Civ1 4SCDE1920 Doctrines Persons

Part One – Persons and Family Relations
I. Effect and Application of Laws

A. Effectivity of Laws (Art. 2)
1. Publication Requirement; What to Publish; Importance of Publication
• Doctrines:
PUBLICATION IS A CONDITION FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF ALL STATUTES
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature. (Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 [Resolution], December 29, 1986)
PUBLICATION IS INDISPENSABLE IN EVERY CASE, BUT THE LEGISLATURE MAY IN ITS DISCRETION
PROVIDE THAT THE USUAL FIFTEEN-DAY PERIOD SHALL BE SHORTENED OR EXTENDED
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication. (Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 [Resolution], December 29, 1986)
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED TO BE BINDING AND EFFECTIVE
There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. (De Roy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80718
[Resolution], January 29, 1988)
CIRCULARS WHICH PRESCRIBE A PENALTY MUST BE PUBLISHED BEFORE BECOMING EFFECTIVE
As a rule, circulars and regulations which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published
before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published, and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. (People v. Que Po Lay, G.R.
No. L-6791, March 29, 1954)
INTERNAL RULES OR REGULATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED
Tañada qualified that: “Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.” (National Power Corp. v. Pinatubo Commercial, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010)
THE REQUIREMENT THAT LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH “DULY
PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE” MANDATES THE SENATE TO EITHER PUBLISH THE RULES
FOR ITS LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN EACH CONGRESS OR OTHERWISE MAKE THE PUBLISHED
RULES CLEARLY STATE THAT THE SAME SHALL BE EFFECTIVE IN SUBSEQUENT CONGRESSES OR
UNTIL THEY ARE AMENDED OR REPEALED LEST THE ORDERS OR PROCEEDINGS THAT RESULT
IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WITNESSES SHALL BE CONSIDERED NULL AND VOID
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules
clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses
should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders
and proceedings are considered valid and effective. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643 [Resolution], September 4, 2008)
SINCE RULES OF THE HOUSE OR THE SENATE THAT AFFECT ONLY THEIR MEMBERS ARE
INTERNAL TO THE HOUSE OR SENATE, SUCH RULES NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED, UNLESS SUCH
RULES EXPRESSLY PROVIDE FOR THEIR PUBLICATION BEFORE THE RULES CAN TAKE EFFECT
Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the
Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under
the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the
Rules expressly mandate their publication. (Pimentel, Jr. v. Senate Committee of the Whole, G.R. No.
187714, March 8, 2011)
4SCDE1920 Page 1 of 47
SENATE RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION MUST BE
PUBLISHED DESPITE ABSENCE OF ANY AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES
The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without
more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance
with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules
have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails
over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate. (Garcillano v. House of Representatives
Committees, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008)
PUBLICATION OF SENATE RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION
THROUGH THE INTERNET IS NOT A SUFFICIENT FORM OF PUBLICATION
R.A. No. 8792 merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws,
rules and regulations. (Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committees, G.R. Nos. 170338 & 179275,
December 23, 2008)
AN AGREEMENT THAT WAS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE IN A LAW WHOSE EXACT TERMS
WERE NEITHER REPRODUCED IN NOR ATTACHED AS AN ANNEX TO, SAID LAW, CANNOT BE
ACCORDED THE STATUS OF A LAW
The publication, as further held in Tañada, must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of
publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the
presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the
publication requirement. In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference,
Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither
was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said
agreement the status of a law. Consequently, the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an
ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil Code.
(Conjuangco, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012)
B. Ignorance of Law Excuses No One (Art. 3)
1. Mistake of Law vs. Mistake of Fact
a. Art. 526 –mistake on doubtful or difficult provision of law is basis for good faith - mitigates
but does not extinguish liability;
b. Art. 1334 – mutual error on legal effect of agreement- may vitiate consent;
c. Art. 2155 – mistake in payment gives rise to right to return of erroneous payment
C. Prospective Application of Laws (Art. 4)
1. Exceptions
a. If provided in the law itself
b. Procedural law
c. Penal law if favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent
d. Curative and repealing statutes
e. Creating new rights
f. Tax statutes
g. Interpretative statutes
2. Exceptions to the Exceptions
a. Ex post facto laws
b. Penal laws not favorable to the accused
c. Substantive laws impairing vested rights
• Doctrines:
PENAL LAWS FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED SHOULD HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex
post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. Although
an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused,
considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866. (Valeroso v. People, G.R. No.
164815, February 22, 2008)
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, LAWS MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate
mortgages, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent must be given effect if the laudable purpose of
protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved. (Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President, G.R.
No. 104528, January 18, 1996)
RULINGS, CIRCULARS, RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE HAVE NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION IF TO APPLY THEM WOULD PREJUDICE
THE TAXPAYER
Any revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations, or any of the rulings or circulars
promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given retroactive application if the revocation, modification
or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Health
Care Providers, Inc., G.R. No. 168129 April 24, 2007)
BIR CIRCULARS OR RULINGS HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT WHERE THEIR APPLICATION WOULD
BE PREJUDICIAL TO TAXPAYERS
Any revocation, modification, or reversal of and of the rules and regulations or any of the rulings or circulars
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall not be given retroactive application if the
relocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers. (ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v.
Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-52306, October 12, 1981)
D. Acts Contrary to Mandatory or Prohibitory Provisions Are Void (Art. 5)
1. Exceptions
a. The law makes the act valid but punishes the violator
b. The law itself authorizes its validity
c. The law makes the act only voidable
d. The law declares the nullity of an act but recognizes its effects as legally existing
E. Waiver of Rights (Art. 6)
1. Requisites
• Doctrines:
WHERE ONE LACKS KNOWLEDGE OF A RIGHT, THERE IS NO BASIS UPON WHICH WAIVER OF IT
CAN REST
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of understanding that presupposes
that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by
the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time actual
or constructive knowledge of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they
depended. Where one lack knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. (DM.
Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001)
2. Exceptions
a. Waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs
b. If the waiver is prejudicial to a third party with a right recognized by law
c. Alleged rights which really do not yet exist, as in the case of future inheritance
d. If the right is a natural right, such as right to be supported
• Doctrines:
STIPULATION WHEREBY STUDENT CANNOT TRANSFER TO ANOTHER SCHOOL WITHOUT
REFUNDING SCHOLARSHIP CASH IS NULL AND VOID
The stipulation in a contract, between a student and the school, that the student's scholarship is good
only if he continues in the same school, and that he waives his right to transfer to another school without
refunding the equivalent of his scholarship in cash, is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void,
because scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit and to help gifted students in whom society
has an established interest or a first lien, and not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its
prestige and increase its business potential. (Cui v. Arellano University, G.R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961)
FOR BEING IMBUED WITH PUBLIC POLICY, POSTING AND PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS
MANDATED BY ACT NO. 3135 MAY NOT BE WAIVED
While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that such
waiver is subject to the condition that it is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. The notice of sale in a
foreclosure of mortgage, intended to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be
sold, is imbued with public policy and any waiver thereon would be inconsistent with the intent and
letter of Act No. 3135. (Philippine National Bank v. Nepomuceno Productions, Inc., G.R. No. 139479,
December 27, 2002)
F. Repeal of Laws (Art. 7)
1. Kinds of Repeal
a. Express
b. Implied (not favored)
2. Effects
3. Sec. 444 of the Local Government Code
• Doctrines:
THE SAME SECTION IN THE OLD LAW NOT BEING RESTATED NOR RE-ENACTED IN THE NEW LAW
WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO IMPLIED REPEAL
Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so
intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the
subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or
abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later
act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond
peradventure renewed. (Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992)
G. Judicial Decisions Form Part of the Law of the Land (Art. 8)
1. Doctrine of Stare Decisis
• Doctrines:
THE RULE THAT A NEW DOCTRINE ABROGATING AN OLD RULE SHOULD OPERATE PROSPECTIVELY
ONLY HOLDS MORE TRUE IN THE APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS
Where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate prospectively only and should
not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith
thereof. This holds more especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal
law, for, in this area, more than in any other it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably
foreseen for the guidance of society. (People v. Licera, G.R. No. L-39990, July 22, 1975)
H. Duty of Judges (Art. 9)
• Doctrines:
THE IGNORANCE OF THE COURT OR HIS LACK OF KNOWLEDGE REGARDING THE LAW APPLICABLE TO
A CASE SUBMITTED TO HIM FOR DECISION ARE NOT REASONS FOR THE COURT TO DISMISS THE CASE
WITHOUT DECIDING ON THE ISSUES THEREIN
The fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain matter that is the subject of an appeal
which must be decided by him and his not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons
that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the
issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law would
be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the
place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law. (Chu Jan v. Bernas, G.R. No.
10010, August 1, 1916)
I. Doubtful Statues (Art. 10)
• Doctrines:
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION OF A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE - A PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE IN THESE CASES - THE PRIMARY RULE IS TO SEARCH FOR AND DETERMINE THE INTENT AND
SPIRIT OF THE LAW
Legislative intent is the controlling factor, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and
this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.
(People v. Purisima, G.R. Nos. L-42050-66, L-46229-32, L-46313-16, & L-46997, November 20, 1978)
J. Customs (Arts. 11-12)
1. Requisites to make a custom an obligatory rule
a. Plurality or repetition of acts;
b. Practiced by the great mass of the social group;
c. Continued practice for a long period of time;
d. The community accepts it as a proper way of acting, such that it is considered as obligatory
upon all
• Doctrines:
ACTS, NOT DESTRUCTIVE AND WHICH RIPENED INTO CUSTOM, CANNOT BE HELD TO BE THEMSELVES
UNREASONABLE OR IMPRUDENT
Acts, the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been
acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent. The very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they are
beneficial rather than prejudicial. (Martinez v. Van Buskirk, G.R. No. L-5691, December 27, 1910)
A CUSTOM MUST BE PROVED AS A FACT, ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil
Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any
other fact". The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom. (Yao
Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. 55960, November 24, 1988)
K. Computation of Period and Time (Art. 13)
1. Rule on Computation of Period: First day excluded, last day included
a. Years: 365 days, unless year identified
b. Months: 30 days, unless month identified
c. Days: 24 hours
d. Nights: Sunset to sundown
2. Exception: Computation of age (each year based on birth anniversary)
3. Policy if last day is a Sunday or legal holiday
• Doctrines:
A YEAR IS COMPOSED OF 12 CALENDAR MONTHS, THE NUMBER OF DAYS IS IRRELEVANT.
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal
with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent
to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a
year is composed of 12 calendar months. There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility between the two,
the Supreme Court held that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the
more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. (Commission on Internal Revenue v. Primetown,
G.R. No. 162155. August 28, 2007)
L. Penal Laws (Art. 14)
1. Applicability in the Philippines if committed here
2. Territoriality
3. Exceptions
a. Public international law (diplomatic immunity, etc.)
b. Treaty stipulations
M. Civil Laws (Arts. 15-17)
1. General Rule: Nationality principle
a. Family rights and duties
b. Status
c. Condition
d. Legal capacity
• Doctrines:
ALIENS MAY OBTAIN DIVORCES ABROAD, WHICH MAY BE RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES,
PROVIDED THEY ARE VALID ACCORDING TO THEIR NATIONAL LAW
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. (Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985)
AFTER A DIVORCE HAS BEEN DECREED, THE INNOCENT SPOUSE NO LONGER HAS THE RIGHT TO
INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE OFFENDERS
The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons. (Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989)
IF THE FOREIGNER OBTAINS A VALID FOREIGN DIVORCE, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL HAVE THE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive
of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other
remains bound to it. (San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007)
THE DOCTRINE IN VAN DORN BECOMES APPLICABLE UPON PROOF THAT ONE OF THE FILIPINO
SPOUSES WAS NO LONGER A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE; HENCE, THE
DIVORCE BEING RECOGNIZED, SAID SPOUSE CAN NO LONGER INHERIT FROM THE OTHER
The Court deduces that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as
the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was
no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner
could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. (Quita v. Dandan, G.R. No. 124862, December 22,
1998)
2. Exceptions
a. Property transactions (real or personal): Lex situs
i. Exception to Exception: Succession: National law of the decedent
c. Order of successional rights: National law of the decedent
d. Amount of successional rights: National law of the decedent
e. Intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions: National law of the decedent
f. Capacity to succeed: National law of the decedent
g. Art. 26, par. 2 of the Family Code
h. Lex Loci Celebrationis
i. Exceptions to the Exception:
.
I Intrinsic validity of ordinary contracts
II . Art. 26, par. 1 of the Family Code
3. Renvoi Doctrine
• Doctrines:
MATTERS BEARING UPON THE EXECUTION, INTERPRETATION AND VALIDITY OF A CONTRACT
ARE DETERMINED BY THE LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE THE CONTRACT IS MADE
Matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law
of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the
law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit,
admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is
brought. (Government v. Frank. G.R. No. L-2935, March 23, 1909)
THE RECOGNITION OF RENVOI THEORY IMPLIES THAT THE RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS INCORPORATING THE ORDINARY/INTERNAL LAW OF THE FOREIGN
STATE AND ITS RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it,
must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and
then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. (Aznar v.
Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963)
N. Suppletory Application of the Civil Code in Matters Governed by Special Laws (Art. 18)
II. Human Relations

A. Arts. 19-21
1. Doctrine of Abuse of Right
a. Requisites
• Doctrines:
A PERSON SHOULD NOT USE HIS RIGHT UNJUSTLY OR CONTRARY TO HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH,
OTHERWISE HE OPENS HIMSELF TO LIABILITY
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a
right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured
party will attach. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was
not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged
vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. (Uypitching v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322,
December 6, 2006)
WHEN A RIGHT IS EXERCISED IN A MANNER NOT CONFORMING WITH THE NORMS IN ARTICLE 19
AND RESULTS IN DAMAGE, A LEGAL WRONG IS COMMITTED AND WRONGDOER MUST BE HELD
RESPONSIBLE
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become
the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 – (1) to act with justice; (2) to give everyone his due; and (3) to observe
honesty and good faith - and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20, which
pertains to damage arising from a violation of law or Article 21, which pertains to damages arising from
a violation of morals, good customs or public policy would be proper. The right of the employer to
dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the
effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to
the employee. (Globe Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989)
WANT OF CARE TO THE CONSCIOUS DISREGARD OF CIVIL OBLIGATIONS COUPLED WITH A
CONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAUSE NATURALLY CALCULATED TO PRODUCE THEM WOULD
MAKE THE ERRING PARTY LIABLE
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for
the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of
the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Want
of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause
naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. (University of the East v. Jader,
G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000)
BAD FAITH IS PRESUMED IF THERE IS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STRICT REQUIREMENTS
OF THE LAW THAT PREJUDICES/INJURES ANOTHER
R.A. 7832 has two requisites for an electric service provider to be authorized to disconnect its customer's
electric service on the basis of alleged electricity pilferage: first, an officer of the law or an authorized
ERB representative must be present during the inspection of the electric facilities; and second, even if
there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity and the customer is caught in flagrante delicto
committing the acts under Section 4 (a), the customer must still be given due notice prior to the
disconnection. In view of MERALCO's failure to comply with the strict requirements under Sections 4
and 6 of R.A. No. 7832, MERALCO had no authority to immediately disconnect the respondents' electric
service. As a result, the immediate disconnection of the respondents' electric service is presumed to be
in bad faith. (Manila Electric Co. v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 195145, February 10, 2016)
GOOD FAITH IS PRESUMED, AND HE WHO ALLEGES BAD FAITH HAS THE DUTY TO PROVE THE
SAME
It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Bad faith, on the
other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some
moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some motives or
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Sending demand letters does not by itself would
constitute bad faith on the part of the sender. (Heirs of Nala v. Cabansag, G.R. No. 161188, June 13, 2008)
2. Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria
3. Damnum Absque Injuria
• Doctrines:
THE EXERCISE OF A LEGAL RIGHT OR DUTY IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH NO INTENTION TO
PREJUDICE OR INJURE ANOTHER WILL NOT GIVE RISE TO AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
suffered through Ms. Lim's exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good
faith, must be his to bear alone. (Nikko Hotel v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005)
IN EVERY SITUATION OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA, THEREFORE, THE INJURED PERSON ALONE
BEARS THE CONSEQUENCES
In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured person alone bears the consequences
because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that does not amount to a legal
injury or wrong. (Spouses Carbonell v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. 178467, April 26, 2017)
4. Acts Contra Bonus Mores
a. Requisites
b. Breach of Promise to Marry
• Doctrines:
MERE BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG. BUT TO FORMALLY SET
A WEDDING AND GO THROUGH ALL THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED PREPARATION AND PUBLICITY,
ONLY TO WALK OUT OF IT WHEN THE MATRIMONY IS ABOUT TO BE SOLEMNIZED, IS QUITE
DIFFERENT
As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding
and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid. (Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964)
FRAUD AND DECEIT BEHIND BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY ENTITLES THE PLAINTIFF TO
RECOVER DAMAGES
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. (Gashem Shookat
Baksh v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 97336, February 19, 1993)
DAMAGES CAN BE RECOVERED BY THE FAMILY IF THE INJURY IS CAUSED IN A MANNER
CONTRARY TO MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of
the new Civil Code. (Pe v. Pe, G.R. No L-17396, May 30, 1962)
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT IN ITSELF AN ACTIONABLE WRONG
That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown
that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is
this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of
the American States. (Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960)
B. Unjust Enrichment (Art. 22)
1. Accion in rem verso
• Doctrines:
THERE IS NO UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN RESPONDENT OBTAINED INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
THE MORTGAGED VEHICLE AS THE PETITIONER SPOUSES HAD ALREADY OBTAINED THE
REQUIRED INSURANCE COVERAGE
Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in
money. It may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other indispensable reductions in the
patrimony of a person. It may also include the prevention of a loss or injury. (Spouses Villalva v. RCBC
Savings Bank, G.R. No. 165661, August 28, 2006)
MONEY RECEIVED WITHOUT A VALID GROUND OR JUSTIFICATION MUST BE RETURNED UNDER
THE PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience. The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have been
benefited without a real or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another
person’s expense or damage. (Loria v. Muñoz, Jr., G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014)
AN ACCION IN REM VERSO DOES NOT APPLY IF THE ACTION IS PROSCRIBED BY THE
CONSTITUTION OR BY THE APPLICATION OF THE IN PARI DELICTO DOCTRINE
An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem
verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by
the application of the pari delicto doctrine (Frenzel v. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003)
C. Respect for Other’s Privacy, Personality, Etc. (Art. 26)
• Doctrines:
IN THE ABSENCE OF MALICIOUS MOTIVES, A PARENT IS NOT LIABLE FOR ALIENATION OF
AFFECTIONS, AS WHERE HE ENTICES HIS SON OR DAUGHTER TO LEAVE HIS OR HER SPOUSE
He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations
in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest
himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and
advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment.
(Tenchavez v. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965)
AN ADVERTISMENT MISREPRESENTING A HOUSE BELONGING TO ANOTHER MISTAKENLY AND
UNNECESSARILY EXPOSES THE PRIVATE LIFE OF A PERSON; THUS, PUNISHABLE UNDER ARTICLE 26
St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the
questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil
who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps. Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were
confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that
Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He
suffered diminution of income and mental anguish. L||| (St. Louis Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
46061, [November 14, 1984], 218 PHIL 172-176) (St. Louis Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
46061, November 14, 1984)
ARTICLE 26 OF THE CIVIL CODE GRANTS A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES, PREVENTION, AND
OTHER RELIEF IN CASES OF BREACH, THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY CONSTITUTING A CRIMINAL
OFFENSE, OF THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS: (1) RIGHT TO PERSONAL DIGNITY; (2) RIGHT TO PERSONAL
SECURITY; (3) RIGHT TO FAMILY RELATIONS; (4) RIGHT TO SOCIAL INTERCOURSE; (5) RIGHT TO
PRIVACY; AND (6) RIGHT TO PEACE OF MIND
It appears that Gregorio's rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were
infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity
of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was
compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the
opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was not able to
refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
he suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time,
effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several
honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a
Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 179799, September
11, 2009)
D. Unfair Competition (Art. 28)
• Doctrines:
WHAT THE LAW PROHIBITS IS NOT COMPETITION PER SE BUT THE USE OF UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE OR
HIGH-HANDED METHODS WHICH MAY DEPRIVE OTHERS OF A FAIR CHANCE TO ENGAGE IN BUSINESS
OR TO EARN A LIVING
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury
to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these
include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The
public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated
by unconscionable means. (Willaware Products Corp. v. Jesichris Manufacturing Corp., G.R. No. 195549,
September 3, 2014)
E. Independent Civil Actions
1. Breach of Constitutional and Other Rights (Art. 32)
• Doctrines:
ALTHOUGH PUBLIC OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO EXERCISE AND PERFORM THEIR
DUTIES AS WHAT RULES AND LAWS PROVIDE, THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM TRAMPLING THE
RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable
in damages for violating Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not
exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said
article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation to the Penal Code or other penal
statute. (Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. L-69866, April 15, 1988)
2. Defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries (Art. 33)
• Doctrines:
AS RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE OR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS NOT ONE OF THE THREE CRIMES
MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE, THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES THAT MAY BE INSTITUTED IN CONNECTION WITH SAID OFFENSE
Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule that
the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same
criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved 2 his right to institute a separate civil action.
(Corpus v. Paje, G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969)
IN CASES OF DEFAMATION, FRAUD OR PHYSICAL INJURIES, A CIVIL ACTION MAY BE FILED
INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION, EVEN IF THERE HAS BEEN NO RESERVATION MADE
BY THE INJURED PARTY
The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party reserves his right to institute it separately. The present article creates an exception to this rule
when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed
independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party;
the law itself in this article makes such reservation. (Madeja v. Caro, G.R. No. L-51183, December 21,
1983)
ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE ASSUMES A DEFAMATION, FRAUD, OR PHYSICAL INJURIES
INTENTIONALLY COMMITTED
Criminal negligence under Article 365 of the RPC consists in the execution of an imprudent or negligent
act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. Thus, the law penalizes the negligent or
reckless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not mentioned in Article 33, no
independent civil action for damages arising from reckless imprudence or criminal negligence may be
instituted under said article. (Bonite v. Zosa, G.R. No. L-33772, June 20, 1988)
3. Refusal or Failure of City or Municipal Police to Render Protection (Art. 34)
4. Quasi Delict or Culpa Aquiliana (Arts. 2176 and 2177)
F. Prejudicial Question (Art. 36)
1. General Rule: Criminal Case takes precedence
2. Exception: Rule 111, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court
3. Application to civil, criminal, administrative cases
• Doctrines:
THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHERE ONE CASE IS ADMINISTRATIVE AND THE OTHER IS
CIVIL
The concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. It was previously ruled that there is
no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. The Board shall proceed
independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for
the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body. (Te v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, November 29,
2000)
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF VITIATED CONSENT IS
DEEMED A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE
Should the question for annulment of the second marriage prosper on the ground that petitioner's consent
thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary
and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. Thus, the issue involved in the action for
the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of
bigamy. (Zapanta v. Montesa, G.R. No. L-14534, February 28, 1962)
NO JUDICIAL DECREE IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH INVALIDITY OF NULL AND VOID MARRIAGES;
HENCE CONTRACTING A SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH DECREE DOES NOT
RENDER THE OFFENDER LIABLE FOR BIGAMY
Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring
judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an
express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound
by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to. (People v. Aragon, G.R. No. L-10016, February 28,
1957) [NOTE: This was decided prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, which now, under Art. 40, categorically
requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior void marriage for the purposes of contracting a subsequent
marriage.]
ABSENCE OF MARRIAGE CEREMONY AND MERE PRIVATE ACT OF SIGNING A MARRIAGE CONTRACT
BEAR NO LEGAL EFFECT, THUS, THE CONTRACT OF MARRIAGE IS NULL
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage. (Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004)
THE FINALITY OF THE JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF PETITIONER’S SECOND MARRIAGE
DOES NOT IMPEDE THE FILING OF A CRIMINAL CHARGE FOR BIGAMY AGAINST HIM
it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. 13 It is clear then that
the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with
private respondent. (Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013)
A DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY DOES NOT ABSOLVE THE OFFENDER OF CRIMINAL BIGAMY
A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision
penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
does not retroact to the date of celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines' penal laws are
concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second
marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. (Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
150758, February 18, 2004)
ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, EVEN IF PENDING IN THE HLURB, AN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY, RAISES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel
Properties' submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where
the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a
prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific
performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose
jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. (San Miguel Properties, Inc., v. Perez, G.R. No. 166836,
September 4, 2013)
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP IS A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A CASE FOR VIOLATION OF ANTI-SQUATTING
LAW
The contention misses the essential point that the owner of a piece of land can be ejected only if for some
reason, e.g., he has let his property to the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary possession. But in the case
at bar, no such agreement is asserted by private respondent. Rather private respondent claims the right to
possession based on her claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is the question
in the civil case, the proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be suspended. (Apa v. Fernandez,
G.R. No. 112381, March 20, 1995)
III. Persons (Art. 37-51)

A. Juridical Capacity vs. Capacity to Act
1. Restrictions/Limitations and Modifications on Capacity to Act
B. Natural Persons
1. Beginning and End of Personality
a. When child considered born
2. Theory of General Capacities
• Doctrines:
AN UNBORN CHILD IS GIVEN BY LAW A PROVISIONAL PERSONALITY OF ITS OWN FOR ALL PURPOSES
FAVORABLE TO IT
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes
favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child,
therefore, has a right to support from it progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity
is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa
mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of
the same Code. (Quimiguing v. Icao, G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970)
NO ACTION FOR DAMAGES COULD BE INSTITUTED ON BEHALF OF THE UNBORN CHILD
No action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received
and no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is generally held that recovery can not be had for the death of an unborn
child. (Geluz v. CA, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961)
C. R.A. No. 6809
D. Juridical Persons
1. How Created and How Terminated
2. Theory of Special Capacities
• Doctrines:
THE ESTATE OF A DECEDENT IS IN LAW REGARDED AS A PERSON AND MAY PROSECUTE AN
UNFINISHED ACTION OF THE DECEDENT TO ITS FINAL CONCLUSION
Within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragante should be considered an artificial
or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include
the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations
of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application
before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to
its final conclusion. The right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute the application for a certificate of public
convenience to its final conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it
constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for such a right was property despite the possibility that in the
end the commission might have denied the application. (Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Fragante, G.R. No. L-
770, April 27, 1948)
E. Rules on Survivorship
F. Citizenship
• Doctrines:
AN ALIEN WOMAN MARRYING A FILIPNO BECOMES IPSO FACTO A FILIPINA PROVIDED SHE IS NOT
DISQUALIFIED TO BE A CITIZEN UNDER SEC. 4, CA 473
An alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalize here or a natural Filipino follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does
not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. (Mo Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971)
DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR DERIVATIVE NATURALIZATION NOT A BAR FOR APPLICATION FOR
JUDICIAL NATURALIZATION
The fact that her application for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not
prevent her from seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. Even if the denial was based on other
grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in
fact grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.
(Republic v. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013)
IT IS NOT ONLY THE LAW ITSELF (P.D. 725) WHICH IS TO BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT, BUT EVEN
THE REPATRIATION GRANTED UNDER SAID LAW.
It is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted
under said law. The reason for this is simply that if, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law
should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being --
in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and
exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the
fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or
retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. (Frivaldo
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996)
G. Domicile vs. Residence
• Doctrines:
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE, THERE IS DISTINCTION BETWEEN DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE; FOR
PURPOSES OF POLITICAL LAW, RESIDENCE IS USED SYNONYMOUSLY WITH DOMICILE
There is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence."
Domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent;
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place, i.e.,
the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. However, in our election law, what
has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile. (Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)
IV. Marriage
A. Definition (Art. 1)
1. Special Contract vs. Ordinary Contract
B. Requirements (Arts. 2-6)
1. Essential
a. Legal Capacity
i. Sex
ii. Age
.
I 18-21 requires parental consent: Voidable if none
II . 21-25 requires parental advice: Valid if none but issuance of marriage license is
suspended for 3 months
.
A Effect if license issued before 3 months: Mere irregularity
iii. Absence of Impediments (Arts. 35[4], 36-38, 52-53)
b. Consent
2. Formal
3. Effects
a. Absence of Essential or Formal: Void
i. Exception: Art. 35(2)
b. Defective Essential: Voidable
c. Irregular Formal: Valid but persons liable punished civilly, criminally or administratively
i. Exception: Voidable if no consent from parents, either or both of contracting parties at 18
or above but below 21
C. Authority of solemnizing officer (Art 7)
1. Persons authorized
• Doctrines:
WHILE SOLEMNIZING A MARRIAGE OUTSIDE HIS COURT'S JURISDICTION MAY SUBJECT THE
OFFICIATING JUDGE TO ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY, THE SAME IS A MERE IRREGULARITY AND
MAY NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE
Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the
marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in
the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. Judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability. (Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088,
July 19, 1996) [NOTE: This may be considered as a mere obiter dictum since the issue involves the liability
of a judge and not the validity of a marriage.]
2. Exception: Either or both parties in good faith, person unauthorized to solemnize marriage Art.
35(2)
D. Valid Marriage License
1. Art. 9, Art. 10, Art. 20
2. Marriages Exempt from Marriage License (Arts. 27-34)
a. No good faith exception
• Doctrines:
THE FIVE-YEAR COHABITATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM THE MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT
SHOULD BE A COHABITATION WHEREIN BOTH PARTIES ARE CAPACITATED TO MARRY EACH
OTHER DURING THE ENTIRE FIVE-YEAR CONTINUOUS PERIOD
That five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and
continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
(Niñal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000) [NOTE: This was decided on the basis of the Art. 76
of the NCC, and not of Art. 34 of the FC.]
A JUDGE MAY BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR SOLEMNIZING A MARRIAGE UNDER
ARTICLE 34 WHERE LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS EXISTED DURING COHABITATION
The judges' gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34
of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such
as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34 are,
doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably
construed. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. The parties should have been
capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage. (Office
of the Court Administrator v. Necesario, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 [Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC], April 2,
2013) [NOTE: This may be considered as a mere obiter dictum since the issue involves the liability of a judge
and not the validity of a marriage.]
THE FALSITY OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF MARITAL COHABITATION, WHERE THE PARTIES HAVE IN
TRUTH FALLEN SHORT OF THE MINIMUM FIVE-YEAR REQUIREMENT, EFFECTIVELY RENDERS
THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE
The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie,
then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
(Republic v. Dayot, G.R. Nos. 175581 & 179474, March 28, 2008)
RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION OF A CIVIL MARRIAGE UNDER ARTICLE 77 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE,
WHEREIN PROCUREMENT OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE MAY BE DISPENSED WITH, DOES NOT APPLY
WHERE THERE WAS NO PRIOR CIVIL MARRIAGE TO RATIFY
Article 77 of the Civil Code pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a
marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the
subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are
exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent
religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the
parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil
marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature. Being that the ceremony held
was the only marriage ceremony between the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to any
ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does
not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. (Diaz-Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494, July
27, 2016)
3. When either or both parties are foreign citizens, stateless persons or refugees (Art. 21)
E. Marriage Ceremony
1. No particular form prescribed
2. Minimum requirements:
a. Appear before Solemnizing officer
i. Proxy Marriage
b. Declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
c. Presence of at least 2 witnesses of legal age
i. Absence merely an irregularity
F. Non-Essential/Non-Formal Requirements
1. Marriage Contract or Marriage Certificate: Best evidence
• Doctrines:
SINCE THE DUE EXECUTION AND THE LOSS OF THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT WERE CLEARLY
SHOWN BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED, SECONDARY EVIDENCE — TESTIMONIAL AND
DOCUMENTARY — MAY BE ADMITTED TO PROVE THE FACT OF MARRIAGE
The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible
evidence. (Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135216, August 19, 1999)
2. Venue of Marriage (Art. 8)
a. Directory, not affect validity of marriage
G. Foreign Marriage
1. General Rule: Where one or both parties to the marriage are citizens of the Philippines, the foreign
marriage is valid in this country if solemnized in accordance with the laws of the country of
celebration
2. Exceptions:
a. Contracted by a national who is below 18 years of age
b. Bigamous or polygamous (except as provided in Art. 41, FC)
c. Contracted through mistake of one party as to the identity of the other
d. Contracted following the annulment or declaration of nullity of a previous marriage but before
partition
e. Void due to psychological incapacity
f. Incestuous
g. Void for reasons of public policy
3. Divorce (Art. 26(2))
a. Requisites
i. Valid marriage between Filipino citizen and foreigner
ii. Valid divorce obtained
• Doctrines:
ALIENS MAY OBTAIN DIVORCES ABROAD, WHICH MAY BE RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES,
PROVIDED THEY ARE VALID ACCORDING TO THEIR NATIONAL LAW
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. (Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985)
OUR COURTS DO NOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS AND JUDGMENTS; HENCE, LIKE
ANY OTHER FACTS, BOTH THE DIVORCE DECREE AND THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE ALIEN MUST
BE ALLEGED AND PROVEN ACCORDING TO OUR LAW ON EVIDENCE
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient. (Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001)
A FILIPINO CITIZEN HAS THE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW AFTER
INITIATING A DIVORCE PROCEEDING ABROAD AND OBTAINING A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT
AGAINST HIS OR HER ALIEN SPOUSE WHO IS CAPACITATED TO REMARRY
Based on a clear and plain reading of [Paragraph 2 of Article 26], it only requires that there be a divorce
validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether
the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. Assuming, for
the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the
statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or
not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry
will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. (Republic v.
Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018)
PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE INCLUDES CASES INVOLVING PARTIES WHO,
AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE WERE FILIPINO CITIZENS, BUT LATER
ON, ONE OF THEM BECOMES NATURALIZED AS A FOREIGN CITIZEN AND OBTAINS A DIVORCE
DECREE
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry. (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005)
IN A MARRIAGE BETWEEN FILIPINOS, A DIVORCE DECREE OBTAINED BY ONE OF THEM PRIOR TO
HER NATURALIZATION AS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN CANNOT BE RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the married couple
is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. And pursuant to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine
laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely
could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. (Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577,
September 21, 2005)
ONLY THE FILIPINO SPOUSE CAN INVOKE THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE; THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAN CLAIM NO RIGHT UNDER THIS PROVISION
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit
of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other
than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by
his national law. (Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010)
THE UNAVAILABILITY OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE TO
ALIENS DOES NOT NECESSARILY STRIP AN ALIEN OF LEGAL INTEREST TO PETITION THE RTC FOR
THE RECOGNITION OF HIS FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest
to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction. Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts
for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law. (Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010)
THE SPOUSE OF A PRIOR MARRIAGE CAN FILE A PETITION TO RECOGNIZE A FOREIGN JUDGMENT
NULLIFYING THE SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE BETWEEN HIS OR HER SPOUSE AND A FOREIGN
CITIZEN ON THE GROUND OF BIGAMY
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. (Fujiki v. Marinay,
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)
A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC DOES NOT APPLY IN A PETITION TO RECOGNIZE FOREIGN JUDGMENT
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF A MARRIAGE WHERE ONE OF THE PARTIES IS AN ALIEN
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC applies would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the
form and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the
setting of pre-trial, the trial, and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is to limit repetitive
litigations on claims and issues. (Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)
V. Void Marriage
A. Grounds
1. Where any party is below 18, even with consent of parents/guardians (Art. 35[1])
2. Absence of authority of person who solemnized the marriage (Art. 35[2])
a. Exception: Any or both of parties in good faith
3. Absence of Marriage License
a. Exceptions: Arts. 27-34
• Doctrines:
FOR A MARRIAGE TO BE CONSIDERED VOID ON THE GROUND OF ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE
LICENSE, THE LAW REQUIRES THAT THE ABSENCE OF SUCH MARRIAGE LICENSE MUST BE
APPARENT ON THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT, OR AT THE VERY LEAST, SUPPORTED BY A
CERTIFICATION FROM THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR THAT NO SUCH MARRIAGE LICENSE WAS
ISSUED TO THE PARTIES
The license is the essence of the marriage contract. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. Stated
differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. (Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016)
4. Bigamous or Polygamous (Art. 35[4])
• Doctrines:
TO BE CONVICTED OF BIGAMY, THE SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE MUST HAVE ALL THE
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the
marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper
of the criminal case. (Santiago v. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015)
SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE NOT A GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR BIGAMY
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first
marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated. The subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the crime had already been consummated. (Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 13, 2013)
SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT A GROUND FOR ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL
CASE FOR BIGAMY
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. (Tenebro
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004)
BIGAMY IS CONSUMNATED AT THE MOMENT OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE NULLITY OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had
not yet been legally dissolved. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the
essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged. (Montañez v. Cipriano, G.R. No.
181089, October 22, 2012)
a. Presumptive Death (Art. 41)
i. Effect of Reappearance of Absent Spouse
• Doctrines:
THE PRESENT SPOUSE MUST HAVE WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF THAT THE PRIOR SPOUSE WAS
ALREADY DEAD
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. (Republic v. Tampus, G.R.
No. 214243, March 16, 2016)
THE "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" REQUISITE UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE
REQUIRES EXERTION OF ACTIVE EFFORT, NOT A MERE PASSIVE ONE
For that reason, this Court stressed that the degree of diligence and reasonable search required by
law is not met (1) when there is failure to present the persons from whom the present spouse
allegedly made inquiries especially the absent spouse's relatives, neighbors, and friends, (2) when
there is failure to report the missing spouse's purported disappearance or death to the police or
mass media, and (3) when the present spouse's evidence might or would only show that the absent
spouse chose not to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed dead. (Republic v.
Sareñogon, Jr., G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016)
5. Mistake in (Physical) Identity (Art. 35[5])
6. Void Subsequent Marriage
a. Without judicial declaration of nullity of previous void marriage (Art. 40)
• Doctrines:
A FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING THE PREVIOUS MARRIAGE VOID NEED NOT BE OBTAINED
ONLY FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE
The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other
incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. When a marriage is declared
void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated
in previous judicial proceedings.” (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17,
1993)
THE REQUIREMENT OF A JUDICIAL DECREE FOR THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE DOES NOT
APPLY TO MARRIAGES CELEBRATED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in
effect at the time of its celebration. As this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of
Appeals, the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were
celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were
born while the Civil Code was in force. (Castillo v. De Leon-Castillo, G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016)
THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT OF A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
PRIOR TO A SECOND MARRIAGE APPLIES TO MARRIAGES CELEBRATED UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists. (Montañez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012)
A SECOND MARRIAGE WITHOUT JUDICIAL DECLARATION IS BIGAMOUS REGARDLESS OF THE
EVIDENCE OF NULLITY OF FIRST MARRIAGE
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they
are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage. (Vitangcol v. People,
G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016)
THE DECLARATION IN THE INSTANT CASE OF NULLITY OF THE PREVIOUS MARRIAGE OF THE
DECEASED AND PETITIONER DOES NOT VALIDATE THE SECOND MARRIAGE OF THE
DECEASED WITH RESPONDENT
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. (Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. No. 132529,
February 2, 2001)
ART. 40, WHICH IS A RULE OF PROCEDURE, SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the
Family Code itself provides that said “Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.” The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. (Jarillo v. People, G.R.
No. 164435, June 29, 2010)
ARTICLE 40 IS APPLICABLE TO REMARRIAGES ENTERED INTO AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF
THE FAMILY CODE REGARDLESS OF THE DATE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code,
said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40,
which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the
application of Article 40 to his case. (Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29, 1995)
b. Without judicial declaration of presumptive death of absent spouse (Art. 41)
c. Where the absent spouse was presumed dead, and both the present spouse and would–be
spouse were in bad faith in contracting marriage (Art. 44)
d. Failure to record in the civil registry and registry of property the judgment of annulment or of
absolute nullity of the marriage, partition and distribution of the property of the spouses and
the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes (Arts. 52–53)
e. Effect of Termination of Subsequent Marriage (Art. 43)
i. Children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be
considered legitimate
ii. Dissolution & liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership. If either
spouse acted in bad faith, his share in the net profits shall be forfeited:
.
I In favor of the common children;
II . If none, in favor of the children of the guilty spouse by previous marriage; or
III. In default of children, in favor of the innocent spouse;
iii. Donations by reason of marriage remain valid except if the donee contracted the marriage
in bad faith
iv. The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the spouse in bad faith as the
beneficiary in any insurance policy
v. The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate or intestate succession
7. Psychological Incapacity
a. Elements
b. Molina Doctrine
• Doctrines:
"PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY" SHOULD REFER TO NO LESS THAN A MENTAL (NOT
PHYSICAL) INCAPACITY THAT CAUSES A PARTY TO BE TRULY INCOGNITIVE OF THE BASIC
MARITAL COVENANTS THAT CONCOMITANTLY MUST BE ASSUMED AND DISCHARGED BY
THE PARTIES TO THE MARRIAGE
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved. (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995)
MOLINA DOCTRINE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS A GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE; GUIDELINES FOR THE APPLICATION OF ART. 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE
Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code for the guidance of the
bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children; (7) Interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
(Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997)
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, AS A GROUND FOR DECLARING THE NULLITY OF A MARRIAGE,
MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY THE TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED. THERE IS NO
REQUIREMENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE EXAMINED BY A PHYSICIAN
OR A PSYCHOLOGIST AS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON FOR SUCH DECLARATION
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. (Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000)
THE PRESENTATION OF ANY FORM OF MEDICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HOWEVER, DID NOT MEAN THAT THE SAME WOULD
HAVE AUTOMATICALLY ENSURED THE GRANTING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of their proceedings. (Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017)
SENSELESS AND PROTRACTED REFUSAL TO HAVE SEXUAL INTERCOURS IS EQUIVALENT TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. (Chi Ming
Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997)
NO AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ON NULLIY ON THE GROUND OF
The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the
marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. It is contradictory to
characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party
because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful.
(Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127358, March 31, 2005)
SEXUAL INFIDELITY PER SE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WITHIN
THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE FAMILY CODE; MERE SHOWING OF "IRRECONCILABLE
DIFFERENCES" AND "CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES" IN NO WISE CONSTITUTES
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b)
alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. (Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004)
A PERSON WHO IS AFFLICTED WITH DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER, CANNOT
ASSUME THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS. ALTHOUGH ON A DIFFERENT PLANE, THE
SAME MAY ALSO BE SAID OF THE RESPONDENT, WHO IS AFFLICTED WITH ANTISOCIAL
PERSONALITY DISORDER
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows
others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people
even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things
that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. The seriousness of the
diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the
parties is null and void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity. (Ngo-Te v. Yu-Te, G.R.
No. 161793, February 13, 2009)
THE INTENT OF THE LAW HAS BEEN TO CONFINE THE MEANING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS
Petitioner's theory that the respondent's psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or
unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits
such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the
level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the
"difficulty", if not outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations that
characterize some marriages. The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders — existing at the time of the marriage
— clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. (Agraviador v. Amparo-
Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010)
OBSSESSIVE COMPULSIVE PERSONALITY DISORDER DOES NOT EQUATE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY ABSENT THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CONDITIONS PRESRIBED BY
JURISPRUDENCE
To warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
(Republic v. Romero, G.R. No. 209180, February 24, 2016)
BEFORE THE PROMULGATION OF THE MOLINA GUIDELINES, NEITHER THE FAMILY CODE
NOR JURISPRUDENCE MANDATED THAT THE INCURABILITY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY BE ESTABLISHED IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
The final point in the Molina guidelines is that such psychological incapacity be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It is to be noted that the testimony of the expert
witnesses and the decision of the trial court transpired well before Molina was promulgated and
made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Santos v. CA did refer to that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." However, in
formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any
reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity. (Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No.
155800, March 10, 2006)
NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO AMOUNT TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF THAT IT PREVENTED THE
OFFENDING SPOUSE FROM COMPLYING WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental-- not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
(Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016)
FINAL JUDGMENT DENYING A PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY ON THE GROUND
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY BARS A SUBSEQUENT PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY ON THE GROUND OF MARRIAGE LICENSE
In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds
cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the
resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage.
(Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528; October 31,2006)
8. Incestuous (Art. 37)
a. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree
b. Between brothers and sisters whether of the full or half blood
9. Void for Reasons of Public Policy
a. Collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate up to the 4th civil degree
b. Step–parents & step children
c. Parents–in–law & children–in–law
d. The adopting parent & the adopted child
e. The surviving spouse of the adopting parent & the adopted child
f. The surviving spouse of the adopted child & the adopter
g. Adopted child & a legitimate child of the adopter
h. Adopted children of the same adopter
i. Parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed the latter’s spouse, or his/her
spouse.
.
I There is no need for conviction in a criminal case of the guilty party. The fact of killing
committed by one of the parties to the marriage can be proved in a civil case
B. Action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
1. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003
2. A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 4, 2003
• Doctrines:
IN CASES WHERE THERE IS NO MARRIAGE THAT TOOK PLACE A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION
UNDER RULE 108 MAY BE UNDERTAKEN TO CHANGE ONE’S CIVIL STATUS
A petition for cancellation of Entries under Rule 108 may be undertaken specifically in the wife portion in
cases where there is no marriage that took place, such as when the only evidence of the marriage is the
marriage certificate. This is not a case of nullification of marriage because there was no marriage to speak of.
(Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014)
VOID MARRIAGES CELEBRATED DURING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE CIVIL CODE MAY BE QUESTIONED
EVEN AFTER THE DEATH OF EITHER PARTY
In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. (Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013)
VI. Voidable Marriage

A. Grounds: Must exist at time of Marriage (Art. 45)
1. 18 or over but below 21 without consent of parents or guardian
2. Either party unsound mind
3. Consent obtained by fraud
a. Non-disclosure of previous conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude
b. Wife concealed pregnancy by another at time of marriage
c. Concealment of STD existing at time of marriage
d. Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism at time of
marriage
• Doctrines:
THAT THE PREGNANCY IS READILY APPARENT CANNOT BE SUSTAINED AS A DEFENSE IN AN
ANNULMENT CASE BASED ON FRAUD (CONCEALMENT OF PREGNANCY) AS THERE WAS EVIDENCE
THAT THE WOMAN IS NATURALLY PLUMP
At the time of marriage, the wife was alleged to be only four months pregnant. At that stage, there is no
assurance that her pregnancy is readily apparent to the husband since according to him, Conchita was
“naturally plump”. According to medical authorities, only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the
enlargement of the woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of
the abdomen more general and apparent. Therefore, it was possible that at the time of the marriage, the
husband did not suspect that his wife was already pregnant. The fact of pregnancy could have been
successfully concealed from him by his wife if she were only five months pregnant but not if she were
already in her 7th month pregnancy. (Aquino v. Delizo, G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960)
NON-DISCLOSURE OF A HUSBAND’S PRE-MARITAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ANOTHER WOMAN IS
NOT ONE OF THE ENUMERATED CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A GROUND FOR
ANNULMENT BASED ON FRAUD
Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment under Article 86 of the Civil
Code (now Article 46 of the Family Code). It is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article,
providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to . . . chastity" shall give ground for an action to
annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having
been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her
grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which
society, and not herself alone, is interested. (Anaya v. Fernando Palaroan, G.R. No. L-27930, November
26, 1970)
4. Consent obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence
5. Either physically incapable of consummating marriage, incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable
a. Doctrine of Triennial Cohabitation
• Doctrines:
IMPOTENCY IS NOT STERILITY, BUT THE PHYSICAL INABILITY TO HAVE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE
Impotency is not synonymous with sterility. Impotency is the physical inability to have sexual
intercourse; it is different from sterility. Impotence is the inability on the part of the male organ of
copulation to perform its proper function. Impotence applies only to disorders affecting the functions of
the organ of copulation, while sterility applies only to lack of fertility in the reproductive elements of
either sex. (Menciano v. San Jose, G.R. No. L-1967, May 28, 1951)
6. Either party afflicted with serious STD which appears to be incurable
B. Action for Annulment of Marriage
1. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003
2. A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 4, 2003
3. Persons who may file action for annulment; Period for filing
a. Parents/Guardian who did not give consent before party reaches 21
b. Party within 5 years from majority unless freely cohabited
c. During the lifetime, either party or any relative or person having legal charge
d. Within 5 years from discovery by injured party unless thereafter freely cohabited
e. Within 5 years after force, intimidation or undue influence ceased by the injured party unless
thereafter freely cohabited
f. Injured party within 5 years from marriage for STD and or incapacity to consummate marriage
4. Role of Prosecuting Attorney/ Public Prosecutor
• Doctrines:
A STRICT APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 48 AND 60 WILL NOT APPLY IF IT IS CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT
EVERY STAGE OF THE LITIGATION WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A NO-HOLDS BARRED CONTEST AND
NOT BY COLLUSION
In all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion
between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant
spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. (Tuason v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996)
C. Effect of Termination of Marriage
1. Children
a. Status
b. Custody
2. Support (Spouse, child)
3. Presumptive Legitime
4. Property Relation
a. Liquidation of Community of Property
5. Testate or Intestate Succession
6. Insurance Policy
7. Donation Propter Nuptias
• Doctrines:
THE PRESUMPTION OF CUSTODY IN FAVOR OF THE MOTHER UNDER ARTICLE 213 OF THE FAMILY
CODE NO LONGER APPLIES IF THE CHILD IS OVER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE
The welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that
either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present time, both children are over 7 years of age and are
thus perfectly capable of making a fairly intelligent choice. (Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115640,
March 15, 1995)
BECAUSE OF ITS PROVISIONAL NATURE, THE COURT NEED NOT DELVE FULLY ON THE MERITS OF THE
PETITION FOR NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BEFORE THE PARTIES CAN BE AFFORDED OF SUPPORT
PENDETE LITE PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of
voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or
upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may temporarily grant
support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a
court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief.
It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.
(Lim-Lua v. Lua, G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013)
IN CASE OF INCAPACITY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT BY THE FORMER SPOUSES AFTER A DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, THE SAME SHALL BE PROVIDED BY PERSONS OBLIGED TO GIVE SUPPORT
UNDER THE FAMILY CODE
The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the
more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who
are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. (Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
125041, June 30, 2006)
THE SEPARATION OF THE PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES IS ONE OF THE NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES
OF THE JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
Petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
instituted for that purpose, is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993)
VII. Legal Separation

A. Grounds (Art. 55)
• Doctrines:
PRIOR CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME OF CONCUBINAGE IS NOT INDISPENSIBLE FOR A PETITION FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION TO PROSPER
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. The guilt of the
spouse by final judgment is not a requirement. (Gandionco v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987)
A PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION MAY BE FILED ON THE GROUND OF REPEATED PHYSICAL
VIOLENCE OR GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT DIRECTED AGAINST THE PETITIONER, A COMMON CHILD,
OR A CHILD OF PETITIONER UNDER ARTICLE 55, PAR. 1 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation under Art.
55, par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were
adequately proven. (Ong v. Ong, G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006)
B. Action for Legal Separation
1. A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC, March 15, 2003
2. A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 4, 2003
3. Effects of Filing Petition
4. Cooling-off Period (Art. 58); Sec. 19, RA 9262
• Doctrines:
ARTICLE 103 THE CIVIL CODE (NOW ARTICLE 58 OF THE FAMILY CODE) IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE
BAR TO THE HEARING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF
THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD
Article 103 of the Civil Code (now Article 58 of The Family Code) prohibiting the hearing of an action for
legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would not likewise preclude
the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary
remedy to such a suit. Thus, the question of management of their respective property need not be left
unresolved even during such six-month period. (Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, Jr., G.R. No. L-34132, July
29, 1972)
5. Grounds for Denial of Petition (Art. 56)
• Doctrines:
THE ACT OF THE WIFE IN LEAVING THE HUSBAND DUE TO THE LATTER’S ABUSIVE CONDUCT
DOES NOT AMOUNT TO ABANDONMENT UNDER ART. 55, WHICH REQUIRES THAT IT BE DONE
WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE AND FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR
Having established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated by the said provision. The abandonment referred to but the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. (Ong v. Ong, G.R. No 153206, October 23,
2006)
CONDONATION IN CASES OF LEGAL SEPARATION
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated
in I Bouver's Law Dictionary, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or
wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". A single voluntary act of sexual
intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute
condonation, especially as against the husband. (Bugayong v. Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, December 28,
1956)
CONDONATION LIES IN THE WIFE’S ASSUMPTION THAT SHE REALLY BELIEVED HER HUSBAND IS
GUIILTY OF CONCUBINAGE
The question of whether the wife condoned the concubinage lies in the wife’s "line of conduct under the
assumption that she really believed [her husband] guilty of concubinage.” (Busuego v. Office of
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 196842, October 9, 2013)
ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION IS PURELY PERSONAL. DEATH OF ONE PARTY CAUSES THE
DEATH OF THE ACTION ITSELF
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the
spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio
personalis moritur cum persona. (Sy v. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972)
4. Period for Filing (Art. 57)
C. Effects of Decree of Legal Separation
• Doctrines:
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS PROPER TO ENJOIN A SPOUSE FROM INTERFERING WITH THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES PENDING A SUIT FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things
subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting
these matters during the pendency of the suit. While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator
has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any
share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation
was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary
injunction. (Sabalones v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106169, February 14, 1994)
IN LEGAL SEPARATION, IT IS THE ONLY THE NET PROFITS AND NOT THE SHARE OF THE OFFENDING
SPOUSE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP THAT IS FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF THE COMMON CHILDREN
Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated
and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal
partnership. what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership property
but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property. (Siochi v. Gozon, G.R. Nos. 169900 &
169977, March 18, 2010)
A PARTIAL VOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY MADE BY THE SPOUSES PENDING THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE MAY BE ALLOWED
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient
cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is
exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the
proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that
this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of
gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code. (Maquilan v.
Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007)
D. Effects of Reconciliation
VIII. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife (Arts. 68-73)
• Doctrines:
MARRIAGE CREATES AN OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE HUSBAND TO SUPPORT HIS WIFE
An obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him
to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. (Goitia v.
Campos-Rueda, G.R. No. 11263, November 12, 1916)
COURTS CANNOT COMPEL ONE OF THE SPOUSES TO COHABIT WITH, AND RENDER CONJUGAL RIGHTS, TO
THE OTHER
At best a preliminary mandatory injunction order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses
to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. (Arroyo
v. De Arroyo, G.R. No. L-17014, August 11, 1921)
ESSENTIAL OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS TO INQUIRE IN ALL MANNER OF
INVOLUNTARY RESTRAINT, AND TO RELIEVE A PERSON THEREFROM IF SUCH RESTRAINT IS ILLEGAL
The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. (Ilusorio v. Bildner, G.R
Nos. 139789 & 139808, May 12, 2000)
FAILURE TO PERFORM MARITAL OBLIGATIONS IS ACTIONABLE BY WAY OF DAMAGES
Refusal to perform wifely duties, and denial of consortium and desertion of husband constitute in law a wrong
caused through fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity. (Tenchavez v. Escaño,
G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965)
IX. Property Relations Between Husband and Wife

A. Marriage Settlement
1. Requisites
2. Modifications: Must be made before marriage
a. Exception: Judicial Separation of Property During Marriage (Art. 76)
• Doctrines:
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS CANNOT BE MODIFIED AFTER MARRIAGE
Marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage. Post-marriage modification of such
settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved
and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and
agreed to revive their former property regime; (c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground
that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d)
there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the
voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains. (Pana v. Heirs of Juanite,
Sr., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012)
B. Absence of Marriage Settlement, Joint Administration (Arts. 96, 124[1])
1. General Rule: Property relations governed by Philippine laws (Art. 80)
2. Exceptions:
a. Both spouses are aliens
b. As to extrinsic validity of contracts
i. Not situated and executed in the Philippines
ii. Situated in the foreign country but not executed in the Philippines
c. Contrary stipulation
3. In case of disagreement, husband’s decision prevails
a. Wife: Relief from courts within 5 years from transaction
4. Incapacity of spouse or cannot provide for joint administration: Assumption of sole administration
(Arts. 96, 124[2])
5. Transfer of administration (Art. 142)
6. Administration vs. Acts of Ownership
7. Management of household
8. Failure to comply with obligation (Arts. 101, 128)
C. Donations by Reason of Marriage
1. Requisites
2. Distinguished from ordinary donation
• Doctrines:
EXPRESS ACCEPTANCE IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE VALIDITY OF DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS
Article 129 of the New Civil Code provides that express acceptance "is not necessary for the validity of these
donations”, thus, implied acceptance is sufficient. Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code provides that "acceptance
is not necessary to the validity of such gifts". Therefore, the celebration of the marriage between the
beneficiary couple, with compliance with the prescribed form, is enough to effectuate a donation propter
nuptias. (Valencia v. Locquiao, G.R. No. 122134, October 3, 2003)
D. Donation between Spouses During the Marriage
• Doctrines:
BAN ON DONATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE APPLIES TO COMMON-LAW
RELATIONSHIP
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy
consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. (Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771, March
31, 1971)
A DONATION MADE BETWEEN SPOUSES WITHOUT A VALID MARRIAGE IS VOID UNDER ART. 87 OF
THE FAMILY CODE
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco
in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. (Arcaba v. Vda. de Batocael, G.R. No. 146683,
November 22, 2001)
TRANSFER OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN SPOUSES CANNOT BE ATTACKED BY PARTIES WHO DO NOT
BEAR ANY RELATION WITH THE SPOUSES
Although certain transfers from husband to wife or from wife to husband are prohibited in the article referred
to, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only by persons who bear such a relation to the parties making
the transfer or to the property itself that such transfer interferes with their rights or interests. Unless such a
relationship appears, the transfer cannot be attacked. (Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., G.R. No.
L-12707, August 10, 1918)
E. Grounds for Revocation
F. Property Relations Governed By
1. Marriage settlement
2. By provisions of the Family Code
3. By local customs
G. Absolute Community of Property
1. General Rule: Consists of all property owned by the spouses at the time of the marriage or acquired
thereafter (Art. 91)
2. Exceptions
a. Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a
former marriage
b. Property for personal and exclusive use except jewelry
c. Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, except when the donor, testator or
grantor expressly provides otherwise (Art. 92)
• Doctrines:
PROPERTY BROUGHT INTO THE MARRIAGE FORM PART OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
REGARDLESS OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION MADE BY THE SPOUSES FOR THE PURCHASE OF SUCH
PROPERTY PRIOR TO MARRIAGE
Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is community property
for the law itself defines what constitutes community property. Whatever property each spouse brings
into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of
the FC) form the common mass of the couple's properties. (Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11,
2015)
3. Administration and Disposition
• Doctrines:
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY EXECUTED BY A SPOUSE CONSTITUTES AS ACCEPTANCE
PERFECTING THE CONTINUING OFFER CONTEMPLATED UNDER ART. 96 AND 124 OF THE FC
A special power of attorney executed by the other spouse subsequent to a transaction disposing or
encumbering common property without prior consent or authority of the court constitutes as an
acceptance by such spouse which perfects the continuing offer, as provided for under Article 96 and 124
of the Family Code. (Flores v. Spouses Lindo, Jr., G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011)
4. Rule on Game of Chance
5. Remedies of Present Spouse in Case of Abandonment
• Doctrines:
ABSOLUTE CESSATION OF MARITAL RELATIONS, DUTIES AND RIGHTS, WITH THE INTENTION OF
PERPETUAL SEPARATION IS NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE ABANDONMENT
The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral
desertion. As in Article 178, to constitute abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be
absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.
(De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-19565, January 30, 1968)
6. Charges upon and Obligations
7. Liquidation (Art. 102)
8. Grounds for Termination (Art. 99)
H. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
1. Properties under Conjugal Partnership of Gains
• Doctrines:
PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION BY BOTH PARTIES IS REQUIRED, OTHERWISE THERE IS NO
CO-OWNERSHIP AND NO PRESUMPTION OF EQUAL SHARING
A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of "actual joint contribution" by both the
live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution.
Proof of actual contribution by both parties is required; otherwise there is no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal sharing. (Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004)
PROCEEDS OF AN INSURANCE POLICY; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
The proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid
by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the
other half to the wife, exclusively; that if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly
conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part;
and that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if
delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under
probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they
belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or
outside. (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Posadas, Jr., G.R. No. L-34583, October 22, 1931)
THAT ALL PROPERTIES OF THE MARRIAGE BELONG TO CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS A
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION
The party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. (Jocson v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-55322, February 16, 1989)
PROPERTIES BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE MARRIAGE WHERE, DURING ITS
SUBSISTENCE, FULL OWNERSHIP WAS ACQUIRED
It is only upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale that full ownership was vested in Daniel
Jovellanos. Since, as early as 1967 he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property
necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife. (Jovellanos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 100728, June 18, 1992)
PROPERTY PURCHASED PARTLY WITH PARAPHERNAL FUNDS AND PARTLY WITH CONJUGAL
FUNDS BELONGS TO BOTH PATRIMONIES IN COMMON, IN PROPORTION TO THE CONTRIBUTIONS
OF EACH
As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and partly with money of the
conjugal partnership, justice requires that the property be held to belong to both patrimonies in
common, in proportion to the contributions of each to the total purchase price. (Castillo, Jr. v. Pasco,
G.R. No. L-16857, May 29, 1964)
2. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse (Art. 109)
• Doctrines:
TRUSTEE OBLIGED TO CONVEY PROPERTY TO RIGHTFUL OWNER
As the trustee of a constructive trust, petitioner has an obligation to convey to the private respondents
that part of the land in question to which she now claims an ostensible title, said portion rightfully
pertaining to the respondents' deceased mother as her share in the conjugal partnership with Martin
Lacerna. (Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. 73733, December 16, 1986)
MERE CONSTRUCTION OF A BUILDING FROM COMMON FUNDS DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY
CONVEY OWNERSHIP OF THE WIFE’S LAND TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The mere construction of a building from common funds does
not automatically convey the ownership of the wife's land to the conjugal partnership. Such a mode of
using the land, namely, by erecting a building thereon, is simply an exercise of the right of usufruct
pertaining to the conjugal partnership over the wife's land. (Vda. de Padilla v. Vda. de Padilla, G.R. No.
L-48137, October 4, 1943)
HE WHO SEEKS INDEMINITY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM DEPRIVATION OF A WIFE’S
DOMESTIC SERVICES, MUST PROVE SUCH SERVICES
Inasmuch as a wife's domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are purely personal and voluntary
acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to do, it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity
for the loss of such services to prove that the person obliged to render them had done so before he was
injured and that he would be willing to continue rendering them had he not been prevented from so
doing. (Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., G.R. No. L-39587, March 24, 1934)
WIFE’S DECISION TO DISMISS A CASE IS BINDING UPON THE HUSBAND ONLY IF HE OR SHE IS THE
REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST
Under Article 113 of the Civil Code, the husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife, except,
if they have in fact been separated for at least one year. The suit contemplated under the said article is
one in which the wife is the real party-in-interest. Said provision cannot apply to the husband if he is the
main party-in-interest, both as to the person principally aggrieved and as administrator of the conjugal
partnership. (Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L-28589, February 29, 1972)
3. Rule in Case of Improvement of Exclusive Property
a. Accession
b. Reverse Accession
• Doctrines:
PRESUMPTION THAT IMPROVEMENT BELONGS TO THE SPOUSE WHO OWNS THE EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY
Proof is needful of the time of the making or construction of the improvements and the source of the
funds used therefor, in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the
conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. Where property is registered in the name of one
spouse only and there is no showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is
that it belongs exclusively to said spouse. (Villanueva v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74577,
December 4, 1990)
INCOME DUE TO WIDOW DURING PERIOD OF ADMINISTRATION
As sole owner of those properties that never became a conjugal because the conjugal improvements
thereon were destroyed before they could be paid for the widow, as well as those properties that never
ceased to be paraphernal because there were paraphernal buildings thereon at the time of the
termination of the conjugal partnership, the widow is also the owner of all their income that accrued
during their administration by the executrix-appellant until they were finally delivered to the estate of
the said widow, who later died, minus the administration expenses incurred by said executrix-appellant
with respect to those paraphernal properties. (Vda. De Padilla v. Paterno, G.R. No. L-8748, December 26,
1961)
4. Charges upon and Obligations
• Doctrines:
OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTED BY ONE OF THE SPOUSES WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER
SPOUSE MUST REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IN ORDER TO BE
CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
A conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by
the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing then of
some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. (BA Finance Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-61464, May 28, 1998)
IN ACTING AS A GUARANTOR OR SURETY FOR A THIRD PARTY, A SPOUSE DOES NOT ACT FOR THE
BENEFIT OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
In acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. If the husband himself is the principal
obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own
business or profession, the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership for it is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family. (Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Mar Tierra Corp., G.R. No. 143382, November 29,
2006)
ONE SPOUSE MAY SEPARATELY BRING AN ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF CREDIT WITHOUT THE
NECESSITY OF JOINING THE OTHER SPOUSE
Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "a partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific
partnership property." Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance
the four checks used to pay for petitioners’ stock subscriptions, and with the presumption that the
credits themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes the spouses de Guzman co-owners of
the alleged credit. Being co-owners of the alleged credit, the spouses may separately bring an action for
the recovery thereof. In a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned
property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners. (Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, G.R.
No. 160347, November 29, 2006)
PROPERTY PURCHASED BY SPOUSES DURING THE EXISTENCE OF THEIR MARRIAGE IS PRESUMED
TO BE CONJUGAL IN NATURE
This presumption stands, absent any clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that the property is
paraphernal. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one
spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. (Spouses
Go v. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006)
ALL PROPERTIES ACQUIRED DURING THE MARRIAGE ARE PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband, or to the wife. (Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004)
THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS BENEFITED WHEN A SPOUSE
ENTERS INTO A CONTRACT OF SURETY
The private respondent carries the burden of proof to establish that such benefit redounded to the
conjugal partnership. (Borlongan v. Banco de Oro, G.R. Nos. 217617 & 218540 [Resolution], April 5, 2017)
DEBTS, FINES, AND PECUNIARY INDEMNITIES CONTRACTED BY THE HUSBAND OR THE WIFE
BEFORE THE MARRIAGE ARE NOT CHARGEABLE TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
As a general rule, debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, as well as fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. However, such
obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161
of the New Civil Code have already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive property or the
same is insufficient. (Lacson v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-19346, May 31, 1965)
WHEN THE CIVIL CODE STILL WAS STILL THE OPERATIVE LAW ON MARRIAGES, THE
PRESUMPTION, ABSENT ANY EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, WAS THAT THEY WERE MARRIED
UNDER THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
Were [the spouses] married when the Civil Code was still the operative law on marriages. The
presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the regime of the
conjugal partnership of gains. (Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012)
INDEBTEDNESS OF THE SPOUSE INCURRED WITHOUT CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE IS NOT
CHARGEABLE TO THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of
the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support
of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when the administration of the conjugal
partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband and when the wife gives moderate
donations for charity. Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs
may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them. (Spouses Wong v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70082, August 19, 1991)
HOSPITALIZATION EXPENSES FOR ONE SPOUSE IS CHARGEABLE TO THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY
The consent of the wife is not required when a disposition of 1/2 of the undivided conjugal properties
was made in order to finance the husband’s hospitalization and medication which are chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. (Costuna v. Domondon, G.R. No. 82753, December 19, 1989)
5. Administration of Conjugal Partnership Property
• Doctrines:
THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE IN A DISPOSITION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY MAYBE
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
The act of the wife signing the 3rd page of the deed of sale, even if the 1 st and 2nd page were not signed,
amounts to an implied consent to such disposition of property. (Pelayo v. Perez, G.R. No. 141323, June 8,
2005)
THE RULES ON PARTNERSHIP UNDER THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES SUPPLETORILY TO THE RULES
ON CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS UNDER THE FAMILY CODE
Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is
not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed,
foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the
rules on partnership under the Civil Code. (Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo, G.R. No. 153802,
March 11, 2005)
THE RULES ON SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS GOVERNING ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY
CODE DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE SPOUSE IS INCOMPETENT TO GIVE CONSENT
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the
proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse
is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.
Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to
give consent. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of
the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. (Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109557, November 29, 2000)
CONSENT OF BOTH SPOUSES REQUIRED TO DISPOSE CONJUGAL PROPERTY
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. (Jader-Manalo v. Spouses Camaisa, G.R.
No. 147978, January 23, 2002)
CONSENT OF BOTH SPOUSES REQUIRED TO DISPOSE CONJUGAL PROPERTY, OTHERWISE
CONTRACT ENTERED INTO IS VOID AND CANNOT BE RATIFIED
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of
the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect. (Spouses Guiang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
125172, June 26, 1998)
6. Dissolution and Liquidation
• Doctrines:
SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE FROM THE NET PROFITS IS FORFEITED
Since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to article 63(2) of the Family Code.
There’s no separate property which may be accounted for the guilty party’s favor. (Quiao v. Quiao, G.R.
No. 176556, July 4, 2012)
CO-OWNER SPOUSE CAN SELL HIS INTEREST IN CPG
Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the conjugal property without
prior liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since the provisions of the
Family code shall be “without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.” (Domingo v. Spouses Molina, G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016)
IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY OR INSUFFICIENCY OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP, THE SPOUSES ARE
NOT SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR DEBTS THEREOF UNLESS EXPRESSLY SPECIFIED
The legal provisions about conjugal partnership, contained in Chapter 5, Title 3, Book 4, of the Civil Code,
do not give an adequate answer as to the liability of the spouses with respect to the debts of the
partnership. In order to be solved, it requires a resort to the rule on the contract of partnership,
prescribed in Article 1698, which provides that the partners are not solidarily liable with respect to the
debt of the partnership, and none can bind the others by a personal act, if they have not given him any
power therefor. (Philippine National Bank v. Quintos, G.R. No. L-22383, October 6, 1924)
I. Separation of Property
1. Marriage Settlement (Art. 134)
2. Judicial Order
a. Causes
b. Effects
J. Union without Marriage (Arts. 147 and 148)
1. Applicability
2. Salaries and Wages
3. Property Acquired Exclusively by Other Party
4. Property Acquired by Both
5. Presumption
• Doctrines:
THE PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES DURING THE PERIOD OF COHABITATION EVEN IN A
VOID MARRIAGE REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSE IS GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 147 OR
ARTICLE 148
The property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household. (Valdez v. Regional Trial Court, G.R No. 122749, July 31, 1996)
LIQUIDATION, PARTITION, AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARTIES’ PROPERTIES IS NOT REQUIRED
BEFORE A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE MAY ISSUE FOR MARRIAGES DECLARED
VOID UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Article 50 of the Family Code which requires liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
before a decree of absolute nullity of marriage may issue does not apply to marriages which are declared void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties. The property relations of parties in such a void marriage during
the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership
apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on
co-ownership. (Diño v. Diño, G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011)
FAILURE TO PROVE ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE PARTY UNDER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY
CODE DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO CO-OWNERSHIP AND PRESUMPTION OF EQUAL SHARES
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article
147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.
If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares. (Agapay v. Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997)
RULES ON CO-OWNERSHIP APPLY TO PROPERTIES ACQUIRED IN VOID MARRIAGES OR BY COMMON
LAW MARRIAGE IF ACQUIRED BY EITHER OR BOTH THROUGH THEIR WORK OR INDUSTRY OR THEIR
WAGES AND SALARIES
Article 144 of the Civil Code provides that “when a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but
they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.” (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Teodoro, G.R. No. L-20530, June 29, 1967)
THE PROVISIONS OF THE FAMILY CODE MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO VESTED RIGHTS
Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo and Carmelita,
under normal circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal property. Article 105 of the Family
Code of the Philippines provides that the Code shall apply to conjugal partnership established before the code
took effect, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the New Civil Code or other laws. In
this case, petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to rebut the presumption. (Francisco v.
Master Iron Works & Construction Corp., G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005)
PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION IS REQUIRED UNDER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be
up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. (Atienza v. De Castro,
G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006)
X. The Family
A. Family Relation
B. Mandatory Prior Recourse to Compromise (Art. 151, NCC)
1. Exceptions
• Doctrines:
A SISTER-IN-LAW OR BROTHER-IN-LAW IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PHRASE “MEMBERS OF THE
FAMILY” UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule. The phrase
"members of the family" must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family Code. Hence, a sister-in-
law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration. (Martinez v. Martinez, G.R. No. 162084, June 28,
2005)
A SISTER-IN-LAW OR BROTHER-IN-LAW IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PHRASE “MEMBERS OF THE
FAMILY” UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule. The phrase
"members of the family" must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family Code. Hence, a sister-in-
law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration. (Gayon v. Gayon, G.R. No. L-28394, November 26,
1970)
C. Family Home
1. General Rule: Exempt from executions
2. Exceptions
• Doctrines:
ARTICLE 153 OF THE FAMILY CODE DOES NOT HAVE RETROACTIVE EFFECT
All existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home. (Manacop v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 97898, August 11, 1997)
FAMILY HOME NOT YET CONSTITUTED AT THE TIME THE DEBT WAS INCURRED IS NOT EXEMPT
FROM EXECUTION
However, the retroactive effect of the Family Code, particularly on the provisions on the family home has
been clearly laid down by the court. The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code
where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain
instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment. At that time
when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly,
petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of
Article 243(2). (Taneo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108532, March 9, 1999)
A RESIDENTIAL HOUSE NOT CONSTITUTED AS A FAMILY HOME UNDER THE CIVIL CODE IS DEEMED
CONSTITUTED AS A FAMILY HOME BY OPERATION OF LAW ONLY UPON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE
FAMILY CODE
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as
such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential
house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under
the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4,
one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year). Article 162
simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
(Modequillo v. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990)
THREE REQUISITES MUST CONCUR BEFORE A MINOR BENEFICIARY IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS
OF ART. 159: (1) THE RELATIONSHIP ENUMERATED IN ART. 154 OF THE FAMILY CODE; (2) THEY LIVE
IN THE FAMILY HOME, AND (3) THEY ARE DEPENDENT FOR LEGAL SUPPORT UPON THE HEAD OF THE
FAMILY
The term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family
home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of
the spouses who constitute a family home. (Patricio v. Dario III, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006)
THE FAMILY HOME IS EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 153 OF
THE FAMILY CODE
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners,
or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following
conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to
fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its
value exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of forced sale, and any
amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160. (Eulogio v. Bell,
Sr., G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015)
XI. Paternity and Filiation

A. Legitimate Children
1. General Rule: Conceived or born during a valid marriage
• Doctrines:
THE LAW ITSELF ESTABLISHES THE LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN CONCEIVED OR BORN DURING
THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARENTS
The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in
exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born
to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected. The paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought
for that purpose. (De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001)
CHILDREN BORN IN WEDLOCK ARE LEGITIMATE
Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate. Such presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor,
i.e., that the child's parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during
the subsistence of that marriage. (Social Security System v. Aguas, G.R. No. 165546, February 27, 2006)
2. Exceptions
a. Artificial Insemination
b. Born of voidable marriage before decree of annulment
c. Conceived or born before judgment of nullity under Art. 36 has become final and executory
d. Conceived or born of Subsequent marriage under Art. 53
e. Conceived or born of mothers who might have declared against legitimacy or sentenced as
adulteress
f. Legally adopted
g. Legitimated
3. Rules on Impugning Legitimacy
a. Generally instituted only by husband
b. Prescriptive period
c. Exception: Heirs may file
i. Husband dies before period expires (remainder)
ii. Posthumous birth (full period)
iii. Continue case instituted by husband
d. Grounds
• Doctrines:
A CHILD WHO IS CONCEIVED OR BORN DURING THE MARRIAGE OF HIS PARENTS IS LEGITIMATE
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
heirs. Since the marriage of Concepcion and Almonte was void from the very beginning, he never became
her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. (Concepcion v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005)
DEATH OF THE PETITIONER DOES NOT IPSO FACTO NEGATE THE APPLICATION OF DNA TESTING
FOR AS LONG AS THERE EXIST APPROPRIATE BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES OF HIS DNA
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. (Estate of Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713,
December 17, 2007)
ARTICLES 164, 166, 170 AND 171 OF THE FAMILY CODE DO NOT CONTEMPLATE A SITUATION
WHERE A CHILD IS ALLEGED NOT TO BE THE CHILD OF NATURE OR BIOLOGICAL CHILD OF A
CERTAIN COUPLE
they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of
nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband
(or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. (Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625,
January 24, 1994)
THE PROCEDURAL RULE THAT PROOF OF LEGITIMACY UNDER ARTICLE 172, OR ILLEGITIMACY
UNDER ARTICLE 175, SHOULD ONLY BE RAISED IN A DIRECT AND SEPARATE ACTION
INSTITUTED TO PROVE THE FILIATION OF A CHILD DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE ALLEGATION
IS THAT THE CHILD IS NOT THE CHILD OF THE SPOUSES
Proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in a direct
and separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. What petitioner failed to recognize,
however, is that this procedural rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy — or illegitimacy
— of a child is at issue. In the instant case, the filiation of a child — herein respondent — is not at issue.
Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased brother Rufino and
his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that respondent is not the child of the deceased spouses
Rufino and Caridad at all. (Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015)
LEGITIMATE CHILD IS A PROPER PARTY IN THE PROCEEDINGS FOR CANCELLATION OF BIRTH
CERTIFICATE
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. The legitimate child
of the mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate if her
inheritance rights are adversely affected. (Babiera v. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000)
FILIATION OR PATERNITY MAY BE PROVED THROUGH DNA TESTING
The right against self-incrimination is only against testimonial compulsion, and the right to privacy is
not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the
common good. As such, DNA testing may be ordered in case proof of filiation or paternity is unlikely to
be satisfactorily established or difficult to be obtained, without violating the right against self-
incrimination and privacy. (Agustin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005)
A LEGITIMATE CHILD IS A PRODUCT OF, AND, THEREFORE, IMPLIES A VALID AND LAWFUL
MARRIAGE
Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and
child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Angeles v. Angeles, G.R. No. 153798, September
2, 2005)
B. Illegitimate Children
C. Actions to Claim Legitimate/Illegitimate Status
1. Who can claim
2. Proof of filiation
• Doctrines:
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IS NOW ALSO ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH HIS CLAIMED FILIATION BY "ANY
OTHER MEANS ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT AND SPECIAL LAWS”
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states: The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws. (Salas v. Matusalem, G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013)
ARTICLE 283 CONTAINS A BLANKET PROVISION "ANY OTHER EVIDENCE OR PROOF" PERMITS
HEARSAY AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE TO PROVE ILLEGIIMATE FILIATION
"Any other evidence or proof" that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the
other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not
sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph.
This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to
illegitimate filiation. (Ilano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994)
DNA TESTING IS A VALID PROBATIVE TOOL IN DETERMINING FILIATION
Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and
technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence. The DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof
of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity.
(Herrera v. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005)
IN A CRIME OF RAPE, THE PRESUMPTION AS TO THE FILIATION OF THE CHILD BEGOTTEN AS A
RESULT THEREOF MAY BE IMPUGNED ONLY DUE TO PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY TO HAVE SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE DUE TO IMPOTENCE OR SERIOUS ILLNESS
In the case at bar, it can be inferred that conception occurred at or about the time that accused-appellant is
alleged to have committed the crime, i.e., within 120 days from the commission of the offense in September
1991. 15 Pursuant to Art. 166 of the Family Code, accused-appellant can overcome the presumption that
Amalia's child was begotten as a result of her having been raped in September 1991 only if he can show either
that it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse because of impotence or serious illness
which absolutely prevents him from having sexual intercourse or that Amalia had sexual intercourse with
another man. However, accused-appellant has not shown either of these. (People v. Malapo, G.R. No. 123115,
August 25, 1998)
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IS ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH HIS CLAIMED FILIATION BY ANY OTHER MEANS
ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT AND SPECIAL LAWS
Such evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to Article 283 of the Civil Code.
Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name
has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the ROC. (Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991)
GROUNDS FOR IMPUGNING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILD MAY ONLY BE INVOKED BY THE
HUSBAND OR BY HEIRS IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES
While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds
for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of
the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases,
his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the
child is a strictly personal right of the husband. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to
contest such legitimacy. (Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002)
FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILD CAN BE ESTABLISHED BY AN ADMISSION IN A PRIVATE
HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT BY THE PARENT CONCERNED AND DULY SUPPORTED BY AN ARRAY OF
EVIDENCE
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or
in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court
action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is
in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. (Verceles v.
Posada, G.R. No. 159785, April 27, 2007)
XII. Adoption
A. Domestic Adoption Act
B. Inter-Country Adoption
• Doctrines:
ADOPTED ILLEGITIMATE CHILD MAY USE AS MIDDLE NAME THE SURNAME OF BIOLOGICAL MOTHER
Adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the
adopted child. Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,
to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. (In the
Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005)
PETITION FOR ADOPTION SHOULD BE FILED BY HUSAND AND WIFE JOINTLY
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads: “…Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases…”
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife
is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. (In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim, G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21,
2009)
XIII. Support
A. Basis: Financial Capacity of Giver, Needs of Recipient

1. Not based on parental authority, hence hoes not terminate with emancipation
B. Coverage
1. Substance
2. Dwelling
3. Clothing
4. Medical Attendance
5. Education
6. Transportation
C. Kinds
1. Legal
2. Judicial
3. Conventional
D. Characteristics
1. Personal
2. Intransmissible
3. Not subject to waiver or compensation
4. Exempt from attachment or execution
5. Reciprocal
6. Provisional character of support judgment
7. Mandatory
E. Persons Obliged to Support Each Other (Art. 195)
F. Order of Liability If Several Persons Obliged to Give Support (Art. 199)
• Doctrines:
SUPPORT MUST BE GIVEN BY MORE REMOTE RELATIVES IF THOSE PRIMARILY LIABLE ARE UNABLE TO
DO SO
The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more
remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called
upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. (Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June
30, 2006)
A SPOUSE IS NOT OBLIGED TO LIVE WITH THE OTHER SPOUSE GUILTY OF INFIDELITY THUS ENTITLED TO
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable
propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable. A husband cannot, by his own
wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful,
illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her
departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder. (Davidas
de Villanueva v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-29951, December 3, 1929)
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF ADULTERY NECESSARILY FORFEITS THE RIGHT OF THE SPOUSE FOR
SUPPORT
The special defense of adultery set up by the defendant in his answer both to the original and the amended
complaint is a good defense, and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action for support. (Quintana v.
Lerma, G.R. No. L-7426, February 5, 1913)
CIVIL STATUS OR JURIDICAL RELATION IS THE BASIS FOR THE ACTION OF SUPPORT IN ALL CASES
ENUMERATED UNDER ARTICLE 143 OF THE FAMILY CODE
It is necessary for the respondent to prove his civil status as the son of the petitioner to claim for support. His
alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in issue for
there is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same
manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. Thus, no effect can be given to a claim
for support until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause. (Francisco v.
Zandueta, G.R. No. L-43794, August 9, 1935)
GENERALLY, ADVANCES MADE BY A STRANGER FOR THE SUPPORT OF ANOTHER ARE RECOVERABLE
FROM THE PERSON BOUND TO GIVE THE SAME
Article 1894 provides: “When without the knowledge of the person who is bound to give support to a dependent,
a stranger supplies it, the latter shall be entitled to recover the same from the former, unless it appears that he
gave it out of charity, and without the expectation of recovering it." For one to recover under said article, it must
be alleged and proved, first, that support has been furnished to a dependent of one bound to give support but who
fails to do so; second, that the support was supplied without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty.
The negative qualification is when the support is given without the expectation of recovering it. (Ramirez v.
Redfern, G.R. No. L-26062, December 31, 1926)
XIV. Parental Authority

A. General Rule: Exercised Jointly
B. Exceptions:
1. Judicial Order to the Contrary
2. Illegitimate Child
3. Parental Preference Rule
4. Rule in Case of Legal Separation
C. Persons exercising Substitute Parental Authority (Art. 216)
D. Persons exercising Special Parental Authority (Art. 218)
E. Kinds of Properties of a Minor
1. Adventitious
2. Profectitious
F. Grounds for Termination and/or Suspension of Parental Authority
1. Emancipation
2. Death
3. Adoption
4. Appointment of Another as General Guardian
5. Judicial Declaration of Abandonment
6. Final Judgment Divesting Parental Authority
a. Excessive harshness
b. Corrupting orders
c. Compelling child to beg
d. Rape
e. Acts of lasciviousness
f. Judicial declaration of incapacity
7. Permanent/Temporary
• Doctrines:
ONLY IN CASE OF DEATH, ABSENCE, OR UNSUITABILITY OF PARENTS MAY SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL
AUTHORITY BE EXERCISED BY GRANDPARENTS
The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only
in cases of adoption, guardianship, and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. The law vests on
the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or
death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents'
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
(Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995)
RIGHT TO THE CUSTODY OF THE CHILD IS INHERENT IN PARENTHOOD
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a
right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or
decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship. (Sagala-Eslao v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997)
SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED IN CASE OF PARENTS’ DEATH, ABSENCE OR
UNSUITABILITY
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In
case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in
case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. (Vancil v. Belmes, G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001)
ASCERTAINING THE WELFARE AND BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is
strong but it is not conclusive as it may be overcome by “compelling reasons.” If a child is over seven, his choice is
paramount but again, the court is not bound by the choice as the court, in its discretion, may find the chosen parent
unfit and award the custody to the other parent or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
(Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995)
BEST INTEREST OF THE MINOR CAN OVERRIDE PROCEDURAL RULES
Best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of the
children. Since in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she
can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce, and give meaning and substance
to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral, and intellectual
development. (Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-68374, June 18, 1985)
SEXUAL PREFERENCE OR MORAL LAXITY ALONE DOES NOT PROVE PARENTAL NEGLECT OR
INCOMPETENCE
Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. To deprive the wife of
custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the
child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care. (Pablo-Gualberto v.
Gualberto, G.R. Nos. 154994 & 156254, June 28, 2005)
LAW EXPLICITLY CONFERS TO THE MOTHER SOLE PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if
she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Even when the parents are estranged
and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged.
Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well
being of the child. (Briones v. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004)
THE ACT OR OMISSION CONSIDERED AS NEGLIGENT MUST BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY FOR
LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 219 OF THE FAMILY CODE
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental
authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident. (St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363,
February 6, 2002)
XV. Emancipation and Age of Majority

A. Reaching 18 Years of Age
B. R.A. No. 6809
XVI. Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code

• Doctrines:
DECISION DECLARING PRESUMPTIVE DEATH IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect
an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code,
supra, are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course
to the Republic's appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
(Republic v. Lorino, G.R. No. 160258, January 19, 2005)
XVII.Funerals
A. Duty and right to make arrangement about funerals is in accordance with right and duty to
support under Art. 199 of the Family Code
B. The funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased
C. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased
1. In the absence of the expressed wishes, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine
2. In case of doubt, the persons in Art. 199 of the Family Code shall decide
D. Any person who disrespects the dead or allows the same shall be liable for damages
E. If the deceased is married, the tombstone or mausoleum is deemed a part of the funeral expense
and chargeable against the community or conjugal partnership property
• Doctrines:
THE LAW CONFINES THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO MAKE FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS TO THE MEMBERS OF
THE FAMILY TO THE EXCLUSION OF ONE'S COMMON LAW PARTNER
The law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of
Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died
has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her
right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to
make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced,
except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. (Valino
v. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014)
XVIII.Cancellation or Correction of Entries
A. R.A. No. 9048

B. Rule 108
C. Grounds
• Doctrines:
CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA MAY BE A GROUND FOR A CHANGE IN “SEX” IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE ENTRY
Respondent undisputedly has [Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)]. This condition causes the early or
"inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too
much androgen, a male hormone. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity
that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. (Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September
12, 2008)
NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO SEX ON THE GROUND OF SEX
REASSIGNMENT
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife)
by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. (Silverio
v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 2, 2007)
XIX. Surname
A. Reason for Interest of State
1. Prevent confusion of identity
2. Prevent use of name for illegal purposes
B. Legal Name: What Appears in Birth Certificate
C. Change: Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
1. Court Approval
2. Grounds
a. Ridiculous, Dishonorable
b. Extreme Difficulty to Pronounce
c. Adoption of Filipino name to remove traces of alienage
d. Legal cause – adoption, et al.
• Doctrines:
A CHANGE OF NAME IS A PRIVILEGE AND NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT
A proper and reasonable cause must exist before a person may be authorized to change his name. In granting
or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound
discretion of the court. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but
a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof,
mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
determination being lodged in the courts. (Gan v. Republic, G.R. No. 207147, September 14, 2016)
ACKNOWLEDGED ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO USE THE SURNAME OF
THEIR ILLEGITIMATE FATHER
Article 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname
of their father or not. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged
illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children. (Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No.
206248, February 18, 2014)
CHANGE OF THE SURNAME OF THE ADOPTEE AS A RESULT OF THE ADOPTION DOES NOT EXTEND TO
CHANGE OF THE FIRST NAME ABSENT LEGAL GROUNDS THEREFOR
The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's
registered Christian or first name. The right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or
as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in
law and consequently cannot be favorably considered. A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of
a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. (Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No.
117209, February 9, 1996)
CONVENIENCE IS NOT A GROUND TO SUPPORT A PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME
Convenience, as a ground to support a petition for change of name is not within the purview of the law as
‘proper and reasonable cause’ to grant the prayer of change of name. (In Re: Petition for Change of Name
and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, G.R. No. 159966,
March 30, 2005)
A CHANGE OF NAME IS NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT BUT OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION, TO BE EXERCISED IN
THE LIGHT OF THE REASONS ADDUCED AND THE CONSEQUENCES THAT WILL FOLLOW; CONGENITAL
ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA (CAH) IS A PROPER GROUND FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine
name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform
with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male. (Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No.
166676, September 12, 2008)
A PERSON’S FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment; rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that
he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October
22, 2007)
THE OBLIGATION OF AN ADOPTED CHILD TO USE THE SURNAME OF THE ADOPTER DOES NOT
PROHIBIT A PETITION TO CHANGE SURNAMES ON VALID GROUNDS; REMOVAL OF IMPRESSION OF
ALIENAGE IS A VALID GROUND TO CHANGE NAME
Although Article 365 of the Civil Code obligates the adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, the law
makes no distinction between natural and adopted children with respect to their right to petition the State
to allow them to use a different surname when there are compelling grounds therefor. Thus, an adopted child
can petition to use a Filipino surname to sincerely erase the impression of alienage caused by the alien
surname of the adopter, when made in good faith and if the change will not cause prejudice to anybody.
(Republic v. Court of Appeals and Wong, G.R. No. 97906, May 21,1992)
D. Rules on what to use
1. Legitimate or Legitimated Children
2. Illegitimate Children
• Doctrines:
A PETITION TO CHANGE THE NAME OF AN INFANT SHOULD BE GRANTED ONLY WHERE TO DO SO
IS CLEARLY FOR THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
“While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction as the petitioner herein shall
principally enjoy the surname of the father, yet, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law,
from taking another surname with the latter’s consent and for justifiable reasons." If under the law a
legitimate child may secure a change of his name through judicial proceedings, upon a showing of a
"proper and reasonable cause", We do not see any reason why a natural child cannot do the same.
(Calderon v. Republic, G.R. No. L-18127, April 5, 1967)
CHANGE OF NAME SHOULD BE DISALLOWED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PROPOSED
CHANGE OF NAME WOULD IN GREAT PROBABILITY CAUSE PREJUDICE OR FUTURE MISCHIEF TO
THE FAMILY WHOSE SURNAME IT IS THAT IS INVOLVED OR TO THE COMMUNITY IN GENERAL
The principle relied on by the lower court remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change
of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is
that is involved or to the community in general. Here, adequate publication of the proceeding has not
elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from
various Government agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State (represented by
the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its realm
for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination,
of Teresita and her witnesses. (Llaneta v. Agrava, G.R. No. L-32054, May 15, 1974)
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, UPON ADOPTION BY HER NATURAL FATHER, MAY USE THE SURNAME
OF HER NATURAL MOTHER AS HER MIDDLE NAME
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that the illegitimate child adopted is entitled
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. (In the Matter of the
Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005)
3. Adopted Child
4. Married Women
a. May retain maiden name
i. May not do so if has been using husband’s surname for a long time
• Doctrines:
ONCE A MARRIED WOMAN OPTED TO ADOPT HER HUSBAND’S SURNAME IN HER PASSPORT, SHE
MAY NOT REVERT TO THE USE OF HER MAIDEN NAME, EXCEPT IN THE CASES ENUMERATED IN
SECTION 5(D) OF RA 8239
These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since
petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement
passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based
only on the severance of the marriage. (Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5,
2010)
5. Marriage Annulled
a. Wife guilty
b. Wife Innocent
6. Legal Separation
7. Death of Husband
8. Persons with Same Names
a. Usurpation of another’s name
• Doctrines:
USURPATION OF NAME UNDER ARTICLE 377 OF THE CIVIL CODE IMPLIES SOME INJURY TO
THE INTERESTS OF THE OWNER OF THE NAME
It consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the owner and the usurper, and exists
when a person designates himself by another name. The elements are as follows: (1) there is an
actual use of another’s name by the defendant; (2) the use is unauthorized; and (3) the use of
another’s name is to designate personality or identify a person. (Dapar v. Biscan, G.R. No. 141880,
September 27, 2004)
XX. Absence
A. Provisional Absence
B. Declaration of Absence
C. Presumption of Death
• Doctrines:
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE MUST BE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF REMARRIAGE
A reading of Article 41 of the Family Code shows that the presumption of death established therein is only
applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. (Tadeo-Matias v.
Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018)
A PETITION WHOSE SOLE OBJECTIVE IS TO DECLARE A PERSON PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD UNDER THE
CIVIL CODE IS NOT A VIABLE SUIT IN OUR JURISDICTION
Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to
presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts. Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare presumptively dead under
either of said articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such actions, there
would be no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor status to be established. (Tadeo-
Matias v. Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018)
D. Reappearance of Absentee
1. Effect on the subsequent marriage of spouse present
2. Effect on the properties

Civ1 4SCDE1920 Doctrines Persons

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Part One – Persons and Family Relations

I. Effect and Application of Laws

II. Human Relations

III. Persons (Art. 37-51)

VI. Voidable Marriage

VII. Legal Separation

IX. Property Relations Between Husband and Wife

XI. Paternity and Filiation

A. Basis: Financial Capacity of Giver, Needs of Recipient

XIV. Parental Authority

XV. Emancipation and Age of Majority

XVI. Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code

XVIII.Cancellation or Correction of Entries

A. R.A. No. 9048

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