Mr.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said: “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law” (Path of the Law, 10 Harvard Law Review, 457, 460 [1897])

Law “in its specific and concrete sense is a rule of conduct, just, obligatory, formulated by legitimate
power for common observance and benefit” (Lapitan vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, 60 O.G.
6841)

G.R. No. 28228-R October 15, 1963

Lapitan vs. PCSO

Lucero J.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Facts:

 In the June 2 1958 draw of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes office ticket bearing
number 073522 divided into four shares
o First prize Php 100,000.00
 Plaintiff Lapitan, on august 7, 1958, presented to the defendant PCSO a badly mutilated
ticket.
 The defendant submitted the ticket to the NBI. To ascertain the Genuity of the ticket.
 The NBI concluded that it is impossible for the ticket to be reconstructed as to ascertain
its number. The only figure found is “3”
 PCSO refused to give the money
 Answering the complainant (a) the plaintiff is not the holder of the number (b) plaintiff
has no valid cause of action against the defendant.
 The plaintiff appealed contending that the “trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff
has not duly established that the mutilated ticket presented to the defendant bears the
number”
More facts

 When the plaintiff bought the ticket, in fear of misplacing the ticket, he wrote the
number thereof, on top of page 12 of the printed calendar for the year 1958
 He placed the ticket inside a wooden wardrobe.
 In the morning of June 2nd, he took the ticket and put it inside a pocket of his trousers
for the purpose of having it hadny for verification. He hung his trousers on a nail at
night
 The next day (June 3rd) he noticed his trousers missing
 He found is trousers soaked in a basin of water.
 The ticket was still inside but wet and mutilated.
  He gathered the torn pieces and warpped the mwith a sheet of paper.
 On June 4 1958, he found out that his number is the winning number.
 Later that day, Ajon went to him to inquire about his ticket.
 Together with Atty. Juan Baes (his legal counsel) went to the PCSO to claim the prize
 Agent Ajon confirmed the sale of the ticket to Lapitan
 However, branding the plaintiff’s testimony as “not only self serving but also irrational
and not in accord with the ordinary course of human behavior”, the Court concluded
that the plaintiff did not duly established that the number is the winning number
 It was improbable that the plaintiff, who have bought a ticket for the first time, would
have written the number in a calendar. The court find such behavior to be incredible.

 However, the ¾ of the shares have been known as to who they are, and that the
plaintiff is the only one claiming the remaining share of the prize.
 The NBI examined the ticket to be genuine even though it cannot be reconstructed as to
ascertain the number
Ruling:

 The court opines that the circumstances, together with the Testimonial evidence,
sufficiently establish that the mutilated ticket held by the plaintiff represents the
remaining share of the winning ticket.
 And that by the given facts at hand, it can be logically deduced that the winning ticket is
that of Mr. Lapitan
 In the interpretation of laws, it is presumed that the law making body intended right and
justice to prevail.
 Wherefore, the plaintiff is to obtain the 25,000, with costs.
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

Tañada vs. Tuvera

ESCOLIN, J.:

FACTS:

Invoking the people’s right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, which States “The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and paper pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.”, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials
to publish in the Official Gazette the Presidential Decrees, Letter of Instructions, General Orders,
Executive Orders, Letters of Implementation and Administrative Orders.

         However, respondents would like to have the case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition, they being not the aggrieved
parties defined in Section 3, Rule 65, furthermore, the respondents contend that publication in
the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
provide for their own effectivity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided ” The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following
its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2
does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
 The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a

requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential
issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

Tañada vs. Tuvera

CRUZ, J.:

DOCTRINE: Statutes; Words and Phrases; The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2
of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws and not to the requirement of publication.

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law.
The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise provided”, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the
necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in
the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect.
The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability
and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must
be made in the official gazette.

ISSUE:

Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

HELD:

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication.

In the Comment required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion
was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that
the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not
have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred
in only by three justices and consequently not binding.

RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals
Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being
in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent
capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the
title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null
and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its
approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence,
which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo
v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional
mandate on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”
Sec. 1.    Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not
considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14,
2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of
candidacy.

ISSUE: W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its
approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence,
which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

HELD: Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it
“shall take effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not
render the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:

... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date without its previous publication

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.

.
Umali vs Estanislao 209 SCRA 446

Facts:
Congress enacted Republic Act 7167 amending the NIRC (adjusting the basic and additional
exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to the poverty threshold level). The
said Act was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and published on 14
January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation. On 26 December 1991, the CIR
promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 stating that the regulations shall take effect on
compensation income from January 1, 1992. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel
the CIR to implement RA 7167 in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and prohibition
to enjoin the CIR from implementing the revenue regulation.

Issue:
Assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992 (15 days after its publication in
“Malaya”), whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to compensation income
earned or received during calendar year 1991.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to
compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991. Sec. 29, par. [L], Item No. 4
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust
not more often than once every three years, the personal and additional exemptions taking into
account, among others, the movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum wages, and
bare subsistence levels.

The exemptions were last adjusted in 1986. The president could have adjusted it in 1989 but did
not do so. The poverty threshold level refers to the level at the time Rep. Act 7167 was enacted
by Congress. The Act is a social legislation intended to alleviate in part the present economic
plight of the lower income taxpayers.

Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions shall be available after the law shall
have become effective. These exemptions are available upon the filing of personal income tax
returns, done not later than the 15th day of April after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under
Rep. Act 7167, which became effective, on 30 January 1992, the increased exemptions are
literally available on or before 15 April 1992 [though not before 30 January 1992]. But these
increased exemptions can be available on 15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation income
earned or received during the calendar year 1991. The personal exemptions as increased by Rep.
Act 7167 are not available in respect of compensation income received during the 1990 calendar
year; the tax due in respect of said income had already accrued, and been presumably paid (The
law does not state retroactive application). The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act
7167 cannot be regarded as available as to compensation income received during 1992 because it
would in effect postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to 1 January-15 April 1993.
The implementing regulations collide with Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the
statute "shall take effect upon its approval”. The revenue regulation should take effect on
compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991. Since this decision is
promulgated after 15 April 1992, those taxpayers who have already paid are entitled to refunds
or credits. 

LA – BUGAL BULAAN
FACTS:

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796
authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which,
upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent.

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to “govern the
exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources.”

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila
Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect.33

Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President
entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor
O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No.
96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.

Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 279, the law in force when the WMC FTAA was executed, did
not come into effect.
E.O. No. 279 was signed into law by then President Aquino on July 25, 1987, two days before
the opening of Congress on July 27, 1987.214 Section 8 of the E.O. states that the same “shall
take effect immediately.” This provision, according to petitioners, runs counter to Section 1 of
E.O. No. 200,215 which provides:

SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

On that premise, petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 could have only taken effect fifteen days
after its publication at which time Congress had already convened and the President’s power to
legislate had ceased.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the validity of E.O. No. 279 was settled in Miners
Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, supra. This is of course incorrect for the issue in
Miners Association was not the validity of E.O. No. 279 but that of DAO Nos. 57 and 82 which
were issued pursuant thereto.

ISSUE: WON E.O. No. 279, the law in force when the WMC FTAA was executed, did not come
into effect.

HELD:

Nevertheless, petitioners’ contentions have no merit.

It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a
date other than—even before—the 15-day period after its publication. Where a law provides for
its own date of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed, this
is the very essence, of the phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” in Section 1 thereof. Section
1, E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies only when a statute does not provide for its own date of
effectivity.

What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due process requires, as this Court held in
Tañada v. Tuvera,217 is the publication of the law for without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis n[eminem] excusat.” It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a ground for
its invalidation since the Constitution, being the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation,” is deemed written in the law.218 Hence, the due process clause,219 which, so Tañada
held, mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally,
Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication “either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,” finds suppletory application. It is significant
to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette220 on August 3, 1987.

From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, and Tañada v.
Tuvera, this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately upon its publication in
the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.

That such effectivity took place after the convening of the first Congress is irrelevant. At the
time President Aquino issued E.O. No. 279 on July 25, 1987, she was still validly exercising
legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution.221 Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions)
of the 1987 Constitution explicitly states:

SEC. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first
Congress is convened.

The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by
President Aquino; it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted.

There can be no question, therefore, that E.O. No. 279 is an effective, and a validly enacted,
statute.
"LAW" — officially promulgated rules of conduct, backed by state-enforced penalties for their
transgression.
''JUSTICE'' — rendering to each person what he or she deserves.

the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice

LAW vs. MORALITY

Morality is a principles concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad
behavior.

any law that claims to regulate behavioral expectations must be in harmony with moral
norms. Approached from this perspective, the law must be enacted in such a way that it
secures the welfare of the individual and the good of the community. Thus, the aim of all
laws should be both the attainment of the end of the state and the common good of the
community, both immediate and ultimate. 

SOCIAL JUSTICE

Social justice tends to focus more on just relations between groups within society as opposed to
the justice of individual conduct or justice for individuals.

The idea of social justice is that all people should have equal access to wealth, health, well-
being, justice, privileges, and opportunity regardless of their legal, political, economic, or
other circumstances. In modern practice, social justice revolves around favoring or
punishing different groups of the population, regardless of any given individual's choices or
actions, based on value judgements regarding historical events, current conditions, and
group relations.

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.

LAW vs. EQUITY

1.Law is the body of rules which are regulated by the government and enforced by
the courts while equity is a set of rules which follows the natural law and fairness.
2.In a court of law, defendants can be ordered to pay monetary damages while in
equity, if the complainant wants to get back what is taken from him instead of
getting money, the court can order the defendant to do so.
3.Law can order writs while equity can order injunctions.
4.In a court of law, a case is heard by a jury and the judge while in equity only the
judge settles a case.
Equity proceeds in the principle that a right or liability should as far as possible be equalized
among all interested. In other words, two parties have equal right in any property, so it is
distributed equally as per the concerned law.

G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015 – CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner, v. ST.
SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE WESTGROVE AND/OR SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB, Respondents.

FACTS:

SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In May 2001,
SSCW hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCW’s Director of the Lay Apostolate and
Community Outreach Directorate.

Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When
SSCW learned of the petitioner’s pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCW’s
Directress, advised her to file a resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the
petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign from her employment just
because she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage.

On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why
she should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting
pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts to serious misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic school.

In a letter7 dated May 31, 2003, the petitioner explained that her pregnancy out of wedlock
does not amount to serious misconduct or conduct unbecoming of an employee. She
averred that she is unaware of any school policy stating that being pregnant out of wedlock
is considered as a serious misconduct and, thus, a ground for dismissal. Further, the
petitioner requested a copy of SSCW’s policy and guidelines so that she may better respond
to the charge against her.

On June 2, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that, pending the promulgation of a
“Support Staff Handbook,” SSCW follows the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools (1992 MRPS) on the causes for termination of employments; that Section 94(e) of
the 1992 MRPS cites “disgraceful or immoral conduct” as a ground for dismissal in addition
to the just causes for termination of employment provided under Article 282 of the Labor
Code.

On June 4, 2003, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Sr. Quiambao a letter, 9 which, in part,
reads:
To us, pre-marital sex between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry
each other who later on married each other does not fall within the contemplation of
“disgraceful or immoral conduct” and “serious misconduct” of the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools and the Labor Code of the Philippines.

Your argument that what happened to our client would set a bad example to the students
and other employees of your school is speculative and is more imaginary than real. To
dismiss her on that sole ground constitutes grave abuse of management prerogatives.

Considering her untarnished service for two years, dismissing her with her present
condition would also mean depriving her to be more secure in terms of financial capacity to
sustain maternal needs.10

In a letter11 dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that pre-marital sexual
relations, even if between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry, is
considered a disgraceful and immoral conduct or a serious misconduct, which are grounds
for the termination of employment under the 1992 MRPS and the Labor Code. That SSCW,
as a Catholic institution of learning, has the right to uphold the teaching of the Catholic
Church and expect its employees to abide by the same. They further asserted that the
petitioner’s indiscretion is further aggravated by the fact that she is the Assistant to the
Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate, a position of
responsibility that the students look up to as role model. The petitioner was again directed
to submit a written explanation on why she should not be dismissed.

On June 9, 2003, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she adopts her counsel’s letter
dated June 4, 2003 as her written explanation.12

Consequently, in her letter13 dated June 11, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner
that her employment with SSCW is terminated on the ground of serious misconduct. She
stressed that pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults with no
impediment to marry, even if they subsequently married, amounts to immoral conduct. She
further pointed out that SSCW finds unacceptable the scandal brought about by the
petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock as it ran counter to the moral principles that SSCW
stands for and teaches its students.

Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City against SSCW and Sr. Quiambao
(respondents). In her position paper, 14 the petitioner claimed that SSCW gravely abused its
management prerogative as there was no just cause for her dismissal. She maintained that
her pregnancy out of wedlock cannot be considered as serious misconduct since the same
is a purely private affair and not connected in any way with her duties as an employee of
SSCW. Further, the petitioner averred that she and her boyfriend eventually got married
even prior to her dismissal.
For their part, SSCW claimed that there was just cause to terminate the petitioner’s
employment with SSCW and that the same is a valid exercise of SSCW’s management
prerogative. They maintained that engaging in pre-marital sex, and getting pregnant as a
result thereof, amounts to a disgraceful or immoral conduct, which is a ground for the
dismissal of an employee under the 1992 MRPS.

They pointed out that SSCW is a Catholic educational institution, which caters exclusively
to young girls; that SSCW would lose its credibility if it would maintain employees who do
not live up to the values and teachings it inculcates to its students. SSCW further asserted
that the petitioner, being an employee of a Catholic educational institution, should have
strived to maintain the honor, dignity and reputation of SSCW as a Catholic school. 15

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On February 28, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision, 16 in NLRC Case No. 6-
17657-03-C which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner. The LA found that
there was a valid ground for the petitioner’s dismissal; that her pregnancy out of
wedlock is considered as a “disgraceful and immoral conduct.” The LA pointed out that, as
an employee of a Catholic educational institution, the petitioner is expected to live up to the
Catholic values taught by SSCW to its students. Likewise, the LA opined that:

Further, a deep analysis of the facts would lead us to disagree with the complainant that
she was dismissed simply because she violate[d] a Catholic [teaching]. It should not be
taken in isolation but rather it should be analyzed in the light of the surrounding
circumstances as a whole. We must also take into [consideration] the nature of her work
and the nature of her employer-school. For us, it is not just an ordinary violation.  It was
committed by the complainant in an environment where her strict adherence to the same is
called for and where the reputation of the school is at stake.

Issue: whether or not the dismissal of the employee is valid.

Ruling: The CA belabored the management prerogative of SSCW to discipline its employees.
The CA opined that the petitioner’s dismissal is a valid exercise of management prerogative
to impose penalties on erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations.

The Court does not agree.

The Court has held that “management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion
and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working
methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers
and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative,
however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the
rights of labor.” Management cannot exercise its prerogative in a cruel, repressive, or
despotic manner.53

SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right to discipline its employees and, if need be,
dismiss them if there is a valid cause to do so. However, as already explained, there is no
cause to dismiss the petitioner. Her conduct is not considered by law as disgraceful
or immoral. Further, the respondents themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of
the controversy, does not have any policy or rule against an employee who engages in pre-
marital sexual relations and conceives a child as a result thereof. There being no valid basis
in law or even in SSCW’s policy and rules, SSCW’s dismissal of the petitioner is despotic and
arbitrary and, thus, not a valid exercise of management prerogative.

In sum, the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as there was no just cause
for the termination of her employment. SSCW failed to adduce substantial evidence to
establish that the petitioner’s conduct, i.e., engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and
conceiving a child out of wedlock, assessed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is
considered disgraceful or immoral. The labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in
upholding the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal as the charge against the petitioner lay
not on substantial evidence, but on the bare allegations of SSCW. In turn, the CA committed
reversible error in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal, failing to recognize
that the labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in ruling for the respondents.

The proscription against disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94 e of the

1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which is made as a cause for
dismissal, must necessarily refer to public and secular morality.

MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice                   
LAUREL, J.:

Facts:
 
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2)  along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCo
mmonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are
not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not
only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila,

brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works;
Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions
of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or
trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare
lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not
be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority
be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies
in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preserving.

2) No.

The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken

sympathy towards any given group. It is the promotion of the welfare of all
people.

Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may  at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public, the state in order to promote
the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

KAREN VS. SALVACION

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, American tourist, lured and detained petitioner Karen Salvacion and was
able to rape the latter several times. Bartelli was eventually arrested and criminal cases for
serious illegal detention and four counts of rape were filed against him. A civil case for damages
with preliminary attachments were also filed.

On the day for Bartelli’s petition for bail hearing, the latter escaped from jail. Hence, the
criminal cases were archived but the civil proceedings continued and later granted moral and
exemplary damages to the petitioner through a writ of attachment on Bartelli’s dollar deposits.

The Philippine bank and the Central Bank refused to honor the writ of attachment, invoking Sec.
8 of R.A. No. 6426, as amended, which provides in part that “foreign currency deposits
shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.”

Respondent argument:

Expanding, the Central Bank said: that one reason for ex-empting the foreign currency
deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, is to
assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and
the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the inflow
of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby placing such institutions more
in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus
directly contributing to the economic development of the country; that the subject section is
being enforced according to the regular methods of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign
currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the dollar bank deposit in a Philippine bank of a foreign tourist can be attached to
satisfy the moral damages awarded in favor of the latter’s 12-year-old rape victim.

RULING:

In rejecting the contention of the banks and holding that the peculiar circumstances obtaining
make the law not applicable to the case of the 12-year old rape victim and that the banks should
comply with the writ of execution and release the dollar deposit in favor of the victim, the Court
applied the principles of right and justice to prevail over the strict and literal words of the
statute.

The questioned law would, therefore, make the favorable judgment futile. The intention of the
questioned law may have been good when it was enacted which is a time when the economy
was in shambles. However, the law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright
injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con daño de otro. When the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is
one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.

In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we
rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient,
injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg
Bartelli.

“It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System
and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign
lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No.
1035). It is these deposits that are induced by the two laws and given protection and
incentives by them.

“Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the
kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection
by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore,
will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.

SOLICITOR GENERAL COMMENT:

The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain redress for a
wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a
purpose which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the alien.
J. Muller vs Muller,

GR NO. 149615   August 29, 2006

In re: Petition for Separation of Property Elena Buenaventura Muller,

petitioner

vs.

HELMUT MULLER, respondent

Ynaes-Santiago, J.:

Doctrine Laid by the SC: It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the
law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public
policy, cannot be done directly—he who seeks equity must do equity, and he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands.

Facts:

Originating Court: Petitioner Elena and Respondent Helmut were married in

Germany. In 1992, the couple moved to the Philippines. Respondent, using
his inheritance money and despite the knowledge of the constitutional
prohibition in owning land, bought a property in Antipolo and live with
petitioner permanently. However, due to incompatibilities and respondent’s
alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually
separated.

     During the termination of absolute community, it was ruled that the
respondent cannot recover his funds for the Antipolo property due to the
violation of section 7, Art. XII of the Constitution, which states that save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, being a foreigner,
respondent is disqualified to acquire the land.

Appellate Court: Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, however, it

held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of
the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It
also considered petitioner’s ownership over the property in trust for the
respondent.
 

Issue: whether or not Respondent has the right to have reimbursement.

Ruling:

No. As Supreme Court held that “He who seek equity must do
equity.” The Respondent bought the said property willingly and
knowingly despite the constitutional prohibition. Thus, respondent is
in bad faith in buying the property. Therefore, Respondent shall not
have the right of reimbursement due to acquiring the property in bad
faith.

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands.The primary purpose of
the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge
thereof to this Court.11 He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of
petitioner because of the said prohibition.12 His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a
right on the said property cannot be sustained.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by
operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the exception
provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands
in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed.
G.R. No. 203947. February 26, 2014.*

RUFA A. RUBIO, BARTOLOME BANTOTO, LEON ALAGADMO, RODRIGO DELICTA,

and ADRIANO ALABATA, petitioners, vs. LOURDES ALABATA, respondent.

FACTS:

The prior case before the RTC-43 involved a reconveyance of a parcel of land in favor of
the rightful owners, the heirs of one Agapito Alagadmo. Petitioners, in instituting the case
against respondent, showed their desire and resolve to pursue and take back what was rightfully
theirs. Eventually, they succeeded in obtaining justice and won back what was theirs. For their
sufferings, the trial court saw it fit to also assess moral damages and exemplary damages against
respondent.

When the case was elevated by respondent to the CA, the PAO continued to represent
petitioners’ cause. As it was an appealed case, the matter was referred to, and handled by, SAC-
PAO in Manila.

For reasons known only to her, the respondent withdrew her appeal, which resulted in the RTC-
43 Decision becoming final and executory. The petitioners, however, never knew of this because
when they followed up the case with PAO-Dumaguete, they were informed that the appeal was
still pending.

It appears from the records that a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma. Lourdes
Naz, the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, who had resigned. Unfortunately, she failed to
inform petitioners of the said entry of judgment before her resignation in November 1997. She
also failed to inform PAO-Dumaguete of such development.

It was only in November 2007, when petitioners actually discovered that their victory was
already final after their nephew secured a copy of the entry of judgment from RTC-43.

Both the RTC-42 and the CA were acting in accordance with the rules and jurisprudence when
they dismissed the action for revival of judgment. Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes
final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion
within five (5) years from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the
decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a
right of action which must be enforced by the insti tution of a complaint in a regular court within
ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in strictly applying the procedural rules.

RULING:

The court grant the petition. To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would
result in an injustice to petitioners considering (1) that respondent decided not to contest
the RTC-43 decision and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to
petitioners.

Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so were represented
by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the records, PAO, SAC-PAO in particular,
failed them. SAC-PAO never informed them of the abandonment by respondent of her
appeal or of the entry of judgment. Under the circumstances, they could not be faulted for their
subsequent actions. They went to PAO-Dumaguete and they were told that the case was still
pending on appeal. Due to their penury and unfamiliarity or downright ignorance of the rules,
they could not be expected to bypass PAO- Dumaguete and directly verify the status of the case
with the SAC-PAO. They had to trust their lawyer and wait.

No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her appeal. Withdrawing her
appeal means that she respected the RTC-43 Decision, which voided the “Declaration of
Heirship and Sale,” dismissed respondent’s counterclaim, and ordered her to reconvey the entire
subject property to petitioners and to pay moral and exemplary damages plus the cost of suit.
Since the decision became final and executory, she has been in possession of the property which
rightfully belongs to petitioners. She will continue to hold on to the property just because of a
technicality.

Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
relaxes the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of judgment filed by
petitioners. The Court believes that it is its bounden duty to exact justice in every way
possible and exercise its soundest discretion to prevent a wrong. Although strict compliance
with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict
enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that
courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.
Adjective Law, governs how the court handle the case, it governs the timeline, it governs
the rule on how people like lawyers would act in court, it governs what rights you have to have
hearings while

SUBSTANTIVE LAW its describing the crime you are accused of in terms what
constitutes the actual crime and what the punishment may or may not be, They also define our
rights and responsibilities as citizens.

The distinction is that, One governs on how your case are going to be handled in short it is
the DUE PROCESS and substantive is that what your case is actually is and what the
government would have to prove to have you be convicted with that charge.

The Act defines certain rights which it will aid, and specifies the way in which it will aid them. So far as
it defines, thereby creating, it is "substantive law." So far as it provides a method of aiding and
protecting, it is "adjective law," or procedure

TAMAYO v. GSELL

WHEN & WHERE:

December 22, 1916, Manila
OPERATIVE STATUTE:
Philippine Bill of 1902
SYLLOGIM:
Act No. 1874, Employer’s Liability Act

FACTS:
An action for damages against Gsell (employer) for personal injuries suffered by Braulio Tamayo, minor
son of plaintiff asking for P 400, without costs except P 25 for the attorney of the Bureau of Labor.
Braulio is a minor about 11 or 12 years old who is employed as a workman in the match factory located
in Sta. Ana, Manila. He met an accident which consisted of an injury caused by the knife of one of the
machines of the factory which cut the little ring fingers on the right hand, the latter of which was
severed. The accident arose by reason of him being assigned by Eugenio Murcia, a foreman employed in
the same factory to perform work which he was not accustomed. He was not given any instruction and
was put in the new task only on the day of the accident. He was assigned to clean the part of the
machine where pieces of wood from the strips were stuck, he was caught by the knife of the machine
and his righ finer was served. He was thereupon brought to the General Hospital.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in rejecting the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory
interpose by the defendant and whether or not damages should be awarded to Tamayo?
HELD:
Applying the foregoing principles (cited in the decision are many American cases in relation to the case
and Act No. 1874, Employer’s Liability Act), which are founded upon reason and justice, it is concluded
that the trial court did not err in rejecting the defense’ claim. Tamayo is also awarded damages for the
injury cost on him on the negligence of the part of the foremen to warn Tamayo or to give instructions
and consideration to his age, skills and capabilities & for pecuniary loss occasioned by the injury as
well as his diminished capacity resulting from the injury.

The Supreme Court granted 'allowances for "pain and suffering". The Court granted moral damages,
the action in this case ·was not based upon the Civil Code but upon the Employer's Liability Act. This
Act, the Court found as taken from Massachussetts and since the jurisprudence interpreting the said
law allowed the granting of moral damages, in the state of its origin, the Court was , the opinion that
"the damages recoverabie .. under the Empioyer's Liability Act include allowances for pain and
suffering".

the master, under the Civil Code, can defend against an action by his servant by proving his own
freedom from negligence; that the negligence of the servant was the immediate cause of the injury or
that the accident happened through one of the ordinary risks of employment. On the other hand the
servant can recover a portion of the damages resulting from the injuries, although he may be guilty of
contributory negligence.

The Act defines certain rights which it will aid, and specifies the way in which it will aid them. So far as
it defines, thereby creating, it is "substantive law." So far as it provides a method of aiding and
protecting, it is "adjective law," or procedure,, The right to damages is the essence of the cause of
action. It is a substantive right granted by the Act Take this away and the injured employee has
nothing of value left. No one in this country has a vested interest in any rule of the Civil Code and the
great office of the Act is to remedy defects in the Civil Code rules as they are developed.

LATIN MAXIMS:
1 – LEGIS INTERPRETATIO LEGIS VIM OBTINET
Judicial construction and interpretation of a statutes acquires the force of the law
B2- AMBIGUITAS VERBORUM PATENS NULLA VERIFICATIONE EXCLUDITUR.
A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence
 Anything that can shed light should be used
**36E- EX ANTECEDENTIBUS ET CONSEQUENTIBUS FIT OPTIMA INTERPRETATIO
A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it.
Case Dig: Dominador Bustos vs. Lucero

G.R. No. L-2068, October 20,1948

Posted By: Vincent Albien V. Arnado on 20 July 2018

FACTS:

The petitioner in the case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice of Peace
of Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against him and asked
if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel
moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be
examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In
view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to present
evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

The counsel for the accused petitioner filed a motion with the CFI praying that the record of the
case be remanded to the justice of peace of Masantol, on order that the petitioner might cross-
examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony. The motion was
denied and for that reason the present special civil action of mandamus was instituted.
Petitioner squarely attacks the validity of the provision of section 11 or Rule 108, on the ground
that it deprives him of the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the
prosecution, contrary to the provision of section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 11, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is an infringement to the provision of
section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution hence the decision of the majority is judicial
legislation that diminishes the right of the accused.

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that section 11 of Rule 108, like its predecessors is an
adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive law creates
substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive
rights are a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to
the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines
and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action;
that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion. As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes
and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law
which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished
Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first step taken in a
criminal prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence — which is the "the
mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to
establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" — is identified with and forms part of the
method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law,
a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice.
The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We cannot tear
down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of
evidence embodied in these Rules. We do not believe that the curtailment of the right of an
accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-examine the witnesses who had given evidence
for his arrest is of such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As we have
said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an essential part of due process of law. It
may be suppressed entirely, and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly
enjoyed thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional prohibition.

While section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to cross-examine
witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to present his witnesses remains
unaffected, and his constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him
both at such investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the
proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process comes into play, he still enjoys to
the full extent the right to be confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The
degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an accused may be gauged by the fact that
this formality is frequently waived. It is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules
should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to
expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive
him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage.
For the Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at
the time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and
comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their
source.

FERIJIA DISSENTING OPINION:

Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution prescribes that “the Supreme Court shall
have power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
but- said rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.” The Constitution
added the last part of the above-quoted constitutional precept in order to emphasize that the
Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore can not enact or promulgate substantive laws or
rules, for it is obvious that rules which diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, are
substantive and not adjective laws or rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
 It does not require an elaborate argument to show that the right granted by law upon a
defendant to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution in
preliminary investigation as well as in the trial of the case is a substantive right. It is based
on human experience, according to which a person is not prone to tell a lie against another in
his presence, knowing fully well that the latter may easily contradict him, and that the
credibility of a person or veracity of his testimony may be efficaciously tested by a cross-
examination. It is a substantive right because by exercising it, an accused person may show,
even if he has no evidence in his favor, that the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution are not sufficient to indicate that there is a probability that a crime has been
committed and he is guilty thereof, and therefore the accused is entitled to be released and not
committed to prison, and thus avoid an open and public accusation of crime, the trouble,
expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and the corresponding anxiety or moral suffering which a
criminal prosecution always entails.

Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court in several cases,
(in which the question of constitutionality or validity of said section had not been squarely
raised) do away with the defendant’s right under discussion, it follows that said section 11
diminishes the substantive right of the defendant in criminal case, and this Court has no
power or authority to promulgate it and therefore is null and void.
 G.R. No. L-6120             June 30, 1953

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS

vs.

FELICISIMO OCAMPO

FACTS:

Petitioner CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS which seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from

proceeding with the trial of two criminal cases namely, (1) with a violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 606, he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to
an alien without the approval of the President of the Philippines and (2) with a violation
of section 129 in relation to section 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code, in that he
failed to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and certain authenticated
documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance from
the Bureau of Customs. On April 23, 1952, which were then pending against
petitioner without the assistance of assessors in accordance with the provisions
of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 in relation to section 154 of Act No. 190.
Petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court
in considering the questions of fact involved in said cases as authorized by
section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, this motion was opposed by the City Fiscal who
appeared for the People of the Philippines. On April 28, 1952, the court issued an
order denying the motion holding in effect that with the promulgation of the Rules
of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines
previously existing were not only superseded but expressly repealed, that the
Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly omitted the
portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of Court, and
that the reference to said statute by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 on the
provisions regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere surplusage. Believing
that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing abuse of
discretion to the respondent Judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an
absolute substantive right, and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.

HELD:

Yes, a trial with the petitioner with an aid of assessors is an absolute substantive
right. The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law
and as such are not embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.
The provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure are still in
force and that the same may still be invoked in the light of the provisions of
section 49 of the Republic Act No. 409.

It is finally contended that section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 is unconstitutional

because it violates the constitutional provisions that procedural rules "shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade" and, therefore, it is a class legislation.
This contention cannot be entertained; firstly, because it is raised for the first time in
this in stance, a procedural defect which would bar any further discussion on the matter
following well-known precedents1 and, secondly, because it is not correct that at
present only in Manila trial with the aid of assessors may be invoked if we will
sustain the theory that the promulgation of the Rules of Court did not have the
effect of repealing the provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil
Procedure.

The contention of respondents        we reckon —is predicated on the assumption

that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been
impliedly repealed.  Such is not the case.

It is therefore that the respondent Judge acted with abuse of discretion in

denying petitioner his right to the aid of assessors in the trial of the two criminal
cases now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Petition is granted, without
pronouncement as to costs.
CageDig: Jaime Tan Jr. vs CA
G.R. No. 136368; 16 Jan. 2002
Posted by: Diana Calipes Islo on July 19, 2018

FACTS:

On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of PHP 59,200.00 executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale overLot No. 645-C in Bunawan, Davao City in favor of spouses Jose and Estrella
Magdangal. Simultaneous with theexecution of the deed, the contracting parties also entered into
another agreement where Tan was given 1 year toredeem/repurchase the property.

Tan failed to redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988. On May 2, 1988, Tan’s
heirs filed a suit with the RTC of Davao against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument.
The complaint alleged that while theagreement was denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale, the
real intention of the parties was to conclude an equitablemortgage.

Barely hours after the complaint was received, the Magdangals were able to have Tan’s title over
the lot cancelled and they were able to secure a TCT in their names. The RTC approved the
reformation of the instrument andordered the petitioners to pay the Magdangals within 120 days
after the finality of the decision PHP 59,200 plus arate of 12% per annum, and upon the payment
of the aforesaid amount, the TCT in the name of the Magdangalsshall be deemed cancelled.The
CA affirmed the aforesaid decision in toto, and the judgment was entered in the book of entries
on March 13,1996, but the entry stated that the decision has become final and executory on
October 21, 1995. This prompted the spouses to file a motion for consolidation and writ of
possession on March 21, 1996, alleging that they did notappeal from the decision.

Respondent spouses argue that the appealed judgment of the CA has become final and executory
15 days fromOctober 5, 1995 up to October 20, and on the latter date, the 120 days redemption
period shall commence fromthere. Tan, Jr. opposed the same, alleging that until an entry of
judgment has been issued by the CA and a copythereof furnished to the parties, the appealed
decision of the court a quo in the case cannot be considered final andexecutory.The motion for
consolidation and a writ of possession has been denied. The respondent spouses moved
forreconsideration, but the judge denied the same for being pro forma and fatally defective. The
RTC applied the oldRules of Civil Procedure, and the CA applied the new 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in determining the reglementaryperiod.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the application of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure retroactively was erroneous.

HELD:

 YES. If the old rule has been applied on the finality of judgment, the subject property was
redeemed withinthe 120-day period of redemption. The appellate court applied the new 1997
rules retroactively and under the givenfacts of the case, the Court deemed that it is
erroneous.Generally, rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect upon pending actions or
proceedings. There are,however, exceptions to the rule:1. the statute itself expressly or by
necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from itsoperation;2. to
apply the new rules to pending proceedings would impair vested rightsThe case falls squarely
within the second exception. Application of Rule 39, Sec. 1 would amount to an injustice tothe
petitioners. The new rule states that:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders.

 Execution shall issue as a matter of right,or motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of
the action or proceeding upon the expirationof the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been duly perfected.If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may
forthwith be appliedfor in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting
therewith certified true copiesof the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be
enforced and of the entry thereof,with notice to the adverse party.The appellate court may, on
motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, directthe court of origin to issue
the writ of execution.

The old rule that was applied by the RTC was Rule 51, Sec. 10-11 which briefly states that the
date

when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry

and the motion forexecution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.

The decision, according to the case at bar became final on March 13, 1996 and the respondent-
spouses filed the questioned motions on March 21, 1996, wellwithin the redemption period and
appeal period given to petitioners.
FACTS:
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of absolute
sale over the property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella
Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same contracting parties
entered into another agreement whereunder Tan was given one (1) year within which to
redeem or repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the property until his death on
January 4, 1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the
Magdangals for reformation of instrument alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals
denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to
conclude an equitable mortgage.

RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:

1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of the parties,
hereby declared and reformed an equitable mortgage;

2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this
decision P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date
the complaint was filed, until paid;

3)xxx.

On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties received the
decision of the appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of
the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision xxx and
issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said
decision has on Oct. 21, 1995 become final and executory.

Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging
that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired.

On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled
that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of
Judgment in the CA or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was deposited on
April 17, 1996.

ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by
the petitioner?

HELD:

From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs
finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10
and 11 provide:

SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final
resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments.
The date when the judgments or final resolution becomes executory shall be
deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the
judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such
judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.

SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution,
or a portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution
may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on
finality of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a

matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the
action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom
if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith
be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting
therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure

should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great
injustice to the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right
is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing
as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the
period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for
petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied
retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult
to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness.
Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he
faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when
he made the redemption.