POLICE POWER

Definition, Scope & Basis

Characteristics

Who exercises said power?

MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130239
- validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of
traffic laws and regulations
-issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic
violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street,
Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995
-Garin filed a complaint contending that in the absence of any IRRs, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants
the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the
Constitution
-Further, he claims that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation
of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore
unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
-MMDA, represented by the OSG, pointed out that the powers under Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are
limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are
legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty
imposed
-MMDA further contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right,
but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety
and welfare; also argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without
due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.
RULING:
-The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a
privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police
power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements.
-The right to operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to
reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The power
to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance with prescribed
conditions.
-We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, as an
inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
-Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power
to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
-[T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the
charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself.
-We are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of
Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the MMDAs enabling law, which we can but
interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law,
or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source.

Laws:
Balacuit vs. CFI, GR No. L-38429
-Petition for review of the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 penalizing any person engaged
in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions etc to require children
between 7 and 12 years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only
of the said ticket
-Petitioners are managers of theaters who contend that the ordinance is ultra vires and an invalid exercise
of police power and that it violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive,
unfair, unjust, confiscatory and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into
contracts
-Respondent City of Butuan justifies its enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause
in Sec. 15 of the cited law (Charter of the City of Butuan)
ISSUE: Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to
these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general
welfare clause as invoked by the City?
RULING:
-In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of
public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power
by the local government.
-The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under
its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the
general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance.
-To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally
requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
-We must bear in mind that there must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures
to secure the ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance, and the large discretion is
necessarily vested in the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require,
but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. The methods or means used to
protect the public health, morals, safety or welfare, must have some relation to the end in view, for under
the guise of the police power, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted
to be arbitrarily invaded by the legislative department.
-The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have
to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves. A
reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the
petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the
petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it.
-Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same
must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that
such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable,
and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling
subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably
interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct,
control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the
citizens of their property rights. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or
used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process
clause.
-Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could
assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been
fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens.
For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police
power, be upheld as valid.

Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323

-constitutionality of BP 22 or Bouncing Check Law
-BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at
the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is
imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the
check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
-BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks
that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is proscribed by the
state because of the injury it causes to t public interests.
ISSUE: Is BP22 a valid law? What is the gravamen of the offense?
-Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision
forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection
clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and (5) its enactment is flawed in that
during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a bill
on Third Reading.
RULING:
-Yes. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
-Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society
as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it
can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its
police power.
-The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of
powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a
power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague
and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon
the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual
citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order and welfare."
-The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest.
-In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
-As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of
changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional
guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-
impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. Whether the police power may override
the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address. This bridge
has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it.
-We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
Del Rosario vs. Bengzon, 180 SCRA 521
-class suit filed by officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors
in the Philippines to declare as unconstitutional, hence, null and void, some provisions of the Generics Act
of 1988 (Rep. Act No. 6675), and of the implementing Administrative Order No. 62 issued pursuant thereto
- The petitioner's main argument against paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the law, is the alleged unequal
treatment of government physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, on one hand, and those in private practice
on the other hand, in the manner of prescribing generic drugs, for, while the former are allegedly required
to use only generic terminology in their prescriptions, the latter may write the brand name of the drug in
parenthesis below the generic name. The favored treatment of private doctors, dentists and veterinarians
under the law is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation.
ISSUE: Is the Generics Act of 1988 valid?
RULING:
-Yes. The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It, on the contrary,
implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people"
and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost"
- The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words of similar import in their
prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right
to choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the
generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug
with "no substitution," the patient's option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent
would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the
population in a still developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority.
- In any event, no private contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the
State to enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or
general welfare of the community. This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual
and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise.

Tablarin vs. Judge Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730

- The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988.
However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education. Petitioners now question the constitutionality of
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959"
ISSUE: Is the questioned statute valid?
RULING:
- Yes. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education " accessible to
all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make
such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. "
-Petitioners contend that the questioned law is against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue
delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate,
the Board of Medical Education.
-Doctrine of Subordinate Legislation. has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not
only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation and
the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts."
-Standards for Subordinate Legislation. The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former,
the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically.
It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
- There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative
provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of
the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests and needs in a word, the
public order of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate
objective of governmental effort and regulation.
- Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one
hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question
is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the
public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation
and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical
board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
- That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or
trauma.
- We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for
admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying
the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.

Carlos Superdrug Corporation vs. DSWD, GR166494

-Questioning the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the
Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003; Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating
drugstores in the Philippines.
-Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the law because it constitutes deprivation of private property.
Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit
and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the
law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.
- The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private
property for public use or benefit which constitutes compensable taking for which the petitioners would
ordinarily be entitled to a just compensation. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior
citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the definition of just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose
upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program
RULING: Yes. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens
to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the
State considers them an integral part of our society.
- The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for
an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution
to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
- For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield
to general welfare.
-Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere
plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in
question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in
its favor.
- While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of business and the
State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an
impairment of property rights in the process.
-Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Zoning and Regulatory Ordinances:

Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators vs. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849
- assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it
would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no
reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due process
-respondents: petition failed to state a cause of action, challenged ordinances purpose is to curb immorality
and a valid and proper exercise of the police power and only the guests or customers not before the court
could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination
ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause
RULING: No. Presumption of validity of laws.
- As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding
the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.
- Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due
process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being
specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent
and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs." It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or
allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and
the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
- On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the
police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements
of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of
such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial
inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may
call for correction by the courts.
- It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral
or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being
devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
- Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order
to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
- As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the
attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect
for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels
a reversal of the appealed decision.

Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569

ISSUE: whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents, can, prohibit
the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs
employing hostesses
- Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of council
to enact ordinances and make regulations. - The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make
such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of
the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
- It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare
clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State."
- It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the
term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field.The purpose sought to be achieved could have been
attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
- . The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one whit. The exact wording was followed. The
power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. It is clear that municipal corporations cannot
prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained.
- Reference is made by respondents to Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila. There is a misapprehension as to what was decided by this Court. That was a regulatory
measure. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds. It did not
prohibit motels. It merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in order precisely to put an
end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. This is an entirely different case. What was
involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to
prohibit.

Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568

-challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila; said ordinance
prohibits any barber shop operator from massaging customers
- attack against the validity cannot succeed
- police power measure based on the general welfare clause
-to be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic in order to
forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage
-ordinance not unconstitutional

Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, 234 SCRA 255

-PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to CDO City by opening of a casino and such was met with
objections from different sectors
-The Sangguniang Panglungsod enacted 2 Ordinances prohibiting the issuance of business permit and
cancelling of existing business permits to any establishment for the using and allowing the premises of such
establishment to be used for the operation of a casino in the exercise of the delegated police power invoking
its power from the Local Government Code (General Welfare Clause)
-The petitioners claim that the Local Government Code has recognized the competence of such
communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their
inhabitants in line with the policies of the State. They posit that the Code expressly authorized them to
prohibit all kinds of gambling without distinction within their territories, including the operation of casinos.
ISSUE: WON the issued ordinances were valid?
RULING: No.
- PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of
chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
- There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869 by the LGC. The proper resolution of the
problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed
must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by
statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the
Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary.
- This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those
authorized by law.
- On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a
statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance
despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
- Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that
the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the
first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Tano vs. Socrates, GR 110249

-questioning the constitutionality of the ordinance that bans the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside
Puerto Princesa City, an office order ordering inspections of cargoes or shipments to check whether the
shipper possessed the required Mayors Permit and a resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering,
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of marine corals
-petitioners are criminally charged for violations against the ordinances aforementioned; they contend that
the ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood and unduly restricted them from; other
set of petitioners are alleged private associations of several marine merchants claiming to be fishermen
(except Airline Shippers Assoc. of Palawan)
-respondents are members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan defending the validity of the ordinances; valid
exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause and its specific power to
protect the environment
ISSUE: Are the questioned ordinances valid?
RULING:
-Yes. After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim
to have been violated, we find petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer
from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
- Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources,
but of their protection, development, and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are
meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment by the people
may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come.
- The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not
at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and,
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development
and utilization ... shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Moreover, their mandated
protection, development, and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution,
imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone.
- What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty
of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
- Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsodand the sangguniang
panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants,
which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties
for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ...
and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of
ecological imbalance.
-Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio, GR 118127

-questioning the validity and constitutionality of an ordinance enacted by the City of Manila prohibiting the
establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services
and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community,
annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community in the Ermita-
Malate area
- The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter.
-This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled
by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national legislature
is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
- The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the
City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed
with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. This
delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare clause.
- Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case,
the sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise
of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code.
- The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional
limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public
good.43 In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as
it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
- To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference
with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will
not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
- Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.
- Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must
include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all
freedom it is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.

Ortigas vs. Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 719

-Ortigas is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public. As a business, they
sold disputed lands with restrictions to customers and was annotated in the transfer cert. title. Eventually,
disputed lands were acquired by Feati Bank from third persons.
-Feati Bank began laying the foundation for the construction of a building for their banking purposes but it
was however, claimed by Ortigas that such properties should be devoted to and used exclusively for
residential purposes
ISSUE: WON the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong can nullify contractual obligations
through police power
RULING: Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute,
since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power (i.e. the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people).
-Invariably described as the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers and in a sense, the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired
into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of
due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
-Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort health and prosperity of the state and to this fundamental aim of our
Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
-Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairments presupposes the maintenance of a
government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhilea government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society
-Building restrictions, which declare the disputed lots as residential, cannot be enforced in view of the
resolution issued by the municipality

Presley vs. Bel-Air Village Association, 201 SCRA 13

-BAVA sues the Almendrases for their operation of a pan de sal store in violation of the Deed Restrictions
that the subdivision was to be a purely residential area and for the non-payment to BAVA of membership
dues and assessments
RULING: The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding the Deed of
Restrictions annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions
are in the nature of contractual obligations freely entered into by the parties.
-Undoubtedly they are valid and can be enforced against the petitioner. However, these contractual
stipulations on the use of the land even if said conditions are annotated on the torrens title can be impaired
if necessary to reconcile with the legitimate exercise of police power.
-The Court therefore sees no reason why the petitioner should be singled out and prohibited from putting
up the hot pan de sal store.

Pasong Baybas Farmers Ass. vs. CA, GR 142359

-The Provincial Board of Cavite passed a resolution declaring the midland areas composed of Carmona,
Dasmarinas, parts of Silang and Trece Martirez (where the property is) and parts of Imus, as industrial
areas.
-The plaintiffs alleged that while the defendant CAI was the owner of the land, they were the actual tillers
of the land
-Notwithstanding the conversion of the land, a representative of the CAI, allowed them to continue
cultivating the property, however they were made to pay a rental while they continue to occupy and till
-Even though they reached an agreement that the plaintiffs will continue to peacefully hold the lands, CAI
ordered the bulldozing of the property for its Housing Projects and thus petitioners suffered damages
-Some plaintiffs entered into a compromise agreement with the defendant to donate parcels of land in
consideration of the execution of deeds of quitclaims and waivers in favor of CAI
-Upon the settlement of this civil case, CAI continued with the development of its housing project but was
however prevented from doing so again, when a petition for compulsory coverage under CARL was filed in
court. Such persons were allegedly farmers occupying a parcel of land originally owned by General Dionisio
Ojeda and that they tilled the said agricultural lands
-The processing of the new claimants petition was stalled because documents covering the property had
not yet been submitted. Pending resolution, the CAI continued with the housing project and ordered a
survey of the property, causing the bulldozing and other development activities, which resulted in the
destruction of plants and trees
-The farmer-tenants filed a complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with
damages in court
-Cases were filed and suits began; during the pendency of such, some plaintiffs executed quitclaims over
the lands after receiving money from CAI
-CAI posits that some lands were not covered by the CARP.
-DARAB rendered a decision in favor of the farmer-tenants. CAI raised the matter to the CA for review and
said decision was set aside by the appellate court
-the CA held that the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite had already reclassified the land as residential
through a resolution. According to jurisprudence, settled is the rule that local government units need not
obtain the approval of DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. It thereby
ruled that the disputed land is not agricultural and not covered by CARL so the plaintiffs could not be
considered as tillers/beneficiaries
ISSUE: WON DARABs decision was erroneous
RULING: Yes. The petition has no merit.
-The authority of the municipality to issue zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the
power of eminent domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which
logically arranges, prescribes defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as
present and future projection of needs.
-With the Courts finding that the property subject of the suit was classified as residential land, the DARAB
had no original and appellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of the petitioner and of the
respondents. Consequently, the DARAB should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
-Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenants of the private respondent CAI, the
petitioners and its members had no cause of action against the private respondent for possession of the
landholding to maintain possession thereof and for damages. The petitioners already executed separate
deeds of quitclaim in favor of CAI over the lands they respectively claimed. In executing the deeds, the
members of the petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence they have
no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the same

Administrative Rules and Regulations

Bautista vs. Junio, 127 SCRA 329
-validity of an energy conservation measure is questioned by spouses Bautista for being allegedly violative
the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution; some private motor vehicles were
banned from use during some days of the week
-spouses also contend that the Memorandum Circular imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle
and cancellation of license is unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of undue delegation of
legislative power
-It is to be noted that such Memorandum Circular does not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely
that of impounding, fine, and for the third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the
rest of the year or for ninety days whichever is longer.
ISSUE: WON the assailed LOI was a valid exercise of police power
RULING: Yes.
-It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police power measure may, because of its
arbitrary, oppressive or unjust character, be held offensive to the due process clause and therefore, may
when challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of them.
-In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed
governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled
law. What is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the
cited Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable
of powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.' It would be, to paraphrase another leading
decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of
its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively
put, police power is 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful
to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.'"

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. BOT, 119 SCRA 597

Mirasol vs. DPWH, GR. 158793
-Petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of various administrative issuances by the DPWH
-RTC held that Sec. 4 of RA2000-Limited Access Highway Act expressly authorized the DPWH to design
limited access facilities and to regulate, restrict or prohibit access as to serve the traffic for which such
facilities are intended. According to the RTC, such authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit logically includes
the determination of who and what can and cannot be permitted entry or access into the limited access
facilities. Thus, the RTC concluded that AO 1, DO 74, and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited
Access Facilities, which ban motorcycles' entry or access to the limited access facilities, are not inconsistent
with RA 2000.
RULING:
-The RTC's ruling is based on a wrong premise. The RTC assumed that the DPWH derived its authority
from its predecessor, the Department of Public Works and Communications, which is expressly authorized
to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities under Section 4 of RA 2000. However,
such assumption fails to consider the evolution of the Department of Public Works and Communications.
-In its evolution, Department of Public Works and Communications was separated into two: Ministry of
Public Works and Ministry of Transportation and Communications.
- The functions of the Ministry of Public Works (became DPWH after amendment of the 1987 Constitution)
were the "construction, maintenance and repair of port works, harbor facilities, lighthouses, navigational
aids, shore protection works, airport buildings and associated facilities, public buildings and school
buildings, monuments and other related structures, as well as undertaking harbor and river dredging works,
reclamation of foreshore and swampland areas, water supply, and flood control and drainage works."
- On the other hand, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (became DOTC after amendment
of the 1987 Constitution) became the "primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing,
regulating and administrative entity of the executive branch of the government in the promotion,
development, and regulation of a dependable and coordinated network of transportation and
communication systems
-Clearly, under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which has authority to regulate, restrict, or
prohibit access to limited access facilities.

Anglo-Fil Trading vs. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494

PPA vs. Cipres Stevedoring, GR. 145742
Chavez vs. Romulo, GR. 157036