1. Santiago v.
COMELEC means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
GR 127325, 270 SCRA 106 [Mar 19, 1997]
Facts. Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend
the Constitution by people’s initiative. He proposed
to lift the term limits of elective officials. COMELEC
acted on the petition. Santiago et al. now petitions
to prohibit COMELEC from further acting on the
petition. They aver that the constitutional provision
on people’s initiative (Art XVII, Sec 2) has no
implementing law yet16 notwithstanding RA 6735,
and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, insofar as it
seeks to govern the conduct of initiative on the
amendments to the Constitution, is ultra vires.
Issues.
(1) Is RA 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum Act) a
sufficient statutory implementation of Art XVII,
Sec 2 of the Constitution?
(2) May COMELEC validly take cognizance of the
Delfin Petition?
Held.
No. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate and
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned. The inclusion of the word
“Constitution” in Sec 2 of RA 6735 (section on the
“Statement and Policy”) was a delayed
afterthought. It is neither germane or relevant to
that section. While the Act provides subtitles for
initiative on national laws and local laws, no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence simply
and referendum on national and local laws [only].
RA 6735 merely paid lip service to the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution in
contrast to the utmost diligence and care
exerted in providing for the details of that for the
national and local legislation.
(1) No. The lacunae of RA 6735 on the foregoing
substantive matter (the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution) are fatal and
cannot be cured by “empowering” the COMELEC
“to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes [the] Act”
Therefore, COMELEC Res. No. 2300, insofar as it
promulgates such rules and regulations, is void.
Two elements to be complied with in order to propose
constitutional amendments by initiative:
(1) the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal; and
(2) the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
2. Lambino v. COMELEC
GR 174153, 505 SCRA 160 [Oct 25, 2006]
Facts. Lambino et al. sought to propose amendments to
the Constitution by People’s initiative through RA
6735. The sheet used to gather signatures from the
people contained only the questions “Do you
approve of the Amendment of Articles VI and VII of
the 1987 Constitution, changing the form of the
 government from the present bicameral-presidential
to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government
in order to achieve greater efficiency xxx; and
providing an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions
xxx?” The signature sheet further provides a table
wherein the personal data of the person signing shall
be indicated. Subsequently, Lambino et al. filed with
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to ratify their proposal.
They have in fact gathered signatures of >12% of all
registered voters with each district represented by
3% at least (6,327,952 voters). COMELEC invoked
Santiago v. COMELEC and denied the petition.
Issue. Did the Lambino petition comply with Art XVII, Sec
2 of the Constitution?
Held. No. Firstly, for the amendment to be “directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition”, two elements must be complied with:
(1) the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal (no agent or representative can sign on
their behalf); and
(2) the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
The deliberations in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show that the framers mean to adopt the
American Jurisprudence on the matter which in particular
reveals that the intention is that the people must first see
the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign,
and the people must sign the petition containing such full
text. The said elements are present only if the foregoing
has been shown. In the Lambino petition, the proposed
changes were not incorporated with or attached to the
signature sheets.
Secondly, American Jurisprudence outlaws logrolling—
when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated
subject matter in the same petition. In the Lambino
petition, the proposed changes include a provision
empowering the interim Parliament to convene and
propose amendments/revisions to the Constitution, which
the Court finds as logrolling.
Thirdly, a shift from a bicameral-presidential to a
unicameral- parliamentary system xxx constitute, beyond
doubt, a revision. It is clear the Constitution only sanctions
“amendments” and not revisions thereto by people’s
initiative.
From the foregoing, it is plain that even if RA 6735 is
valid, Lambino’s initiative will still fail. There is no need to
revisit the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC as the outcome of
this case will not be changed thereby.
3. Tolentino v. COMELEC
No. L-34150, 41 SCRA 702 [Oct 16, 1971]
Facts. The first Organic Resolution approved by the 1971
Constitutional Convention proposed to reduce the
voting age from 21 to 18 years of age. It was also
provided therein that the plebiscite to ratify such
partial amendment shall coincide with the local
elections in November 1971 and shall be without
prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future by the same Convention.
Petitioners now seek to restrain COMELEC on acting
on such resolution.
 Issue. May amendments to the Constitution be
submitted to the electorate for ratification partially
without prejudice to future amendments that may
be proposed by the Constitutional Convention?
Held. No. Art XV, Sec 1 of the 1935 Const. clearly
provides that “such amendments shall be valid as
part of the Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for
ratification”, thus leaving no room for doubt as to
how many “elections” or plebiscites may be held to
ratify any amendment/s proposed by the same
Convention. The provision unequivocally says “an
election” which means only one. In order that the
plebiscite xxx may be validly held, it must provide the
voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment
per se as well as its relation to the other parts with
which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the case
at bar, the Convention has hardly started considering
the merits of the proposals. To present to the people
any single proposal cannot comply with this
requirement. There is here “no proper submission”.
Political questions are associated with the wisdom and not
the legality of an act.
“[A constitutional amendment] proposed today has relation
to the sentiment and felt needs today, and that, if not
ratified early while the sentiment may fairly be supposed to
exist, it ought to be regarded as waived…”
4. Del Rosario v. Comelec 35 S 367
Facts: The present petition for prohibition assails the
constitutionality and validity of Republic Act (RA) No. 11259,
entitled "Charter of the Provinces of Palawan del Norte,
Palawan Oriental, and Palawan del Sur."[1] The bill originated
from House Bill Nos. 7413 and 8055, which was initiated in
the 17th Congress by the representatives of the three
legislative districts of the province of Palawan.[2] The bill was
signed into law on April 5, 2019[3] and published in the
Official Gazette on May 20, 2019.[4]
Sections 51 and 54 of the assailed law provide:
SEC. 51. Plebiscite. - The provinces of Palawan del Norte,
Palawan Oriental, and Palawan del Sur shall be created upon
approval by the majority of the votes cast by the voters of the
affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on the second
Monday of May 2020 following the effectivity of this Charter.
The amount necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite shall
be charged against the appropriations of the present Province
of Palawan.
SEC. 54. Residents of the City of Puerto Princesa. - The
residents of the City of Puerto Princesa, as a highly urbanized
city, shall not be qualified to vote in the plebiscite and for
candidates for provincial elective positions.
The district representatives who were duly elected and
qualified in the election immediately preceding the May 2022
national and glocal elections of the present First Legislative
District, Second Legislative District, and Third Legislative
District shall continue to represent their respective districts
until the representatives for the newly created legislative
districts for the three (3) provinces and the highly urbanized
City of Puerto Princesa shall have been elected and qualified.
Petitioners Cynthia S. Del Rosario, Federico N. Virgo, Jr.,
Renato V. Baladad, Beatriz A. Dioso, and Corazon Manalon
Davila are all residents of various barangays in Puerto
Princesa City; while the other petitioners are residents of
three municipalities in Palawan. Loreta N. Alsa is a resident of
Sagpangan, Aborlan; petitioner Hiya I. Hassan is a resident of
Panitian, Sofronio Espanola; and petitioner John Vincent C.
Colili is a resident of Amas, Brooke's Point. Claiming standing
as taxpayers and registered voters of Puerto Princesa City and
of Palawan, they ask this Court to declare RA No. 11259
unconstitutional and invalid. Consequently, they also seek the
issuance of a writ of prohibition against the conduct of the
May 11, 2020[5] plebiscite provided for in Sections 51 and 54
of RA No. 11259, without the participation of the electorate of
Puerto Princesa City, as well as the disbursement of funds
relative thereto.
Issues: The petition alleges that RA No. 11259 suffers from
three infirmities which render it unconstitutional: first, its
passage and enactment into law was made in gross violation
of the public's right to take part in the conduct of public
affairs through public hearings and consultations; second, it
disqualifies the voters of Puerto Princesa City from voting in
the scheduled plebiscite, contrary to Article X, Section 10 of
the Constitution; and third, it provides for a substantial
change in the sharing of proceeds from the development and
utilization of the national wealth between the three new
provinces and their existing municipalities and barangays, in
violation of Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.
Ruling: The foregoing disquisitions make it abundantly clear
that Puerto Princesa has become a distinct political entity
independent and autonomous from the province of Palawan,
by virtue of its conversion into a highly urbanized city in 2007.
Hence, it can no longer be considered a "political unit directly
affected" by the proposed division of Palawan into three
provinces; and perforce, the qualified voters of the city of
Puerto Princesa, including herein petitioners Cynthia S. Del
Rosario, Federico N. Virgo, Jr., Renato V. Baladad, Beatriz A.
Dioso, and Corazon Manalon Davila were properly excluded
from the coverage of the plebiscite scheduled by RA No.
11259. The petition must therefore be dismissed.
5.Imbong v. COMELEC
No. L-32432, 35 SCRA 28 [Sept 11, 1970]
Facts. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly
passed resolution No. 2 which, among others, called
for a Constitutional Convention to be composed of
two delegates from each representative district who
shall have the same qualifications as those of
Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday
of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised
Election Code. Congress then as a legislative
 assembly enacted RA 4914 implementing Resolution
No. 2. Subsequently, Congress as a Constitutional
Assembly passed Resolution No. 4 which amended
Resolution No. 2 and provided more details on the
qualifications and apportionment of the delegates
but provided that other details are to be embodied
in an implementing legislation. Congress acting as a
legislative assembly thus enacted RA 6132,
implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and
expressly repealing RA 4914. Petitioners now assail
the validity of RA 6132.
Issue. May Congress, acting as a legislative assembly,
enact RA 6132 to implement a resolution passed by
the same body acting as a Constituent Assembly?
Held. Yes. The grant to Congress as a Constituent
Assembly of such plenary authority to call a
constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the
doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers
essential to the effective exercise of the principal
power granted, such as the power to fix the
qualifications, number, apportionment, and
compensation of the delegates as well as
appropriation of funds, and other implementing
details indispensable to the convention. While the
authority to call a constitutional convention is vested
by the Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress
acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact
the implementing details, does not exclusively pertain
to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such
implementing details are matters within the
competence of Congress in the exercise of its
comprehensive legislative power, which power
encompasses all matters not expressly or by
necessary implication removed by the Constitution
from the ambit of legislative action. Consequently,
when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
omits to provide for such implementing details
after calling a constitutional convention, Congress,
acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary
implementing legislation to fill in the gaps.10
A constituent body can propose anything but conclude
nothing.
6. Tolentino v. Comelec (Please see Case #3)
7. Planas vs Comelec49 Scra 105, January 22, 1973
Facts:
On Nov. 30, 1972, the President issued PD no. 73,
“submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed
by the 1971Constitutional Convention,” as well as setting the
plebiscite for the said ratification or rejection on January 15,
1973.Charito Planas filed a petition in order to prohibit the
implementation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 73 alleging
that it has no force and effect as law because theconduct of
a plebiscite are lodged exclusively in Congress.On December
23, the President announced the postponement of the said
plebiscite
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of PD No. 73 by the
President is valid.
Ruling: The issue has become moot and academic. Since the
plebiscite in question has been postponed,the court found it
unnecessary to pass upon the question of the validity of PD
No. 73. If the plebiscite is scheduled, the parties may file such
actions as justified by the given circumstances. A moot and
academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
8. Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary 50 SCRA 30
Facts:
The Plebiscite Case
A Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of
the Philippines was approved on August 24, 1970 and began
to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. On September 21,
1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing
the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention
approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. The next day, President Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people
for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as
setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the
Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines
and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their
agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any
manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the
grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no
force and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite,
the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the
prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be
answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public
funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged
exclusively in Congress “ and “there is no proper submission
to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January
15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and
assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the
people of the contents thereof.”
On December 23, the President announced the
postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution and temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for
purposes of free and open debate on the proposed
Constitution.”
The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from
deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor
the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held
were known or announced officially.
“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case
G.R. No. L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying that said
case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later
than January 15, 1973.”
The Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in
said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and
“manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16,
1973 and set the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at
9:30 a.m.”
While the case was being heard, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1102.
“ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE
OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities
and in districts/wards in chartered cities. The said Citizens
Assemblies were established to broaden the base of citizen
participation in the democratic process and to afford ample
opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on
important national issues.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-
36142, as a “Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered
voter” and as “a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all
citizens and voters similarly situated against the Executive
Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice
and Finance, to restrain said respondents “and their
subordinates or agents from implementing any of the
provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the
present Constitution” referring to that of 1935. Javellana
alleged that the President ordered “the immediate
implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet,
and that the latter are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution.
He construed that the President is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies; to approve the proposed
Constitution; proclaim the ratification; and that the election
held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free
election, hence null and void.
The Issue:
Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a
justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable,
question?
Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not
strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions?
Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced
in (with or without valid ratification) by the people?
(acquiesced – “permission” given by silence or passiveness.
Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making
objections.)
Are petitioners entitled to relief?
Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

Ruling:
The court was severely divided on the issues raised in the
petition but when the crucial question of whether the
petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court
(Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion,
together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted
to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973
Constitution.
The Court held that the issue is political and “beyond
the ambit of judicial inquiry.”
Court held that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in
accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification,
i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law
and participated in only by qualified and duly registered
voters. However, it is conceded that the doctrine stated in
some American decisions to the effect that independently
of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once
accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded
recognition by the Court.”
On the fourth question, 6 justices voted to DISMISS the
petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the
strength of their view that “The effectivity of the said
Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate
question posed by these cases to resolve which
considerations other than judicial, and therefore beyond
the competence of this Court, are relevant and
unavoidable.
On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution
of 1973 is in force:
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes
of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief
Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all
the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle
to the new Constitution being considered in force and
effect.
9. Mitra v. Comelec
FACTS:
We resolve the Motion for Reconsideration Filed by public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Oral Arguments
filed by private respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and
Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (private respondents), dated July 19,
2010 and July 20, 2010, respectively, addressing our Decision
of July 2, 2010 (July 2, 2010 Decision or Decision).We
annulled in this Decision the February 10, 2010 and May 4,
2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC, and denied the private
respondents petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (Mitra).
To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that despite
our limited certiorari jurisdiction in election cases, we are not
only obliged but are constitutionally bound to intervene
when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion in
this case, a situation where resulting errors, arising from the
grave abuse committed by the COMELEC, mutated from
being errors of judgment to errors of jurisdiction. Based on
our evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, we
found that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material
misrepresentation in his COC. We noted, too, that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation of
the evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a
resident of Aborlan, Palawan.We also found that the
COMELEC failed to critically consider whether Mitra
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact
that would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of
Governor of Palawan.
On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately
misrepresented his Aborlan residence to deceive and mislead
the people of the Province of Palawan, we found that Mitra
did not. In fact, Mitra adduced positive evidence of transfer
of residence which the private respondents evidence failed
to sufficiently controvert. Specifically, the private
respondents evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a
Puerto Princesa City resident.
In this regard, we took note of the incremental moves Mitra
undertook to establish his new domicile in Aborlan, as
evidenced by the following:(1) his expressed intent to
transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to
make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his
preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of
registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial transfer
through a leased dwelling at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the
purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the
construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to
the premises he was leasing pending the completion of his
house. Thus, we found that under the situation prevailing
when Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer that
Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether
inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence in
Aborlan. We also emphasized that the COMELEC could not
even present any legally acceptable basis (as it used
subjective non-legal standards in its analysis) to conclude
that Mitras statement in his COC concerning his residence
was indeed a misrepresentation. In sum, we concluded that
the evidence in the present case, carefully reviewed, showed
that Mitra indeed transferred his residence from Puerto
Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law.
In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2010, the
COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, asks us
to reconsider our July 2, 2010 Decision. The COMELEC argues
that we overstepped our review power over its factual
findings; as a specialized constitutional body, the findings
and conclusions of the COMELEC are generally respected and
even given the status of finality. The COMELEC also contends
that the Court erred in taking cognizance of the present
petition since the issues raised therein are essentially factual
in nature. It claims that it is elementary that the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to correcting
questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the
present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari.

Issues: Whether the SC erred when it reviewed the probative

value of the evidence presented and substituted its own
factual findings over that of the public respondent.

Ruling: We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for

reconsideration and for oral arguments.

We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private

respondent's arguments are mere rehashes of their previous
submissions; they are the same arguments addressing the
issues we already considered and passed upon in our July 2,
2010 Decision. Thus, both the COMELEC and private
respondents failed to raise any new and substantial
argument meriting reconsideration. The denial of the motion
for oral arguments proceeds from this same reasoning; mere
reiterations of the parties original submissions on issues our
Decision has sufficiently covered, without more, do not merit
the time, effort and attention that an oral argument shall
require.