[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and

MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA,
in their capacities as founding members of the People's
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents.

SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL

ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-
intervenors.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;

CERTIORARI; COMELEC'S FAILURE TO ACT ON MOTION TO DISMISS
AND ITS INSISTENCE TO HOLD ON TO THE PETITION RENDERED RIPE
AND VIABLE THE PETITION UNDER SECTION 2 OF RULE 65 OF
THE RULES OF COURT. — Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco,
the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper
for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC. . . It must be recalled that intervenor
Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the
petition. The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after
having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12
December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda
or oppositions/memoranda. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion
to dismiss and its insistence to hold onto the petition rendered ripe and viable
the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. ID.; ID.; THE COURT MAY BRUSH ASIDE TECHNICALITIES OF
PROCEDURE IN CASES OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE. — The
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental
importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.: A Party's
standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised.
In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this
technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if
we must, technicalities of procedure.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; AMENDMENTS
OR REVISIONS; PROVISION ON THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO
DIRECTLY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, NOT
SELF-EXECUTORY. — Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-
executory. In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated: Without implementing legislation Section 2
cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a
mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last
analysis it still is dependent on congressional action. Bluntly stated the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of
the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated
otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide
for its implementation.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; R.A. 6735; INTENDED TO COVER INITIATIVE TO
PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. — We agree that R.A.
No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the
committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of Representatives on the basis
of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with
the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of
the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the subject
matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under
Section 3 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 solely, dealt
with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate
Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently
approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of
Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONGRESS, INVESTED WITH THE POWER TO
PROVIDE FOR THE RULES IMPLEMENTING THE EXERCISE OF THE
RIGHT. — There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement
the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative
act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the
Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of
Article XVII then reading: "The Congress shall by law provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right with the Congress shall provide for
the implementation of the exercise of this right." This substitute amendment
was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how
[the right] is to be carried out."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE POWER
AND DUTY OF CONGRESS TO PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT. — First, Contrary to the assertion of
public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the word
"Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative
and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions.
That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out
earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND.
The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve,
or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.
They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."' . . . Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the
Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as
one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered
voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other
systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution. Section 5 paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, a statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approve or
rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as
among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to
be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. . . . The use of the
clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended
or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier,
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Third. While the Act
provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle, II) and for
Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to
fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that
in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws. . . . The foregoing
brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are
fatal and. cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
[the] Act."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBTITLING OF THE ACT, NOT ACCURATE. — A
further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate.
Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum
are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, (2) that portion
of Section 1] (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the
legislative bodies of local governments, and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it
applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be
petitions for both national and local initiative and referendum.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 18 ON AUTHORITY OF COURTS
UNDER SUBTITLE ON LOCAL INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM,
MISPLACED. — Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local
Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, since the provision therein applies to
both national and local initiative and referendum.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILED TO GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION ON THE
SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT BEING THE
PARAMOUNT SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE. — While R.A. No. 6735 exerted
utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of
initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them
special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Upon the other hand, as
to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions the word "Constitution" in Section
2. (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration
of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the
process by which the proposition, in an initiative on the Constitution may be
approved or rejected by the people., (d) reiterates the constitutional
requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e)
provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition. There was,
therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount
system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a
reluctant lip service.
 10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARGUMENT THAT
INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION IS SUBSUMED
UNDER SUBTITLE ON NATIONAL INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM, NOT
ACCEPTABLE. — We cannot accept the argument that
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope.
Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III
(Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the
classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved,
but on its nature and character. It is national initiative," if what is proposed to
be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can
pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into national and local is
actually based on Section 3 of the Act.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC DOES NOT HAVE THE POWER TO
VALIDLY PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT
THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DIRECTLY
PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION UNDER R.A. 6735. —
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It
does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for
the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by
the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a
law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DELFIN PETITION, DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT
DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SIGNATURES OF THE REQUIRED NUMBER
OF VOTERS. — Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must
be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required
number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered
signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance
in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition
cannot be deemed validly initiated.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DELFIN PETITION, NOTHING MORE THAN A
MERE SCRAP OF PAPER. — The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a
petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en
banc. . . . Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No.
6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given
cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have
known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the
said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition
was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December
1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time,
energy, and resources.
14. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ; DELEGATION
OF POWER; WHAT HAS BEEN DELEGATED CANNOT BE DELEGATED;
EXCEPTIONS THEREOF. — The rule is that what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non
delegari potest. The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows: (1)
Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of
the Constitution; (2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under
Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at
large; (4) Delegation to local governments; and (5) Delegation to
administrative bodies.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR VALID DELEGATION;
SUFFICIENT STANDARD; CONSTRUED; R.A. 6735 MISERABLY FAILED
TO SATISFY BOTH REQUIREMENTS. — In every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable
— to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then
invalid.
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; AMENDMENTS
OR REVISIONS: R.A. 6735; SUFFICIENTLY IMPLEMENTS THE RIGHTS
OF THE PEOPLE TO INITIATE AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION THRU INITIATIVE. — I submit that R.A. No.
6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to
the Constitution thru initiative. . . . We need not torture the text of said law to
reach the conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to this prerogative of
the people. First, the policy statement declares: "Sec. 2. Statement of Policy.
— The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements and guaranteed." Second, the law defines
"initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to
the  Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election
called for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an
initiative on the  Constitution is approved or rejected by the people." Third, the
law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend
the Constitution. Section 5(b) states that "(a) petition for an
initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%)
of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein." It also states that
"(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter." Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment.
Section 9(b) states that "(t)he proposition in an
initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENTLY STATES THE POLICY AND
STANDARDS TO GUIDE THE COMELEC IN PROMULGATING THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE LAW; CASE AT
BAR. — R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to
guide the COMELEC in promulgating the law's implementing rules and
regulations of the law. . . . In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are
bright-lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20 look at the law cannot miss
them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible ink. The policy and
standards can also be found in no less than Section 2, Article XVII of
the  Constitution on Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to
hold that the standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are insufficient for in
other cases we have upheld as adequate more general standards such as
"simplicity and dignity," "public interest," "public welfare," "interest of law and
order," "justice and equity," "adequate and efficient instruction," "public
safety," "public policy," "greater national interest, "protect the local consumer
by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates," and "promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in government." A due regard and respect to the
legislature, a co-equal and coordinate branch of government, should counsel
this Court to refrain from refusing to effectuate laws unless they are clearly
unconstitutional.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 MERELY
PROVIDES THE PROCEDURE TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICY OF R.A.
6735, HENCE, DID NOT VIOLATE THE RULES ON VALID DELEGATION. —
In enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred
its power to enact the law implementing people's initiative to COMELEC. A
close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided
the procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that the rules of procedure to enforce
the people's initiative can be delegated. . . . The prohibition against the
legislature is to impair the substantive right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution. It is not, however, prohibited from legislating
the procedure to enforce the people's right of initiative or to delegate it to
another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARGUMENT ON LACK OF SUB-
TITLE ON PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION,
SHOULD BE GIVEN THE WEIGHT OF HELIUM. — The argument that R.A.
No. 6735 does not include people's initiative to amend the Constitution simply
because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the weight of
helium. Again, the hoary rule in statutory construction is that headings
prefixed to titles, chapters and sections of a statute may be consulted in aid of
interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom are entitled to very little weight,
and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LAPSES IN R.A. 6735 ARE TO BE EXPECTED,
FOR LAWS ARE NOT ALWAYS WRITTEN IN IMPECCABLE ENGLISH. — It
is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained interpretation
of R.A. No. 6735 to defeat its intent which it itself concedes is to implement
people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. Thus, it laments
that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant to the Policy
thrust of Section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not accurate. These
lapses are to be expected for laws are not always written in impeccable
English. Rightly, the  Constitution does not require our legislators to be word-
smiths with the ability to write bills with poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa
or in lyrical prose like Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good
policy not to refuse to effectuate the intent of a law on the ground that it is
badly written. As the distinguished Vicente Francisco reminds us: "Many laws
contain words which have not been used accurately. But the use of inapt or
inaccurate language or words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative
intention can be ascertained. The same is equally true with reference to
awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical expressions, that is, such expressions
and words will be construed as carrying the meaning the legislature intended
that they bear, although such a construction necessitates a departure from the
literal meaning of the words used."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION AGAINST RESPONDENTS PEDROSAS
SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION.
— The petition should be dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas. The
inclusion of the Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show
that the case at bar started when respondent Delfin alone and by himself filed
with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials by People's Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the petition. .
. . Petitioners sued the COMELEC, Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and
Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of the People's
Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an
original action for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction. The petition on its face states no cause of action
against the Pedrosas. The only allegation against the Pedrosas is that they
are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to undertake the
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
7 ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SOLICITATION OF SIGNATURES IS A RIGHT
GUARANTEED IN BLACK AND WHITE BY SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE XVII
OF THE CONSTITUTION. — One need not draw a picture to impart the
proposition that in soliciting signatures to start a people's initiative to amend
the  Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act. Their
solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed in black and white by Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution which provides that ". . . amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
. . . ." This right springs from the principle proclaimed in Section 1, Article II of
the Constitution that in a democratic and republican state "sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The
Pedrosas are part of the people and their voice is part of the voice of the
people. They may constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but no power
can trivialize them for sovereignty is indivisible.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENTS' RIGHT OF SOLICITING
SIGNATURES TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION, CANNOT BE ABRIDGED
WITHOUT ANY IFS AND BUTS. — Section 16 of Article XIII of
the Constitution provides: "The right of the people and their organizations to
effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and
economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall by law,
facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms." This is
another novel provision of the 1987 Constitution strengthening the sinews of
the sovereignty of our people. In soliciting signatures to amend
the  Constitution, the Pedrosas are participating in the political decision-
making process of our people. The  Constitution says their right cannot be
abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question mark on their
right.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENTS' CAMPAIGN TO AMEND
THE CONSTITUTION IS AN EXERCISE OF THEIR FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND EXPRESSION AND THEIR RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT
FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES. — The Pedrosas' campaign to amend
the  Constitution is an exercise of their freedom of speech and expression. We
have memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental laws from
the Malolos Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and
reiterated in our rulings that freedom of speech is a preferred right, the matrix
of other important rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom speech
enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and let think. For this
reason, the Constitution encourages speech even if it protects the
speechless.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENTS, RIGHT TO SOLICIT SIGNATURES
TO START A PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE TO AMEND
THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT DEPEND ON ANY LAW. — It is thus
evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a people's
initiative to amend the Constitution does not depend on any law, much
less on R.A. No. 6735 or COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. No law, no
Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status quo. To be sure,
there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions.
Change is the predicate of progress and we should not fear change. Mankind
has long recognized the truism that the only constant in life is change and so
should the majority.
11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE;
THE INTENT OF R.A. 6735 IS TO IMPLEMENT THE PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE
TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION. — Our effort to discover the meaning
of R.A. No. 6735 should start with the search of the intent of our lawmakers. A
knowledge of this intent is critical for the intent of the legislature is the law and
the controlling factor in its interpretation. Stated otherwise, intent is the
essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment. . . . Since it is
crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people's
initiative to amend the  Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law
as it was intended by the legislature. We have ruled that once intent is
ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the law and this ruling is as old as the mountain. We have also held
that where a law is susceptible of more than one interpretation, that
interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the manifest intent of the
legislature will be adopted. The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore
be reasonably construed to effectuate its intent to implement the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. . . . All said, it is difficult to agree with the
majority decision that refuses to enforce the manifest intent or spirit of R.A.
No. 6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It
blatantly disregards the rule cast in concrete that the letter of the law is its
body but its spirit is its soul.
12. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; DELEGATION
OF POWER; SUFFICIENT STANDARD; PURPOSE THEREOF. — Former
Justice Isagani A. Cruz similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is
intended to map out the boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the
legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be
pursued and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is to prevent
a total transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to the
delegate."
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT HAS PRUDENTIALLY REFRAINED
FROM INVALIDATING ADMINISTRATIVE RULES ON THE GROUND OF
LACK OF ADEQUATE STANDARD. — A survey of our case law will show
that this Court has prudentially refrained from invalidating administrative
rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their
promulgation. As aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself
does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend backward to
locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from
constitutional infirmity.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; AMENDMENTS
OR REVISIONS; R.A. 6735; DELFIN PETITION, UTTERLY DEFICIENT. —
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the
constitutional imperatives, the petition would rather have much of its burden
passed on, in effect, to the COMELEC. The petition would
require COMELEC to schedule "signature gathering all over the country," to
cause the necessary publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and
local circulation," and to instruct "Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions
of the Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED BY THE
COURT SHOULD BE HELD TO COVER ONLY THE DELFIN PETITION. —
The TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made
permanent under the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition
and must not be so understood as having intended or contemplated to
embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is
clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.
FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; AMENDMENTS
OR REVISIONS; R.A. 6735; AMPLY COVERS AN
INITIATIVE ON THE CONSTITUTION. — Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise
known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act" amply covers an
initiative on the Constitution. In its definition of terms, Republic Act No.
6735 defines initiative as "the power of the people to propose amendments to
the  constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election
called for the purpose." The same section, in enumerating the three systems
of initiative, included in "initiative on the  constitution which refers to a petition
proposing amendments to the  constitution." Paragraph (e) again of Section 3
defines "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which
an initiative on the  constitution is approved or rejected by the people." And as
to the material requirements for an initiative on the Constitution, Section 5(b)
distinctly enumerates the following: "A petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number
of the registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative distinct must
be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein. Initiative on the constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years
from the ratification of 1987 Constitution and only once every five years
thereafter." These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the
intent being to provide for the implementation of the right to propose an
amendment to the Constitution by way of initiative. "A legal provision," the
Court has previously said, "must not be construed as to be a useless
surplusage, and accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to
the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon". . . . Clearly then, Republic
Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the constitution. Any other construction as
what petitioners foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and
spirit behind the enactment.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC CANNOT TAKE ANY
ACTION ON DELFIN PETITION BECAUSE IT IS UNACCOMPANIED BY
THE REQUIRED PERCENTAGE OF REGISTERED VOTERS; CASE AT
BAR. — I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on Elections, at
present, cannot take any action (such as those contained in the Commission's
orders dated December 6, 9, and 12, 1996 [Annexes B, C and B-1 ])
indicative of its having already assumed jurisdiction over private respondents'
petition. This is so because from the tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it
would appear that proof of procurement of the required percentage of
registered voters at the time the petition for initiative is filed, is a jurisdictional
requirement. Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the
required signatures. This defect notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the
refiling of their petition once compliance with the required percentage is
satisfactorily shown by private respondents. In the absence, therefore, of an
appropriate petition before the Commission on Elections, any determination of
whether private respondents' proposal constitutes an amendment or revision
is premature.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; EVERY PART OF THE STATUTE
MUST BE INTERPRETED WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONTEXT. — It is a
rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be construed together with the
other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be interpreted in
isolation. The legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the
statute as a whole.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1987 CONSTITUTION; AMENDMENTS
OR REVISIONS; R.A. 6735; TAKEN TOGETHER AND INTERPRETED
PROPERLY, THE CONSTITUTION, R.A.
6735 AND COMELEC RESOLUTION 2300 ARE SUFFICIENT TO
IMPLEMENT CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVES. — While R.A. 6735 may not
be a perfect law it was — as the majority openly concedes — intended by the
legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to
effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. I completely agree with the inspired
and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo
J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently implements
the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views,
which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with
this Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority vs. Commission on Elections, that "provisions for initiative . . . are
(to be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not
hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby'; and
in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's
initiatives ought to be rejected."
2. ID.; ID.; ID .; ID.; MAJORITY'S POSITION ALL TOO SWEEPING
AND ALL TOO EXTREMIST. — I find the majority's position all too sweeping
and all too extremist. It is equivalent to burning the whole house to
exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What
Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not
thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly
and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of
initiative does not justify a ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right
way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC CANNOT ENTERTAIN ANY PETITION
IN THE ABSENCE OF THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF SIGNATURES. —
Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of
signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines
with at least 3% in every legislative district — no public funds may be spent
and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend
the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition
absent such signatures.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WISELY EMPOWERED
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS. — No law can completely and absolutely cover all
administrative details. In recognition of this, R.A. 6735 wisely empowered
the Commission on Elections "to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant
thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such
Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and
local laws," not by the incumbent Commission on Elections by one then
composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo E.
Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara
B. Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed resolution 2300 have
retired from the Commission, and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto
them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort to give life to a
cherished right of our people.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE COURT HAS NO POWER TO RESTRAIN
ANYONE FROM EXERCISING THEIR RIGHT OF INITIATIVE. — The Court
has no power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative. The right
to propose amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of
free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and
despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to
conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, "I may disagree
with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." After all,
freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes
wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate."

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J  :p

FACTS:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for

prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of initiative was
unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars
before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986
Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent 1 and the main
sponsor 2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of
the Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for
both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by
Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a
constitutional convention. 4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed,
we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition
to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for
an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of
general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the
Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the
Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a group of citizens desirous to avail of the
system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of
the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in
proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as
required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be
established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election
registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that
before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is
necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first
fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform
the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the
said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be
published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control
and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be
amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7 Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and
Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the
provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted
to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total
number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with
the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the
number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman,
issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and
the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of
general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and
(b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following
appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor
Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers and representatives
of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-
Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory
petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the
oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five
days. 13
 On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this
special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend
the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290
entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments
by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24
November 1995, is still pending before the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of
initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which
are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend
the Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo
Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech
delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that
law which can be considered as implementing [the
provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have
been obviously left to a separate law."
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law
after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only
laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect
only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991
to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since
the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the
exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to
the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits
constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's
initiative. 
cdtai

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's

initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government department,
agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition,
the petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin
Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses
to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at
least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses
which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the
transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised
demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a
taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to
comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice;
and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to
amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty. Quadra, filed their
Comment 15 on the petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO
THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF
VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE COMELEC GRANTS
THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE
THE COMELEC."
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE
PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR
PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO
THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM
OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND
HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS
ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY
LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY"
PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS . COMELEC, ET . AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS
THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE
INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
 SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP.
ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO.
2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP.
ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE
RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC
BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO.
125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID:
"THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY
SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES
AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL
NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO
THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE
PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS
ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF
OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS
ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW
AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413,
2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G.
BERNAS, SJ.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own
behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion that the instant petition
is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution' . . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December
1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally
necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put
the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and
function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintain as
follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No.
6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution.
The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since
subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
 (2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the
proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of
the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is
contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which
grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which
empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but
mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a
few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only
those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul
the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers
petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can
give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be
simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund
requirements for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will
be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2
January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly
affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which
enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes
initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5
repeatedly mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not
necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in scope, that
system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked
pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was
provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material
proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere
amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof.
 (5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The
rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A.
No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the
temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the
Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents
through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the
counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the
Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for
Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to
file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the
case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity
and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the
motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an
Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to,
but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, SJ., 18 it would involve a change from a political philosophy that
rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and
although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect
other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the
State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public
service and prohibiting political dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done
by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the
limits provided for all other national and local elective officials are
based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena
to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of
leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers
in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common good";
hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision
of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative
particularly in a conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a
fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they are
dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a
premium for good performance. 20
 (4) R.A. No 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called
the enabling law that implements the people's initiative on amendments
to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the
petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be
filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e)
the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide
and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or
question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in
the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h)
the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (i) the holding of a
plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative.
Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or
remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is
without authority to legislate the procedure for a people's initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively
pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a
legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient
standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that
implements the people's right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law
is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-
authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon.
He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of
that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he
contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said
petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under
the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an
initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which
is signed by the required number of registered voters. He also submits that
the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority
and resources of the COMELEC to assist them in securing the required
number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an
initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of
the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.  cdt

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it
attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following arguments:
 (1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the
required implementing law on the initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it
does not have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution,
which can be proposed only by Congress or a constitutional
convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the
Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well
as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the
Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to
file within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated
Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN
to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days
from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible
period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the
following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of the allegations
and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System
of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was
intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to
the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re:
Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of
Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National
and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local
officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to,
the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has
jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing
the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal
election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the
 publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance
of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty days and requested
intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill
No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it
adopts the allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits
that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to
state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal
to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both
the Journal and the Record of the House of Representatives relating to the
deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of
stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference
Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June
1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their
Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK
and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate
memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this
special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first
take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural
question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY
IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no
serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to
take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes
imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under
 the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the
proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing
out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for
the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction
with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this
case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and
adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of the
questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion
and political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is
threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of
the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a
motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no
ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin
and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to
submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier,
or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the
Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition,
together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the
notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure
to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition
rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions
judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said
petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the
required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may
likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his
Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in cases
of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,
Jr.; 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality
which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the
importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases,
this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF
INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS,
UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise
of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it
still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in
the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or
granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
 This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft
Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the
Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed
Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:
SEC. 1.  Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for
in Article _____ Section _____ of the Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the
Committee submitted a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it
denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ.
Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention
of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate
given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section
2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the
Members, may I quote Section 2:
"The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to
this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent
of the registered voters."
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee
Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out
Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS.
Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at
least 10 percent, there are no details in the provision on how to
carry this out. Do we understand therefore that we are leaving
this matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ.
That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS.
And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the
legislature does not pass the necessary implementing
law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ.
That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing,
especially with respect to the budget appropriations which would
have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We
deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The
Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no amendment
through the power of initiative can be called until after five years
from the date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the
first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of
this initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably
expected that within that five-year period, the National Assembly
can come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of
this power.
FR. BERNAS.
Since the matter is left to the legislature — the details on how
this is to be carried out — is it possible that, in effect, what will be
presented to the people for ratification is the work of the
legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude
that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ.
No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the
legislature itself as a body could propose that amendment, maybe
individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths
vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and
submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the
process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO.
Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the
proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend
the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ.
That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO.
I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms
of institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of
the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a
 lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as
written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of
legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal
mandates?
MR. SUAREZ.
The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO.
And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of
legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and
that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the
drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ.
That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO.
Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power
we have a separate article in the Constitution that would
specifically cover the process and the modes of amending
the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ.
That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO.
Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted
now, to again concede to the legislature the process or the
requirement of determining the mechanics of amending
the  Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ.
The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the
hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate
into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all
the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned
Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND — not to REVISE —
the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ.
. . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional
modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1.
The committee members felt that this system of initiative should
not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
 removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed
Article on Amendment or Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO.
In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process
of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment.
Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in
terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of
Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if
it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ.
We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while
ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO.
In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process
of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is
given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ.
That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the
Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by
then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted.
Thus:
MR. DAVIDE.
Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire
Section 2 with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE.
Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after
taking into account the modifications submitted by the sponsor
himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod,
Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment
in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as follows:
"SEC. 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
 TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ.
Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is
reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our completed
Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment
to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must implement
the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO.
Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the
legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the
initiative . . .?
MR. DAVIDE.
It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO.
But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the
legislature from asking another body to set the proposition in
proper form.
MR. DAVIDE.
The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation
of this particular right would be subject to legislation, provided the
legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the
requirement.
MR. ROMULO.
But the procedures, including the determination of the proper
form for submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE.
As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In
other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the
legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
 MR. ROMULO.
In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I
have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE.
Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment
strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of —
the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE.
With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG.
My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed
amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover
the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
made the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE.
No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can
only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing
amendments through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the
initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE.
A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is
involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National
Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional
convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to
submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority
of the National Assembly is required, the import being that the
process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult
than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to
a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a
referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement approved
by the Committee on the Legislative because it would require
another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely
based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present
such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when
the Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative
or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
 The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to
amendments, and the final version, which the Commission approved by a
vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE.
Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as
follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was
approved on second reading on 9 July 1986. 41 Thereafter, upon his motion for
reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof,
the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August
1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved
Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to
"therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that
said paragraph reads: The Congress  43 shall provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of
the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of
initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is
not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this
right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private
respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the
exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act.
This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the
Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of
Article XVII then reading:
 The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise
of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power
to provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules"
means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to
cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a
consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was
prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House
of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a)
House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No.
988, 48 which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as
with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government)
and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution.
Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning
ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral
Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by
the Senate 50 and by the House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is
now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of
Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section
2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The said section reads:
SEC. 2.  Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under
a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve
or reject, in whole or in part, the  Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
(Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local
laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as
to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The
people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.
They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this
section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to
a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately used
the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in
part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act
defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of
the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the
constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who
must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems
of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as
among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to
be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c)
reads in full as follows: 
cda

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than
one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the
petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved
or rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that
Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to
the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III),
no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No.
6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that
in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right
of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National
Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum)
leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the
initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if
what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which
only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted
or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of
the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities,
and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into national and local is
actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and
clearer understanding:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms —
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition
proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to
enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis
supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have
been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not
accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9,
which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective
as to the day of the plebiscite.
 (c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the
votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become
effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of
the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative
with the legislative bodies of local governments; thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative
with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of
the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for
initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and
local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle
III on Local Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision
therein applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent
or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of
the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact
the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care
in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and
referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special
attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national
legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and
the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required
number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of
registered voters for the petition;
 (b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon,
and the invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence
thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in
the local government unit concerned as to whether the required
number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the
proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which must
be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a)
mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines
"initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three
systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by
which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or
rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the
number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of
effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or
the paramount system of initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating
blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely
paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
"empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as
expressed in a Latin maxim:potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The
recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
 (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section
23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-
judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation
of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is
valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b)
fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks
its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then
invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES
AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF
INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It
does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's
power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for
the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by
the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a
law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
 Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance
with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of
subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section
5(b)of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be
signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required
number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered
signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance
in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition
cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only
after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its
filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of
the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to
prescribe the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election Records
and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in
each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No.
6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given
cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have
known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the
said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition
was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December
1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time,
energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether
the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is
 an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered
unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition
for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have
been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given
flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in
complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of
the right of the people under that system.  cdll

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R. A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of
the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to
the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the
DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is
made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as
against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
 (Defensor Santiago v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 127325, [March 19,
|||

1997], 336 PHIL 848-930)

 [G.R. No. 174153. October 25, 2006.]

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER

WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, petitioners, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., intervenor.

ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,

MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR.,
SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., intervenors.

ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, intervenor.

BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina

Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its
Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO
represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD
represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona
Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr.
Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson
Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its
Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA
WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de
Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by
Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the
League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR.
DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter
Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for
Human Rights, intervenors.

LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA

THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, intervenors.

LUWALHATI RIACASA ANTONINO, intervenor.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, intervenor.

TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.

LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, intervenor.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),

CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M.
TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT
INCIONG, intervenors.

RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and

RUELO BAYA, intervenors.

PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS

ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F.
BALAIS, intervenors.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President,

MANUEL VILLAR, JR., intervenor.

SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., intervenor.

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA

KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL
TABAYOYONG, intervenors.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND

CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, intervenors.

SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and

SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL,
JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO
LACSON, intervenors.
 JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG
PILIPINO, intervenors.

[G.R. No. 174299. October 25, 2006.]

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and

RENE A.V.
SAGUISAG, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and
Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A.
TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO
NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter
Doe, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J  :p

The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August
2006 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to
an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul
L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other
groups 1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006,
the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) 2 and Section
7 3 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the
6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department) 4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) 5 and by
adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." 6 These proposed
changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due
publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following
proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND
VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL
TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING
ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with
the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. 7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due
course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this
Court's ruling in Santiago  v.  Commission  on  Elections  8  declaring  RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause  on proposals to amend the  Constitution.  9

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the

writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31
August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their
initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to
their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively,
the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case,
and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the
sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court
require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they
should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures
and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent
injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an
opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General
joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition
despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court
treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement
the system of initiative."
 Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings
supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting
intervenors 10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing
intervenors 11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding
precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's
standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and
verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum
requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; 12 (4) the nature of the
proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative
petitions to only one subject. 
ACETIa

The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26

September 2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court
considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to
the Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus,
there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants
dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with
the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling
in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
the Commission on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of
the  Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
 Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is
the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the
meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some
voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the
people when they are asked to sign?
 
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam
President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is
ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the
draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already
a draft shown to them and they are asked whether or not they want
to propose this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare
that proposal and pass it around for signature. 13 (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the
people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that
"before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers
also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal
itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is
a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon
a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent
by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only
if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the
face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the
fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several
millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the
time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen
the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed 14 the concept of
people's initiative from the United States where various State constitutions
incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States 15 which allow initiative
petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the
full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their
assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments. 16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in
several decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State
Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the
person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he
or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of
the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A
person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to
a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the
petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting,
downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that
might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly
acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the
drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in
seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot. 17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury, 18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon
explained:
 The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments
by initiative commonly are described in similar terms. . . . (The purpose
of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so
that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the
initiative petition."); . . . (publication of full text of amended
constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to
have . . . the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted
from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge.
Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.")
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of
the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is
"deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void. 19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that
the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However,
the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the
framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's
initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended
that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments
before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing
such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative
and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that
the people must sign the "petition . . . as signatories."  cADTSH

The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people.
The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as
public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can
impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal
to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The
proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear
the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements
in gathering the signatures — that the petition contained, or incorporated
by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this
Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition.
The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature
sheet 20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during
the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached 21 to the opposition in
intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-
Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to
the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:

Province: City/Municipality: No. of

     
    Verified
     
Legislative District: Barangay: Signatures:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES
VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER
TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN
GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO
ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the  1987 Constitution. My
signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend
the  Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of

the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither
does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is
attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people
approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show
to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to
sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not
the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they
formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-
gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated,
together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's
draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC.
When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition
filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied
that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and
stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006
amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared
the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months
earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner
Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006
petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with
the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition
in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the
Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the
mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 to the present petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of
Local Authorities of the Philippines" 22 has posted the full text of Resolution
No. 2006-02, which provides:
 RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE
PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE
THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE
OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of
the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to
support the proposals of the People's
Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda
of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional
Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition
of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October
2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter
Change created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to
the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in
December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political
developments in Congress which militates against the use of the
expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members
and the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent
assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional
reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without
prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF
LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE
PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE
(SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special
meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel,
Manila. 23 (Underscoring supplied)

ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner

Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006
amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
"support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative
(sic) Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and
referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of
the Consultative Commission 24 are vastly different from the proposed
changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August
2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the
Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing
Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The
proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National
Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that
the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's
proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing
Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or
more than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30
August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group
caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets,
six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that
they circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to
the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before
the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the
proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically,
paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory
Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their
proposed amendments.  AaDSEC

The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition
because the amended petition was what they had shown to the people during
the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group
alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to
correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or
the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated
printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets.
Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before
this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with
the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication
that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions
that the Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is
not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a
referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground
that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h.
Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the
registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated
together with the petition for initiative filed with
the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the
proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought,
made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City
Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out
that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed
changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that
they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention
the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated
during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of
the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating
that "a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum
petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority
that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the
people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the
proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority
the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed
amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition
signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed
changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets.
The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from
under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed,
circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering
period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with
the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in
their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature
sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless,
even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition
during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that
they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than
six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also
asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but
he could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other
supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the
printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of
these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October
2006, the Lambino Group expressly admit that
"petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000
copies of the petition for initiative . . . ." 25 This admission binds
the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that
the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes
to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have
received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent
distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy
of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could
have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten
signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature
sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw
the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed
1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically
impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen
the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable
conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than
one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature
sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the
full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or
as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such
attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is
also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission
is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the
signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is
not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed
changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus
members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely; 26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members,
who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for
new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim
Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of
office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution. 28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in
the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature
sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three
proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or
rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and
his group assured the people during the signature-gathering that
the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007
local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007
local elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as
found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election
of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. . .
. . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be
held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely
requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held
simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the
proposed changes, could have easily written the word "next" before the
phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured
that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next
local elections following the ratification of the proposed changes. However,
the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule
the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future
local elections. 
CDISAc

Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration
of their own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of
Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office,
and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of
the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of
Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million
signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud
or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to
rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because
the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The
result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to
believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007
of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people
who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim
Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The
proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the
principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
(Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a
"surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from
being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American
jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling — when the initiative
petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This
puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to
the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains
two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the
entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus,
in Fine v. Firestone, 29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal
constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is to
mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the
proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate
cannot know what it is voting on — the amendment's proponents'
simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. . . . . The ballot
must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being
voted on. . . . . The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that.
The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it
will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed
amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air
Alaska v. McAlpine, 30 the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against
"inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of
the problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are
exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's
passage, and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence,
stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The
drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or
supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their
proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less
appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. . . . Indeed,
initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present
their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters.
Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the
election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting
the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly
distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further
amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not
have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4)
to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again
the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or
before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section
4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or
revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the
initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to
immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in
amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do
not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for
such further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark
to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such
an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do
not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's
amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the
Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be
members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member
of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the
regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart
provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if
their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of
half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will
remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter,
the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June
2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the
House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the
Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could
not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate
against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures
would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's
choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first
showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely
a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why
the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the
people . . . in a petition" — meaning that the people must sign on a petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue
as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the
proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general
or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people
even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign
the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental
assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to
the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the
petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional
because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of
the  Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or
a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to
the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or  CcTIDH

(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative . . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
 Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending
the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote
of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention.
The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes,
applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In
contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to
"[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as
shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of
the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which
embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This
is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution
thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered
voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee
Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter
of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes
of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to
amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the
revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the
operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or
Revision. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process
of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would
the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified
a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
 MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting
to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to
include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation
to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned
in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam
President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's
proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not
cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla
when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and
"revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative
is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of
the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose
revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a
people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where
the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people
the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose
revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the
United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan, 32 the Supreme Court of
California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to
the Constitution . . . applies only to the proposing and the adopting
or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and does
not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. . . . . It is thus clear
that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through
ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a
convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove.
Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter
termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure
became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution
would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to
 the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional
convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. . . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling: 33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner
in which it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who
favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one
of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a
difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from
an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an
amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used in
Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large
part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for
Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961 Legislative
Assembly, . . . and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed
to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses
required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, . . . .
While differing from that document in material respects, the
measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough
overhauling of the present constitution . . . .
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a
measure as can be submitted to the people through the initiative. If a
revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a
new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the
manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. . . . .
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's
initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since
the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no
deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes
of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in
the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition
No. 364: 34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be
revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the instrument
itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner
other than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably
treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. . . . . "While it is
universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have
power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they
 must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled
principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a
constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may alter
or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of the
self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution,
cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear
command of the Constitution — that a people's initiative may only amend,
never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an
amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative
constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being
outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment
and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the
distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a
permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein
for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying
principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of
the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the
other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an
addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect
an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed. 35 (Emphasis supplied)  CDISAc

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in

the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters
the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering
the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of
the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision
being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not
revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have
developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by
the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions." 36 The court
examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the
degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
"accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision." 37 Whether there is an
alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus,
"a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in
its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." 38 A
change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes
that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check
and balances." 39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's
initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively,
the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles — Article
VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive — affecting a total of
105 provisions in the entire Constitution. 40 Qualitatively, the proposed
changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of
the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in
the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of
powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution.
Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the
structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of
Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a
revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of
Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and
constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the
abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of
Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face
alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that
the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth
in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the
Constitutional Commission, writes:
 An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific
and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an
amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions
deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific
portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions
of the document which have over-all implications for the entire
document, to determine how and to what extent they should be
altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to
a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all
impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch
from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its
effect on other important provisions of
the Constitution. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter, 42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment
of the Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and
unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would . . . affect several other
provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down
the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968
Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only
many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a
change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which
has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the
states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be
difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a
House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It
would not only radically change the whole pattern of government in
this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but
would even affect the physical facilities necessary to
carry on government.
xxx xxx xxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed
amendment were adopted by the people at the General Election and if
the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further
amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and
conflicts which would result, or if after submission of appropriate
amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos
would prevail in the government of this State. The same result would
obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to
provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be
 other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly
to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of
men and women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about
the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts
and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-
date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold
that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
here. 43 (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the
present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive
and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the
executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the
Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than
105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count
of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. 44 There is no doubt that
the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the
structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment"
and "revision" is only one of procedure, not of substance.
The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes
changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions"
because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the
changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through
an initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by
ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or
vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory
in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional
provisions expressly provide for both "amendment" and "revision" when
it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same
provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the
people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the
actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people in
general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting
the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or
vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional
convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter
 because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the
difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain
only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections,
for purposes of interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment"
and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of
the correction. . . . . (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional
convention had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group
wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of
the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed
changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a
constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since
the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the
changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group
trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of
the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of
the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated,
courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. 45 Any theory
espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant
consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating
inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution.
Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting
inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of
the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change
involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a
revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents
in American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success.
In Lowe v. Keisling, 46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory,
thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that
Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the
legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does
not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.  AcaEDC

Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a

wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be enacted through the
initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment
and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of
the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal
 overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure
proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original
instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights
and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined
group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot
measure "will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon
constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article
XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior
approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1),
does not prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v.
Appling, . . ., the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of
the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the
provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII,
section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1,
authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending the
Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use
as a means of revising the constitution." . . . .
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and
said: "It is the only section of the constitution which provides the means
for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual,
through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." .
...
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII,
section 2, does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed by
initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates
the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end
green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the
middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in determining
whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is
indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins.
The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of
powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-
reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of
the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may
generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a
change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years 47 is an amendment
and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass
media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision. 48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional
qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. 49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of
sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being
amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or
the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.
These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum,
opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is
located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an
amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of
the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the
substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in
Section 1, Article II 50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of
the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-
by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it
affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-
and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several
provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded
proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with
those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to
undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives,
which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded
proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the
Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be
amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other
Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially
as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with
the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall
be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government; . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
 The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is
irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also
applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of
Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of
construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the
earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two
irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which
requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner
Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that the
requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short,
Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the
later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency.
However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2
of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
"Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be
resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do
the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to — the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among
the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes
could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms
of government — the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian,
Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did
the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting
the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of
government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for
revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires
harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision
of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross
absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative
is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments
to this Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the
basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the
conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is
no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover
the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal
of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this
Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA
6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement
the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of
a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds.
Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that
courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be
resolved on some other grounds. 51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the
constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not
change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first
comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying
with RA 6735.  IATSHE

Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which
requires that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have
at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the
"petition . . . as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or
the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only
Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra
signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul
L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC,
the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million
signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended
petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did
not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that
the Lambino Group claims as valid.
 The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a)
of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1) subject
shall be submitted to the electorate; . . . ." The proposed Section 4(4) of the
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative
embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the
initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid,
the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in
Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en
banc merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative
for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA)  v.  COMELEC.  52  For
following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the  COMELEC.  On this
ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate
its  unanimous ruling in PIRMA:

The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse

of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in
dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10,
1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the
utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can
trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant
violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down
in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift
the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every
dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier
change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes,
tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set
of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door
constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority — 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3
percent of the total votes cast 53 — approved our Constitution in a national
plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable
voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will.
 That approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising
the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures
gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the
specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when
they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change,
which means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding
the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As
the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its
solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real
sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the
people decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing
the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise,
the Constitution — the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring
stability to our society — becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes
by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then,
the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice."
However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP
maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group
thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the
agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This
forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or
"sovereign will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect
the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign
will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect
the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by
deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is
to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and
desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
 (Lambino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 174153 & 174299, [October
|||

25, 2006], 536 PHIL 1-364)

 [G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997.]

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; DEFINED. — A constitution is a

system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It
is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government,
assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and
establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered.
2. ID.; ID.; DEEMED WRITTEN IN EVERY STATUTE AND CONTRACT.
— Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates
any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since
the  Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract. Adhering to the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should be,
impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding
rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental
law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSIDERED SELF-EXECUTING RATHER THAN NON-
SELF-EXECUTING. — In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered
self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . Unless the contrary is clearly
intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing,
as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Cruz, Isagani
A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. 8-10)
4. ID.; ID.; SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS; LEGISLATURE NOT
PRECLUDED FROM ENACTING LAWS ENFORCING PROVISIONS. — Quite
apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce
the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with
the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions. The omission from a constitution of
any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is
that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with
the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the
subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A PROVISION MAY BE SELF-EXECUTING IN ONE PART
AND NON-SELF-EXECUTING IN ANOTHER. — Respondents also argue that
the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from
the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly
are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs
are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage
the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first
paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority
over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph,
then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-
executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be
self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.
6. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PROVISION ON PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, SELF-EXECUTING. — Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation
to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When
our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES THE NATIONAL RESOURCES AND
CULTURAL HERITAGE. — When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony,
it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as
the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, EMBRACED THEREIN;
FILIPINO FIRST POLICY PROVISION, APPLICABLE IN SALES
OF HOTEL STOCKS. — For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos;
its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with
our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For
sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who
acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel.
In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the
land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain
respondents' claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since
what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not
the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
9. ID.; STATE; SALE BY THE GSIS OF 51% OF ITS SHARE
IN MANILA HOTEL CORP., A STATE ACTION, SUBJECT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND. — In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by
the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a " public function", (2)
when the government is so-significantly involved with the private actor as to
make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government
has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent
GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second
and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction,
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State
and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
10. ID.; CONSTITUTION; WHEN THE CONSTITUTION ADDRESSES
THE STATE, IT REFERS TO BOTH PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT. — When
the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to
the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of
three (3) divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a
constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the
three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from
the State.
11. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS; SALE OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION BY THE
GSIS; FILIPINOS ALLOWED TO MATCH THE BID OF FOREIGN ENTITY. — In
the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent
to be imply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of
the basic law.
12. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FOREIGN BIDDERS WITHOUT CAUSE
OF ACTION AGAINST GSIS BEFORE ACCEPTANCE OF BID. — The argument
of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to
Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a
foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and
foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the
sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the
highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner
was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus
it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept
its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the
apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter
have a cause of action.
13. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, CERTIORARI; FAILURE OF THE GSIS
TO EXECUTE CORRESPONDING DOCUMENTS WHERE PETITIONER HAD
MATCHED THE BID PRICE BY FOREIGN BIDDER, A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. — Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute
the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not
only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well.
The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with
petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of
the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
14. ID.; SUPREME COURT; DUTY BOUND TO MAKE SURE THAT
CONTRACTS DO NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAWS. —
While it is no business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred
to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its
bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws,
or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted
by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. Indeed, the Court will always defer to
the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is
nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial
review when the Constitution is involved.
PADILLA, J., concurring opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION,
CONSTRUED. — A study of the 1935 Constitution, where the concept of
"national patrimony" originated, would show that its framers decided to adopt the
even more comprehensive expression "Patrimony of the Nation" in the belief that
the phrase encircles a concept embracing not only the natural resources of the
country but practically everything that belongs to the Filipino people, the tangible
and the material as well as the intangible and the spiritual assets and
possessions of the people. It is to be noted that the framers did not stop with
conservation. They knew that conservation alone does not spell progress; and
that this may be achieved only through development as a correlative factor to
assure to the people not only the exclusive ownership, but also the exclusive
benefits of their national patrimony. Moreover, the concept of national patrimony
has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. There is no doubt in my mind that
the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as such
deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its
operation. This institution has played an important role in our nation's history,
having been the venue of many a historical event, and serving as it did, and as it
does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state,
dignitaries, celebrities, and others.
2. ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL, PART OF OUR NATIONAL PATRIMONY. —
There is no doubt in my mind that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our
national patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who
shall own it and benefit from its operation. This institution has played an
important role in our nation's history, having been the venue of many a historical
event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for
visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.
 3. ID.; ID.; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; APPLIED TO
SALES OF SHARE OF STOCKS OF MANILA HOTEL. — "Preference to
qualified Filipinos," to be meaningful, must refer not only to things that are
peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of the
existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that
pertain to the national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a
qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference
shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino
are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be made to the qualified
Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an
opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the
preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all. While
government agencies, including the courts should re-condition their thinking to
such a trend, and make it easy and even attractive for foreign investors to come
to our shores, yet we should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos
certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved. In
the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established themselves
creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin
Hotels. This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of
the Manila Hotel Corporation in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping
with the intent of the Filipino people to preserve our national patrimony, including
our historical and cultural heritage in the hands of Filipinos.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY;
PROVISION GIVING PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, SELF-
EXECUTORY. — The provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(i)n
the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is self-
executory. The provision verily does not need, although it can obviously be
amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PATRIMONY INCLUDES CULTURAL HERITAGE OF THE
COUNTRY; MANILA HOTEL, EMBRACED THEREIN. — The term "patrimony"
does not merely refer to the country's natural resources but also to its cultural
heritage. A "historical landmark," to use the words of Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres,
Jr., Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM; SALE OF ITS SHARE IN MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, AN ACT
OF THE STATE; CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE COMPLIED
WITH. — The act of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS"), a
government entity which derives its authority from the State, in selling 51% of its
share in MHC should be considered an act of the State subject to the
Constitutional mandate.
4. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY;
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; DOES NOT REFER TO ALLOWING
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS TO MATCH FOREIGN BID. — On the pivotal issue of
the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos" I find it somewhat difficult to take
the same path traversed by the forceful reasoning of Justice Puno. In the
particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would really
be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid for, as a practical matter,
I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the
last cent) with another. The magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly
possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the
dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL PATRIMONY;
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; FILIPINO BIDDERS SHOULD BE
ALLOWED TO EQUAL BID OF FOREIGN FIRM IN SALE OF STOCKS
OF MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION. — I take the view that in the context of the
present controversy the only way to enforce the constitutional mandate that "[i]n
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is to allow petitioner
Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for
the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation.
Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino or Philippine corporation can be
given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the
State, by favoring it over a foreign national or corporation. Under the rules on
public bidding of the Government Service and Insurance System, if petitioner and
the Malaysian firm had offered the same price per share, "priority [would be
given] to the bidder seeking the larger ownership interest in MHC," so that if
petitioner bid for more shares, it would be preferred to the Malaysian corporation
for that reason and not because it is a Philippine corporation. Consequently, it is
only in cases like the present one, where an alien corporation is the highest
bidder, that preferential treatment of the Philippine corporation is mandated not
by declaring it winner but by allowing it "to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share" before it is awarded the shares of stocks. That, to me, is what
"preference to qualified Filipinos" means in the context of this case — by favoring
Filipinos whenever they are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis foreigners.
TORRES, JR., J., separate opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE
NATION; MANILA HOTEL, EMBRACED WITHIN THE MEANING THEREOF;
SALE OF ITS STOCKS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. —
Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution should be read in conjunction with
Article II of the same Constitution pertaining to "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies" which ordain — "The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy, effectively controlled by Filipinos." (Sec. 19),
Interestingly, the matter of giving preference to "qualified Filipinos" was one of
the highlights in the 1987 Constitution Commission proceedings. The nationalistic
provisions of the 1987 Constitution reflect the history and spirit of the Malolos
Constitution of 1898, the 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution. I subscribe
to the view that history, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and is
the product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of
growth and acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul
of a people. The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. Every
inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to historic events (too numerous to mention)
which shaped our history for almost 84 years. The history of
the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the auction block of a purely business
transaction, where profit subverts the cherished historical values of our people.
The Filipino should be first under his Constitution and in his own land.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; AS A RULE PROVISIONS
THEREOF ARE SELF-EXECUTING. — A Constitution provides the guiding
policies and principles upon which is built the substantial foundation and general
framework of the law and government. As a rule, its provisions are deemed self-
executing and can be enforced without further legislative action. Some of its
provisions, however, can be implemented only through appropriate laws enacted
by the Legislature, hence not self-executing. Courts as a rule consider the
provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, rather than as requiring future
legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult to discern For if they
are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by
the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused
with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give
breath to constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate
them.
2. ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS ARE NOT SELF-EXECUTING WHERE IT
MERELY ANNOUNCES A POLICY AND EMPOWERS THE LEGISLATURE TO
ENACT LAWS TO CARRY THE POLICY INTO EFFECT. — Contrariwise, case
law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not self-executing where it
merely announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature to
prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into effect.
3. ID.; ID.; FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 10, ARTICLE 12 NOT
SELF-EXECUTING. — The first paragraph directs Congress to reserve certain
areas of investments in the country to Filipino citizens or to corporations sixty per
cent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipinos. It further commands Congress
to enact laws that will encourage the formation and operation of one hundred
percent Filipino-owned enterprises. In checkered contrast, the second paragraph
orders the entire State to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights and privileges covering the national economy and patrimony. The third
paragraph also directs the State to regulate foreign investments in line with our
national goals and well-set priorities. The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-
executing. By its express text, there is a categorical command for Congress to
enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain areas of investments in the
country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino
enterprises.
4. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS UNDER PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF SECTION 10, ARTICLE 12,
SELF-EXECUTING. — The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are
different. They are directed to the State and not to Congress alone which is but
one of the three great branches of our government. Their coverage is also
broader for they cover "the national economy and patrimony" and "foreign
investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of
investments." Beyond debate, they cannot be read as granting Congress the
exclusive power to implement by law the policy of giving preference to qualified
Filipinos in the conferral of rights and privileges covering our national economy
and patrimony. Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or
instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any
reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is unconditional and it is now. The
second and the third paragraphs of Section 10, Article XII are thus self-executing.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, PART OF THE
NATIONAL PATRIMONY. — The second issue is whether the sale of a majority
of the stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the disposition of part of
our national patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that
the Commissioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to
Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources
but also to the cultural heritage of our race. By this yardstick, the sale
of Manila Hotel falls within the coverage of the constitutional provision giving
preferential treatment to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights involving our
national patrimony.
6. ID.; STATE; GSIS, EMBRACED WITHIN THE MEANING THEREOF. —
The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes the
respondent GSIS. A look at its charter will reveal that GSIS is a government-
owned and controlled corporation that administers funds that come from the
monthly contributions of government employees and the government. The funds
are held in trust for a distinct purpose which cannot be disposed of indifferently.
They are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life insurance
benefits of the employees and the administrative and operational expenses of the
GSIS. Excess funds, however, are allowed to be invested in business and other
ventures for the benefit of the employees. The GSIS is not a pure private
corporation. It is essentially a public corporation created by Congress and
granted an original charter to serve a public purpose. It is subject to the
jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit. As a
state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies
spelled out in the Constitution especially those designed to promote the general
welfare of the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which the
people elevated as a constitutional command.
7. ID.; CONSTITUTION; PROVISIONS THEREOF DEEMED INCLUDED
IN ALL LEGISLATIONS AND ALL STATE ACTIONS. — The constitutional
command to enforce the Filipino First policy is addressed to the State and not to
Congress alone. Hence, the word "laws" should not be understood as limited to
legislations but all state actions which include applicable rules and regulations
adopted by agencies and instrumentalities of the State in the exercise of their
rule-making power.
8. ID.; ID.; NATIONAL PATRIMONY; PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS; STATE NOT PROHIBITED FROM GRANTING RIGHTS TO
FOREIGN FIRM IN THE ABSENCE OF QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. — In the
absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited from granting these
rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the weal of
the nation.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The right of preference of petitioner
arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand
equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder, should be preferred. It is with
deep regret that I cannot subscribe to the view that petitioner has a right to match
the bid of Renong Berhad. Petitioner's submission must be supported by the
rules but even if we examine the rules inside-out a thousand times, they can not
justify the claimed right. Under the rules, the right to match the highest bid arises
only "if for any reason, the highest bidder cannot be awarded the block of
shares . . . ." No reason has arisen that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad.
It deserves the award as a matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the
petitioner as a qualified Filipino the privilege to match the higher bid of a
foreigner. What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand. Our
sympathies may be with petitioner but the court has no power to extend the
latitude and longitude of the right of preference as defined by the rules. We are
duty-bound to respect that determination even if we differ with the wisdom of their
judgment. The right they grant may be little but we must uphold the grant for as
long as the right of preference is not denied. It is only when a State action
amounts to a denial of the right that the Court can come in and strike down the
denial as unconstitutional.
 10. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; PARTY ESTOPPED FROM
ASSAILING THE WINNING BID OF FOREIGN FIRM FROM BEING AWARE OF
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BIDDINGS IT AGREED TO
RESPECT. — I submit that petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid
of Renong Berhad. Petitioner was aware of the rules and regulations of the
bidding. It knew that the rules and regulations do not provide that a qualified
Filipino bidder can match the winning bid after submitting an inferior bid. It knew
that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the
first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to repudiate the rules which it agreed
to respect. It cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard
them when it loses. If sustained, petitioners' stance will wreak havoc on the
essence of bidding.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate dissenting opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; PATRIMONY OF THE NATION;
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS; LOSING FILIPINO NOT GIVEN
RIGHT TO EQUAL THE HIGHEST FOREIGN BID. — The majority contends
the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is
concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the
highest foreign bid, and thus to win. However, the Constitution [Sec. 10 (2), Art.
XII] simply states that "in the grant of rights . . . covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." The majority
concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such
preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase
his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such
empowering law, the majority's strained interpretation, I respectfully submit,
constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous
sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win. Only in the
Philippines! Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial
legislation is short-sighted and, viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term
Filipino interests. In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the
"Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the constitutional preference for the
"qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the bids are equal. In this
manner, we put the Filipino ahead without self-destructing him and without being
unfair to the foreigner. In short, the Constitution mandates a victory for the
qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied. But not when the ballgame is
over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J  : p
 The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, 1 is invoked by
petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain
that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation
for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the
national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of
the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is
to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel.  2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as
its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS
state —
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH
GSIS/MHC —
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth
below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest
Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will
instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for
the Manila Hotel . . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase
and Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC
PARTNER —
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic
Partner after the following conditions are met
 a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC
not later than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP
(Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel) are obtained." 3
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic
partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to
respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October
1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three
Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian
Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . . . 5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC
may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad,
petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995
the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from
perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En
Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for
oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the
Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects
the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC
carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation,
the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving
51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national
economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the
national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national
economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. 8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it
is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s). . . . Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing
laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done." 9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does
not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first
and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to
respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in
the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make
the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of
the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the
State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate
and distinct from the Philippines as a State. lexlib

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony,

the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor
the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC
cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition
of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should
have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1, of the bidding
rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders
that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing
to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents
postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it
only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is
premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of
shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a
matching bid had not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion
should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious,
whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not
have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the
governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute
and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other
words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law
or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the  Constitution is the fundamental paramount and supreme
law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and
principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out
the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been
generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner
similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This
can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
—
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute. 15
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the
floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —
MR. RODRIGO.
 Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to
"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to
qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So,
why do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against
aliens?
THE PRESIDENT.
 What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word
"QUALIFIED?"
MR. RODRIGO.
 No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against
whom? As against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO.
 Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
"QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will
always lay down conditions under which business may be
done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (italics supplied
by respondents).
MR RODRIGO.
 It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO.
 Yes. 16
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way
as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to
enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares
with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of
the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject,
but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation
however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is
not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10,
second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs
of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. 18 The argument is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress
is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic,
the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language
require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-
self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional
provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically
not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to
legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply not in
point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of
constitutional provisions on personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the
vital role of the youth in nation-building, 23 the promotion of social justice, 24 and
the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to
constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on
education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the
promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the
youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development. 33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are
not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation.
The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only principles upon
which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation
to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When
our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which
all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission 34 explains —
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and
developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands,
forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or
faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only
to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912,
it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it
has since then become the venue of various significant events which have
shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was
the site of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth.
Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to
dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine
hospitality. 36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the
book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. 37 During World War II
the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military
headquarters. When the American forces returned to
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with
Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's
and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to
almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation
and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the
Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup
d'etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the
Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become
part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the
MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the
MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which
the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the
land upon which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in
our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission —
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE.
I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo
amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the
words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF
THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS
WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY
OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS."
 xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we
have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-
percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE.
The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino.
What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD.
At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE.
Is that the intention?
MR MONSOD.
Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the
preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE.
I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to juridical
personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD.
We agree, Madam President. 39
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO.
Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read
again.
MR. NOLLEDO.
The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS." And the word
"Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents, will include not
only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or
entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —
MR. FOZ.
Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo
to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.
 MR. NOLLEDO.
"IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."
MR. FOZ.
In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is
qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO.
Obviously.
MR. FOZ.
If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino
enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO.
The answer is "yes."
MR. FOZ.
Thank you. 41
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner
Nolledo continues —
MR NOLLEDO.
Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL —
THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS." This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy.
That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant
of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national
patrimony. 42
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission
regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner
Nolledo 43 —
"Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino"
bias in all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST
Policy. . . . This provision was never found in previous Constitutions. . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall
be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the
common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to
Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since
 such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and
inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions,
when a choice has to be made between a "qualified foreigner" and a
"qualified Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so
considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It
was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so
that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of
proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity
ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and
marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by
arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing
legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional
provision — by the government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt such a
line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to
the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which
evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be
the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a
defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or
guiding legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on
constitutional government is apt —
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement
laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts — provided
that there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When
the executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the
constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for
reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole
prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the
executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to
the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and
distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that
the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of
the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly
pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the
assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional
jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are considered
"state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a
"public function;" (2) when the government is so-significantly involved with the
private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when
the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the
second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the
transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of
the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people
but also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is
composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case
the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its
authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it
is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that
the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents
are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of
which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules
issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative
of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and
contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate
the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to
award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of
a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
 In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is
no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be
to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are
understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which
investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction.
Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations
under the Constitution and the laws of the forum
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the
beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless.
Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified
Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case
before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding
because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid
offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to
compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had
matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent
GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard
unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling
the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the
bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other
ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment,
regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of
the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion
while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the
habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative
but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only
with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The
refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with
petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of
the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is
embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future
legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable
circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is
tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court
to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments.
Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but
avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is
ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have
not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function
to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about
the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme
Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles
to economic progress and development . . . in connection with a
temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division against the sale
of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain
statements were published in a major daily to the effect that that
injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a
major obstacle to doing business here."
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no
business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or
set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its
bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or
the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk
that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed
criticism. 48
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business
viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset,
should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a
budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values.
Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance
of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy
as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49
 Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a
democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people
and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the
happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have
no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere
to such basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudable, is
merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. 50
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We
are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We
are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important
events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about
a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong
manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to
their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century
Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the
Filipino soul — a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that
has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51 cda

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of
respondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in
Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of
the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in
whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces
of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn
from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel — and all
that it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will
vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the
other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national
patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning
Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision
of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of
the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the
nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at
P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such
other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED
 (Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No.
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122156, [February 3, 1997], 335 PHIL 82-154)