remedios kept the decedent Rosario a
virtual hostage for the past ten (10) years and her family was financially
dependent on her which led to the wastage and disposal of the properties
owned by her and her husband, Primo. Marty averred that until the alleged
will of the decedent could be probated and admitted, Remedios and her ten
(10) children had no standing to either possess or control the properties
comprising the estate of the Villasins. She prayed for the probate court to: 1)
order an immediate inventory of all the properties subject of the proceedings;
2) direct the tenants of the estate, namely, Mercury Drug and Chowking,
located at Primrose Hotel, to deposit their rentals with the court; 3) direct
Metro bank, P. Burgos Branch, to freeze the accounts in the name of Rosario,
Primrose Development Corporation (Primrose) or Remedios; and 4) lock up
the Primrose Hotel in order to preserve the property until final disposition by
the court.
On July 8, 2008, Remedios and Manuela filed their Comment/Opposition to
the urgent manifestation averring that Marty was not an adopted child of the
Villasins based on a certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of
Tacloban City, attesting that no record of any adoption proceedings involving
Marty existed in their records. They also argued that the probate court had no
jurisdiction over the properties mistakenly claimed by Marty as part of
Rosario's estate because these properties were actually owned by, and titled in
the name of, Primrose. Anent the prayer to direct the tenants to deposit the
rentals to the probate court, Remedios and Manuela countered that the
probate court had no jurisdiction over properties owned by third persons,
particularly by Primrose, the latter having a separate and distinct personality
from the decedent's estate.
ISSUE Whether or not Primrose has a personality separate and distinct from the
RULING Yes. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons
forming a corporation; and (2) a collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. This class of artificial
persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. Example is the estate
of a bankrupt or deceased person. From this pronouncement, it can be
gleaned that the estate of the deceased person is a juridical person separate
and distinct from the person of the decedent and any other corporation. This
status of an estate comes about by operation of law. This is in consonance
with the basic tenet under corporation law that a corporation has a
separate personality distinct from its stockholders and from other
corporations to which it may be connected.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Temporary Restraining Order,
dated June 14, 2013, is hereby made PERMANENT, effective immediately.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, is ENJOINED from
enforcing and implementing its January 20, 2011 and June 10, 2011 Orders,
insofar as the corporate properties of Primrose Development Corporation are
concerned, to avert irreparable damage to a corporate entity, separate and
distinct from the Estate of Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan.
2
G.R. No. 197099
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, Petitioner, vs.
KAREN SANTOS, Respondent.
DOCTRIN Birth / Proof of Birth / Legitimacy
E
FACTS
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of
document and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and
Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with
the death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the parcel of
land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-
02017-00219 and belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on
intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants executed a document
entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only
heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the
property in question; and that consequently[,] they took possession and were
able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names. She
 Page 60 of 320
prayed that the document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration of the
land transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay
her damages.
Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff is
the only child and legal heir of his brother Rufino. He disclosed that when
Rufino’s wife could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff
who was Caridad’s niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13 years
after the marriage, when Karen joined her adoptive parents’ household.
Believing that in the absence of a direct heir, his brother Emiliano and he
should succeed to the estate of their brother, they executed in 2000 an extra-
judicial settlement called
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman.
Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiff’s alleged birth certificate. It
had irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in
the box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written
and the name Emma Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box
intended for the informant’s signature.
Two more witnesses were adduced. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal consultant of
the DECS in Bulacan brought the plaintiff's service record as an elementary
school teacher at Paombong[,] Bulacan to show that she did not have any
maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11, 1963 to
October 24, 1984, and a certification from the Schools Division
Superintendent that the plaintiff did not file any maternity leave during her
service. He declared that as far as the service record is concerned, it reflects
the entry and exit from the service as well as the leaves that she availed of.
Upon inquiry by the court, he clarified that the leaves were reflected but the
absences were not. Testifying on the plaintiff’s birth certificate, Exhibit 14,
Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, confirmed that there was an
alteration in the date of birth and signature of the informant. In view of the
alterations, he considered the document questionable.
The trial court further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth
certificate is questionable, the filiation of respondent has already been
sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the birth certificate
of respondent and the offered evidence of a mere certification from the Office
of the Civil Registry instead of the birth certificate itself.
According to petitioner, respondent’s open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child is only secondary evidence to the birth certificate
itself. Respondent questioned if it was legally permissible for petitioner to
question her filiation as a legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and Caridad
in the same action for annulment of document and recovery of possession
that she herself filed against petitioner and his then co-defendant.
ISSUE Whether or not respondent is a child of the deceased spouses?
RULING No, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child
of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the
child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and
even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her
birth certificate, which is a public document.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie
evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the
truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. Following
the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her codefendants in SD-857
should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her
birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 dated January
17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Complaint in Civil Case No. 268-M-2001 for Annulment of Document and
Recovery of Possession is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
3
G.R. No. 187456            June 2, 2014
ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
ALABANG HILLS VILLAGE ASSOCIATION and RAFAEL TINIO,
Respondents.
DOCTRIN Capacity of a Corporation
E
FACTS Alabang  Development  Corporation (ADC)  is the developer of  Alabang
Hills Village and  still owns certain parcels of  land therein that are yet to
be  sold, as well as the open spaces.  Sometime in September 2006, ADC
learned  that Alabang Hills Village Association, Inc.  (AHVAI) started the
construction of a multi-purpose  hall and a swimming pool on one of the
parcels of  land still owned by ADC without the latter's consent and
approval, and that despite demand, AHVAI failed to desist from
constructing the said improvements.
 Page 61 of 320
On  October  19, 2006,  ADC filed a  Complaint for Injunction  and
Damages in the RTC, Muntinlupa  City against AHVAI and its President,
Rafael Tinio, to enjoin the said construction.
In  its Answer,  AHVAI claimed  that ADC has no  legal capacity to sue
since its existence as a  registered corporate entity was  revoked by the
Securities and Exchange  Commission (SEC) on May 26, 2003. Moreover,
ADC has no cause of action because by law it  is no longer the absolute
owner but is merely holding  the subject property in trust for the benefit
of AHVAI  as beneficial owner thereof, and that the subject lot is part  of
the open space required by law to be provided in the subdivision.  As
counterclaim, it prayed that an order be issued divesting ADC of the
title of the property and declaring AHVAI as owner thereof, and that ADC
be made liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
The  RTC dismissing  ADC's complaint on  the grounds (1) that  ADC has
no personality  to file the same; (2) that  the subject property “is a
reserved  area for the beneficial use of the homeowners,  as mandated by
law;” and (3) that the Housing and  Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), not the RTC, has  exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.
ADC  filed a  Notice of  Appeal of the  RTC decision. AHVAI,  on the
other hand, moved  that it be allowed to prosecute its compulsory
counterclaim.
The  RTC approved  ADC's notice of  appeal but dismissed  AHVAI’s
counterclaim on  the ground that it is dependent on ADC''s complaint.
The  Court  of Appeals  (CA) affirmed  the decision of  the RTC. The CA
ruled  that the RTC correctly dismissed  ADC's complaint as the same was
filed  when ADC was already defunct and, as such,  it no longer had
capacity to file the said complaint  as per the case of Columbia Pictures
Incs. vs. Court of Appeals.  As regards AHVAI’s counterclaim, the CA
held that “where there is no  claim against the AHVAI, because ADC is
already inexistent and has no capacity  to sue, the counterclaim is
improper and it must be dismissed, more so where the complaint is
dismissed at the instance of the AHVAI.
ISSUE Whether or not ADC has personality/capacity
RULING No, ADC  lacks  capacity  to sue because  it no longer possesses  juridical
personality by reason  of its dissolution and lapse of the three-year winding
up period for corporate dissolution.
The CA  cited Columbia   Pictures, Inc.  v. Court of Appeals  for  the
purpose  of distinguishing  the jurisprudential definition  of the terms “lack
of capacity  to sue” and “lack of personality  to sue;”
Lack  of legal  capacity  to  sue means  that the plaintiff  is not in the
exercise  of his civil rights, or does not  have the necessary qualification
to  appear in the case, or does not have  the character or representation
he claims.  Lack  of capacity  to  sue refers  to a plaintiff's  general
disability to  sue, such as on account  of minority, insanity, incompetence,
lack of juridical personality or any  other general disqualifications of a
party.
ADC  lacks capacity  to sue because it  no longer possesses juridical
personality by reason of its dissolution  and lapse of the three-year grace
period provided  under Section 122 of the Corporation Code.
The  trustee  of a corporation  may continue to prosecute  a case
commenced by the corporation  within three years from its dissolution
until rendition of the final judgment, even  if such judgment is rendered
beyond the three-year  period allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation
Code.
Three year period for winding up in corporate liquidation
“SEC.  122. Corporate  liquidation.  – Every  corporation  whose
charter  expires by its  own limitation or  is annulled by forfeiture  or
otherwise, or whose corporate  existence for other purposes is terminated
in any other manner, shall nevertheless be  continued as a body
corporate for three (3) years after  the time when it would have been so
dissolved, for the  purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or
against it  and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose  of
and convey its property and to distribute its assets , but not for which it
was established . for  the purpose of continuing the business At any time
during said three (3) years, said corporation is  authorized and
empowered to convey all of its property to trustees for the benefit of
stockholders, members,  creditors, and other persons in interest. From
and after any such conveyance by the corporation of its property  in
trust for the benefit of its stockholders, members, creditors and others
in interest, all interest which the corporation  had in the property
terminates, the legal interest vests in the trustees, and the beneficial
interest in the stockholders, members, creditors or other persons in interest.
Upon  winding up of the corporate affairs, any asset distributable to any
creditor or stockholder or member who is unknown or cannot be found
shall be escheated to the city  or municipality where such assets are
located. Except by decrease of capital stock and as otherwise allowed by
this Code, no corporation shall distribute any of its assets or  property
except upon lawful dissolution and after payment of all its debts and
liabilities.”
No time limit within which the trustees must complete a
liquidation placed in their hands
The  time during  which the corporation,  through its own officers,  may
conduct the liquidation  of its assets and sue and be  sued as a
corporation is limited  to three years from the time the period  of
dissolution commences; but there is no time  limit within which the
trustees must complete a  liquidation placed in their hands . It is
provided  only that the conveyance to the trustees must be made  within
the three-year period. It may be found impossible to  complete the work
 Page 62 of 320
of liquidation within the three-year period or  to reduce disputed claims
to judgment. The authorities are to the  effect that suits by or against a
corporation abate when it ceased to  be an entity capable of suing or
being sued; but trustees to whom the corporate  assets have been
conveyed pursuant to the authority of Sec. 78 [now Sec. 122] may  sue
and be sued as such in all matters connected with the liquidation. In the
absence of a board  of directors or trustees assets, including not only the
shareholders , those having any pecuniary  interest likewise the creditors
of the corporation, acting for and in its behalf, might make proper
representations with the SEC, which has primary and sufficiently broad
jurisdiction in matters of this  nature, for working out a final settlement
of the corporate concerns. ADC lacks capacity to sue because it  no longer
possesses juridical personality by reason of its dissolution and lapse of the
three-year winding up period for corporate dissolution.
In the present case, petitioner filed its complaint not only after its corporate
existence was terminated but also beyond the three-year period allowed by
Section 122 of the Corporation Code. Thus, it is clear that at the time of the
filing of the subject complaint petitioner lacks the capacity to sue as a
corporation. To allow petitioner to initiate the subject complaint and pursue it
until final judgment, on the ground that such complaint was filed for the sole
purpose of liquidating its assets, would be to circumvent the provisions of
Section 122 of the Corporation Code.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88864, sustaining the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276, in Civil Case No. 06-
138, is AFFIRMED.
4 G.R. No. 182836
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,
Petitioner, vs. HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
DOCTRIN Civil Personality / Death
E
FACTS Hortillano, an  employee of Continental  Steel and a Union member  filed
a claim for Paternity  Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death  and Accident
Insurance for dependent,  pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union. The  claim of
Hortillano was based on the death of his unborn child during the
premature delivery  of his wife. Continental Steel granted Hortillano’s
claim for paternity leave but denied his claims  for bereavement leave and
other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.
The  Union  argued that  Hortillano was  entitled to bereavement  leave and
other death benefits  pursuant to the CBA. It maintained  that the CBA did
not specifically state  that the dependent should have first been  born
alive or must have acquired juridical personality  so that his/her
subsequent death could be covered by the  CBA death benefits.
Continental  Steel, relying  on Articles  40,  41  and  42  of  the Civil  Code,
contended  that the CBA is  clear and unambiguous,  so that the literal
and  legal meaning of death should  be applied. It argued that a dead fetus,
never having acquired a juridical personality, could not “die”.
The  Voluntary  Arbitrator,  ruled that Hortillano  was entitled and reasoned
that a fetus had the right  to be supported by the parents  from the very
moment he/she was conceived.  Therefore, the fetus was already a
dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the resolution of the Voluntary Arbitrator.
ISSUE Whether or not Hortillano is entitled
RULING The  reliance  of Continental  Steel on Articles  40, 41 and 42 of the  Civil
Code for the legal  definition of death is misplaced.  Article 40 provides
that a conceived  child acquires personality only when it  is born, and
Article 41 defines when a child  is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality  is extinguished by death.
The issue of civil personality is  not relevant . It is not a question  before us
whether the unborn child acquired  any rights or incurred any
obligations prior to his/her  death that were passed on to or assumed by
the child’s  parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death
benefits  in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn
child upon the latter’s death.
Sections  40, 41 and  42 of the Civil  Code do not provide  at all a
definition of  death. Moreover, while the Civil  Code expressly provides
that civil  personality may be extinguished by death,  it does not
explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could
die.
Death has been defined as the  cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with
civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before  he/she
could die. Even a  child inside  the womb already  has life. No less
than the Constitution  recognizes the life of  the unborn from conception,
that the State must protect equally  with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already  has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death.
The  unborn  child can  be considered  a dependent under  the CBA. As
Continental  Steel itself defines, a dependent  is “one who relies on
another for  support; one not able to exist or sustain  oneself without the
 Page 63 of 320
power or aid of someone else.”  Under said general definition, even an
unborn child is  a dependent of its parents. The child could not have
reached  38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its
mother for sustenance. The  CBA did not provide a qualification for the
child dependent, such that the child must  have been born or must have
acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the
mother’s womb.
(ENRIQUEZ, K)
5 [G.R. No. 149417. June 4, 2004]
GLORIA SANTOS DUEAS, petitioner, vs. SANTOS SUBDIVISION
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, respondent.
DOCTRIN Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
E unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision
for its retroactive application must be made in the law.
FACTS Petitioner Gloria Santos Dueas is the daughter of the late Cecilio J. Santos
who, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land with a total area of 2.2
hectares located at General T. De Leon, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. In
1966, Cecilio had the realty subdivided into smaller lots, the whole forming
the Cecilio J. Santos Subdivision (for brevity, Santos Subdivision). The then
Land Registration Commission (LRC) approved the project and the National
Housing Authority (NHA) issued the required Certificate of Registration and
License to Sell. At the time of Cecilios death in 1988, there were already
several residents and homeowners in Santos Subdivision.
Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a
resolution asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for
recreational and other community activities, in accordance with the
provisions of P.D. No. 957,  as amended by P.D. No. 1216. Petitioner,
however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the members of SSHA to seek
redress from the NHA.
On April 25, 1997, the NHA General Manager forwarded the SSHA resolution
to Romulo Q. Fabul, Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer of the
HLURB in Quezon City.
In a letter dated May 29, 1997, the HLURB opined that the open space
requirement of P.D. No. 957 was not applicable to Santos Subdivision.
The CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE WON the respondent had any right to demand an open space and the
petitioner had any legal obligation to provide said open space within Santos
Subdivision under P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216.
RULING No.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision
for its retroactive application must be made in the law. There being no such
provision in both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot be applied to a
situation that occurred years before their promulgation.
At any rate, our principal concern in this case is Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, an
amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1216. Properly, the question should focus
on the retroactivity of P.D. No. 1216 and not P.D. No. 957 per se.
Nowhere do we find any clause or provision expressly providing for its
retroactive application. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance,
rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated.
Hence, there is no legal basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply
retroactively.
Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon is inapplicable. It is not on all fours with the
instant case. The issue in Eugenio was the applicability of P.D. No. 957 to
purchase agreements on lots entered into prior to its enactment where there
was non-payment of amortizations, and failure to develop the subdivision. We
held therein that although P.D. No. 957 does not provide for any retroactive
application, nonetheless, the intent of the law of protecting the helpless
citizens from the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers justify its retroactive application to
contracts entered into prior to its enactment. Hence, we ruled that the non-
payment of amortizations was justified under Section 23 of the said decree in
view of the failure of the subdivision owner to develop the subdivision project.
Unlike Eugenio, non-development of the subdivision is not present in this
case, nor any allegation of non-payment of amortizations.  We have held in a
subsequent case that P.D. No. 957, as amended, cannot be applied
retroactively in view of the absence of any express provision on its retroactive
application.
H.
1 G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, Petitioners,  vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
DOCTRIN Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
E but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
 Page 64 of 320
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for
ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same
meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
FACTS Eliseo died intestate. Petition for Letters of Administration were filed by
Belen and Elise who are his common-law wife and daughter. The petition was
opposed by petitioner to whom Eliseo was married. Respondent Elise claims
that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting
on the legal capacity of Eliseo and respondent Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to petitioner Amelia by claiming
that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the
latter’s marriage with another.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together
with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners
asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of
Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas
City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that
there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of
Eliseo’s estate.
The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to respondent
daughter Elise. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. CA
agreed that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence up to the time of Eliseo’s death.
ISSUE WON the venue of the petition as properly laid. Yes
WON Elise may question the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia. Yes
RULING 1st issue
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of
the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for
ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same
meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of
the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
2nd Issue
In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot
be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly
or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.
It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of
Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family
Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog applicable four-square to the
case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein
petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contra
 Page 65 of 320
distinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may
attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional
rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn
the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said
marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity
thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such
cause of action.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in
the estate as distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by
the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With
the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation
to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right
of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law,
is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children,
Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of
the law.
2 G.R. No. 155635  November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, respondents.
DOCTRIN Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of
E divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had
been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure)
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
FACTS Vicente and Rebecca were married in 1979. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate identified Rebecca to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam,
USA. In 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican
Republic, pursuant thereto, the Dominican court issued a divorce decree.
Subsequently, Rebecca filed with the RTC Muntinlupa a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of
divorce.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her
Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
RTC held that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best
taken up during actual trial. On appeal, CA effectively dismissed Rebecca’s
case for failure to state a cause of action; anchored on the ground of res
judicata
ISSUE WON the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal
effects?
RULING Yes.
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be
one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The
following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American
citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus
soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to
those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an
American passport. Hence, when Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not
a Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One.
Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the
United States of America, a country which allows divorce.
 Page 66 of 320
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven
as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.  Be this as it
may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured
the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of
the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied,
but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the
jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings
on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both
appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect
to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained in
Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of
divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had
been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive
upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a
foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the
foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain
Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign
divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are
valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice
Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not,
standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at
the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would
come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the
reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall
be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente
is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In
plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each
other.
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be
subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for
instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to Rebecca.
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code. In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the
twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Both elements obtain in the instant case.
3 NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, vs COMELEC  G.R. No. 181097 June 25,
2008
DOCTRIN To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
E removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.
FACTS Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G.
Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent Malik Bobby T. Alingan (Malik) were
mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
 Page 67 of 320
Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad for failure to comply with the
residency requirement. Malik filed another petition to disqualify Norlainie
also on the ground of lack of the one-year residency requirement.
Norlainie filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy.
Thereafter, she filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for disqualification in
on the ground that the petition had become moot in view of the withdrawal of
her certificate of candidacy.
The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of Norlainies certificate of
candidacy.
Comelec granted the petition to disqualify Mohammad. Thus, Norlanie filed a
new certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate for Mohammad.
Thus, Malik filed a second petition for disqualification against Norlainie.
After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning candidate and
accordingly took her oath and assumed office.
However, on September 4, 2007, the COMELEC disqualified Norlainie on
three grounds: lack of the one-year residency requirement; not being a
registered voter of the municipality; and, nullity of her certificate of candidacy
for having been filed at a place other than the Office of the Election Officer.
Norlainie filed an Omnibus Motion to declare the petition moot and/or for
reconsideration, arguing that the Comelec en banc had approved the
withdrawal of her first certificate of candidacy and had given due course to
her new certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate for Mohammad.
Malik opposed the omnibus motion.
ISSUE WON Norlanie was disqualified on the ground of lack of the one-year
residency requirement.
RULING Yes.
Petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. The term
residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile, which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The
manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a
stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve
that community.
For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of
intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a
person actually resides. Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a
man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; second, that where once
established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third, a man can have
but one domicile at a time.
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3)
an intention to abandon the old domicile. A persons domicile once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new
one is established.
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.
The petitioners domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is also
her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of
marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad,
petitioners husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar,
Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the
husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows that
petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006.
Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from
living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid
and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall
not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate
residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove otherwise,
reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in
consonance with human experience.
Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is
disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
However, petitioners disqualification would not result in Maliks proclamation
who came in second during the special election.
(ENRIQUEZ, M)
 Page 68 of 320
4 RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,  vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent
DOCTRIN There is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
E "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.
FACTS The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During
his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children,
namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11,
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged that she is the
widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing
at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that
the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children
by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left
real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more
or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and
that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss  on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to
his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Respondent submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they
bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to
prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry
her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code.
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately
filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage
with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of
Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
ISSUE 1. WON venue was properly laid?
2. Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration
RULING 1. Yes.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
"domicile." There is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election
laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is,
the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated
 Page 69 of 320

January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property.
She also presented billing statements  from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating
the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa."
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-
envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his
Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his
home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
filed in the Regional Trial Court  which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa.
2. Yes.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has
a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of
the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then
she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code.
This provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it
is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven.
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before
he contracts a subsequent marriage.
FACTS Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of 4 years
(from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with
each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete
from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they
became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition
appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were
married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan,
Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage. The complaint seek among others, the declaration of
nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy. The petitioner
moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in
the bigamy case.

ISSUE Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of
5 LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
good faith is valid.
respondent.
RULING No, petitioner has not committed bigamy.
DOCTRIN The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
E been legally married. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,  we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
 Page 70 of 320
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been
for the existence of the first.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired
was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence
of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab
initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on
their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a
subsequent marriage.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time
he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity
of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is
but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there
is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of
the instant charge.
I.
1 AMADA COTONER-ZACARIAS, Petitioner,  vs. SPOUSES ALFREDO AND
THE HEIRS REVILLA OF PAZ REVILLA, Respondents.
DOCTRIN Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and
E not courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice
outside legality," should be applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law.
In any case, doctrines of equity such as laches apply only in the absence of
statutory law. The Civil Code clearly provides that the action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. Hence,
laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal
right, and petitioners can validly vindicate their right despite the lapse of
time.
FACTS Alfredo Revilla and Paz Castillo-Revilla (Revilla spouses) are the owners in
fee simple of a 15,000-square-meter unregistered parcel of land in Silang,
Cavite.
In 1983, the Revilla spouses faced financial difficulties in raising funds for
Alfredo Revilla’s travel to Saudi Arabia, so Paz Castillo-Revilla borrowed
money from Amada Cotoner-Zacarias (Amada). By way of security, the
parties verbally agreed that Amada would take physical possession of the
property, cultivate it, then use the earnings from the cultivation to pay the
loan and realty taxes.5 Upon full payment of the loan, Amada would return
the property to the Revilla spouses.
Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious document
entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihanng Lupa" before the Provincial Assessor of
Cavite. This document was executed on March 19, 1979 with the Revilla
spouses as sellers and Amada as buyer of the property.
On August 25, 1984, Amada sold the property to the spouses Adolfo and
Elvira Casorla (Casorla spouses). Tax Declaration No. 30411-A was later
issued in the name of the Casorla spouses.
In turn, the Casorla spouses executed a deed of absolute sale dated December
16, 1991 in favor of the spouses Rodolfo and Yolanda Sun (Sun spouses).
In December 1994, Alfredo Revilla returned from Saudi Arabia. He asked
Amada why she had not returned their tax declaration considering their full
payment of the loan. He then discovered that the property’s tax declaration
was already in the name of the Sun spouses.
The Revillaspouses filed a complaint before the Tagaytay Regional Trial Court
for the annulment of sales and transfers of title and reconveyance of the
property with damages against Amada, the Casorla spouses, the Sun spouses,
and the Provincial Assessor of Cavite.
In her answer, Amada denied that the property was used as a security for the
Revilla spouses’ loan. Instead, she claimed that the Revilla spouses
voluntarily executed the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" in her favor on
March 19, 1979. She added that the Revilla spouses’ cause of action already
prescribed.
For their part, the Sun spouses argued good faith belief that Amada was the
real owner of the property asAmada showed them a tax declaration in her
name and the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" allegedly executed by the
Revilla spouses When the Sun spouses discovered there was another sale with
 Page 71 of 320
the Casorla spouses, they were assured by Amada that she had already bought
back the property from the Casorla spouses.Subsequently, the Casorla
spouses executed a deed of absolute sale dated December 16, 1991 in favor of
the Sun spouses. They also argued prescription against the Revilla spouses,
and prayed for damages against Amada by way of crossclaim.
ISSUE Whether respondents Revilla spouses’ cause of action is barred by
prescription or laches?
RULING No.
Laches has been defined as "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which — by the exercise of due
diligence — could or should have been done earlier."
The elements that need to be present and proven before an action is
considered barred by laches are the following:
The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
suit; and, (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred.
There was no delay by respondents Revilla spouses in asserting their rights
over the property. The lower courts found that respondents Revilla spouses
first learned of the existence of the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" in
February 1995 when they were served a copy of the pleading in the land
registration case instituted by the Sun spouses. They filed their complaint
within the same year, specifically, on November 17, 1995. The lapse of only
nine (9) months from the time they learned of the questionable transfers on
the property cannot be considered as sleeping on their rights.
In any case, doctrines of equity such as laches apply only in the absence of
statutory law. The Civil Code clearly provides that "[t]he action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. This court
has discussed:
Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and
not courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice
outside legality," should be applied only in the absence of, and never against,
statutory law. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The positive mandate of
Art. 1410 of the New Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions for
declaration of the inexistence of a contract should pre-empt and prevail over
all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot be set up
to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and petitioners can
validly vindicate their inheritance despite the lapse of time.
2 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE REGIONAL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, REGION IV, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Petitioner, v. MARJENS INVESTMENT
CORPORATION AND PATROCINIO P. VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
DOCTRIN Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
E unexplained length of time to do that which, by observance of due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert his right either has abandoned or declined to assert it.
The following elements must be present in order to constitute laches: (a)
conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant's rights
after he had knowledge of defendant's acts and after he has had the
opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the
complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the
complainant.
FACTS On December 22, 1998, or almost 46 years after the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-669, petitioner Republic, represented by the
Region IV Regional Executive Director of the DENR, filed a petition for
annulment of judgment, cancellation of title, and reversion against
respondents Marjens Investment Corporation (Marjens) and Patrocinio
Villanueva (Villanueva), the Register of Deeds for the Province of Batangas
(Tanauan, Batangas), and the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.
Petitioner, through the OSG, alleges that respondents Marjens and Villanueva
appear as registered owners of a land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-18592 issued on April 7, 1976 by the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas.
The OSG avers that TCT No. T-18592 appears to have emanated from
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-669 in the name of Hammon H. Buck
issued by virtue of a Decision dated March 30, 1951, rendered in Land
Registration Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-3454 of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Lipa City, Batangas.
The OSG further alleges that upon verification through a certification issued
by the CENRO of the DENR in Batangas City, it was ascertained that the land
covered by TCT No. T-18592 is within the unclassified public forest per Land
Classification Control Map No. 10 for the Provinces of Batangas and Cavite.
The OSG argues that the land in question cannot be the subject of disposition
 Page 72 of 320

or registration, and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over said
property, much less to decree the same as private property. Therefore, the
registration proceedings, the judgment in the subject case, the OCT No. O-
669 issued pursuant thereto, and all subsequent titles are null and void. The
land covered by TCT No. T-18592, not having been legally registered, remains
and forms part of the public domain of the State.

Respondents assert that the government has lost its rights by laches and
estoppel to question the validity of the OCT No. 0-669, the proceedings in
LRC Case No. 52, G.L.R.O. Record No. N-3454, and the corresponding decree
(Decree 6610) issued after almost 50 years have lapsed. They maintain that
the proceeding for its registration was made in accordance with the
requirements of the law, including the publication of notices addressed to the
Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, and the Director of Forestry, among
others, in the Official Gazette. Despite the notices, there was no opposition
from the government.

Respondents insist that it will be most unfair and will violate their right to
due process if they will again be required to undergo another trial to establish
their long continued, open, public, adverse possession and cultivation of the
property in the concept of owners as against the whole world, now that all
their witnesses are long dead, senile, or impossible to locate. They also point
out that the subject property has transferred to various parties who have been
regularly assessed and paying realty taxes for several years.

ISSUE Whether or not the government is barred by laches and estoppel.  

RULING Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by observance of due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert his right either has abandoned or declined to assert it.

The following elements must be present in order to constitute laches: (a)

conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant's rights
after he had knowledge of defendant's acts and after he has had the
opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the
complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the
complainant.

We find it unnecessary to discuss further this issue in view of our ruling that
Decree No. 6610, OCT No. 0-669, and TCT No. T-18592 registered in the
name of respondents were validly issued.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated

November 19, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50023 is AFFIRMED.
 Page 73 of 320
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 - DIGESTS (BATCH 2)
A.
1 A.M. No. RTJ-12-2325               April 14, 2015
(Formerly A.M. No. 12-7-132-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. JUDGE
ALAN L. FLORES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 7, TUBOD, LANAO DEL NORTE AND FORMER ACTING
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21,
KAPATAGAN, LANAO DEL NORTE, Respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Facts:
 The first letter dated April 28, 2011 was received on May 10, 2011 by
the OCA and sent by a certain "John Hancock" while the other was
received on June 15, 2011 and sent by "Concerned Citizens."
 Both letters accused Judge Flores of rendering favorable judgments
in exchange for monetary consideration; of taking cognizance of, and
deciding cases on annulment of marriage even if said cases were
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the courts he presided; and,
that every time an audit team of the OCA visits Iligan, Lanao del
Norte and Marawi City, Judge Flores would meet them at the
airport, act as their driver, entertain them and even give presents for
their return to Manila.
 In addition, "John Hancock" alleged that Judge Flores demands
₱5,000.00 for special proceedings and notarial commissions; that he
maintains the services of four non-court personnel who regularly
reported to him and acted as his errand boys, bag-men, personal
security and drinking buddies; and if Judge Flores is not with his
mistress in Cagayan de Oro City or Ozamis City, he is having
drinking sprees from 3 p.m. until 7 or 8 p.m. with his errand boys at
"Randy's Place" in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. Judge Flores also
allegedly claims to be protected by one of the associate justices of the
Supreme Court (SC) who is a former Free Legal Assistance Group
lawyer, and by a "Lawyer-Administrator" who is assigned in Lanao
del Norte.
 OCA observed that the Judge made violation of the rule on venue in
several of its cases.
 Moreover, Prosecutor Cabrera claimed that Judge Flores neglected
to resolve incidents in eight criminal cases, which were then pending
in his sala, and that he rendered favorable decisions in numerous
petitions for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in exchange for
monetary consideration even if the parties reside in areas outside the
territorial jurisdiction of his courts.
 Judge Flores’ contention –  Prosecutor Cabrera has an "attitude
problem"; the rule on declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
does not require a judge to verify the exact address of the parties,
and that the prosecutor is in a better position to verify the veracity of
the parties' statements.
 CA – Judge Flores is administratively liable for ignorance of the law,
gross misconduct and undue delay in rendering decisions and
orders.
 In the cases for declaration of nullity of marriage, Judge Flores
rendered judgment in record time despite the heavy case load he was
claiming. The special interest shown by Judge Flores in these cases
constitutes gross misconduct, which was aggravated by the fact that
it resulted in the pendency of incidents in other cases and prejudiced
the affected parties.
ISSUE WON Judge Flores is liable for the acts mentioned by CA.
RULING  The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of the CA
and the OCA.
 In petitions for declaration of nullity of void marriages, the
applicable rule is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as amended. In particular,
Section 4 categorically states the venue where a petition shall be
filed, to wit: “SEC. 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the
Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date
of the filling, or in case of a non-resident respondent, where he may
be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x”
 In this case, the OCA report is replete with findings showing that
Judge Flores deliberately disregarded the foregoing rule. He
continued to try and resolve cases despite glaring circumstances,
which should have created doubt as to the veracity of the residential
addresses declared in the petitions. Prosecutor Cabrera even actually
brought these to the attention of Judge Flores but he was merely
brushed aside. Worse, there were even instances when Judge Flores,
during clarificatory questioning, knowingly led a party into curing
the defect.
 The utter disregard shown by Judge Flores displays not only a lack of
familiarity with the law but a gross ignorance thereof. What's more,
Judge Flores rendered judgments in several cases for nullity of
marriage in record time, which ranged from six (6) months to one (1)
year and seven (7) months from the date of filing, despite his claim
of being burdened by heavy caseload.
2 A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691               April 2, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE
ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA,
Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Branch 4; and JUDGE
 Page 74 of 320
EDGEMELO C. ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu ·City;
CELESTE P. RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6, Cebu City;
CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6,
Cebu City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ, Administrative Officer I,
Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC) Cebu City;
EMMA D. VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18,
Cebu City; MARILOU CABANEZ, Court Stenographer, MTCC,
Branch 4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process Server,
MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter,
MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City; and HELEN MONGGAYA, Court
Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City. Respondents.
DOCTRIN
E signature on the marriage license to determine its authenticity
FACTS  On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor,
proceeded to Cebu City and headed the audit team created by OCA
in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City.
 A female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a
couple looking to get married. They went to the Palace of Justice and
were directed by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a
certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would be recognized
by other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4
who was a former law school classmate. The two lawyers then agreed
that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the
marriage application process.
 Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and assisted
the female lawyer.
 When the female lawyer asked if the marriage process could be
rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be
solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be
dated the day the marriage license becomes available.
 Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a fee of three
thousand pesos (₱3,000) only.
 OCA Report
o Out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280
marriages were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a
higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of
marriage certificates in the courts’ custody.
o There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses
obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili
and Liloan, Cebu. There were even marriages solemnized at
9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day.
The town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers
away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two
(2) hours. Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten
(10) kilometers away from Cebu City.
 Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity
regarding the documents presented to him by contracting parties.
He claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the
Family Code had the required affidavit of cohabitation. He claims
that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other
judges even before he became a judge. He avers that he ascertains
the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the existence of an
impediment to marry. He also asks the parties searching questions
and clarifies whether they understood the contents of the affidavit
and the legal consequences of its execution.
 Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage
license and that he is not required to inquire whether the license was
obtained from a location where one of the parties is an actual
resident. The judge believes that it is not his duty to verify the
because he relies on the presumption of regularity of public
documents. The judge also outlines his own procedure in
solemnizing marriages which involves: first, the determination
whether the solemnization fee was paid; second, the presentation of
the affidavit of cohabitation and birth certificates to ascertain
identity and age of the parties; third, if one of the parties is a
foreigner, the judge asks for a certificate of legal capacity to marry,
passport picture, date of arrival, and divorce papers when the party
is divorced; fourth, he then asks the parties and their witnesses
questions regarding cohabitation and interviews the children of the
parties, if any.
 Judge Rosabella M. Tormis claims that there is nothing wrong with
solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage
license and with the fact that the issued marriage license was
obtained from a place where neither of the parties resided. As to the
pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues that she cannot be
faulted for accepting it as genuine as she and the other judges are
not handwriting experts
 Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales maintains that it is the local civil
registrar who evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and
he presumes the regularity of the license issued. It is only when there
is no marriage license given that he ascertains the qualifications of
the parties and the lack of legal impediment to marry. As to the
affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing wrong
with the fact that these are pro forma. He states that marriage
certificates are required with the marriage license attached or the
affidavit of cohabitation only and the other documents fall under the
responsibility of the local civil registrar. He surmises that if the
marriage certificate did not come with the marriage license or
affidavit of cohabitation, the missing document might have been
inadvertently detached, and it can be checked with the proper local
civil registrar.
ISSUE WON the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty
of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and
 Page 75 of 320
gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal
from service.
RULING  Yes, the judges and personnel are of the offense charged.
 The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta,
Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales are all guilty of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized marriages
without following the proper procedure laid down by law,
particularly the Family Code of the Philippines and existing
jurisprudence.
 The liabilities of the judges are the following:
o First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized
marriages even if the requirements submitted by the
couples were incomplete and of questionable character.
Most of these documents showed visible signs of
tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of
entries related to the parties’ place of residence. These
included indistinguishable features such as the font, font
size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the
marriage certificate and marriage license. These actions of
the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency.
o Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty
regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The marriage
documents examined by the audit team show that
corresponding official receipts for the solemnization fee
were missing or payment by batches was made for
marriages performed on different dates. The OCA
emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization fee starts
off the whole marriage application process and even puts a
"stamp of regularity" on the process.
o Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also
solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a
foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity
to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners
submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity to
marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity
that are required under Article 21 of the Family Code
displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They
should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents
required for the marriage license issuance. Any
irregularities would have been prevented in the
qualifications of parties to contract marriage.
o Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise
guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the
Family Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized
where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such
as the minority status of one party. The audit team cites in
their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose
ages ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old
who were married by mere submission of a pro forma joint
affidavit of cohabitation. These affidavits were notarized by
the solemnizing judge himself or herself.
o Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the
solemnization of marriages of some couples where no
marriage license was previously issued. The contracting
parties were made to fill up the application for a license on
the same day the marriage was solemnized.
 The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges
that the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is
beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when
there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary.
 As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity
accorded to a marriage license disappears the moment the marriage
documents do not appear regular on its face.
 Also as noted by the OCA, the absence of the required certificates
coupled with the presence of mere affidavits should have aroused
suspicion as to the regularity of the marriage license issuance.
 The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they
solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code without
the required qualifications and with the existence of legal
impediments such as minority of a party.
 Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article
34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability
of the formal requisite of a marriage license.
 The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void
ab initio. The actions of the judges have raised a very alarming issue
regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they
did not follow the proper procedure or check the required
documents and qualifications.
3 A.M. No. RTJ-12-2316               October 9, 2012
(Formerly A.M. No. 09-7-280-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. HON.
LIBERTY 0. CASTANEDA, Presiding Judge, ATTY. PAULINO I.
SAGUYOD, Clerk of Court, LOURDES E. COLLADO, Sheriff,
MARYLINDA C, DOCTOR, EVELYN B. ANTONIO, ROSALIE P.
SARSAGAT and CHERYL B. ESTEBAN, Court Stenographers,
GEORGE P. CLEMENTE, Clerk, MARITONI FLORIAN C.
CERVANTES, Court Interpreter, and RUBEN A. GIGANTE, Utility
Worker, all of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 67,
PANIQUI, TARLAC, Respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  Prompted by reports that Branch 67 is fast becoming a haven for
 Page 76 of 320
couples who want their marriages to be judicially declared null and
void or annulled, or those who merely want to be legally separated,
the audit team gave special attention to cases for declaration of
nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage and legal separation, and
found that of the 717 civil cases, 522 or 72.80% involved nullity of
marriage, annulment and legal separation.
 These cases revealed various irregularities in the proceedings,
consisting of blatant violations of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, as well as A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC, or the Rule
on Legal Separation.
 First. Judge Castañeda allowed the petitions for nullity of marriage
or annulment to prosper despite the impropriety of venue.
 Second. In some cases, there are no proofs of payment of docket
fees, while in others, summons and other initial court processes were
issued even before the docket fees were fully paid.
 Third. There are cases where the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) and the Office of the Public Prosecutor (OPP) were not
furnished copies of the petition, which under the rules must be done
within five (5) days from the date of its filing, and proof of such
service must be submitted to the court within the same period,
otherwise, the petition may be outrightly dismissed. However, in
those cases where it has been established that the OSG and OPP
were not served copies of the petition, Judge Castañeda did not
order the petitioners to comply.
 Fourth. In several cases, the process server or sheriff merely resorted
to substituted service of summons, without strict compliance with
the rule thereon.
 Fifth. Judge Castañeda likewise granted motions for depositions and
allowed the advance taking of testimonies even without the
respondent or public prosecutor being furnished copies of the
motion. In several cases, she granted the motion on the very same
day, or merely a day after it was filed.
 Sixth. After having been served with summons, respondents were
usually no longer notified of subsequent court orders or processes.
 Seventh. In other cases, Judge Castañeda permitted the public
prosecutor to conduct a collusion investigation even before the
respondent has filed an answer, or the lapse of the prescribed period
of 15 days.
 Eighth. Judge Castañeda allowed the pre-trial to proceed in several
cases, notwithstanding the absence of the petitioner, or the fact that
the latter failed to authorize his/her counsel, through a duly-
executed special power of attorney (SPA), to represent him/her
thereat. She also condoned the late filing of pre-trial briefs, as in
fact, there were instances when the petitioner's pre-trial brief was
filed on the day of the pre-trial conference itself.
 Ninth. There are cases where the documentary evidence had been
allegedly marked and formally offered, and which Judge Castañeda
admitted, but which cannot be found in the records. In several cases,
the petitioner would be allegedly cross-examined by the public
prosecutor, but records are bereft of showing to establish such
proceeding.
 Tenth. Most of the pyschologists' reports are pro forma and mere
photocopies, and the psychologists did not even testify in court. On
the other hand, the respondent's failure to appear in court for
purposes of presenting his/her evidence is considered a waiver
thereof, despite lack of due notice.
 Eleventh. At the time of the audit, Judge Castañeda had granted 175
cases involving nullity or annulment of marriage and legal
separation. More particularly, the audit team observed the
extraordinary speed and overzealousness with which Judge
Castañeda acted in granting some 11 cases, which were decided
between a period of a mere 16 days to four (4) months from the
date of their filing.
 Finally, Judge Castañeda issued certificates of finality of decisions
notwithstanding the lack of proof that the parties, counsels, the OSG
and the OPP had been duly furnished with copies of the decisions.
 Judge Castañeda’s contention – since the petitions filed before her
were all verified, it was no longer incumbent upon her to confirm the
veracity of the contents thereof, including the parties' addresses. She
contended that she merely allowed the issuance of summons even
before the filing fees had been paid when no receipts were readily
available to be issued. She likewise explained that it was not the duty
of the court to order the petitioner to furnish the OSG or the OPP
with copies of the petition, and that it was only upon the petitioner's
failure to do so that the court arrogates unto itself the duty to furnish
the OSG a copy of the petition.
ISSUE WON Judge Castañeda is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
RULING  Yes, the respondent is guilty of the offense charge.
 The serious infractions committed by Judge Castañeda were in cases
involving petitions for nullity and annulment of marriage and legal
separation, the most disturbing and scandalous of which was the
haste with which she disposed of such cases.
 For the year 2010 alone, Judge Castañeda granted a total of 410
petitions of this nature. The audits likewise showed that she acted on
these petitions despite the fact that it was not verified; that the OSG
or the OPP were not furnished a copy of the petition within 5 days
from its filing; that the petition did not recite the true residence of
the parties, which should be within the territorial jurisdiction of
Branch 67 for at least 6 months prior to the filing of the petition; or
that the docket fees have not been fully paid and jurisdiction over
the person of the respondents have not been acquired.
 The Court takes special exception to the case Dodgie Benaid v. Lea
Benaid, which Judge Castañeda granted notwithstanding the
following irregularities: (1) petitioner-husband Dodgie Benaid
 Page 77 of 320
appeared to be a resident of Infanta, Quezon, contrary to the
information reflected on the petition that he was a resident of
Apulid, Paniqui, Tarlac; (2) respondent-wife Lea Benaid is not a
resident, either, of Goldenland Subdivision, Mabalacat, Pampanga,
but of Infanta, Quezon; and (3) Lea was neither interviewed nor
investigated by the public prosecutor in arriving at the conclusion
that no collusion exists between her and her husband. In fact,
records show that Dodgie Benaid, the Chief of Police of Real,
Quezon, was eventually found guilty of misconduct and dishonesty
for falsely claiming in his petition for nullity of marriage that he was
a resident of Apulid, Tarlac and that his wife, Lea, was a resident of
Mabalacat, Pampanga.
 For her blatant disregard of the provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC
and 02-11-11-SC, Judge Castañeda is thus found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and procedure.
4 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE
CADER P. INDAR, Presiding Judge and Acting Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City and Branch 15, Shariff Aguak,
Maguindanao, respectively, respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232. April 10,
2012.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and
Quezon City to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have
received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on
annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.
The Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil
Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases
received, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15. Likewise, the
annulment decisions did not exist in the records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14.
The Audit Team further observed that the case numbers in the list submitted
by the Local Civil Registrars are not within the series of case numbers
recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato.
Court En Banc: preventively suspended Judge Indar pending investigation of
this case.
Judge Indar failed to attend the hearing as rescheduled and to submit the
affidavit as required.
Despite several notices, Judge Indar did not participate in the proceeding.
ISSUE WON Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.
RULING Yes. Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.
The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which govern
the conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in
administrative cases, clearly provide that technical rules of procedure and
evidence do not strictly apply to administrative proceedings.
In Cornejo v. Gabriel, the Court held that notice and hearing are not
indispensable in administrative investigations.
It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case
against him is decided.
The Constitutional precept that public office is a public trust, which is the
underlying principle for the relaxation of the requirements of due process of
law in administrative proceedings.
In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the
charges against him. While there is no proof that Judge Indar personally
received the notices of hearing issued by the Investigating Justices, the first
two notices of hearing were received by one Mustapha Randang of the Clerk
of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices was received by a certain
Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and capable to receive notices on
behalf of Judge Indar.
Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation
against him because aside from the fact that the Court's Resolution
suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive suspension was reported in
major national newspapers. Moreover, Judge Indar was repeatedly sent
notices of hearings to his known addresses. Thus, there was due notice on
Judge Indar of the charges against him. However, Judge Indar still failed to
file his explanation and appear at the scheduled hearings. Consequently, the
investigation proceeded ex parte in accordance with Section 4, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.
Public office is a public trust. 20(20) This constitutional principle requires a
judge, like any other public servant and more so because of his exalted
position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty
and integrity.
Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting standards.
Simple misconduct vs Grave misconduct:
Misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer." The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements
of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established
rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge
of grave misconduct.
Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on
the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such
cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential
requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross
misconduct.
The Court condemns Judge Indar's reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that
voided marital unions, without conducting any judicial proceedings. Such
malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing
consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice,
and due process. Not only that, Judge Indar's gross misconduct greatly
 Page 78 of 320
undermines the people's faith in the judiciary and betrays public trust and
confidence in the courts. Judge Indar's utter lack of moral fitness has no place
in the Judiciary. Judge Indar deserves nothing less than dismissal from the
service.
Judge Indar made it appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases
complied with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict
statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, when quite
the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
mandates that a judge "perform official duties honestly."
Since this is Judge Indar's third offense, showing the depravity of his
character and aggravating the serious offenses of gross misconduct and
dishonesty, the Court imposes on Judge Indar the ultimate penalty of
dismissal from the service, with its accessory penalties, pursuant to Section
11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
This administrative case against Judge Indar shall also be considered as a
disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar.
Indisputably, Judge Indar's gross misconduct and dishonesty likewise
constitute a breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Judge Indar's dishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that the
annulment cases underwent trial and complied with the Rules of Court, laws,
and established jurisprudence violates the lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court." Such violation is also a ground for
disbarment.
B.
1 PHILIP YU, petitioner, vs. VIVECA LIM YU, respondent. G.R. No. 200072.
June 20, 2016.
DOCTRIN
E undo or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the
FACTS Petitioner Philip Yu and respondent Viveca Lim Yu were married.
They had four children and maintained their conjugal home at Room 1603
Horizon Condominium, Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila.
Viveca left the conjugal home with their four children and filed a Petition for
Legal Separation against Philip before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 261, for
repeated physical violence, grossly abusive conduct against her and the
children, sexual infidelity, and attempt on her life.
She prayed for permanent custody over the children, support, and the
dissolution and distribution of their conjugal partnership valued at
approximately P5,000,000.00.
Philip denied the accusations against him claiming that it was Viveca who
actually attacked him a few times.
He narrated that his marriage to Viveca was arranged according to the
Chinese tradition and that it was much later when he discovered Viveca's
excessively jealous, cynical, and insecure behaviour.
Philip prayed in his Counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage due to Viveca's psychological incapacity, rendering her incapable of
complying with her
marital obligations.
Philip filed a Motion to Withdraw Counterclaim for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage revealing that he no longer had the desire to have his marriage
declared void. Despite Viveca's fervent opposition, the Pasig RTC granted the
motion.
RTC Ruling: Parties are in pari delicto warranting a denial of this petition.
Claiming to be completely unaware of the proceedings before the RTC,
nullifying her marriage with Philip on the ground of her psychological
incapacity, Viveca filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA
seeking to annul the Decision.
CA Ruling: Granted the annulment of judgment.
ISSUE WON the appellate court's judgment of setting aside the decision of the
Batangas RTC despite its own finding that said court validly acquired
jurisdiction when Summons was duly served on Viveca by publication.
WON the appellate court's choice of supporting jurisprudence alleging them
to be inapplicable to the instant case
WON the CA erred in finding that due to his bad faith in maliciously
supplying the Batangas court with an erroneous address wherein Viveca may
supposedly be summoned, she was deprived of her constitutional right to due
process, warranting the annulment of the subject judgment.
RULING Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.
Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction or denial of due process.
The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to
petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense.
Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the
prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party
was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception
practiced on him by the prevailing party.
We find that Viveca was completely prevented from participating in the
Declaration of Nullity case because of the fraudulent scheme employed by
Philip insofar as the service of summons is concerned.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
against him. Through its service, the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person.
As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does
not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not
found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service
 Page 79 of 320
in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property
within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part,
in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under
any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of
court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the
court by registered mail to the defendant's last known address, also with leave
of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider sufficient.
Viveca was already residing in the United States of America. Thus,
extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court is the proper mode by which summons may be served on Viveca, a non-
resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines.
Philip claims that Viveca was duly served summons because: (1) copies of the
summons, complaint, and order of the Batangas court were published in
Tempo, a newspaper of general circulation on March 27, 2008 and April 3,
2008; and (2) the sheriff served copies of the summons, complaint, and order
of the Batangas court on Viveca at their conjugal home in Pasig City, her last
known address.
The Court finds, however, that such service of summons on their conjugal
home address cannot be deemed compliant with the requirements of the rules
and is even tantamount to deception warranting the annulment of the
Batangas court's judgment.
As borne by the records of the instant case, not only is he mistaken, factual
considerations herein belie his claims of good faith. (1) a disclosure of their
basic personal information, which customarily includes their respective local
addresses, wherein they may be served with court papers are provided in the
parties’ legal separation case; (2) as shown by his stipulation in his Amended
Answer with Counterclaim that "after abandoning the conjugal abode on 24
August 1993, petitioner resided at her parent's house in Richbelt
Condominium, Annapolis Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
until she moved to her present address in October 1993."
Thus, Philip cannot be allowed to feign ignorance to the fact that Viveca had
already intentionally abandoned their conjugal abode and that of all the
addresses that Viveca resided at, their conjugal home in Horizon
Condominium is her least recent address.
The aforementioned doubtful circumstances may not instantly amount to
extrinsic fraud, these circumstances, when viewed in conjunction with each
other, paint a deceitful picture which resulted in a violation of Viveca's
constitutional right to due process.
But because of Philip's employment of deceptive means in the service of
summons on Viveca, said purpose of satisfying the due process requirements
was never accomplished.
That because of the service of summons at the erroneous address, Viveca was
effectively prevented from participating in the proceedings thereon.
This Court, therefore, deems as proper the annulment of the Batangas court's
judgment issued without proper service of summons.
2 VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N.
MACAPAZ, represented by ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 191936. June 1, 2016.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No.
1273 Bo. Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was
duly registered in the names of the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag)
and Silvestra.
The title includes an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights
and interests over a portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq.m.
Silvestra died without issue.
The title was cancelled and a new certificate of title was issued in the name of
the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her
99-sq.m. portion to the petitioner.
It was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not
signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the same
legally ineffective.
Fidela passed away.
Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of falsification of
public documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code
against the petitioner. However, said criminal charges were eventually
dismissed.
The respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the
action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466
with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.
The petitioner averred that the respondents have no legal capacity to institute
said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio,
Sr.
RTC Ruling: Deed of sale declared null and void and pay damages. Deed of
Sale was a forgery considering that Silvestra, who purportedly executed said
deed of sale died on November 11, 2002, about three years before the
execution of the said Deed of Sale.
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE WON the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.
RULING While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, this Court however deems it
necessary to pass upon the respondents' relationship to Silvestra so as to
determine their legal rights to the subject property.
At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, viz.: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage contract,
and (2) the canonical certificate of marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to
 Page 80 of 320
establish the fact of marriage without running afoul with the Rules on
Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on
Evidence provides that: "When the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, . . . ." Nevertheless, a reproduction of the original document can still be
admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain requirements specified by
law.
A canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. It has been
settled that
church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the
promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no
longer
public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are
private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all
other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence. Accordingly,
since there is no showing that the authenticity and due execution of the
canonical certificate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven,
it cannot be admitted in evidence.
Other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents.
In order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their
respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office
where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.
A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries
(regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar). Thus, being public
documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are presumed valid, and
are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them.
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the
father in order to be a competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not find
support in law and jurisprudence.
The declaration of either parent of the new-born legitimate child shall be
sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the
registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth
certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant, or only
by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a
number of years, as a result of which they had two children — the second
child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first child,
Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of
marriage.
“[P]ersons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if
the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would
be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage.”
Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela transpired way before the effectivity of the Family Code, the strong
presumption accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor of the
validity of marriage cannot be disregarded.
3 [G.R. No. 189607. April 18, 2016.]
RENATO A. CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS -1st marriage - On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea)
married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista).
-2nd marriage - On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner
Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
-On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to
her subsisting marriage to Bautista/ bigamy.
-Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage to
Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license and neither of
them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer
belonged. Respondent argued that she need not obtain a judicial decree of
nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage.
- On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued a Certificate of Finality
of the decision declaring Lea's first marriage to Bautista as null and void ab
initio.
-respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence but was denied by the RTC.
-RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner; declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground of bigamy
under Article 41 of Family Code. RTC stressed that so long as no judicial
declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing.
-CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and upheld the validity of the
parties' marriage. CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972
and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988,
the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the
marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code. Furthermore, the CA
ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
-Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.  Hence, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari
ISSUE Whether or not judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the
 Page 81 of 320

nullity of a marriage. - Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a
divorce decree from the Dominican Republic.
RULING -No. - Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of
-The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in Virginia in the United States of America (USA).
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the - Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a
law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican
Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws.
Code on void marriages and those on voidable marriages - Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter
-Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig's scandalous affair with Atty.
following ways: Baydo and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and
signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001
void marriage voidable marriage - On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of
his marriage to Gomez
marriage is nonexistent (no marriage is valid until annulled by a - On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son - He
marriage from the beginning) competent court denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his
relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997.
cannot be ratified can be ratified by cohabitation - For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig
- the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
can be collaterally attacked cannot be collaterally attacked - On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of
the IBP-CBD pointed out that Atty. Catindig's act of marrying Dr. Perez
no conjugal partnership and there is conjugal partnership and the despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted
the offspring are natural children conceived before the decree of was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate
children by legal fiction annulment are considered legitimate penalty of disbarment. On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of
no judicial decree to establish there must be a judicial decree to evidence.
the invalidity is necessary establish the invalidity - IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
-Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court held that the Civil Code contains - Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration; denied.
no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage
ISSUE whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant
- The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is
their disbarment
valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the
absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the
RULING -Yes
first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is
-the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors
subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage
-Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to
removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly
Renato is valid.
immoral conduct.
-Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one
amounts to a grossly immoral conduct. Atty. Catindig resorted to
4 [A.C. No. 5816. March 10, 2015.] various legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his otherwise
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. TRISTAN A. invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew
CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, respondents. that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic
was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino
DOCTRIN citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that
E he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a
nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
FACTS - Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. That his marriage with Dr. Perez
Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 in the USA was for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by
 Page 82 of 320
entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. Atty.
Catindig's subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one
definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws
5 [G.R. No. 199886. December 3, 2014.]
CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., represented by its
General Manager and Chief Executive Officer, GABRIEL A.
TORDESILLAS, petitioner, vs. ALLAN RAPANAN and MARY GINE
TANGONAN, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and
FACTS - a motorcycle with three passengers figured in a mishap along the National
Highway. It was driven by its owner Camilo Tangonan who died from the
accident, while his companions respondent Rapanan and one Erwin Coloma
suffered injuries
- Rapanan and Camilo's common law wife, respondent Mary Gine Tangonan,
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for damages against
petitioner. They alleged that the victims were struck and electrocuted by a live
tension wire from one of the electric posts owned by petitioner
- In its Answer, petitioner alleged that they cannot be faulted for negligence
because the accident was due to fortuitous events
- During the trial, Mary Gine testified that she is not married to Camilo but
they are living together and that they have one child.
-the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and dismissed the
complaint for damages of respondents. It further held that respondent Mary
Gine has no legal personality to institute the action since such right is only
given to the legal heir of the deceased. Mary Gine is not a legal heir of Camilo
since she is only his common law wife. RTC awarded damages to the legal
heirs of the deceased Camilo Tangonan, but none to Mary Gine.
- On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and held petitioner liable for quasi-
delict
ISSUE Whether or not the deceased's common law wife is eligible to institute an
action against petitioner.
RULING -No.
-As a mere common law wife of Camilo, she is not considered a legal heir of
the latter, and hence, has no legal personality to institute the action for
damages due to Camilo's death.
6 [G.R. No. 187495. April 21, 2014.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGAR
JUMAWAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, 7(7) alleging that
her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3:00 a.m. of December 3,
1998 at
their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that
on
December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to
have sex
with him. The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the
management of their businesses and that KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-
marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd
behavior. Accused posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which
gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual,
obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a
legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is
presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is
proved. Further, sexual community is a mutual right and obligation between
husband and wife.
ISSUE W/N there is marital rape
RULING Marital rape which regards rape within marriage as a form of
sexual violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or
outside the
family abode.
A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her
will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to
the
CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as
rape
under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A
husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a
property, he is
fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal
120(120)
to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by
coercing
her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent.
It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but
this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that
are both spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally
exacted by force or coercion. Further, the delicate and reverent nature of
sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion.
 Page 83 of 320
Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his
indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy
may
legally seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically
incapacitated to
fulfill an essential marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand
sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly
rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control
her own body, as does an unmarried woman. 128(128) She can give or
withhold her consent to a sexual
intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent
from her
in case she refuses. Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to
have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to
their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion,
discrimination and violence. Women do not divest themselves of such right by
contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable.
7 [G.R. No. 190710. June 6, 2011.]
JESSE U. LUCAS, petitioner, vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
DOCTRIN
E discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing
FACTS Petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation
(with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his
mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila got acquainted with respondent,
Jesus S. Lucas, and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie
eventually got pregnant and gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The
name of petitioner's father was not stated in petitioner's certificate of live
birth.
Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a
period of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent
ended, Elsie refused to accept respondent's offer of support. Respondent filed
a motion to dismiss.
the RTC, granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the case holding that
there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action
which the parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must first establish
these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and
filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like
blood group test and DNA test results.
RTC reconsidered granting the petition of Jesse. However, CA granted the
petition for certiorari filed by the respondent, Jesus.
ISSUE W/N the petition for certiorari should be granted
RULING The assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying respondent's
motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a
motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which cannot be questioned in a
special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors
of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to
dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order
is rendered, but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
There are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case
which parties have to face. The petitioner failed to establish a prima facie
case. A prima facie
case is built by a party's evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima
facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet,
been
presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether,
under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that
no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just
set the said case for hearing.
A prima facie case is built by a party's evidence and not by mere allegations in
the initiatory pleading. Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to
since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially,
it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing
order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the
trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.
8
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal profession. Complainant filed the instant petition
averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of
wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated
promises to marry her.
ISSUE W/N Barranco, Jr. should be denied to take the oath due to gross immorality
 Page 84 of 320
RULING We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests
a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute
grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or
disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree."
Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no
impediment to
marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of
respondent, is
neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of
disciplinary
sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born
out of
wedlock.
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were
evidently consensual. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend
even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. Complainant
was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship.
Respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We
cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage
is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love,
not for any other reason.
C.
1 G.R. No. 204494
JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO,
Petitioners
vs.
LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent
DOCTRIN Marriage Requirements - Marriage License
E Luis.
FACTS Luis Anson filed a Complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado and Gerard
Salgado (Spouses Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya and
Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment of the three
Unilateral Deeds of Sale dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October
25, 2002.
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late
Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They were married in a civil
ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage,
ISSUE
Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965
while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship.
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real
properties located in San Juan, Metro Manila.
According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him
and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal
partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three
separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002 transferring the
properties in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the
said properties.
When Severina died on September 21, 2002, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on October
25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir.
Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful
share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of
Severina.
Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her
mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a common-
law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally terminated
through a Partition Agreement.
Thus, Luis had already received the properties apportioned to him by virtue of
the said agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of
Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's
properties were under Severina's name only and she was described therein as
single without reference to any husband.
The Spouses Salgado disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's
marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license as borne out by the
marriage contract. They further claimed that Luis himself disclosed on cross-
examination that he did not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged
marriage. The logical conclusion therefore is that the properties disposed in
favor of Jo-Ann were owned by Severina as her own, separate and exclusive
properties, which she had all the right to dispose of, without the conformity of
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Luis, holding that
the marriage between Luis and Severina was valid. It noted that the marriage
contract, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its
execution and is conclusive as to the fact of marriage. The trial court also
based its ruling in Geronimo v. CA where the validity of marriage was upheld
despite the absence of the marriage license number on the marriage contract.
1. Whether or not the marriage between Luis and Severina valid?
 Page 85 of 320
2. (Whether or not the absence of a marriage license may be proven on
the basis of a marriage contract which states that no marriage
license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on account of the
marriage being of an exceptional character.) (Yes)
RULING No.
1. Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is
the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of its celebration  on December 28,
1966.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of
the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional
character, renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3 ). It
sets forth:
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character;
x x x x. (Emphasis ours)
"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by
Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are:
(1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war,
(2) marriages in remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4) ratification of
marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages." To reiterate, in
any of the aforementioned marriages of exceptional character, the
requirement of a valid marriage license is dispensed with.
Yes.
2. A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina
reveals that no marriage license number was indicated therein. It
also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being
cited as the reason therefor.
Both the RTC and CA upheld the fact of marriage based on the marriage
contract but simply glossed over the part stating that the marriage is of an
exceptional character. It is inevitable to deduce that this is not a case of mere
non-recording of the marriage license number on the marriage contract, as
was in Geronimo.
The factual antecedents in Geronimo are not on all fours with the case under
review, hence, inapplicable. In Geronimo, despite the absence of the marriage
license number on the marriage contract presented by therein petitioner
(brother of the deceased), there was no statement therein that the marriage is
of an exceptional character. Various witnesses also testified that the deceased
and her husband were indeed married. More importantly, the husband of the
deceased was able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the
National Archives and Records Section where the marriage license number
appears.
"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties." Considering that the absence of the marriage license is
apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that
the marriage is of an exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was
presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that the marriage
between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license
and is thus, void ab initio.
"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of
the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud
against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law
sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just
the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6,
2012 and the Resolution dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.
2 G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016
RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner,
v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND VERONICA B. KHO,
Respondents.
DOCTRIN Marriage License
E
FACTS Sometime in May 31, 1972, petitioner’s parents summoned one Eusebio
Colongon, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said
clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the
intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to take
place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from
witnessing the marriage ceremony.
Petitioner and respondent exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony
which took place at around 3:00 o’clock before dawn of June 1, 1972. The
clerk was told to obtain such marriage license on May 31, 1972, considering
the shortness of period from the time the afore named clerk of the treasurer’s
officewas told to obtain the pertinent papers, no marriage license therefore
could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized on
even date null and void for want of the most essential requisite; for all intents
 Page 86 of 320
and purposes, petitioner’s and respondent’s marriage was solemnized sans
the required marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and
neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of
such marriage license
Thus petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that there was no marriage license during their marriage. Among the
pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a
marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their
marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.
Respondent prayed that petition be dismissed.
RTC rendered its decision granting the petition. The RTC found that
petitioner’s evidence sufficiently established the absence of the requisite
marriage license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent was
celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3)
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license
rendered the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab
initio.
Respondent appealed to CA, which reversed RTC decision and marriage be
declared valid. The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized
between the contending parties, there is a presumption that a marriage
license was issued for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome
such presumption. The CA also ruled that the absence of any indication in the
marriage certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the
formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties’ marriage.
ISSUE Whether or not there was a marriage license obtained by petitioner and
respondent
RULING No.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the Civil Code governs their
union.
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not
those under Article 75.
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by
Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1)
marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2)
marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital
cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan
or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner’s and respondent’s
marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more
than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the
essence of the marriage contract. The rationale for the compulsory character
of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority
granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage. Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a
marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which
the general public is interested
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent,
it may well be that his motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of
his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that
as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to
prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an
essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the
evidence is clearly in his favor.
Respondent can’t present in court a marriage license and also petitioners
contention was backed up by the clerk that no marriage license was issued
due to time constraint. That based on the Certification issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar, coupled with respondent’s failure to produce a copy
of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license
was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it
cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the
 Page 87 of 320
requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the marriage.
The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage
license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed
without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent,
it may well be that his motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of
his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that
as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to
prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, an
essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the marriage of
petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and
January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is
REINSTATED.
3 G.R. No. 189607
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.
DOCTRIN Marriage License - required /
E In a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary
FACTS On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo married Benjamin
Bautista. On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A.
Castillo.
Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting
marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the
ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license
therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged.
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting
when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato
bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's
argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could
presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so
long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing.
Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage
judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to
obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before
contracting her second marriage with Renato.
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
between the parties on the ground that respondent had a previous valid
marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the other hand,
that respondent was not prevented from contracting a second marriage if the
first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to
await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.
ISSUE Whether or not the CA was correct in holding thus and consequentially
reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.
RULING Yes. The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the
law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code.
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the
following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage
from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until
annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a
voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a
void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot
be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal
partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in
voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived
before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void
marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial
decree.
In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that
no judicial decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void
marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the
rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages
celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. 38 A second marriage
contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus
considered bigamous and void
A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of
nullity is thus considered bigamous and void.
The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to
Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to
Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was
 Page 88 of 320
no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the
second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement
under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of
Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to
strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find
no reason to disturb its ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September
2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.
4 RENE RONULO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. No. 182438. July 2, 2014.]
DOCTRIN Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
E perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this
crime includes: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a
marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3
(3) of the Family Code.
FACTS Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled at the Sta. Rosa Catholic
Parish Church in Ilocos Norte; however, on the day of the wedding, the
church's officiating priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of
a marriage license. With the couple and the guests already dressed for the
wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan Churchl and the Aglipayan priest,
petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day where the couple
took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite
Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license. Petitioner was
eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an
illegal marriage ceremony.
The prosecution's witnesses, testified on the incidents of the ceremony.
Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the
wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She
also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a
document. She heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign
the marriage contract.
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his
act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage
as contemplated by law.
Petitioner’s contention: Article 352 of the RPC is vague and does not
define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a
marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of
the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the
verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a
marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed
by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer.  
ISSUE WON there was a performance of an illegal marriage ceremony
RULING Yes. Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of
this crime includes: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a
"marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3
(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions
were taken from Article 55 23(23) of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was
copied from Section 3 24(24) of the Marriage Law with no substantial
amendments.
Article 6 25(25) of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or
religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before
the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife."
Pertinently, Article 3 (3) 27(27) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and
particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Both elements/requirements are present since Petitioner himself admitted
that he has authority to solemnize a marriage; and the alleged act of
"blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an illegal
marriage ceremony. There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization
of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the Family Code provides that it shall be
necessary: for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer; and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses
of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.  Again, both
requisites are hereto present as mentioned in the facts above written.
Under Article 3 (3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of
marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case,
the
petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet
he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship. Undoubtedly, the petitioner
conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and
 Page 89 of 320
formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage
ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner's knowledge of the absence of
these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a
marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3
(3) of the Family Code.
5 REX M. TUPAL, complainant, vs. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, Negros Occidental,
respondent.
DOCTRIN As a solemnizing officer, the judge's only duty involving the affidavit of
E cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for
at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not
state that the judge can notarize the parties' affidavit of cohabitation.
FACTS Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint
against Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and
for gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5,
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages
without the required marriage license. He instead notarized affidavits of
cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties. He notarized these
affidavits on the day of the parties' marriage. These "package marriages" are
allegedly common in Bacolod City.
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he
solemnized, Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February
26, 1990. 8(8) Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as
notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their
official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not
connected with a judge's official functions and duties as solemnizing officer.
Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of
parties whose marriage he solemnized.
ISSUE WON Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and
of gross ignorance of the law.
RULING Yes. Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally
interview the contracting parties and examine the requirements they
submitted. The parties must have complied with all the essential and formal
requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage license.
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all
the qualifications and none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally
examine the marriage license presented.
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
years and have no legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Instead, the parties must present an affidavit
of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the
affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and the absence of any legal impediment to
marry each other. The judge must also execute a sworn statement that he
personally ascertained the parties' qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage. This is provided under Art 34 of the FC.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members
of the Judiciary also provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the
marriage in legal ratification of cohabitation. — In the case of a marriage
effecting legal ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing officer shall (a)
personally interview the contracting parties to determine their qualifications
to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties as to
the fact of having lived together as husband and wife for at least five [5] years
and the absence of any legal impediments to marry each other; and (c)
execute a sworn statement showing compliance with (a) and (b) and that the
solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting
parties' affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will
solemnize the parties' marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judge's only duty involving the affidavit of
cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for
at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not
state that the judge can notarize the parties' affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge's
official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties'
requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of
cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit's
statements before performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any
irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of cohabitation he notarized,
he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage despite the
irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties
whose marriage they will solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents
not connected with their official function and duty to solemnize marriages.
 Page 90 of 320
Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized
nine private documents. As discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not
connected with a judge's official duty to solemnize marriages. Judge Rojo
violated Circular No. 1-90.
WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental is
SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and other benefits for SIX (6)
MONTHS.
6 [G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS,
respondent.
DOCTRIN The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the
E couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties
in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is,
however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance
with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A
marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered
into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as
the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage.
Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
FACTS In 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married. In 2006,
Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nu`llity of her marriage
with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage they separated
and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations.
Fringer, on the other hand, did not file his answer, nor attend the hearing
despite being duly notified of the schedule. RTC declared the marriage void
ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties married each other for convenience
only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to
enable her to acquire American citizenship and that in consideration thereof,
she agreed to pay him a certain sum of money, however, the same did not
materialize, and hence no payment was also made by Albios. On appeal, RTC
decision was affirmed, and it was ruled that the essential requisite of consent
was lacking.
ISSUE Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack
of consent?
RULING No. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any
essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
For consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent
must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In
fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective
by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences
of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the
couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties
in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is,
however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance
with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A
marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered
into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as
the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law
are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law,
it shall be declared valid.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost
any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
 Page 91 of 320
children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into
for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all
the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in
a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
7 SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.,
respondent
DOCTRIN Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
E except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be
void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no
marriage license was issued to them.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In
this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just
signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The
supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the
NSO. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist.
FACTS On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. filed a petition for declaration of
a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC.
Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre in
Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and
Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan
who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by
Benjamin's family. In December 1981, Azucena left for USA. In February
1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally's father
was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father,
Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed
a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin's marital status,
assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
njamin and Sally's cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley.
During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired certain real properties:
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for
Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal
actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin,
using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground
that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the
partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article
148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice
and Bentley as illegitimate children.
ISSUE 1.      Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is null void ab initio
and non-existent?
2.      Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is bigamous?
RULING 1.      Yes.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be
void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no
marriage license was issued to them.
The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage
void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-
existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or
fictitious are] "inexistent and void from the beginning." Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court's ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
2.      No.
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In
this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just
signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The
supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the
NSO. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They
lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
8 SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, respondent.
DOCTRIN Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
E essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35 (2)." Article 35 (3) of the Family Code also provides that
a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
 Page 92 of 320
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2,
Title I of the same Code. Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage
license, is void ab initio.
FACTS The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas.
Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4 OF
the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License
No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to
the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution
of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a
Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992
at the
Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992.
On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, he was at his
mother-in-law's residence when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He
testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of
the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature
of said ceremony.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he
did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He
further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract
wherein the marriage license number could be found.
The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend
Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a
barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines.
He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria
Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez  and Mary Ann Ceriola. Rev. Dauz
further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day
before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary. After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage
contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of
Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. He
testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for
the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him
on January 8, 1993. He further testified that he did not know where the
marriage license was obtained. He attended the wedding ceremony on
January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the
signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the
other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the
marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof. She and her mother
sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked
him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said
that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned
with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed
did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to
Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria
testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the
previous marriage. Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married
on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had
been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.
ISSUE Whether the marriage between Gloria and Syed is void?
RULING Yes.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, the
Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law.
The resolution of this case hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license
had been issued for the couple.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy
thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her
witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license
 Page 93 of 320
was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he
requested certification that no such license was issued.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license
of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that
no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial
number of the marriage license pertained to another couple. A certified
machine copy of the Marriage License was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in
the document.
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the
absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when
it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2)." Article 35 (3) of
the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is
void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement
under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. Again, this
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
9 RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, vs. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
DOCTRIN Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of
E either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite
the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of
the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does
not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
FACTS A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by Restituto Alcantara against
respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and
respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the
Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding
before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC
BR Chapel. They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982.
Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the
San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The
marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage
license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing
on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the
local civil registrar of the said place.
Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their
marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding
marriage contract and its entry on file.
Answering petitioner's petition for annulment of marriage, respondent
asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has
three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for
concubinage against petitioner. Respondent prays that the petition for
annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE Whether there was a valid marriage license, hence, a valid marriage?
RULING Yes.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982,
or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine
its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80 (3) in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the
validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a
marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent
reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also
issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification
moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the
marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario,
further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
herein.
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular
conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of official acts may
be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption
is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made
 Page 94 of 320
in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer's act being
lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a
marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage
license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona,
Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul
petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city
or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to
the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in
any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of
the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward
the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption
with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of
merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City,
dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petition
10 MERCEDITA MATA Arañes vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002
DOCTRIN
E Nicdao without the required marriage license, while the second, during the
FACTS Arañes was married to the late Orobia. Their marriage was solemnized by
Presiding Judge of Camarines Sur without the requisite of marriage license
and outside his territorial jurisdiction. Due to the nullity of their marriage,
Arañes was deprived of the right to inherit the vast properties of his late
husband and of receiving the pensions of Orobia as a retired Commodore of
the Philippine Army.
ISSUE FIRST ISSUE: Whether the Judge has authority to solemnize marriage
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
SECOND ISSUE: Whether marriage license vests authority to the solemnizing
officer.
RULING FIRST HELD: No, the Judge has no authority to solemnize marriage outside
his territorial jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court cited Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 or B.P.129 which provides that the authority of the trial court
judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to
their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In addition, the
Court ruled that a priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local
ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice
of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions,
may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.
SECOND HELD: Yes, marriage license vests authority to the solemnizing
officer. The Supreme Court ruled that  a marriage which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of
such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided in law, it is the marriage license that gives
the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner.
11 SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
G.R. No. 132529; February 2, 2001
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two marriages. The first was with Susan
subsistence of the first, was with Susan Yee. When he died in 1988 petitioner
and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
from various government agencies. Petitioner collected P146,000 from MBAI,
PCCUI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig, while respondent collected
P21,000 from GSIS and SSS. Respondent, in an action for collection, sought
to recover half the amount collected by petitioner. She claimed that she had
no knowledge of the previous marriage with petitioner and presented
evidence that the same was contracted without the necessary marriage
license. Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of respondent
which was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE Whether both marriages are void ab initio.
RULING Yes, both marriages are void ab initio. The Supreme Court ruled that under
the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
 Page 95 of 320
Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, there is no
question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within
the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of
such marriage license. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without
the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt
from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. It does
not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the "death benefits"
under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate,
under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must
first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void.
12 FILIPINA Y. SYvs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO,
PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY
G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000
DOCTRIN
E license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued
FACTS On February 11, 1987, Filipina Sy filed a petition for legal separation. The
action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the
ground that her husband, Fernando Sy, abandoned her without just cause.
Judgment was rendered dissolving the conjugal partnership of gains and the
court approved a regime of separation of properties based on the
Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. Petitioner later filed a
new action for legal separation against private respondent. The Regional Trial
Court granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and
sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody
of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to
respondent. In 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of her marriage to her husband Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court denied the petition. It
stated that the alleged acts of the respondent as cited by petitioner do not
constitute psychological incapacity, which may warrant the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court. Hence, this appeal
by certiorari. It was the first time the petitioner raises the issue of the
marriage being void for lack of marriage license at the time of its celebration.
ISSUE 1.     Whether the issue of the marriage being void for lack of marriage license
at the time of its celebration can be raised for the first time on appeal.
2.     Whether the marriage is void ab initio due to lack of marriage license.
RULING 1.     Yes, the issue of the marriage being void for lack of marriage license at
the time of its celebration can be raise for the first time on appeal. The
Supreme Court ruled that we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise
an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules
of fair play and justice, in a number of instances, we have relaxed observance
of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but
exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that
certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing,
the very reason for their existence would be defeated. Hence, when
substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the
operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil. In our view, the case
at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage
between Filipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution
of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however,
that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a
declaration of their effects according to existing law.
2.     Yes, the marriage is void ab initio due to lack of marriage license. The
Supreme Court ruled that reviewing the documents and the pleadings on
record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition
before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage
on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was
indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private
respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code is
clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional
character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent
could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of the Civil
Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage
between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning.
13 A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.
DOMAGTOY, respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
 Page 96 of 320
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
 Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony
between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside
his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
 Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
 The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in
the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos,
located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
 In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator,
respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal
Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's
"lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as
a private person.
 In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks
exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between
Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn
F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by
the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that
Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost
seven years.
 With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing
the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate
Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that:
"Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof
applies to the case in question.
 The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is
"separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
solemnized by respondent judge.
 The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by
respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their
affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have
been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that
after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children,
Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and
that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years,
thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
 In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint
affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death,
and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony.
ISSUE 1. WON the judge violated Article 41 of the Family Code.
2. WON the judge is liable for solemnizing marriage outside of his
court’s jurisdiction.
RULING First Issue
 On the presumptive death of Ida, the affidavit is not sufficient to
prove the same.
 Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides: “A marriage
contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee ,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.”
 Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration
of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
 In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death.
Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error
on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom.
 Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The
following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those
bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
Second Issue
 Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by : “(1) Any incumbent member
of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; xxx”
 Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers
the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the
office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may
be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on
the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29
of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer
in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
 Page 97 of 320
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect.
 Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the
justification for his having solemnized the marriage between
Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's
jurisdiction.
 As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside
of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following
instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
 There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the
point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request
presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one
party, Gemma del Rosario.
 The elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority
of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer."
 Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."
 Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of
the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of
the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-
compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
 An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is
a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
 Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as
grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent
judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law.
 Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross
ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases
brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated,
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is
due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
 The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is
considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
D.
1 G.R. No. 173540               January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, vs. TECLA
HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to
have been validly married to the same man, now deceased.
 Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11
November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground
that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido
(Eustaquio).
 In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was
solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites
officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town.
 According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a
Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II,
records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification 3 was issued by the
LCR.
 In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in
Davao City living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura
Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
 In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to
another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she
claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous – an
action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the
properties acquired by Eustaquio.
 Peregrina testified on her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in
Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care
of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her
knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common
law wife of Eustaquio.
 RTC – denied Tecla’s petition and Peregrina’s counter-claim. In
ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio
relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as
useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period
1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the Certification
issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. In the absence of
the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the
testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as
 Page 98 of 320
mere self-serving assertions.
 CA – declared the validity of Tecla’s marriage to Eustaquio, while
pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and
Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. It concluded that
there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and
Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and
begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by
documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications
disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence
especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the
CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial
court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence
presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE WON the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the
marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
RULING  We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court.
 While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a
marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage.
 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
 As correctly stated by the appellate court: “In the case at bench, the
celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was
established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who
appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla]
herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the
certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These
are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown
by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and
documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.”
 In another case, SC held that "marriage may be proven by any
competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the
parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person
who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an
eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
2 A.C. No. 5581               January 14, 2014
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN
A. CELERA, Respondent.
DOCTRIN
E contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
FACTS  On May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan),
entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox
copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila.
 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of
respondent.
 Notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent
contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma.
Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy
of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer
of San Juan, Manila.
 Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan
was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his
second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never
been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
 Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with
Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly
immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
 IBP recommended that respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a
period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
ISSUE WON respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice despite the charges against him.
RULING  An administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the
desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to
answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
 In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
 In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that
respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his
first marriage.
 Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates
to prove that respondent entered into a second marriage while the
latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second
marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage
to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was
still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second
marriage with Alba.
 The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a
public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence
of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, to wit: “Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original
document is a public record. – When the original of a document is in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
 Page 99 of 320
officer in custody thereof.”
 Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates,
other than being admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that
respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage
is subsisting.
 By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two
marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies
should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these
Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent
and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.
 Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His
act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is
subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
 In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous
directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to
have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will
just ignore.
 The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's
nonchalant attitude towards this case; accommodating respondent's
endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of
the complaint.
 Respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment.
E.
1 ISSUE
DOCTRINE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
2 AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of
MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, respondent. G.R. No. 189121. July 31,
2013
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo's
common-law wife and daughter.
The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quiazon
(Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children,
Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate.
Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and
born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.
Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned
the validity of Eliseo's marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous
for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter's marriage
with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent,
Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father's estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together
with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for
settlement of decedent's estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and
not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the
petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratrix of Eliseo's estate.
RTC Ruling: issued the Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond.
CA Ruling: Affirmed the RTC decision.
WON Eliseo is a resident of Las Pinas and therefore the Petition for letters of
administration was properly filed with the RTC of Las Pinas - YES
WON Amelia was not legally married to Eliseo due to pre-existing marriage -
YES
RULING Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of
the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
 Page 100 of 320
Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
"Resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and
the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
The CA cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue
for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It
is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the
venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
The petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo's Death Certificate that he is a
resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While
the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent's
residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not
binding on the courts.
In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot
be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly
or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage. It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code.
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may
attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
There is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced
by her father's marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party
to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by
the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San
Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac.
In the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the
time Amelia and Eliseo's marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab
initio.
Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners' pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedent's estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
findings of the CA.
3
DOCTRINE
FACTS
ISSUE
RULING
4 [G.R. No. 169766. March 30, 2011.]
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and
ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS -Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice —
initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony on June 2, 1993. In their marriage
contracts, Sen. Tamano's civil status was indicated as 'divorced.'
-On November 23, 1994, private respondents filed a complaint with the RTC
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano
for being bigamous. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano
married respondent Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The
complaint likewise averred that: Sen. Tamano and Zorayda’s marriage, having
been celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law.
Moreover, they did not and could not have divorced by invoking the provision
of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the
simple reason that their marriage was never deemed, legally and factually, to
have been one contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of
P.D. 1083, since they did not register their mutual desire to be thus covered
by this law;
-Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues
involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of shari'a courts. Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage
with the late senator is valid as the latter was already divorced under the
Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law
automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without
 Page 101 of 320
need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are
Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She argues that
Zorayda and Adib (son) have no legal standing to file
suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.
-The trial court denied Estrellita's motion. finding that the marital ties of Sen.
Tamano and Zorayda were never Severed and  declaring Estrellita's marriage
with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio
-the CA adjudged that Estrellita's marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio
for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano
is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce.
It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the
subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial
ISSUE 1. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
Bigamous
2. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita's
marriage declared void ab initio.
RULING #1 The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen.
Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano's
subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio
-The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike
was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage
can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized.
-PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13 (1) thereof provides that
the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But
SC already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not
provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and
Muslim rites."
-Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this
law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed
certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.
#2 Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to
file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which
limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is
prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing
suit if the
ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage
-Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can
file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this
interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
-The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz.:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of
voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or
by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
-they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and
hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of
the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
-Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita's
marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to
the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in
which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the
children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise
considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had
filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit.
5 [G.R. No. 158298. August 11, 2010.]
ISIDRO ABLAZA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS -the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
-The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila
had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being
issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio
for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his
being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before
his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person,
himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due
to the marriage being void ab initio
-RTC dismissed the petition: held that petitioner is not a party to the
 Page 102 of 320
marriage
-CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC
ISSUE Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime
of the old CivilCode
RULING -The petition is meritorious
-Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the
limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line
to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003.
-Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages),;
and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to
March 15, 2003.
-Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code,
the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule
on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate
the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
-the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and
explained how and when each might
be impugned, thuswise:
    Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage
does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights
or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."
"Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so
far asconcerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as
though nomarriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legalpurpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which thefact of marriage may be material, either
direct or collateral, in any civilcourt between any parties at any
time, whether before or after the death ofeither or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the factsrendering
such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated asnon-
existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which
cannotbe collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during thelifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot beimpeached, and is made good ab
initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can
be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the
law makes either the action or defense for thedeclaration of
absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, ifthe
death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the
groundfor defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case.
-It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new
Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring
an action todeclare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v.
Sandoval, theplaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by
the suit, or the partyentitled to the avails of the suit
-Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the
laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother
under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the
petitioner from succeeding to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the
right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination
of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late
Cresenciano's surviving heir.
-both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue. WHEREFORE,
the petition for review on certiorari is granted
6 [G.R. No. 179922. December 16, 2008.]
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL,
also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE
CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
 Page 103 of 320
FACTS -Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels
of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos
-During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo.
The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes.
Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal
heir, petitioner Juan de Dios Carlos.
-On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents
Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II).
-Petitioner and respondents entered into contracts dividing among  them the
parcels of land
-In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No.
95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes
of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c)
recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages.
-In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late
brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence
of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased
brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II.
- Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite
marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo.
Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased
Teofilo Carlos with another woman
-But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for
summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of
the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the
Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late
Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
-RTC rendered judgment:
    -Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo
Carlos as null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
    -Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
--CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling; held that:
    -The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly
prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation
of facts or a confession of judgment. the rule is to the effect that the material
facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be
proved (Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court)
    -While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among
the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil
Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the
marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee
represents it to be.
    - If the non-presentation of the marriage contract — the primary evidence
of marriage — is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should
appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof
that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
-Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of
Court. He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the
pleadings.
ISSUE whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial.
RULING I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must
be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary
judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed
-With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages",
thequestion on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on
the pleadingsin cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped
with clarity
SEC. 17. Trial.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring
supplied)
- Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order
the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this
stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of
evidence
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity
of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the
Civil Code.
- Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by
stating: SDEHIa
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
- Section 2 (a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
- The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988
- the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003
 Page 104 of 320
although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code.
-While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it
does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse
under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in
the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not
petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage in controversy.
- In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in
1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their
son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower; SCETHa
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But
although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit
of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001
and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring
supplied)
- Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate
children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the
decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or
children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives
-If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have
a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a
brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent
dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
-The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no
other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to
be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds
to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the
widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a
real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of
his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is
found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
-It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring
the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that
Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo
F.
1 G.R. No. 215723
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN GRACE
MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner vs. MICHIYUKI KOIKE
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Petitioner and respondent were married in 2005 in QC but filed a divorce in
Japan in 2012. Medina filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to 2 nd Par of Art. 26
of FC. No one opposed. RTC denied ruling that the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of alien must be proved in accordance with rules of court.
While she proved the divorce documents, she failed to prove the national law
since the The Civil Code of Japan were not duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consul in Japan.
ISSUE W/N petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry should be granted.
RULING Remanded for the reception of evidence.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign
marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a
Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. "No sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion
to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country”.
Foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be
made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
 Page 105 of 320
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.
In order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in
our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner.
2 G.R. No. 196049            June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs MARIA PAZ GALELA
MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
DOCTRIN
E relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
FACTS Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippine. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other. Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara
and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were
able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage) with prayer for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on
the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
RTC dismissed the petition and cited the the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC). A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife and The petition shall be filed
in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing,
or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action
which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong."
ISSUE W/N the petition should be granted
RULING The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.   To hold that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted
in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad
Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended
procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial.
While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is
a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary
to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related
laws.
 Page 106 of 320
3 G. R. No. 183622            February 8, 2012
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,
Vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
DOCTRIN
E Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further
FACTS Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly
obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he
contracted a second marriage with petitioner. Orlando died intestate in the
Philippines. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan
City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. Respondent
Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage,
filed a similar petition. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered
an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention,
respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner. Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that
petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been
married to one Eusebio Bristol. RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.
RTC dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed
by petitioner ruling that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to
her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested
party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
ISSUE W/N the petition to grant letters of administration should be granted
RULING Owing to the nationality principle, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent
marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate. It appears that the trial court no longer
required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws
of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent
marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be
issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the
deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
4 G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents.
DOCTRIN Article 26 application
E
FACTS Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to
work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after
the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an
affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor,
Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She,
thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
 Page 107 of 320
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in
order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
ISSUE Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends
to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of
a foreign divorce decree.
RULING No. However, Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court applies.
Based on the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment
or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or
final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our
courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.
The provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree
of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as
a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family
Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail
the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time
and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in
the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC
as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve
as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the
foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
 Page 108 of 320
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and
REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag
City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil
Registrar General. No costs.
5 G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DOCTRIN Article 26 application
E as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
FACTS Cipriano Orbecido and Lady Myros Villanueva, both Filipino citizens at that
time, got married on May 4,1981. In 1986, Villanueva left for the United State
and subsequently has been naturalized as an American Citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano
thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied. In this petition, the OSG raises a pure
question of law:Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of
the Family Code.
ISSUE Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
RULING Yes. (Check twin elements needed)
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they
got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of
obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
On Petition for Declaratory Relief:
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before
the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this
connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
 Page 109 of 320
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest
in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship,
obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of
the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its
duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen,
insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for
relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for
judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is
GRANTED. The assailed Decisiondated May 15, 2002, and Resolutiondated
July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
G.
1 G.R. No. 203284
NICOLAS S. MATUDAN, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARILYN** B. MATUDAN,
Respondents.
DOCTRIN Rights and obligations between husband and wife / Psychological Incapacity
E
FACTS Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn B.
Matudan (Marilyn) were married in Laoang, Northern Samar on October 26,
1976. They had four children.
In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and the
children lost contact with her; she had not been seen nor heard from again.
Twenty-three years later, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94. Petitioner alleged that
before, during, and after his marriage to Marilyn, the latter was
psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and
mother; that she consistently neglected and failed to provide petitioner and
her children with the necessary emotional and financial care, support, and
sustenance, and even so after leaving for work abroad; that based on expert
evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag),
Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable; that
petitioner's consent to the marriage was obtained by Marilyn through
misrepresentation as she concealed her condition from him; and that Marilyn
is "not ready for a lasting and permanent commitment like marriage" 7 as she
"never (gave) him and their children financial and emotional support x x x
and for being selfish through their six (6) years of cohabitation;" that Marilyn
became "so despicably irresponsible as she has not shown love and care upon
her husband, x x x and that she cannot properly and morally take on the
responsibility of a loving and caring wife x x x."
On December 18, 2009, the RTC issued its Decision dismissing the Petition
on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove Marilyn's
claimed psychological incapacity.
In his Affidavit which was considered as his direct testimony, petitioner
claimed that respondent failed to perform her duties as a wife to him.
Respondent never gave petitioner and their children financial and emotional
support, love and care during their cohabitation. She was irresponsible,
immature and exhibited irrational behavior towards petitioner and their
children. She was self-centered, had no remorse and involved herself in
activities defying social and moral ethics.
RTC
Article 36 of the Family Code as amended, states:
'A marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.'
Article 68 of the same Code provides:
'The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.'
RTCheld its ground reiterating its pronouncement that petitioner failed to
demonstrate Marilyn's psychological incapacity, and that the petition is
anchored merely on Marilyn's abandonment of the marriage and family,
which by itself is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.
CA
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Rorodel Glaviano Molina, the following
definitive guidelines were laid down in resolving petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff: Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) Tue incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
celebration' of the marriage,
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
 Page 110 of 320

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements established in Santos v.
Court of Appeals that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. These requisites must
be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
ISSUE ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists?
(Whether not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.)
RULING No. (No.)
"[W]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party's psychological condition." "[T]he complete facts should allege the
physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at
the time of the celebration of the marriage." Petitioner's judicial affidavit and
testimony during trial, however, fail to show gravity and juridical
antecedence.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and
on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric,
and unremorseful person who 'believes that the world revolves around him';
and who 'used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence
[petitioner] extended towards him.' x x x
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2012 Decision
and August 23, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
95392 are AFFIRMED.
2 [G.R. No. 214077. August 10, 2016.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DANILO A.
PANGASINAN, respondent.
DOCTRIN It is true that in petitions for nullification of marriages, it is not necessary that
E a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party's psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. However, the
totality of evidence must still prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity.  In addition to the
foregoing, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist
from the inception of the marriage.
It has been held that mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity nor
does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons.

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36

of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental-- not merely
physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
 Page 111 of 320

FACTS Following a three-month courtship between Danilo and Josephine, Josephine ISSUE WON the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity
became pregnant. To erase any notion of impropriety, the couple immediately
contracted marriage, first civilly on December 29, 1981, followed by a church
wedding on January 23, 1982. The couple begot three children — Juan Carlo,
Julia Erika, and Josua.

At the outset, life for Danny and Josephine generally ran harmoniously,
although marred from time to time by arguments about money matters. They
did not have any major problems, and even became partners in Danilo's
business pursuits. Signs of marital kinks appeared when Danilo's business
began to slow down. This caused the couple to fight incessantly, since Danilo
began to have difficulty supporting Josephine and their children at the same
level to which they were accustomed. Allegations of infidelity on the part of
Danilo compounded things.

After their quarrel when Josephine underwent hysterectomy, Josephine left

the conjugal home, never to resume cohabitation with Danilo.

After 30 years of marriage, Danilo filed a petition praying for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Josephine on the ground of the latter's
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Danilo alleged in his petition that barely a few months into their boyfriend-
girlfriend relationship, Josephine already exhibited certain negative traits,
which he merely trivialized at that time.
·         competitive, domineering, headstrong, and always determined to get
what she wanted in the relationship.
·         Josephine would suddenly become overly excited and elated that she got
her way whenever he gave in to her desires.
·         She enjoyed talking about herself and expected him to give her special
treatment.
·         She always made the decisions during their marriage, especially when it
came to money matters, and made it appear to her children that she was the
one in-charge of the family.
·         She ignored and demeaned his abilities and contributions, and
complained that she received no help at all from him.
·         She was indifferent and lacked empathy to his plight, as shown by her
lack of concern for his distress when she failed to take care of him in the
hospital when he was recuperating from two heart surgeries in 2009. During
this time, Josephine visited him but did not tend to his needs.

In support of his case, Danilo presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan (Dr. Dayan),
a clinical psychologist, who, in her Psychological Evaluation Report, 14(14)
concluded that both Josephine and Danilo are psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill their essential marital obligations of rendering love and respect to
each other.
 Page 112 of 320

RULING No.
3 [G.R. No. 200072. June 20, 2016.]
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify marriage under Article 36 of PHILIP YU, petitioner, vs. VIVECA LIM YU, respondent.
the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical
— incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Code, among DOCTRIN Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be
others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect E notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests. When defendants
and fidelity and render help and support. are deprived of such opportunity to duly participate in, and even be informed
of, the proceedings, due to a deceitful scheme employed by the prevailing
The totality of evidence presented fails to establish the psychological litigant, as in this case, there exists a violation of their due process rights. Any
incapacity of the parties. judgment issued in violation thereof necessarily suffers a fatal infirmity for
courts, as guardians of constitutional rights cannot be expected to deny
It is true that in petitions for nullification of marriages, it is not necessary that persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as
a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. acting within their jurisdiction.
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party's psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. However, the
totality of evidence must still prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity.  In addition to the
foregoing, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist
from the inception of the marriage.

In this case, there is no such reliable and independent evidence establishing

Josephine's psychological condition and its associations in her early life.
Aside from what Danilo relayed to Dr. Dayan, no other evidence supports his
claim and Dr. Dayan's finding that the root cause of Josephine's personality
disorder antedated the marriage since Emelie and Jay's testimonies covered
circumstances that transpired after the marriage.

Danilo's characterization of his wife, without more, is insufficient to

constitute psychological incapacity. At most, it merely establishes that their
personalities are different and that their frequent arguments and differences
in handling finances and managing their business affairs were money-related.
No less than Danilo's own sister, Gatus, narrated during her interview with
Dr. Dayan that the couple's problems started when Danilo's business began to
slow down and he began to have difficulty supporting his family at the same
level they were used to. Thus, it appears that her "incapacity" surfaced only in
the latter years of marriage when they experienced difficulties in their
business ventures.
It has been held that mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity nor
does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons.

These differences do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity under

Article 36 of the Family Code and are not manifestations thereof which may
be a ground for declaring their marriage void. If at all, these are difficulties
that couples ordinarily deal with in the course of their marriage.
 Page 113 of 320

FACTS Petitioner Philip Yu and respondent Viveca Yu were married on November 18, ISSUE WON the petition for annulment of Judgment will prosper.
1984. However, Viveca left the conjugal home with their four children and
filed a Petition for Legal Separation with RTC Pasig against Philip, for
repeated violence grossly abusive conduct against her and the children, sexual
infidelity, and attempt on her life.

Philip, on the other hand, denied the accusations against him, claiming that it
was Viveca who attacked him few times. After the marriage, he discovered
Viveca’s excessively jealous, cynical and insecure behavior.  Philip prayed in
his Counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of their marriage due to
Viveca’s psychological incapacity, rendering her incapable of complying with
her marital obligations. Thereafter, Philip filed a Motion to Withdraw
Counterclaim for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage revealing that he no
longer had the desire to have his marriage declared void. Despite Viveca's
fervent opposition, the Pasig RTC granted the motion.

RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition for legal separation on the
ground that the parties are in pari delicto. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
same becomes moot with the declaration of nullity of the marriage of the
parties, on the ground of the psychological incapacity of Viveca Yu. Since the
marriage of the parties was declared a nullity, there is, therefore, no legal
basis to issue a decree of legal separation to the spouses whose marriage has
already been declared as no force and effect.

Claiming to be completely unaware of the proceedings before the RTC of

Balayan, Batangas, nullifying her marriage with Philip on the ground of her
psychological incapacity, Viveca filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
According to Viveca, jurisdiction over her person did not properly vest since
she was not duly served with Summons. She alleged that she was deprived of
her right to due process when Philip fraudulently declared that her address
upon which she may be duly summoned was still at their conjugal home,
when he clearly knew that she had long left said address for the United States
of America. Viveca likewise maintained that had Philip complied with the
legal requirements for an effective service of summons by publication, she
would have been able to rightly participate in the proceedings before the
Batangas court.

CA granted petition.
 Page 114 of 320

RULING Yes.

Viveca was completely prevented from participating in the Declaration of 4 [G.R. No. 209180. February 24, 2016.]
Nullity case because of the fraudulent scheme employed by Philip insofar as REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. REGHIS M. ROMERO II
the service of summons is concerned. and OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, respondents.

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought

against him. Through its service, the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person.
As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does
not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.
Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, however, enumerates the actions in
rem or quasi in rem when Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction
over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.
A defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be
served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action
relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which
the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when
the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the
property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.
DOCTRIN Marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State. Accordingly, it
E cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the pieces of
evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital
duties.
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest
themselves; rather, it must be limited to cases where there is a downright
incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.

When Philip filed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, an action
which affects his personal status, Viveca was already residing in the United
States of America. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is the proper mode by which summons may be
served on Viveca, a non-resident defendant who is not found in the
Philippines.

In compliance therewith, Philip claims that Viveca was duly served summons
because: (1) copies of the summons, complaint, and order of the Batangas
court were published in Tempo, a newspaper of general circulation on March
27, 2008 and April 3, 2008; and (2) the sheriff served copies of the summons,
complaint, and order of the Batangas court on Viveca at their conjugal home
in Pasig City, her last known address. The Court finds, however, that such
service of summons on their conjugal home address cannot be deemed
compliant with the requirements of the rules and is even tantamount to
deception warranting the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment.

Philip fervently asserts the propriety of their conjugal home address as

Viveca's "last known address," well within the true meaning and intent of the
rules. However, Philip knew that Viveca had already left their conjugal home
and moved to a different local address for purposes of the pendency of the
Legal Separation case, as shown by his stipulation in his Amended Answer
with Counterclaim that "after abandoning the conjugal abode on 24 August
1993, petitioner resided at her parent's house in Richbelt Condominium,
 Page 115 of 320

FACTS Reghis and Olivia were married were blessed with two children. It was alleged
that Olivia's parents planned for them to get married. Reghis initially objected
to the planned marriage as he was unemployed and still unprepared.
However, Olivia's parents assured him that they would shoulder all expenses
and would support them until they are financially able. As Olivia's parents
had treated him with nothing but kindness, Reghis agreed.

The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having

violent fights and jealous fits. They became even more estranged when Reghis
secured a job as a medical representative and became engrossed in his career
and focused on supporting his parents and siblings. As a result, he spent little
time with his family, causing Olivia to complain that Reghis failed to be a real
husband to her. In 1986, the couple parted ways.

Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing his

psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.

RTC – declared the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological

incapacity.

CA – affirmed the decision of the RTC

The Republic filed a petition for review on certiorari where it maintained that
Reghis has not established that his alleged psychological incapacity is grave,
has juridical antecedence, and is incurable.

ISSUE WON the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity
 Page 116 of 320
RULING No.
In Republic v. CA, the Court laid down definitive guidelines on the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Among
others, it clarified that the illness must be grave enough to bring about the
incapacity or inability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage such that "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the
foregoing requirements do not concur. As aptly pointed out by the petitioners,
Reghis' testimony shows that he was able to comply with his marital
obligations which, therefore, negates the existence of a grave and serious
psychological incapacity on his part. Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived
together as husband and wife under one roof for fourteen (14) years and both
of them contributed in purchasing their own house in Parañaque City. Reghis
also fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his family, as he categorically
stated that he loves their children and that he was a good provider to them.
That he married Olivia not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter's
parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically incapacitated in the
context of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest
themselves; rather, it must be limited to cases where there is a downright
incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a
mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. Thus, absent sufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity
within the context of Article 36 of the Family Code, the Court is compelled to
uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
5 ROBERT F. MALLILIN, petitioner, vs. LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DOCTRIN Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by
E (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only
emerge after the marriage.
Psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely
the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing;
to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological
incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
FACTS Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3)
children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage,
Luz was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and
unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential
obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even more apparent
during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of immaturity,
irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and inability to
cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She
averred that it was Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their
marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not appear during the trial.
Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal appeared for the State.
When Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California,
USA, and had married an American. He also revealed that when they were
still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt.
Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her
duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following
circumstances:
(1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how
to keep order;
(2) it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one
 Page 117 of 320
who washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails
destroyed;
(3) it was also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her
time sleeping and looking at the mirror;
(4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men;
(5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students;
(6) when he was not home, she would receive male visitors;
(7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and
(6) she would contract loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes
Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert
filed a petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of
First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila.
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision
declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due
discretion on the part of both parties as contemplated by the second
paragraph of Canon1095.
ISSUE Whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code?
RULING No.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental — not merely
physical — incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe
love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support.
There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only
emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
The Court is of the considered view that Robert's evidence failed to establish
the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other
evidence was adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He presented no
other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on her behavior. Thus, his
testimony was self-serving and had no serious value as evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was not
medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial.
Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that her disposition of not
cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity
for dating and receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as
well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise
to the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of the
parties' marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse
or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Psychological incapacity
refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a
marriage void based on psychological incapacity. Robert argues that the series
of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the psychological
defect that she was suffering within her person, which could be considered as
nymphomania or "excessive sex hunger." Other than his allegations, however,
no other convincing evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual
indiscretions were considered as nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply
rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in
Article 36. To stress, Robert's testimony alone is insufficient to prove the
existence of psychological incapacity.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009, and its
Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice.
6 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO O. DE
GRACIA, respondent.
 Page 118 of 320
DOCTRIN "Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36
E of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental — not merely
physical — incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68  of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
FACTS Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969. They lived in
Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2) children, namely,
Ma. Reynilda R. de Gracia and Ma. Rizza R. de Gracia, who were born on
August 20, 1969 and January 15, 1972, respectively.
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage, alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first met
Natividad when they were students at the Barangay High School of
Sindangan, and he was forced to marry her barely three (3) months into their
courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. At the time of their marriage,
he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18 years of age. He had no stable job
and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as "kristo" and "bangkero sa
hantak." When he decided to join and train with the army, Natividad left their
conjugal home and sold their house without his consent. Thereafter,
Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived with a certain Engineer
Terez, and bore him a child.
After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage on
January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio Mondarez and has lived
since then with the latter. From the time Natividad abandoned them in 1972,
Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza  and he exerted
earnest efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved futile because of
Natividad's psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.
In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report, Dr. Zalsos stated that both
Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from "utter
emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior
considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established norms of
conduct." As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the willful
cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly,
Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he
sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental
condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of
marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the foregoing, Dr.
Zalsos concluded that the "couple's union was bereft of the mind, will and
heart for the obligations of marriage."
On February 10, 1999, the (OSG) filed an opposition  to the complaint,
contending that the acts committed by Natividad did not demonstrate
psychological incapacity as contemplated by law, but are mere grounds for
legal separation under the Family Code.
ISSUE Whether the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad is void on the ground
of psychological incapacity?
RULING No.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental — not merely
physical — incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68  of the Family
Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
In this case, the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos does not explain in
reasonable detail how Natividad's condition could be characterized as grave,
deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological
incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of
psychological tests which she administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to
identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's condition and to show that
it existed at the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or
seriousness of Natividad's behavior in relation to her failure to perform the
essential marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos's report.
Further, the finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's
condition remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence,
appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self-serving. In the
same vein, Dr. Zalsos's testimony during trial, which is essentially a
reiteration of her report, also fails to convince the Court of her conclusion that
Natividad was psychologically incapacitated.
Verily, although expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight
by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by
independent evidence. After poring over the records, the Court, however, does
not find any such evidence sufficient enough to uphold the court a quo's
nullity declaration. To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with
 Page 119 of 320
Rodolfo and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties'
marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing;
to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. To hark back to
what has been earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
In the final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to
exist in the present case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the
recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family, the instant petition is hereby granted.
7 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CESAR ENCELAN,
respondent
DOCTRIN In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling,
E even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are
simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it
must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations
of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations.
FACTS On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children.
To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984.
On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had
been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez.
Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children
and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated.
On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita's psychological
incapacity.
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used
to be an associate in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not
psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of
irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law.
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr.
Fareda Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores
found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric
illness[,]"but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her for
a good and lasting marital relationship";  her "transferring from one job to the
other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her
impatience in attaining her ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with her
husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and
family relationship
ISSUE Whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar's marriage to Lolita on
the ground of psychological incapacity?
RULING No. There is no sufficient basis to annul Cesar's marriage to Lolita on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides that "[a] marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume the basic marital obligations"; not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the
existence at the time of
the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the
errant spouse.
In this case, Cesar's testimony failed to prove Lolita's alleged psychological
incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolita's alleged
affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his
continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of
the affair, but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita's alleged affair with
Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling,
even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are
simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it
must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations
of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations. No evidence on record exists to
support Cesar's allegation that Lolita's infidelity and abandonment were
manifestations of any psychological illness.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005
amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583.
Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.
8 VALERIO E. KALAW, petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, respondent.
 Page 120 of 320
G.R. No. 166357
September 19, 2011
ISSUE
DOCTRIN
E
RULING
FACTS Valerio Kalaw (Tyrone) and Elena Fernandez (Malyn) got married in Hong
Kong and they had four children. Shortly after the birth of their youngest,
Tyrone had an affair with Jocelyn who gave birth to a son. Malyn eventually
left the conjugal home and her four children to Tyrone. Tyrone started living
with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children. After some time, Tyrone
went to the US together with Jocelyn and their children, leaving behind his
children with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde. The house helper will
just call Malyn to visit the kids every time they are sick. Nine years after the
de facto separation, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn is
psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential
marital obligation due to her addiction to majhong and her alleged infidelity.
That Malyn brings with her the kids to play majhong and that Tyrone saw
Malyn in one of the rooms of Hyatt Hotel with a man.
ISSUE Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from
psychological incapacity.
RULING No, the petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that respondent suffers from
psychological incapacity. The Supreme Court ruled that psychological
incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological
incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated
party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological
disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must
be incurable. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that
respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of
sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention
from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it
does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
9 VALERIO E. KALAW, petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, respondent
G.R. No. 166357 (Resolution)
January 14, 2015
DOCTRIN
E State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a
FACTS This case involves a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision promulgated
on September 19, 2011 which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Whether there is a valid ground to declare the marriage of the spouses Kalaw
as null and void ab initio under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Yes, there is a valid ground to declare Ms. Kalaw as psychologically
incapacitated and thus, should be declared null and void ab initio.
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to
deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code
has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually
looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the
Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order
to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the
Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and
in the end they decided to adopt the provision “with less specificity than
expected” in order to have the law “allow some resiliency in its application.”
Illustrative of the “less specificity than expected” has been the omission by the
Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological
incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision
conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee
desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by
virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and
applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version
of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.”
Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own
facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the
next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court.” In the task of ascertaining the
presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage,
the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to
inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of
being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts.
We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the
valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and
void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence. In declaring
some marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously
 Page 121 of 320
defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social
institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong
and solid.
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the
trial court to properly determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the
respondent (if not also of the petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal
examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality disorder,
like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The
Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000), that there is
no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be
personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the
presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological
incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.”
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could
possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert
opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in
interpreting such other evidence on the causation. Indeed, an expert opinion
on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative
and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to
establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would
not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. This is
so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical
procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it
was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties’
upbringing and psychodynamics.
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere
statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can
render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion
and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded. Hence, we
should weigh and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert
witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited
our determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity.
Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the
duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital
vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would
have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her
mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices
that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the
respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life,
particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the
disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw — the parties’ eldest son — in his
deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother
had been hooked on playing mahjong.
The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent
who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof.—Although the petitioner, as the
plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological
incapacity of her husband because she raised the matter in her answer. The
courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent
who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the
imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity
may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological
incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed null
and void.
In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the
respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time
of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of
the marriage between the parties. To stress, our mandate to protect the
inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not
preclude striking down a marital union that is “ill-equipped to promote family
life.”
10 NOEL B. BACCAY, petitioner, vs. MARIBEL C. BACCAY and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 173138
December 1, 2010
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS During the boyfriend-girlfriend relationship of Noel and Maribel, Maribel if
aloof and snobbish when it comes to the family of Noel. And when confronted
about her attitude, she would promise to change but never did. After some
time, Noel decided to break up with Maribel as he is already with another
woman. But Maribel refused and offered to accept Noel’s relationship with
another woman. They went out as friends but had some sexual contacts which
resulted to Maribel being pregnant with Noel’s child. They got married and
Maribel lived with Noel’s family. She remained aloof with the family, never
contributed to the family’s coffer and refused to have any sexual contact with
Noel. Despite the claim of pregnancy, Noel never noticed any signs of such.
Then, Maribel did not go home for a day and when she came home she
announced that she had a miscarriage and was confined. Eventually, Noel
confronted Maribel of the alleged miscarriage and such confrontation
escalated into an intense quarrel which resulted to Maribel leaving the house.
Noel exerted efforts to reach out to Maribel but to no avail. Noel filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. The trial court found that
Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and
such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality
Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as
 Page 122 of 320
determined by a clinical psychologist.
ISSUE Whether Maribel’s alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder is tantamount to
psychological incapacity.
RULING No, Maribel’s alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder is not tantamount to
psychological incapacity which is a ground for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Noel. The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals 21 that the
phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to
the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.     In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was
not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically
incapacitated. Noel's evidence merely established that Maribel refused to
have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him
after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He
failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and
establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who
concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder
traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the
personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the
essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even
testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that it
would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is
not the incapacity contemplated by law. The Court emphasizes that the
burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent suffers
from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder
renders her "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage."Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a
"refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. An
unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
11 MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, petitioner, vs. RAMON REYES,
respondent. Camacho-Reyes vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 185286
August 18, 2010
DOCTRIN
E DOCTRIN
FACTS Socorro and Ramon started a casual acquaintanceship which turned into
boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Socorro was too impressed with Ramon
despite his attitude of cutting classes and taking marijuana. Socorro
graduated from College while Ramon dropped out from school. Following
Socorro’s graduation and her father’s death, Socorro got married with
Ramon. At that time, she was already five months pregnant and employed at
the Population Center Foundation while Ramon continues to work in their
family business which is the Aristocrat Restaurant. Ramon left the family
business and ventured into several businesses but none of which was
successful. Also, business ventures caused Ramon to live away from Socorro
without communication. Socorro even confirmed that Ramon had an extra-
marital affair with his former secretary. In addition, Socorro remained to be
the sole provider for the family and during the time that Socorro needs to
undergo an operation, Ramon never bothered to show some care to her.
Despite Ramon’s attitude towards their marriage. Socorro still attempted to
save their marriage and went to counselling session but it never improved
their situation. Socorro then filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE Whether Ramon is psychologically incapacitated.
RULING Yes, Ramon is psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court ruled that
the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the factors characterizing
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1)
gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained: The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved. In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an
inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital
affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money
obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family
businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 - DIGESTS (BATCH 3)
H.
1 G.R. No. 172060               September 13, 2010
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, vs. MARIA CHRYSANTINE L.
PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
E
 Page 123 of 320
FACTS  On 25 October 2004 (RTC Quezon City), Maria Chrysantine
Pimentel filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel.
 On 7 February 2005 (RTC Antipolo), petitioner received summons
for the pre-trial and trial for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
 On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend
the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
RTC Decision
 The pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case
before it.
 The issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries
sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the
validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question.
CA Decision
 The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission
of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the
acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
 On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of
marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
 The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial
to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged
acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been
committed.
 The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of
frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the
marriage is still subsisting.
ISSUE WON the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide against petitioner.
RULING  The petition has no merit.
 Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in
Criminal Case for Parricide.
 There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which
must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.
 The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person "who shall
kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any
of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse." The relationship
between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide
from murder or homicide.
 However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further,
the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
 The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
 The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim.
 In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide,
the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would
have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will.
 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage
will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of
the subsistence of the marriage.
 In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time
of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.
2 G.R. No. 164435               September 29, 2009
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in
a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then
Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal.
 On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated
marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in
San Carlos City, Pangasinan.
 Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy on November 26, 1979.
 On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital
vows anew in a church wedding in Manila.
 In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed for annulment of marriage before the
 Page 124 of 320
RTC of Manila.
 Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the
RTC of Pasay City.
 Accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, for
declaration of nullity of their marriage.
 Lower court – finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
 Petitioner’s contention:
o Her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void
because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain
Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their
marriage;
o Her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void
for lack of a valid marriage license;
o The action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
 CA – affirmed. The CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when
she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time,
her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by
the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to
Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also
struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that
her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy
had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
 RTC of Makati City, Branch 140 declared petitioner’s 1974 and 1975
marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s
psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on
July 9, 2003.
 In petitioner’s MR, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a
ground for the reversal of her conviction.
ISSUE WON the decision nullifying petitioner’s marriage with Alocillo is a ground
for the reversal of petitioner’s conviction for the crime of bigamy.
RULING  In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis – he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case
may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of
its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at
bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for
nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in
the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge.
It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
 The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two
marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of
bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of
bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration
of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not
yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was
deemed valid and subsisting.
 Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s
marriage to Uy make any difference.
 Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back
as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the
party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it.
Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent
upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already
obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
I.
1 G.R. No. 195670               December 3, 2012
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, vs. AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in
March 29, 1980.
 After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental declared the nullity
of their marriage in the Decision dated November 10, 2000 on the basis
of the former’s psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of
the Family Code.
 Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership praying for the distribution of the following described
properties claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their
marriage.
 Respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2)
residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire
any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that she
used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of
her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance.
She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to
the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using
her own money.
 Petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were
registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with
the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability
 Page 125 of 320
benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their
acquisition.
 He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the
Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the
Family Code, hence, invalid.
 RTC
o Dissolving the parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding all
the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal
properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as
his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on
Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.
o It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the
acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner could not
have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as
petitioner still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding
his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of private lands.
 CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE WON the court erred in not sustaining petitioner’s attempt at subsequently
asserting or claiming a right of half or whole of the purchase price used in the
purchase of the real properties subject of this case.
RULING  The petition lacks merit.
 Petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited
constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such
prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the
latter’s name.
 Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt
the constitutional prohibition.
 He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity
must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity
shall not be accorded equity.
 The Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever
over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is
well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot
be done directly.
 Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on
the basis of unjust enrichment. The provision on unjust enrichment does
not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.
 Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on
his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which
demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine
land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to
ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon,
such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were
properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition.
Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the
national patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to
protect.
2 [G.R. No. 178044. January 19, 2011.]
ALAIN M. DIÑO, petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were
childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until
they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided
to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor
Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love
and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family,
choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends
that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was
not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary
period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the
Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a
psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system
since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent's disorder
was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
RTC Ruling: petitioner was able to establish respondent's psychological
incapacity. The trial court found that respondent committed acts which hurt
and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent
failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under
Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent
abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married
another man.
ISSUE WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
 Page 126 of 320
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RULING Section 19 (1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147
of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition
and distribution of the parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19 (1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19 (1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article
50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or
bigamous marriage was contracted. Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages,
meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment
of a
competent court in an action for annulment. In both instances under Articles
40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before
the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of
annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. The rules on co-ownership apply
and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the
Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
"[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. . . . ." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the
spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
3 [G.R. No. 185286. August 18, 2010.]
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, petitioner, vs. RAMON REYES-REYES,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at
the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both
nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university
subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baños campus. The
casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend
relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought
was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and
traditions. Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every
day and drove home together from the university.
At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat
Restaurant. Petitioner's good impression of the respondent was not
diminished by the latter's habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery
that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a
degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of
school on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat
Restaurant. The year following petitioner's graduation and her father's death,
petitioner and respondent got married.
On March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Further, respondent no
longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough
courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had
resigned due to slow advancement within the family business.
 Page 127 of 320
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this
time, moved in with petitioner's mother. But the new set up did not end their
marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner
continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but
in most aspects as well.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-
marital affair. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to
provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in
his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties' marriage was a
surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife
was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when
petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the
operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had enough of
respondent's lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to
leave the recovery room.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a
psychological assessment to "determine benchmarks of current psychological
functioning." As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and
did not continue with the clinical psychologist's recommendation to undergo
psychotherapy.
Petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter's psychological incapacity to
fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
RTC Ruling: granted the petition and declared the marriage between the
parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity.
CA Ruling: reversed the RTC and declared the parties' marriage as valid and
subsisting.
ISSUE WON the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the ground of both
parties' psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code
RULING After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the
appellate court's ruling that the psychological incapacity of respondent was
not sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision declaring the
marriage between the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant
the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the
principle that the factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform
the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and
(3) incurability.
As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing
respondent with a personality disorder. The lack of personal examination and
interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality
disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do
their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their
exclusion as evidence.
The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and
marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this
case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state
of the parties' marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein
petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to
interact with, and experience, respondent's pattern of behavior which she
could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the
psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from
various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not
necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a
personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by
the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors' separate
diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical
findings of experts.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In
general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or
even psychiatrists, to manage behavior.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and
the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1)
respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic
irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs
of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of
unpaid money obligations.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts' conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established
during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
In the instant case, respondent's pattern of behavior manifests an inability,
nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as
shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3)
substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations;
(6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses;
and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
Given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing
 Page 128 of 320
disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at
the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
4 G.R. No. 163744. February 29, 2008.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
DOCTRIN
E First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not
FACTS Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on
January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito
and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment
standing thereon located in Makati City. Later on, the title covering the said
lot was canceled and in lieu thereof, a TCT of the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a.
Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
RTC declared the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson and ordered the
dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses' conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without
liquidating their conjugal partnership.
Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a
PhP58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
(Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros
executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including
one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283. Among the documents
Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a
photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a document
denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9,
1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal properties
of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include the lot in
question.
Due to failure to pay, the property was foreclosed. In the auction sale,
Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder. Nicholson filed a complaint and
alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged
without his consent.
RTC Ruling: concluded that the disputed property may not be validly
encumbered by Florencia without Nicholson's consent.
CA Ruling: Affirmed the RTC decision
ISSUE WON the CA erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by applying
Article 116 of the Family Code
WON the CA erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of marriage
between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto
dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses
RULING The Disputed Property is Conjugal
Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the
property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its
theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed, there must
be a showing that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal
funds. Contrary to Metrobank's submission, the Court did not, in
Manongsong, add the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an essential
requirement for the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise. Nicholson is
correct in pointing out that only proof of acquisition during the marriage is
needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof
on the use of conjugal is still required as a necessary condition before the
presumption can arise, then the legal presumption set forth in the law would
veritably be a superfluity.
Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobank's theory.
Metrobank would thrust on the Court, invoking the two cases, the argument
that the registration of the property in the name of "Florencia Nevalga,
married to Nelson Pascual" operates to describe only the marital status of the
title holder, but not as proof that the property was acquired during the
existence of the marriage. When there is no showing as to when the property
was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is
an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholson's arguments regarding
Metrobank having implicitly acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to
question, the conjugal ownership of the disputed lot, the bank having named
the former in the foreclosure proceedings below as either the spouse of
Florencia or her co-mortgagor.
It is felt, however, that there is no compelling reason to delve into the matter
of estoppel, the same having been raised only for the first time in this petition.
Besides,
however Nicholson was designated below does not really change, one way or
another, the classification of the lot in question.
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature
of Conjugal Ownership
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed
their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of
 Page 129 of 320
the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the
Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal partnership's assets and liabilities
which is generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV,
Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal
Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of both Codes first require
the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of separation of
property reigns.
We ruled that pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal
partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership
among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on
April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the
partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the
former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493.
Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of
Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only
to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is
null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his
undivided half.
5 [G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996.]
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M.
GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents
DOCTRIN CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; VOID MARRIAGES; PROPERTY RELATIONS
E GOVERNED BY PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE.
— In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations
of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions
of Article 147 or Article 148, as the case may be, of the Family Code.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 147, ELABORATED. — Article 147 is a remake of
Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of Art. 147 refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of
the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code. Under this property regime,
property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the
conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are
not included in the co-ownership. Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance
and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition,
the law now expressly provides that — (a) Neither party can dispose or
encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership property,
without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and (b) In
the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share
in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or
waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the
innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 148, ELABORATED. — When the common-law
spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property
acquired byboth of them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industryshall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Suchcontributions and corresponding shares,
however, are prima facie presumed to beequal. The share of any party who is
married to another shall accrue to the absolutecommunity or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a validmarriage. If the
party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, hisor her
share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
ID.; ID.; VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES; ARTICLE 50,
APPLICABILITY. — The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its
explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes
the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from
the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their
nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of
nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the
present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of
the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in
relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the
termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is
not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property
relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages
(before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or
 Page 130 of 320
spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary
rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148
of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely
state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family
home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code,
remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses
FACTS -Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married
-Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article
36 (psychological incapacity) of FC
-RTC granted; directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 FC and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of FC
-Consuelo asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without
marriage."
-trial court made the following clarification:
considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the
property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof
to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts
of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that
matter in equal shares
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the
property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules
onco-ownership
In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the
plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply."
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application
since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the
liquidation of the absolute community of property
-petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be
held controlling; he argues that:
-"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated.
-"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses.
ISSUE settlement of the parties' common property
RULING Decisions of trial court are AFFIRMED
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of
this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation."
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of
the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any
"male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" 7(7) of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household."
6 [A.M. No. MTJ-92-706. March 29, 1995.]
 Page 131 of 320
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE
FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 20, Manila, respondent
DOCTRIN
J.
E
FACTS - This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and
Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila
- Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro and
that the respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko
- In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, complainant saw
respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by
the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro.
- respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko. He alleges that
while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony on April 25, 1965,
the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license
- Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los
Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for
all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage
was solemnized without a license. Respondent argues that the provision of
Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by
the Family Code.
ISSUE WON judicial declaration of nullity of previous marriage is required
RULING Yes
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage.
Article 40 of said Code provides:
"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may
not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely. The reason is that as a general rule no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws
1 [G.R. No. 199522. June 22, 2015.]
RICKY DINAMLING, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS petitioner Ricky Dinamling and a friend came from a drinking session and
went to the boarding house of AAA, whom he has ongoing five-year
relationship and two common children (then aged four and two years old).
-Dinamling started to evict AAA and the children. His reason for the eviction
was that she was allegedly using the place as a "whore house" wherein she
"brought (her) partners.". he threw the feeding bottle of their baby outside
that caused it to break. This forced AAA to hastily leave even without her
children. Dinamling also left and took with him the elder child and left the
baby behind.
punching AAA at the left ear upon seeing her;
kicking AAA to the ground and then pulling off her pants and underwear
(panty) and calling her worthless
throwing the pants and panty back at AAA while shouting AAA's family name
as he left
AAA was brought to the hospital. There, she was told that she was 19 weeks
pregnant and had an incomplete abortion.
-In addition to AAA's testimony, her mother DDD also testified that her
daughter was "like a corpse" because of Dinamling's maltreatment
-petitioner Ricky Dinamling was charged in two (2) criminal Informations in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Section 5 (i), in relation to
Section 6 (f) 7(7) of RA No. 9262.
-RTC rendered its decision: Dinamling guilty of both charges
-petition assails that witness, Dr. Diaz, testified that she was unsure if the
abortion was a result of the mauling that AAA suffered or could have been
caused by an infection or other factors. Petitioner Dinamling's position is that
such testimony of Dr. Diaz, which expresses an uncertainty as to whether the
mauling of AAA caused her abortion, exculpates him from the crime
ISSUE Liability of petitioner under Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, otherwise known as
the
 Page 132 of 320
Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004
RULING The above testimonies suffice to establish the elements of the crime as
defined in Section 5 (i) of RA No. 9262 and as alleged in the two Informations
filed against petitioner. The provision of the law states:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. —
The crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to
the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
children or access to the woman's child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5 (i), in relation to other sections of RA No.
9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children; 23(23)
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman
with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a
woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's
child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or
without the family abode; 24(24) cHDAIS
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional
anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of
minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or omissions.
25(25)
the elements have been proven and duly established in the 2 criminal
informations filed which lead to no other conclusion than the commission of
the crime as prescribed in the law
It bears emphasis that Section 5 (i) penalizes some forms of psychological
violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children. Other
forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic
violence, are addressed and penalized in other sub-parts of Section 5. The law
defines psychological violence as follows:
Section 3(a)
xxx xxx xxx
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to
cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse
of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful
or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.
Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (i) just like the
mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is
the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is
the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To
establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or
similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is
necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are
personal to this party. 30(30) All of these were complied with in the case at
bar.
AAA's physical condition (physical injuries from the mauling, including her
abortion ) is not an element of the crime that petitioner was charged with,
hence, proof of the same is, strictly speaking, unnecessary. The victim's
resulting actual bodily injuries are immaterial unless such injuries are also
alleged to have led to her mental or emotional anguish.
In fact, it is not abortion but the mere fact of pregnancy of the victim at the
time of commission which is an aggravating circumstance, not an element, of
the offense. Section 6 of RA 9262 reads:
SECTION 6.Penalties. — The crime of violence against women and their
children, under Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following
rules:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by
prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or
committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be the
maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.
In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual
physical violence done by the perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential
elements of the crime as defined in Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. The only
exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by the
accused is alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in
which case, such acts of physical violence must be proven. In this instance,
the physical violence was a means of causing mental or emotional suffering.
As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the physical violence
translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's
mental or emotional well-being. In the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts
of publicly punching, kicking and stripping AAA of her pants and underwear,
although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of psychological
violence since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in AAA's public
ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress. The clear,
unrebutted testimony of the victim AAA, as to the physical violence done on
her as well as to the mental and emotional suffering she experienced as a
result thereof, suffices to prove such facts.
 Page 133 of 320
2 [G.R. No. 206957. June 17, 2015.]
CHERITH A. BUCAL, petitioner, vs. MANNY P. BUCAL, respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
DOCTRIN
E 3
FACTS Petitioner Cherith A. Bucal (Cherith) and Manny were married on July 29,
2005 6(6) and have a daughter. Cherith filed a Petition for the Issuance of a
Protection Order based on Republic Act No. (RA) 9262, the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004." alleging that Manny had
never shown her the love and care of a husband, nor supported her and
Francheska financially. Furthermore, due to Manny's alcoholism, he was
always mad and would even shout hurtful words. RTC issued TPO and PPO
but granting Manny visitation rights. Cherith filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Amend Order alleging that continuing Francheska's weekly visits to her father
defeated the purpose of the protection order granted to them as the obligation
made her and the child vulnerable to the abuse. Lower court denied the
motion. CA affirmed.
ISSUE whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Cherith's certiorari petition, thus,
affirming the June 22, 2010 and November 23, 2010 RTC Orders granting
visitation rights to Manny.
RULING The petition is meritorious. Under RA 9262, "[a] protection order is an order
issued . . . for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a
woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other
necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order serve the purpose
of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in
the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim
to independently regain control over her life.
Courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings. Due process
considerations justify this requirement. The records do not show that Manny
prayed for visitation rights.
Neither was it shown that Cherith sought the award of visitation rights for her
estranged husband. In fact, Cherith's RTC Petition specifically prayed that the
RTC
prohibit Manny from communicating with her, directly or indirectly (which
would tend to occur if Francheska would be turned-over to Manny during
weekends), order Manny to absolutely desist and refrain from imposing any
restraint on her personal liberty and from taking from her custody or charge
of Francheska. Cherith has repeatedly contested the award of visitation rights
during the course of the proceedings.
The grant of visitation rights by the RTC is an act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which deserves correction through
the prerogative writ of certiorari.
[G.R. No. 193707. December 10, 2014.]
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN
BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990 but ended on
July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. Thereafter,
respondent came to the Philippines and remarried. On August 28, 2009,
petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit
against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E (2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter's unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged. RTC
issued Order dismissing the criminal case
ISSUE Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and
Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
RULING We find the petition meritorious.
Petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New
Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code
on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same
principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national
law with respect to family rights and duties.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner's son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have
a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
 Page 134 of 320
foreign law. Respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands but he never
proved the same. Thus, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern.
Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and
proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local
or domestic or internal law.
Further, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound
and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or
order shall not be applied. Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in
a foreign country.  The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case
is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a
single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a
parent's obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance
therewith,
such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be
of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is
entitled
Thereto.
under Section 5 (e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262, the deprivation or denial of
financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against women
and children. Considering that respondent is currently living in the
Philippines,the Territoriality Principle in criminal law which states thatp]enal
laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who
live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations"  shall apply.
The act of denying supporti s a continuing offense, hence, case has clearly not
prescribed.
4 [G.R. No. 193960. January 7, 2013.]
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, petitioner, vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA.
ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC, 1(1)
respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Petitioner, boyfriend of the complainant was charged with violation of Section
5 (a) of RA 9262 in an Information which states that he use personal violence
[on] the
complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant's back, shoulder and
left
eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainant's intrinsic worth and
dignity as a human being. Petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred
that at the time of the alleged incident, he was no longer in a dating
relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable. The
RTC denied petitioner's motion. Petitioner insists that the act which resulted
in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because
its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that
the offense committed was only slight physical injuries
ISSUE 1) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense;
2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the
accused; and
3) whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted
should be quashed.
RULING Court is not persuaded.
Sec. 3 (a) of RA 9262 reads Violence against women and their children" refers
to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in
or
is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. . . .
Two limiting qualifications:
1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the
offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating
relationship or with whom he has a common child; and
2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
Elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of
 Page 135 of 320
acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to her.
While it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman,it is not indispensable that the act of
violence be a consequence of such relationship. When the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer
to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship. It is immaterial whether the relationship had
ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present
existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed. The legislative intent is to purposely impose a
more severe sanction with the end in view of promoting the protection of
women and children.
5 G.R. No. 182367               December 15, 2010
CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner,
vs.
GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.
DOCTRIN The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the
E protection and safety of women and children who are victims of
abuse or violence.
FACTS Facts:
Petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City for alleged woman and child
abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262. Dolina added ahandwritten prayer for
financial support from Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her
prayer on the latter’s Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the
child’s father.
Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolina’s petition was
essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman
and child abuses; that he was not the child’s father; that the signature
appearing on the child’s Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is
a harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and
give it financial support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been
living with Dolina, rendering unnecessary the issuance of a protection order
against him.
RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists
establishing the filiation of Dolina’s son and granting him the right to support
as basis for an order to compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a
motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it, with an admonition that
she first file a petition for compulsory recognition of her child as a
prerequisite for support.
ISSUE Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary
protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child.
RULING Yes.
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The
object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection
and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or
violence. Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent
in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child,
this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first
establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her
claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his
relation to him.The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial
action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate
children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation
must be duly proved.
It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed
the entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of
filiation between Vallecera and Dolina’s child since the main issue remains to
be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child
and whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is
already water under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on
review. This omission lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the
real purpose of the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded
paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s
legitimate family. Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a hand
in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be
resolved in an appropriate case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City’s Order dated March 13, 2008 that
dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina’s action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and
Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion for reconsideration dated
March 28, 2008.
6 A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ               April 23, 2010
FRANCISCO P. OCAMPO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch
 Page 136 of 320
144, Makati City, Respondent.
DOCTRIN Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) - immediate personal service (RA 9262)
E not appear that respondent Judge had any hand in the belated service of the
FACTS       In an Order dated March 22, 2007, respondent Judge denied the motion
to dismiss. Francisco Ocampo questioned the dismissal of his motion since
Milan never presented any evidence to controvert the evidence which he
submitted in support of his motion to dismiss. Francisco Ocampo, thereafter,
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua in an Order dated April 3, 2007. On that date, respondent
Judge issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), requiring complainant
Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor daughters to his wife, to stay
away from his wife's residence at 1211 West Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil
Puyat Ave., Makati City, to refrain from committing acts that would harass,
intimidate or threaten and create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or
welfare of their minor daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly support
of P50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of expenses
for medication and education.
            Francisco Ocampo faulted respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua for
issuing the TPO as the period to file his answer had not yet expired when
respondent Judge issued the said Order. Moreover, he was directed to give
monthly support of P50,000.00 to his wife and minor daughters, even if his
wife alleged that he is not the father of the said minors and in the absence of
any factual finding as to the resources of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. In directing the payment of support to his wife, respondent Judge
also ignored the factual circumstances relating to the adulterous relations of
his wife and the pendency of the legal separation case based on his wife's
sexual infidelity and abandonment.
            Francisco Ocampo further alleged that respondent Judge caused the
implementation of the TPO as if it was a matter of life and death. When her
branch sheriff was not available, respondent Judge dispatched another sheriff
to implement the Order. At that time, Francisco Ocampo, his minor daughters
and family were having their Holy Week vacation. The sheriff went inside the
house and opened the rooms against the will of the occupants and without
regard to their privacy. When the sheriff learned that Francesca and Fatima
were still sleeping, he demanded that they be roused from their sleep, even as
Ocampo assured him that he will peacefully bring his minor daughters to his
wife.
            The sheriff also insisted that Francisco Ocampo pay the support of
P50,000.00 right there and then, although he was told by Francisco that he
did not have such amount of money. Francesca and Fatima refused to go with
the sheriff, but because of the court order, Francisco Ocampo told them to go
with him.
ISSUE Whether or not the issuance of the TPO is proper.
RULING Yes.
Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's explanation
acceptable. The order setting the case for hearing on December 13, 2006 was
issued on December 8, 2006. Thus, there was an interim of at least five days
from the issuance of the order and the date of the scheduled hearing. It did
notice to the complainant. Justice Salazar-Fernando held that respondent
Judge cannot be faulted as to the alleged suddenness of the said hearing,
because a prayer for TPO requires to be acted upon with dispatch. In that
respect, no wrong-doing, fraud, bad faith, malice or even arbitrariness can be
attributed to respondent Judge.
According to the Investigating Justice, the alleged precipitate issuance of the
TPO had no leg to stand on. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua correctly stated
that the issuance of the TPO can be made upon the filing of the application
after ex parte determination by the judge that the same be issued. This is in
accordance with Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9262, thus:
SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection Orders
(TPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of
the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued.
A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this
Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a
hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of
the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on
the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law
enforcement agents for the service.The TPO shall include notice of the date of
the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
Hence, the issuance of the TPO by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even
before complainant Ocampo could file his answer was neither irregular nor
improper.
7 G.R. No. 182835               April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD,
Respondents.
DOCTRIN Crim Case - Nude pic pasted with victims face = violation of RA 9262
E
FACTS The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan)
before the RTC of violation of RA 9262 in an information that reads:
            On or about June 5, 2005, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short
Messaging Service using his mobile phone a pornographic picture to  Irish
 Page 137 of 320
Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was
attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it appear that
it was said Irish Sagud who is pasted in the said obscene and pornographic
picture, thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress
and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.
            The RTC found Rustan guilty of violation of Sec. 5(h) of RA 9262.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE Whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture
with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish,
psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h)
of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1.    Whether or not a “dating relationship” existed between Rustan and
Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;
2.   Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the
nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262;
3.    Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained
from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and
4.    Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene
picture presented in the case.
RULING Yes. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes
an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual
or dating relationship.  Thus:
SEC. 3.  Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
(a)     “Violence against women and their children” refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
x xxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and
these include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to a woman.  Thus:
SEC. 5.  Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
x xxx
h.      Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or
through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to,
the following acts:
x xxx
5.      Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime
of violence against women through harassment are:
1.       The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman;
2.       The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of
acts of harassment against the woman; and
3.       The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to her.
One.  The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that
accused Rustan had a “dating relationship” with Irish.  Section 3(e) provides
that a “dating relationship” includes a situation where the parties are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course
of the relationship.  Thus:
(e)     “Dating relationship” refers to a situation wherein the parties live as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically
involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two
individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being “romantically involved,” implies that the
offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations.  According to
him, “romance” implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive
Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal
meaning to the word “romance” used as a verb, i.e., “to make love; to make
love to” as in “He romanced her.”
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb
“romance” that implies a sexual act.  It did not say that the offender must
have “romanced” the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun “romance” to
describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., “a love affair.”
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that “violence against women x xx refers to
any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x xx with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.”  Clearly, the law
itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed,
Section 3(e) above defines “dating relationship” while Section 3(f) defines
“sexual relations.” The latter “refers to a single sexual act which may or may
not result in the bearing of a common child.”  The dating relationship that the
law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse
taking place between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of
the “on-and-off” variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as
having developed “over time and on a continuing basis.”  But the two of them
were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to
December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship
of mutual trust and love. An “away-bati” or a fight-and-kiss thing between
two lovers is a common occurrence.  Their taking place does not mean that
the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during
 Page 138 of 320
periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what “away-bati” meant, Irish
explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he
would get angry at her.  That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-
month romantic relation as continuous.
Two.  Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should
not be considered a form of harassment.  He claims that such would unduly
ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of
R.A. 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts” that constitutes violence against
women.  This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into
violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and
children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license
isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene
communications that her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm
in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress.  He
claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she
was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their
testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the
obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7).  It is doubtful if the woman in the
picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that
Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7.  But her testimony did not make sense. She
said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she
deleted the pictures.  Later, however, she said that she did not have time to
delete them.[11] And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from
the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory
card. There would have been nothing to hide.  Finally, if she knew that some
pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for
several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see
anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving
credence to her testimony.
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based
on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth.
What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be
determined based on the circumstances of each case.  Here, the naked woman
on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was
clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely,
any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be
scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture.  What makes it
further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a
threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a
nightmare.
Three.  Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were
seized from him without any warrant, the evidence presented against him
should be deemed inadmissible.  But the fact is that the prosecution did not
present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police
officers seized from him at the time of his arrest.  The prosecution did not
need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a
photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which
cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s
testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious text messages
that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had
been previously in communication.  Indeed, to prove that the cellphone
numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to
summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did. Consequently, the
prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards
to prove that Rustan sent those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.
His defense was that he himself received those messages from an unidentified
person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her,
using his cellphone.  But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the
unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the same.
The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court.
Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had
merely tried to help her identify the sender.
Four.  Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document.  Thus, it should be authenticated
by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene
picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court.  The objection is too
late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such
ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection. Besides, the rules he cites do not
apply to the present criminal action.  The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings.
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and
every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its
resolution dated April 25, 2008.
8 SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN
and JUANITA L. TAN, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan
(Steven) were married. Out of this union, two female children were born,
Kyra Danielle 4(5) and Kristen Denise. Barely six years into the marriage,
petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law. She alleged
 Page 139 of 320
that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5), and (i) 7(8) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, 8(9) otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004".
RTC granted the TPO.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of
Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition,
contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as
parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground
that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known
rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius".
ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA,
PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".
RULING Yes.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their
children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats
of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to
the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it
does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
RPC.
Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application
of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. — For purposes of this Act, the Revised
Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.
(Emphasis supplied)
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the
RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express
provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus,
general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act
of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators
are principals.
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes
that the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed
by an offender through another, thus:
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may
include individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
The intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must be effectuated by
the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects
the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and
spirit — the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and
children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est
exclusio alterius" finds no application here. It must be remembered that this
maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction". It is not of
universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a
means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and
should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the
legislature.
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the
attendance of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of
Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses
upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be
threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in
the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. 26(27) It is thus
premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is
centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included
in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can
be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.
K.
1 CELERINA J. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS, respondent.
 Page 140 of 320
DOCTRIN A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after
E a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-
founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be
considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid
termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
FACTS On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner
Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband,
respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of
absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15,
2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo
alleged that Celerina left Tarlac to work abroad and never heard from her
again.
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to
Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their
daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other relatives and
friends, but no one gave him any information. It was almost 12 years when
Celerina left. He believed that she passed away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in
October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies. Hence she filed a
petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was
deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true
residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City.
According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension,
Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been her and
Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a
result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and
opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively dead.
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and
worked as a domestic helper abroad. Ricardo was aware that she never left
their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal
dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman.
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008,
dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong
mode of remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to
file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in
accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the
Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the
spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-
founded belief of the spouse's death. She added that it would be inappropriate
to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place.
She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the
declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.
ISSUE WON the annulment of judgment declaring presumptive death is the right
remedy.
RULING Yes.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse
that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a
second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being
terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears.
Thus:
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance
of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be
recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of
reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with
the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the
first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated
when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination
of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions:
(1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of
the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of
reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always
immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of
 Page 141 of 320
the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the
subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family
Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or
presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already
been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the
reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses'
residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact
of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is
yet rendered confirming such fact of reappearance.
Mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the
parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was "no step . . .
taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of
reappearance] or by court action[.] Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such
presumption continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by
fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the
subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law."
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of
determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse
who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous
subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present:
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
alreadydead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.
55(55)
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after
a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-
founded belief  that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be
considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid
termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to
declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent
marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the
element of "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is
essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply.
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the
termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who
was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in
law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also
be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage."
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the
termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects.
She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only
terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the
declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent
marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in
relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent
for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
may be filed solely by the husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina
is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome
of an action to nullify the second marriage, this remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage
but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and
the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would
not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will,
therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for
nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition
2 AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of
MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, respondent
DOCTRIN A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to
E the marriage, and by any proper interested party, however, the said rule finds
application only in cases of marriage solemnized prior to the Family Code.
FACTS Eliseo died intestate. Petition for Letters of Administration were filed by
respondents who are his common-law wife and daughter.
The petition was opposed by petitioner to whom Eliseo was married.
Respondent Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
 Page 142 of 320
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and respondent
Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to
petitioner Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with another.
The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to respondent
daughter Elise. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. CA
agreed that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence up to the time of Eliseo’s death
ISSUE WON Elise may question the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia?
RULING Yes.
In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot
be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly
or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.  It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog
applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father's marriage to therein respondent after the
death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to
wit:
[C]onsequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail
it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
There is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced
by her father's marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be
questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or
collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as
a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party
to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by
the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San
Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a
competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the National
Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not
diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of
the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus,
the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the
National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote.
Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been
dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo's marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore,
void ab initio.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in
the estate as distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by
the distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With
the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation
to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent's estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right
of Elise to be appointed administratrix of the state of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law,
is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural children,
Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of
the law.
3 ISIDRO ABLAZA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DOCTRIN A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and
E wife
and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such
relation.
The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a
marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted.
FACTS On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his
late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila
 Page 143 of 320
had
been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued
only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for
having been solemnized without a marriage license.
He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died
without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and
that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage
between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
ISSUE Whether the petitioner, Isidro, is a real party in interest in the action to seek
the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
RULING Yes.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the
limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line
to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code,
the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule
on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate
the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano's brother and
surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be,
then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be
adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the
petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the
right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother.
4 JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL,
also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE
CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.
DOCTRIN ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages
E solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases
commenced prior to March 15, 2003.
FACTS Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each
have three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died
intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son,
Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land were registered in
the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II.
In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the
court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his
late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was
neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that
the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums
received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
ISSUE Whether the petitioner, Juan, has the capacity to bring an action for the
nullity of marriage between Teofilo and Felicidad.
RULING Yes.
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it
does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse
under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in
the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within
the
coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became
effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.
 Page 144 of 320
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent
Felicidad
in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. The
marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of
its celebration.
5 SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO,
respondent.
DOCTRIN The absence of a marriage license, as a general rule, renders the marriage void
E ab initio. However, for purposes of remarriage, a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of the previous marriage must be obtained. For other purposes, no
such judicial action is required.
FACTS SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two marriages. The first was with
petitioner with whom he begot two (2) children, while the second, during the
subsistence of the first, was with respondent with whom he had no issue.
When he died in 1988, petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies.
Petitioner collected P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, commutation,
NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig, while respondent collected P21,000 from GSIS
and SSS. Respondent, in an action for collection, sought to recover half the
amount collected by petitioner.
She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage
and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she
met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster
her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the
petitioner which bears no marriage license number.
ISSUE WON a judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity,
for purposes other than remarriage?
RULING No.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death
of the parties thereto.,
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage
license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity
of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license.
Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification
issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became
the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they
secured the required marriage license.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan
Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the "death
benefits" under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains
that their
 Page 145 of 320
marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring
the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab
initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of
the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property
regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property,
but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code on "Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage."
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a
previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased),
the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
Article
147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who
are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage,
but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of
a marriage license.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
L.
6 ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778    G.R. No. 207406
March 14, 2000
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Pepito Niñal was married to Bellones. Their marriage gave birth to Engrace
and other petitioners. After some time, Bellones was shot to death by Pepito
Niñal who eventually got married to Norma Bayadog without marriage
license. In lieu of the marriage license, the two executed an affidavit stating
that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. However,
Pepito died in a car accident. After the death, the children of Pepito filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma
alleging that the said marriage lacks marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage
would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage"
under Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUE Whether judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a marriage.
RULING No, judicial decree is not necessary to establish the nullity of a marriage. The
Supreme Court ruled that jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. “A
void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the
nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction.” Other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or
a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
1 NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
January 13, 2016
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Norberto married Alice in Intramuros and three children were born into their
union. After some time, Alice has been hearing rumors that Norberto was
married to another woman prior to their marriage. Alice found out eventually
that Norberto was previously married to Gina. Thus, Alice filed a complaint
for bigamy.
ISSUE Whether Norberto is liable for bigamy.
 Page 146 of 320
RULING Yes, Norberto is liable for bigamy. The Supreme Court ruled that for an
accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the
following elements:
[first,] that the offender has been legally married;
[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code;
[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
Assuming without conceding that petitioner's first marriage was solemnized
without a marriage license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner's
first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina
judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. The second
element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case. Should the
requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the
crime of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "All that
an adventurous bigamist has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage
and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void
and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first.” Further, "[a] party may even enter into a
marriage aware of the absence of a requisite — usually the marriage license —
and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is
void.”
2 LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
G.R. No. 200233
July 15, 2015
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,
Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information for bigamy.
Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the
criminal suit. The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been
married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner to marry him.
Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July
1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she
wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without
responsibility." Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not
be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under
the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred
that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should
be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their
marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license. Eleven years after the
inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and
April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife
of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang
only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
ISSUE Whether the second spouse may be a co-accused in a bigamy case.
RULING Yes, the second spouse may be a co-accused in a bigamy case. The Supreme
Court ruled that crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of
two persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them
is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno, in the crime of bigamy,
both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without
being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had
knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be
included in the information as a co-accused. Therefore, the lower courts
correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang.
Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown
by the totality of the following circumstances:
(1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-
laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him;
(2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his
true civil status; and
(3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who
had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had
already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of
Santos.
3 G.R. No. 159031               June 23, 2014
NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
DOCTRIN Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial
E declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void
and in existent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined
and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS  On February 16, 1968, Judge Carlos B. Salazar solemnized the
marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo without the
benefit of a marriage license.
 Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation
to excuse the lack of the marriage license.
 On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage
vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose
Church in Iloilo City.
 They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for
 Page 147 of 320
that purpose.
 In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of
irreconcilable differences.
 On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa
Eslaban in a religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the
Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate reflected the
civil status of the accused as single.
 On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of
marriage and damages against Socorro. The complaint alleged that
Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing
his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches,
psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to suffer
mental anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting the
award of damages.
 In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City.
 The RTC rendered its judgment in the civil case dismissed the
accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the
marriage between him and Socorro valid and legal.
 On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed
decision in criminal case finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.
 Petitioner’s contention – RTC erred in finding that he had legally
married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of
cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer. Sincehe had not
been legally married to Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not
established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent were
absolutory in his favor; and that he had been of the honest belief that
there was no need for a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage before he could contract a subsequent marriage.
ISSUE WON petitioner should be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was
null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage.
RULING  The appeal lacks merit.
 This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant
Lasanas and private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence
of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory
religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage.
Neither can the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do
so, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be
present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those
instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no
marriage license nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who
presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated
as a valid marriage in itself.
 But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have
first secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to
private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he
did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he
violated the law on bigamy.
 The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the
absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the
accused and Socorro.
 If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits
bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable
decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against
him.
 We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the
first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the
Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage.
 Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint
has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape
liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes
the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so
would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability
of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints
and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s strained
reading of the law is against its simple letter.
 The crime of bigamy was consummated from the moment he
contracted the second marriage without his marriage to Socorro being
first judicially declared null and void, because at the time of the
celebration of the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still
deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not being yet declared
null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction.
 There is a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs
of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
4 G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY,
SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DOCTRIN
E
 Page 148 of 320
FACTS  Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Marinay in
the Philippines on 23 January 2004.
 The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki
could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.
 In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara.
 Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara
were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
 In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment
be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara
and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
RTC Decision
 Issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case
from its active civil docket.
 The RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this
case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their
marriage void, and not Fujiki.
 Petitioner’s contention:
o A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions
for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage, thus,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply.
o The petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status
and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband
and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese
Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The
petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.
o A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
o To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the
words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that
the party interested in having a bigamous marriage
declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-
existing marriage."
o He argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of
the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) in relation to Article
413 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
RULING  We grant the petition.
 The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
 The rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can
file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if
the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
 Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay.
 For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara
in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court.
 There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it.
 There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the
public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive
right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances)
his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.
 These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.
 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the
substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.
 Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a
subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on
the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
 Page 149 of 320
solely by the husband or the wife"—it refers to the husband or the
wife of the subsisting marriage.
 Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning.
 The parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the
wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.
 Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages
void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime.
 Anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has
an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file
a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he
is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
 When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
judgment of the suit.
 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can
petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous
marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in
the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment
to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
5 G.R. No. 191425               September 7, 2011
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DOCTRIN
E 
FACTS  On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan
B. Lledo filed an Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora")
and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy.
 Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a Staff
Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got married in Bulacan.
 While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband
has another wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left
Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines.
 Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private complainant learned that
indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with co-
accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 when she secured a
certification as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. from NSO
sometime in November 2003.
RTC Decision
 Convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
 There are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article 41 7
of the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180 of the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree
No. 1083.
 The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for allowing
Muslim men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim male can have
more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship
and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional
cases."
 The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and
polygamy is allowed only to meet urgent needs. Only with the permission
of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have a second wife subject to
certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is merely
tolerated, not encouraged, under certain circumstances.
 Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract
subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Shari’a Circuit
Court of the place where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a
copy thereof to the wife or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an
Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said council fails to
secure the wife’s consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall,
subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection.
 Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-
accused Rowena P. Geraldino, did not comply with the above-mentioned
provision of the law. In fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim
convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent.
 In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the
mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after marrying the
private complainant.
What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled
right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth time.
 In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused re-
celebrated their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However,
this can no longer cure the criminal liability that has already been
violated.
 The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused
Atilano Nollora, Jr., only. There is no sufficient evidence that would pin
accused Rowena P. Geraldino down.
CA Decision
 Dismissed Nollora’s appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.
 The appellate court rejected Nollora’s defense that his second
 Page 150 of 320
marriage to Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and
was allowed by the Qur’an.
 It denied Nollora’s invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to
the prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him pursuant to
Philippine civil laws.1avvphi1Nollora’s two marriages were not conducted
in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family
Code of the Philippines should apply. Nollora’s claim of religious freedom
will not immobilize the State and render it impotent in protecting the
general welfare.
ISSUE WON Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
RULING  Nollora’s petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the
appellate court and of the trial court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
 The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of
bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; (2) Nollora and Pinat’s
marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second marriage to
Geraldino; and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his
prior marriage.
 Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged
that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo
that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages, Nollora cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not
conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or
Presidential Decree No. 1083.
 Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized
according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion,
Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
 Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his
civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Nollora’s marriage contracts do
not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the
declaration of one’s religion in the marriage certificate is not an essential
requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of
Nollora’s liability for bigamy. Nollora’s false declaration about his civil
status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
6 [G.R. No. 164435. September 29, 2009.]
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DOCTRIN Criminal bigamy,prescription of bigamy
E
FACTS Petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City
Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M.
Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on
January 12, 1999.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil
wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal
Mayor of Taguig, Rizal
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage
in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before
then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew
in a church wedding in Manila
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant for annulment of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City
Accused-appellant filed against Alocillo for declaration of nullity of their
marriage.
RTC: finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of BIGAMY.
Petitioner contentions: (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null
and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta
Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to
both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license;
and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to
Alocillo as far back as 1978.
CA Ruling: petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with
Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo
had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the
 Page 151 of 320
presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time
of her marriage to Uy.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision
dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner's 1974 and 1975 marriages to
Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo's psychological
incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003.
ISSUE WON the accused is guilty of bigamy
RULING Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already
been consummated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage to
[private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner's
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted.
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner's two marriages to
Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
petitioner's marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and
void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage".
Petitioner's defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as
1978; hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party
who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The
defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense;
otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving. Thus, for
petitioner's defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to
adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained
knowledge of her previous marriage.
Petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to support her
allegation. “The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted
only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the
date of registration of the bigamous marriage. Since petitioner failed to prove
with certainty that the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her
defense is, therefore, ineffectual.
7 [G.R. No. 145226. February 6, 2004.]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates in Bohol; however, they
lost contacts for a while, but after receiving a card from Barrete and various
exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990.
Subsequently, Lucia went back to Canada for work. In 1991, she filed petition
for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted.
In 1992, Lucio married Lumbago. He then filed a complaint for judicial
declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony that
transpired between him and Lucia. In turn Lucia charged Lucio with bigamy.
Arraignment was suspended in view of the civil case already pending, which,
posed a prejudicial question in the criminal case of Bigamy. Lucio pleaded not
guilty, he claims that his marriage with Lucia was void ab initio, and as such,
he contracted second marriage in good faith. RTC and CA held that the
divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian Court could not be
accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Art. 15 of the Civil Code, and
given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Art.
17 of the same Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered
ineffectual by a judgement promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction. Further,
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia could not acquit
Lucio in the Bigamy case pending against him. The reason is that what is
sought to be punished by Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved.
RTC of Bohol found accused Lucio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy. CA affirmed.
ISSUE WON Lucio should have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with
Lucia before his second marriage.
RULING No.
There was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia
by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other
words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration
of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.
 Page 152 of 320
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time
he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity
of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is
but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there
is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of
the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v.
Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already
celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as
void.[26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage
certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a
duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely
signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might
be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
M.
1 [G.R. No. 214243. March 16, 2016.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NILDA B. TAMPUS,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code exist. Since it is the present
FACTS Respondent Nilda was married to Dante on November 29, 1975 in Cordova,
Cebu. The marriage ceremony was solemnized by Municipal Judge Julian B.
Pogoy of Cordova, Cebu. Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975,
Dante, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), left
respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no
children.
Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her
efforts proved futile. She filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as
presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse
of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, she
firmly believes that he is already dead.
RTC Ruling: granted Nilda's petition and declared Dante as presumptively
dead for all legal purposes, without prejudice to the effect of his
reappearance. It found that Dante left the conjugal dwelling sometime in 1975
and from then on, Nilda never heard from him again despite diligent efforts
to locate him. In this light, she believes that he had passed away especially
since his last assignment was a combat mission. Moreover, the RTC found
that the absence of thirty-three (33) years was sufficient to give rise to the
presumption of death.
CA Ruling: affirmed the RTC Decision declaring Dante as presumptively
dead. Moreover, the CA opined that if Dante were still alive after many years,
it would have been easy for him to communicate with Nilda, taking into
consideration the fact that Dante was only 25 years old when he left and,
therefore, would have been still physically able to get in touch with his wife.
However, because neither Nilda nor his own family has heard from him for
several years, it can be reasonably concluded that Dante is already dead.
ISSUE WON the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision declaring Dante as
presumptively dead.
RULING Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4)
consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that
the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
(4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the foregoing
spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially
asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of
 Page 153 of 320
proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and mere allegation is not evidence.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to
locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to
his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him.
Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to
find her husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP
headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to do so.
To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing
husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's
parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of
diligence required to create a "well-founded belief" of his death.
Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or neighbors as
witnesses who could have corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly
looked for Dante. These resource persons were not even named.
Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence
had been offered to support her allegation that she exerted efforts to find him
but was unsuccessful. What appears from the facts as established in this case
was that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without actively and
diligently searching for her husband, which the Court cannot accept as
constituting a "well-founded belief" that her husband is dead. Whether or not
the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse.
2 [G.R. No. 199194. February 10, 2016.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JOSE B.
SAREÑOGON, JR., respondent.
DOCTRIN
E years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
FACTS -(2008) respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S. 7(7) Sareñogon
(Netchie).
-(1996) they lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he
left to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic
helper. 13(13) For three months, he did not receive any communication from
Netchie. 14(14) He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. 15(15) While
still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie's parents, but failed, He returned
home after his contract expired. 17(17) He then inquired from Netchie's
relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know
where she was. 18(18) Because of these, he had to presume that his wife
Netchie was already dead.
-Jose's testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and
by Netchie's aunt, Consuelo Sande.
-RTC granted. Netchie had disappeared for more than four years, reason
enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead
-Court of Appeals upheld RTC
-The Republic claims that based on jurisprudence, Jose's alleged efforts in
locating Netchie did not engender or generate a well-founded belief that the
latter is probably dead.  It maintains that Jose inexplicably failed to enlist the
assistance of the relevant government agencies. It likewise points out that
Jose did not present any disinterested person to corroborate his allegations
that the latter was indeed missing and could not be found. 39(39) It also
contends that Jose did not advert to circumstances, events, occasions, or
situations that would prove that he did in fact make a comprehensive search
for Netchie. Republic submits that Jose did not categorically assert that he
wanted to have Netchie declared presumptively dead because he intends to
get married again, an essential premise of Article 41 of the Family Code
ISSUE THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING
WIFE DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF"
THAT RESPONDENT'S ABSENT WIFE . . . IS PROBABLY DEAD.
RULING The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code
iscomplied with only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts
hadindeed been made to ascertain whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead
Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of
 Page 154 of 320
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee. 58(58) (Underscoring supplied)
Republic v. Cantor:  the degree of diligence and reasonable search required
by law is not met (1) when there is failure to present the persons from whom
the present spouse allegedly made inquiries especially the absent spouse's
relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when there is failure to report the
missing spouse's purported disappearance or death to the police or mass
media, and (3) when the present spouse's evidence might or would only show
that the absent spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that the
latter was indeed dead
Given the Court's imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that
there was no basis at all for the RTC's finding that Jose's Petition complied
with the requisites of Article 41 of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-
founded belief" standard.
Petition is GRANTED. Decision of Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.
3 [G.R. No. 210929. July 29, 2015.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDNA
ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA, respondent.
DOCTRIN
E requirement of  "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a
FACTS Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978
In 1992, Edna worked as domestic helper in Singapore while her husband
worked as a mechanic in Valencia City
In 1993, Edna heard the news from her children that Romeo had left their
conjugal home without reason or information as to his whereabouts.
Thereafter, Edna took a leave from work and returned to the country to look
for Romeo. She inquired from her parents-in-law and common friends in
Iligan City. Still she found no leads as to his whereabouts or existence. She
also went to his birthplace in Escalante, Negros Oriental, and inquired from
his relatives. Despite her efforts, she averred that she received negative
responses from them because none of them had knowledge of the existence of
her husband who had been missing for 15 years
(2009) Edna filed before the RTC a petition 5(5) to declare Romeo
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code
RTC granted the petition on the basis of her well-founded belief of Romeo's
death
CA upheld RTC
The OSG argues that the evidence presented by Edna, which merely consisted
of bare anduncorroborated assertions, never amounted to a diligent and
serious search
ISSUE THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING Her MISSING
husband DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF"
THAT RESPONDENT'S ABSENT husband . . . IS PROBABLY DEAD
RULING Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of
presumptive death may be granted, the present spouse must prove that
he/she has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. 14(14) In this case,
Edna failed
The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to
locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
necessitates exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence
of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that
the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure
to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code
would not suffice. 15(15) The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code
places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the stringent
showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain
not only the absent spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead
This strict standard approach ensures that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to
conveniently circumvent the laws in light of the State's policy to protect and
strengthen the institution of marriage
Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases,
particularly Cantor, Edna's efforts failed to satisfy the required well-founded
belief of her absent husband's death.
Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it
merely consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on
record. She also failed to present any person from whom she inquired about
the whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her children from
 Page 155 of 320
whom she learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact, she was the lone
witness. Moreover, no document was submitted to corroborate the allegation
that her husband had been missing for at least fifteen (15) years already. As
the OSG observed, there was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the
authorities at the time her husband disappeared.
petition is GRANTED. The petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva
to have her husband declared presumptively dead is DENIED
4 [G.R. No. 209741. April 15, 2015.]
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. EDNA A.
AZOTE, respondent
DOCTRIN
E THE COMMISSION IS BEREFT OF AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE THE
FACTS -1992, respondent Edna and Edgardo, a member of the Social Security System
(SSS), were married
-1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three
older children as designated beneficiaries
- 2001, Edgardo submitted another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three
younger children as additional beneficiaries
- 2005, Edgardo passed away. Shortly thereafter, Edna filed her claim for
death benefits with the SSS as the wife of a deceased-member. It appeared,
however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier submitted another
Form E-4 on November 5, 1982 with a different set of beneficiaries, namely:
Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer), as
dependent. Consequently, Edna's claim was denied
- 2007, Edna filed a petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump
sum and monthly pension of Edgardo. 7(7) She insisted that she was the
legitimate wife of Edgardo
The SSC argues that under Section 5 of the SS Law, it is called upon to
determine the rightful beneficiary in the performance of its quasi-judicial
function of adjudicating SS benefits. And With the death certificate
ofRosemarie showing that she died only on November 6, 2004, it proved that
she was alive at the time Edna and Edgardo were married, and, therefore,
there existed a legal impediment to his second marriage, rendering it void.
Edna is, therefore, not a legitimate spouse who is entitled to the death
benefits of Edgardo. The SSC claims that the right to designate a beneficiary is
subject to the SS Law. The designation of a wife-beneficiary merely creates a
disputable presumption that they are legally married and may be overthrown
by evidence to the contrary. Edna's designation became invalid with the
determination of the subsistence of a previous marriage. The SSC posits that
even though Edgardo revoked and superseded his earlier designation of
Rosemarie as beneficiary, his designation of Edna was still not valid
considering that only a legitimate spouse could qualify as a primary
beneficiary.
- CA reversed and set aside the resolution and the order of the SSC; Edna had
established her right to the benefits by substantial evidence, namely, her
marriage certificate and the baptismal certificates of her children. Edna was
the sole claimant for the death benefits, and that her designation as wife-
beneficiary remained valid and unchallenged. It was of the view that
Rosemarie's non-appearance despite notice could be deemed a waiver to
claim death benefits from the SSS, thereby losing whatever standing she
might have had to dispute Edna's claim.
ISSUE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
VALIDITY OR INVALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AND MEMBER EDGARDO AZOTE
RULING It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was
celebrated at the time when the Family Code was already in force. Article 41
of the Family Code expressly states:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without
doubt, failed to establish that there was no impediment or that the
impediment was already removed at the time of the celebration of her
marriage to Edgardo. Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the
earlier marriage of Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there
was a declaration of Rosemarie's presumptive death before her marriage to
Edgardo
The Court does not subscribe to the disquisition of the CA that the updated
Form E-4 of Edgardo was determinative of Edna's status and eligibility to
claim the death benefits of deceased-member. Although an SSS member is
free to designate a beneficiary, the designation must always conform to the
statute.
 Page 156 of 320
Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of
marriages, it is required by Section 4 (b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282 29(29) to
examine available statistical and economic data to ensure that the benefits fall
into the rightful beneficiaries
As can be gleaned from the certification issued by the NSO, 31(31) there is no
doubt that Edgardo married Rosemarie in 1982. Edna cannot be considered
as the legal spouse of Edgardo as their marriage took place during the
existence of a previously contracted marriage. For said reason, the denial of
Edna's claim by the SSC was correct. It should be emphasized that the SSC
determined Edna's eligibility on the
basis of available statistical data and documents on their database as
expressly permitted by Section 4 (b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282
Accordingly, the petition for entitlement of SS death benefits filed by
respondent Edna Azote is DENIED for lack of merit
5 [G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014.]
CELERINA J. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS,
respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
DOCTRIN
E being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she
FACTS The Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T.
Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage. Ricardo alleged Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. She
allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February
1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from
again.Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. 9(9)
He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, but they, too, did not know their
daughter's whereabouts. Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo,
despite his knowledge of her true residence in Neptune Extension,
Congressional Avenue, Quezon City which had been her and Ricardo's
conjugal dwelling since 1989.  Celerina claimed that she learned about
Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008. Celerina claimed that she
never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper
abroad. The Court of Appeals dismissed Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy and the proper remedy was to
file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in
accordance with Article 42 of FC. Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of
reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when
the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of
presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death.
She did not disappear in the first place. She insisted that an action for
annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death
is obtained fraudulently.
ISSUE Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained
judgment declaring presumptive death.
RULING The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's
judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner." The grounds for annulment of
judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
Jurisdiction.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse
that the
absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second
marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage. Second marriage is in danger of
reappears.
Reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination and subject to the following Conditions:
(1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio;
(2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance;
(3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and
(4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.
Subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively
dead spouse's reappearance
(1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a
nullity;
(2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil
registry of the subsequent spouses' residence;
(3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or
(4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no
judgment is yet rendered confirming such fact of reappearance.
 Page 157 of 320
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of
presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead
and that
the second marriage is legal. The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity
of the second marriage. "Since the second marriage has been contracted
because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law,
he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law."
Bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following
are present:
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after
a death:
court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-
founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be
considered as validly terminated.
Subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to
prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of
dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.
An undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is
valid until terminated. The "children of such marriage shall be considered
legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will
be the same as in valid marriages." If it is terminated by mere reappearance,
the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination
shall still be considered legitimate. Therefore, for the purpose of not only
terminating the subsequent marriage but
also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not
suffice.
Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore,
lie.
6 [G.R. No. 184621. December 10, 2013.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARIA FE
ESPINOSA CANTOR, respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. Cotabato.
Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about
by: (1) the respondent's inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and
Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry's expression of animosity
toward the respondent's father. After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal
dwelling. On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years, the respondent filed
before the RTC a petition 4(4) for her husband's declaration of presumptive
death,the RTC issued an order granting the respondent's petition. CA
affirmed. The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-
founded belief to justify the declaration of her husband's presumptive death,
particularly, the degree of search conducted.
ISSUE W/N CA and lower court erred in declaring Jerry presumptively dead.
RULING The Essential Requisites for the Declaration of Presumptive Death under
Article 41 of the Family Code
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is
danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
The Present Spouse Has the Burden of Proof to Show that All the Requisites
under Article 41 of the Family Code are Present
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the
absentee is already dead. Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such
period required by the law), lack of any news, or  failure to communicate
would not suffice.
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief:
"well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper
and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead. result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries
to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
 Page 158 of 320
dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
Strict Standard Approach is Consistent with the State's Policy to Protect and
Strengthen Marriage.
Strict Standard Prescribed under Article 41 of the Family Code is for the
Present Spouse's Benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a criminal
prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of RPC. Upon the issuance of the
decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present
spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established.
7 [G.R. No. 180863. September 8, 2009.]
ANGELITA VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
DOCTRIN
E ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,
FACTS Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971. In March 1972, Sofio left their
conjugal dwelling. October 1975 was the last time petitioner saw him.
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on
June 20, 1985. Subsequently, however, Virgilio's application for
naturalization was denied because petitioner's marriage to Sofio was
subsisting. Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the
RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of
Sofio.The RTC dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in this case
and not the Family Code. OSG recommended that the Court to grant the
Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead arguing that the requirement of
"well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case because it was not yet in existence during her marriage to
Virgilio Reyes in 1985.
ISSUE W/N CA and lower court erred in dismissing the petition pursuant to Family
Code.
RULING The marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June
20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil
Code. Under the Civil Code, for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The law
only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. Further, presumption of death cannot be the
subject of court proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentee's
estate.
Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no
court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is
presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be
presumed dead starting October 1982. Consequently, at the time of
petitioner's marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner's
capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of
the Civil Code. Proof of "well-founded belief" is not required.
The Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of Sofio's
death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having
arisen by operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was
capacitated to marry Virgilio as the time their marriage was celebrated in
1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
8 G.R. No. 136467             April 6, 2000
vs.
MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
DOCTRIN The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
E second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee
being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee ispresumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void
by a competent court
FACTS Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an
estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein
respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been
married to James William Bounds. James Bounds disappeared without a
trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years
later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court
declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving
sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court, a petition entitled, "In
the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y
Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole
 Page 159 of 320
surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and
respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and
thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be
appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that
the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate
would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first
marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence,
his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she
contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the
surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the
estate of the decedent.
The trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr.,
and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of
the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:   "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered finding for the petitioner and against the oppositor whereby herein
petitioner, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the estate
of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos.” The CA reversed and set aside the
appealled decision.
ISSUE Whether or not the marriage between Teodorico and Marrietta is valid being
determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.
RULING Yes. The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta
was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil
Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article
256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases
where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83
of the New Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such
first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee ispresumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void
by a competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio
unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph
(2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the
subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases
therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the
absentee spouse) socontracting the later marriage must have done
so in good faith.  Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of the nature of fraud, a
breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.
The Court does not find these circumstances to be here extant.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is
equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases
are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until
declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the
burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the
second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is
danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil
Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old
rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which
purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to
ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance
with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so
provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first
husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for
more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958
with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been
adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to
them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the
property should rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one portion going
to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased
spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net
 Page 160 of 320
estate of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the
inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to
the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of
representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other
hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that
brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation
by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed.
The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the
dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's
children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking
successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of
the dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise
entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it
is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate
pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.
N.
1 G.R. No. 188289               August 20, 2014
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
DOCTRIN Art. 102 - (5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children
E shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all
common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial
court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for
such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for
the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way
prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the
death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already
received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime. (n)
FACTS David Noveras (David) and Leticia Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3
December 1988 in Quezon City. They resided in California, USA where they
acquire American citizenship. They then begot two children. During their
marriage, they acquired properties in the Philippines and in the USA. David
was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse. Due
to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in
2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2M.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition
for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA.
The court granted the petition. It granted to Leticia the custody of her two
children as well as the couple’s properties in USA.Upon issuance of the
decree, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property
before RTC of Baler, Aurora.
The trial court regarded the petition as petition for liquidation of property
since the marriage was already dissolved. It classified their property relation
as absolute community due to absence of marriage settlement before the
marriage. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of
processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court
cannot take judicial notice of US law since the parties did not submit any
proof of their national law. The court awarded the properties in the
Philippines to David, subject to the payment of children’s legitimes.
ISSUE Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to
presumptive legitimes.
RULING Yes.
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the
absolute community regime and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
xxx
Art. 102 - (5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children
shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all
common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial
court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for
such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for
the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way
prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the
death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already
received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime. (n)
 Page 161 of 320
A.
xxx
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed,
Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the
share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines,
as well as the payment of their children’s presumptive legitimes, which the
appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the
Sampaloc property.1âwphi1 While both claimed to have contributed to the
redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their
contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of
the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given
full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00 incurred in going to and from
the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of
₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the
absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly
received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to
settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same
had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in
the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of ₱120,000.00 or in the respective
amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of
legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother." The children are therefore entitled to
half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well
as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of
₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the
amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
III. LEGAL SEPARATION
1 NENITA D. SANCHEZ, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. ROMEO G.
AGUILOS, RESPONDENT.
DOCTRIN Elements of Legal Separation / Procedure
E
FACTS Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos (respondent) with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the
amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services despite his
not having performed the contemplated professional services.
She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of the respondent
to represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged
husband.
She subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of
the amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as he had already
started working on the case; that she had sent him a letter, through Atty.
Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever
amount corresponded to the legal services he had already performed.
That the respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having
rendered any appreciable legal services to her; and that his constant refusal to
return the amounts prompted her to bring an administrative complaint
against him in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.
IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. declared that the
respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition for legal
separation based on the psychological incapacity of the complainant's
husband was sanctionable because he himself was apparently not conversant
with the grounds for legal separation; that because he rendered some legal
services to the complainant, he was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of
the P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the
value of the services rendered under the principle of quantum meruit; and
that, accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount of
P30,000.00.
            IBP also recommended that Atty. Aguilos be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six months.
ISSUE Whether or not it is a petition for legal separation
RULING No. A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that he
 Page 162 of 320
himself is not well versed in the grounds for legal separation. He stated the
following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal separation case for the
alleged psychological incapacity of her husband to comply with his marital
obligations developed or of their marriage on February 6, 1999. (please see
par. 2 of the Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-
SC, the grounds are as follows:
Sec. 2. Petition-
(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed
only by the husband or the wife, as the case may be, within five years from the
time of the occurrence of any of the following causes:
(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in
such corruption or inducement;
(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than
six years, even if pardoned;
(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in or outside the Philippines;
(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;
(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or
(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for
more than one year.
2 BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, petitioner, vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO,
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to the
complainant, is not one of those mentioned in any of the grounds for legal
separation.
DOCTRIN
Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, psychological
E
incapacity is never a ground for the purpose of filing a petition for legal
separation.
On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used for the
purpose of filing a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage.
That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales that "a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization."
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill
to the complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the
distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of
marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a
lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His
explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action for legal
separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably contemplated by
the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an
action for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with
the intention of marrying her British fiancee. They did not contemplate legal
separation at all, for legal separation would still render her incapacitated to
re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had
prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as
attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for annulment was, therefore,
beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify
his claim for services rendered.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476
dated September 20, 2008 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby
FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence to the
client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper
language towards his fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition
of the offense shall be severely punished.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the
complainant within thirty (30) days from notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus
legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until
full payment.
LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA
QUIAO, respondents.
 Page 163 of 320
FACTS On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a
complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido). The RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the
RCBC, all the remaining properties, namely:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao,
Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan
City;
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;
shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner]
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00.
[Petitioner's] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.
On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of
the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,
asking the RTC to define the term "Net Profits Earned."
To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order
dated which held that the phrase "NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate
properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts." The Order further held that
after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor
of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right
to any share of the net profits earned.
ISSUE WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EFFECTING THE
FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY
CODE?
RULING First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the
property relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the
definition of "net profits." As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code
applies as to the property relations of the parties. In other words, the
computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under
Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we
cannot but refer to Article 102 (4) of the Family Code, since it expressly
provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture
under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102 (4) applies. In
this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in value between the market
value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution." Thus, without any iota of
doubt, Article 102 (4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute
community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the
processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime
under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
Code.
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the liquidation
of the properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made, separately listing
the couple's conjugal properties and their separate properties. In the instant
case, the trial court found that the couple has no separate properties when
they married. Rather, the trial court identified the following conjugal
properties, to wit:
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao,
Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de
Bugabos, Butuan City;
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan
City;
8. Bashier Bon Factorylocated in Tungao, Butuan City.
(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership
during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal
partnership; and if the community is enriched at the expense of the separate
properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to
their respective owners shall be made.
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses
shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But if the conjugal
partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses
with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable.
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the husband
and of the wife shall be returned to each of them. In the instant case, since it
was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
 Page 164 of 320
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties
above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what
remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs.
3 ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner, vs. LUCITA G. ONG,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E effect of the so-called alterations in the Memorandum/Medical Certificate
FACTS Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong
(Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila.
They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now
all of the age of majority.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under
Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked by
physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William
quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her;
William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga",
and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against concrete
wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of
these fights were petty things regarding their children or their business;
William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their
bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from
hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on December 9,
1995, after she protested with William's decision to allow their eldest son
Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, "it is none of your
business"; on December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back
from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left
cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and she
bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at
her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sister's house in
Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their
parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parent's doctor,
Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.
ISSUE WON the decree of legal separation should be granted.
RULING Yes.
The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were
uncontroverted and credible. Dr. Elinzano's testimony was able to show that
the [Lucita] suffered several injuries inflicted by [William]. It is clear that on
December 14, 1995, she sustained redness in her cheek, black eye on her left
eye, fist blow on the stomach, blood clot and a blackish discoloration on both
shoulders and a "bump" or "bukol" on her head. The presence of these
injuries was established by the testimonies of [Lucita] herself and her sister,
Linda Lim. The Memorandum/Medical Certificate also confirmed the
evidence presented and does not deviate from the doctor's main testimony —
that [Lucita] suffered physical violence on [sic] the hands of her husband,
caused by physical trauma, slapping of the cheek, boxing and fist blows. The
questioned by [William] does not depart from the main thrust of the
testimonyof the said doctor.
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly established
that [William] inflicted repeated physical violence upon her during their
marriage and that she had been subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he
constantly hurled invectives at her even in front of their customers and
employees, shouting words like, "gaga", "putang ina mo," tanga," and "you
don't know anything."
William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel with
his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent
of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their
children.
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for
William, the Court gives more weight to those of the former. The Court also
gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the unique
opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage
point denied appellate tribunals
Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witness's
testimony as biased and unworthy of credence  and a witness' relationship to
one of the parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her
testimony. Considering the detailed and straightforward testimonies given by
Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, bolstered by the credence accorded them
by the trial court, the Court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with
bias.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted,
following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment
without justifiable cause for more than one year.  As it was established that
 Page 165 of 320
Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
4 SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET
H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by her Legal
Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner,
died on December 8, 1996. Pablo's surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed
a claim with the SSS for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna
indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child,
Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991.  Her claim for monthly pension
was settled on February 13, 1997.
SSS received a sworn letter  dated April 2, 1997 from Leticia Aguas-
Macapinlac, Pablo's sister, contesting Rosanna's claim for death benefits. She
alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than
six years before, and lived with another man on whom she has been
dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal children
with Rosanna, but that the latter had several children with a certain Romeo
dela Peña. In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of
the original birth certificate of one Jefren H. dela Peña, showing that the
latter was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo
C. dela Peña, and that the two were married on November 1, 1990.
As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn's monthly
pension in September 1997.
SSS averred that, based on the sworn testimonies and documentary evidence
showing the disqualification of the petitioners as primary beneficiaries, the
claims were barren of factual and legal basis; as such, it was justified in
denying their claims.
ISSUE WON  Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits
accruing from the death of Pablo.
RULING At the time of Pablo's death, the prevailing law was Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the law enumerates
those who are entitled to death benefits:
Sec. 13. Death benefits. — Effective July 1, 1975, upon the covered employee's
death, (a) his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the basic monthly
pension, and his dependents to the dependent's pension: Provided, That he
has paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions prior to the semester of
death: Provided, further, That if the foregoing condition is not satisfied, or if
he has no primary beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled
to a lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty times the basic monthly pension:
Provided, however, That the death benefit shall not be less than the total
contributions paid by him and his employer on his behalf nor less than five
hundred pesos: Provided, finally, That the covered employee who dies in the
month of coverage shall be entitled to the minimum benefit.
Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary beneficiaries of
an SSS member as follows:
SECTION 8. Terms defined. — For the purposes of this Act the following
terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the following
meanings:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Dependent. — The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age
provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and incapable of self-support
physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the
employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the covered
employee for regular support.
(k) Beneficiaries. — The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent
children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the
dependent parents and, subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who shall be
the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other
person designated bythe covered employee as secondary beneficiary.
Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish his or her right
thereto by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence, the quantum of
evidence required to establish a fact in cases before administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Jeylnn's claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears
the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification
from the Civil Registry showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The
records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977
and the marriage subsisted until the latter's death on December 8, 1996. It is
therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablo's marriage.
Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the
husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.  In this case, there is no showing
that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence,
Jeylnn's status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested.
 Page 166 of 320
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth
certificate bearing Pablo's signature, which was verified from his specimen
signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a
competent evidence of paternity.
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to
Janet because her date of birth was not substantiallyproven. Such
presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis
therefor, i.e., that the child's parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. It
should be noted that respondents likewise submitted a photocopy of Janet's
alleged birth certificate. However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate
the same probative weight as Jeylnn's because it was not verified in any way
by the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy, without probative weight.
Unlike Jeylnn, there was no confirmation by the civil register of the fact of
Janet's birth on the date stated in the certificate.
A  wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to
be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the
contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living
together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was
dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable
of providing for herself.
Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory requirements have
been complied with, particularly her dependency on her husband for support
at the time of his death. Aside from her own testimony, the only evidence
adduced by Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo lived together as husband
and wife until his death were the affidavits of Vivencia Turla and Carmelita
Yangu where they made such declaration.
Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their testimonies before the
SSC will not prevail over the categorical and straightforward testimonies of
the other witnesses who testified that Rosanna and Pablo had already
separated for almost six years before the latter died.
In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is
entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was
established that she is his legitimate child. On the other hand, the records
show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal
papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally,
while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified
as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at
the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they
were already living separately.
5 AIDA P. BAÑEZ, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL B. BAÑEZ, respondent.
DOCTRIN The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately,
E dissolution and liquidation of the absolute or conjugal partnership, and
custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation.
They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court
and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather,
they are mere incidents of legal separation. Thus, they may not be subject to
multiple appeals.
FACTS In Civil Case No. CEB-16765, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20
decreed among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Bañez and
respondent Gabriel Bañez, the dissolution of their conjugal property relations
and
division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondent's one-half
share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the payment
to petitioner's counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorney's fees to be taken
from petitioner's share in the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of
the use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential
house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner and the
common children within 15 days from receipt of the decision.
Petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while
respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court granted said petitioner's
urgent ex-parte motion by ordering, among others, the administrator to pay
petitioner's counsel the sum of P100,000 as advance attorney's fees
chargeable against the 5% of the total value of respondent's ideal share in the
conjugal assets. Later, it gave due course to the motion for execution pending
appeal filed by petitioner. Respondent elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The appellate court set aside the order of
release of P100,000.00 to petitioner's counsel and the order granting the
motion for execution pending appeal.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition docketed as G.R. No. 132592.
ISSUE 1. Whether execution of judgment pending appeal was justified?
2. Whether the effects of legal separation such as entitlement to live
separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute or conjugal
partnership, and custody of the minor children, subject to multiple appeals?
RULING
1. No.
As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, execution pending appeal is allowed
when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that
may result from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an
instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a tool of
oppression and inequity.
 Page 167 of 320
In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view
that
there is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which
respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. We note that
petitioner did not refute respondent's allegations that she did not intend to
use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses in the United States
where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely putting
up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending
appeal. To do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather than the
exception.
2.    No.
The issues involved in an action for legal separation will necessarily relate to
the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal
separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation
of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor
children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not separate or
distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to
or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents
of legal separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
6 HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R.
SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
DOCTRIN Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
E parties to remarry.
FACTS Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May 1966. Four children were born out of
that marriage.
On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with
one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge
solemnized
said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was
legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as
manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the
late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise,
he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy.
ISSUE Whether respondent judge be charged with gross ignorance of the law for
solemnizing a marriage where one of the contracting parties is legally
separated from his wife?
RULING Yes.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage
is an impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.
In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano
was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another
marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano's and
Payao's subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their
separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code
allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when
the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
7 ERLINDA ILUSORIO VS. ERLINDA BILDNER, ET AL.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. The latter
possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. Erlinda and
Potenciano got married in 1942 and lived together for a period of thirty (30)
years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons.
In 1997, their children alleged that their mother gave Potenciano an overdose
of antidepressant drug; consequently, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.
Pursuant thereto, Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for guardianship over
the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail
health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. Potenciano, however, did not
 Page 168 of 320
return to live with Erlinda. The latter then filed with the CA a petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano and enforce consortium as
the wife.
ISSUE Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus may be granted
RULING -We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated
to choose whether to see his wife or not.
- The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.[20] The sanction therefor is the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.[21]
-Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined
empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only
by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
-Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with
"amor gignit amorem respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution
- On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio died. the case has been rendered
moot by the death of subject
8 ERLINDA ILUSORIO VS. ERLINDA BILDNER, ET AL.
DOCTRIN
E the conjugal properties of the spouses and alleged that the proceed of the sale
FACTS Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. The latter
possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. Erlinda and
Potenciano got married in 1942 and lived together for a period of thirty (30)
years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons.
In 1997, their children alleged that their mother gave Potenciano an overdose
of antidepressant drug; consequently, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.
Pursuant thereto, Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for guardianship over
the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail
health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. Potenciano, however, did not
return to live with Erlinda. The latter then filed with the CA a petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano and enforce consortium as
the wife.
ISSUE Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus may be granted
RULING -We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated
to choose whether to see his wife or not.
- The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.[20] The sanction therefor is the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.[21]
-Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined
empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only
by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
-Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with
"amor gignit amorem respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution
- On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio died. the case has been rendered
moot by the death of subject
9 SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents.
G.R. No. 106169
February 14, 1994
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS During Samson’s stint as a member of the diplomatic service, he left the
administration of their conjugal properties to his wife, Remedios. Samson
eventually retired from the diplomatic service and returned to the Philippines
but not to his wife and children. He then filed an action for judicial
authorization to sell a building and lot located to a property which belongs to
will be used for his hospitalization and medication. However, Remedios
opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.
Remedios alleged that Samson had a bigamous marriage with Thelma and
they have been living together since Samson’s retirement. Remedios prayed
for the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation
of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of his share therein by reason of
his bigamous marriage to Thelma.  Further, Remedios filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Samson from interfering
with the administration of their properties.
ISSUE Whether enjoining Samson from interfering with the administration of their
properties is valid.
RULING Yes, the act of enjoining Samson from interfering with the administration of
their properties is valid. The Supreme Court ruled that the law does indeed
grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as
clearly provided in the above cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However,
Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation
has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement
between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act
as the administrator. While it is true that no formal designation of the
 Page 169 of 320
administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of
the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and
thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). The Court notes that
the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen
years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has
not alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to
the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of the
Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least
be given his share of the rentals.
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of the administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or the authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall
be entitled to live separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall
designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute
community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by
the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under
the Rules of Court.
III. a.
1 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN
DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
G.R. No. 139789, 139808 (Resolution)
July 19, 2001
DOCTRIN
E valued millions of pesos. He is married to Erlinda Kalaw. In 1972, they
FACTS This case stemmed from a petition for habeas corpus filed by Erlinda K.
Ilusorio before the Court of Appeals to have custody of her husband
Potenciano Ilusorio in consortium. The petition was dismissed by the
appellate court for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject. The
appellate court, however, gave visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio. The
dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. However, the appellate court's ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda
K. Ilusorio was nullified by the Court. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
Erlinda contended that the facts mentioned in the decision of the Court of
Appeals were erroneous and incomplete. She claimed that Potenciano
suffered from various ailments. Thus, he did not have the mental capacity to
decide for himself. Erlinda argued that Potenciano must be brought before
the Court so that his mental state could be determined. Erlinda sought
custody of her husband contending, among others, that respondents Lin and
Sylvia, her daughters, were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to
fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed. She argued that
since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and
Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his
position and control. Yet Lina and Sylvia were the ones controlling the
corporations.
ISSUE Whether the court’s denial of Erlinda’s custody of her husband is valid.
RULING Yes, the court’s denial of Erlinda’s custody of her husband is valid. The
Supreme Court held that the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The
sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.
Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined
empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only
by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process. Marriage is definitely for
two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem"
respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of
its value as a sublime social institution.
2 ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA
K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents
G.R. Nos. 139789
May 12, 2000
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age who possessed extensive property
separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
Urdaneta Condominium, Makati City when he is in Manila, and at Ilusorio
Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he is in Baguio City, while Erlinda
lived in Antipolo City. On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's arrival from
the United States, he stayed with Erlinda in Antipolo City for about five
 Page 170 of 320
months. During that period, his health deteriorated allegedly because of an
overdose of medicine that was given to him by Erlinda. On May 31, 1998,
from Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City. Instead he lived
at Cleveland Condominium, Makati City. Consequently, Erlinda filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
Potenciano. After due hearing, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition,
but Erlinda was given visitation rights. Both parties elevated the case to this
Court. Erlinda sought the reversal of the dismissal of her petition, while
Potenciano wanted to annul the visitation rights of Erlinda.
ISSUE Whether a spouse can be denied of his/her visitation rights over the other.
RULING Yes, a spouse can be denied of his/her visitation rights over the other. The
Supreme Court ruled that with his full mental capacity coupled with the right
of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.
Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. The
Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a
petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.
The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject's sanity. The Court of
Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to
visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the
husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. No court is
empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice.
3 CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO
MARTIN, respondents.
G.R. No. 107383
February 20, 1996
DOCTRIN
E DOCTRIN
FACTS Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Martin. Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a
doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE Whether a spouse may intrude to the privacy of the other.
RULING No, a spouse may not intrude to the privacy of the other. The Supreme Court
held that the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies
between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures
absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 - DIGESTS
IV. A.
1 G.R. No. 181097             June 25, 2008
NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and MALIK "BOBBY" T. ALINGAN, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
E "domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
FACTS  Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her husband,
Mohammad G. Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent Malik
"Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were mayoralty candidates in Pantar,
Lanao del Norte during the 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections.
 On April 2, 2007, Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad for
failure to comply with the residency requirement.
 On April 12, 2007, Malik filed another petition to disqualify
 Page 171 of 320
Norlainie also on the ground of lack of the one-year residency
requirement.
 On April 21, 2007, Norlainie filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of
Certificate of Candidacy.
 The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of Norlainie’s
certificate of candidacy.
 The First Division of Comelec granted the petition filed by Malik and
disqualifying Mohammad from running as municipal mayor of
Pantar, Lanao del Norte for failing to satisfy the one year residency
requirement and for not being a registered voter of the said place.
 Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as
substitute candidate for Mohammad.
 Malik filed a second petition for disqualification against Norlainie.
After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning candidate and
accordingly took her oath and assumed office.
 On September 4, 2007, the Second Division of Comelec disqualified
Norlainie on three grounds: lack of the one-year residency
requirement; not being a registered voter of the municipality; and,
nullity of her certificate of candidacy for having been filed at a place
other than the Office of the Election Officer.
o Norlainie’s domicile of origin was in Maguing, Lanao del
Norte, which is her place of birth. When she got married,
she became a resident of Marawi City, specifically, in
Barangay Rapasun where her husband served as Barangay
Chairman until November 2006.
o This is her domicile by operation of law pursuant to the
Family Code as applied in the case of Larrazabal v.
Comelec (G.R. No. 100739, September 3, 1991).
ISSUE WON Comelec gravely abused its discretion in proceeding to resolve the
petition despite the approval of petitioner’s withdrawal of certificate of
candidacy.
RULING  The petition lacks merit.
 The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily
render the certificate void ab initio.
 Thus, when petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on March 29,
2007, such act produced legal effects, and the withdrawal of the
same, despite the approval of the Comelec, did not bar or render
nugatory the legal proceedings it had set in motion. As such, the
Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled on
the merits of the petition despite the withdrawal of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy.
 In the instant case, although petitioner withdrew her first certificate
of candidacy, the subsequent disqualification of her husband
required that she file a new certificate of candidacy as a substitute
candidate. The second filing of a certificate of candidacy thus once
again put her qualifications in issue. Hence, a ruling upon the same
is necessary.
 The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-
year residency requirement.
 The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions
and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community.
 For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one
of intention.
 In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. A
person’s "domicile" once established is considered to continue and
will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
 In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
 We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioner’s domicile of
origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is also her place of birth;
and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is
Rapasun, Marawi City.
 The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioner’s husband, effected
the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only
on November 11, 2006.
 Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one
legal residence, then it follows that petitioner effected the change of
her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the
Family Code provide:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may
exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter
should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(Emphasis ours)
 Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a
separate residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to
prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is
proper and is in consonance with human experience.
 Page 172 of 320
2 G.R. No. 139789            July 19, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP,
JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA
K. ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so
lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a
petition with the Court of Appeals 1 for habeas corpus to have
custody of her husband in consortium.
 CA – dismissed the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.
 On May 12, 2000, SC dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for
lack of merit.
 On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to
reconsider the Court's order of January 31 , 2001.
 Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles
68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses,
they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and
care for each other.
ISSUE
RULING  We deny Erlinda’s MR.
 The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction
therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce
consortium.
 Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda
and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972.
We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process.
 Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship
with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.
3 G.R. No. 139789.         May 12, 2000
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and
SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents.
G.R. No. 139808.        May 12, 2000
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA
ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
 On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted
matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years.
 In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons.
 On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
She alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see
and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo City.
 CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with
her in conjugal bliss?
RULING  No.
 Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling
may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
 A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where
the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.
 The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
 To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
 The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not
 Page 173 of 320
merely nominal or moral.
 The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention
or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would
justify the issuance of the writ.
 No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband
to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of
a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to
the man and woman’s free choice.
4 G.R. No. 114791 May 29, 1997
NANCY GO AND ALEX GO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HERMOGENES ONG and JANE C. ONG,
respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
DOCTRIN No less than the Constitution commands us to protect marriage as an
E inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family. In our society,
the importance of a wedding ceremony cannot be underestimated as it is the
matrix of the family and, therefore, an occasion worth reliving in the
succeeding years.
FACTS  Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were
married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City.
 The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a
contract price of P1,650.00.
 Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape
of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the
United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice
they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The
parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon private
respondents' return.
 When private respondents came home from their honeymoon,
however, they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners
and therefore, could no longer be delivered.
ISSUE WON RTC erred in ruling that the petitioners are liable.
RULING  The petition is not meritorious.
 Petitioners' argument that since the video equipment used belonged
to Lim and thus the contract was actually entered into between
private respondents and Lim is not deserving of any serious
consideration. In the instant case, the contract entered into is one of
service, that is, for the video coverage of the wedding. Consequently,
it can hardly be said that the object of the contract was the video
equipment used. The use by petitioners of the video equipment of
another person is of no consequence.
 As correctly observed by CA, it is contrary to human nature for any
newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their
wedding; the fact that private respondents filed a case against
petitioners belies such assertion.
 Clearly, petitioners are guilty of actionable delay for having failed to
process the video tape.
 Considering that private respondents were about to leave for the
United States, they took care to inform petitioners that they would
just claim the tape upon their return two months later. Thus, the
erasure of the tape after the lapse of thirty days was unjustified.
 In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who
in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence
or delay, and those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages."
 In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into
a contract whereby, for a fee, the former undertook to cover the
latter's wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event.
 For whatever reason, petitioners failed to provide private
respondents with their tape. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of
contravening their obligation to said private respondents and are
thus liable for damages.
 Petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the trial and appellate
courts holding him jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy
regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed. He argues that when his
wife entered into the contract with private respondent, she was
acting alone for her sole interest.
 We find merit in this contention.
 Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family
Code), the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in
business without the consent of the husband.
 In the instant case, we are convinced that it was only petitioner
Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent.
Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents
for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that
contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute
them.
5 G.R. No. 80116             June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA
IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
DOCTRIN
E
 Page 174 of 320
FACTS  On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
 Respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He
claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had
been living apart since April, 1982.
 Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is
still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866.
 On January 15, 1986, the Federal Republic of Germany promulgated
a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner.
 The records show that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the
dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized
by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
 More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that,
while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair.
ISSUE WON private respondent qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a
final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint.
RULING  We find this petition meritorious.
 Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, only the offended
spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action
therefor.
 Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action.
 We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time
the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery
case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
 In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons.
 Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
 When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously
knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to
protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
 The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect the other.
6 [G.R. No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.]
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.,
as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City, and RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen
of the United States
They were married in Hongkong in 1972
After the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines
They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively
In 1982, the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States
Petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn
In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property
Petitioner moved to dismiss: cause of action is barred by previous judgment
in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June
11, 1982
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss
Petitioner’s contentions:
1. respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community
of property
2. Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds
3. Respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment
Respondent’s contentions:
 Page 175 of 320
1. Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy
2. acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same
is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction
ISSUE What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines?
RULING There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of
the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as
an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner,
as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case
is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and public policy.
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
As private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.
V. A.
1 [G.R. No. 200180. June 6, 2016.]
BENJAMIN H. CABAÑEZ, petitioner, vs. MARIE JOSEPHINE CORDERO
SOLANO A.K.A. MA. JOSEPHINE S. CABAÑEZ, respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Subject of the present controversy are two (2) parcels of land located in
Alabang Hills, Muntinlupa, with land areas measuring 739 and 421 square
meters, and are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 154626 and
154627, respectively. Appearing on the face of these titles as the registered
owner is herein respondent, "Maria Josephine S. Cabañez, of legal age,
married to [herein petitioner] Benjamin H. Cabañez"
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City a
"Petition for Correction of the Name and Marital Status of the Registered
Owner of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No[s.] 154626 and 154627 of the
Registry of Deeds for Muntinlupa City."
Respondents alleged the following:
Petitioner is of legal age, single and a resident of #21 Doña Ines St., Alabang
Hills Village, Muntinlupa City
Petitioner is the owner of two parcels of land
Petitioner erroneously made it
appear that she is married to Mr. Benjamin when in truth and in fact they are
not married but merely living a common-law relationship
Mr. Benjamin H. Cabanez is actually married to a certain Leandra D. Cabanez
who had previously filed a case against Petitioner, questioning the ownership
of the said properties which case however was terminated by virtue of a
compromise
Mr. Benjamin H. Cabanez has also declared that he is not actually married to
the Petitioner and that he has no interest or share whatsoever in the aforesaid
properties
No interests or rights will be affected by the correction of the name and status
of Petitioner as registered owner of the said properties
RTC Ruling: Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City is directed to cause the
correction of the name and civil status of the registered owner of Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 154626 and 154627 from MA. JOSEPHINE S.
CABANEZ, married to BENJAMIN H. CABANEZ, to MARIE JOSEPHINE C.
SOLANO, single.
CA Ruling: respondent's petition for correction of her name and marital
status as appearing in the subject TCTs should have been published in
accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and that respondent failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove compliance with such requirement.
Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending, among
others, that the provisions of PD 1529, and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
should be applied in the present case.
CA Resolution: agreed with respondent and ruled that PD 1529 is the
governing law and that there is nothing under the pertinent provisions of the
 Page 176 of 320
said law which states that publication is a requirement for the RTC to acquire
jurisdiction over respondent's petition.
ISSUE
RULING Under settled jurisprudence, the enumerated instances for amendment of
alteration of a certificate of title under Section 108 of PD 1529 are non-
controversial in nature. They are limited to issues so patently insubstantial as
not to be genuine issues. The proceedings thereunder are summary in nature,
contemplating insertions of mistakes which are only clerical, but certainly not
controversial issues.
In the present case, the Court notes that in a separate action for annulment of
title and recovery of ownership filed by petitioner's wife against respondent,
the RTC made a categorical finding that petitioner and his wife are the lawful
owners of the subject properties and ordering respondent to surrender
possession thereof to the said spouses. Respondent, on the other hand, claims
that she together with petitioner and his wife subsequently executed an
amicable settlement which was approved by the RTC, wherein petitioner's
wife waived her rights and interests over the said properties. Petitioner
executed an Affidavit of Declaration against Interest indicating that he has no
right or interest over the subject properties.
There is no question that there is a serious objection and an adverse claim on
the part of an interested party as shown by petitioner's subsequent execution
of his Affidavit of Non-Waiver of Interest. The absence of unanimity among
the parties is also evidenced by petitioner's petition seeking the annulment of
the RTC Decision which granted respondent's petition for correction of
entries in the subject TCTs. A complete determination of the issues in the
present case can only be achieved if petitioner and his wife are impleaded in
an adversarial proceeding.
Changes in the citizenship of a person or in his status from legitimate to
illegitimate or from married to not married are substantial as well as
controversial, which can only be established in an appropriate adversary
proceeding as a remedy for the adjudication of real and justifiable
controversies involving actual conflict of rights the final determination of
which depends upon the resolution of issues of nationality, paternity, filiation
or legitimacy of the marital status for which existing substantive and
procedural laws as well as other rules of court amply provide.
Before the trial court can alter the description of the civil status of respondent
in the transfer certificates of title in question, it will have to receive evidence
of and determine respondent's civil status. This requires a full dress trial
rendering the summary proceedings envisaged in Section 108 of PD 1529
inadequate.
2 [G.R. No. L-26399. January 31, 1981.]
FERNANDO MARTINEZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. FLORENCIA
EVANGELISTA, oppositor-appellee.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Fernando Martinez filed a petition to change his civil status appearing in
three land certificates of title registered in his name from "married to
Florencia Evangelista" to "single", alleging that the description was inserted
due to a clerical error and oversight. The petition was filed in a land
registration case under the summary and administrative proceedings
provided for in Section 112 of Act 496. Florencia Evangelista opposed the
petition and submitted that the insertion of the description
was voluntary. The records shows that basis for the description appearing in
the certificates of title was petitioner Martinez's application for registration of
lands covered by the titles in his name wherein he stated under oath that he
was married to Florencia Evangelista; and that from 1946 to 1956 petitioner
consistently maintained under oath in various official documents that
Florencia was his wife. The trial court denied the petition.
ISSUE Whether the opposition of Florencia Evangelista to the petition to strike out
the phrase "married to Florencia Evangelista" in the transfer certificates of
title in question and placing in lieu thereof the word "single" to describe the
civil status of the petitioner is a serious or adverse claim which would bring
the case outside the jurisdiction of the land registration court and thus
preclude an award of relief under Sec. 112 of Act 496.
RULING Oppositor contends that the said insertion was caused by no reason of clerical
error or oversight but by the voluntary act of the petitioner shown by the
following instances:
1. Fernando Martinez filed a petition dated January 18, 1946 in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, in G. L. R. O. No. 4004, praying
that the three certificates of title in question be issued in his name.
In that petition, he stated under oath that he was "Fernando
Martinez, of legal age, Filipino, married to Florencia Evangelista,
and a resident of 422 Isabel, Sampaloc, Manila."
2. On November 28, 1952, he executed a mortgage on two of the
properties covered by the transfer certificates of title in question in
favor of the Philippine National Bank wherein he swore to the fact
that he was married to Florencia Evangelista.
3. Petitioner-appellant and oppositor-appellee, as spouses, executed an
additional mortgage in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation on the same properties.
4. In the income tax returns filed by the petitioner-appellant in 1958
and 1959, it appears that he is married to Florencia Evangelista.
It is thus seen that the petitioner-appellant had consistently maintained
under oath that the oppositor-appellee, Florencia Evangelista, is his wife.
These overt and voluntary acts of the petitioner-appellant give rise to the
conclusion that he and the oppositor-appellee are married. He had expressly
 Page 177 of 320
alleged that he is married to the oppositor-appellee, Florencia Evangelista.
It is now apparent that before the Court of First Instance of Manila, sitting as
a land registration court, can alter the description of the civil status of the
petitioner-appellant in the transfer certificates of title in question, it will have
to receive evidence of and determine the civil status of the petitioner-
appellant. This requires a full dress trial rendering the summary proceeding
envisaged in Sec. 112 of Act 496 inadequate.
The question to be resolved in the instant petition is controversial in nature
and that there exists an adverse claim or serious opposition on the part of a
party-in-interest, the oppositor-appellee, Florencia Evangelista. It being so,
the petition should be dismissed.
3 [G.R. No. 164201. December 10, 2012.]
EFREN PANA, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE
JUANITE, JR., respondents.
DOCTRIN
E property relation all conjugal partnership of gains that existed before 1988
FACTS The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and
others of murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City.
The RTC rendered a consolidated decision acquitting Efren of the charge for
insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as
charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death.
On appeal to this Court, it affirmed the conviction of both accused but
modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the
issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the
names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of
sale on execution were issued.
Petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not
paraphernal assets of Melecia. The RTC denied the motion. The spouses
moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same.
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains, given that they were married prior to the enactment of
the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.
Although the heirs of the deceased victims do not dispute that it was the Civil
Code, not the Family Code, which governed the marriage, they insist that it
was the system of absolute community of property that applied to Efren and
Melecia.
None of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights have been acquired
by each over the properties of the community. Hence, the liabilities imposed
on the accused-spouse may properly be charged against the community as
heretofore discussed.
Efren and Melecia's property relation was admittedly conjugal under the Civil
Code but, since the transitory provision of the Family Code gave its provisions
retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, that property
relation between the couple was changed when the Family Code took effect in
1988. The latter code now prescribes in Article 75 absolute community of
property for all marriages unless the parties entered into a prenuptial
agreement.
ISSUE WON the CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren
and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia's
civil liability in the murder case.
RULING To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal
liability is chargeable against the properties of the marriage, the Court has
first to identify the spouses' property relations.
While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets
are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights
in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not
intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of
excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot
be modified except prior to marriage.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the
marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot
be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where:
1. the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and
liquidated upon a decree of legal separation;
2. the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to
revive their former property regime;
3. Judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a
spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with
his obligations to the family;
4. there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the
spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains.
None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
Under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil
Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property
and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund.
This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of
ownership over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically
change the marriage settlements of couples who got married under the Civil
Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code
took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate
properties.
The RTC cannot take advantage of the spouses' loose admission that absolute
community of property governed their property relation since the record
shows that they had been insistent that their property regime is one of
 Page 178 of 320
conjugal partnership of gains. No evidence of a prenuptial agreement between
them has been presented.
The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were
married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains.
The Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or
not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for
the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC's finding that Melecia has no exclusive
property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision
in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code
have been covered.
Contrary to Efren's contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the
criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership
assets even before these are liquidated.
B.
1 [G.R. No. 122134. October 3, 2003.]
ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA,
petitioners, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by
JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF
PANGASINAN, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E was clearly time-barred. Even following petitioners' theory that the
FACTS Petitioners, Romania and daughter Constancia, filed an action for annulment
of titles covering subject parcels of land in 1985 or more than forty (40) years
from the execution of the deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of the
respondents in 1944.
As early as May 15, 1970, the deed of donation was registered and transfer
certificate of title was issued in respondents' name. Petitioners also had actual
knowledge of the donation propter nuptias of subject parcels of land when a
deed of partition among the heirs was executed in 1973 and when a
compromise agreement was forged in 1976, but they never questioned the
donation propter nuptias on both occasions. Petitioners assailed the
genuineness of the donation propter nuptias and claimed there was lack of
compliance with the prescribed mandatory form requirements.
ISSUE 1. WON the donation propter nuptias is authentic;
2. WON acceptance of the donation by the donees is required;
3. If so, in what form should the acceptance appear, and
4. WON the action is barred by prescription and laches.
RULING Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason
of marriage are those "made before its celebration, in consideration of the
same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses." The distinction is
crucial because the two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the
same rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites. Under the
Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public
instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.
However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that "acceptance is not
necessary to the validity of such gifts." In other words, the celebration of the
marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the
prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under
the Old Civil Code. Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article
127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated
by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the
Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be
in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express
acceptance "is not necessary for the validity of these donations." Thus,
implied acceptance is sufficient.
Viewing petitioners' action for reconveyance from whatever feasible legal
angle, it is definitely barred by prescription. Petitioners' right to file an action
for the reconveyance of the land accrued in 1944, when the Inventario Ti
Sagut was executed. It must be remembered that before the effectivity of the
New Civil Code in 1950, the Old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190)
governed prescription. Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an action for
recovery of the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein,
can only be brought within ten years after the cause of such action accrues.
Thus, petitioners' action, which was filed on December 23, 1985, or more than
forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of donation on May 22, 1944,
prescriptive period should commence from the time of discovery of the
alleged fraud, the conclusion would still be the same. As early as May 15,
1970, when the deed of donation was registered and the transfer certificate of
title was issued, petitioners were considered to have constructive knowledge
of the alleged fraud, following the jurisprudential rule that registration of a
deed in the public real estate registry is constructive notice to the whole world
of its contents, as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
As it is now settled that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
property allegedly registered through fraud is ten (10) years, reckoned from
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, the action filed on December
23, 1985 has clearly prescribed.
In any event, independent of prescription, petitioners' action is dismissible on
the ground of laches. The elements of laches are present in this case. Of the
facts which support the finding of laches, stress should be made of the
following: (a) the petitioners Romana unquestionably gained actual
knowledge of the donation propter nuptias when the deed of partition was
executed in 1973 and the information must have surfaced again when the
compromise agreement was forged in 1976, and; (b) as petitioner Romana
was a party signatory to the two documents, she definitely had the
opportunity to question the donation propter nuptias on both occasions, and
she should have done so if she were of the mindset, given the fact that she was
 Page 179 of 320
still in possession of the land in dispute at the time. But she did not make any
move. She tarried for eleven (11) more years from the execution of the deed of
partition until she, together with petitioner Constancia, filed the annulment
case in 1985.
2 [G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001.]
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA.
DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C.
TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C.
TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A.
COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
DOCTRIN ID.; ID.; ID.; DONATION MADE IN FAVOR OF A COMMON-LAW SPOUSE
E IS VOID UNDER THE FAMILY CODE; CASE AT BAR — Cirila admitted that
she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time. It is very possible
that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco
therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the
very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a
relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to
husband and wife. Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle
told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila and
Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented
documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As
previously stated, these are an application for a business permit to operate as
a real estate lessor, a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a
health certificate, and the death certificate of Francisco. These documents
show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she
would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by
Francisco's lessees in "ErlindaTabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and
Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees
referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact
that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's
common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under
the law. It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him
out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that
she was Francisco's common-law spouse. Respondents having proven by a
preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that
the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code. I
FACTS Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco
Comille, then a widower, asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the latter's cousin,
Luzviminda Paghacian, and petitioner Cirila Arcaba to take care of his house,
as well as the store inside. A few months before his death, Francisco executed
an instrument denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," in which he
ceded a portion of his lot consisting of 150 square meters, together with his
house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for declaration of nullity of a
deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages.
Respondents, who are Francisco's nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of
Francisco, and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship
between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were
lovers since they slept in the same room, while Erlinda Tabancura, another
niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his
mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could
enter the master's bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that
Francisco in any case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual
intercourse. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents,
holding the donation void under the provision of the Family Code. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
present petition.
ISSUE validity of donation made in favor of common law wife
RULING Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
3 [G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997.]
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V.
PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondent
DOCTRIN CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT
E MARRIAGE; PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION BY BOTH PARTIES,
REQUIRED; ABSENCE THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. — The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted
marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the
latter's de facto separation. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual jointcontribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts
in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is
not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares. Even assuming that the subject property was bought before
cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual
 Page 180 of 320
contribution would still be essential. Since petitioner failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan,
Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the
same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel
and private respondent Carlina Palang.
ID.; ID.; SEPARATION OF PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE; JUDICIAL ORDER, REQUIRED. — Separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial
order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in
the marriage settlements. [Article 134 of the Family Code] The judgment
which resulted from the parties' compromise was not specifically and
expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
ID.; ID.; DONATION; BETWEEN PERSONS GUILTY OF ADULTERY OR
CONCUBINAGE; VOID; RATIONALE; CASE AT BAR. — With respect to the
house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on
September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the
notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals
the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel
Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda's
name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was properly a donation
made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by
express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the
Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that
the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations
between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn
out to be better than those in legal union
FACTS Miguel Palang married on July 16, 1949. It was his first marriage. Their only
child, Herminia, was born on May 12, 1950.
On July 15, 1973, Miguel, then 63 years old, contracted his second marriage
with Erlinda Agapay, 19, herein petitioner. Two months earlier, Miguel and
Erlinda purchased a piece of riceland. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736
was issued in their names.
C.
On September 23, 1975, a house and lot was purchased allegedly by Erlinda as
the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 was later issued in her name.
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristoper A. Palang, born
on December 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
concubinage upon Carlina' s complaint. Two years later, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la
Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted an action for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. Private
respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
After trial on the merits, the lower court dismissed the complaint declaring
that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to
the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this
petition.
The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The
application law is Art. 148 of the Family Code on the cohabitation of a man
and a woman under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The
marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting. Under Art. 148, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Actual contribution
is required by this provision, in contrast to Art. 147. If the actual contribution
of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption
of equal shares. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to
the purchase price ,of the riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-
ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should
revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and
private respondent Carlina Palang.
As regards Kristopher Palang's heirship and filiation, the same should be
ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for
the purpose, and cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for
recovery of ownership and possession.
ISSUE recovery of ownership and possession of riceland and the house and lot
allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner
RULING The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
1 [G.R. No. 193038. March 11, 2015.]
JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, petitioner, vs. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Sometime in 1988 when the parties were still engaged, Shirley was working as
 Page 181 of 320
a domestic helper in Israel. Upon the request of Rogelio, Shirley sent him
money 5(5) for the purchase of a residential lot in Marikina where they had
planned to eventually build their home. Rogelio was then also working abroad
as a seaman. The following year, or on September 13, 1989, Rogelio
purchased the subject house. Shirley claims that upon her arrival in the
Philippines sometime in 1989, she settled the balance.  On October 19, 1989,
TCT No. 171963 9(9) over the subject property was issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Marikina, Rizal solely under the name of Rogelio.
Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married to Rogelio A. Nuega
(Rogelio) on September 1, 1990. While overseas, she received information
that Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica Escobar, into the
family home
In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage
and another for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property
Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention of selling the subject property.
Shirley then advised the interested buyers — one of whom was their neighbor
and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) — of the existence of the cases
that she had filed against Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the
subject property until the cases are closed and terminated. Nonetheless,
under a Deed of Absolute Sale 11(11) dated December 29, 1992, Rogelio sold
the subject property to petitioner without Shirley's consent
1994, the RTC granted the petition for legal separation and ordered the
dissolution and liquidation of the regime of absolute community of property
between Shirley and Rogelio
1996, Shirley instituted a Complaint 15(15) for Rescission of Sale and
Recovery of Property against petitioner and Rogelio; judgment  in favor of
plaintiff Shirley Nuega; Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 December 1992 is
hereby declared null and void in its entirety, and defendant-appellant
Josefina V. Nobleza is ordered to reconvey the entire subject property to
plaintiff-appellee Shirley B. Nuega and defendant Rogelio Nuega
ISSUE Disposition of property Without consent or authority of the other spouse
RULING we rule that the appellate court did not err when it declared that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 is void in its entirety.
Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides: Art. 91. Unless otherwise
provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community
property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of
the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the
absolute community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the
marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the
Family Code, which states:
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse,
and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly
provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the
community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry
shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any,
of such property.
As held in Quiao v. Quiao: When a couple enters into a regime of absolute
community, the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the
properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's
properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that
common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs,
equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the
value each one may have originally owned
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided
in Article 92, it therefore forms part of the absolute community property of
Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its
acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's
name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the
spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
Under Article 96 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The Family
Code of the Philippines, the said disposition of a communal property is void
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly…. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void
It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family Code that Rogelio could
not sell the subject property without the written consent of respondent or the
authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is voi
including the portion of the subject property pertaining to defendant Rogelio
who contracted the sale with defendant-appellant Josefina.
2 [G.R. No. 188289. August 20, 2014.]
DAVID A. NOVERAS, petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS,
respondent.
 Page 182 of 320
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the
USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia
filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.
RTC rendered judgment
-absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared
DISSOLVED
-The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the
Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras
only, with the properties in the United States of America remaining in the sole
ownership of petitioner Leticia Novera
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's Decision by
directing the equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses
ISSUE ownership of conjugal properties upon judicial separation
RULING At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which
severed the bond of marriage between the parties. The requirements of
presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner
must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the
Rules of Court
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The
required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent
California law on divorce were not presented. Absent a valid recognition of
the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the
Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made
before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed
provided that the modification is judicially approved and refers only to the
instances provided in Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of
property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to
comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact
for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this
case to necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of
Article 135 of the Family Code
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had
indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is
undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha
Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the
Consent for Operation form. 20(20) Third and more significantly, they had
filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least
one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of
property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property
automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th
paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under
Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the
absolute community regime and the following procedure should apply:
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed,
Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the
share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines
3 [G.R. No. 176556. July 4, 2012.]
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, petitioner, vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C.
QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by
their mother RITA QUIAO, respondents.
 Page 183 of 320
DOCTRIN
E property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements,
FACTS -2000, respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation
against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).
-2005, RTC rendered a Decision declaring the legal separation; Further,
except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all
the remaining properties shall be divided equally between herein
[respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of the
children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities; [Petitioner's]
share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children
-the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses
is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil
Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: "All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife." 60(61) Thus, since he is one of the owners
of the properties covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested
right over half of the said properties, even after the promulgation of the
Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family Code may
deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code
which prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will
prejudice a person's vested right.
ISSUE IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE
COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF
THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125
(SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
RULING Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the
parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains.
Article 129 (7) of the Family Code applies in this case
First, petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977.
Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the
Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a
marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains. And under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their
work or industry." 56(57) The husband and wife also own in common all the
property of the conjugal partnership of gains.
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon
absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of
or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the
respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code and the
applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to
Article 63 (2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because
according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other law."
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common
properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited
them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63 (2) and 129 of the Family
Code?
We respond in the negative
while one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the same if
there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. the
alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one founded, not only
in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This
provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the
guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her
share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the
children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or
entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from
the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not
apply.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the
fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the products of
their labor and industry
the definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer to Article 102 (4) of the
Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the
net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No.
(2), Article 102 (4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall be the increase
in value between the market valueof the community property at the time of
 Page 184 of 320
the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution."
Article 102 (4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community
regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code, the
difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband
and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage.
Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired
during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family
Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the
couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the
parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an
inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and
obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute
community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the
separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to
each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets,
which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Article 102 (4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes
only of defining "net profit." the definition of "netprofits" in Article 102
(4) of the Family Code applies to both the absolute communityregime and
conjugal partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) ofthe
Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separationwhen a couple
enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142
of the Civil Code, "the husband and the wife place in common fundthe fruits
of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and
divideequally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the
net gains orbenefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage."
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family
Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's
properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to
wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the
conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal
debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal
partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds
in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property,
the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of
the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or
deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to
either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from
the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute
the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements
or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as
provided in this Code. aHESCT
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered
upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have
chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no
such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children.
In the instant case,
a. the trial court found that the couple has no separate
properties when they married. 79(80) Rather, the trial court identified
the following conjugal properties
b.    Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership
during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal
partnership; 81(82) and if the community is enriched at the expense of the
separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such
properties to their respective owners shall be made
c.     Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses
shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But if the conjugal
partnership is not
 Page 185 of 320
sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate
properties shall be solidarily liable
d. In the instant case, since it was already established by the
trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, 85(86)
there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above
are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what
remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs. 86(87) However, since the trial court
found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to
Article 63 (2) of the Family Code.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is
not entitled to any property at all
4 LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO, petitioners,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO and
VITTORIO C. ROMERO, respondents
DOCTRIN
E accusing a
FACTS Petitioners allege that upon their father's death on 18 October 1974, their
mother, respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian.
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several
Deeds
of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are purportedly conjugal
properties of
their parents. Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their
brother Vittorio —
through fraud, misrepresentation and duress — succeeded in registering the
above-mentioned properties in his name through Deeds of Sale executed by
their
mother, Aurora.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Respondents filed their
Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long after the
death of
their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered
conjugal. They allege that the lots were paraphernal properties of Aurora.
RTC dismissed the complaint and CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE whether or not petitioners in this case may file a separate civil action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of title despite the pendency of the
settlement proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero.
RULING The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in the present case.
While it is true that a probate court's determination of ownership over
properties which may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature,
this rule
is applicable only as between the representatives of the estate and strangers
thereto.
The issue before the court is not really one of title or ownership,
but the determination of which particular properties should be included in
the
inventory of the estate. Determination of whether a property is conjugal or
paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with
the probate court:
Petitioners believe that Sec 3 rule 87  is subject to certain exceptions. They
invoke the doctrine that while heirs have no standing in court to sue for the
recovery
of property of the estate represented by an administrator, these heirs may
maintain
such action if the administrator is unwilling to bring the suit, or has allegedly
participated in the act complained of.
On this contention, petitioners' theory must again fail. There is nothing on the
record that would prove that Aurora defied the orders of the probate court or
entered
into sale agreements in violation of her trust. In fact, petitioners are really
co-heir, their brother Vittorio, of having acquired certain properties which
they allege
to be properties of their parents.
Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate,
Aurora Romero's acts as the administrator of the estate are subject to the sole
jurisdiction of the probate court.
Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by
petitioners' co-heir, Vittorio, can only be determined by the probate court,
because it is
the probate court which is empowered to identify the nature of the property,
and that
has jurisdiction over Aurora's actions and dispositions as administrator
Denied.
5 LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan,
Zamboanga Del Norte; THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
SHERIFF, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte; THE
CLERK OF COURT OF MANILA, as Ex-Officio Sheriff; and
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondents
DOCTRIN
 Page 186 of 320
D.
E
D1.
FACTS In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership to engage in the
marketing of liquefied petroleum ga and was registered as a sole
proprietorship in the name of Jacinto.
After Jacinto's death in 1989, his widow, petitioner Cecilia Sunga, and
married
daughter, petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the business
without Chua's
consent. Chua's subsequent repeated demands for accounting and winding up
went
unheeded, prompting him to file a Complaint for Winding Up of a
Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
Damages
with Writ of Preliminary Attachment
RTC judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. the RTC granted Chua's
motion for execution against petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan.
ISSUE Whether or not the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth
Sunga Chan with her husband Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer
for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under the judgment
RULING The fact that the levied parcel of land is a conjugal or community
property, as the case may be, of spouses Norberto and Sunga-Chan does not
per se
vitiate the levy and the consequent sale of the property. Verily, said property
is not
among those exempted from execution.
records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were
married on February 4, 1992, or after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3,
1988. Withal, their absolute community property may be held liable for the
obligations contracted by either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94, provides that
absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(1) . . .
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both
spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other.
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited.
(Emphasis ours).
Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner
Sunga-Chan of the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued
on May
30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her
husband's
benefit.
1 MELECIO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES GENARO
MOLINA and ELENA B. MOLINA, substituted by ESTER
MOLINA, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property
in Camiling, Tarlac. During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the
respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina (spouses Molina). 10 years
after Flora died, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses
Molina. Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora filed a Complaint
for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against the
spouses Molina claiming that Anastacio could not
have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora's
consent, as
Flora was already dead and spouses Molina falsified the document.
The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the
subject
property to answer for his debts and told the spouses Molina that they already
own
half of the land. The spouses Molina also asserted that Melecio knew of the
disputed sale since he accompanied Anastacio several times to borrow money.
RTC dismissed the case. CA affirmed.
ISSUE W/N the sale of land belonging to the conjugal partnership without the wife's
consent is invalid.
RULING Anastacio and Flora's conjugal partnership was dissolved upon Flora's death.
Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership upon death of a spouse and prohibits any disposition or
encumbrance of
the conjugal property prior to the conjugal partnership liquidation without
prejudice to vested rights.
An implied co-ownership among Flora's heirs governed the conjugal
properties pending liquidation and partition. Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner,
cannot claim title to any specific portion. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the
right to freely sell and dispose of
his undivided interest in the subject property. Thus, the spouses Molina
became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest.
Melecio's recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the
subject property, is an action for partition
 Page 187 of 320
Affirmed..
2 VIRGINIA OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E exists between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages.
FACTS Petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo on the ground of
psychological incapacity. RTC granted. Trial court rendered the assailed
Order 6(6) stating that the properties declared by the parties belong to each
one of them on a 50-50 sharing. Virginia appealed but was denied.
ISSUE whether
respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of
gains by
reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
RULING While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16, 1978, it is
still the Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships, however, which will
govern
the property relations between Deogracio and Virginia even if they were
married
before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall
apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without
prejudice
to vested rights.
If the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is
that they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party claiming
that they
are not conjugal.
The applicable law, in liquidation is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation
to Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Court held that in a void marriage, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148
for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and
wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage
is void, as
in the instant case.
In the liquidation and partition of the property that they
owned in common, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code
should aptly
prevail. The rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the
absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for
valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that
Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will
share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the
properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.
All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in
whose name the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal unless
proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the
certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one
of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption
remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the
spouses."
Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were
obtained by the spouses' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly
owned by
them in equal shares. Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses'
properties on
the basis of co-ownership, as ordered by the RTC and the appellate court,
should be
affirmed, and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
3 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. JOSE GARCIA and
CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA, JR., BOBBY
GARCIA and JIMMY GARCIA and HEIRS OF ROGELIO
GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA,
ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA, HEHERSON GARCIA,
GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA and JANE GARCIA,
respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS a parcel of residential land is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title T-44422
under the name of Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.) who acquired the subject
property during his marriage with Ligaya Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21,
1987. Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses
Garcia) obtained a loan facility from the petitioner, Philippine National Bank
and was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their property covered by
TCT No. 177585. The loan was increased and secured by the subject property
 Page 188 of 320
covered by TCT No. T-44422. The spouses Garcia failed to pay.
The respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Nullity of the
Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage,against the spouses Garcia and the
petitioner bank. They claimed that the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage
was null and void as to respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy as they
were not parties to the contract. The respondents alleged that the subject
property was a conjugal property of
Jose Sr. and his deceased spouse, Ligaya, such that upon Ligaya's death, Jose
Sr., together with his children Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, by law,
became owners pro indiviso. The RTC dismissed the complaint and held that
the subject property was a conjugal property since it was acquired by Jose Sr.
during his marriage. one-half of the property passed on to Jose Sr., while the
other half went to Jose and his children as co-owners and as forced heirs of
his deceased spouse. Without the consent of the children, the trial court ruled
that the conjugal property could only be transferred or encumbered to the
extent of Jose Sr.'s share in the conjugal partnership, plus his share as an heir
in the other half pertaining to the estate of his deceased spouse. CA affirmed.
ISSUE W/N subject property registered in the name of Jose Sr. alone, who was
described in
the title as "widower" and not "married." is conjugal
RULING The Subject Property is Conjugal. All property acquired during marriage is
presumed conjugal. Because of the petitioner bank's failure to rebut the
allegation that the subject property was acquired during the former's
marriage to Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property applies.
Registration of the subject property in the name of one spouse does not
destroy the presumption that the property is conjugal. Registration of a
property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its
conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the property was acquired.
9(9)
The registration of the property is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive
ownership
of the husband or the wife. Although the property appears to be registered in
the name
of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal property if it was
acquired for
valuable consideration during marriage.
In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the property, the
petitioner
must present strong, clear and convincing evidence of exclusive ownership of
one of
the spouses.
The successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided under Article 777 of the
Civil Code, which states that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent." The conjugal partnership was
converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership upon the death of Ligaya.
This resulting ordinary co-ownership among the heirs is governed by Article
493 which provides that the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Under this provision, each
co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share
in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it except
when
personal rights are involved.
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject
property after the death of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. While under Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had the
right to
freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed property,
he could
not dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his children's consent.
The right of the petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited though only to the
portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr.
Affirmed.
4 G.R. No. 195670               December 3, 2012
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March
29, 1980. After several years, the RTC declared the nullity of their marriage
on the basis of the former’s psychological incapacity as contemplated in
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying for
the distribution of the described properties claimed to have been acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage.
Respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential
houses, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during
their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to
 Page 189 of 320
purchase said properties out of her personal funds and by way of inheritance.
She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to the
fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her
own money. Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for
dissolution.
Petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the
name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he
received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent
did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed
that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.
Respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots
came exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from
selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware. She
further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in 1996,
petitioner transferred to their second house and brought along with him
certain personal properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders,
clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and equipment have a total cost of
P500,000.00.
RTC – Dissolved the parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of
land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in
favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on
Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the
complaint which were brought out by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are
hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses are hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the
respondent since these were acquired during their marital union and since
there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential
units.
CA – Affirmed in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC. The CA stressed the
fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens
to acquire lands in the Philippines."Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support
his claim for reimbursement.
ISSUE Whether or not petitioner can own properties in the Philippines?
RULING No, but -
In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v.
Helmut Mullerthe Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the
value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut
Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It
held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity
where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite
the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign
citizenship.Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights
of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the
constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of
Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as
the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly
declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless
to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony
and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8,
2009 Decision and January 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
5 G.R. No. 157537               September 7, 2011
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA, namely:
LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN
LORRAINNE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA and ASUNCION,
all surnamed GO, represented by LEONORA B. GO, Petitioners,
vs.
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, Respondents.
DOCTRIN The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving
E spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family
Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by
judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At
any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested
rights.
FACTS On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total
area of 17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr.
(Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr.
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed
under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who
had purchased the two parcels of land (the property).
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio,
Sr. and mother of the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and
his son Rito B. Go (joined by Rito’s wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the
property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio)
for ₱5,686,768.00. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of
the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand. After barangay
proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, they sued Servacio and Rito in the
Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the annulment
of the sale of the property.
 Page 190 of 320
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the
property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between
Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the
property because he had purchased it with his own money.
On October 3, 2002, the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal
property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio,
Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely:
Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that the participation of Rito and Dina as
vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta; that under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired,
all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal
unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively
to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation was grossly
insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property, holding
that: "xxx As long as the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be
allotted to the other heirs in the final partition of the property, or to state it
plainly, as long as the portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate (sic)
of other heirs, it is valid." Quoting Tolentino’s commentary on the matter as
authority.
ISSUE Whether or not Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; and that
the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without
prior liquidation.
RULING Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of
the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall
be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code,
viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property
relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of
supplementary application.
105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the
rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with theCivil Code or other
laws." This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely
void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had
already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of
the sale.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell
his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for
the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third
person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it
[Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases
where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as
in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action
for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. xxx
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM
the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
6 G.R. No 176556               July 4, 2012
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,
vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C.
QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner
Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal
separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of
Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the
spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of
the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership
is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending
spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period
270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the
Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking
the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
 Page 191 of 320
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of
the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each
[of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of
the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the
Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129
of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article
102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUE 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art
129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the
properties in the conjugal partnership– NO.
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of
gains the same with the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute
community? NO.
RULING 1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the
current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case
and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation
to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the
spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the
Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of
the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if
there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First,
he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the
conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner
prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner
and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties.
Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the
petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial
court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.
Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolutecommunity, the
husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those
acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when
the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is
divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one
may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been
established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided
equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal
separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be
awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal
partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and
the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution
of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing
provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law
does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties
between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the
spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of
them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties
should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.
However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share
from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest
we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there
is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
7 [G.R. No. 185063. July 23, 2009.]
SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA, petitioners, vs.
ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and VILMA B. DE
LEON, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
 Page 192 of 320
FACTS On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite
and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell
for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City.  On April 24,
1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and
Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of
Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on
February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, “single.” On January 12, 1974,
Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The
Deed of Sale did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On
February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita,
Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit alleging that Bonifacio was still
the owner of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to
them was his exclusive property because he was still single when he acquired
it from PHHC.  They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage
between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question
was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE Whether or not the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment
before the marriage although some installments were paid during the
marriage would be considered conjugal property
RULING Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of
Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio
after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970.  This full payment
was made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In
effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence,
ownership to the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
8 [G.R. No. 164584. June 22, 2009.]
PHILIP MATTHEWS, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and
JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E trying to own lands through another.
FACTS On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin, a British subject, married Joselyn, a
17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting,
Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a lot (Boracay property). The sale was
allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s
funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the
property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.
All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained
in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister. However, Benjamin and
Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philipps.
On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a SPA in favor of Benjamin, authorizing
the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into
contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a
period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00.
Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort
as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since
it was entered into by Joselyn without Benjamin’s consent, Benjamin
instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner.
Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and
improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was
Joselyn’s husband, any transaction involving said property required his
consent.
ISSUE 1. Whether or not the Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a
Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband is valid
2. Whether or not Benjamin is the actual owner of the property since he
provided the funds used in purchasing the same
RULING Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether
individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of
the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision,
they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose
of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.
Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the
public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least
sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire
public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally
recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional
prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and
petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring
private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn
appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property,
she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain
Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering
into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in
his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no
 Page 193 of 320
declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses.
In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be
declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest
and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer
or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to
have.
9 CAMILO F. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR,
respondent.
DOCTRIN Since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation's land for future
E generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition
of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those
transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is
already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be
no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
FACTS Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, was assigned by his employer, Simmering-
Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro.
Jambrich met Descallar in Cebu. Jambrich and Descallar fell in love and
decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City.
Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro
Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell covering the
properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed
of Absolute Sale was likewise issued in their favor.
However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration
before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that
Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. Consequently, Jambrich's name was erased from the document. But
it could be noted that his signature remained on the left hand margin of page
1, beside respondent's signature as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page
4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title over the properties were
issued in respondent's name alone.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner
was engaged in the real estate business. He also built and repaired speedboats
as a hobby. Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat
from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about
P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-
Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment".
When petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that
titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and
that the subject property has already been mortgaged.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property
before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the
Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which
identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true
agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the
purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who
paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real
and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute
ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11,
1991 which Jambrich executed in his favor.
RTC ruled in favor of Borromeo. CA reversed decision of Trial Court.
ISSUE Whether the conveyance of the property by Jambrich to Borromeo is valid.
RULING Yes.
The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich,
who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not
Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In
United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court reiterated
the consistent ruling in a number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred
to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a
Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title
of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World
Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the
properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to
the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition
of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured
the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
The rationale behind the Court's ruling in United Church Board for World
Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases, is this — since the ban on aliens
is intended to preserve the nation's land for future generations of Filipinos,
that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens
who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by
aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of
a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to
be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.
 Page 194 of 320
10 ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, petitioner, vs. HELMUT MULLER,
respondent.
DOCTRIN Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
E lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring
private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony.
FACTS Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were
married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time,
respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he
sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo,
Rizal and the construction of a house. The Antipolo property was registered in
the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondent's alleged womanizing, drinking, and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994,
respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also
decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of
the Constitution
CA reversed. According to CA, respondent merely prayed for reimbursement
for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of
ownership to him.
ISSUE Whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.
RULING No.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring
private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including
residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that
"aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that
"they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building
homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and
vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of
other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly
agricultural." (That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the
Constitution is beyond question
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly
admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the
Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said
prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the
said property cannot be sustained.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to
recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondent's part. To allow
reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by
law. As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged
with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention
that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly
violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event,
he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of
the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely
exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To
sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this
would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over
land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to
purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be
reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used
conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to
 Page 195 of 320
militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding
the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an event,
he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or
charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is
not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic
exercise.
D2.
1 ISAAC VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. VICTOR LINGAN and ATTY. ERNESTO
CARREON, respondents.
DOCTRIN Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
E lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring
private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony.
FACTS This case originated from a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Instrument
with Damages filed by the petitioner against Victor Lingan (respondent) and
Atty. Ernesto Carreon as the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. The respondent
filed his Answer and pre-trial ensued. The RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order
wherein it declared that no factual issue exists and that the sole legal issue to
be resolved is:
Whether or not the power of attorney is a general power of attorney or a
special power of attorney. Corollarily, whether upon the terms thereof, the
attorney-in-fact Gloria Roa Catral, had authority, or none at all, to execute the
deed of sale in favor of [respondent] Victor Lingan.
The facts are:
[Petitioner] Isaac Villegas was the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, known as Lot 2637-C of the Subdivision plan Psd.2-01-
019664, being a portion of Lot 2637, Cad. 151, containing an area of 1,267
square meters, more or less, situated at Bgy. Pengue, Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
covered byTransfer Certificate of Title No. T-63809 of the Register of Deeds
of Cagayan. In order to secure the payment of a loan from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) the petitioner constituted a real estate
mortgage over the said parcel of land in favor of DBP. The said loan and
mortgage was subsequently transferred by the DBP to the Home Mutual
Development Fund (HMDF). When the petitioner failed to settle his loan, the
real estate mortgage he constituted over the property was foreclosed, the
property was sold at public auction and, as the HMDF was itself the highest
bidder at such public auction, a certificate of sheriff's sale was issued and,
thereafter, registered with the Register of Deeds on March 8, 1996. By virtue
of a power of attorney executed by petitioner’s wife, Marilou C. Villegas in
favor of Gloria Roa Catral, the latter redeemed the property from the HMDF.
Gloria R. Catral (Catral), by virtue of the same power of attorney, executed a
Deed of Sale in favor of respondent.
the RTC dismissed the Complaint, ruling that the tenor of the power of
attorney in question is broad enough to include the authority to sell any
property of the principal, who, in this case, is the petitioner; that the act of the
agent, Catral, in executing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent
was within her power or authority; that the power "to enter into any and all
contracts and agreements" qualified the said power of attorney as a special
power of attorney; that the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and binds the
principal, herein petitioner; that the authority to sell came from both the
petitioner and his wife, Marilou, since the petitioner himself signed the power
of attorney affirming the authority of the agent, Catral; and that even if Catral
in fact exceeded her authority, the act is deemed to have been performed
within the scope of the agent's authority if such is within the terms of the
power of attorney as written.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
The CA held that when the redemption of the property had been made by
Catral by virtue of a General Power of Attorney executed in her favor by
Marilou, it follows that the petitioner is no longer the owner of the subject
property but his wife, Marilou; that the issue as to whether the power of
attorney was a special or general one is of no moment, because the petitioner
was no longer the owner of the property when it was sold; in other words, any
disposition of the property needs no power of attorney from the petitioner
himself; that the petitioner signed the General Power of Attorney above the
word "conforme", connoting an implied admission that he was not anymore
the owner of the said property; and, finally, that the Deed of Sale between
Marilou (through Catral) and respondent is valid
ISSUE Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of Victor Lingan is valid.
RULING Yes.
There are two principal issues raised by the pleadings in the present petition
that must be resolved: First, whether Marilou, the wife of the petitioner, as
successor-in-interest, may validly redeem the property in question; and
second, whether the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondent.
Was there a valid redemption effected by Marilou? Yes.
Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
SEC. 27. Who may redeem real property so sold. — Real property sold as
provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately,
maybe redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following
persons:
(a) The judgment obligor, or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part
of the property;
xxx xxx xxx
 Page 196 of 320
The "successor-in-interest" of the judgment debtor referred to in the above
provision includes a person who succeeds to his property by operation of law,
or a person with a joint interest in the property, or his spouse or heirs.
Section 33, Rule 39, Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period;
by whom executed or given. — If no redemption be made within one (1) year
from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is
entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed
whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been
made, and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the
last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all
cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from
the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall
be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in
the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the
sale had continued in office and executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest
and claim of the judgment obligor to the property at the time of the levy. The
possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment obligor.
Under the above provision, petitioner could have redeemed the property from
Marilou after she had redeemed it. The pleadings filed and the records of this
case do not show that petitioner exercised said right. Consequently, as
correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property.
All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration
of the right of redemption.
And where the redemption is made under a property regime governed by the
conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that
property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the
spouses redeeming the property.
Clearly, therefore, Marilou, as owner, had the right to sell the property to
another.
Whether petitioner has a cause of action against respondent? No.
A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the
legal right of the plaintiff. A complaint states a cause of action when it
contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the
defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant
violates the right of the plaintiff.
In the present case, there is no property right that exists in favor of the
petitioner, and, with more reason, no such obligation arises in behalf of the
defendant, herein respondent, to respect such right. There was no violation of
a legal right of the petitioner.
It must be stressed that there is no allegation or proof that Marilou redeemed
the property in behalf of the petitioner — Marilou did not act as agent of the
petitioner. Rather, she exercised the right of redemption in her own right as
successor-in-interest of the petitioner. Under the circumstances, should there
be any right violated, the aggrieved party is Marilou, petitioner's wife. The
property in question was the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of her
redemption. Thus, petitioner has no valid cause of action against the
respondent.
Consequently, the question whether Catral had validly sold the subject
property to respondent by virtue of the General Power of Attorney executed
by Marilou, is not within the realm of the Court's jurisdiction to resolve in this
case as said issue is not properly raised by the right person, Marilou.
Divested of all interest over the property, the petitioner has ceased to be the
proper party who may challenge the validity of the sale. Moreover, since, as a
rule, the agency, as a contract, is binding only between the contracting
parties, then only the parties, as well as the third person who transacts with
the parties themselves, may question the validity of the agency or the
violation of the terms and conditions found therein. This rule is a corollary of
the foregoing doctrine on the rights of real parties in interest.
D3.
1 EVANGELINE D. IMANI, petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, respondent.
DOCTRIN Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for
E this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership.  Thus, the time when the property was
acquired is material.
FACTS Evangeline D. Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of
respondent Metroban, with others as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound
themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc.
(CPDTI)
CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The
loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo.
CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several
demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted
 Page 197 of 320
Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including
Imani.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Metrobank. Thus, Metrobank filed
with the RTC a motion for execution. Metrobank undertook to consolidate the
title covering the subject property in its name, and filed a Manifestation and
Motion, praying that spouses Sina and Evangline Imani be directed to
surrender the owner's copy of TCT No. T-27957 for cancellation. Petitioner
opposed the motion and argued that the subject property belongs to the
conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities
incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy on
execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of
the levy on execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in
favor of Metrobank.
ISSUE Whether the property is conjugal and this cannot be the subject of the levy.
RULING No.
Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for
this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was
acquired is material.
To support her assertion that the property belongs to the conjugal
partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit 3of Crisanto Origen, attesting
that petitioner and her husband were the vendees of the subject property, and
the photocopies of the checks allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for
the subject property.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly be considered
sufficient evidence to prove her claim that the property is conjugal. As
correctly pointed out by Metrobank, the said Affidavit has no evidentiary
weight because Crisanto Origen was not presented in the RTC to affirm the
veracity of his Affidavit:
The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on
the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be
rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written
statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for
cross-examination.
In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative
value. In Concepcion v. Atty. Fandiño, Jr. and Intestate Estate of the Late Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, we held that a photocopy of
a document has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the
CA was correct in disregarding the said pieces of evidence.
Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioner's assertion. As
aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the
name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof
that the property was acquired during the spouses' coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing.
Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the
property belongs to the conjugal partnership. Thus, it cannot be rightfully
said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis.
2 FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, JR., petitioner, vs. ERLINDA RAMIREZ and ELISEO
CARLOS, respondents.
DOCTRIN Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code,
E provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that
are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under
this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase
in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the
conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of
the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property
shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
FACTS Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No. 1427,
with Erlinda's consent, to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within 20 years, through
monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66. The respondents then constructed a
36-square meter, two-story residential house on the lot.
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed
by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated
consideration of P602,000.00. On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed
a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale,
claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the
documents transferring the title to the petitioner's name were falsified.
The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner granted them a
P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the
petitioner gave Erlinda a P200,000.00 advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage,
and made her sign a document purporting to be the mortgage contract; the
petitioner promised to give the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda
surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS mortgage cancelled, and submits an
 Page 198 of 320
affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights to the subject
property; with the P200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27 to
cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427;
The petitioner countered that there was a valid contract of sale. He alleged
that the respondents sold the subject property to him after he refused their
offer to mortgage the subject property because they lacked paying capacity
and were unwilling to pay the incidental charges; the sale was with the
implied promise to repurchase within one year. Petitioner filed an ejectment
case which was decided against the respondents.
The petitioner introduced evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject
property since it was registered in Erlinda's name; the residential lot was part
of a large parcel of land owned by Pedro Ramirez and Fructuosa Urcla,
Erlinda's parents; it was the subject of Civil Case No. 50141, a complaint for
annulment of sale, before the RTC, Branch 158, Pasig City, filed by the
surviving heirs of Pedro against another heir, Amado Ramirez, Erlinda's
brother; and, as a result of a compromise agreement, Amado agreed to
transfer to the other compulsory heirs of Pedro, including Erlinda, their
rightful shares of the land.
ISSUE (1)         Whether the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal; and, (2)
whether the contract between the parties was a sale or an equitable mortgage.
RULING Conjugal
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name
of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved.
Clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. Pursuant to
Articles 92  and 109 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous
title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the
community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. The
residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda's exclusive paraphernal property.
As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its
provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have
governed their property relations. However, with the enactment of the Family
Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of
gains, including Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the
Family Code (Articles 105 to 133). Article 105 of the Family Code states:
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall
also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided
in Article 256.
Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the
provisions of the Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except with respect to
rights then already vested.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code,
provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that
are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under
this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase
in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the
conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of
the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property
shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan
through monthly salary deductions. Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, 44(44) not
the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner
advanced the P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992.
Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly
reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more
than the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary
deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of
Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of
Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary.
Equitable Mortgage
There are four (4) telling circumstances pointing to the existence of an
equitable mortgage.
First, the respondents remained in possession as lessees of the subject
property; the parties, in fact, executed a one-year contract of lease, effective
May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993.
Second, the petitioner retained part of the "purchase price," the petitioner
gave a P200,000.00 advance to settle the GSIS housing loan, but refused to
give the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda failed to submit Eliseo's signed
affidavit of waiver of rights.
Third, respondents paid the real property taxes on July 8, 1993, despite the
alleged sale on April 30, 1992;  payment of real property taxes is a usual
 Page 199 of 320

burden attaching to ownership and when, as here, such payment is coupled
with continuous possession of the property, it constitutes evidence of great
weight that the person under whose name the realty taxes were declared has a
valid and rightful claim over the land.
Fourth, Erlinda secured the payment of the principal debt owed to the
petitioner with the subject property. The records show that the petitioner, in
fact, sent Erlinda a Statement of Account showing that as of February 20,
1993, she owed P384,660.00, and the daily interest, starting February 21,
1993, was P641.10. Thus, the parties clearly intended an equitable mortgage
and not a contract of sale.
That the petitioner advanced the sum of P200,000.00 to Erlinda is
undisputed. This advance, in fact, prompted the latter to transfer the subject
property to the petitioner. Thus, before the respondents can recover the
subject property, they must first return the amount of P200,000.00 to the
petitioner, plus legal interest of 12% per annum, computed from April 30,
1992.
Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial, RTC Branch 94 in Quezon City
rendered a Decision declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson.
In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the ex-spouses' conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without
liquidating their conjugal partnership. On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together
with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP58 million loan
from petitioner Metrobank. To secure the obligation, Florencia and the
spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages on their properties,
including one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283.
Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of
TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a
document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on
April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal
properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include
the lot in question.

3 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
DOCTRIN Pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of
E gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the
surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the
property relationship between the former spouses, where: Each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
ISSUE
FACTS Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on
January 19, 1985.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan
obligation when it fell due, Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings.
Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale
on three issues of Remate.
At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest
bidder. Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed a
Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. In
it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged that
the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia's name, was paraphernal.
Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.
WON the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondent
Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of
community of property of the spouses.

During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a
250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located
in Makati City. Subsequently, TCT No. S-101473/T-510 covering the
purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 156283 of the ROD
of Makati City was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson
Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
RULING No.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed
their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of
the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership.
 Page 200 of 320
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation
following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into
an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other
heirs of the deceased. In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil
Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses,
where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on
April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the
partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the
former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493.
Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of
Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only
to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is
null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his
undivided half.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank's right, as mortgagee and as the
successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2
undivided
portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other
undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the
lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property
rights "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
4 JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER, petitioner, vs. SPS. MANUEL M. FERRER &
VIRGINIA FERRER and SPS. ISMAEL M. FERRER and FLORA FERRER,
respondents.
DOCTRIN Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the
E respondents to respect or not to violate her right. While we could concede
that Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference to the right of the spouse as
contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost
of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon
whom ownership of the entire property is vested.
FACTS In her Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements, sum of money, and
accounting with prayer for injunction and damages, petitioner alleged that
she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), a half-brother of respondents
Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael).
Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot. He applied
for a loan with the SSS to build improvements thereon, including a residential
house and a two-door apartment building. However, it was during their
marriage that payment of the loan was made using the couple's conjugal
funds.
Petitioner averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the
apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in September 2 1991,
he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership
over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of
respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. TCT.
It is petitioner's contention that when her husband was already bedridden,
respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purported
to be his last will and testament. The document, however, was a Deed of Sale
covering Alfredo's lot and the improvements thereon. Learning of this
development, Alfredo filed a Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against
respondents.
On 22 June 1993, the RTC dismissed the same. The RTC found that the terms
and conditions of the Deed of Sale are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, and public policy, and should be complied with by the parties in
good faith, there being no compelling reason under the law to do otherwise.
The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In support of her Complaint, petitioner alluded to a portion of the Decision of
the RTC in Civil Case No. 61327, which stated, to wit: In determining which
property is the principal and which is the accessory, the property of greater
value shall be considered the principal. In this case, the lot is the principal
and the improvements the accessories. Since Article 120 of the Family Code
provides the rule that the ownership of accessory follows the ownership of the
principal, then the subject lot with all its improvements became an exclusive
and capital property of Alfredo with an obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership of the cost of improvements at the time of liquidation of [the]
conjugal partnership. Clearly, Alfredo has all the rights to sell the subject
property by himself without need of Josefa's consent. According to petitioner,
the ruling of the RTC shows that, when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999,
or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the right
 Page 201 of 320
to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredo's lot.
She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted to P500,000.00;
hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as
they are now the registered owners of Alfredo's lot. She averred that
respondents cannot claim lack of knowledge about the fact that the
improvements were constructed using conjugal funds as they had occupied
one of the apartment buildings on Alfredo's lot, and even paid rentals to
petitioner. In addition, petitioner prayed that respondents be ordered to
render an accounting from September, 1991, on the income of the boarding
house constructed thereon which they had appropriated for themselves, and
to remit one-half thereof as her share. Finally, petitioner sought from
respondents moral and exemplary damages, litigation and incidental
expenses.
ISSUE WON the petitioner has a right of reimbursement from respondents, who are
the buyers of the subject property?
D4.
RULING No.
Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the
respondents to respect or not to violate her right. While we could concede
that Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference to the right of the spouse as
contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost
of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon
whom ownership of the entire property is vested.
There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the
property is sold by the owner-spouse. Indeed, Article 120 provides the
solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on
the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or
through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of
the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value
of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of
the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of
the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by
the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive
property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations
contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises,
are not petitioner's spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse
upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is
the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may
be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect
petitioner's right to be reimbursed.
On this matter, we do not find an act or omission on the part of respondents
in violation of petitioner's rights. The right of the respondents to acquire as
buyers the subject premises from Alfredo under the assailed Deed of Sale in
Civil Case No. 61327 had been laid to rest. This is because the validity of the
Deed of Sale had already been determined and upheld with finality. The same
had been similarly admitted by petitioner in her Complaint. It can be said,
thus, that respondents' act of acquiring the subject property by sale was not in
violation of petitioner's rights. The same can also be said of the respondents'
objection to reimburse petitioner. Simply, no correlative obligation exists on
the part of the respondents to reimburse the petitioner. Corollary thereto,
neither can it be said that their refusal to reimburse constituted a violation of
petitioner's rights.
As has been shown in the foregoing, no obligation by the respondents under
the law exists.
1 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. VENANCIO C. REYES, JR.,
respondent
DOCTRIN A spouse's consent is indispensable for the disposition or encumbrance of
E conjugal properties.
FACTS Venancio is married to Lilia since 1973. During their union, they acquired 3
parcels of land in Malolos, Bulacan. TCT Nos. T-52812 and T-52813 were
registered under "Felicidad Pascual and Lilia C. Reyes, married to Venancio
Reyes” while TCT No. 53994 was registered under "Lilia C. Reyes, married to
Venancio Reyes."
The properties were mortgaged to PNB on August 25, 1994 to secure a loan
worth P1,100,000.00, which on October 6, 1994 was increased to
P3,000,000.00. According to PNB, the Reyes Spouses contracted and duly
consented to the loan.
When the Reyes Spouses failed to pay the loan obligations, PNB foreclosed
the mortgaged real properties. In the auction sale PNB emerged as the highest
bidder, and a certificate of sale was issued in its favor.
Venancio filed a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real
Estate Mortgage against PNB. In assailing the validity of the real estate
mortgage, Venancio claimed that his wife undertook the loan and the
 Page 202 of 320
mortgage without his consent and his signature was falsified on the
promissory notes and the mortgage. Since the 3 lots involved were conjugal
properties, he argued that the mortgage constituted over them was void.
ISSUE 1.    WON the real estate mortgage is void;
2.    Whether the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan
contracted unilaterally by Lilia Reyes.
RULING 1. The real estate mortgage over a conjugal property is void if the non-
contracting spouse did not give consent.
The real estate mortgage over the conjugal properties is void for want of
consent from respondent. The Family Code is clear: the written consent of the
spouse who did not encumber the property is necessary before any
disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property can be valid.
Petitioner points to respondent's signature on the Promissory Notes and Deed
of Mortgage to prove that he consented to the transactions. For his part,
respondent alleges that his signature was forged and offers testimony from a
handwriting expert to prove that his signature on the bank documents were
falsified. The RTC and CA both agreed that respondent presented clear and
convincing evidence that his signature, as it appeared on the mortgage
contract, was forged.
2. The lower courts may have declared the mortgage void, but the
principal obligation is not affected. It remains valid.
Petitioner contends that the conjugal partnership should be made liable to the
extent that it redounded to the benefit of the family under Article 122 of the
Family Code.
Petitioner's reliance on Article 122 to support the validity of the mortgage is
misplaced.
Article 122 provides:
ARTICLE 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of
the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be
charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse
before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them,
as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-
mentioned.
Article 122 applies to debts that were contracted by a spouse and redounded
to the benefit of the family. It applies specifically to the loan that respondent's
wife Lilia contracted, but not to the mortgage.
What the lower courts declared void was the real estate mortgage attached to
the conjugal property of the Reyes Spouses. Since the real estate mortgage
was an encumbrance attached to a conjugal property without the consent of
the other spouse, it is void and legally inexistent. Although petitioner cannot
foreclose the mortgage over the conjugal property in question, it can still
recover the loan amount from the conjugal partnership.
2 YOLANDA LEACHON CORPUZ, complainant, vs. SERGIO V. PASCUA,
Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Trece Martires City, Cavite,
respondent
DOCTRIN Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is
E presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, for this
presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was
acquired is material. There is no such proof in the records of the present case.
FACTS Upon the complaint of Alicia Panganiban, Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082
for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were instituted against Juanito
Corpuz before the MTCC. The MTCC approved the Compromise Agreement
executed between Panganiban and Juanito (in which Juanito promised to pay
Panganiban the sum of P330,000.00) and dismissed provisionally Criminal
Case Nos. 2079 to 2082.
On January 25, 2010, the MTCC allegedly rendered a judgment based on the
Compromise Agreement, but there was no copy of said judgment in the
records of this case. When Juanito failed to comply with his obligations under
the Compromise Agreement, Panganiban filed Motions for Execution of the
MTCC judgment. On March 17, 2010, the MTCC acted favorably on
Panganiban's Motions and issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Sheriff
of the MTCC of Trece Martires City.
 Page 203 of 320
On June 2, 2010, Yolanda, Juanito's wife, and her daughter were in her office
at the Cavite Provincial Engineering Office of Trece Martires City. At around
three o'clock in the afternoon, Sheriff Pascua arrived at Yolanda's office and
demanded that Yolanda surrender the Toyota Town Ace Noah, which was
registered in Yolanda's name, threatening to damage the said vehicle if
Yolanda would refuse to do so.
Sheriff Pascua tried to forcibly open the vehicle. Yolanda called her brother to
ask for help. Yolanda's brother arrived after one hour. Yolanda, with her
daughter and brother, went out of the office to face Sheriff Pascua. Deeply
embarrassed and humiliated, and to avoid further indignities, Yolanda
surrendered the key to the vehicle to Sheriff Pascua, but she did not sign any
document which Sheriff Pascua asked her to sign.
Offended, humiliated, and embarrassed, Yolanda was compelled to file the
present administrative complaint against Sheriff Pascua. In addition to the
aforementioned incident on June 2, 2010, Yolanda alleged in her complaint
that Sheriff Pascua kept possession of the vehicle and even used the same on
several occasions for his personal use. Yolanda attached to her complaint
pictures to prove that Sheriff Pascua, instead of parking the vehicle within the
court premises, in accordance with the concept of custodia legis, parked the
vehicle in the garage of his own house. Yolanda also claimed that her vehicle
was illegally confiscated or levied upon by Sheriff Pascua because the Writ of
Execution, which Sheriff Pascua was implementing, was issued against
Juanito, Yolanda's husband. Yolanda further pointed out that Sheriff Pascua
has not yet posted the notice of sale of personal property, as required by Rule
39, Section 15 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE WON Sheriff Pascua is guilty of misconduct for attaching the subject property
on the presumption that the vehicle is the conjugal property of Yolanda and
Juanito?
RULING Yes.
A sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging to the
judgment debtor. The sheriff may be liable for enforcing execution on
property belonging to a third party. If he does so, the writ of execution affords
him no justification, for the action is not in obedience to the mandate of the
writ.
Sheriff Pascua cannot rely on the presumption that the vehicle is the conjugal
property of Juanito and Yolanda. Indeed, Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife." However, for this presumption to apply, the party
who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua
non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material. There is no such
proof in the records of the present case.
Sheriff Pascua's assertions of diligence do not exculpate him from
administrative liability. After inquiry from the LTO, he already discovered
that the vehicle was registered in Yolanda's name only. This fact should have
already prompted Sheriff Pascua to gather more information, such as when
Juanito and Yolanda were married and when did Yolanda acquire the vehicle,
which, in turn, would have determined whether or not Sheriff Pascua could
already presume that the said vehicle is conjugal property.
WHEREFORE, respondent Sheriff Sergio V. Pascua is found GUILTY of
simple misconduct and is SUSPENDED for TWO (2) MONTHS WITHOUT
PAY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
3 JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK-LAOAG BRANCH, respondent.
DOCTRIN Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or
E profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be
deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
 
FACTS On January 13, 1983, spouses Joe A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a
complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal
proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch docketed as Civil
Case No. 7803.
The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros
obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974
and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate
mortgage involving a parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon
described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB,
Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the
property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the
name of PNB, Laoag Branch.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the
loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted
on the conjugal property — a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings
 Page 204 of 320
pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property —
interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were
forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of
action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-appellees' own acts [of]
omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the subject property on
the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.
ISSUE WON the the debt is chargeable to the conjugal property?
RULING Yes.
There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and
Aguete's marriage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954, while
the subject property was acquired in 1968. There is also no doubt that Ros
encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on
23 October 1974.
PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as evidenced by her signature,
consented to Ros' mortgage to PNB of the subject property. On the other
hand, Aguete denies ever having consented to the loan and also denies
affixing her signature to the mortgage and loan documents. The husband
cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent,
express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable.
Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros' encumbrance of
the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the
courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared
only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.
In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule
that Aguete gave her consent to Ros' encumbrance of the subject property.
The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary
public, hence they are public documents. Every instrument duly
acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie
evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. The
execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot
be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer.
PNB was correct when it stated that petitioners' omission to present other
positive evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was fatal to petitioners'
cause. Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a
handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare that Aguete's
signatures were really forged.
The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for
additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco." In her
testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed
to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans
contracted by Ros, but did not know where he "wasted the money."
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or
profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be
deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
For this reason, we rule that Ros' loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.
4 SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO
NICOL, respondents
G.R. No. 145222
April 24, 2009
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Spouses Buado filed a case of slander against Erlinda Nicol. Nicol was
convicted and was ordered to pay damages and other damages. Since Nicol’s
personal properties are no longer sufficient to satisfy the judgment, the
Sheriff levied the property conjugal property of the Spouses Nicol. The
husband of Erlinda filled a case to safeguard the conjugal property.
ISSUE 1. Whether one of the spouses who is not a party to the suit but whose
conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the
judgment obligor, may be considered a “stranger.”
2. Whether a conjugal property may be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse.
RULING 1. Yes, one of the spouses who is not a party to the suit but whose conjugal
property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment
obligor, may be considered a “stranger.” The Supreme Court ruled that a
third-party claim must be filed by a person other than the judgment debtor or
his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may file a third-party
claim. In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the
character of the property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of
Appeals, 174 SCRA 59 (1989), which was later adopted in Spouses Ching v.
Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 356 (2004) this Court held that the husband of
the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted
and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the
 Page 205 of 320
benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of
Appeals, 347 SCRA 60 (2000), and Sy v. Discaya, 181 SCRA 378 (1990), the
Court stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ
of execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent
action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal
property.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122
of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community where
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The
conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the
liability of the debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination
can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
2. No, a conjugal property may not be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse. The Supreme Court ruled that conjugal property
cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse,
unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
partnership. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded
that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by
Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
5 SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. MAR TIERRA
CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C. MARTINEZ, MIGUEL J. LACSON and
RICARDO A. LOPA, respondents.
G.R. No. 143382
November 29, 2006
DOCTRIN
E loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching,
FACTS Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied
for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and
Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit
line agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity
agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel
J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally
with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. When the
Corporation could no longer pay, SBTC filed a complaint for sum of money
against the respondents. However, SBTC eventually dismissed the case
against other respondents which left Martinez as the sole respondent. In
came to that point that the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez
were attached.
ISSUE Whether the conjugal property may be held liable for the obligation
contracted on behalf of the family business.
RULING No, the conjugal property may be held liable for the obligation contracted on
behalf of the family business. The Supreme Court ruled that in Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that,
if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct
recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or
profession, the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership." In other words, where the husband contracts an
obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that
such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the
other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and
the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by
itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is
for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption is raised that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Proof must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal
partnership. In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement
executed by the husband to accommodate a third party.
6 ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners, vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 124642
February 23, 2004
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of
P9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this
executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay on a certain
date. As added security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo
Ching, together with Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a
continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally
guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the
extent of P38,000,000.00. The loan was subsequently renewed on various
dates, the last renewal having been made on December 4, 1980. The PBMCI
defaulted in the payment of all its loans. ABC filled a complaint for sum of
money and it impleaded Ching, et. Al. The Deputy Sheriff levied on
attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citicorp stocks in the name of
 Page 206 of 320
Ching.
ISSUE Whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy
on attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment
Philippines.
RULING Yes, the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on
attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment
Philippines. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner-wife filed her
motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in
the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were
conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The
petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said relief.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired
during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife.
In Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held that it is not even necessary to prove that
the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the
properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are
presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which
the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still
apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of
the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in
the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the
same.
It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the Board of
Directors of PBMCI and was one of its top twenty stockholders, and that the
shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would appreciate if
the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that the
petitioner-husband's career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive
because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits
contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The benefits must be those
directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a
spin-off of the loan itself. This is different from the situation where the
husband borrows money or receives services to be used for his own business
or profession. In the Ayala case, we ruled that it is such a contract that is one
within the term "obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Thus:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business
or his own profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be
proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of
the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or
services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be
rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in
the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated,
where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.
7 HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner, vs. MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent
G.R. No. 146504
April 9, 2002
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS For failure to pay the amount of US$25,000.00, which the petitioner
advanced to the respondent and his wife for the purchase of a house and lot,
petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages
against respondent and his wife. Since the respondent and his wife were
separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, they
filed separate answers. The wife admitted securing a loan with her husband
from the petitioner. Respondent claimed that the amount he received from
the petitioner was part of the profit sharing which was promise to him by the
petitioner for reviving an erstwhile losing company of the latter. He also
denied the claim that he made threats to petitioner. The Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondent appealed the decision
to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial
court's decision and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to
show that the subject amount was indeed loaned by petitioner to respondent
and his wife. A motion for reconsideration of the above decision having been
denied, petitioner brought this appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE Whether the loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership.
RULING Yes, the loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121
of the Family Code. While respondent did not and refused to sign the
acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan
redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the
house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family.
Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art.
121 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with
his wife.
8 AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO
MAGSAJO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF AP-PEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO
& ENCARNACION CHING, respondents
G.R. No. 118305
February 12, 1998
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from
 Page 207 of 320
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC).
Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on
December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable
with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC.  PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of
complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering
PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with
interests.  Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution.
Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and
service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties on May 1982.  Respondent spouses filed injunction
against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the
benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower
court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of
respondent spouses conjugal properties.  A certificate of sale was issued to
AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE Whether the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.
D5.
RULING This court does not agree that is a difference between the terms "redounded
to the benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand; and "for the benefit of"
on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil
Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both
use the term "for the benefit of". On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family
Code provides that "The payment of personal debts by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family." As
can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably. From jurisprudential rulings
of this Court, the following conclusions can be derived: (A) If the husband
himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the
money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is
enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of
the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the
husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. (B) On the other hand, if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred
that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation
agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be
presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. In all
our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband, we
underscored the requirement that: "there must be the requisite showing . . . of
some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses" or
"benefits to his family" or "that such obligations are productive of some
benefit to the family."
The provisions of the Family Code highlight the underlying concern of the law
for the conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the husband's duty to
protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it. This is the
underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered
into by one of the spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the
family and that the measure of the partnership's liability is to "the extent that
the family is benefited." (Article 121, Nos. 2 & 3, Family Code.) These are all in
keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the Civil Code
which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any part
of the conjugal property. (Article 174, Civil Code.)
1 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. VENANCIO C. REYES,
JR., Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
DOCTRIN A spouse's consent is indispensable for the disposition or encumbrance of
E conjugal properties.
FACTS  Venancio is married to Lilia since 1973.
 During their union, they acquired three (3) parcels of land in
Malolos, Bulacan which were registered under "Felicidad Pascual
and Lilia C. Reyes, married to Venancio Reyes.
 The properties were mortgaged to Philippine National Bank on
August 25, 1994 to secure a loan worth P1,100,000.00,7 which on
October 6, 1994 was increased to P3,000,000.00.8 According to
Philippine National Bank, the Reyes Spouses contracted and duly
consented to the loan.
 When the Reyes Spouses failed to pay the loan obligations,
Philippine National Bank foreclosed the mortgaged real properties.
 Venancio filed before the RTC a Complaint (or Annulment of
Certificate of Sale and Real Estate Mortgage) against PNB, claiming
that his wife undertook the loan and the mortgage without his
consent and his signature was falsified on the promissory notes and
the mortgage and that since the three (3) lots involved were conjugal
properties, he argued that the mortgage constituted over them was
void.
 RTC – ordered the annulment of the real estate mortgage and
directed Lilia to reimburse PNB the loan amount with interest.
 CA – affirmed RTC’s ruling
 Page 208 of 320
ISSUE 1. WON CA erred in declaring the real estate mortgage void;
2. WON the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan
contracted unilaterally by Lilia C. Reyes.
RULING First Issue
 The real estate mortgage over a conjugal property is void if the non-
contracting spouse did not give consent.
 We see no compelling reason to overturn the lower couris' factual
findings that the forgery was proven with clear and convincing
evidence. Having established that his signature was forged,
respondent proved that he did not consent to the real estate
mortgage. The mortgage unilaterally made by his wife over their
conjugal property is void and legally inexistent.
Second Issue
 The lower courts may have declared the mortgage void, but the
principal obligation is not affected. It remains valid.
 Petitioner contends that the conjugal partnership should be made
liable to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the family
under Article 122 of the Family Code.
 Article 122 provides: “The payment of personal debts contracted by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership. However, the payment of personal debts contracted by
either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities
imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of
either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been
covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what
has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.”
 Article 122 applies to debts that were contracted by a spouse and
redounded to the benefit of the family. It applies specifically to the
loan that respondent's wife Lilia contracted, but not to the mortgage.
 There are two scenarios considered: one is when the husband, or in
this case, the wife, contracts a loan to be used for the family business
and the other is when she acts as a surety or guarantor. If she is a
mere surety or guarantor, evidence that the family benefited from
the loan need to be presented before the conjugal partnership can be
held liable.
 On the other hand, if the loan was taken out to be used for the family
business, there is no need to prove actual benefit. The law presumes
the family benefited from the loan and the conjugal partnership is
held liable.
 Since the loaned money is used in the husband's business, there is a
presumption that it redounded to the benefit of the family; hence,
the conjugal partnership may be held liable for the loan amount.
Since there is a legal presumption to this effect, there is no need to
prove actual benefit to the family.
 What the lower courts declared void was the real estate mortgage
attached to the conjugal property of the Reyes Spouses. Since the
real estate mortgage was an encumbrance attached to a conjugal
property without the consent of the other spouse, it is void and
legally inexistent.
 Although petitioner cannot foreclose the mortgage over the conjugal
property in question, it can still recover the loan amount from the
conjugal partnership.
2 G.R. No. 170004,        January 13, 2016
ILONA HAPITAN, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JIMMY LAGRADILLA
AND WARLILY LAGRADILLA AND ESMERALDA BLACER,
Respondents.
JARDELEZA, J.:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  Respondent Esmeralda issued thirty-one (31) UCPB checks payable
to the order of respondent Warlily.
 The checks were dishonored by UCPB for reasons of "account
closed" when presented for payment by Warlily.
 Jimmy and Warlily alleged that they made several demands on
Nolan and Esmeralda for the latter to settle their outstanding
obligations.
 The latter spouses promised to convey and transfer to Jimmy and
Warlily the title of their house and lot, located at Barangay M. V.
Hechanova, Jaro, Iloilo City.
 Jimmy and Warlily later found out that Nolan and Esmeralda
separately executed an SPA designating Ilona, Nolan's sister, as their
attorney-in-fact for the sale of the same property.
 Jimmy and Warlily alleged that the property was fraudulently sold to
Spouses Terosa, and that Nolan and Esmeralda were about to depart
from the Philippines with the intent to defraud their creditors.
 Nolan and Ilona denied the allegations of Jimmy and Warlily. They
argued that the debts were incurred solely by Esmeralda and were
not intended to benefit the conjugal partnership. They further stated
that Esmeralda has abandoned her only son with Nolan and that
Nolan has filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Esmeralda.
 RTC – ruled in favor of Jimmy and Warlily, declaring null and void
the Deed of Sale in favor our spouses Terosa.
o The RTC ruled that the house and lot is part of Nolan and
Esmeralda's conjugal property, having been built from the
 Page 209 of 320
amounts sent by Nolan to Esmeralda as well as the income
from Esmeralda's business.
 CA – affirmed RTC’s ruling.
 On November 6, 2003, Warlily executed a Waiver stating that she
had received from Nolan an amount of Php125,000.00 representing
the full and complete satisfaction of Warlily’s complaint.
 On November 20, 2003, Jimmy and Warlily, and Nolan and Ilona
filed a Motion for Approval of Amicable Settlement.
ISSUE WON the Waiver and the Amicable Settlement can modify the Decision of the
CA.
RULING  The Waiver is invalid.
 The nullity of the Deed of Sale could not be affected by the
subsequent waiver of Warlily.
 Warlily's Waiver cannot cover the issue of the validity of the sale of
the property to the Spouses Terosa since the property is neither a
right nor a benefit she is entitled to.
 Moreover, the declaration of nullity due to the existence of fraud was
both a finding of fact and of law by the lower courts, and the parties
cannot agree amongst themselves and decide otherwise.
 The Amicable Settlement is not valid
 The Amicable Settlement, intending to put an end to the controversy
between jimmy and Warlily and Nolan and Ilona, partakes the
nature of a compromise agreement. The Amicable Settlement
involves two subjects: 1) the payment of the principal obligation of
P510,463.98 to Jimmy and Warlily; and 2) the cancellation of the
sale of the house and lot to the Spouses Terosa.
 The Amicable Settlement of the payment of the debt to Jimmy and
Warlily is not valid.
 A compromise agreement is defined as a contract whereby the
parties make reciprocal concessions in order to resolve their
differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit.
 To have the force of law between the parties, a compromise
agreement must comply with the requisites and principles of
contracts.
 Thus, it must have the following elements: 1) the consent of the
parties to the compromise; 2) an object certain that is the subject
matter of the compromise; and 3) the cause of the obligation that is
established.
 The allegations of Jimmy and Warlily cast doubt on whether they
fully understood the terms of the Amicable Settlement when they
signed it. They further argued that they did not fully comprehend the
CA Decision in their favor. Thus, it may be reasonably inferred that
Jimmy and Warlily did not give consent to the Amicable Settlement
with Nolan and Ilona.
 Nolan cannot waive his and Esmeralda’s rights over the house and
lot sold to the Spouses Terosa
 Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of
the other spouse; otherwise, such disposition is void.
 Further, under Article 89 of the Family Code, no waiver of rights,
interests, shares, and effects of the conjugal partnership of gains50
during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial
separation of property.
 Clearly, Esmeralda did not consent to Nolan disposing or waiving
their rights over the house and lot through the Amicable Settlement.
In fact, she even objected to the Amicable Settlement, as evidenced
by her pleadings filed before the courts.
 She further expressed disbelief that Nolan would want the CA to
reverse its decision when its ruling, saving Nolan and Esmeralda's
conjugal property, is favorable to him.
3 G.R. No. 177235               July 7, 2014
SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. AURORA MENDOZA
FERMIN, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  Leonardo G. Mendoza (Leonardo), allegedly married to petitioner
Serconsision R. Mendoza, died on November 25, 1986.
 In the testate proceedings of her father’s estate, respondent Aurora
Mendoza Fermin, being the legitimate and eldest daughter of
Leonardo, was appointed as one of the administratix.
 When respondent was the one preparing an inventory of the
properties of her late father as directed by the probate court, she
discovered that her father and petitioner purportedly sold the said
property to one Eduardo C. Sanchez as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated September 22, 1986, for and in consideration of
the amount of 150,000.00.
 However, the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register
of Deeds for the City of Parañaque only on April 30, 1991, or five (5)
years after the alleged transfer.
 Petitioner did not inform the tenants of the property that a certain
Eduardo C. Sanchez already owned the same; and in fact, continued
to collect the rentals of the property even after the alleged sale.
 Respondent filed a case for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale. She
alleges that the signature of her father on the Deed of Absolute Sale
was forged.
 RTC – there was no forgery and declaring the sale of the property as
valid.
 CA – declared as null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale.
 Page 210 of 320
ISSUE WON CA gravely erred in setting aside RTC’s finding as to the authenticity
and dues execution of the Deed of Sale.
RULING  The petition is bereft of merit.
 As Leonardo and Serconsision were married sometime in 1985, the
applicable provision governing the property relations of the spouses
is Article 172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that
the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s
consent.
 In a previous case, the SC had the occasion to rule that the sale of a
land belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the wife without
the consent of the husband is voidable.
 It further ruled that the disposal by the wife of their conjugal
property without the husband’s consent is voidable is supported by
Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that contracts entered by
the husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is
required are annullable at her instance during the marriage and
within ten years from the transaction questioned.
 In the present case, the fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
on September 22, 1986, one month after Leonardo died.
 Aurora as one of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix of
Leonardo’s estate, had the right therefore to seek for the annulment
of the Deed of Sale asit deprived her and the other legal heirs of
Leonardo of their hereditary rights.
 Defendant appellees’ unauthorized and fictitious transaction cannot
be invoked as a source of right.
 Considering that the questioned sale was concluded on September
22, 1986, the transaction could still be aptly governed by the then
governing provisions of the Civil Code.
 Under Article 173 of the Civil Code, the remedy available to the wife
in case her husband should dispose of their conjugal property
without her consent is as follows: “Art. 173. The wife may, during
the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the
property fraudulently alienated by the husband.”
4 G.R. No. 165803               September 1, 2010
SPOUSES REX AND CONCEPCION AGGABAO, Petitioners, vs.
DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN,
Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
DOCTRIN The sale of conjugal property without the consent of the husband was not
E merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be ratified.
FACTS  Involved in this action are two parcels of land and their
improvements (property) located at Parañaque City registered in the
name of respondents Spouses Parulan, who have been estranged
from one another.
 In January 1991, real estate broker Atanacio offered the property to
the petitioners, who initially did not show interest due to the
rundown condition of the improvements.
 On February 2, 1991, they and Atanacio met with Ma. Elena at the
site of the property.
 On March 19, 1991, TCT No. 63377 was cancelled and a new one was
issued in the name of the petitioners.
 Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No.
63376 as promised. In due time, the petitioners learned that the
duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376 had been all along in the
custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA
executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots.
 Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to
call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they had
already fully paid to Ma. Elena.
 On April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an
action praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of
absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title
issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof.
 RTC – Deed of Absolute Sale is declared null and void.
 CA – affirmed the RTC, opining that Article 124 of the Family Code
applied because Dionisio had not consented to the sale of the
conjugal property by Ma. Elena.
ISSUE Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family
Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the
consent of Dionisio?
RULING  The petition has no merit.
 We sustain the CA.
 Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made
after the effectivity of the Family Code.
 The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore,
Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the
Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
 Article 124 of the Family Code provides: “Article 124. The
administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
 Page 211 of 320
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the court or the written consent of
the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors.”
 The petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio,
while holding the administration over the property, had delegated to
his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property,
considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to
Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.
 Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not
include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict
ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an
authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only
be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the
Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878).
 Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special
agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did
not include or extend to the power to administer the property.
 Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans
the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void;
hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be
ratified.
 On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a
continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio
had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was
withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners.
 The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the
Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other
spouse’s consent, the transaction should be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
5 G.R. No. 160708               October 16, 2009
PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners, vs.
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of
INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA
ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN
DYAN VILLA ABRILLE, Respondents.
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land
located in Davao City under their names covered by TCT No. T-
88674.
 Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he
was still single and which is registered solely in his name covered by
TCT No. T-26471.
 Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the DBP,
the spouses built a house on their lot and Pedro’s lot.
 The house was finished in the early 1980’s but the spouses
continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an
annex.
 In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary
Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the
family and the studies of her children.
 By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein
petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and
notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold
the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced
by a Deed of Sale dated June 21, 1991.
 It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her
name.
 Respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for
Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney’s
Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and
herein petitioners.
 RTC – ruled in favor of herein respondent Mary Ann P. Villa Abrille,
ruling that the sale on one half of the lot is valid, while the other half
is void since it belongs to respondent Mary Ann.
ISSUE WON the subject property is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal
property and WON its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of
Mary Ann’s consent.
RULING  Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
 There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471,
which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by
him before his marriage to Mary Ann.
 However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982
 Page 212 of 320

during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. DOCTRINE

 The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in
the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to FACTS
overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is
exclusively owned by Pedro. ISSUE
 Petitioners’ bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the
presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of RULING
Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal.
 Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been
constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even 8
obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.1avvphi
 A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the DOCTRINE
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by
Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be FACTS
void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the
wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the ISSUE
court.
 Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the RULING
husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal
property, such sale is void.
 If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the 9
wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at
the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the
DOCTRINE
contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the
case.
FACTS
 Respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale
within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
ISSUE
However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal
house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-
26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can RULING
dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s consent.

10
6 [G.R. No. 149801. June 26, 2008.]
SPOUSES RENATO and FLORINDA DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES DOCTRINE
GIL and LEONILA SEGOVIA, respondents.
FACTS
DOCTRIN
E ISSUE

FACTS RULING

ISSUE
11 [G.R. No. 125172. June 26, 1998.]
RULING Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA CORPUZ, respondents

7 DOCTRIN FAMILY CODE; ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP

E PROPERTY; SETTLEMENT DOES NOT MENTION A CONTINUING OFFER
 Page 213 of 320
TO SELL PROPERTY OR ACCEPTANCE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. —
Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that
was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of
Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale,
petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after
which the barangay authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and
petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement,
however, does not mention a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that
private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the
imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance
mentioned in Article 124
FACTS Private respondent Gilda Corpuz and husband Judie Corpuz sold one-half of
ISSUE their lot to petitioner-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. When Gilda
RULING was in Manila looking for work abroad Judie sold the remaining one-half
portion of the lot including the house standing thereon to the Guiang spouses.
When Gilda returned home, she gathered her children together and stayed at
their house. She then filed a complaint before the RTC for the nullification of
the deed of sale executed by her husband in favor of the petitioner spouses.
The RTC rendered judgment in her favor and against petitioners. The Court of
Appeals, affirmed the trial court's ruling. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners contend that the contract of sale was merely voidable and was
ratified by private respondent when she entered into an amicable settlement
with them. Petitioners based their arguments under Article 1390 of the Civil
Code providing that contracts entered into where consent of one party is
vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud are
voidable and are binding, unless annulled but they are susceptible of
ratification.
The Supreme Court held that the error in petitioners' contention is evident.
Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e.,
contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained
and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud. In this instance, private respondent's consent to the contract of sale of
their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. This being the case,
said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code,
which was correctly applied by the two lower courts.
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)"
(emphasis supplied)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code
'Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of
the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required,
or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise
this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand
the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)'
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to
by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying
the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay
authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and
coercion. In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the
deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses. The fact
remains that such contract was entered into without the wife's consent.
12 [G.R. No. 92245. June 26, 1991.]
MELANIA A. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ANTONIO M. CAYETANO, respondents
DOCTRIN CIVIL LAW; ADMINISTRATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY;HUSBAND AS
E ADMINISTRATOR. — Under the New Civil Code (NCC) "Art. 165.The
husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership,"in view of the fact
that the husband is principally responsible for the support of the wife and the
rest of thefamily. If the conjugal partnership does not have enough assets, it is
the husband'scapital that is responsible for such support, not the paraphernal
property. Responsibility should carry authority with it.
ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE AND LIMITATION. — However, administration does not
include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer theconjugal
assets unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus,
under Art. 166 of NCC, "unless the wife has been declared a non-
composmentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in
a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnershipwithout the wife's consent. If she refuses
unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the
same." This rule prevents abuse on the part of the husband, and guarantees
the rights of the wife, who is partly responsible for the acquisition of the
property, particularly the real property. Contracts entered into by the
husband in violation of this prohibition are voidable and subject to
 Page 214 of 320
annulment at the instance of the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil Code).
ID.; ID.; LEASE OF REALTY FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR, CONSTITUTES
ENCUMBRANCE WHICH REQUIRES MARITAL CONSENT. — The joinder
of the wife, although unnecessary for an oral lease of conjugal realty which
does not exceed one year in duration, is required in a lease of conjugal realty
for a period of more than one year, such a lease being considered a
conveyance and encumbrance within the provisions of the Civil Code
requiring the joinder of the wife in the instrument by which real property is
conveyed or encumbered (See also 41 C.J.S., p. 1149).
ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY IN CASE OF VIOLATION. — In case the wife's
consent is not secured by the husband as required by law, the wife has the
remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the contract. Art. 173 of the
Civil Code states "the wife may, during the marriage and within ten years
from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent
is required. . . ."
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, the
allegation in paragraph 2 of the complaint indicates that petitioner's
estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas had entered into a contract
of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano without her marital consent
being secured as required by law under Art. 166 of the Civil Code. Petitioner,
therefore, has a cause of action under Art. 173 to file a case for annulment of
the contract of lease entered into without her consent. Petitioner has a cause
of action not only against her husband but also against the lessee, Antonio M.
Cayetano, who is a party to the contract of lease.
FACTS Plaintiff married but living separately from husband
plaintiff discovered that her estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas,
had entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano
sometime on March 30, 1987 covering a portion of their conjugal lot without
her previous knowledge, much less her marital consent. That on the same lot,
plaintiff had planned to put up her flea market
ISSUE whether or not a husband, as the administrator of the conjugal partnership,
may legally enter into a contract of lease involving conjugal real property
without the knowledge and consent of the wife.
RULING Petitioner, therefore, has a cause of action under Art. 173 to file a case for
annulment of the contract of lease entered into without her consent.
Petitioner has a cause of action not only against her husband but also against
the lessee, Antonio M. Cayetano, who is a party to the contract of lease.
D6.
1 [G.R. No. 182839. June 2, 2014.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. JOSE GARCIA and
CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA, JR., BOBBY
GARCIA and JIMMY GARCIA and HEIRS OF ROGELIO
GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA,
ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA, HEHERSON GARCIA,
GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA and JANE GARCIA,
respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS -The subject of the present case is a parcel of residential land with all its
improvements (subject property) located in Barrio Olango, Mallig, Isabela.
The land is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44422 under
the name of Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.) who acquired the subject property
during his marriage with Ligaya Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987
-respondents are the children of  Jose Sr. and Ligaya
-1989 spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained a
loan facility from the petitioner, Philippine National Bank (petitioner bank).
As security for theincreased loan, they offered their property covered by TCT
No. 75324 and the subjectproperty covered by TCT No. T-44422. Jose Sr.
agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering the subjectproperty as
additional collateral security for the latter's increased loan. For thispurpose,
Jose Sr. executed Special Powers of Attorney. Jose Sr. also executed an
Amendment ofReal Estate Mortgage in favor of the petitioner bank. All of
thesetransactions, however, were without the knowledge and consent of Jose
Sr.'s children.
-spouses Garcia failed to pay their loan to the petitioner bank despite
repeated demands
-1996, the respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Nullity of the
Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage. They claimed that the Amendment of
Real Estate Mortgage was null and void as to respondents as they were not
parties to the contract. respondents alleged that the subject property was a
conjugal property of Jose Sr. and his deceased spouse, Ligaya; that upon
Ligaya's death, Jose Sr., together with his children became owners pro
indiviso of the subject Property; that the real estate mortgage executed by
Jose Sr. could not bind his children as they did not give their consent or
approval to the encumbrance;
-In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr. was indebted to
them. To settle this  indebtedness, Jose Sr. volunteered to give the subject
property as additional security for their (the Garcias') loan to the petitioner
bank.
-petitioner bank disputes the CA's finding that the subject property was
conjugal in nature. It argues that, as can be gleaned from TCT No. T-44422,
the subject property was registered in the name of Jose Sr. alone, who
was described in the title as "widower" and not "married." Since the
subject property belonged to Jose Sr., insofar as petitioner bank as mortgagee
was concerned, Jose Sr. had the right under Article 428 of the Civil Code to
 Page 215 of 320
mortgage it without the consent of his children. Accordingly, the mortgage in
its entirety should be declared valid.  Likewise, it raises the argument that
Jose Sr.'s change of status in the subject property's title from "married" to
"widower" prior to the constitution of the real estate mortgage showed that
the property was no longer conjugal
ISSUE whether the subject property was conjugal
RULING The Subject Property is Conjugal
-All property acquired during marriage is presumed conjugal
Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, their property relations were governed by the conjugal partnership of
gains as provided under Article 119 of the Civil Code. Under Article 160 of the
Civil Code, "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife." Because of the petitioner bank's failure to rebut the
allegation that the subject property was acquired during the former's
marriage to Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property, in line with Article 160 of the Civil Code, applies to this property.
Proof of the subject property's acquisition during the subsistence of marriage
suffices to render the statutory presumption operative
Registration of the subject property in the name of one spouse
does not destroy the presumption that the property is conjugal.
Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy
its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the property
was acquired. 9(9) The registration of the property is not conclusive
evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the
property appears to be registered in the name of the husband, it has the
inherent character of conjugal property if it was acquired for valuable
consideration during marriage. 10(10) It retains its conjugal nature.
The conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary
co-ownership upon the death of Ligaya
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied
ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and
the heirs of the deceased, on the other. 14(14) This resulting ordinary co-
ownership among the heirs is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code which
reads:
        Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
of
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership." (Emphasis supplied)
Under this provision, each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or
share in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it
except when personal rights are involved. Should a co owner alienate or
mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall
remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Carvajal v. Court of Appeals -the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage with respect to the co owners, shall be limited, by
mandate of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted
to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
He has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or
determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the
other co owners because his right over the thing is represented by
an abstract or Ideal portion without any physical adjudication
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject
property after the death of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. While under Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had the
right to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed
property, he could not dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his
children's consent. As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr.'s right
in the subject property is limited only to his share in the conjugal
partnership as well as his share as anheir on the other half of the
estate which is his deceased spouse's share. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract is void insofar as it extends to the undivided shares of his children
(Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because they did not give
their consent to the transaction. Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate
Mortgage constituted by Jose Sr. over the entire property without his co-
owners' consent is not necessarily void in its entirety. The right of the
petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited though only to the portion which may
be allotted to Jose Sr. in the event of a division and liquidation of the subject
property
2 [A.C. No. 9081. October 12, 2011.]
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, complainants,
vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS -Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife
Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña's legal advice on whether they
could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23
July 1983. Omaña then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay" (contract)’
-Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the
validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its
terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their
 Page 216 of 320
children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during
their union.
-Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a
law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was
not valid
-Omaña denied that she prepared the contract. Omaña alleged that Espinosa
returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to
persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff
forged her signature and notarized the contract then later claimed that it was
her former maid who notarized it
-Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her
oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.
-Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay”; Espinosa's desistance
ISSUE whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the
notarization of Marantal and Espinosa's "Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay."
RULING the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosa's desistance did not put an end to the
proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD
stated that Omaña had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of
her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the
law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD
This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void. 2(2) The Court has also ruled
that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and
the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership, 3(3) which is exactly what Omaña did in
this case.
3 [A.C. No. 9081. October 12, 2011.]
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, complainants,
vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, respondent
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS - 1998 Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) –
married
- 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code
- Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the
Superior Court of California on 2001. Petitioner also learned that on October
2001, respondent already remarried
- Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative
years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long-lasting and by
nature, incurable.
- 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition: Declaring the marriage
NULL and VOID from the beginning and Dissolving the regime of absolute
community of property. A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
- Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages 6 (the Rule)
does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution
of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RULING For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
1.      The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2.      They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3.      Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. 9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent
We agree with petitioner. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the
Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule
are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)
of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
 Page 217 of 320
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of
all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment
of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially
approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may
ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in
no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children
accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on
their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared
void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or
bigamous marriage was contracted. Under Article 40, [t]he absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus we
ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void. 11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages,
meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment
of a competent court in an action for annulment. 12 In both instances under
Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community
of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains 14 unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before
the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of
annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of
the trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
4 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
DOCTRIN Pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of
E gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the
surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the
property relationship between the former spouses, where: Each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
FACTS Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on
January 19, 1985.
During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a
 Page 218 of 320
250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located
in Makati City. Subsequently, TCT No. S-101473/T-510 covering the
purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 156283 of the ROD
of Makati City was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson
Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial, RTC Branch 94 in Quezon City
rendered a Decision declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson.
In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the ex-spouses' conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without
liquidating their conjugal partnership. On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together
with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP58 million loan
from petitioner Metrobank. To secure the obligation, Florencia and the
spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages on their properties,
including one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283.
Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of
TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a
document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on
April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal
properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include
the lot in question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan
obligation when it fell due, Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings.
Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale
on three issues of Remate.
At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest
bidder. Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed a
Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. In
it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged that
the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia's name, was paraphernal.
Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.
ISSUE WON the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondent
Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of
community of property of the spouses.
RULING No.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed
their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of
the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation
following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into
an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other
heirs of the deceased. In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil
Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses,
where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on
April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the
partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the
former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493.
Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of
Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only
to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is
null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his
undivided half.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank's right, as mortgagee and as the
successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2
undivided
portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other
undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the
lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property
rights "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
5 LOREA DE UGALDE, petitioner, vs. JON DE YSASI, respondent
DOCTRIN
E
 Page 219 of 320
FACTS On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi
(respondent) got married without ante-nuptial agreement. Petitioner and
respondent separated sometime in April 1957. On 26 May
1964, respondent allegedly contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor
Smith. Petitioner further alleged that
respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal
properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. On 12 December 1984,
petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
against respondent. In particular, petitioner asked for her conjugal share in
respondent's inheritance as per the settlement of the estate of respondent's
parents, Juan Ysasi 6(6) and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, monthly support, the
annulment of all contracts, agreements, and documents signed and ratified by
respondent with third persons without her consent;Respondent countered
that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement which
provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be
deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. CFI approved the settlement.
Respondent further alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from
him
before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second
marriage
with Richard Galoway (Galoway). After Galoway's death, petitioner
contracted a third
marriage with Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of
estoppel, laches, and res judicata. RTC granted dismissed the petition of
Lorea. CA affirmed.
ISSUE whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in affirming the trial court's Decision which dismissed the action for
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains.
RULING Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband
and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution
of
the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
(Emphasis supplied)
The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the
parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal
partnership
of gains in accordance with Article 175
A judgment upon a compromise
agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive
only
upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who
are not
parties to it. The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner
and
respondent when it was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFI's
approval of
the Compromise Agreement on 6 June 1961 resulted in the dissolution of the
conjugal
partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent on even date
Denied.
6 [G.R. No. 138497. January 16, 2002]
IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner, vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for
APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC., against defendant
Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio, and alleged that sometime in
1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private respondent,
abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated
unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal
properties,, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein
petitioner since 1976. Defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their
period of cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune. As such, defendant
Lopez either did not place them in his name or otherwise removed,
transferred, stashed away or concealed them from the private-respondent. He
placed substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the name of
petitioner Relucio. a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein
petitioner on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action
against her. Motion to dismiss was denied. Court of Appeals denied the
petition for certiorari
ISSUE Whether respondents petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the
conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez
established a cause of action against petitioner.
RULING The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband. Nowhere in the
allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondents
causes of action were all against her husband.A real party in interest is one
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.[18] In this
case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special
 Page 220 of 320

Proceedings. She cannot be an indispensable party Nor can petitioner be a RULING The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving
necessary party spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of
Granted. money
chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for
him to
7 PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent. First. Petitioner's
ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months
G. JARING, respondents before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on October
13,
DOCTRIN 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21
E Under the
law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is one which is
FACTS Respondent Jaring entered into a sublease contract over a 14.5 hectare chargeable
fishpond against their conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the
with Spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and Spouses Bienvenido and conjugal
Remedios partnership is liable for —
Manuel, with the rent payable in two installments. All the sublessees signed All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
contract. When the unpaid balance remained unpaid, Spouses Alipio and purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. 8(8)
Spouses When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically
Manuel were sued by private respondent for the collection of the said amount. dissolved 9(9) and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement
Purita of estate
Alipio moved to dismiss the complaint only against them pursuant to Section proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, §2 which states:
21, Rule Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — When the
3 of the Rules of Court, claiming that her husband Placido had died 10 marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
months before property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
the commencement of the action. The trial court denied the motion, holding thereof
that she paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both
can be independently impleaded in the case with the exclusion of her spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate
deceased or
husband. Thereafter, judgment was rendered ordering petitioner and Spouses intestate proceedings of either.
Manuel The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of
to pay the unpaid balance without specifying whether payment should be administration
made jointly of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed
or solidarily. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was by the
dismissed. court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. 11(11)
It held that the rule that the action for recovery of money, debt or interest Indeed, the
thereon must surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator such that conveyances
be dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment does not apply made by
where him of any property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of
there are other defendants against whom the action should be maintained. the mass of
Hence, this conjugal partnership property is void.
petition. In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the
spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not
ISSUE whether a creditor can sue the mean,
surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal however, that the conjugal partnership continues.
partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
the settlement of the estate of the decedent. partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is
chargeable
 Page 221 of 320
against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which is primarily
bound
for its repayment. 17(17) Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement
of an
obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as
representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors
such that
the concept of joint or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply.
Granted.
8 SULPICIA VENTURA, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCIS J.
MILITANTE, in His Capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch XII, Cebu City; and JOHN UY,
respondents
DOCTRIN
E and
FACTS Private respondent John Uy filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and
Damages
against the Estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by his surviving spouse Ms.
Sulpicia
Ventura. Petitioner Sulpicia Ventura moved to dismiss the foregoing
complaint on the
ground that the estate of Carlos Ngo has no legal personality. Private
respondent
opposed the said motion to dismiss and manifested that he was going to
amend the
complaint. Public respondent then gave private respondent fifteen days to
make
amendments in the complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said
Order on the ground among others, that public respondent never acquired
jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case considering that an action to recover a sum
of
money from a deceased person may only be heard by a probate court.
Thereafter,
private respondent filed his Amended Complaint which substituted Sulpicia
Ventura
as defendant, and claiming that it was Carlos Ngo and Sulpicia Ventura who
incurred
an indebtedness from him. Acting on both issues, public respondent denied
the
Motion for Reconsideration and admitted the Amended Complaint.
ISSUE
RULING We grant the petition.
First. Sec. 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provided that "only natural
or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action".
Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff. It is clear that
the original complaint of private respondent against the
estate of Carlos Ngo was a suit against Carlos Ngo himself who was already
dead at
the time of the filing of said complaint. At that time, and this, private
respondent
admitted, no special proceeding to settle his estate had been filed in court. As
such,
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over either the deceased Carlos Ngo
or his
estate.
To cure this fatal defect, private respondent amended his original complaint.
In
his amended complaint, private respondent deleted the estate of Carlos Ngo
named petitioner as the defendant.
the conjugal partnership
terminates upon the death of either spouse. 28(29) After the death of one of
the spouses,
in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the conjugal property in order to
pay
outstanding obligations of the partnership, such sale must be made in the
manner and
with the formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the
property of
deceased persons. 29(30) Where a complaint is brought against the surviving
spouse for
the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property,
any
judgment obtained thereby is void. 30(31) The proper action should be in the
form of a
claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses,
there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not mean,
however, that
the conjugal partnership continues. 32(33) And private respondent cannot be
said to
have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may
apply
in court for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of
the
deceased Carlos Ngo if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed
to apply
for administration or request that administration be granted to some other
person.
 Page 222 of 320

Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent

never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and
without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able
to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations,
9 [G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992.] duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. This
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT idea is clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a
OF APPEALS and HO HANG (WITH ALIASES JOSE JO AND spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the
CONSING), respondents. conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning.

The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had
DOCTRIN already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their
E conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita.
The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that
he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship.
FACTS The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three
Moreover, beginning 1968 until the final determination by this Court of the
women and fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, the herein
action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give financial
petitioner, claims to be his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter, Monina
support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with
Jo. The other two women and their respective offspring are not parties to this
the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed
case.
to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their
In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of
conjugal property. Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135
conjugal property, in addition to an earlier action for support, also against
of the Family Code, providing as follows: Art. 135. Any of the following shall
him in the RTC.
be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: . . . (6) That
The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least
one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
There was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of the
complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property. Jo elevated the
The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the
decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the trial court in
finding of both the trial and respondent courts that the private respondent is
the complaint for support. The complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
indeed their real owner. It is these properties that should now be divided
property was dismissed for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that
between him and the petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired
separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.
during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. As the private
When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to
respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must include such properties
this Court for relief. The private respondent's petition for review on certiorari
properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered in
was dismissed for tardiness in our resolution dated February 17, 1988, where
the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
we also affirmed the legality of the marriage between Jose and Prima and the
obligation of the former to support her and her daughter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of
the respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in
favor of the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the conjugal property of the
ISSUE Whether or not there can be dissolution of conjugal partnership on the petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered divided between
ground of abandonment. them, share and share alike.
This division shall be implemented by the trial court after determination of all
the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership, including those
RULING Yes. that may have been illegally registered in the name of other persons.
Art. 178(3) of the Civil Code has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family D7.
Code. Under this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of
1 [G.R. No. 187942. September 7, 2016.]
the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF TUGUEGARAO, petitioner,
comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause,
vs. FLORENTINA PRUDENCIO, Now Deceased, Substituted by Her
even if said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
Heirs, Namely: Exequiel, Lorenzo, Primitivo, Marcelino, Juliana,
 Page 223 of 320
Alfredo and Rosario, All Surnamed Domingo; AVELINA
PRUDENCIO, Assisted by Her Husband Victoriano Dimaya;
ERNESTO PENALBER *(1) and RODRIGO TALANG; SPOUSES
ISIDRO CEPEDA and SALVACION DIVINI, Now Deceased,
Substituted by Her Heirs, Namely: Marcial, Pedro and Lina, All
Surnamed Cepeda, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E petitioner shall retain ownership of only 33,550 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot,
FACTS Felipe Prudencio (Felipe) married twice during his lifetime. With his first
wife, Elena Antonio (Elena), he begot five (5) children, namely: Valentina,
Eusebia, Paula, Florentina and Avelina. With his second wife, Teodora Abad
(Teodora), he had two (2) children namely: Felipe Prudencio, Jr. (Prudencio,
Jr.) and Leonora. During the marriage of Felipe and Elena, they acquired a
13.0476 hectares (or 130,476 sq. m.) parcel of land located at Sitio Abbot,
Barrio Imurung, Baggao, Cagayan (Cagayan lot. When Elena died, Felipe and
their children became co-owners of the property. Felipe then died intestate
during his second marriage. Upon his death, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and
Leonora executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of
the late Felipe with Waiver of Rights in favor of Teodora (Extra-
Judicial Partition). While the Extra-Judicial Partition acknowledged that the
Cagayan lot was acquired during the marriage of Felipe and Elena, it stated
that Felipe and Elena did not have any children who could inherit the
property; hence, Teodora and her children with Felipe are the only living
heirs by operation of law. The Extra-Judicial Partition also provided that
Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora waived their rights over the Cagayan lot in favor
of their mother Teodora. It was published in the Daily Mirror on October 22
and 29, 1969 and November 5, 1969. Accordingly, title to the Cagayan lot was
transferred to Teodora's name under TCT No. 14306. On May 16, 1972,
Teodora sold the Cagayan lot to respondents Spouses Isidro Cepeda and
Salvacion Divini (Spouses Cepeda). TCT No. 14306 was therefore cancelled,
and TCT No. 184375 was issued in favor of Spouses Cepeda.
On August 25, 1972, Spouses Cepeda sold the Cagayan lot to petitioner for
P16,500.00.  Thereafter, petitioner was issued TCT No. T-20084. On
September 15, 1972, respondents-appellees filed a Complaint for Partition
with Reconveyance against petitioner, Spouses Cepeda and Teodora,
Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora before the RTC. They alleged that they are the
children and grandchildren of Felipe by his first marriage. They asserted that
upon the death of Elena, they became the owners of Elena's conjugal share on
the Cagayan lot, while the other undivided half remained with Felipe. Upon
the death of Felipe, respondents-appellees then became owners as well of
Felipe's conjugal share in the property, together with Teodora, Prudencio, Jr.
and Leonora.
Respondents-appellees posited that they were fraudulently deprived of their
rightful shares in the estate of Felipe and Elena when the Extra-Judicial
Partition declared Teodora as the sole owner of the Cagayan lot. Thus, they
prayed that they be declared the owners pro indiviso of the undivided portion
of 10.2512 hectares of the Cagayan lot, and that this portion be reconveyed to
them.
RTC Held in favor of respondent-appellees. The RTC held that it was
impossible for Teodora and her children to not know that Felipe had
children/heirs by his first marriage.  Therefore, the execution of the Extra-
Judicial Partition was done in bad faith. In excluding the children of Felipe
with Elena, the partition is invalid and not binding upon them.
The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. It declared that
which is the area equivalent to Teodora's share. The remaining 96,926 sq. m.
(as modified by the CA from the RTC's previous ruling of 99,924.6 sq. m.)
should be reconveyed to respondents-appellees. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which was denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE Whether or not the action for partition with reconveyance filed by
respondents-appellees against petitioner should prosper.
RULING Yes.
Before the partition of the Cagayan lot among the surviving heirs, the
conjugal share of the surviving spouse shall first be deducted from
the conjugal property of the spouses because the same does not form
part of the estate of the deceased spouse.
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is dissolved
upon the death of either spouse. It shall then be subject to inventory
and liquidation, the net remainder of which shall be divided
equally between the husband and the wife.
Here, the Cagayan lot is the conjugal property of Elena and Felipe. Upon the
former's death, one-half (1/2) of the Cagayan lot automatically goes to the
latter as his conjugal share. The remaining one-half (1/2) forms part of the
estate of Elena and shall be divided equally between Felipe and his four (4)
surviving children with Elena,
in conformity with Article 996 of the Civil Code. Thus, Felipe shall receive
one-half (1/2) or 65,238 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot as his conjugal share and
one-fifth (1/5) or 13,047.6 sq. m. of the same lot as heir of Elena. Simply put,
Felipe is entitled to a total of 78,285.6 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot. Meanwhile,
respondents-appellees shall receive one-fifth (1/5) or 13,047.6 sq. m. each.
When Felipe obtained a second marriage, his 78,285.6 sq. m. share was
brought into his marriage with Teodora, such that the same formed part of
their conjugal partnership. Upon Felipe's death, Teodora became entitled to
one-half (1/2) of the 78,285.6 sq. m. or 39,142.8 sq. m. The remaining half
will compose the estate of Felipe, which will be divided equally among
Teodora, Prudencio Jr., Leonora and respondents-appellees — each of them
receiving one-seventh (1/7) of 39,142.8 sq. m.
Teodora then shall receive 44,734.63 sq. m. This is further increased by the
waiver of Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora of their rights over the estate of Felipe,
such that the aggregate share of Teodora will now be equivalent to 55,918.29
 Page 224 of 320
sq. m.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The October 21,
2008 Decision and May 11, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 77100 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that:
(1) Petitioner is ORDERED to reconvey to respondents-appellees an area of
74,557.72 square meters as their pro indiviso share in the Cagayan lot; while
petitioner shall retain the remaining area of 55,918.29 square meters.
(2) Spouses Cepeda are ORDERED to return to petitioner the amount paid
corresponding to the 74,557.72 square meters share of respondents-appellees,
with legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed from the time
petitioner filed its Answer with Cross-Claim dated October 14, 1972 with the
RTC until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, the legal interest from July 1, 2013 until
finality of decision shall be at 6% per annum. After this decision becomes
final and executory, the applicable rate shall be 6% per annum until its full
satisfaction.
(3) The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City,
Branch 4, for partition of the Cagayan lot in accordance with this Decision.
2 [G.R. No. 200274. April 20, 2016.]
MELECIO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES GENARO
MOLINA and ELENA B. MOLINA, substituted by ESTER
MOLINA, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the
FACTS In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property
in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18, 164
square meter parcel of land. The sale was annotated on the Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354 covering the subject property.
During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses
Genaro and Elena Molina (spouses Molina). On September 10, 1978 or 10
years after Flora’s death4, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the
spouses Molina to answer for his debts. The sale to the spouses Molina was
annotated at the OCT of the subject property.5 In 1986, Anastacio died.
In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio’s interest was registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 272967[[7]] and transferred the entire one-half
undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina.
Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer
and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership
(Complaint) against the spouses Molina on May 17, 1999.
Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the spouses Molina
to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could
not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora’s
consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.
ISSUE Whether or not there is an implied co-ownership among Flora’s heirs on the
conjugal properties pending liquidation and partition.
RULING Yes.
In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna, we held that the
properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the
regime of co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the heirs
of the deceased spouse until final liquidation and partition. The
surviving spouse, however, has an actual and vested one-half
undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of
determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and
partition of the conjugal partnership.
An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora’s surviving heirs,
including Anastacio, with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership
until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-
half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an
undivided interest.
Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership provides:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. (399) (emphases supplied)
conjugal properties without an actual partition being first done either by
agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely
sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subject property.
The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of
Anastacio’s interest.
The OCT annotation of the sale to the spouses Molina reads that "[o]nly the
rights, interests and participation of Anastacio Domingo, married to Flora
Dela Cruz, is hereby sold, transferred, and conveyed unto the said vendees for
the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) which pertains to an
undivided one-half (1/2) portion and subject to all other conditions specified
in the document x x x" (emphases supplied). At the time of the sale,
Anastacio’s undivided interest in the conjugal properties consisted of: (1) one-
half of the entire conjugal properties; and (2) his share as Flora’s heir on the
conjugal properties.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently,
Anastactio’s sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-
owners was not totally void, for Anastacio’s rights or a portion thereof were
thereby effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the
subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest. This result conforms
with the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must
be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut
 Page 225 of 320
ago, valeat quantum valere potest).
The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of
Anastacio in respect of any portion that might belong to the co-heirs after
liquidation and partition. The observations of Justice Paras cited in the case
of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. V. Servacio are instructive:
x x x [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would
pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it
turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets
then the whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the
property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in
the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the wife, then
that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the
other is not. Since all these can be determined only at the time the liquidation
is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is not
void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal properties
cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The
sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of course as to that
portion of the husband’s share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The
buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said
portion for the benefit of the husband’s other heirs, the cestui que trust ent.
Said heirs shall not be barred by prescription or by laches.
3 [G.R. No. 198908. August 3, 2015.]
VIRGINIA OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E DOCTRIN
FACTS On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo
(Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the
ground of psychological incapacity. On January 22, 1993, the trial court
rendered a Decision declaring the marriage between Virginia and Deogracio
as null and void, As to the couple's property relations, their conjugal
partnership of gains shall necessarily be dissolved and liquidated but since
the petitioner has not submitted any detailed and formal listing or inventory
of such property, the court cannot act now on the liquidation aspect. The
parties are given thirty (30) days to submit an inventory of their conjugal
partnership for the purpose of liquidation. On March 31, 1999, the trial court
directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried
properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual
issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to agree on a project of
partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties
adduced evidence in support of their respective stand. On January 13, 2004,
the trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties declared
by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing. CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Thus, the instant petition for review.
ISSUE Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal
partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
RULING No, Deogracio cannot be deprived of his share because the property regime
applicable here is Article 147. In a void marriage, as in those declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case.
The court a quo did not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article 147 of
the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family home
and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that,
in the liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in common,
the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail. The
rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community (Article 102) or the conjugal partnership of gains (Article 129),
the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
law spouses or spouses of void marriages.
4 [G.R. No. 176492. October 20, 2014.]
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, petitioner, vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO,
respondent.
E
FACTS Leonardo and Marietta’s marriage was declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Since there was no
more reason to maintain their co-ownership over their house and lot,
Leonardo asked Marietta for partition, but the latter refused, prompting him
to file a complaint for partition. Marietta claimed that that the subject
property had already been sold to their children, with whom majority of their
common children chose to remain. As evidence, she attached an unnotarized
deed of sale.
ISSUE Whether or not the house and lot can still be divided between Leonardo and
Marietta?
RULING Yes. The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been
declared void for psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the
spouses’ property relations. Here, the former spouses both agree that they
 Page 226 of 320
acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus,
it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
On the claim of Marietta that ownership over the house and lot is already
vested on their children by virtue of a Deed of Sale, it should be noted that
aside from the title to the property remains registered in the names of the
former spouses. Moreover, the deed of sale does not bear a notarization of a
notary public. Without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private,
due execution and authenticity must be sufficiently proven. This Marietta
failed to do. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common
by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules
on co-ownership.
5 DAVID A. NOVERAS, petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, respondent.
DOCTRIN
E indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
FACTS David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3
December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California,
United States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired American
citizenship.
David was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse
in San Francisco, California. During the marriage, they acquired properties in
the Philippines and in the USA.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines
in 2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million.
According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed
that David agreed to and executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia stating that:
1) the P1.1 Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be
paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia
P750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption
price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce and forfeit
all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
Philippines. David was able to collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the
Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition
for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA.
The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was
duly entered on 29 June 2005. The California court granted to Leticia the
custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA.
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their
marriage was entered by the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also
include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation,
including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal
partnership.
ISSUE WON the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property
should be granted.
RULING Yes.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is
undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Third and
more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the
California court in June 2005.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property
automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th
paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138.(Emphasis supplied).
Further, under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the
dissolution of the absolute community regime.
We agree with the appellate court that Philippine courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed,
Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the
share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines,
 Page 227 of 320
as well as the payment of their children's presumptive legitimes, which the
appellate court explained in this wise:
“Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the
Sampaloc property. While both claimed to have contributed to the
redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their
contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half
of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be
given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00 incurred in going to
and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the
amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly
received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to
settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same
had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally
in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or in the
respective amounts of P1,040,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of
legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother." The children are therefore entitled to
half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well
as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the
amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay
them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom”
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
6 LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO, petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO and VITTORIO C. ROMERO,
respondents.
DOCTRIN
E heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to
FACTS Petitioners allege that upon their father's death on 18 October 1974, their
mother, respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who
held several real and personal properties in trust for her children. Since that
year until the present, she continues to be the administrator of the properties,
businesses, and investments comprising the estate of her late husband.
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several
Deeds of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are purportedly
conjugal properties of their parents.
Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio —
through fraud, misrepresentation and duress — succeeded in registering the
properties in his name through Deeds of Sale executed by their mother,
Aurora.  Vittorio allegedly employed force and threat upon her, and even
administered drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable. Thus, Aurora
signed the Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their contents.
On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title (Amended) against private
respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero. Respondents filed
their Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long after
the death of their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot
be considered conjugal. They allege that the lots covered by TCT Nos. 290010,
290011, 113514, and Tax Declaration Nos. 16136 and 11639 were paraphernal
properties of Aurora which she had mortgaged. Vittorio purportedly had to
shell out substantial amounts in order to redeem them. The lots covered by
TCT Nos. 77223, 77224, and 77225 were sold by Aurora herself as attorney-in-
fact of her children.
RTC dismissed petitioner’ complaint. CA affirmed decision of RTC.
ISSUE Whether or not petitioners may file a separate civil action for annulment of
sale and reconveyance of title,despite the pendency of the settlement
proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero.
RULING Yes. The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in the present
case.
While it is true that a probate court's determination of ownership over
properties which may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature,
this rule is applicable only as between the representatives of the estate and
strangers thereto. Indeed, as early as Bacquial v. Amihan, the court stated
thus:
. . . The rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not
protect the same, but not for a decision on their action. In the case of In re
Estate of the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, Teresa Garcia vs.
Luisa Garcia, et al., 67 Phil., 353, this court held:
 Page 228 of 320
A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power
and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein
or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a
determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the
right of interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question on the
ownership or existence of the right or credit.
To this same effect are rulings in various states of the United States.
. . . That the probate court is without jurisdiction to try the title to property as
between the representatives of an estate and strangers thereto is too well
established bythe authorities to require argument.
There is also authority abroad that where the court is without jurisdiction to
determine questions of title, as for example, as between the estate and
persons claiming adversely, its orders and judgments relating to the sale do
not render the issue of title res judicata.
In any case, there is no merit to petitioners' claim that the issues raised in the
case at bar pertain to title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated
in a separate civil action. The issue before the court is not really one of title or
ownership, but the determination of which particular properties should be
included in the inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has
listed the properties alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties of
their parents and, therefore, part of the estate that was illegally sold to the
respondent. Some of these real properties identified seem to be the same real
properties that form part of the inventory of the estate in the intestate
proceedings.
Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory heirs, they
also seek to be the owners, pro indiviso, of the said properties. To anchor
their claim, they argue that the properties are conjugal in nature and hence
form part of their inheritance. For his defense, Vittorio contends that the lots
are the paraphernal properties of Aurora that she had mortgaged, and that
Vittorio subsequently redeemed.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that the
determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes
of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the probate court.
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the
allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part of their share in the
estate. To date, there has been no final inventory of the estate or final order
adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can
competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the
estate. It is only the probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership
and distribute the same to the heirs, after the debts of the estate have been
paid.
7 PAZ VS. REPUBLIC
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS On November 29, 2000, the petitioner brought a petition for the cancellation
of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 684 docketed as LRC Case No. 00-
059. The petition, ostensibly made under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529,
impleaded the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), Filinvest Development
Corporation (FDC), and Filinvest Alabang, Inc. (FAI) as respondents.
The petition averred that the petitioner was the owner of parcel of lands
registered in the name of the Republic, and included Lot 392 of the
Muntinlupa Estate with an area of approximately 244 hectares; that Lot 392
was segregated from OCT No. 684, resulting in the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 185552, also in the name of the Republic; that
FDC and FAI developed Lot 392 into a subdivision based on their joint
venture agreement with the Government; that pursuant to the joint venture
agreement, Lot 392 was further subdivided, causing the cancellation of TCT
No. 185552, and the issuance of TCTs for the resulting individual subdivision
lots in the names of the Republic and FAI; and that the subdivision lots were
then sold to third parties.
FDC and FAI moved to dismiss the petition for cancellation on the following
grounds,[4] to wit:
(1)   The serious and controversial dispute spawned by the Petition for
cancellation of title is litigable in an ordinary action outside the special and
limited jurisdiction of land registration courts. The Petition is thus removed
from the ambit of Sec. 108 of the Property Registration Decree which
requires, as an indispensable element for availment of the relief thereunder,
either unanimity of the parties or absence of serious controversy or adverse
claim. It authorizes only amendment and alteration of certificates of title, not
cancellation thereof;
(2)   Lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the persons of the respondents who
were not validly served with summons but only a copy of the Petition;
(3)   Docket fees for the Petition have not been paid.
(4) The Petition does not contain the requisite certificate of non-forum
shopping.
ISSUE Whether Section 108 of P.D. 1529, is applicable and the petition should not be
dismissed because it was exempt from the requirements of paying docket fees,
of service of summons, and of the certification against forum shopping due to
its not being an initiatory pleading.
 Page 229 of 320
RULING No.
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 reads as follows:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure,
alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the
entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation
of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of
First Instance. A registered owner or other person having interest in the
registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the
approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to
the court upon the ground that the registered interest of any description,
whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the
certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing
upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or an
error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on
any duplicate certificate: or that the same or any person in the certificate has
been changed or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as
married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of
heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned
registered land and has been dissolved has not yet convened the same within
three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and
the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in
interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry
or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief
upon such terms and conditions, requiring security and bond if necessary, as
it may consider proper; Provided,however, That this section shall not be
construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of
registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which
shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for
value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns without his or their written
consent. Where the owners duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar
petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.
All petitions or motions filed under this section as well as any other provision
of this decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the
original case in which the decree of registration was entered.
Based on the provision, the proceeding for the amendment and alteration of a
certificate of title under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 is applicable in seven
instances or situations, namely: (a) when registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have
terminated and ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or been created
which do not appear upon the certificate; (c) when any error, omission or
mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on
any duplicate certificate; (d) when the name of any person on the certificate
has been changed; (e) when the registered owner has been married, or,
registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or
interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when a corporation,
which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the
same within three years after its dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable
ground for the amendment or alteration of title.
We agree with both the CA and the RTC that the petitioner was in reality
seeking the reconveyance of the property covered by OCT No. 684, not the
cancellation of a certificate of title as contemplated by Section 108 of P.D. No.
1529. Thus, his petition did not fall under any of the situations covered by
Section 108, and was for that reason rightly dismissed.
Moreover, the filing of the petition would have the effect of reopening the
decree of registration, and could thereby impair the rights of innocent
purchasers in good faith and for value. To reopen the decree of registration
was no longer permissible, considering that the one-year period to do so had
long ago lapsed, and the properties covered by OCT No. 684 had already been
subdivided into smaller lots whose ownership had passed to third persons.
Thusly, the petition tended to violate the proviso in Section 108 of P.D. No.
1529, to wit:
xxx Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the
court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that
nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or
other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value in good faith, or
his heirs and assigns without his or their written consent. Where the owners
duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as
provided in the preceding section.
8 THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA, namely:
LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN
LORRAINE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA and ASUNCION, all
surnamed GO, represented by LEONORA B. GO, petitioners, vs. ESTER L.
SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140 square
meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.).
Twenty three years later,  Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio
Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land.
Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the
petitioners.
 Page 230 of 320
Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Rito's wife Dina B. Go) sold a
portion of the property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L.
Servacio (Servacio) for P5,686,768.00. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners
demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their
demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, 5(5) they
sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern
Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.'s renunciation, the
property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between
Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the
property because he had purchased it with his own money.
RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and
Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three
vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that
the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being
heirs of the late Marta.
RTc affirmed the validity of the sale
ISSUE Whether Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; and that the sale
by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior
liquidation.
RULING The sale is valid.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of
the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall
be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property
relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of
supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of
gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
Any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must
be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no
dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly
characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code.
Upon Marta's death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, and an
implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other
heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal
partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.  The ensuing
implied ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of
Marta's share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to
any specific portion of Marta's share without an actual partition of the
property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until
then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta's share. 1
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr.
had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
interest of his co-owners.
Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the
consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the
selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer
(Servacio) a co-owner of Marta's share.
This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of
 Page 231 of 320
a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability
of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws." This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely
void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had
already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of
the sale.
In their separate comments, the respondents aver that each of the heirs had
already received "a certain allotted portion" at the time of the sale, and that
Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold only the portions adjudicated to and owned by
them. However, they did not present any public document on the allocation
among her heirs, including themselves, of specific shares in Marta's estate.
Neither did they aver that the conjugal properties has already been liquidated
and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a partition among the heirs of Marta,
the efficacy of the sale, and whether the extent of the property sold adversely
affected the interests of the petitioners might not yet be properly decided with
finality. The appropriate recourse to bring that about is to commence an
action for judicial partition, as instructed in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of
Appeals,  to wit:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell
his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights
of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner
of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for
the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third
person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it
[Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases
where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as
in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action
for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
9 SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH
AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO
DAGORO, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without
any known
debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages,
first with Lucia
Garcia (Lucia), and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April
24, 1924. Joaquin
and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose
(survived by three
children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on
February 9, 1926.
They also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by
her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with
improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and
874-(38255). Joseph,
a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and
had been
appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator. He was latter appointed by the
probate court and
was issued with letters of administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of
Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became
the pro indiviso
owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with
the exclusive
money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the
house were
shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant)
was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that considering
that the bulk of the
estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as
shown by TCT
No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was
married to
Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other
than their negative
allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second
marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties
belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification
of the October 23,
 Page 232 of 320
2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However,
before the RTC
could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to
the CA. The CA
settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of
Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros. Moreover,  the CA the estate of Milagros in
the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court
for the probate
of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she
would receive from
Joaquin’s estate. CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this
case belong to the
first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title
were registered in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without
any known
debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages,
first with Lucia
Garcia (Lucia), and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April
24, 1924. Joaquin
and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose
(survived by three
children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on
February 9, 1926.
They also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by
her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with
improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and
874-(38255). Joseph,
a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and
had been
appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator. He was latter appointed by the
probate court and
was issued with letters of administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of
Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became
the pro indiviso
owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with
the exclusive
money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the
house were
shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant)
was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that considering
that the bulk of the
estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as
shown by TCT
No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was
married to
Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other
than their negative
allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second
marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties
belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification
of the October 23,
2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However,
before the RTC
could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to
the CA. The CA
settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of
Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros. Moreover,  the CA the estate of Milagros in
the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court
for the probate
of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she
would receive from
Joaquin’s estate. CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this
case belong to the
first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title
were registered in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without
any known
debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages,
first with Lucia
Garcia (Lucia), and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April
24, 1924. Joaquin
and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose
(survived by three
children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on
February 9, 1926.
They also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by
her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with
improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and
874-(38255). Joseph,
a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and
 Page 233 of 320
had been
appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator. He was latter appointed by the
probate court and
was issued with letters of administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of
Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became
the pro indiviso
owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with
the exclusive
money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the
house were
shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant)
was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that considering
that the bulk of the
estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as
shown by TCT
No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was
married to
Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other
than their negative
allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second
marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties
belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification
of the October 23,
2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However,
before the RTC
could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to
the CA. The CA
settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of
Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros. Moreover,  the CA the estate of Milagros in
the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court
for the probate
of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she
would receive from
Joaquin’s estate. CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this
case belong to the
first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title
were registered in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without
any known
debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages,
first with Lucia
Garcia (Lucia), and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April
24, 1924. Joaquin
and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose
(survived by three
children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on
February 9, 1926.
They also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by
her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with
improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and
874-(38255). Joseph,
a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and
had been
appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator. He was latter appointed by the
probate court and
was issued with letters of administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of
Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became
the pro indiviso
owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with
the exclusive
money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the
house were
shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant)
was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that considering
that the bulk of the
estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as
shown by TCT
No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was
married to
Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other
than their negative
allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second
marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties
belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification
of the October 23,
2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However,
before the RTC
 Page 234 of 320
could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to
the CA. The CA
settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of
Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros.
CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the
first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title
were registered in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
ISSUE Whether or not the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction,
is vested
with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership
RULING Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the
probate of the will and/or settlement
of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule
is that such court
merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a
probate court or
one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong
to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased
but by title adverse
to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties
is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no
problem, but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to
an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of
title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency
and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice
to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are
all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent
to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
Verily, its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering
that the parties are
all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the
resolution of the
ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject
properties are
conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate
of Joaquin
10 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
DOCTRIN Pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of
E gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the
surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the
property relationship between the former spouses, where: Each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
FACTS Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on
January 19, 1985.
During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a
 Page 235 of 320
250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located
in Makati City. Subsequently, TCT No. S-101473/T-510 covering the
purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 156283 of the ROD
of Makati City was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson
Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial, RTC Branch 94 in Quezon City
rendered a Decision declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson.
In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the ex-spouses' conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without
liquidating their conjugal partnership. On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together
with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP58 million loan
from petitioner Metrobank. To secure the obligation, Florencia and the
spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages on their properties,
including one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283.
Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of
TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a
document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on
April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal
properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include
the lot in question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan
obligation when it fell due, Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings.
Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale
on three issues of Remate.
At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest
bidder. Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed a
Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. In
it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged that
the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia's name, was paraphernal.
Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.
ISSUE WON the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondent
Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of
F.
community of property of the spouses.
1 DAVID A. NOVERAS, petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, respondent.
RULING No.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed
their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of
the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation
following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into
an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other
heirs of the deceased. In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil
Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses,
where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on
April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the
partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the
former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493.
Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of
Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only
to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is
null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his
undivided half.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank's right, as mortgagee and as the
successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2
undivided
portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other
undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the
lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property
rights "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
 Page 236 of 320
DOCTRIN
E indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
FACTS David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3
December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California,
United States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired American
citizenship.
David was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse
in San Francisco, California. During the marriage, they acquired properties in
the Philippines and in the USA.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines
in 2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million.
According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed
that David agreed to and executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia stating that:
1) the P1.1 Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be
paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia
P750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption
price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce and forfeit
all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
Philippines. David was able to collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the
Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition
for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA.
The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was
duly entered on 29 June 2005. The California court granted to Leticia the
custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA.
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their
marriage was entered by the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also
include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation,
including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal
partnership.
ISSUE WON the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property
should be granted.
RULING Yes.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is
undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Third and
more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the
California court in June 2005.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property
automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th
paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138.(Emphasis supplied).
Further, under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the
dissolution of the absolute community regime.
We agree with the appellate court that Philippine courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed,
Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the
share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines,
as well as the payment of their children's presumptive legitimes, which the
appellate court explained in this wise:
“Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the
Sampaloc property. While both claimed to have contributed to the
redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their
contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half
of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be
given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00 incurred in going to
and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the
amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly
received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to
 Page 237 of 320
settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same
had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally
in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or in the
respective amounts of P1,040,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of
legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother." The children are therefore entitled to
half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well
as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the
amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay
them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom”
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
2 VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner, vs. DITA MAQUILAN, respondent
DOCTRIN
E authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of
FACTS Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a
blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However,
petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair
with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of
adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently,
both the private respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime
charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of
Gains and Damages, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the
petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent
entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT providing for the sharing in the
conjugal assets.
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated January 15, 2002,
praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the
reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the
respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently
and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise
Agreement.
ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY
SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS CONVICTED OF ADULTERY, GIVING
THE CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY,
VALID AND LEGAL.
RULING Yes.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected
voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned
Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a
separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even
if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is
subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and
other persons with interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.
The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction.
Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil
interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender
during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read
with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of
prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon. It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime
of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of
such property inter vivos.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise Agreement
is VALID without prejudice to the rights of all creditors and other persons
with pecuniary interest in the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains.
G.
 Page 238 of 320
ISSUE
1 JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO,
petitioners, vs. LUIS G. ANSON, respondent.
DOCTRIN
E RULING
FACTS On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson filed a Complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-
Salgado and Gerard Salgado along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya and Gaston
Maya, seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis.
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late
Severina de Asis-Anson. They were married in a civil ceremony on December
28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to
their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's
daughter from a previous relationship.
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties
located in San Juan, Metro Manila.
According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him
and Severina, the properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But
without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate
Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos.
20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of
title over the said properties. When Severina died on September 21, 2002,
Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Severina de Asis, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She
secured new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637
and 8003.
Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful
share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of
Severina.
In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, which the trial court
considered as the Answer of her husband, Gerard, Jo-Ann countered that she
was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew
however that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship which they
both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agreement
executed in November 1980. This was implemented through another
Partition Agreement executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received
the properties apportioned to him by virtue of the said agreement while the
properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by
Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were under Severina's
name only and she was described therein as single without reference to any
husband.
1. Whether or not the marriage between Luis and Severina is valid?
2. What property regime is applicable to Luis and Severina’s union?
1.    No.
A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina
reveals that no marriage license number was indicated therein.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license
must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties.
Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on
the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the
marriage is of an exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary
was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that
the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a
valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.
2. As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to
marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their
marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license,
Article 144 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are
the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147
of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license."
"Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household.'"
Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply
in the partition of the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated
under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those
to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to
how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that
"partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement
to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by
 Page 239 of 320

Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement. RULING

2 In Re: A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC [Report on the Judicial Audit 4

Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu]
and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC [Violation of Judge Ildefonso Suerte, DOCTRINE
Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu of Administrative
Order No. 36-2004 dated March 3, 2004], Prosecutor MARY ANN FACTS
T. CASTRO-ROA, respondent.
ISSUE
DOCTRIN
E RULING

FACTS Castro-Roa married Mr. Rocky Rommel D. Roa (Mr. Roa) on March 30, 1993
and had two children together. 5
On June 5, 2000, Castro-Roa filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of DOCTRINE
Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
FACTS

ISSUE
ISSUE What property regime govern the spouses after their marriage was dissolved
RULING
under Section 36 of the Family Code?

RULING Dissolved marriages under Article 45 are governed either by absolute 6

community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, unless the parties
agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered DOCTRINE
into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, FACTS
there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. This is not the case for the nullity of ISSUE
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. Particularly, Articles 147 and RULING
148 of the Family Code govern the property relations of void marriages; while
Articles 50 and 51 govern the property relations of voidable marriages under
Article 45. 7

DOCTRINE
3
FACTS
DOCTRINE
ISSUE
FACTS
RULING
ISSUE
 Page 240 of 320
8 G.R. No. 178044               January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent)
were married on January 14, 1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of
Las Piñas City.
 On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to
give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility
to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
 Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and
would at times become violent and hurt him.
 RTC – granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage, thereby
dissolving the regime of absolute community of property. As ruled
by the RTC, a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE WON the RTC erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RULING  The petition has merit.
 Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family
Code.
 We agree with petitioner.
 Article 147 of the Family Code provides: “Article 147. When a man
and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.”
 When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children.
 In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
 For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements
must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void.
 All these elements are present in this case and there is no question
that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.
 We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
 The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code.
 Section 19(1) of the Rule provides: “Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the
court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment
shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.”
 It is clear from the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies
only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code.
 In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family
Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
9 G.R. No. 133743             February 6, 2007
 Page 241 of 320
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 134029             February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
ISSUE
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
DOCTRIN
RULING
E
FACTS
 The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T.
San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province
of Laguna.
 During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
 His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.
 Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American
citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, U.S.A., which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973.
 On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992.
 Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
 On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that respondent has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
 Respondent presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
 RTC – respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for
letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid
in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino
citizen
 CA – reversed RTC. It held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to
marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code. It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee
was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to
contract a subsequent marriage with respondent.
WON respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
 The petition lacks merit.
 On the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue
of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
 The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the
legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving
spouse.
 However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
 With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law.
 As stated in another case, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
 Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
 In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person
who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners.
 If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered
as a co-owner under Article 144  of the Civil Code.
 This provision governs the property relations between parties who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void from the beginning.
 It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
 Page 242 of 320
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry.
 Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven.
 Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the
divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article
148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of
the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry.
 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,  we held that even if the cohabitation
or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs.   should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they
 The Court described the property regime under this provision as
follows: “We find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.”
10 G.R. No. 152716             October 23, 2003
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
DOCTRIN
E creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire
FACTS  This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code
filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno
Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of Makati in March 1997.
 After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of property.
 The trial court also ruled that the conjugal partnership of property
existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof, a regime
of complete separation of property between the said spouses is
established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Family Code, without prejudice to the rights previously acquired by
creditorts.
 The trial court also found several properties which are excluded from
the conjugal properties: (1) Bacolod property; and (2) Suite 204 of
LCG Condominium.
 As to the monthly rentals prior to the issuance of this Order of the
subject properties, namely the Ground Floor Front (Friday’s Club),
Ground Floor Rear Apartment and Upper Basement at LGC
Condominium, all leased by Bar 4 Corporation, the trial court ruled
that the same shall be shared by the parties in common, in
proportion to one-half each or share and share alike, after deducting
all expenses for Income Taxes, Business Permits, Realty Taxes,
Municipal License fees, clearances, etc.
 Petitioner’s contention – Suite 204 was purchased on installment
basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in
accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
 Trial court held that since the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership
own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE The ownership of Suite 204 of LCG Condominium and how the properties
acquired by petitioner and respondent should be partitioned.
RULING  We give more credence to petitioner’s submission that Suite 204 was
acquired during the parties’ cohabitation.
 Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property
should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
 Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision
during their cohabitation.
 For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void.
 All these elements are present in the case at bar.
 It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any
impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each
other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with
respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their
marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the
Family Code because of respondent’s psychological incapacity to
comply with essential marital obligations.
 The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was
purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when
petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it
should be considered as common property of petitioner and
respondent.
 Page 243 of 320
 As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner
and respondent, we hold that the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership should apply.
 There is nothing in the records that support the pronouncement of
the trial court that the parties have agreed to divide the properties
into three—1/3 share each to the petitioner, the respondent and their
children. Petitioner, in fact, alleges in her petition before this Court
that the parties have agreed on a four-way division of the properties
—1/4 share each to the petitioner and the respondent, and 1/4 share
each to their two children.
 In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite 204 of
LCG Condominium is a common property of petitioner and
respondent and the property regime of the parties should be divided
in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
11 G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO,
respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
DOCTRIN
E has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
FACTS  During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he
contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had two offsprings,
namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño, with whom
he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
back in 1982.
 He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
 Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies.
 Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.”
 Respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS
Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).”
 On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case
for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao
praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half
of the P146,000.00.
 Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased
took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and
the deceased.
 RTC – ruled in favor of Susan Yee, ordering petitioner to pay ½ to
respondent.
 CA – affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE Who between petitioner or respondent is entitled to the benefits of the
deceased Cariño.
RULING  CA decision is reversed.
 The SC is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity
of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death
benefits” of the deceased.
 Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage
of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage
void ab initio.
 In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the
license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage.
 The presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured
the required marriage license.
 However, it does not follow from the foregoing disquisition that
since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab
initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee.
 To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also
be void.
 Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does
not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent
Susan Yee.
 The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased void.
 The marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.
 One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the
separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable
property regime.
 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
 Page 244 of 320
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage.”
 In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-
ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him
or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the
home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime.
 Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during
the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148
is therefore in order.
 Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could
not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the
acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the
same.
 By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife
of the deceased is not one of them.
 As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies
to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license.
 In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and
salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be
owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other
did not contribute thereto.
 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by
the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a
co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share
one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present
case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good
faith.
 Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go
to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other
half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to
his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
12 G.R. No. 122749 J       uly 31, 1996
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDEZ, respondents.
VITUG, J.:p
DOCTRIN Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
E live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share
in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation.
FACTS  Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January
1971.
 Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family code.
 The trial court granted the petition, ruling that the marriage of
petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez
is declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their
essential marital obligations and that the parties are directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation their common properties.
 Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision
directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code.
She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions
without marriage."
 RTC’s clarification – Consequently, considering that Article 147 of
the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by
both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint
efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares,
plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their
properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and
 Page 245 of 320
partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall
apply.
 In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the
family dwelling, the trial court said: “Considering that this Court has
already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as
null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of
petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on
ownership. The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family
Code finds no application since Article 102 refers to the procedure
for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article
129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute
community of property.”
ISSUE What law must govern the parties.
RULING  The trial court correctly applied the law.
 In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may
be, of the Family Code.
 This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage
or without the benefit of marriage.
 The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the
law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e.,
any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of
the Code.
 Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts.
 A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said
party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household."
 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
 When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to
marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as
husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions.
 Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to
another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage.
If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed.
 The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter
case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation
of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.
 The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, relates only, by its
explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void
marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of
nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.
 The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy
and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their
nullity.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 - DIGESTS
IV. A.
1 G.R. No. 181097             June 25, 2008
NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and MALIK "BOBBY" T. ALINGAN, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
DOCTRIN The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
E "domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
FACTS  Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her husband,
Mohammad G. Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent Malik
"Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were mayoralty candidates in Pantar,
Lanao del Norte during the 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections.
 On April 2, 2007, Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad for
failure to comply with the residency requirement.
 On April 12, 2007, Malik filed another petition to disqualify
Norlainie also on the ground of lack of the one-year residency
requirement.
 Page 246 of 320
 On April 21, 2007, Norlainie filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of
Certificate of Candidacy.
 The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of Norlainie’s
certificate of candidacy.
 The First Division of Comelec granted the petition filed by Malik and
disqualifying Mohammad from running as municipal mayor of
Pantar, Lanao del Norte for failing to satisfy the one year residency
requirement and for not being a registered voter of the said place.
 Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as
substitute candidate for Mohammad.
 Malik filed a second petition for disqualification against Norlainie.
After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning candidate and
accordingly took her oath and assumed office.
 On September 4, 2007, the Second Division of Comelec disqualified
Norlainie on three grounds: lack of the one-year residency
requirement; not being a registered voter of the municipality; and,
nullity of her certificate of candidacy for having been filed at a place
other than the Office of the Election Officer.
o Norlainie’s domicile of origin was in Maguing, Lanao del
Norte, which is her place of birth. When she got married,
she became a resident of Marawi City, specifically, in
Barangay Rapasun where her husband served as Barangay
Chairman until November 2006.
o This is her domicile by operation of law pursuant to the
Family Code as applied in the case of Larrazabal v.
Comelec (G.R. No. 100739, September 3, 1991).
ISSUE WON Comelec gravely abused its discretion in proceeding to resolve the
petition despite the approval of petitioner’s withdrawal of certificate of
candidacy.
RULING  The petition lacks merit.
 The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily
render the certificate void ab initio.
 Thus, when petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on March 29,
2007, such act produced legal effects, and the withdrawal of the
same, despite the approval of the Comelec, did not bar or render
nugatory the legal proceedings it had set in motion. As such, the
Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled on
the merits of the petition despite the withdrawal of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy.
 In the instant case, although petitioner withdrew her first certificate
of candidacy, the subsequent disqualification of her husband
required that she file a new certificate of candidacy as a substitute
candidate. The second filing of a certificate of candidacy thus once
again put her qualifications in issue. Hence, a ruling upon the same
is necessary.
 The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-
year residency requirement.
 The manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions
and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community.
 For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one
of intention.
 In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to
remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. A
person’s "domicile" once established is considered to continue and
will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
 In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
 We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioner’s domicile of
origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is also her place of birth;
and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is
Rapasun, Marawi City.
 The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioner’s husband, effected
the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only
on November 11, 2006.
 Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one
legal residence, then it follows that petitioner effected the change of
her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the
Family Code provide:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may
exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter
should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(Emphasis ours)
 Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a
separate residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to
prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is
proper and is in consonance with human experience.
 Page 247 of 320
2 G.R. No. 139789            July 19, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP,
JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA
K. ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
DOCTRIN
E FACTS
FACTS  On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so
lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a
petition with the Court of Appeals 1 for habeas corpus to have
custody of her husband in consortium.
 CA – dismissed the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.
 On May 12, 2000, SC dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for
lack of merit.
 On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to
reconsider the Court's order of January 31 , 2001.
 Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles
68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses,
they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and
care for each other.
ISSUE
RULING  We deny Erlinda’s MR.
 The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction
therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce
consortium.
 Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda
and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972.
We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process.
 Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship
with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.
3 G.R. No. 139789.         May 12, 2000
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and
SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents.
G.R. No. 139808.        May 12, 2000
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA
ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
 Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
 On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted
matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years.
 In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons.
 On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
She alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see
and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo City.
 CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with
her in conjugal bliss?
RULING  No.
 Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling
may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
 A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where
the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom.
 The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
 To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
 The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not
merely nominal or moral.
 The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention
 Page 248 of 320
or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would
justify the issuance of the writ.
 No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband
to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of
a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to
the man and woman’s free choice.
4 G.R. No. 114791 May 29, 1997
NANCY GO AND ALEX GO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HERMOGENES ONG and JANE C. ONG,
respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
DOCTRIN No less than the Constitution commands us to protect marriage as an
E inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family. In our society,
the importance of a wedding ceremony cannot be underestimated as it is the
matrix of the family and, therefore, an occasion worth reliving in the
succeeding years.
FACTS  Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were
married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City.
 The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a
contract price of P1,650.00.
 Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape
of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the
United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice
they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The
parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon private
respondents' return.
 When private respondents came home from their honeymoon,
however, they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners
and therefore, could no longer be delivered.
ISSUE WON RTC erred in ruling that the petitioners are liable.
RULING  The petition is not meritorious.
 Petitioners' argument that since the video equipment used belonged
to Lim and thus the contract was actually entered into between
private respondents and Lim is not deserving of any serious
consideration. In the instant case, the contract entered into is one of
service, that is, for the video coverage of the wedding. Consequently,
it can hardly be said that the object of the contract was the video
equipment used. The use by petitioners of the video equipment of
another person is of no consequence.
 As correctly observed by CA, it is contrary to human nature for any
newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their
wedding; the fact that private respondents filed a case against
petitioners belies such assertion.
 Clearly, petitioners are guilty of actionable delay for having failed to
process the video tape.
 Considering that private respondents were about to leave for the
United States, they took care to inform petitioners that they would
just claim the tape upon their return two months later. Thus, the
erasure of the tape after the lapse of thirty days was unjustified.
 In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who
in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence
or delay, and those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages."
 In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into
a contract whereby, for a fee, the former undertook to cover the
latter's wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event.
 For whatever reason, petitioners failed to provide private
respondents with their tape. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of
contravening their obligation to said private respondents and are
thus liable for damages.
 Petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the trial and appellate
courts holding him jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy
regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed. He argues that when his
wife entered into the contract with private respondent, she was
acting alone for her sole interest.
 We find merit in this contention.
 Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family
Code), the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in
business without the consent of the husband.
 In the instant case, we are convinced that it was only petitioner
Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent.
Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents
for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that
contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute
them.
5 G.R. No. 80116             June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA
IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
 Page 249 of 320
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
 Respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He
claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had
been living apart since April, 1982.
 Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is
still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866.
 On January 15, 1986, the Federal Republic of Germany promulgated
a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner.
 The records show that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the
dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized
by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
 More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that,
while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair.
ISSUE WON private respondent qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a
final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint.
RULING  We find this petition meritorious.
 Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, only the offended
spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action
therefor.
 Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action.
 We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time
the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery
case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
 In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons.
 Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
 When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously
knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to
protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
 The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect the other.
6 [G.R. No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.]
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.,
as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City, and RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen
of the United States
They were married in Hongkong in 1972
After the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines
They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively
In 1982, the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States
Petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn
In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property
Petitioner moved to dismiss: cause of action is barred by previous judgment
in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June
11, 1982
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss
Petitioner’s contentions:
1. respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community
of property
2. Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds
3. Respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment
Respondent’s contentions:
1. Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
 Page 250 of 320
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy
2. acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same
is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction
ISSUE What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines?
RULING There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of
the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as
an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner,
as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case
is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and public policy.
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
As private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.
V. A.
1 [G.R. No. 200180. June 6, 2016.]
BENJAMIN H. CABAÑEZ, petitioner, vs. MARIE JOSEPHINE CORDERO
SOLANO A.K.A. MA. JOSEPHINE S. CABAÑEZ, respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Subject of the present controversy are two (2) parcels of land located in
Alabang Hills, Muntinlupa, with land areas measuring 739 and 421 square
meters, and are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 154626 and
154627, respectively. Appearing on the face of these titles as the registered
owner is herein respondent, "Maria Josephine S. Cabañez, of legal age,
married to [herein petitioner] Benjamin H. Cabañez"
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City a
"Petition for Correction of the Name and Marital Status of the Registered
Owner of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No[s.] 154626 and 154627 of the
Registry of Deeds for Muntinlupa City."
Respondents alleged the following:
Petitioner is of legal age, single and a resident of #21 Doña Ines St., Alabang
Hills Village, Muntinlupa City
Petitioner is the owner of two parcels of land
Petitioner erroneously made it
appear that she is married to Mr. Benjamin when in truth and in fact they are
not married but merely living a common-law relationship
Mr. Benjamin H. Cabanez is actually married to a certain Leandra D. Cabanez
who had previously filed a case against Petitioner, questioning the ownership
of the said properties which case however was terminated by virtue of a
compromise
Mr. Benjamin H. Cabanez has also declared that he is not actually married to
the Petitioner and that he has no interest or share whatsoever in the aforesaid
properties
No interests or rights will be affected by the correction of the name and status
of Petitioner as registered owner of the said properties
RTC Ruling: Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City is directed to cause the
correction of the name and civil status of the registered owner of Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 154626 and 154627 from MA. JOSEPHINE S.
CABANEZ, married to BENJAMIN H. CABANEZ, to MARIE JOSEPHINE C.
SOLANO, single.
CA Ruling: respondent's petition for correction of her name and marital
status as appearing in the subject TCTs should have been published in
accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and that respondent failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove compliance with such requirement.
Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending, among
others, that the provisions of PD 1529, and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
should be applied in the present case.
CA Resolution: agreed with respondent and ruled that PD 1529 is the
governing law and that there is nothing under the pertinent provisions of the
said law which states that publication is a requirement for the RTC to acquire
jurisdiction over respondent's petition.
 Page 251 of 320
ISSUE
RULING Under settled jurisprudence, the enumerated instances for amendment of
alteration of a certificate of title under Section 108 of PD 1529 are non-
controversial in nature. They are limited to issues so patently insubstantial as
not to be genuine issues. The proceedings thereunder are summary in nature,
contemplating insertions of mistakes which are only clerical, but certainly not
controversial issues.
In the present case, the Court notes that in a separate action for annulment of
title and recovery of ownership filed by petitioner's wife against respondent,
the RTC made a categorical finding that petitioner and his wife are the lawful
owners of the subject properties and ordering respondent to surrender
possession thereof to the said spouses. Respondent, on the other hand, claims
that she together with petitioner and his wife subsequently executed an
amicable settlement which was approved by the RTC, wherein petitioner's
wife waived her rights and interests over the said properties. Petitioner
executed an Affidavit of Declaration against Interest indicating that he has no
right or interest over the subject properties.
There is no question that there is a serious objection and an adverse claim on
the part of an interested party as shown by petitioner's subsequent execution
of his Affidavit of Non-Waiver of Interest. The absence of unanimity among
the parties is also evidenced by petitioner's petition seeking the annulment of
the RTC Decision which granted respondent's petition for correction of
entries in the subject TCTs. A complete determination of the issues in the
present case can only be achieved if petitioner and his wife are impleaded in
an adversarial proceeding.
Changes in the citizenship of a person or in his status from legitimate to
illegitimate or from married to not married are substantial as well as
controversial, which can only be established in an appropriate adversary
proceeding as a remedy for the adjudication of real and justifiable
controversies involving actual conflict of rights the final determination of
which depends upon the resolution of issues of nationality, paternity, filiation
or legitimacy of the marital status for which existing substantive and
procedural laws as well as other rules of court amply provide.
Before the trial court can alter the description of the civil status of respondent
in the transfer certificates of title in question, it will have to receive evidence
of and determine respondent's civil status. This requires a full dress trial
rendering the summary proceedings envisaged in Section 108 of PD 1529
inadequate.
2 [G.R. No. L-26399. January 31, 1981.]
FERNANDO MARTINEZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. FLORENCIA
EVANGELISTA, oppositor-appellee.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Fernando Martinez filed a petition to change his civil status appearing in
three land certificates of title registered in his name from "married to
Florencia Evangelista" to "single", alleging that the description was inserted
due to a clerical error and oversight. The petition was filed in a land
registration case under the summary and administrative proceedings
provided for in Section 112 of Act 496. Florencia Evangelista opposed the
petition and submitted that the insertion of the description
was voluntary. The records shows that basis for the description appearing in
the certificates of title was petitioner Martinez's application for registration of
lands covered by the titles in his name wherein he stated under oath that he
was married to Florencia Evangelista; and that from 1946 to 1956 petitioner
consistently maintained under oath in various official documents that
Florencia was his wife. The trial court denied the petition.
ISSUE Whether the opposition of Florencia Evangelista to the petition to strike out
the phrase "married to Florencia Evangelista" in the transfer certificates of
title in question and placing in lieu thereof the word "single" to describe the
civil status of the petitioner is a serious or adverse claim which would bring
the case outside the jurisdiction of the land registration court and thus
preclude an award of relief under Sec. 112 of Act 496.
RULING Oppositor contends that the said insertion was caused by no reason of clerical
error or oversight but by the voluntary act of the petitioner shown by the
following instances:
1. Fernando Martinez filed a petition dated January 18, 1946 in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, in G. L. R. O. No. 4004, praying
that the three certificates of title in question be issued in his name.
In that petition, he stated under oath that he was "Fernando
Martinez, of legal age, Filipino, married to Florencia Evangelista,
and a resident of 422 Isabel, Sampaloc, Manila."
2. On November 28, 1952, he executed a mortgage on two of the
properties covered by the transfer certificates of title in question in
favor of the Philippine National Bank wherein he swore to the fact
that he was married to Florencia Evangelista.
3. Petitioner-appellant and oppositor-appellee, as spouses, executed an
additional mortgage in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation on the same properties.
4. In the income tax returns filed by the petitioner-appellant in 1958
and 1959, it appears that he is married to Florencia Evangelista.
It is thus seen that the petitioner-appellant had consistently maintained
under oath that the oppositor-appellee, Florencia Evangelista, is his wife.
These overt and voluntary acts of the petitioner-appellant give rise to the
conclusion that he and the oppositor-appellee are married. He had expressly
alleged that he is married to the oppositor-appellee, Florencia Evangelista.
It is now apparent that before the Court of First Instance of Manila, sitting as
a land registration court, can alter the description of the civil status of the
 Page 252 of 320
petitioner-appellant in the transfer certificates of title in question, it will have
to receive evidence of and determine the civil status of the petitioner-
appellant. This requires a full dress trial rendering the summary proceeding
envisaged in Sec. 112 of Act 496 inadequate.
The question to be resolved in the instant petition is controversial in nature
and that there exists an adverse claim or serious opposition on the part of a
party-in-interest, the oppositor-appellee, Florencia Evangelista. It being so,
the petition should be dismissed.
3 [G.R. No. 164201. December 10, 2012.]
EFREN PANA, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE
JUANITE, JR., respondents.
DOCTRIN
E property relation all conjugal partnership of gains that existed before 1988
FACTS The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and
others of murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City.
The RTC rendered a consolidated decision acquitting Efren of the charge for
insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as
charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death.
On appeal to this Court, it affirmed the conviction of both accused but
modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the
issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the
names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of
sale on execution were issued.
Petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not
paraphernal assets of Melecia. The RTC denied the motion. The spouses
moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same.
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains, given that they were married prior to the enactment of
the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.
Although the heirs of the deceased victims do not dispute that it was the Civil
Code, not the Family Code, which governed the marriage, they insist that it
was the system of absolute community of property that applied to Efren and
Melecia.
None of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights have been acquired
by each over the properties of the community. Hence, the liabilities imposed
on the accused-spouse may properly be charged against the community as
heretofore discussed.
Efren and Melecia's property relation was admittedly conjugal under the Civil
Code but, since the transitory provision of the Family Code gave its provisions
retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, that property
relation between the couple was changed when the Family Code took effect in
1988. The latter code now prescribes in Article 75 absolute community of
property for all marriages unless the parties entered into a prenuptial
agreement.
ISSUE WON the CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren
and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia's
civil liability in the murder case.
RULING To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal
liability is chargeable against the properties of the marriage, the Court has
first to identify the spouses' property relations.
While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets
are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights
in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not
intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of
excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot
be modified except prior to marriage.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the
marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot
be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where:
1. the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and
liquidated upon a decree of legal separation;
2. the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to
revive their former property regime;
3. Judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a
spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with
his obligations to the family;
4. there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the
spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains.
None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
Under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil
Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property
and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund.
This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of
ownership over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically
change the marriage settlements of couples who got married under the Civil
Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code
took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate
properties.
The RTC cannot take advantage of the spouses' loose admission that absolute
community of property governed their property relation since the record
shows that they had been insistent that their property regime is one of
conjugal partnership of gains. No evidence of a prenuptial agreement between
them has been presented.
The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were
 Page 253 of 320
married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of gains.
The Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or
not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for
the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC's finding that Melecia has no exclusive
property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision
in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code
have been covered.
Contrary to Efren's contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the
criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership
assets even before these are liquidated.
B.
1 [G.R. No. 122134. October 3, 2003.]
ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA,
petitioners, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by
JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF
PANGASINAN, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E was clearly time-barred. Even following petitioners' theory that the
FACTS Petitioners, Romania and daughter Constancia, filed an action for annulment
of titles covering subject parcels of land in 1985 or more than forty (40) years
from the execution of the deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of the
respondents in 1944.
As early as May 15, 1970, the deed of donation was registered and transfer
certificate of title was issued in respondents' name. Petitioners also had actual
knowledge of the donation propter nuptias of subject parcels of land when a
deed of partition among the heirs was executed in 1973 and when a
compromise agreement was forged in 1976, but they never questioned the
donation propter nuptias on both occasions. Petitioners assailed the
genuineness of the donation propter nuptias and claimed there was lack of
compliance with the prescribed mandatory form requirements.
ISSUE 1. WON the donation propter nuptias is authentic;
2. WON acceptance of the donation by the donees is required;
3. If so, in what form should the acceptance appear, and
4. WON the action is barred by prescription and laches.
RULING Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason
of marriage are those "made before its celebration, in consideration of the
same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses." The distinction is
crucial because the two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the
same rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites. Under the
Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public
instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.
However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that "acceptance is not
necessary to the validity of such gifts." In other words, the celebration of the
marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the
prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under
the Old Civil Code. Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article
127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated
by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the
Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be
in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express
acceptance "is not necessary for the validity of these donations." Thus,
implied acceptance is sufficient.
Viewing petitioners' action for reconveyance from whatever feasible legal
angle, it is definitely barred by prescription. Petitioners' right to file an action
for the reconveyance of the land accrued in 1944, when the Inventario Ti
Sagut was executed. It must be remembered that before the effectivity of the
New Civil Code in 1950, the Old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190)
governed prescription. Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an action for
recovery of the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein,
can only be brought within ten years after the cause of such action accrues.
Thus, petitioners' action, which was filed on December 23, 1985, or more than
forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of donation on May 22, 1944,
prescriptive period should commence from the time of discovery of the
alleged fraud, the conclusion would still be the same. As early as May 15,
1970, when the deed of donation was registered and the transfer certificate of
title was issued, petitioners were considered to have constructive knowledge
of the alleged fraud, following the jurisprudential rule that registration of a
deed in the public real estate registry is constructive notice to the whole world
of its contents, as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein.
As it is now settled that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
property allegedly registered through fraud is ten (10) years, reckoned from
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, the action filed on December
23, 1985 has clearly prescribed.
In any event, independent of prescription, petitioners' action is dismissible on
the ground of laches. The elements of laches are present in this case. Of the
facts which support the finding of laches, stress should be made of the
following: (a) the petitioners Romana unquestionably gained actual
knowledge of the donation propter nuptias when the deed of partition was
executed in 1973 and the information must have surfaced again when the
compromise agreement was forged in 1976, and; (b) as petitioner Romana
was a party signatory to the two documents, she definitely had the
opportunity to question the donation propter nuptias on both occasions, and
she should have done so if she were of the mindset, given the fact that she was
still in possession of the land in dispute at the time. But she did not make any
move. She tarried for eleven (11) more years from the execution of the deed of
partition until she, together with petitioner Constancia, filed the annulment
 Page 254 of 320
case in 1985.
2 [G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001.]
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA.
DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C.
TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C.
TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A.
COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
DOCTRIN ID.; ID.; ID.; DONATION MADE IN FAVOR OF A COMMON-LAW SPOUSE
E IS VOID UNDER THE FAMILY CODE; CASE AT BAR — Cirila admitted that
she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time. It is very possible
that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco
therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the
very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a
relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to
husband and wife. Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle
told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila and
Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented
documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As
previously stated, these are an application for a business permit to operate as
a real estate lessor, a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a
health certificate, and the death certificate of Francisco. These documents
show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she
would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by
Francisco's lessees in "ErlindaTabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and
Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees
referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact
that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's
common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under
the law. It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him
out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that
she was Francisco's common-law spouse. Respondents having proven by a
preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that
the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code. I
FACTS Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco
Comille, then a widower, asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the latter's cousin,
Luzviminda Paghacian, and petitioner Cirila Arcaba to take care of his house,
as well as the store inside. A few months before his death, Francisco executed
an instrument denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," in which he
ceded a portion of his lot consisting of 150 square meters, together with his
house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for declaration of nullity of a
deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages.
Respondents, who are Francisco's nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of
Francisco, and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship
between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were
lovers since they slept in the same room, while Erlinda Tabancura, another
niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his
mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could
enter the master's bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that
Francisco in any case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual
intercourse. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents,
holding the donation void under the provision of the Family Code. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
present petition.
ISSUE validity of donation made in favor of common law wife
RULING Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
3 [G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997.]
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V.
PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondent
DOCTRIN CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT
E MARRIAGE; PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION BY BOTH PARTIES,
REQUIRED; ABSENCE THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. — The provision of law
applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted
marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the
latter's de facto separation. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual jointcontribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts
in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is
not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares. Even assuming that the subject property was bought before
cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual
contribution would still be essential. Since petitioner failed to prove that she
contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan,
Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the
 Page 255 of 320
same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel
and private respondent Carlina Palang.
ID.; ID.; SEPARATION OF PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE; JUDICIAL ORDER, REQUIRED. — Separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial
order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in
the marriage settlements. [Article 134 of the Family Code] The judgment
which resulted from the parties' compromise was not specifically and
expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
ID.; ID.; DONATION; BETWEEN PERSONS GUILTY OF ADULTERY OR
CONCUBINAGE; VOID; RATIONALE; CASE AT BAR. — With respect to the
house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on
September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the
notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals
the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel
Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda's
name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was properly a donation
made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by
express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the
Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that
the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations
between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn
out to be better than those in legal union
FACTS Miguel Palang married on July 16, 1949. It was his first marriage. Their only
child, Herminia, was born on May 12, 1950.
On July 15, 1973, Miguel, then 63 years old, contracted his second marriage
with Erlinda Agapay, 19, herein petitioner. Two months earlier, Miguel and
Erlinda purchased a piece of riceland. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736
was issued in their names.
C.
On September 23, 1975, a house and lot was purchased allegedly by Erlinda as
the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 was later issued in her name.
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristoper A. Palang, born
on December 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
concubinage upon Carlina' s complaint. Two years later, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la
Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted an action for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. Private
respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
After trial on the merits, the lower court dismissed the complaint declaring
that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to
the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this
petition.
The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The
application law is Art. 148 of the Family Code on the cohabitation of a man
and a woman under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The
marriage of Miguel and Erlinda was patently void because the earlier
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting. Under Art. 148, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Actual contribution
is required by this provision, in contrast to Art. 147. If the actual contribution
of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption
of equal shares. Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to
the purchase price ,of the riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-
ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should
revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and
private respondent Carlina Palang.
As regards Kristopher Palang's heirship and filiation, the same should be
ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for
the purpose, and cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for
recovery of ownership and possession.
ISSUE recovery of ownership and possession of riceland and the house and lot
allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner
RULING The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
1 [G.R. No. 193038. March 11, 2015.]
JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, petitioner, vs. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Sometime in 1988 when the parties were still engaged, Shirley was working as
a domestic helper in Israel. Upon the request of Rogelio, Shirley sent him
money 5(5) for the purchase of a residential lot in Marikina where they had
planned to eventually build their home. Rogelio was then also working abroad
 Page 256 of 320
as a seaman. The following year, or on September 13, 1989, Rogelio
purchased the subject house. Shirley claims that upon her arrival in the
Philippines sometime in 1989, she settled the balance.  On October 19, 1989,
TCT No. 171963 9(9) over the subject property was issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Marikina, Rizal solely under the name of Rogelio.
Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married to Rogelio A. Nuega
(Rogelio) on September 1, 1990. While overseas, she received information
that Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica Escobar, into the
family home
In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage
and another for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property
Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention of selling the subject property.
Shirley then advised the interested buyers — one of whom was their neighbor
and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) — of the existence of the cases
that she had filed against Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the
subject property until the cases are closed and terminated. Nonetheless,
under a Deed of Absolute Sale 11(11) dated December 29, 1992, Rogelio sold
the subject property to petitioner without Shirley's consent
1994, the RTC granted the petition for legal separation and ordered the
dissolution and liquidation of the regime of absolute community of property
between Shirley and Rogelio
1996, Shirley instituted a Complaint 15(15) for Rescission of Sale and
Recovery of Property against petitioner and Rogelio; judgment  in favor of
plaintiff Shirley Nuega; Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 December 1992 is
hereby declared null and void in its entirety, and defendant-appellant
Josefina V. Nobleza is ordered to reconvey the entire subject property to
plaintiff-appellee Shirley B. Nuega and defendant Rogelio Nuega
ISSUE Disposition of property Without consent or authority of the other spouse
RULING we rule that the appellate court did not err when it declared that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 is void in its entirety.
Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides: Art. 91. Unless otherwise
provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community
property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of
the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the
absolute community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the
marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the
Family Code, which states:
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse,
and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly
provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the
community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry
shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any,
of such property.
As held in Quiao v. Quiao: When a couple enters into a regime of absolute
community, the husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the
properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded
under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's
properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that
common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs,
equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the
value each one may have originally owned
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided
in Article 92, it therefore forms part of the absolute community property of
Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its
acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's
name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the
spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
Under Article 96 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The Family
Code of the Philippines, the said disposition of a communal property is void
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly…. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void
It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family Code that Rogelio could
not sell the subject property without the written consent of respondent or the
authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the entire sale is voi
including the portion of the subject property pertaining to defendant Rogelio
who contracted the sale with defendant-appellant Josefina.
2 [G.R. No. 188289. August 20, 2014.]
DAVID A. NOVERAS, petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
 Page 257 of 320
FACTS David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the
Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the
USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia
filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal properties.
RTC rendered judgment
-absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared
DISSOLVED
-The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the
Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras
only, with the properties in the United States of America remaining in the sole
ownership of petitioner Leticia Novera
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's Decision by
directing the equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses
ISSUE ownership of conjugal properties upon judicial separation
RULING At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which
severed the bond of marriage between the parties. The requirements of
presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner
must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the
Rules of Court
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The
required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent
California law on divorce were not presented. Absent a valid recognition of
the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the
Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made
before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed
provided that the modification is judicially approved and refers only to the
instances provided in Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of
property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial
separation of property
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to
comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact
for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this
case to necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of
Article 135 of the Family Code
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had
indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is
undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha
Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the
Consent for Operation form. 20(20) Third and more significantly, they had
filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least
one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of
property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property
automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th
paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under
Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the
absolute community regime and the following procedure should apply:
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed,
Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the
share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines
3 [G.R. No. 176556. July 4, 2012.]
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, petitioner, vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C.
QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by
their mother RITA QUIAO, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
 Page 258 of 320
FACTS -2000, respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation
against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).
-2005, RTC rendered a Decision declaring the legal separation; Further,
except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all
the remaining properties shall be divided equally between herein
[respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of the
children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities; [Petitioner's]
share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children
-the petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses
is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil
Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: "All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife." 60(61) Thus, since he is one of the owners
of the properties covered by the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested
right over half of the said properties, even after the promulgation of the
Family Code; and he insisted that no provision under the Family Code may
deprive him of this vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code
which prohibits retroactive application of the Family Code when it will
prejudice a person's vested right.
ISSUE IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT LIQUIDATION OF THE
COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF
THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125
(SIC) OF THE FAMILY CODE?
RULING Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the
parties' property relation is governed by the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains.
Article 129 (7) of the Family Code applies in this case
First, petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977.
Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the
Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a
marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains. And under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their
work or industry." 56(57) The husband and wife also own in common all the
property of the conjugal partnership of gains.
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon
absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements,
or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the
respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code and the
applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets
and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to
Article 63 (2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because
according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other law."
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common
properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited
them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63 (2) and 129 of the Family
Code?
We respond in the negative
while one may not be deprived of his "vested right," he may lose the same if
there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. the
alleged deprivation of the petitioner's "vested right" is one founded, not only
in the provisions of the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This
provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the
guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her
share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the
children of both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property came mostly or
entirely from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from
the fruits of the separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not
apply.
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the
fruits of the separate properties of the spouses and the products of
their labor and industry
the definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer to Article 102 (4) of the
Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the
net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No.
(2), Article 102 (4) applies. In this provision, net profits "shall be the increase
in value between the market valueof the community property at the time of
the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution."
 Page 259 of 320
Article 102 (4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community
regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code, the
difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution
On Absolute Community Regime:
When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband
and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the marriage.
Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired
during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family
Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the
couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the
parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, an
inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and
obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute
community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the
separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered to
each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net assets,
which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.
On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
Article 102 (4) of the Family Code applies in the instant case for purposes
only of defining "net profit." the definition of "netprofits" in Article 102
(4) of the Family Code applies to both the absolute communityregime and
conjugal partnership regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) ofthe
Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal Separationwhen a couple
enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142
of the Civil Code, "the husband and the wife place in common fundthe fruits
of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and
divideequally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the
net gains orbenefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage."
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the Family
Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the couple's
properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to
wit:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the
conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal
debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal
partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds
in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property,
the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of
the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or
deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to
either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from
the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute
the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements
or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as
provided in this Code. aHESCT
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered
upon the partition in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have
chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no
such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children.
In the instant case,
a. the trial court found that the couple has no separate
properties when they married. 79(80) Rather, the trial court identified
the following conjugal properties
b.    Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership
during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal
partnership; 81(82) and if the community is enriched at the expense of the
separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such
properties to their respective owners shall be made
c.     Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the debts of the
conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of the spouses
shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But if the conjugal
partnership is not
sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the spouses with their separate
properties shall be solidarily liable
d. In the instant case, since it was already established by the
 Page 260 of 320
trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, 85(86)
there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above
are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what
remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs. 86(87) However, since the trial court
found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to
Article 63 (2) of the Family Code.
In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the petitioner is
not entitled to any property at all
4 LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO, petitioners,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO and
VITTORIO C. ROMERO, respondents
DOCTRIN
E accusing a
FACTS Petitioners allege that upon their father's death on 18 October 1974, their
mother, respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian.
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several
Deeds
of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are purportedly conjugal
properties of
their parents. Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their
brother Vittorio —
through fraud, misrepresentation and duress — succeeded in registering the
above-mentioned properties in his name through Deeds of Sale executed by
their
mother, Aurora.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Respondents filed their
Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long after the
death of
their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered
conjugal. They allege that the lots were paraphernal properties of Aurora.
RTC dismissed the complaint and CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE whether or not petitioners in this case may file a separate civil action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of title despite the pendency of the
settlement proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero.
RULING The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in the present case.
While it is true that a probate court's determination of ownership over
properties which may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature,
this rule
is applicable only as between the representatives of the estate and strangers
thereto.
The issue before the court is not really one of title or ownership,
but the determination of which particular properties should be included in
the
inventory of the estate. Determination of whether a property is conjugal or
paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with
the probate court:
Petitioners believe that Sec 3 rule 87  is subject to certain exceptions. They
invoke the doctrine that while heirs have no standing in court to sue for the
recovery
of property of the estate represented by an administrator, these heirs may
maintain
such action if the administrator is unwilling to bring the suit, or has allegedly
participated in the act complained of.
On this contention, petitioners' theory must again fail. There is nothing on the
record that would prove that Aurora defied the orders of the probate court or
entered
into sale agreements in violation of her trust. In fact, petitioners are really
co-heir, their brother Vittorio, of having acquired certain properties which
they allege
to be properties of their parents.
Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, part of the estate,
Aurora Romero's acts as the administrator of the estate are subject to the sole
jurisdiction of the probate court.
Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly orchestrated by
petitioners' co-heir, Vittorio, can only be determined by the probate court,
because it is
the probate court which is empowered to identify the nature of the property,
and that
has jurisdiction over Aurora's actions and dispositions as administrator
Denied.
5 LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan,
Zamboanga Del Norte; THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
SHERIFF, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte; THE
CLERK OF COURT OF MANILA, as Ex-Officio Sheriff; and
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondents
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership to engage in the
 Page 261 of 320
marketing of liquefied petroleum ga and was registered as a sole
proprietorship in the name of Jacinto.
After Jacinto's death in 1989, his widow, petitioner Cecilia Sunga, and
married
daughter, petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the business
without Chua's
consent. Chua's subsequent repeated demands for accounting and winding up
went
unheeded, prompting him to file a Complaint for Winding Up of a
Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
Damages
with Writ of Preliminary Attachment
RTC judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. the RTC granted Chua's
motion for execution against petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan.
ISSUE Whether or not the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth
Sunga Chan with her husband Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer
for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under the judgment
RULING The fact that the levied parcel of land is a conjugal or community
property, as the case may be, of spouses Norberto and Sunga-Chan does not
per se
vitiate the levy and the consequent sale of the property. Verily, said property
is not
among those exempted from execution.
records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were
married on February 4, 1992, or after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3,
1988. Withal, their absolute community property may be held liable for the
obligations contracted by either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94, provides that
absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(1) . . .
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both
spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other.
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited.
(Emphasis ours).
Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner
Sunga-Chan of the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued
on May
30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her
husband's
benefit.
D.
D1.
1 MELECIO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES GENARO
MOLINA and ELENA B. MOLINA, substituted by ESTER
MOLINA, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property
in Camiling, Tarlac. During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the
respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina (spouses Molina). 10 years
after Flora died, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses
Molina. Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora filed a Complaint
for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against the
spouses Molina claiming that Anastacio could not
have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora's
consent, as
Flora was already dead and spouses Molina falsified the document.
The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the
subject
property to answer for his debts and told the spouses Molina that they already
own
half of the land. The spouses Molina also asserted that Melecio knew of the
disputed sale since he accompanied Anastacio several times to borrow money.
RTC dismissed the case. CA affirmed.
ISSUE W/N the sale of land belonging to the conjugal partnership without the wife's
consent is invalid.
RULING Anastacio and Flora's conjugal partnership was dissolved upon Flora's death.
Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership upon death of a spouse and prohibits any disposition or
encumbrance of
the conjugal property prior to the conjugal partnership liquidation without
prejudice to vested rights.
An implied co-ownership among Flora's heirs governed the conjugal
properties pending liquidation and partition. Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner,
cannot claim title to any specific portion. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the
right to freely sell and dispose of
his undivided interest in the subject property. Thus, the spouses Molina
became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest.
Melecio's recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the
subject property, is an action for partition
Affirmed..
 Page 262 of 320
2 VIRGINIA OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E exists between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages.
FACTS Petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo on the ground of
psychological incapacity. RTC granted. Trial court rendered the assailed
Order 6(6) stating that the properties declared by the parties belong to each
one of them on a 50-50 sharing. Virginia appealed but was denied.
ISSUE whether
respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of
gains by
reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
RULING While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16, 1978, it is
still the Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships, however, which will
govern
the property relations between Deogracio and Virginia even if they were
married
before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall
apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without
prejudice
to vested rights.
If the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is
that they are conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party claiming
that they
are not conjugal.
The applicable law, in liquidation is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation
to Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Court held that in a void marriage, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148
for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and
wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage
is void, as
in the instant case.
In the liquidation and partition of the property that they
owned in common, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code
should aptly
prevail. The rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the
absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for
valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that
Thus, the trial court and the appellate court correctly held that the parties will
share on equal shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that the
properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.
All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in
whose name the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal unless
proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the
certificate of title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one
of the spouses only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption
remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the
spouses."
Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were
obtained by the spouses' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly
owned by
them in equal shares. Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses'
properties on
the basis of co-ownership, as ordered by the RTC and the appellate court,
should be
affirmed, and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
3 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. JOSE GARCIA and
CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA, JR., BOBBY
GARCIA and JIMMY GARCIA and HEIRS OF ROGELIO
GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA,
ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA, HEHERSON GARCIA,
GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA and JANE GARCIA,
respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS a parcel of residential land is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title T-44422
under the name of Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.) who acquired the subject
property during his marriage with Ligaya Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21,
1987. Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses
Garcia) obtained a loan facility from the petitioner, Philippine National Bank
and was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their property covered by
TCT No. 177585. The loan was increased and secured by the subject property
covered by TCT No. T-44422. The spouses Garcia failed to pay.
The respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Nullity of the
Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage,against the spouses Garcia and the
petitioner bank. They claimed that the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage
 Page 263 of 320
was null and void as to respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy as they
were not parties to the contract. The respondents alleged that the subject
property was a conjugal property of
Jose Sr. and his deceased spouse, Ligaya, such that upon Ligaya's death, Jose
Sr., together with his children Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, by law,
became owners pro indiviso. The RTC dismissed the complaint and held that
the subject property was a conjugal property since it was acquired by Jose Sr.
during his marriage. one-half of the property passed on to Jose Sr., while the
other half went to Jose and his children as co-owners and as forced heirs of
his deceased spouse. Without the consent of the children, the trial court ruled
that the conjugal property could only be transferred or encumbered to the
extent of Jose Sr.'s share in the conjugal partnership, plus his share as an heir
in the other half pertaining to the estate of his deceased spouse. CA affirmed.
ISSUE W/N subject property registered in the name of Jose Sr. alone, who was
described in
the title as "widower" and not "married." is conjugal
RULING The Subject Property is Conjugal. All property acquired during marriage is
presumed conjugal. Because of the petitioner bank's failure to rebut the
allegation that the subject property was acquired during the former's
marriage to Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property applies.
Registration of the subject property in the name of one spouse does not
destroy the presumption that the property is conjugal. Registration of a
property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its
conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the property was acquired.
9(9)
The registration of the property is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive
ownership
of the husband or the wife. Although the property appears to be registered in
the name
of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal property if it was
acquired for
valuable consideration during marriage.
In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the property, the
petitioner
must present strong, clear and convincing evidence of exclusive ownership of
one of
the spouses.
The successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided under Article 777 of the
Civil Code, which states that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent." The conjugal partnership was
converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership upon the death of Ligaya.
This resulting ordinary co-ownership among the heirs is governed by Article
493 which provides that the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Under this provision, each
co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share
in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it except
when
personal rights are involved.
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject
property after the death of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. While under Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had the
right to
freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed property,
he could
not dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his children's consent.
The right of the petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited though only to the
portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr.
Affirmed.
4 G.R. No. 195670               December 3, 2012
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March
29, 1980. After several years, the RTC declared the nullity of their marriage
on the basis of the former’s psychological incapacity as contemplated in
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying for
the distribution of the described properties claimed to have been acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage.
Respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential
houses, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during
their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to
purchase said properties out of her personal funds and by way of inheritance.
She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to the
fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her
own money. Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for
 Page 264 of 320
dissolution.
Petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the
name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he
received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent
did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed
that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.
Respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots
came exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from
selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware. She
further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in 1996,
petitioner transferred to their second house and brought along with him
certain personal properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders,
clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and equipment have a total cost of
P500,000.00.
RTC – Dissolved the parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of
land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in
favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on
Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the
complaint which were brought out by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are
hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses are hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the
respondent since these were acquired during their marital union and since
there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential
units.
CA – Affirmed in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC. The CA stressed the
fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens
to acquire lands in the Philippines."Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support
his claim for reimbursement.
ISSUE Whether or not petitioner can own properties in the Philippines?
RULING No, but -
In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v.
Helmut Mullerthe Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the
value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut
Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It
held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity
where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite
the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign
citizenship.Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights
of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the
constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of
Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as
the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly
declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless
to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony
and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8,
2009 Decision and January 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
5 G.R. No. 157537               September 7, 2011
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA, namely:
LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN
LORRAINNE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA and ASUNCION,
all surnamed GO, represented by LEONORA B. GO, Petitioners,
vs.
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, Respondents.
DOCTRIN The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving
E spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family
Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by
judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At
any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested
rights.
FACTS On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total
area of 17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr.
(Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr.
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed
under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who
had purchased the two parcels of land (the property).
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio,
Sr. and mother of the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and
his son Rito B. Go (joined by Rito’s wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the
property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio)
for ₱5,686,768.00. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of
the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand. After barangay
proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, they sued Servacio and Rito in the
Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the annulment
of the sale of the property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the
property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between
Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
 Page 265 of 320
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the
property because he had purchased it with his own money.
On October 3, 2002, the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal
property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio,
Sr., because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely:
Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that the participation of Rito and Dina as
vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta; that under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired,
all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal
unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively
to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation was grossly
insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property, holding
that: "xxx As long as the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be
allotted to the other heirs in the final partition of the property, or to state it
plainly, as long as the portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate (sic)
of other heirs, it is valid." Quoting Tolentino’s commentary on the matter as
authority.
ISSUE Whether or not Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; and that
the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without
prior liquidation.
RULING Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of
the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall
be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code,
viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property
relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of
supplementary application.
105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the
rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with theCivil Code or other
laws." This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely
void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had
already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of
the sale.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell
his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for
the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third
person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it
[Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases
where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as
in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action
for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. xxx
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM
the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
6 G.R. No 176556               July 4, 2012
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,
vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C.
QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner
Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal
separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of
Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the
spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of
the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership
is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending
spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period
270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the
Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking
the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of
the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each
[of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common
 Page 266 of 320
children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of
the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the
Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129
of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article
102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUE 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art
129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the
properties in the conjugal partnership– NO.
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of
gains the same with the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute
community? NO.
RULING 1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the
current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case
and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation
to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the
spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the
Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of
the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if
there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First,
he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the
conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner
prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner
and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties.
Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the
petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial
court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.
Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolutecommunity, the
husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those
acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when
the couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is
divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one
may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been
established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided
equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal
separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be
awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal
partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and
the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution
of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing
provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law
does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties
between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the
spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of
them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties
should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.
However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share
from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest
we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there
is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
7 [G.R. No. 185063. July 23, 2009.]
SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA, petitioners, vs.
ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and VILMA B. DE
LEON, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite
and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell
for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City.  On April 24,
 Page 267 of 320
1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had two children, Danilo and
Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of
Bonifacio upon full payment of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on
February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, “single.” On January 12, 1974,
Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The
Deed of Sale did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On
February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita,
Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit alleging that Bonifacio was still
the owner of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to
them was his exclusive property because he was still single when he acquired
it from PHHC.  They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage
between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question
was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE Whether or not the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment
before the marriage although some installments were paid during the
marriage would be considered conjugal property
RULING Yes. The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of
Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio
after he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970.  This full payment
was made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In
effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence,
ownership to the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
8 [G.R. No. 164584. June 22, 2009.]
PHILIP MATTHEWS, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and
JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E trying to own lands through another.
FACTS On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin, a British subject, married Joselyn, a
17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting,
Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a lot (Boracay property). The sale was
allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s
funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the
property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.
All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained
in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister. However, Benjamin and
Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philipps.
On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a SPA in favor of Benjamin, authorizing
the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into
contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a
period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00.
Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort
as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since
it was entered into by Joselyn without Benjamin’s consent, Benjamin
instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner.
Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and
improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was
Joselyn’s husband, any transaction involving said property required his
consent.
ISSUE 1. Whether or not the Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a
Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband is valid
2. Whether or not Benjamin is the actual owner of the property since he
provided the funds used in purchasing the same
RULING Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether
individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of
the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision,
they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose
of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.
Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the
public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least
sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire
public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally
recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional
prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and
petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring
private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn
appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property,
she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain
Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering
into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in
his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no
declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses.
In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
 Page 268 of 320
subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be
declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest
and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer
or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to
have.
9 CAMILO F. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR,
respondent.
DOCTRIN Since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation's land for future
E generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition
of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those
transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is
already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be
no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
FACTS Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, was assigned by his employer, Simmering-
Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro.
Jambrich met Descallar in Cebu. Jambrich and Descallar fell in love and
decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City.
Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro
Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell covering the
properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed
of Absolute Sale was likewise issued in their favor.
However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration
before the Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that
Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public
domain. Consequently, Jambrich's name was erased from the document. But
it could be noted that his signature remained on the left hand margin of page
1, beside respondent's signature as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page
4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title over the properties were
issued in respondent's name alone.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner
was engaged in the real estate business. He also built and repaired speedboats
as a hobby. Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat
from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about
P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-
Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment".
When petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that
titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and
that the subject property has already been mortgaged.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property
before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the
Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which
identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true
agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the
purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who
paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real
and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute
ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11,
1991 which Jambrich executed in his favor.
RTC ruled in favor of Borromeo. CA reversed decision of Trial Court.
ISSUE Whether the conveyance of the property by Jambrich to Borromeo is valid.
RULING Yes.
The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich,
who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not
Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In
United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court reiterated
the consistent ruling in a number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred
to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a
Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title
of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World
Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the
properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to
the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition
of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured
the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
The rationale behind the Court's ruling in United Church Board for World
Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases, is this — since the ban on aliens
is intended to preserve the nation's land for future generations of Filipinos,
that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens
who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by
aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of
a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to
be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.
10 ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, petitioner, vs. HELMUT MULLER,
respondent.
 Page 269 of 320
DOCTRIN Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
E lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring
private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony.
FACTS Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were
married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time,
respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he
sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo,
Rizal and the construction of a house. The Antipolo property was registered in
the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondent's alleged womanizing, drinking, and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994,
respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also
decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of
the Constitution
CA reversed. According to CA, respondent merely prayed for reimbursement
for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of
ownership to him.
ISSUE Whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.
RULING No.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring
private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including
residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that
"aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that
"they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building
homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and
vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of
other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly
agricultural." (That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the
Constitution is beyond question
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly
admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the
Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said
prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the
said property cannot be sustained.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to
recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondent's part. To allow
reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by
law. As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged
with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention
that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly
violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event,
he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of
the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely
exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To
sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this
would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over
land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to
purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be
reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used
conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to
militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding
the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an event,
he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or
 Page 270 of 320
charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is
not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic
exercise.
D2.
1 ISAAC VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. VICTOR LINGAN and ATTY. ERNESTO
CARREON, respondents.
DOCTRIN Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
E lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring
private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony.
FACTS This case originated from a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Instrument
with Damages filed by the petitioner against Victor Lingan (respondent) and
Atty. Ernesto Carreon as the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. The respondent
filed his Answer and pre-trial ensued. The RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order
wherein it declared that no factual issue exists and that the sole legal issue to
be resolved is:
Whether or not the power of attorney is a general power of attorney or a
special power of attorney. Corollarily, whether upon the terms thereof, the
attorney-in-fact Gloria Roa Catral, had authority, or none at all, to execute the
deed of sale in favor of [respondent] Victor Lingan.
The facts are:
[Petitioner] Isaac Villegas was the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, known as Lot 2637-C of the Subdivision plan Psd.2-01-
019664, being a portion of Lot 2637, Cad. 151, containing an area of 1,267
square meters, more or less, situated at Bgy. Pengue, Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
covered byTransfer Certificate of Title No. T-63809 of the Register of Deeds
of Cagayan. In order to secure the payment of a loan from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) the petitioner constituted a real estate
mortgage over the said parcel of land in favor of DBP. The said loan and
mortgage was subsequently transferred by the DBP to the Home Mutual
Development Fund (HMDF). When the petitioner failed to settle his loan, the
real estate mortgage he constituted over the property was foreclosed, the
property was sold at public auction and, as the HMDF was itself the highest
bidder at such public auction, a certificate of sheriff's sale was issued and,
thereafter, registered with the Register of Deeds on March 8, 1996. By virtue
of a power of attorney executed by petitioner’s wife, Marilou C. Villegas in
favor of Gloria Roa Catral, the latter redeemed the property from the HMDF.
Gloria R. Catral (Catral), by virtue of the same power of attorney, executed a
Deed of Sale in favor of respondent.
the RTC dismissed the Complaint, ruling that the tenor of the power of
attorney in question is broad enough to include the authority to sell any
property of the principal, who, in this case, is the petitioner; that the act of the
agent, Catral, in executing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent
was within her power or authority; that the power "to enter into any and all
contracts and agreements" qualified the said power of attorney as a special
power of attorney; that the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and binds the
principal, herein petitioner; that the authority to sell came from both the
petitioner and his wife, Marilou, since the petitioner himself signed the power
of attorney affirming the authority of the agent, Catral; and that even if Catral
in fact exceeded her authority, the act is deemed to have been performed
within the scope of the agent's authority if such is within the terms of the
power of attorney as written.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
The CA held that when the redemption of the property had been made by
Catral by virtue of a General Power of Attorney executed in her favor by
Marilou, it follows that the petitioner is no longer the owner of the subject
property but his wife, Marilou; that the issue as to whether the power of
attorney was a special or general one is of no moment, because the petitioner
was no longer the owner of the property when it was sold; in other words, any
disposition of the property needs no power of attorney from the petitioner
himself; that the petitioner signed the General Power of Attorney above the
word "conforme", connoting an implied admission that he was not anymore
the owner of the said property; and, finally, that the Deed of Sale between
Marilou (through Catral) and respondent is valid
ISSUE Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of Victor Lingan is valid.
RULING Yes.
There are two principal issues raised by the pleadings in the present petition
that must be resolved: First, whether Marilou, the wife of the petitioner, as
successor-in-interest, may validly redeem the property in question; and
second, whether the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondent.
Was there a valid redemption effected by Marilou? Yes.
Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
SEC. 27. Who may redeem real property so sold. — Real property sold as
provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately,
maybe redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following
persons:
(a) The judgment obligor, or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part
of the property;
xxx xxx xxx
The "successor-in-interest" of the judgment debtor referred to in the above
provision includes a person who succeeds to his property by operation of law,
or a person with a joint interest in the property, or his spouse or heirs.
 Page 271 of 320
Section 33, Rule 39, Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period;
by whom executed or given. — If no redemption be made within one (1) year
from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is
entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed
whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been
made, and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the
last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all
cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from
the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall
be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in
the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the
sale had continued in office and executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest
and claim of the judgment obligor to the property at the time of the levy. The
possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment obligor.
Under the above provision, petitioner could have redeemed the property from
Marilou after she had redeemed it. The pleadings filed and the records of this
case do not show that petitioner exercised said right. Consequently, as
correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property.
All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration
of the right of redemption.
And where the redemption is made under a property regime governed by the
conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that
property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the
spouses redeeming the property.
Clearly, therefore, Marilou, as owner, had the right to sell the property to
another.
Whether petitioner has a cause of action against respondent? No.
A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the
legal right of the plaintiff. A complaint states a cause of action when it
contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the
defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant
violates the right of the plaintiff.
In the present case, there is no property right that exists in favor of the
petitioner, and, with more reason, no such obligation arises in behalf of the
defendant, herein respondent, to respect such right. There was no violation of
a legal right of the petitioner.
It must be stressed that there is no allegation or proof that Marilou redeemed
the property in behalf of the petitioner — Marilou did not act as agent of the
petitioner. Rather, she exercised the right of redemption in her own right as
successor-in-interest of the petitioner. Under the circumstances, should there
be any right violated, the aggrieved party is Marilou, petitioner's wife. The
property in question was the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of her
redemption. Thus, petitioner has no valid cause of action against the
respondent.
Consequently, the question whether Catral had validly sold the subject
property to respondent by virtue of the General Power of Attorney executed
by Marilou, is not within the realm of the Court's jurisdiction to resolve in this
case as said issue is not properly raised by the right person, Marilou.
Divested of all interest over the property, the petitioner has ceased to be the
proper party who may challenge the validity of the sale. Moreover, since, as a
rule, the agency, as a contract, is binding only between the contracting
parties, then only the parties, as well as the third person who transacts with
the parties themselves, may question the validity of the agency or the
violation of the terms and conditions found therein. This rule is a corollary of
the foregoing doctrine on the rights of real parties in interest.
D3.
1 EVANGELINE D. IMANI, petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, respondent.
DOCTRIN Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for
E this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership.  Thus, the time when the property was
acquired is material.
FACTS Evangeline D. Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of
respondent Metroban, with others as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound
themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc.
(CPDTI)
CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The
loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo.
CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several
demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted
Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including
Imani.
 Page 272 of 320
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Metrobank. Thus, Metrobank filed
with the RTC a motion for execution. Metrobank undertook to consolidate the
title covering the subject property in its name, and filed a Manifestation and
Motion, praying that spouses Sina and Evangline Imani be directed to
surrender the owner's copy of TCT No. T-27957 for cancellation. Petitioner
opposed the motion and argued that the subject property belongs to the
conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities
incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy on
execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of
the levy on execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in
favor of Metrobank.
ISSUE Whether the property is conjugal and this cannot be the subject of the levy.
RULING No.
Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for
this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was
acquired is material.
To support her assertion that the property belongs to the conjugal
partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit 3of Crisanto Origen, attesting
that petitioner and her husband were the vendees of the subject property, and
the photocopies of the checks allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for
the subject property.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly be considered
sufficient evidence to prove her claim that the property is conjugal. As
correctly pointed out by Metrobank, the said Affidavit has no evidentiary
weight because Crisanto Origen was not presented in the RTC to affirm the
veracity of his Affidavit:
The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on
the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be
rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written
statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for
cross-examination.
In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative
value. In Concepcion v. Atty. Fandiño, Jr. and Intestate Estate of the Late Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, we held that a photocopy of
a document has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the
CA was correct in disregarding the said pieces of evidence.
Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioner's assertion. As
aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the
name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof
that the property was acquired during the spouses' coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing.
Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the
property belongs to the conjugal partnership. Thus, it cannot be rightfully
said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis.
2 FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, JR., petitioner, vs. ERLINDA RAMIREZ and ELISEO
CARLOS, respondents.
DOCTRIN Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code,
E provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that
are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under
this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase
in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the
conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of
the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property
shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
FACTS Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No. 1427,
with Erlinda's consent, to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within 20 years, through
monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66. The respondents then constructed a
36-square meter, two-story residential house on the lot.
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed
by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated
consideration of P602,000.00. On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed
a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale,
claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the
documents transferring the title to the petitioner's name were falsified.
The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner granted them a
P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the
petitioner gave Erlinda a P200,000.00 advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage,
and made her sign a document purporting to be the mortgage contract; the
petitioner promised to give the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda
surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS mortgage cancelled, and submits an
affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights to the subject
property; with the P200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27 to
cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427;
 Page 273 of 320
The petitioner countered that there was a valid contract of sale. He alleged
that the respondents sold the subject property to him after he refused their
offer to mortgage the subject property because they lacked paying capacity
and were unwilling to pay the incidental charges; the sale was with the
implied promise to repurchase within one year. Petitioner filed an ejectment
case which was decided against the respondents.
The petitioner introduced evidence on the paraphernal nature of the subject
property since it was registered in Erlinda's name; the residential lot was part
of a large parcel of land owned by Pedro Ramirez and Fructuosa Urcla,
Erlinda's parents; it was the subject of Civil Case No. 50141, a complaint for
annulment of sale, before the RTC, Branch 158, Pasig City, filed by the
surviving heirs of Pedro against another heir, Amado Ramirez, Erlinda's
brother; and, as a result of a compromise agreement, Amado agreed to
transfer to the other compulsory heirs of Pedro, including Erlinda, their
rightful shares of the land.
ISSUE (1)         Whether the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal; and, (2)
whether the contract between the parties was a sale or an equitable mortgage.
RULING Conjugal
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name
of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved.
Clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. Pursuant to
Articles 92  and 109 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous
title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the
community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. The
residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda's exclusive paraphernal property.
As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its
provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have
governed their property relations. However, with the enactment of the Family
Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of
gains, including Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the
Family Code (Articles 105 to 133). Article 105 of the Family Code states:
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall
also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided
in Article 256.
Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the
provisions of the Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except with respect to
rights then already vested.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code,
provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that
are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under
this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase
in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the
conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of
the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property
shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan
through monthly salary deductions. Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, 44(44) not
the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner
advanced the P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992.
Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly
reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more
than the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary
deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of
Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of
Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary.
Equitable Mortgage
There are four (4) telling circumstances pointing to the existence of an
equitable mortgage.
First, the respondents remained in possession as lessees of the subject
property; the parties, in fact, executed a one-year contract of lease, effective
May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993.
Second, the petitioner retained part of the "purchase price," the petitioner
gave a P200,000.00 advance to settle the GSIS housing loan, but refused to
give the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda failed to submit Eliseo's signed
affidavit of waiver of rights.
Third, respondents paid the real property taxes on July 8, 1993, despite the
alleged sale on April 30, 1992;  payment of real property taxes is a usual
burden attaching to ownership and when, as here, such payment is coupled
with continuous possession of the property, it constitutes evidence of great
weight that the person under whose name the realty taxes were declared has a
 Page 274 of 320

valid and rightful claim over the land.
Fourth, Erlinda secured the payment of the principal debt owed to the
petitioner with the subject property. The records show that the petitioner, in
fact, sent Erlinda a Statement of Account showing that as of February 20,
1993, she owed P384,660.00, and the daily interest, starting February 21,
1993, was P641.10. Thus, the parties clearly intended an equitable mortgage
and not a contract of sale.
That the petitioner advanced the sum of P200,000.00 to Erlinda is
undisputed. This advance, in fact, prompted the latter to transfer the subject
property to the petitioner. Thus, before the respondents can recover the
subject property, they must first return the amount of P200,000.00 to the
petitioner, plus legal interest of 12% per annum, computed from April 30,
1992.
In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the ex-spouses' conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without
liquidating their conjugal partnership. On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together
with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP58 million loan
from petitioner Metrobank. To secure the obligation, Florencia and the
spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages on their properties,
including one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283.
Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of
TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a
document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on
April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal
properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include
the lot in question.

3 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
DOCTRIN Pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of
E gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the
surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the
property relationship between the former spouses, where: Each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
ISSUE
FACTS Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on
January 19, 1985.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan
obligation when it fell due, Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings.
Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale
on three issues of Remate.
At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest
bidder. Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed a
Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. In
it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged that
the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia's name, was paraphernal.
Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.
WON the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondent
Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of
community of property of the spouses.

During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a
250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located
in Makati City. Subsequently, TCT No. S-101473/T-510 covering the
purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 156283 of the ROD
of Makati City was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson
Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial, RTC Branch 94 in Quezon City
rendered a Decision declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson.
RULING No.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed
their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of
the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation
following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into
 Page 275 of 320
an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other
heirs of the deceased. In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil
Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses,
where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on
April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the
partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the
former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493.
Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of
Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only
to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is
null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his
undivided half.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank's right, as mortgagee and as the
successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2
undivided
portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other
undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the
lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property
rights "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
4 JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER, petitioner, vs. SPS. MANUEL M. FERRER &
VIRGINIA FERRER and SPS. ISMAEL M. FERRER and FLORA FERRER,
respondents.
DOCTRIN Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the
E respondents to respect or not to violate her right. While we could concede
that Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference to the right of the spouse as
contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost
of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon
whom ownership of the entire property is vested.
FACTS In her Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements, sum of money, and
accounting with prayer for injunction and damages, petitioner alleged that
she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), a half-brother of respondents
Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael).
Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot. He applied
for a loan with the SSS to build improvements thereon, including a residential
house and a two-door apartment building. However, it was during their
marriage that payment of the loan was made using the couple's conjugal
funds.
Petitioner averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the
apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in September 2 1991,
he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership
over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of
respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. TCT.
It is petitioner's contention that when her husband was already bedridden,
respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purported
to be his last will and testament. The document, however, was a Deed of Sale
covering Alfredo's lot and the improvements thereon. Learning of this
development, Alfredo filed a Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against
respondents.
On 22 June 1993, the RTC dismissed the same. The RTC found that the terms
and conditions of the Deed of Sale are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, and public policy, and should be complied with by the parties in
good faith, there being no compelling reason under the law to do otherwise.
The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In support of her Complaint, petitioner alluded to a portion of the Decision of
the RTC in Civil Case No. 61327, which stated, to wit: In determining which
property is the principal and which is the accessory, the property of greater
value shall be considered the principal. In this case, the lot is the principal
and the improvements the accessories. Since Article 120 of the Family Code
provides the rule that the ownership of accessory follows the ownership of the
principal, then the subject lot with all its improvements became an exclusive
and capital property of Alfredo with an obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership of the cost of improvements at the time of liquidation of [the]
conjugal partnership. Clearly, Alfredo has all the rights to sell the subject
property by himself without need of Josefa's consent. According to petitioner,
the ruling of the RTC shows that, when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999,
or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the right
to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredo's lot.
She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted to P500,000.00;
 Page 276 of 320
hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as
they are now the registered owners of Alfredo's lot. She averred that
respondents cannot claim lack of knowledge about the fact that the
improvements were constructed using conjugal funds as they had occupied
one of the apartment buildings on Alfredo's lot, and even paid rentals to
petitioner. In addition, petitioner prayed that respondents be ordered to
render an accounting from September, 1991, on the income of the boarding
house constructed thereon which they had appropriated for themselves, and
to remit one-half thereof as her share. Finally, petitioner sought from
respondents moral and exemplary damages, litigation and incidental
expenses.
ISSUE WON the petitioner has a right of reimbursement from respondents, who are
the buyers of the subject property?
D4.
RULING No.
Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the
respondents to respect or not to violate her right. While we could concede
that Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference to the right of the spouse as
contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost
of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon
whom ownership of the entire property is vested.
There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the
property is sold by the owner-spouse. Indeed, Article 120 provides the
solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on
the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or
through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of
the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value
of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of
the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of
the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by
the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive
property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations
contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises,
are not petitioner's spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse
upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is
the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may
be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect
petitioner's right to be reimbursed.
On this matter, we do not find an act or omission on the part of respondents
in violation of petitioner's rights. The right of the respondents to acquire as
buyers the subject premises from Alfredo under the assailed Deed of Sale in
Civil Case No. 61327 had been laid to rest. This is because the validity of the
Deed of Sale had already been determined and upheld with finality. The same
had been similarly admitted by petitioner in her Complaint. It can be said,
thus, that respondents' act of acquiring the subject property by sale was not in
violation of petitioner's rights. The same can also be said of the respondents'
objection to reimburse petitioner. Simply, no correlative obligation exists on
the part of the respondents to reimburse the petitioner. Corollary thereto,
neither can it be said that their refusal to reimburse constituted a violation of
petitioner's rights.
As has been shown in the foregoing, no obligation by the respondents under
the law exists.
1 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. VENANCIO C. REYES, JR.,
respondent
DOCTRIN A spouse's consent is indispensable for the disposition or encumbrance of
E conjugal properties.
FACTS Venancio is married to Lilia since 1973. During their union, they acquired 3
parcels of land in Malolos, Bulacan. TCT Nos. T-52812 and T-52813 were
registered under "Felicidad Pascual and Lilia C. Reyes, married to Venancio
Reyes” while TCT No. 53994 was registered under "Lilia C. Reyes, married to
Venancio Reyes."
The properties were mortgaged to PNB on August 25, 1994 to secure a loan
worth P1,100,000.00, which on October 6, 1994 was increased to
P3,000,000.00. According to PNB, the Reyes Spouses contracted and duly
consented to the loan.
When the Reyes Spouses failed to pay the loan obligations, PNB foreclosed
the mortgaged real properties. In the auction sale PNB emerged as the highest
bidder, and a certificate of sale was issued in its favor.
Venancio filed a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real
Estate Mortgage against PNB. In assailing the validity of the real estate
mortgage, Venancio claimed that his wife undertook the loan and the
mortgage without his consent and his signature was falsified on the
promissory notes and the mortgage. Since the 3 lots involved were conjugal
properties, he argued that the mortgage constituted over them was void.
 Page 277 of 320
ISSUE 1.    WON the real estate mortgage is void;
2.    Whether the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan
contracted unilaterally by Lilia Reyes.
RULING 1. The real estate mortgage over a conjugal property is void if the non-
contracting spouse did not give consent.
The real estate mortgage over the conjugal properties is void for want of
consent from respondent. The Family Code is clear: the written consent of the
spouse who did not encumber the property is necessary before any
disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property can be valid.
Petitioner points to respondent's signature on the Promissory Notes and Deed
of Mortgage to prove that he consented to the transactions. For his part,
respondent alleges that his signature was forged and offers testimony from a
handwriting expert to prove that his signature on the bank documents were
falsified. The RTC and CA both agreed that respondent presented clear and
convincing evidence that his signature, as it appeared on the mortgage
contract, was forged.
2. The lower courts may have declared the mortgage void, but the
principal obligation is not affected. It remains valid.
Petitioner contends that the conjugal partnership should be made liable to the
extent that it redounded to the benefit of the family under Article 122 of the
Family Code.
Petitioner's reliance on Article 122 to support the validity of the mortgage is
misplaced.
Article 122 provides:
ARTICLE 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of
the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be
charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse
before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them,
as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-
mentioned.
Article 122 applies to debts that were contracted by a spouse and redounded
to the benefit of the family. It applies specifically to the loan that respondent's
wife Lilia contracted, but not to the mortgage.
What the lower courts declared void was the real estate mortgage attached to
the conjugal property of the Reyes Spouses. Since the real estate mortgage
was an encumbrance attached to a conjugal property without the consent of
the other spouse, it is void and legally inexistent. Although petitioner cannot
foreclose the mortgage over the conjugal property in question, it can still
recover the loan amount from the conjugal partnership.
2 YOLANDA LEACHON CORPUZ, complainant, vs. SERGIO V. PASCUA,
Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Trece Martires City, Cavite,
respondent
DOCTRIN Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is
E presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, for this
presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was
acquired is material. There is no such proof in the records of the present case.
FACTS Upon the complaint of Alicia Panganiban, Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082
for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were instituted against Juanito
Corpuz before the MTCC. The MTCC approved the Compromise Agreement
executed between Panganiban and Juanito (in which Juanito promised to pay
Panganiban the sum of P330,000.00) and dismissed provisionally Criminal
Case Nos. 2079 to 2082.
On January 25, 2010, the MTCC allegedly rendered a judgment based on the
Compromise Agreement, but there was no copy of said judgment in the
records of this case. When Juanito failed to comply with his obligations under
the Compromise Agreement, Panganiban filed Motions for Execution of the
MTCC judgment. On March 17, 2010, the MTCC acted favorably on
Panganiban's Motions and issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Sheriff
of the MTCC of Trece Martires City.
On June 2, 2010, Yolanda, Juanito's wife, and her daughter were in her office
at the Cavite Provincial Engineering Office of Trece Martires City. At around
 Page 278 of 320
three o'clock in the afternoon, Sheriff Pascua arrived at Yolanda's office and
demanded that Yolanda surrender the Toyota Town Ace Noah, which was
registered in Yolanda's name, threatening to damage the said vehicle if
Yolanda would refuse to do so.
Sheriff Pascua tried to forcibly open the vehicle. Yolanda called her brother to
ask for help. Yolanda's brother arrived after one hour. Yolanda, with her
daughter and brother, went out of the office to face Sheriff Pascua. Deeply
embarrassed and humiliated, and to avoid further indignities, Yolanda
surrendered the key to the vehicle to Sheriff Pascua, but she did not sign any
document which Sheriff Pascua asked her to sign.
Offended, humiliated, and embarrassed, Yolanda was compelled to file the
present administrative complaint against Sheriff Pascua. In addition to the
aforementioned incident on June 2, 2010, Yolanda alleged in her complaint
that Sheriff Pascua kept possession of the vehicle and even used the same on
several occasions for his personal use. Yolanda attached to her complaint
pictures to prove that Sheriff Pascua, instead of parking the vehicle within the
court premises, in accordance with the concept of custodia legis, parked the
vehicle in the garage of his own house. Yolanda also claimed that her vehicle
was illegally confiscated or levied upon by Sheriff Pascua because the Writ of
Execution, which Sheriff Pascua was implementing, was issued against
Juanito, Yolanda's husband. Yolanda further pointed out that Sheriff Pascua
has not yet posted the notice of sale of personal property, as required by Rule
39, Section 15 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE WON Sheriff Pascua is guilty of misconduct for attaching the subject property
on the presumption that the vehicle is the conjugal property of Yolanda and
Juanito?
RULING Yes.
A sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging to the
judgment debtor. The sheriff may be liable for enforcing execution on
property belonging to a third party. If he does so, the writ of execution affords
him no justification, for the action is not in obedience to the mandate of the
writ.
Sheriff Pascua cannot rely on the presumption that the vehicle is the conjugal
property of Juanito and Yolanda. Indeed, Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife." However, for this presumption to apply, the party
who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua
non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material. There is no such
proof in the records of the present case.
Sheriff Pascua's assertions of diligence do not exculpate him from
administrative liability. After inquiry from the LTO, he already discovered
that the vehicle was registered in Yolanda's name only. This fact should have
already prompted Sheriff Pascua to gather more information, such as when
Juanito and Yolanda were married and when did Yolanda acquire the vehicle,
which, in turn, would have determined whether or not Sheriff Pascua could
already presume that the said vehicle is conjugal property.
WHEREFORE, respondent Sheriff Sergio V. Pascua is found GUILTY of
simple misconduct and is SUSPENDED for TWO (2) MONTHS WITHOUT
PAY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
3 JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK-LAOAG BRANCH, respondent.
DOCTRIN Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or
E profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be
deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
 
FACTS On January 13, 1983, spouses Joe A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a
complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal
proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch docketed as Civil
Case No. 7803.
The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros
obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974
and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate
mortgage involving a parcel of land, with all the improvements thereon
described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB,
Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the
property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the
name of PNB, Laoag Branch.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the
loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted
on the conjugal property — a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings
pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property —
interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were
forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
 Page 279 of 320
In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of
action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-appellees' own acts [of]
omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the subject property on
the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.
ISSUE WON the the debt is chargeable to the conjugal property?
RULING Yes.
There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and
Aguete's marriage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954, while
the subject property was acquired in 1968. There is also no doubt that Ros
encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on
23 October 1974.
PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as evidenced by her signature,
consented to Ros' mortgage to PNB of the subject property. On the other
hand, Aguete denies ever having consented to the loan and also denies
affixing her signature to the mortgage and loan documents. The husband
cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent,
express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable.
Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros' encumbrance of
the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the
courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared
only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.
In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule
that Aguete gave her consent to Ros' encumbrance of the subject property.
The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary
public, hence they are public documents. Every instrument duly
acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie
evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. The
execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot
be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer.
PNB was correct when it stated that petitioners' omission to present other
positive evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was fatal to petitioners'
cause. Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a
handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare that Aguete's
signatures were really forged.
The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for
additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco." In her
testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed
to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans
contracted by Ros, but did not know where he "wasted the money."
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or
profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be
deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
For this reason, we rule that Ros' loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.
4 SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO
NICOL, respondents
G.R. No. 145222
April 24, 2009
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Spouses Buado filed a case of slander against Erlinda Nicol. Nicol was
convicted and was ordered to pay damages and other damages. Since Nicol’s
personal properties are no longer sufficient to satisfy the judgment, the
Sheriff levied the property conjugal property of the Spouses Nicol. The
husband of Erlinda filled a case to safeguard the conjugal property.
ISSUE 1. Whether one of the spouses who is not a party to the suit but whose
conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the
judgment obligor, may be considered a “stranger.”
2. Whether a conjugal property may be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse.
RULING 1. Yes, one of the spouses who is not a party to the suit but whose conjugal
property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment
obligor, may be considered a “stranger.” The Supreme Court ruled that a
third-party claim must be filed by a person other than the judgment debtor or
his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may file a third-party
claim. In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the
character of the property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of
Appeals, 174 SCRA 59 (1989), which was later adopted in Spouses Ching v.
Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 356 (2004) this Court held that the husband of
the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted
and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of
Appeals, 347 SCRA 60 (2000), and Sy v. Discaya, 181 SCRA 378 (1990), the
Court stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action wherein the writ
 Page 280 of 320
of execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent
action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or paraphernal
property.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122
of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not
be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community where
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The
conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the
liability of the debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination
can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
2. No, a conjugal property may not be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse. The Supreme Court ruled that conjugal property
cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse,
unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
partnership. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded
that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by
Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
5 SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. MAR TIERRA
CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C. MARTINEZ, MIGUEL J. LACSON and
RICARDO A. LOPA, respondents.
G.R. No. 143382
November 29, 2006
DOCTRIN
E executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay on a certain
FACTS Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied
for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and
Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit
line agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity
agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel
J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally
with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. When the
Corporation could no longer pay, SBTC filed a complaint for sum of money
against the respondents. However, SBTC eventually dismissed the case
against other respondents which left Martinez as the sole respondent. In
came to that point that the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez
were attached.
ISSUE Whether the conjugal property may be held liable for the obligation
contracted on behalf of the family business.
RULING No, the conjugal property may be held liable for the obligation contracted on
behalf of the family business. The Supreme Court ruled that in Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that,
if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct
recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or
profession, the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership." In other words, where the husband contracts an
obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that
such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the
other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and
the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by
itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is
for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption is raised that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Proof must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal
partnership. In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement
executed by the husband to accommodate a third party.
6 ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners, vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 124642
February 23, 2004
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of
P9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this
loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching,
date. As added security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo
Ching, together with Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a
continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally
guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the
extent of P38,000,000.00. The loan was subsequently renewed on various
dates, the last renewal having been made on December 4, 1980. The PBMCI
defaulted in the payment of all its loans. ABC filled a complaint for sum of
money and it impleaded Ching, et. Al. The Deputy Sheriff levied on
attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citicorp stocks in the name of
Ching.
ISSUE Whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy
on attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment
 Page 281 of 320
Philippines.
RULING Yes, the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on
attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment
Philippines. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner-wife filed her
motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in
the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were
conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The
petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said relief.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired
during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife.
In Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held that it is not even necessary to prove that
the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the
properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are
presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which
the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still
apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of
the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in
the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the
same.
It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the Board of
Directors of PBMCI and was one of its top twenty stockholders, and that the
shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would appreciate if
the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that the
petitioner-husband's career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive
because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits
contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The benefits must be those
directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a
spin-off of the loan itself. This is different from the situation where the
husband borrows money or receives services to be used for his own business
or profession. In the Ayala case, we ruled that it is such a contract that is one
within the term "obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Thus:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business
or his own profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be
proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of
the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or
services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be
rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in
the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated,
where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership.
7 HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner, vs. MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent
G.R. No. 146504
April 9, 2002
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS For failure to pay the amount of US$25,000.00, which the petitioner
advanced to the respondent and his wife for the purchase of a house and lot,
petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages
against respondent and his wife. Since the respondent and his wife were
separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, they
filed separate answers. The wife admitted securing a loan with her husband
from the petitioner. Respondent claimed that the amount he received from
the petitioner was part of the profit sharing which was promise to him by the
petitioner for reviving an erstwhile losing company of the latter. He also
denied the claim that he made threats to petitioner. The Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondent appealed the decision
to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial
court's decision and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to
show that the subject amount was indeed loaned by petitioner to respondent
and his wife. A motion for reconsideration of the above decision having been
denied, petitioner brought this appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE Whether the loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership.
RULING Yes, the loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121
of the Family Code. While respondent did not and refused to sign the
acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan
redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the
house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family.
Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art.
121 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with
his wife.
8 AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO
MAGSAJO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF AP-PEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO
& ENCARNACION CHING, respondents
G.R. No. 118305
February 12, 1998
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC).
Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on
December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable
with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC.  PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of
 Page 282 of 320
complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering
PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with
interests.  Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution.
Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and
service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties on May 1982.  Respondent spouses filed injunction
against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the
benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower
court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of
respondent spouses conjugal properties.  A certificate of sale was issued to
AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE Whether the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is
considered “for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.
D5.
RULING This court does not agree that is a difference between the terms "redounded
to the benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand; and "for the benefit of"
on the other. They mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil
Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both
use the term "for the benefit of". On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family
Code provides that "The payment of personal debts by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family." As
can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably. From jurisprudential rulings
of this Court, the following conclusions can be derived: (A) If the husband
himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the
money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is
enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of
the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the
husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. (B) On the other hand, if the money or services are
given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred
that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation
agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be
presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. In all
our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the husband, we
underscored the requirement that: "there must be the requisite showing . . . of
some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses" or
"benefits to his family" or "that such obligations are productive of some
benefit to the family."
The provisions of the Family Code highlight the underlying concern of the law
for the conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the husband's duty to
protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it. This is the
underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered
into by one of the spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the
family and that the measure of the partnership's liability is to "the extent that
the family is benefited." (Article 121, Nos. 2 & 3, Family Code.) These are all in
keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the Civil Code
which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any part
of the conjugal property. (Article 174, Civil Code.)
1 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. VENANCIO C. REYES,
JR., Respondent.
LEONEN, J.:
DOCTRIN A spouse's consent is indispensable for the disposition or encumbrance of
E conjugal properties.
FACTS  Venancio is married to Lilia since 1973.
 During their union, they acquired three (3) parcels of land in
Malolos, Bulacan which were registered under "Felicidad Pascual
and Lilia C. Reyes, married to Venancio Reyes.
 The properties were mortgaged to Philippine National Bank on
August 25, 1994 to secure a loan worth P1,100,000.00,7 which on
October 6, 1994 was increased to P3,000,000.00.8 According to
Philippine National Bank, the Reyes Spouses contracted and duly
consented to the loan.
 When the Reyes Spouses failed to pay the loan obligations,
Philippine National Bank foreclosed the mortgaged real properties.
 Venancio filed before the RTC a Complaint (or Annulment of
Certificate of Sale and Real Estate Mortgage) against PNB, claiming
that his wife undertook the loan and the mortgage without his
consent and his signature was falsified on the promissory notes and
the mortgage and that since the three (3) lots involved were conjugal
properties, he argued that the mortgage constituted over them was
void.
 RTC – ordered the annulment of the real estate mortgage and
directed Lilia to reimburse PNB the loan amount with interest.
 CA – affirmed RTC’s ruling
ISSUE 1. WON CA erred in declaring the real estate mortgage void;
2. WON the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan
contracted unilaterally by Lilia C. Reyes.
 Page 283 of 320
RULING First Issue
 The real estate mortgage over a conjugal property is void if the non-
contracting spouse did not give consent.
 We see no compelling reason to overturn the lower couris' factual
findings that the forgery was proven with clear and convincing
evidence. Having established that his signature was forged,
respondent proved that he did not consent to the real estate
mortgage. The mortgage unilaterally made by his wife over their
conjugal property is void and legally inexistent.
Second Issue
 The lower courts may have declared the mortgage void, but the
principal obligation is not affected. It remains valid.
 Petitioner contends that the conjugal partnership should be made
liable to the extent that it redounded to the benefit of the family
under Article 122 of the Family Code.
 Article 122 provides: “The payment of personal debts contracted by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership. However, the payment of personal debts contracted by
either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities
imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of
either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been
covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the
liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what
has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.”
 Article 122 applies to debts that were contracted by a spouse and
redounded to the benefit of the family. It applies specifically to the
loan that respondent's wife Lilia contracted, but not to the mortgage.
 There are two scenarios considered: one is when the husband, or in
this case, the wife, contracts a loan to be used for the family business
and the other is when she acts as a surety or guarantor. If she is a
mere surety or guarantor, evidence that the family benefited from
the loan need to be presented before the conjugal partnership can be
held liable.
 On the other hand, if the loan was taken out to be used for the family
business, there is no need to prove actual benefit. The law presumes
the family benefited from the loan and the conjugal partnership is
held liable.
 Since the loaned money is used in the husband's business, there is a
presumption that it redounded to the benefit of the family; hence,
the conjugal partnership may be held liable for the loan amount.
Since there is a legal presumption to this effect, there is no need to
prove actual benefit to the family.
 What the lower courts declared void was the real estate mortgage
attached to the conjugal property of the Reyes Spouses. Since the
real estate mortgage was an encumbrance attached to a conjugal
property without the consent of the other spouse, it is void and
legally inexistent.
 Although petitioner cannot foreclose the mortgage over the conjugal
property in question, it can still recover the loan amount from the
conjugal partnership.
2 G.R. No. 170004,        January 13, 2016
ILONA HAPITAN, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JIMMY LAGRADILLA
AND WARLILY LAGRADILLA AND ESMERALDA BLACER,
Respondents.
JARDELEZA, J.:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  Respondent Esmeralda issued thirty-one (31) UCPB checks payable
to the order of respondent Warlily.
 The checks were dishonored by UCPB for reasons of "account
closed" when presented for payment by Warlily.
 Jimmy and Warlily alleged that they made several demands on
Nolan and Esmeralda for the latter to settle their outstanding
obligations.
 The latter spouses promised to convey and transfer to Jimmy and
Warlily the title of their house and lot, located at Barangay M. V.
Hechanova, Jaro, Iloilo City.
 Jimmy and Warlily later found out that Nolan and Esmeralda
separately executed an SPA designating Ilona, Nolan's sister, as their
attorney-in-fact for the sale of the same property.
 Jimmy and Warlily alleged that the property was fraudulently sold to
Spouses Terosa, and that Nolan and Esmeralda were about to depart
from the Philippines with the intent to defraud their creditors.
 Nolan and Ilona denied the allegations of Jimmy and Warlily. They
argued that the debts were incurred solely by Esmeralda and were
not intended to benefit the conjugal partnership. They further stated
that Esmeralda has abandoned her only son with Nolan and that
Nolan has filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Esmeralda.
 RTC – ruled in favor of Jimmy and Warlily, declaring null and void
the Deed of Sale in favor our spouses Terosa.
o The RTC ruled that the house and lot is part of Nolan and
Esmeralda's conjugal property, having been built from the
amounts sent by Nolan to Esmeralda as well as the income
from Esmeralda's business.
 CA – affirmed RTC’s ruling.
 On November 6, 2003, Warlily executed a Waiver stating that she
had received from Nolan an amount of Php125,000.00 representing
 Page 284 of 320
the full and complete satisfaction of Warlily’s complaint.
 On November 20, 2003, Jimmy and Warlily, and Nolan and Ilona
filed a Motion for Approval of Amicable Settlement.
ISSUE WON the Waiver and the Amicable Settlement can modify the Decision of the
CA.
RULING  The Waiver is invalid.
 The nullity of the Deed of Sale could not be affected by the
subsequent waiver of Warlily.
 Warlily's Waiver cannot cover the issue of the validity of the sale of
the property to the Spouses Terosa since the property is neither a
right nor a benefit she is entitled to.
 Moreover, the declaration of nullity due to the existence of fraud was
both a finding of fact and of law by the lower courts, and the parties
cannot agree amongst themselves and decide otherwise.
 The Amicable Settlement is not valid
 The Amicable Settlement, intending to put an end to the controversy
between jimmy and Warlily and Nolan and Ilona, partakes the
nature of a compromise agreement. The Amicable Settlement
involves two subjects: 1) the payment of the principal obligation of
P510,463.98 to Jimmy and Warlily; and 2) the cancellation of the
sale of the house and lot to the Spouses Terosa.
 The Amicable Settlement of the payment of the debt to Jimmy and
Warlily is not valid.
 A compromise agreement is defined as a contract whereby the
parties make reciprocal concessions in order to resolve their
differences and thus avoid or put an end to a lawsuit.
 To have the force of law between the parties, a compromise
agreement must comply with the requisites and principles of
contracts.
 Thus, it must have the following elements: 1) the consent of the
parties to the compromise; 2) an object certain that is the subject
matter of the compromise; and 3) the cause of the obligation that is
established.
 The allegations of Jimmy and Warlily cast doubt on whether they
fully understood the terms of the Amicable Settlement when they
signed it. They further argued that they did not fully comprehend the
CA Decision in their favor. Thus, it may be reasonably inferred that
Jimmy and Warlily did not give consent to the Amicable Settlement
with Nolan and Ilona.
 Nolan cannot waive his and Esmeralda’s rights over the house and
lot sold to the Spouses Terosa
 Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of
the other spouse; otherwise, such disposition is void.
 Further, under Article 89 of the Family Code, no waiver of rights,
interests, shares, and effects of the conjugal partnership of gains50
during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial
separation of property.
 Clearly, Esmeralda did not consent to Nolan disposing or waiving
their rights over the house and lot through the Amicable Settlement.
In fact, she even objected to the Amicable Settlement, as evidenced
by her pleadings filed before the courts.
 She further expressed disbelief that Nolan would want the CA to
reverse its decision when its ruling, saving Nolan and Esmeralda's
conjugal property, is favorable to him.
3 G.R. No. 177235               July 7, 2014
SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. AURORA MENDOZA
FERMIN, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  Leonardo G. Mendoza (Leonardo), allegedly married to petitioner
Serconsision R. Mendoza, died on November 25, 1986.
 In the testate proceedings of her father’s estate, respondent Aurora
Mendoza Fermin, being the legitimate and eldest daughter of
Leonardo, was appointed as one of the administratix.
 When respondent was the one preparing an inventory of the
properties of her late father as directed by the probate court, she
discovered that her father and petitioner purportedly sold the said
property to one Eduardo C. Sanchez as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated September 22, 1986, for and in consideration of
the amount of 150,000.00.
 However, the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register
of Deeds for the City of Parañaque only on April 30, 1991, or five (5)
years after the alleged transfer.
 Petitioner did not inform the tenants of the property that a certain
Eduardo C. Sanchez already owned the same; and in fact, continued
to collect the rentals of the property even after the alleged sale.
 Respondent filed a case for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale. She
alleges that the signature of her father on the Deed of Absolute Sale
was forged.
 RTC – there was no forgery and declaring the sale of the property as
valid.
 CA – declared as null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale.
ISSUE WON CA gravely erred in setting aside RTC’s finding as to the authenticity
and dues execution of the Deed of Sale.
RULING  The petition is bereft of merit.
 As Leonardo and Serconsision were married sometime in 1985, the
 Page 285 of 320
applicable provision governing the property relations of the spouses
is Article 172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that
the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s
consent.
 In a previous case, the SC had the occasion to rule that the sale of a
land belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the wife without
the consent of the husband is voidable.
 It further ruled that the disposal by the wife of their conjugal
property without the husband’s consent is voidable is supported by
Article 173 of the Civil Code which states that contracts entered by
the husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is
required are annullable at her instance during the marriage and
within ten years from the transaction questioned.
 In the present case, the fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
on September 22, 1986, one month after Leonardo died.
 Aurora as one of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix of
Leonardo’s estate, had the right therefore to seek for the annulment
of the Deed of Sale asit deprived her and the other legal heirs of
Leonardo of their hereditary rights.
 Defendant appellees’ unauthorized and fictitious transaction cannot
be invoked as a source of right.
 Considering that the questioned sale was concluded on September
22, 1986, the transaction could still be aptly governed by the then
governing provisions of the Civil Code.
 Under Article 173 of the Civil Code, the remedy available to the wife
in case her husband should dispose of their conjugal property
without her consent is as follows: “Art. 173. The wife may, during
the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the
property fraudulently alienated by the husband.”
4 G.R. No. 165803               September 1, 2010
SPOUSES REX AND CONCEPCION AGGABAO, Petitioners, vs.
DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN,
Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
DOCTRIN The sale of conjugal property without the consent of the husband was not
E merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be ratified.
FACTS  Involved in this action are two parcels of land and their
improvements (property) located at Parañaque City registered in the
name of respondents Spouses Parulan, who have been estranged
from one another.
 In January 1991, real estate broker Atanacio offered the property to
the petitioners, who initially did not show interest due to the
rundown condition of the improvements.
 On February 2, 1991, they and Atanacio met with Ma. Elena at the
site of the property.
 On March 19, 1991, TCT No. 63377 was cancelled and a new one was
issued in the name of the petitioners.
 Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No.
63376 as promised. In due time, the petitioners learned that the
duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376 had been all along in the
custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA
executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots.
 Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to
call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they had
already fully paid to Ma. Elena.
 On April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an
action praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of
absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title
issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof.
 RTC – Deed of Absolute Sale is declared null and void.
 CA – affirmed the RTC, opining that Article 124 of the Family Code
applied because Dionisio had not consented to the sale of the
conjugal property by Ma. Elena.
ISSUE Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family
Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the
consent of Dionisio?
RULING  The petition has no merit.
 We sustain the CA.
 Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made
after the effectivity of the Family Code.
 The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore,
Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the
Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
 Article 124 of the Family Code provides: “Article 124. The
administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other
 Page 286 of 320
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without authority of the court or the written consent of
the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors.”
 The petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio,
while holding the administration over the property, had delegated to
his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property,
considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to
Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.
 Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not
include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict
ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an
authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only
be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the
Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878).
 Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special
agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did
not include or extend to the power to administer the property.
 Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans
the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void;
hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be
ratified.
 On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a
continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio
had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was
withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners.
 The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the
Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other
spouse’s consent, the transaction should be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
5 G.R. No. 160708               October 16, 2009
PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners, vs.
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of
INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA
ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN
DYAN VILLA ABRILLE, Respondents.
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS  In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land
located in Davao City under their names covered by TCT No. T-
88674.
 Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he
was still single and which is registered solely in his name covered by
TCT No. T-26471.
 Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the DBP,
the spouses built a house on their lot and Pedro’s lot.
 The house was finished in the early 1980’s but the spouses
continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an
annex.
 In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary
Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the
family and the studies of her children.
 By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein
petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and
notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold
the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced
by a Deed of Sale dated June 21, 1991.
 It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her
name.
 Respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for
Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney’s
Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and
herein petitioners.
 RTC – ruled in favor of herein respondent Mary Ann P. Villa Abrille,
ruling that the sale on one half of the lot is valid, while the other half
is void since it belongs to respondent Mary Ann.
ISSUE WON the subject property is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal
property and WON its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of
Mary Ann’s consent.
RULING  Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
 There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471,
which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by
him before his marriage to Mary Ann.
 However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982
during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann.
 The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in
the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to
overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is
exclusively owned by Pedro.
 Page 287 of 320

 Petitioners’ bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the ISSUE

presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of
Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. RULING
 Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been
constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even
obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.1avvphi 8
 A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by DOCTRINE
Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be
void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the FACTS
wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the
court. ISSUE
 Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the
husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal RULING
property, such sale is void.
 If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the
wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at 9
the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the
contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the DOCTRINE
case.
 Respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale FACTS
within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal
ISSUE
house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-
26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can
RULING
dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s consent.

10
6 [G.R. No. 149801. June 26, 2008.]
SPOUSES RENATO and FLORINDA DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
GIL and LEONILA SEGOVIA, respondents. DOCTRINE

DOCTRIN FACTS
E
ISSUE
FACTS
RULING
ISSUE

RULING 11 [G.R. No. 125172. June 26, 1998.]

Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA CORPUZ, respondents
7
DOCTRIN FAMILY CODE; ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
E PROPERTY; SETTLEMENT DOES NOT MENTION A CONTINUING OFFER
DOCTRINE
TO SELL PROPERTY OR ACCEPTANCE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. —
Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that
FACTS
was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of
Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale,
 Page 288 of 320
petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after
which the barangay authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and
petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement,
however, does not mention a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that
private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the
imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance
mentioned in Article 124
FACTS Private respondent Gilda Corpuz and husband Judie Corpuz sold one-half of
ISSUE their lot to petitioner-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. When Gilda
RULING was in Manila looking for work abroad Judie sold the remaining one-half
portion of the lot including the house standing thereon to the Guiang spouses.
When Gilda returned home, she gathered her children together and stayed at
their house. She then filed a complaint before the RTC for the nullification of
the deed of sale executed by her husband in favor of the petitioner spouses.
The RTC rendered judgment in her favor and against petitioners. The Court of
Appeals, affirmed the trial court's ruling. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners contend that the contract of sale was merely voidable and was
ratified by private respondent when she entered into an amicable settlement
with them. Petitioners based their arguments under Article 1390 of the Civil
Code providing that contracts entered into where consent of one party is
vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud are
voidable and are binding, unless annulled but they are susceptible of
ratification.
The Supreme Court held that the error in petitioners' contention is evident.
Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e.,
contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained
and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud. In this instance, private respondent's consent to the contract of sale of
their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. This being the case,
said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code,
which was correctly applied by the two lower courts.
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)"
(emphasis supplied)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code
'Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of
the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required,
or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise
this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand
the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)'
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to
by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying
the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay
authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and
coercion. In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the
deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses. The fact
remains that such contract was entered into without the wife's consent.
12 [G.R. No. 92245. June 26, 1991.]
MELANIA A. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ANTONIO M. CAYETANO, respondents
DOCTRIN CIVIL LAW; ADMINISTRATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY;HUSBAND AS
E ADMINISTRATOR. — Under the New Civil Code (NCC) "Art. 165.The
husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership,"in view of the fact
that the husband is principally responsible for the support of the wife and the
rest of thefamily. If the conjugal partnership does not have enough assets, it is
the husband'scapital that is responsible for such support, not the paraphernal
property. Responsibility should carry authority with it.
ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE AND LIMITATION. — However, administration does not
include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer theconjugal
assets unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus,
under Art. 166 of NCC, "unless the wife has been declared a non-
composmentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in
a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnershipwithout the wife's consent. If she refuses
unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the
same." This rule prevents abuse on the part of the husband, and guarantees
the rights of the wife, who is partly responsible for the acquisition of the
property, particularly the real property. Contracts entered into by the
husband in violation of this prohibition are voidable and subject to
annulment at the instance of the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil Code).
ID.; ID.; LEASE OF REALTY FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR, CONSTITUTES
ENCUMBRANCE WHICH REQUIRES MARITAL CONSENT. — The joinder
 Page 289 of 320
of the wife, although unnecessary for an oral lease of conjugal realty which
does not exceed one year in duration, is required in a lease of conjugal realty
for a period of more than one year, such a lease being considered a
conveyance and encumbrance within the provisions of the Civil Code
requiring the joinder of the wife in the instrument by which real property is
conveyed or encumbered (See also 41 C.J.S., p. 1149).
ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY IN CASE OF VIOLATION. — In case the wife's
consent is not secured by the husband as required by law, the wife has the
remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the contract. Art. 173 of the
Civil Code states "the wife may, during the marriage and within ten years
from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent
is required. . . ."
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, the
allegation in paragraph 2 of the complaint indicates that petitioner's
estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas had entered into a contract
of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano without her marital consent
being secured as required by law under Art. 166 of the Civil Code. Petitioner,
therefore, has a cause of action under Art. 173 to file a case for annulment of
the contract of lease entered into without her consent. Petitioner has a cause
of action not only against her husband but also against the lessee, Antonio M.
Cayetano, who is a party to the contract of lease.
FACTS Plaintiff married but living separately from husband
plaintiff discovered that her estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas,
had entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano
sometime on March 30, 1987 covering a portion of their conjugal lot without
her previous knowledge, much less her marital consent. That on the same lot,
plaintiff had planned to put up her flea market
ISSUE whether or not a husband, as the administrator of the conjugal partnership,
may legally enter into a contract of lease involving conjugal real property
without the knowledge and consent of the wife.
RULING Petitioner, therefore, has a cause of action under Art. 173 to file a case for
annulment of the contract of lease entered into without her consent.
Petitioner has a cause of action not only against her husband but also against
the lessee, Antonio M. Cayetano, who is a party to the contract of lease.
D6.
1 [G.R. No. 182839. June 2, 2014.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. JOSE GARCIA and
CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA, JR., BOBBY
GARCIA and JIMMY GARCIA and HEIRS OF ROGELIO
GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA,
ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA, HEHERSON GARCIA,
GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA and JANE GARCIA,
respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS -The subject of the present case is a parcel of residential land with all its
improvements (subject property) located in Barrio Olango, Mallig, Isabela.
The land is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44422 under
the name of Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.) who acquired the subject property
during his marriage with Ligaya Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987
-respondents are the children of  Jose Sr. and Ligaya
-1989 spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained a
loan facility from the petitioner, Philippine National Bank (petitioner bank).
As security for theincreased loan, they offered their property covered by TCT
No. 75324 and the subjectproperty covered by TCT No. T-44422. Jose Sr.
agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering the subjectproperty as
additional collateral security for the latter's increased loan. For thispurpose,
Jose Sr. executed Special Powers of Attorney. Jose Sr. also executed an
Amendment ofReal Estate Mortgage in favor of the petitioner bank. All of
thesetransactions, however, were without the knowledge and consent of Jose
Sr.'s children.
-spouses Garcia failed to pay their loan to the petitioner bank despite
repeated demands
-1996, the respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Nullity of the
Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage. They claimed that the Amendment of
Real Estate Mortgage was null and void as to respondents as they were not
parties to the contract. respondents alleged that the subject property was a
conjugal property of Jose Sr. and his deceased spouse, Ligaya; that upon
Ligaya's death, Jose Sr., together with his children became owners pro
indiviso of the subject Property; that the real estate mortgage executed by
Jose Sr. could not bind his children as they did not give their consent or
approval to the encumbrance;
-In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr. was indebted to
them. To settle this  indebtedness, Jose Sr. volunteered to give the subject
property as additional security for their (the Garcias') loan to the petitioner
bank.
-petitioner bank disputes the CA's finding that the subject property was
conjugal in nature. It argues that, as can be gleaned from TCT No. T-44422,
the subject property was registered in the name of Jose Sr. alone, who
was described in the title as "widower" and not "married." Since the
subject property belonged to Jose Sr., insofar as petitioner bank as mortgagee
was concerned, Jose Sr. had the right under Article 428 of the Civil Code to
mortgage it without the consent of his children. Accordingly, the mortgage in
its entirety should be declared valid.  Likewise, it raises the argument that
Jose Sr.'s change of status in the subject property's title from "married" to
 Page 290 of 320
"widower" prior to the constitution of the real estate mortgage showed that
the property was no longer conjugal
ISSUE whether the subject property was conjugal
RULING The Subject Property is Conjugal
-All property acquired during marriage is presumed conjugal
Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, their property relations were governed by the conjugal partnership of
gains as provided under Article 119 of the Civil Code. Under Article 160 of the
Civil Code, "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife." Because of the petitioner bank's failure to rebut the
allegation that the subject property was acquired during the former's
marriage to Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property, in line with Article 160 of the Civil Code, applies to this property.
Proof of the subject property's acquisition during the subsistence of marriage
suffices to render the statutory presumption operative
Registration of the subject property in the name of one spouse
does not destroy the presumption that the property is conjugal.
Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy
its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the property
was acquired. 9(9) The registration of the property is not conclusive
evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the
property appears to be registered in the name of the husband, it has the
inherent character of conjugal property if it was acquired for valuable
consideration during marriage. 10(10) It retains its conjugal nature.
The conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary
co-ownership upon the death of Ligaya
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied
ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and
the heirs of the deceased, on the other. 14(14) This resulting ordinary co-
ownership among the heirs is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code which
reads:
        Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
of
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership." (Emphasis supplied)
Under this provision, each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or
share in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it
except when personal rights are involved. Should a co owner alienate or
mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall
remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Carvajal v. Court of Appeals -the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage with respect to the co owners, shall be limited, by
mandate of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted
to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
He has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or
determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the
other co owners because his right over the thing is represented by
an abstract or Ideal portion without any physical adjudication
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject
property after the death of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. While under Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had the
right to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed
property, he could not dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his
children's consent. As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr.'s right
in the subject property is limited only to his share in the conjugal
partnership as well as his share as anheir on the other half of the
estate which is his deceased spouse's share. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract is void insofar as it extends to the undivided shares of his children
(Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because they did not give
their consent to the transaction. Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate
Mortgage constituted by Jose Sr. over the entire property without his co-
owners' consent is not necessarily void in its entirety. The right of the
petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited though only to the portion which may
be allotted to Jose Sr. in the event of a division and liquidation of the subject
property
2 [A.C. No. 9081. October 12, 2011.]
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, complainants,
vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS -Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife
Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña's legal advice on whether they
could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23
July 1983. Omaña then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay" (contract)’
-Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the
validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its
terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their
children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during
their union.
-Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a
 Page 291 of 320
law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was
not valid
-Omaña denied that she prepared the contract. Omaña alleged that Espinosa
returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to
persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff
forged her signature and notarized the contract then later claimed that it was
her former maid who notarized it
-Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her
oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.
-Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay”; Espinosa's desistance
ISSUE whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the
notarization of Marantal and Espinosa's "Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay."
RULING the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosa's desistance did not put an end to the
proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD
stated that Omaña had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of
her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the
law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD
This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void. 2(2) The Court has also ruled
that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and
the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership, 3(3) which is exactly what Omaña did in
this case.
3 [A.C. No. 9081. October 12, 2011.]
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, complainants,
vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, respondent
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS - 1998 Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) –
married
- 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code
- Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the
Superior Court of California on 2001. Petitioner also learned that on October
2001, respondent already remarried
- Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative
years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long-lasting and by
nature, incurable.
- 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition: Declaring the marriage
NULL and VOID from the beginning and Dissolving the regime of absolute
community of property. A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
- Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages 6 (the Rule)
does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution
of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RULING For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
1.      The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2.      They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3.      Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. 9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent
We agree with petitioner. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the
Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule
are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)
of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
 Page 292 of 320
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of
all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment
of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially
approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may
ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in
no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children
accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on
their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared
void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or
bigamous marriage was contracted. Under Article 40, [t]he absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus we
ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void. 11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages,
meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment
of a competent court in an action for annulment. 12 In both instances under
Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community
of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains 14 unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before
the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of
annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of
the trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
4 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
DOCTRIN Pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of
E gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the
surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the
property relationship between the former spouses, where: Each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
FACTS Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on
January 19, 1985.
During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a
250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located
in Makati City. Subsequently, TCT No. S-101473/T-510 covering the
purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 156283 of the ROD
 Page 293 of 320
of Makati City was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson
Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial, RTC Branch 94 in Quezon City
rendered a Decision declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson.
In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the ex-spouses' conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without
liquidating their conjugal partnership. On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together
with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP58 million loan
from petitioner Metrobank. To secure the obligation, Florencia and the
spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages on their properties,
including one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283.
Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of
TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a
document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on
April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal
properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include
the lot in question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan
obligation when it fell due, Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings.
Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale
on three issues of Remate.
At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest
bidder. Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed a
Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. In
it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged that
the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia's name, was paraphernal.
Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.
ISSUE WON the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondent
Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of
community of property of the spouses.
RULING No.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed
their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of
the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation
following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into
an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other
heirs of the deceased. In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil
Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses,
where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on
April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the
partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the
former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493.
Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of
Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only
to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is
null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his
undivided half.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank's right, as mortgagee and as the
successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2
undivided
portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other
undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the
lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property
rights "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
5 LOREA DE UGALDE, petitioner, vs. JON DE YSASI, respondent
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi
(respondent) got married without ante-nuptial agreement. Petitioner and
respondent separated sometime in April 1957. On 26 May
 Page 294 of 320
1964, respondent allegedly contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor
Smith. Petitioner further alleged that
respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal
properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. On 12 December 1984,
petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
against respondent. In particular, petitioner asked for her conjugal share in
respondent's inheritance as per the settlement of the estate of respondent's
parents, Juan Ysasi 6(6) and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, monthly support, the
annulment of all contracts, agreements, and documents signed and ratified by
respondent with third persons without her consent;Respondent countered
that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement which
provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be
deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. CFI approved the settlement.
Respondent further alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from
him
before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second
marriage
with Richard Galoway (Galoway). After Galoway's death, petitioner
contracted a third
marriage with Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of
estoppel, laches, and res judicata. RTC granted dismissed the petition of
Lorea. CA affirmed.
ISSUE whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in affirming the trial court's Decision which dismissed the action for
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains.
RULING Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband
and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution
of
the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
(Emphasis supplied)
The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the
parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal
partnership
of gains in accordance with Article 175
A judgment upon a compromise
agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive
only
upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who
are not
parties to it. The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner
and
respondent when it was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFI's
approval of
the Compromise Agreement on 6 June 1961 resulted in the dissolution of the
conjugal
partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent on even date
Denied.
6 [G.R. No. 138497. January 16, 2002]
IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner, vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for
APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC., against defendant
Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio, and alleged that sometime in
1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private respondent,
abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated
unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal
properties,, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein
petitioner since 1976. Defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their
period of cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune. As such, defendant
Lopez either did not place them in his name or otherwise removed,
transferred, stashed away or concealed them from the private-respondent. He
placed substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the name of
petitioner Relucio. a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein
petitioner on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action
against her. Motion to dismiss was denied. Court of Appeals denied the
petition for certiorari
ISSUE Whether respondents petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the
conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez
established a cause of action against petitioner.
RULING The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband. Nowhere in the
allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondents
causes of action were all against her husband.A real party in interest is one
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.[18] In this
case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special
Proceedings. She cannot be an indispensable party Nor can petitioner be a
necessary party
Granted.
 Page 295 of 320

chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for
7 PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and him to
ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent. First. Petitioner's
G. JARING, respondents husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months
before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court on October
DOCTRIN 13,
E 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21
Under the
FACTS Respondent Jaring entered into a sublease contract over a 14.5 hectare law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is one which is
fishpond chargeable
with Spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and Spouses Bienvenido and against their conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the
Remedios conjugal
Manuel, with the rent payable in two installments. All the sublessees signed partnership is liable for —
the All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
contract. When the unpaid balance remained unpaid, Spouses Alipio and conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
Spouses purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. 8(8)
Manuel were sued by private respondent for the collection of the said amount. When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically
Purita dissolved 9(9) and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement
Alipio moved to dismiss the complaint only against them pursuant to Section of estate
21, Rule proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, §2 which states:
3 of the Rules of Court, claiming that her husband Placido had died 10 Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — When the
months before marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community
the commencement of the action. The trial court denied the motion, holding property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
that she thereof
can be independently impleaded in the case with the exclusion of her paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both
deceased spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate
husband. Thereafter, judgment was rendered ordering petitioner and Spouses or
Manuel intestate proceedings of either.
to pay the unpaid balance without specifying whether payment should be The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of
made jointly administration
or solidarily. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed
dismissed. by the
It held that the rule that the action for recovery of money, debt or interest court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. 11(11)
thereon must Indeed, the
be dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment does not apply surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator such that conveyances
where made by
there are other defendants against whom the action should be maintained. him of any property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of
Hence, this the mass of
petition. conjugal partnership property is void.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the
ISSUE whether a creditor can sue the spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not
surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal mean,
partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for however, that the conjugal partnership continues.
the settlement of the estate of the decedent. It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is
chargeable
RULING The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which is primarily
spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of bound
money for its repayment. 17(17) Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement
 Page 296 of 320

of an or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil

obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as action".
representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff. It is clear that
such that the original complaint of private respondent against the
the concept of joint or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply. estate of Carlos Ngo was a suit against Carlos Ngo himself who was already
Granted. dead at
the time of the filing of said complaint. At that time, and this, private
respondent
8 SULPICIA VENTURA, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCIS J. admitted, no special proceeding to settle his estate had been filed in court. As
MILITANTE, in His Capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial such,
Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch XII, Cebu City; and JOHN UY, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over either the deceased Carlos Ngo
respondents or his
estate.
To cure this fatal defect, private respondent amended his original complaint.
DOCTRIN In
E his amended complaint, private respondent deleted the estate of Carlos Ngo
and
FACTS Private respondent John Uy filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and named petitioner as the defendant.
Damages the conjugal partnership
against the Estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by his surviving spouse Ms. terminates upon the death of either spouse. 28(29) After the death of one of
Sulpicia the spouses,
Ventura. Petitioner Sulpicia Ventura moved to dismiss the foregoing in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the conjugal property in order to
complaint on the pay
ground that the estate of Carlos Ngo has no legal personality. Private outstanding obligations of the partnership, such sale must be made in the
respondent manner and
opposed the said motion to dismiss and manifested that he was going to with the formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the
amend the property of
complaint. Public respondent then gave private respondent fifteen days to deceased persons. 29(30) Where a complaint is brought against the surviving
make spouse for
amendments in the complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property,
the said any
Order on the ground among others, that public respondent never acquired judgment obtained thereby is void. 30(31) The proper action should be in the
jurisdiction form of a
over the subject matter of the case considering that an action to recover a sum claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
of In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses,
money from a deceased person may only be heard by a probate court. there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not mean,
Thereafter, however, that
private respondent filed his Amended Complaint which substituted Sulpicia the conjugal partnership continues. 32(33) And private respondent cannot be
Ventura said to
as defendant, and claiming that it was Carlos Ngo and Sulpicia Ventura who have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may
incurred apply
an indebtedness from him. Acting on both issues, public respondent denied in court for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of
the the
Motion for Reconsideration and admitted the Amended Complaint. deceased Carlos Ngo if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed
to apply
ISSUE for administration or request that administration be granted to some other
person.
RULING We grant the petition.
First. Sec. 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provided that "only natural
 Page 297 of 320
9 [G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992.]
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and HO HANG (WITH ALIASES JOSE JO AND
CONSING), respondents.
DOCTRIN
E conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita.
FACTS The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three
women and fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, the herein
petitioner, claims to be his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter, Monina
Jo. The other two women and their respective offspring are not parties to this
case.
In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of
conjugal property, in addition to an earlier action for support, also against
him in the RTC.
The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
There was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of the
complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property. Jo elevated the
decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the trial court in
the complaint for support. The complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property was dismissed for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that
separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.
When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to
this Court for relief. The private respondent's petition for review on certiorari
was dismissed for tardiness in our resolution dated February 17, 1988, where
we also affirmed the legality of the marriage between Jose and Prima and the
obligation of the former to support her and her daughter.
ISSUE Whether or not there can be dissolution of conjugal partnership on the
ground of abandonment.
RULING Yes.
Art. 178(3) of the Civil Code has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family
Code. Under this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of
the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to
comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause,
even if said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and
without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able
to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations,
duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. This
idea is clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a
spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the
conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning.
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had
already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their
The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that
he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship.
Moreover, beginning 1968 until the final determination by this Court of the
action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give financial
support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with
the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed
to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their
conjugal property. Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135
of the Family Code, providing as follows: Art. 135. Any of the following shall
be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: . . . (6) That
at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least
one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the
finding of both the trial and respondent courts that the private respondent is
indeed their real owner. It is these properties that should now be divided
between him and the petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired
during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. As the private
respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must include such properties
properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered in
the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of
the respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in
favor of the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the conjugal property of the
petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered divided between
them, share and share alike.
This division shall be implemented by the trial court after determination of all
the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership, including those
that may have been illegally registered in the name of other persons.
D7.
1 [G.R. No. 187942. September 7, 2016.]
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF TUGUEGARAO, petitioner,
vs. FLORENTINA PRUDENCIO, Now Deceased, Substituted by Her
Heirs, Namely: Exequiel, Lorenzo, Primitivo, Marcelino, Juliana,
Alfredo and Rosario, All Surnamed Domingo; AVELINA
PRUDENCIO, Assisted by Her Husband Victoriano Dimaya;
ERNESTO PENALBER *(1) and RODRIGO TALANG; SPOUSES
 Page 298 of 320
ISIDRO CEPEDA and SALVACION DIVINI, Now Deceased,
Substituted by Her Heirs, Namely: Marcial, Pedro and Lina, All
Surnamed Cepeda, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E petitioner shall retain ownership of only 33,550 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot,
FACTS Felipe Prudencio (Felipe) married twice during his lifetime. With his first
wife, Elena Antonio (Elena), he begot five (5) children, namely: Valentina,
Eusebia, Paula, Florentina and Avelina. With his second wife, Teodora Abad
(Teodora), he had two (2) children namely: Felipe Prudencio, Jr. (Prudencio,
Jr.) and Leonora. During the marriage of Felipe and Elena, they acquired a
13.0476 hectares (or 130,476 sq. m.) parcel of land located at Sitio Abbot,
Barrio Imurung, Baggao, Cagayan (Cagayan lot. When Elena died, Felipe and
their children became co-owners of the property. Felipe then died intestate
during his second marriage. Upon his death, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and
Leonora executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the Estate of
the late Felipe with Waiver of Rights in favor of Teodora (Extra-
Judicial Partition). While the Extra-Judicial Partition acknowledged that the
Cagayan lot was acquired during the marriage of Felipe and Elena, it stated
that Felipe and Elena did not have any children who could inherit the
property; hence, Teodora and her children with Felipe are the only living
heirs by operation of law. The Extra-Judicial Partition also provided that
Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora waived their rights over the Cagayan lot in favor
of their mother Teodora. It was published in the Daily Mirror on October 22
and 29, 1969 and November 5, 1969. Accordingly, title to the Cagayan lot was
transferred to Teodora's name under TCT No. 14306. On May 16, 1972,
Teodora sold the Cagayan lot to respondents Spouses Isidro Cepeda and
Salvacion Divini (Spouses Cepeda). TCT No. 14306 was therefore cancelled,
and TCT No. 184375 was issued in favor of Spouses Cepeda.
On August 25, 1972, Spouses Cepeda sold the Cagayan lot to petitioner for
P16,500.00.  Thereafter, petitioner was issued TCT No. T-20084. On
September 15, 1972, respondents-appellees filed a Complaint for Partition
with Reconveyance against petitioner, Spouses Cepeda and Teodora,
Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora before the RTC. They alleged that they are the
children and grandchildren of Felipe by his first marriage. They asserted that
upon the death of Elena, they became the owners of Elena's conjugal share on
the Cagayan lot, while the other undivided half remained with Felipe. Upon
the death of Felipe, respondents-appellees then became owners as well of
Felipe's conjugal share in the property, together with Teodora, Prudencio, Jr.
and Leonora.
Respondents-appellees posited that they were fraudulently deprived of their
rightful shares in the estate of Felipe and Elena when the Extra-Judicial
Partition declared Teodora as the sole owner of the Cagayan lot. Thus, they
prayed that they be declared the owners pro indiviso of the undivided portion
of 10.2512 hectares of the Cagayan lot, and that this portion be reconveyed to
them.
RTC Held in favor of respondent-appellees. The RTC held that it was
impossible for Teodora and her children to not know that Felipe had
children/heirs by his first marriage.  Therefore, the execution of the Extra-
Judicial Partition was done in bad faith. In excluding the children of Felipe
with Elena, the partition is invalid and not binding upon them.
The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. It declared that
which is the area equivalent to Teodora's share. The remaining 96,926 sq. m.
(as modified by the CA from the RTC's previous ruling of 99,924.6 sq. m.)
should be reconveyed to respondents-appellees. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which was denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE Whether or not the action for partition with reconveyance filed by
respondents-appellees against petitioner should prosper.
RULING Yes.
Before the partition of the Cagayan lot among the surviving heirs, the
conjugal share of the surviving spouse shall first be deducted from
the conjugal property of the spouses because the same does not form
part of the estate of the deceased spouse.
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is dissolved
upon the death of either spouse. It shall then be subject to inventory
and liquidation, the net remainder of which shall be divided
equally between the husband and the wife.
Here, the Cagayan lot is the conjugal property of Elena and Felipe. Upon the
former's death, one-half (1/2) of the Cagayan lot automatically goes to the
latter as his conjugal share. The remaining one-half (1/2) forms part of the
estate of Elena and shall be divided equally between Felipe and his four (4)
surviving children with Elena,
in conformity with Article 996 of the Civil Code. Thus, Felipe shall receive
one-half (1/2) or 65,238 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot as his conjugal share and
one-fifth (1/5) or 13,047.6 sq. m. of the same lot as heir of Elena. Simply put,
Felipe is entitled to a total of 78,285.6 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot. Meanwhile,
respondents-appellees shall receive one-fifth (1/5) or 13,047.6 sq. m. each.
When Felipe obtained a second marriage, his 78,285.6 sq. m. share was
brought into his marriage with Teodora, such that the same formed part of
their conjugal partnership. Upon Felipe's death, Teodora became entitled to
one-half (1/2) of the 78,285.6 sq. m. or 39,142.8 sq. m. The remaining half
will compose the estate of Felipe, which will be divided equally among
Teodora, Prudencio Jr., Leonora and respondents-appellees — each of them
receiving one-seventh (1/7) of 39,142.8 sq. m.
Teodora then shall receive 44,734.63 sq. m. This is further increased by the
waiver of Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora of their rights over the estate of Felipe,
such that the aggregate share of Teodora will now be equivalent to 55,918.29
sq. m.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The October 21,
2008 Decision and May 11, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
 Page 299 of 320
G.R. CV No. 77100 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that:
(1) Petitioner is ORDERED to reconvey to respondents-appellees an area of
74,557.72 square meters as their pro indiviso share in the Cagayan lot; while
petitioner shall retain the remaining area of 55,918.29 square meters.
(2) Spouses Cepeda are ORDERED to return to petitioner the amount paid
corresponding to the 74,557.72 square meters share of respondents-appellees,
with legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed from the time
petitioner filed its Answer with Cross-Claim dated October 14, 1972 with the
RTC until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, the legal interest from July 1, 2013 until
finality of decision shall be at 6% per annum. After this decision becomes
final and executory, the applicable rate shall be 6% per annum until its full
satisfaction.
(3) The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City,
Branch 4, for partition of the Cagayan lot in accordance with this Decision.
2 [G.R. No. 200274. April 20, 2016.]
MELECIO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES GENARO
MOLINA and ELENA B. MOLINA, substituted by ESTER
MOLINA, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E conjugal properties without an actual partition being first done either by
FACTS In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property
in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18, 164
square meter parcel of land. The sale was annotated on the Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354 covering the subject property.
During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses
Genaro and Elena Molina (spouses Molina). On September 10, 1978 or 10
years after Flora’s death4, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the
spouses Molina to answer for his debts. The sale to the spouses Molina was
annotated at the OCT of the subject property.5 In 1986, Anastacio died.
In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio’s interest was registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 272967[[7]] and transferred the entire one-half
undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina.
Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer
and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership
(Complaint) against the spouses Molina on May 17, 1999.
Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the spouses Molina
to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could
not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora’s
consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.
ISSUE Whether or not there is an implied co-ownership among Flora’s heirs on the
conjugal properties pending liquidation and partition.
RULING Yes.
In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna, we held that the
properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the
regime of co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the heirs
of the deceased spouse until final liquidation and partition. The
surviving spouse, however, has an actual and vested one-half
undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of
determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and
partition of the conjugal partnership.
An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora’s surviving heirs,
including Anastacio, with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership
until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-
half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an
undivided interest.
Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership provides:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. (399) (emphases supplied)
Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the
agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely
sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subject property.
The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of
Anastacio’s interest.
The OCT annotation of the sale to the spouses Molina reads that "[o]nly the
rights, interests and participation of Anastacio Domingo, married to Flora
Dela Cruz, is hereby sold, transferred, and conveyed unto the said vendees for
the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) which pertains to an
undivided one-half (1/2) portion and subject to all other conditions specified
in the document x x x" (emphases supplied). At the time of the sale,
Anastacio’s undivided interest in the conjugal properties consisted of: (1) one-
half of the entire conjugal properties; and (2) his share as Flora’s heir on the
conjugal properties.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently,
Anastactio’s sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-
owners was not totally void, for Anastacio’s rights or a portion thereof were
thereby effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the
subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest. This result conforms
with the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must
be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut
ago, valeat quantum valere potest).
The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of
Anastacio in respect of any portion that might belong to the co-heirs after
liquidation and partition. The observations of Justice Paras cited in the case
 Page 300 of 320
of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. V. Servacio are instructive:
x x x [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would
pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it
turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets
then the whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the
property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in
the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the wife, then
that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the
other is not. Since all these can be determined only at the time the liquidation
is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is not
void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal properties
cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The
sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of course as to that
portion of the husband’s share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The
buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said
portion for the benefit of the husband’s other heirs, the cestui que trust ent.
Said heirs shall not be barred by prescription or by laches.
3 [G.R. No. 198908. August 3, 2015.]
VIRGINIA OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. DEOGRACIO OCAMPO,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
E E
FACTS On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo
(Deogracio) before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the
ground of psychological incapacity. On January 22, 1993, the trial court
rendered a Decision declaring the marriage between Virginia and Deogracio
as null and void, As to the couple's property relations, their conjugal
partnership of gains shall necessarily be dissolved and liquidated but since
the petitioner has not submitted any detailed and formal listing or inventory
of such property, the court cannot act now on the liquidation aspect. The
parties are given thirty (30) days to submit an inventory of their conjugal
partnership for the purpose of liquidation. On March 31, 1999, the trial court
directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried
properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual
issues with regard to said properties. Having failed to agree on a project of
partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties
adduced evidence in support of their respective stand. On January 13, 2004,
the trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties declared
by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing. CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Thus, the instant petition for review.
ISSUE Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal
partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
RULING No, Deogracio cannot be deprived of his share because the property regime
applicable here is Article 147. In a void marriage, as in those declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case.
The court a quo did not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article 147 of
the Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family home
and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that,
in the liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in common,
the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail. The
rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community (Article 102) or the conjugal partnership of gains (Article 129),
the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
law spouses or spouses of void marriages.
4 [G.R. No. 176492. October 20, 2014.]
MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, petitioner, vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO,
respondent.
DOCTRIN
FACTS Leonardo and Marietta’s marriage was declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Since there was no
more reason to maintain their co-ownership over their house and lot,
Leonardo asked Marietta for partition, but the latter refused, prompting him
to file a complaint for partition. Marietta claimed that that the subject
property had already been sold to their children, with whom majority of their
common children chose to remain. As evidence, she attached an unnotarized
deed of sale.
ISSUE Whether or not the house and lot can still be divided between Leonardo and
Marietta?
RULING Yes. The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been
declared void for psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the
spouses’ property relations. Here, the former spouses both agree that they
acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus,
it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
On the claim of Marietta that ownership over the house and lot is already
 Page 301 of 320
vested on their children by virtue of a Deed of Sale, it should be noted that
aside from the title to the property remains registered in the names of the
former spouses. Moreover, the deed of sale does not bear a notarization of a
notary public. Without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private,
due execution and authenticity must be sufficiently proven. This Marietta
failed to do. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common
by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules
on co-ownership.
5 DAVID A. NOVERAS, petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, respondent.
DOCTRIN
E indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
FACTS David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3
December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California,
United States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired American
citizenship.
David was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse
in San Francisco, California. During the marriage, they acquired properties in
the Philippines and in the USA.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines
in 2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million.
According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed
that David agreed to and executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia stating that:
1) the P1.1 Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be
paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia
P750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption
price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce and forfeit
all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
Philippines. David was able to collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the
Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition
for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA.
The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was
duly entered on 29 June 2005. The California court granted to Leticia the
custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA.
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their
marriage was entered by the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also
include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation,
including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal
partnership.
ISSUE WON the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property
should be granted.
RULING Yes.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is
undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Third and
more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the
California court in June 2005.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property
automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th
paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138.(Emphasis supplied).
Further, under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the
dissolution of the absolute community regime.
We agree with the appellate court that Philippine courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed,
Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the
share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines,
as well as the payment of their children's presumptive legitimes, which the
appellate court explained in this wise:
“Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the
Sampaloc property. While both claimed to have contributed to the
 Page 302 of 320
redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their
contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half
of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be
given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00 incurred in going to
and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the
amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly
received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to
settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same
had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally
in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or in the
respective amounts of P1,040,000.00.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of
legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother." The children are therefore entitled to
half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well
as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the
amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay
them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom”
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
6 LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO, petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO and VITTORIO C. ROMERO,
respondents.
DOCTRIN
E heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to
FACTS Petitioners allege that upon their father's death on 18 October 1974, their
mother, respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who
held several real and personal properties in trust for her children. Since that
year until the present, she continues to be the administrator of the properties,
businesses, and investments comprising the estate of her late husband.
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that several
Deeds of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are purportedly
conjugal properties of their parents.
Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their brother Vittorio —
through fraud, misrepresentation and duress — succeeded in registering the
properties in his name through Deeds of Sale executed by their mother,
Aurora.  Vittorio allegedly employed force and threat upon her, and even
administered drugs that rendered her weak and vulnerable. Thus, Aurora
signed the Deeds of Sale without reading or knowing their contents.
On 18 December 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title (Amended) against private
respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero. Respondents filed
their Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long after
the death of their father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot
be considered conjugal. They allege that the lots covered by TCT Nos. 290010,
290011, 113514, and Tax Declaration Nos. 16136 and 11639 were paraphernal
properties of Aurora which she had mortgaged. Vittorio purportedly had to
shell out substantial amounts in order to redeem them. The lots covered by
TCT Nos. 77223, 77224, and 77225 were sold by Aurora herself as attorney-in-
fact of her children.
RTC dismissed petitioner’ complaint. CA affirmed decision of RTC.
ISSUE Whether or not petitioners may file a separate civil action for annulment of
sale and reconveyance of title,despite the pendency of the settlement
proceedings for the estate of the late Judge Dante Y. Romero.
RULING Yes. The probate court has jurisdiction to determine the issues in the present
case.
While it is true that a probate court's determination of ownership over
properties which may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature,
this rule is applicable only as between the representatives of the estate and
strangers thereto. Indeed, as early as Bacquial v. Amihan, the court stated
thus:
. . . The rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not
protect the same, but not for a decision on their action. In the case of In re
Estate of the deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, Teresa Garcia vs.
Luisa Garcia, et al., 67 Phil., 353, this court held:
A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power
and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein
or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a
determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the
right of interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question on the
 Page 303 of 320
ownership or existence of the right or credit.
To this same effect are rulings in various states of the United States.
. . . That the probate court is without jurisdiction to try the title to property as
between the representatives of an estate and strangers thereto is too well
established bythe authorities to require argument.
There is also authority abroad that where the court is without jurisdiction to
determine questions of title, as for example, as between the estate and
persons claiming adversely, its orders and judgments relating to the sale do
not render the issue of title res judicata.
In any case, there is no merit to petitioners' claim that the issues raised in the
case at bar pertain to title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated
in a separate civil action. The issue before the court is not really one of title or
ownership, but the determination of which particular properties should be
included in the inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has
listed the properties alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties of
their parents and, therefore, part of the estate that was illegally sold to the
respondent. Some of these real properties identified seem to be the same real
properties that form part of the inventory of the estate in the intestate
proceedings.
Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as compulsory heirs, they
also seek to be the owners, pro indiviso, of the said properties. To anchor
their claim, they argue that the properties are conjugal in nature and hence
form part of their inheritance. For his defense, Vittorio contends that the lots
are the paraphernal properties of Aurora that she had mortgaged, and that
Vittorio subsequently redeemed.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that the
determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes
of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the probate court.
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the
allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part of their share in the
estate. To date, there has been no final inventory of the estate or final order
adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can
competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the
estate. It is only the probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership
and distribute the same to the heirs, after the debts of the estate have been
paid.
7 PAZ VS. REPUBLIC
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS On November 29, 2000, the petitioner brought a petition for the cancellation
of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 684 docketed as LRC Case No. 00-
059. The petition, ostensibly made under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529,
impleaded the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), Filinvest Development
Corporation (FDC), and Filinvest Alabang, Inc. (FAI) as respondents.
The petition averred that the petitioner was the owner of parcel of lands
registered in the name of the Republic, and included Lot 392 of the
Muntinlupa Estate with an area of approximately 244 hectares; that Lot 392
was segregated from OCT No. 684, resulting in the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 185552, also in the name of the Republic; that
FDC and FAI developed Lot 392 into a subdivision based on their joint
venture agreement with the Government; that pursuant to the joint venture
agreement, Lot 392 was further subdivided, causing the cancellation of TCT
No. 185552, and the issuance of TCTs for the resulting individual subdivision
lots in the names of the Republic and FAI; and that the subdivision lots were
then sold to third parties.
FDC and FAI moved to dismiss the petition for cancellation on the following
grounds,[4] to wit:
(1)   The serious and controversial dispute spawned by the Petition for
cancellation of title is litigable in an ordinary action outside the special and
limited jurisdiction of land registration courts. The Petition is thus removed
from the ambit of Sec. 108 of the Property Registration Decree which
requires, as an indispensable element for availment of the relief thereunder,
either unanimity of the parties or absence of serious controversy or adverse
claim. It authorizes only amendment and alteration of certificates of title, not
cancellation thereof;
(2)   Lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the persons of the respondents who
were not validly served with summons but only a copy of the Petition;
(3)   Docket fees for the Petition have not been paid.
(4) The Petition does not contain the requisite certificate of non-forum
shopping.
ISSUE Whether Section 108 of P.D. 1529, is applicable and the petition should not be
dismissed because it was exempt from the requirements of paying docket fees,
of service of summons, and of the certification against forum shopping due to
its not being an initiatory pleading.
RULING No.
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 reads as follows:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. No erasure,
 Page 304 of 320
alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the
entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation
of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of
First Instance. A registered owner or other person having interest in the
registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the
approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to
the court upon the ground that the registered interest of any description,
whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the
certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing
upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or an
error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on
any duplicate certificate: or that the same or any person in the certificate has
been changed or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as
married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of
heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned
registered land and has been dissolved has not yet convened the same within
three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and
the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in
interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry
or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief
upon such terms and conditions, requiring security and bond if necessary, as
it may consider proper; Provided,however, That this section shall not be
construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of
registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which
shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for
value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns without his or their written
consent. Where the owners duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar
petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section.
All petitions or motions filed under this section as well as any other provision
of this decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the
original case in which the decree of registration was entered.
Based on the provision, the proceeding for the amendment and alteration of a
certificate of title under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 is applicable in seven
instances or situations, namely: (a) when registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have
terminated and ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or been created
which do not appear upon the certificate; (c) when any error, omission or
mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on
any duplicate certificate; (d) when the name of any person on the certificate
has been changed; (e) when the registered owner has been married, or,
registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or
interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when a corporation,
which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the
same within three years after its dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable
ground for the amendment or alteration of title.
We agree with both the CA and the RTC that the petitioner was in reality
seeking the reconveyance of the property covered by OCT No. 684, not the
cancellation of a certificate of title as contemplated by Section 108 of P.D. No.
1529. Thus, his petition did not fall under any of the situations covered by
Section 108, and was for that reason rightly dismissed.
Moreover, the filing of the petition would have the effect of reopening the
decree of registration, and could thereby impair the rights of innocent
purchasers in good faith and for value. To reopen the decree of registration
was no longer permissible, considering that the one-year period to do so had
long ago lapsed, and the properties covered by OCT No. 684 had already been
subdivided into smaller lots whose ownership had passed to third persons.
Thusly, the petition tended to violate the proviso in Section 108 of P.D. No.
1529, to wit:
xxx Provided, however, That this section shall not be construed to give the
court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that
nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or
other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value in good faith, or
his heirs and assigns without his or their written consent. Where the owners
duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as
provided in the preceding section.
8 THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA, namely:
LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN
LORRAINE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA and ASUNCION, all
surnamed GO, represented by LEONORA B. GO, petitioners, vs. ESTER L.
SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140 square
meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.).
Twenty three years later,  Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio
Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land.
Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the
petitioners.
Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Rito's wife Dina B. Go) sold a
portion of the property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L.
Servacio (Servacio) for P5,686,768.00. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners
demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their
 Page 305 of 320
demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, 5(5) they
sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern
Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.'s renunciation, the
property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to
Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between
Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the
property because he had purchased it with his own money.
RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and
Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three
vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that
the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being
heirs of the late Marta.
RTc affirmed the validity of the sale
ISSUE Whether Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; and that the sale
by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior
liquidation.
RULING The sale is valid.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of
the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall
be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property
relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of
supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of
gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
Any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must
be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no
dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly
characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code.
Upon Marta's death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, and an
implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other
heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal
partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.  The ensuing
implied ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of
Marta's share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to
any specific portion of Marta's share without an actual partition of the
property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until
then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta's share. 1
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr.
had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
interest of his co-owners.
Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the
consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the
selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer
(Servacio) a co-owner of Marta's share.
This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of
a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability
of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other
 Page 306 of 320
laws." This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely
void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had
already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of
the sale.
In their separate comments, the respondents aver that each of the heirs had
already received "a certain allotted portion" at the time of the sale, and that
Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold only the portions adjudicated to and owned by
them. However, they did not present any public document on the allocation
among her heirs, including themselves, of specific shares in Marta's estate.
Neither did they aver that the conjugal properties has already been liquidated
and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a partition among the heirs of Marta,
the efficacy of the sale, and whether the extent of the property sold adversely
affected the interests of the petitioners might not yet be properly decided with
finality. The appropriate recourse to bring that about is to commence an
action for judicial partition, as instructed in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of
Appeals,  to wit:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell
his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights
of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner
of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for
the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third
person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it
[Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases
where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as
in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action
for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
9 SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH
AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO
DAGORO, respondents.
DOCTRIN
E 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However,
FACTS Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without
any known
debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages,
first with Lucia
Garcia (Lucia), and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April
24, 1924. Joaquin
and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose
(survived by three
children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on
February 9, 1926.
They also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by
her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with
improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and
874-(38255). Joseph,
a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and
had been
appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator. He was latter appointed by the
probate court and
was issued with letters of administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of
Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became
the pro indiviso
owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with
the exclusive
money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the
house were
shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant)
was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that considering
that the bulk of the
estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as
shown by TCT
No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was
married to
Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other
than their negative
allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second
marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties
belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification
of the October 23,
before the RTC
could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to
the CA. The CA
settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of
 Page 307 of 320
Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros. Moreover,  the CA the estate of Milagros in
the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court
for the probate
of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she
would receive from
Joaquin’s estate. CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this
case belong to the
first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title
were registered in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without
any known
debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages,
first with Lucia
Garcia (Lucia), and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April
24, 1924. Joaquin
and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose
(survived by three
children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on
February 9, 1926.
They also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by
her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with
improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and
874-(38255). Joseph,
a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and
had been
appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator. He was latter appointed by the
probate court and
was issued with letters of administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of
Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became
the pro indiviso
owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with
the exclusive
money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the
house were
shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant)
was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that considering
that the bulk of the
estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as
shown by TCT
No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was
married to
Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other
than their negative
allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second
marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties
belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification
of the October 23,
2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However,
before the RTC
could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to
the CA. The CA
settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of
Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros. Moreover,  the CA the estate of Milagros in
the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court
for the probate
of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she
would receive from
Joaquin’s estate. CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this
case belong to the
first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title
were registered in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without
any known
debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages,
first with Lucia
Garcia (Lucia), and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April
24, 1924. Joaquin
and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose
(survived by three
children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on
February 9, 1926.
They also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by
her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with
improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and
874-(38255). Joseph,
a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and
had been
appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator. He was latter appointed by the
probate court and
was issued with letters of administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
 Page 308 of 320
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of
Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became
the pro indiviso
owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with
the exclusive
money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the
house were
shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant)
was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that considering
that the bulk of the
estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as
shown by TCT
No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was
married to
Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other
than their negative
allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second
marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties
belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification
of the October 23,
2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However,
before the RTC
could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to
the CA. The CA
settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of
Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros. Moreover,  the CA the estate of Milagros in
the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court
for the probate
of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she
would receive from
Joaquin’s estate. CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this
case belong to the
first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title
were registered in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without
any known
debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages,
first with Lucia
Garcia (Lucia), and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April
24, 1924. Joaquin
and Lucia had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros, and Jose
(survived by three
children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on
February 9, 1926.
They also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by
her daughter
Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with
improvements in Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and
874-(38255). Joseph,
a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and
had been
appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator. He was latter appointed by the
probate court and
was issued with letters of administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong to the
conjugal partnership of
Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became
the pro indiviso
owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with
the exclusive
money of their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the
house were
shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant)
was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that considering
that the bulk of the
estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage as
shown by TCT
No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that decedent was
married to
Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence other
than their negative
allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second
marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties
belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification
of the October 23,
2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the heirs. However,
before the RTC
could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to
the CA. The CA
settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of
Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros.
 Page 309 of 320
CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the
first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title
were registered in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
ISSUE Whether or not the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction,
is vested
with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership
RULING Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the
probate of the will and/or settlement
of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule
is that such court
merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a
probate court or
one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong
to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased
but by title adverse
to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties
is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no
problem, but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to
an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of
title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency
and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a
testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice
to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are
all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent
to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
Verily, its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering
that the parties are
all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the
resolution of the
ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject
properties are
conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate
of Joaquin
10 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
DOCTRIN Pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of
E gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership among the
surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the
property relationship between the former spouses, where: Each co-owner
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
FACTS Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on
January 19, 1985.
During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a
250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located
in Makati City. Subsequently, TCT No. S-101473/T-510 covering the
purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 156283 of the ROD
of Makati City was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson
Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
 Page 310 of 320
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial, RTC Branch 94 in Quezon City
rendered a Decision declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null
and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson.
In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the ex-spouses' conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without
liquidating their conjugal partnership. On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together
with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP58 million loan
from petitioner Metrobank. To secure the obligation, Florencia and the
spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages on their properties,
including one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283.
Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of
TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a
document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on
April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal
properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include
the lot in question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan
obligation when it fell due, Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings.
Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale
on three issues of Remate.
At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest
bidder. Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed a
Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. In
it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged that
the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia's name, was paraphernal.
Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.
ISSUE WON the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondent
Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of
F.
community of property of the spouses.
RULING No.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed
their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of
the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation
following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into
an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other
heirs of the deceased. In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil
Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses,
where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on
April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the
partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the
former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493.
Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of
Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only
to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is
null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his
undivided half.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank's right, as mortgagee and as the
successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2
undivided
portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other
undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the
lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property
rights "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
1 DAVID A. NOVERAS, petitioner, vs. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, respondent.
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3
December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California,
 Page 311 of 320
United States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired American
citizenship.
David was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse
in San Francisco, California. During the marriage, they acquired properties in
the Philippines and in the USA.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines
in 2001. In December 2002, Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million.
According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed
that David agreed to and executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia stating that:
1) the P1.1 Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be
paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia
P750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption
price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce and forfeit
all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
Philippines. David was able to collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the
Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition
for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA.
The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was
duly entered on 29 June 2005. The California court granted to Leticia the
custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA.
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their
marriage was entered by the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also
include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation,
including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal
partnership.
ISSUE WON the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property
should be granted.
RULING Yes.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had
indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is
undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Third and
more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the
California court in June 2005.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property
automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th
paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138.(Emphasis supplied).
Further, under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the
dissolution of the absolute community regime.
We agree with the appellate court that Philippine courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed,
Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the
share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in the Philippines,
as well as the payment of their children's presumptive legitimes, which the
appellate court explained in this wise:
“Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the
Sampaloc property. While both claimed to have contributed to the
redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their
contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from the
community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half
of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be
given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00 incurred in going to
and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the
amount of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be
allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly
received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to
settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same
had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally
in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or in the
respective amounts of P1,040,000.00.
 Page 312 of 320
xxx xxx xxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of
legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother." The children are therefore entitled to
half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well
as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the
amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay
them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom”
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
2 VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner, vs. DITA MAQUILAN, respondent
DOCTRIN
E guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
FACTS Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a
blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However,
petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair
with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of
adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently,
both the private respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime
charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of
Gains and Damages, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the
petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent
entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT providing for the sharing in the
conjugal assets.
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated January 15, 2002,
praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the
reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the
respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently
and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the Compromise
Agreement.
G.
ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY
SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS CONVICTED OF ADULTERY, GIVING
THE CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY,
VALID AND LEGAL.
RULING Yes.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected
voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned
Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a
separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even
if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is
subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and
other persons with interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.
The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction.
Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil
interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender
during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of
such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read
with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of
prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon. It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime
of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of
such property inter vivos.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise Agreement
is VALID without prejudice to the rights of all creditors and other persons
with pecuniary interest in the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains.
1 JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO,
petitioners, vs. LUIS G. ANSON, respondent.
 Page 313 of 320
DOCTRIN
E
FACTS On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson filed a Complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-
Salgado and Gerard Salgado along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya and Gaston
Maya, seeking the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis.
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late
Severina de Asis-Anson. They were married in a civil ceremony on December
28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to
their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's
daughter from a previous relationship.
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties
located in San Juan, Metro Manila.
According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him
and Severina, the properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But
without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate
Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos.
20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of
title over the said properties. When Severina died on September 21, 2002,
Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Severina de Asis, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She
secured new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637
and 8003.
Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful
share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of
Severina.
In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, which the trial court
considered as the Answer of her husband, Gerard, Jo-Ann countered that she
was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew
however that Luis and Severina had a common-law relationship which they
both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agreement
executed in November 1980. This was implemented through another
Partition Agreement executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received
the properties apportioned to him by virtue of the said agreement while the
properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by
Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were under Severina's
name only and she was described therein as single without reference to any
husband.
ISSUE 1. Whether or not the marriage between Luis and Severina is valid?
2. What property regime is applicable to Luis and Severina’s union?
RULING 1.    No.
A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina
reveals that no marriage license number was indicated therein.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license
must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties.
Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on
the marriage contract itself, with a false statement therein that the
marriage is of an exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary
was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that
the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a
valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.
2. As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to
marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their
marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license,
Article 144 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are
the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147
of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license."
"Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household.'"
Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply
in the partition of the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated
under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those
to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to
how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that
"partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement
to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by
Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.
2 In Re: A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC [Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu]
 Page 314 of 320

and A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC [Violation of Judge Ildefonso Suerte, DOCTRINE

Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu of Administrative
Order No. 36-2004 dated March 3, 2004], Prosecutor MARY ANN FACTS
T. CASTRO-ROA, respondent.
ISSUE
DOCTRIN
E RULING

FACTS Castro-Roa married Mr. Rocky Rommel D. Roa (Mr. Roa) on March 30, 1993
and had two children together. 5

On June 5, 2000, Castro-Roa filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of DOCTRINE

Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. FACTS

ISSUE
ISSUE What property regime govern the spouses after their marriage was dissolved
RULING
under Section 36 of the Family Code?

6
RULING Dissolved marriages under Article 45 are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, unless the parties
agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered DOCTRINE
into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, FACTS
there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. This is not the case for the nullity of ISSUE
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. Particularly, Articles 147 and RULING
148 of the Family Code govern the property relations of void marriages; while
Articles 50 and 51 govern the property relations of voidable marriages under
Article 45. 7

DOCTRINE
3
FACTS
DOCTRINE
ISSUE
FACTS
RULING
ISSUE

RULING 8 G.R. No. 178044               January 19, 2011

ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
4
DOCTRIN
 Page 315 of 320
E cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
FACTS  Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent)
were married on January 14, 1998 before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of
Las Piñas City.
 On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to
give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility
to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and
gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
 Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and
would at times become violent and hurt him.
 RTC – granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage, thereby
dissolving the regime of absolute community of property. As ruled
by the RTC, a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE WON the RTC erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RULING
 The petition has merit.
 Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family
Code.
 We agree with petitioner.
 Article 147 of the Family Code provides: “Article 147. When a man
and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.”
 When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children.
 In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
 For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements
must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void.
 All these elements are present in this case and there is no question
that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.
 We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
 The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family
Code.
 Section 19(1) of the Rule provides: “Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the
court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment
shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.”
 It is clear from the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies
only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code.
 In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family
Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
9 G.R. No. 133743             February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 134029             February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
 Page 316 of 320
DOCTRIN
E 
FACTS  The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T.
San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province
of Laguna.
 During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
 His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.
 Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American
citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, U.S.A., which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973.
 On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992.
 Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
 On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that respondent has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
 Respondent presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
 RTC – respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for
letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid
in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino
citizen
 CA – reversed RTC. It held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to
marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code. It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee
was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to
contract a subsequent marriage with respondent.
ISSUE WON respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
RULING  The petition lacks merit.
On the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue
of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before
the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
 The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the
legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving
spouse.
 However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
 With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law.
 As stated in another case, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
 Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
 In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person
who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners.
 If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered
as a co-owner under Article 144  of the Civil Code.
 This provision governs the property relations between parties who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void from the beginning.
 It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry.
 Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
 Page 317 of 320
contrary is proven.
 Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the
divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article
148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of
the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry.
 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,  we held that even if the cohabitation
or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs.   should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they
 The Court described the property regime under this provision as
follows: “We find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.”
10 G.R. No. 152716             October 23, 2003
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
DOCTRIN
E creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire
FACTS  This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code
filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno
Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of Makati in March 1997.
 After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of property.
 The trial court also ruled that the conjugal partnership of property
existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof, a regime
of complete separation of property between the said spouses is
established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Family Code, without prejudice to the rights previously acquired by
creditorts.
 The trial court also found several properties which are excluded from
the conjugal properties: (1) Bacolod property; and (2) Suite 204 of
LCG Condominium.
 As to the monthly rentals prior to the issuance of this Order of the
subject properties, namely the Ground Floor Front (Friday’s Club),
Ground Floor Rear Apartment and Upper Basement at LGC
Condominium, all leased by Bar 4 Corporation, the trial court ruled
that the same shall be shared by the parties in common, in
proportion to one-half each or share and share alike, after deducting
all expenses for Income Taxes, Business Permits, Realty Taxes,
Municipal License fees, clearances, etc.
 Petitioner’s contention – Suite 204 was purchased on installment
basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in
accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
 Trial court held that since the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership
own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE The ownership of Suite 204 of LCG Condominium and how the properties
acquired by petitioner and respondent should be partitioned.
RULING  We give more credence to petitioner’s submission that Suite 204 was
acquired during the parties’ cohabitation.
 Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property
should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
 Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision
during their cohabitation.
 For Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void.
 All these elements are present in the case at bar.
 It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any
impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each
other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with
respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their
marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the
Family Code because of respondent’s psychological incapacity to
comply with essential marital obligations.
 The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was
purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when
petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it
should be considered as common property of petitioner and
respondent.
 As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner
and respondent, we hold that the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership should apply.
 There is nothing in the records that support the pronouncement of
the trial court that the parties have agreed to divide the properties
into three—1/3 share each to the petitioner, the respondent and their
children. Petitioner, in fact, alleges in her petition before this Court
 Page 318 of 320
that the parties have agreed on a four-way division of the properties
—1/4 share each to the petitioner and the respondent, and 1/4 share
each to their two children.
 In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite 204 of
LCG Condominium is a common property of petitioner and
respondent and the property regime of the parties should be divided
in accordance with the law on co-ownership.
11 G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO,
respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
DOCTRIN
E has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
FACTS
 During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he
contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had two offsprings,
namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño, with whom
he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
back in 1982.
 He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
 Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies.
 Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.”
 Respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS
Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).”
 On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case
for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao
praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half
of the P146,000.00.
 Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased
took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and
the deceased.
 RTC – ruled in favor of Susan Yee, ordering petitioner to pay ½ to
respondent.
 CA – affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE Who between petitioner or respondent is entitled to the benefits of the
deceased Cariño.
RULING  CA decision is reversed.
 The SC is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity
of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death
benefits” of the deceased.
 Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage
of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage
void ab initio.
 In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the
license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage.
 The presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured
the required marriage license.
 However, it does not follow from the foregoing disquisition that
since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab
initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee.
 To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also
be void.
 Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does
not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent
Susan Yee.
 The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased void.
 The marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.
 One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the
separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable
property regime.
 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage.”
 In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-
ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him
or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the
 Page 319 of 320
home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime.
 Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during
the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148
is therefore in order.
 Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could
not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the
acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the
same.
 By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife
of the deceased is not one of them.
 As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies
to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license.
 In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and
salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be
owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other
did not contribute thereto.
 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by
the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a
co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share
one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present
case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good
faith.
 Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go
to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other
half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to
his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
12 G.R. No. 122749 J       uly 31, 1996
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDEZ, respondents.
VITUG, J.:p
DOCTRIN Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
E live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share
in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation.
FACTS  Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January
1971.
 Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family code.
 The trial court granted the petition, ruling that the marriage of
petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez
is declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their
essential marital obligations and that the parties are directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation their common properties.
 Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision
directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code.
She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions
without marriage."
 RTC’s clarification – Consequently, considering that Article 147 of
the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by
both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint
efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares,
plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their
properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and
partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall
apply.
 In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the
family dwelling, the trial court said: “Considering that this Court has
already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as
null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of
 Page 320 of 320

petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
ownership. The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter
Code finds no application since Article 102 refers to the procedure case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation
for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.
129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute  The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying
community of property.” paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, relates only, by its
explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void
ISSUE What law must govern the parties. marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of
nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
RULING  The trial court correctly applied the law. void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.
 In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property  The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their
be, of the Family Code. nullity.
 This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage
or without the benefit of marriage.
 The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the
law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e.,
any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of
the Code.
 Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts.
 A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said
party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household."
 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
 When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to
marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as
husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions.
 Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to
another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage.
If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed.
 The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute