PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 

Criminal procedure, defined. Criminal procedure has been defined as

the rules of law governing the procedures by which crimes are investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated,
and punished. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 374). Criminal procedure and criminal law,
distinguished. Criminal procedure, being remedial in nature, provides for the manner by which crimes
are investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and punished. It is the generic term to describe the network of
laws and rules which govern the procedural admi- nistration of criminal justice (Black’s Law Dictionary,
6th ed., p. 374). On the other hand, criminal law, being substantive, defines crimes, treats of
their nature and provides for their punishment (12 Cyc. 129). It refers to statutes imposing penalty, fine
or punishment for certain offenses of a public nature
or wrongs committed against the state (Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, p. 1133). But where a statute is
both penal and remedial, as where it is in penal in one part and remedial in the other, it should be
considered as a “penal statute” when it is sought to enforce the penalty, and as a “remedial statute”,
when it is sought to en- force the remedy (Collins vs. Kidd, D.C. Tex., 38 F. Supp. 634, 637 cited in
Black’s Law Dictionary, Ibid.). Goal of criminal law and procedure. The great goal of our criminal law and
procedure is not to send people to the gaol but to do justice. The prosecution's job is to prove that the
accused is guilty be- yond reasonable doubt. Conviction must be based on the strength of the
prose- cution and not on the weakness of the defense—the obligation is upon the 

shoulders of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, not on the accused to prove his
innocence. Thus, when the evidence for the prosecution is not enough to sustain a conviction, it must be
rejected and the accused absolved and released at once (People vs. Mamalias, 328 SCRA 760, 773
[2000]). Due process in criminal proceedings. Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal
proceedings, in partic- ular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired
by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d)
that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing (Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr. 287 SCRA 245, 261 [1998];
People vs. Dapitan, 197 SCRA 378). These constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now
elementary 

and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indis- pensable. The
principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that
procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a “law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.” (Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr. 287 SCRA 245,
261 [1998]). Criminal jurisdiction, defined. Criminal jurisdiction is the power and authority to hear and
try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it (see Antiporda, Jr. vs. Garchitorena, 321
SCRA 551, 558 [1999] citing People vs. Mariana, 71 SCRA 600) Requisites of criminal jurisdiction. A court
acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the following requi- sites concur: (1) the offense is
one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of, (2) the offense must have been
committed within its territorial 

jurisdiction, and (3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for
trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submis- sion to the court. (Antiporda, Jr. vs.
Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551, 558 [1999] citing Arula vs. Espino, 28 SCRA 540, 567 [1969]; see also Cruz
vs. CA, 388 SCRA 72, 83 [2002]). A fourth requisite should be added, that is, the court must have
acquired juris- diction over the issues in the case. Such jurisdiction is acquired by arraignment and plea.
By the accused’s plea to the offense charged, which partakes the nature of an answer in a civil case,
issues in the case are joined and the court
acquires jurisdiction thereof. It is for this reason that there can be no trial in absentia unless the accused
is arraigned. Mere acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the ac- cused does not suffice to confer
jurisdiction to the court to try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the offense charged. Jurisdiction
over the offense charged in the complaint or information is conferred by law or statute (People vs.
Garfin, G.R. 153176, Mar. 29, 2004). A court has juris- diction over the offense charged if the following
requisites concur: (a) the offense charged is one which the court is by law conferred to take cognizance
of; and (b) the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction (see Cruz vs. CA, 388
SCRA 72, 83 [2002]; Antiporda, Jr. vs. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551, 558 [1999]; Arula vs. Espino, 28 SCRA
540, 567 [1969]). Jurisdiction over the accused, how acquired. Jurisdiction over the person of the
accused or defendant is obtained by his lawful arrest or voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court (Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 300 SCRA 367, 387 [1998]; Velasco vs. CA, 245 SCRA 677, 686 

[1995]). What constitutes voluntary Submission to the jurisdiction of the court. When the accused is

unlawfully arrested but he entered a plea on arraignment with- out invoking his right to question any
irregularity which might have accompanied his arrest, he voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process (see People vs. Conde, 356 SCRA 415, 426 [2001];
People vs. Legaspi, 331 SCRA 95, 123 [2000]; People vs. Codilla, 224 SCRA 104 [1993]; (People vs. Galvez,
355 SCRA 246, 259 [2001]; People vs. Robles, 333 SCRA 107, 117 [2000; People vs. Alojado, 305 SCRA
236 [1999]; People vs. Tidula, 292 SCRA 596. 611 [1998]). So also, as a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief by filing pleadings or motions is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. 

In other words, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes
voluntary appearance (Miranda vs. Tuliao, G.R. 158763, Mar. 31, 2006). There is, however, an exception
to the rule that filing pleadings or motions seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance,
and the consequent submission of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of
pleadings or motions whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which
only leads to a special appearance. These are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are
included; (2) in criminal cases, mo- tions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
conse- quences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense 

of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of
the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion
to quash a warrant of arrest. (see Mi- randa vs. Tuliao, G.R. 158763, Mar. 31, 2006). The principles on
voluntary submission may be summarized as follows: (1) When the accused is unlawfully arrested but he
entered a plea on arraignment without invoking his right to question the legality of his arrest, or he filed
a motion to the court seeking affirmative relief other than to question the court’s jurisdiction over his
person, he is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court (see People vs.
Conde, 356 SCRA 415 [2001]; Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581 [1998]). (2) When the accused is
unlawfully arrested and he files a motion to quash the complaint or information, or to quash the
warrant of arrest solely questioning the 

jurisdiction of the court over his person, the filing of such motion only leads to special appearance, and
he has not thereby voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court (see Miranda vs. Tuliao, op. cit.). (3) When the accused is not under the custody
of the law, the court does not ac- quire jurisdiction over his person; his filing of any motion does not
constitute voluntary submission, and the court has no authority to rule on his motion except: (a) a
motion to quash grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person; and (b)
a motion to quash the warrant for his arrest (see Ibid.). Jurisdiction over the person and Custody of the
law, distinguished. There is a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not
required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the accused 

where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished ei- ther by arrest or voluntary surrender,
while jurisdiction over the person of the ac- cused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
per- son, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before ar- raignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the juris- diction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial
has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Cus- tody of
the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention
(Miranda vs. Tuliao, G.R. 158763, Mar. 31, 2006). 

Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingre- dients
took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court (Abalos vs. People, 389 SCRA 135, 141 [2002]).
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Hence, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory
(Uy vs. CA, 276 SCRA 367, 374-375 [1997]; US vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376 [1913]; Macasaet vs. People,
G.R. 156747, Feb. 23, 2005). It is thus a rule that in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed 

or where any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (Barrameda vs. CA, 313 SCRA 477, 484
[1999] citing People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77 [1991]). The spe- cific crime charged must in fact have been
committed at a place within the juris- diction of the court (see People vs. Ferolino, 329 SCRA 719, 729
[2000]). Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction (Cudia vs. CA,
284 SCRA 173, 180 [1998]; Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA 699 [1979]; Macasaet vs. People, G.R. 156747,
Feb. 23, 2005). Stated otherwise, the place of the commis- sion of the offense is an element of criminal
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dis- miss the action for want of jurisdiction (Uy vs. CA, 276
SCRA 367, 374-375 [1997]). 

Exceptions to the rule. There are two (2) kinds of exceptions to the territorial juris- diction of courts. The

first kind are those offenses committed outside
Philippine territory under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, viz: (1) offenses committed on a Philippine
ship or airship; (2) forging or counterfeiting any coin or currency note of the Philippines or obligations
and securities issued by the Government of the Philippines; (3) acts connected with the introduction
into the Philippines of such obligations and securities; (4) offenses committed by public officers or
employees in the exercise of their functions; and (5) crimes against national security and the law of
nations defined in Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code (Art. 2, Revised Penal Code). The
second kind are those offenses committed within Philippine territory but ex- pressly allowed by law to
be instituted in a place other than their place of commis- sion. These are the following: (1) criminal
offenses of libel, which may be instituted 

in the place where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense (Art. 260, Revised Penal Code); and (2) a criminal ac- tion arising from illegal recruitment as
defined under RA 8042, which may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where
the offended party actu- ally resides at the time of the commission of the offense (Sec. 9, RA
8042). Criminal jurisdiction, governing law. It is well established that the jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal case is deter- mined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once the
court acquires jurisdiction over a controversy, it shall continue to exercise such juris- diction until the
final determination of the case and it is not affected by subsequent legislation vesting jurisdiction over
such proceedings in another tribunal. A recog- nized exception to this rule is when the statute expressly
provides, or is construed 

to the effect that it is intended to operate upon actions pending before its enact- ment. However, where
such retroactive effect is not provided for, statutes altering the jurisdiction of a court cannot be applied
to cases already pending prior to their enactment. (People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 [1998]; Azarcon
vs. Sandi- ganbayan, 268 SCRA 747 [1997]; People vs. Velasco, 252 SCRA 135 [1996]; People vs. Mariano,
71 SCRA 600 [1976]; People vs. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273 [1968]; Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65, 99
[1999]). Jurisdiction, how determined. The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to
ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence, it is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of
a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or infor- mation (Alarilla vs. Sandiganhayan,
338 SCRA 485, 496, 498 [2001]; People vs. 

Magallanes, 249 SCRA 219, 222-223 [1995]; People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 [1998]; Lim vs. CA, 251
SCRA 408 [1995]; Tamano vs. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 [1998]; Chico vs. CA, 284 SCRA 33 [1998]; Esteban vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 146646- 49, Mar. 11, 2005), and not by the evidence presented by the parties
at the trial. (Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298, 325 [1999]; People vs.
Magallanes, Ibid. citing US vs. Mallari, 24 Phil. 366 [1913]; People vs. Co Hiok, 62 Phil. 501 [1935]; People
vs. Ocaya 83 SCRA 218 (1978]). Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases is not
determined by what may be meted out to the offender or accused after trial (People v. Cuello, 1
SCRA 814 [1961]), or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented
during the trial (People v. Co Hiok, supra), but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes,
together with other legal obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information
(People vs. Purisima, 69 SCRA 341, 347 [1976]) 

constitutive of the offense charged (Dioquino vs. Cruz, L-39951, Sept. 9, 1982). Extent of the exercise of
jurisdiction. In criminal cases, a court can only do three things: (1) convict the accused and sentence him
accordingly; (2) acquit the accused and release him from detention if he is detained or cancel his bail if
he is bonded; or (3) he can dismiss the case for any of the grounds provided by law (Quindoza vs.
Bandon, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1552. Dec. 16, 2004). Nevertheless, where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial
juris- diction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law re- quires the court
to resolve (Cruz vs. CA, 388 SCRA 72, 83 [2002]). The issues in- clude the civil liability of accused arising
from the crime which is deemed 

instituted with the criminal action unless reserved or waived by the offended party. In a case, the
Regional Trial Court in Manila acquitted the accused of the charge of estafa thru falsification of official
document but rendered a judgment on the civil aspect of the case ordering the return to the surviving
heirs of the parcel of land lo- cated in Bulacan. The accused questioned the propriety of the decision on
the civil aspect arguing that the Manila court had no jurisdiction over the parcel of land in Bulacan which
is outside the trial court’s jurisdiction. It was held that the Manila trial court had jurisdiction to decide
the civil aspect of the case—ordering
resti- tution even if the parcel of land is located in Bulacan (Cruz vs. CA, Ibid., p. 84). Court’s retention of
jurisdiction. The settled doctrine is that once a court has assumed jurisdiction over a case, its jurisdiction
shall continue until the case is finished and it may not be ousted from its jurisdiction by a co-equal or
coordinate court (Al-Awadhi vs. Astih, G.R. 81969

Sept. 26, 1988; People vs. Layao, 111 SCRA 20 [1982]; People vs. Ocampo, 83 SCRA 218 [1976]; Denila vs.
Bellosillo, 64 SCRA 63 [1975]). Corollarily, once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court
(Jalandoni vs. Drilon, 327 SCRA 107, 122 [2000] citing Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 [1987]; Pilapil
vs. Garchitorena, 299 SCRA 343, 357-358 [1998]). This rule does not foreclose a reinvestigation or a
review by a superior authority of the resolution finding probable cause. Nevertheless, once a motion to
dismiss or withdraw information is thereafter filed, the court may grant or deny it in
faithful exercise of judicial prerogative, not out of subservience to the prosecution arm, i.e., the Office of
the Special Prosecutor or the Ombudsman, or the Department of Jus- tice, as the case may be (Pilapil vs.
Garchitorena, Ibid,p. 358). Effect of lack of jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that a judgment rendered by a court with- out jurisdiction is
null and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights and produces no effect. (Limpangog vs.
CA, 319 SCRA 341, 345 [1999]). Thus, the rule provides that the failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did
not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the
grounds of a motion to quash, except inter alia the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged (Sec. 9, Rule 117; Uy vs. CA, 276 SCRA 367, 377 [1997]). It follows that, as a rule, the filing of a
complaint with one court which has no juris- diction over it does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the
same complaint later with the competent court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply
be- cause it made a mistake before in the choice of the proper forum. In such a 

situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This
has to be so as a contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest the competent court of its
jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even delib- erately, in derogation of the law. (Binay vs.
Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65, 99 [1999]; Zamora vs. Court of Appeals (183 SCRA 279 [1990]; see also
China Banking Corpo- ration vs. Court of Appeals. 270 SCRA 503 [1997]). Jurisdiction by
estoppel. Jurisdiction is determined by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by
estoppel (Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 226 [1997]). The Court
has, however, ruled in certain cases (e.g., Ramirez vs. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 590 [1997];
Quintanilla vs. Court of Appeals, 279 9CRA 397 [1997]; Sia vs. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 141 [1997])
that estoppel prevents a party from ques- tioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself
invoked. Nevertheless, 

estoppel remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is vested by law
(Calimlim vs. Ramirez, 118 SCRA 399 [1982]; see also Dy vs. NLRC, 145 SCRA 211 [1986]; People vs.
Eduarte. 182 SCRA 750 [1990]; Corona vs. CA, 214 SCRA 378 [1992]). In those instances where estoppel
is applied, the party estopped consistently in- voked the jurisdiction of the court and actively
participated in the proceedings, im- pugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision
(Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, 316 SCRA 65, 99 [1999]). It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (Security Agency vs. De la Serna, 182
SCRA 472 [1990]; People vs. Munar, 53 SCRA 278 [1973]). Thus, in a case, the original Information filed
with the Sandiganbayan did not

mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed
that the prosecution belatedly remembered that such a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein. It
appears, however, in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation
filed by accused with the same court that accused challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the offense charged is work-
connected. The Supreme Court held that the accused are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan (Antiporda, Jr. vs. Garchitorena, 321 SCRA 551-560-561 [1999]). Concurrent
criminal jurisdiction of courts. As a rule, there is no confluent or coordinate jurisdiction of courts of
different ranks over criminal cases except in cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers 
and consuls. However, courts of equal rank are vested with concurrent jurisdiction over the following
offenses: (1) felonies stated in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) continuing crimes committed in
different judicial regions (see U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376; People vs. Zapata, 88 Phil. 688); (3) offenses
wherein any of their essential ingredients occurred in different municipalities or territories (Sec. 15(a),
Rule 110); (4) offenses committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or pri- vate vehicle in the course of
its trip (Sec. 15(b), Rule 110); (5) offenses committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage (Sec.
5(c), Rule 110); and (6) libel and written defamation (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code)(see Regalado, Vol. 2,
9th ed., pp. 196-197). With regard to cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls,
juris- diction is concurrently lodged with the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Courts (Sec. 21, BP
129 and Sec. 5(1), Art. VIII, Const.).