ARTICLE 2
Parenthetically, rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of
1. Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985): a the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity.
Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986): We have
come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on
any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. "
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only
to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. An example
is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed
instant naturalization. We hold therefore that all
statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature. Administrative rules and
regulations must a also be published if their purpose
is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also
to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and
those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Accordingly,
even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees
must be published, including even, say, those naming
a public place after a favored individual or exempting
him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The
circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be
published if they are meant not merely to interpret but
to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.
municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but
by the Local Government Code. We agree that
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement.
2. Department of Finance v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No.
209331 (2015): The proviso "unless it is otherwise
provided" refers to an effectivity date other than after
fifteen days following the completion of the law's
publication.12 Thus, it is within the discretion of the
legislature, or the Executive Department in this case,
whether to shorten or extend the fifteen-day period13
as long as there is compliance with the requirement of
publication. Here, Section 9 of EO 140 provides that
the "order shall take effect immediately upon
publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation." EO 140 was published in Manila
Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013.
As such, EO 140 took effect on 17 September 2013.
In addition, the Court already ruled that
"[interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published."14 EO 140 is an internal regulation that
affects primarily the personnel of the DOF and the
BOC. It remains valid even without publication.
3. Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R.
No. 170338 (2008): AThe Senate cannot be allowed
to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or
the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure." The requisite of publication of the
due process.[42] With respect to the present Senate
of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of
half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no
effort was undertaken for the publication of these
rules when they first opened their session.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations,[46] we said:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure"
requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its
rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the
one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are
held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate's
membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may
thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit.
Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the
subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the
14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
3. Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R.
No. 170338 (2008): Respondents justify their non-
observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are
published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate's
internet web page.[49] The Court does not agree. The
absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify
the Senate's defiance of the clear and unambiguous
language of Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. The organic law instructs, without
more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with
duly published rules of procedure, and does not make
any distinction whether or not these rules have
undergone amendments or revision. The
constitutional mandate to publish the said rules
prevails over any custom, practice or tradition
followed by the Senate.
3. Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R.
No. 170338 (2008): Justice Carpio's response to the
same argument raised by the respondents is
illuminating: The publication of the Rules of
Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not
sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of
Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take
effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation," precluding any
other form of publication. Publication in accordance
with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure
put a person's liberty at risk. A person who violates
the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained
by the Senate.
3. Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R.
No. 170338 (2008): Given this discussion, the
respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not,
in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished
rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it
shall have caused the publication of the rules, because
it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."
3. Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R.
No. 170338 (2008): Very recently, the Senate caused
the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the
October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and
Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the
recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the
inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject
thereof still could not be undertaken by the
respondent Senate Committees, because no published
rules governed it, in clear contravention of the
Constitution.
4. Basa vs. Mercado, G.R. No. L-42226 (1935): The
appellants also contend that the trial court erred in
ruling that the weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in
which the notice of hearing was published, was a
newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Pampanga. The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a
newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact
that it is published for the dissemination of local news
and general information; that it has a bona fide
subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is
published at regular intervals and that the trial court
ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan
precisely because it was a "newspaper of general
circulation in the Province of Pampanga."
Furthermore no attempt has been made to prove that
it was a newspaper devoted to the interests or
published for the entertainment of a particular class,
profession, trade, calling, race or religious
denomination. The fact that there is another paper
published in Pampanga that has a few more
subscribers (72 to be exact) and that certain Manila
dailies also have a larger circulation in that province
is unimportant. The law does not require that
publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of
Civil Procedure, should be made in the newspaper
with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a
newspaper of general circulation.
ARTICLE 3
1. Consunji v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873
(2001): There is also no showing that private
respondent knew of the remedies available to her
when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the
contrary, private respondent testified that she was not
aware of her rights. Petitioner, though, argues that
under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the
law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal
system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent
cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in
Floresca allowing a choice of remedies. The
argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is
limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This
may be deduced from the language of the provision,
which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does
not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The
rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a
choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor
prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof
cannot be held against her.
ARTICLE 21
1. Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089 (1964): It
must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to
which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated
with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said
Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage." The record
reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and
defendant applied for a license to contract marriage,
which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations
were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's
trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8).
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl
were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories,
was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts
received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two
days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28
years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating:
"Will have to postpone wedding — My mother
opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest
assured returning soon." But he never returned and
was never heard from again. Surely this is not a case
of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to
be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
2. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals and
Marilou Gonzales, G.R. No. 97336 (1993): The
existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per
se is not an actionable wrong. This notwithstanding,
the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which
is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-
delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. But the
Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of
wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully
sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes,
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following
rule: Art. 21. Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the
forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide
for specifically in the statutes. 21
2. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals and
Marilou Gonzales, G.R. No. 97336 (1993): Thus,
Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code,
Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law
on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. In
the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21,
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause
of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because
of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. In the instant case,
respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he
would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in
with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24
In short, the private respondent surrendered her
virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal
seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article
338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the seduction.
2. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals and
Marilou Gonzales, G.R. No. 97336 (1993): Prior
decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21
may be applied in a breach of promise to marry
where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this
Court denied recovery of damages to the woman
because:. . . we find ourselves unable to say that
petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten (10) years younger
than the complainant — who was around thirty-six
(36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a
former high school teacher and a life insurance agent
are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of
clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this
Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there
had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually
denied because We were not convinced that such
seduction existed. The following enlightening
disquisition and conclusion were made in the said
case: The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked
that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that
in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a
breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded. Over and
above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that
for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-
appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the
idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness
and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of
the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his
embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage,
and would have cut short all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence,
we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of
the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
(U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs.
Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). To constitute seduction there
must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely
from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit.
Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart
from the path of virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to
have and do have that effect, and which result in her
person to ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
2. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals and
Marilou Gonzales, G.R. No. 97336 (1993): (In
other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry,
and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a
chance that there was criminal or moral seduction,
hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it
be the other way around, there can be no recovery of
moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened). . . . But so long as there is fraud, which is
characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The
court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it
is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a
girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as
to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so
long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury,
there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law and there should
have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal
case for that reason.
2. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals and
Marilou Gonzales, G.R. No. 97336 (1993): It is
clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic,
regard for the private respondent on account of the
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background,
poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. Obviously then, from the very
beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and
an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred
to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to
marry were empty words directly intended to fool,
dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman
into believing that indeed, he loved her and would
want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but
pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love
and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy
a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated
the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied
the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.
It can even be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of
the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations. No foreigner must be
allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
traditions.
ARTICLE 22
1. Republic v. Judge Ballocanag and Danilo Reyes,
G.R. No. 163794 (2008): We are disposed to agree
with the CA that Reyes was a planter in good faith.
Reyes was of the belief that he was the owner of the
subject land; in fact, a TCT over the property was
issued in his name. He tilled the land, planted fruit
trees thereon, and invested money from 1970. He
received notice of the Republic's claim only when the
reversion case was filed on May 13, 1987. The trees
are now full-grown and fruit-bearing. To order Reyes
to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in
favor of the State -- because the decision in the
reversion case declaring that the land is part of
inalienable forest land and belongs to the State is
already final and immutable -- would inequitably
result in unjust enrichment of the State at the expense
of Reyes, a planter in good faith. Nemo cum alterius
detrimento locupletari potest.28 This basic doctrine
on unjust enrichment simply means that a person
shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at another's expense.29 There is unjust
enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit
to the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience.30
Article 22 of the Civil Code states the rule in this
wise: … The requisites for the application of this
doctrine are present in the instant case. There is
enrichment on the part of the petitioner, as the State
would come into possession of -- and may technically
appropriate -- the more than one thousand fruit-
bearing trees planted by the private respondent. There
is impoverishment on the part of Reyes, because he
stands to lose the improvements he had painstakingly
planted and invested in. There is lack of valid cause
for the State to acquire these improvements, because,
as discussed above, Reyes introduced the
improvements in good faith. Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not commit any error in ruling that Reyes
is entitled to the benefits of Articles 448 and 546 of
the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 26
1. Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736
(June 2013): The right to privacy is the right to be let
alone. The right to privacy is enshrined in our
Constitution[44] and in our laws. It is defined as “the
right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of
one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
person’s ordinary sensibilities.” It is the right of an
individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or
to live without unwarranted interference by the public
in matters in which the public is not necessarily
concerned.”[46] Simply put, the right to privacy is
“the right to be let alone.”[47] The Bill of Rights
guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects
them against the State’s abuse of power. In this
regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to
be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State,
except “in case of overriding social need and then
only under the stringent procedural safeguards,” can
disturb them in the privacy of their homes.[48]
1. Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736
(June 2013): The right to privacy under Article 26(1)
of the Civil Code covers business offices where the
public are excluded therefrom and only certain
individuals are allowed to enter. Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an
individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal
remedy against abuses that may be committed against
him by other individuals. This provision recognizes
that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to
privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others.
It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or
peering inquisitively into the residence of another
without the consent of the latter.”[49]
1. Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736
(June 2013): The phrase “prying into the privacy of
another’s residence,” however, does not mean that
only the residence is entitled to privacy. As
elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:
Our Code specifically mentions “prying into the
privacy of another’s residence.” This does not mean,
however, that only the residence is entitled to
privacy, because the law covers also “similar acts.”
A business office is entitled to the same privacy when
the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x
x[50] (Emphasis supplied) Thus, an individual’s
right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
should not be confined to his house or residence as it
may extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase
“prying into the privacy of another’s residence,”
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations
which an individual considers as private. And as
long as his right is recognized by society, other
individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
1. Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736
(June 2013): The “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test is used to determine whether there is a
violation of the right to privacy. In ascertaining
whether there is a violation of the right to privacy,
courts use the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
test. This test determines whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the
expectation has been violated.[51] In Ople v. Torres,
[52] we enunciated that “the reasonableness of a
person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-
part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual
has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this
expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable.” Customs, community norms, and
practices may, therefore, limit or extend an
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”[53]
Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation
of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis
since it depends on the factual circumstances
surrounding the case.[54]
1. Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., G.R. No. 179736
(June 2013): In this day and age, video surveillance
cameras are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation of
these cameras, however, should not cover places
where there is reasonable expectation of privacy,
unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should
these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of
another’s residence or business office as it would be
no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime
under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law. In this case, the RTC, in granting
the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:
"After careful consideration, there is basis to grant
the application for a temporary restraining order. The
operation by [respondents] of a revolving camera,
even if it were mounted on their building, violated the
right of privacy of [petitioners], who are the owners
of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus
on [respondents’] property or the roof of the factory
at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.)
but it actually spans through a good portion of [the]
land of [petitioners]" …. The RTC, thus, considered
that petitioners have a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” in their property, whether they use it as a
business office or as a residence and that the
installation of video surveillance cameras directly
facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant
portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear
violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the
issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified.
ARTICLE 41
1. Quimiging v. Icao, G.R. No. 26795 (31
July 1970): A conceived child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of
its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right
to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed
admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss),
even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;"
just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may
receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the
same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his
testament may result in preterition of a forced heir
that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir,
even if such child should be born after the death of
the testator Article 854, Civil Code). It is thus clear
that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the
Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children "does not
contemplate support to children as yet unborn,"
violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a
condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article
291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the
conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus
be alive at the time it is completely delivered from
the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a
condition precedent to the right of the conceived
child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would
become entirely useless and ineffective.
2. Geluz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
16439 (20 July 1961): It is the third and last abortion
that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action
and award of damages. Upon application of the
defendant Geluz we granted certiorari. The Court of
Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of
damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions
of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error,
for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of
P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover
the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with
personality. Since an action for pecuniary damages
on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no
action for such damages could be instituted on behalf
of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause
of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since
no transmission to anyone can take place from on that
lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to
invoke the provisional personality of a conceived
child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of
the Civil Code, because that same article expressly
limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born
alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb. The prevailing
American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is
generally held that recovery can not had for the death
of an unborn child.
Geluz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-16439 (20
July 1961): This is not to say that the parents are not
entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them,
as distinguished from the injury or violation of the
rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical
integrity. Because the parents can not expect either
help, support or services from an unborn child, they
would normally be limited to moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes
hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ.
Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if
the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230).
But in the case before us, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an
award of moral damages, evidently because the
appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of
his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration
of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court
expressly found, and the majority opinion of the
Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the
appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the
first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the
event, he appeared to have taken no steps to
investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure
the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even
after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does
not seem to have taken interest in the administrative
and criminal cases against the appellant. His only
concern appears to have been directed at obtaining
from the doctor a large money payment, since he
sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00
attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
Article 43.
1. Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil 257, G.R. No.
L-5426 (29 May 1953): Most provisions, as their
language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute
for lacks and so are not to be available when there are
facts. With particular reference to … "the situation
which it present is one in which the facts are not only
unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no
specific evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it
is assumed that no evidence can be produced." It is
manifest …that the evidence of the survivorship need
not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or
inferential. Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be
made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule
of preponderance of evidence controls.
ARTICLE 1.
1. PT&T v. NLRC and Grace de Guzman,
G.R. No. 118978 (1997): In the case at bar,
petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the
right against, discrimination, afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it
dismissed private respondent from employment on
account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly
that her ties with the company were dissolved
principally because of the company’s policy that
married women are not qualified for employment in
PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts
of dishonesty. That it was so can easily be seen from
the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia
M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company,
with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that
“you’re fully aware that the company is not accepting
married women employee (sic), as it was verbally
instructed to you.”[21] Again, in the termination notice
sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private
respondent was made to understand that her
severance from the service was not only by reason of
her concealment of her married status but, over and
on top of that, was her violation of the company’s
policy against marriage (“and even told you that
married women employees are not applicable [sic] or
accepted in our company.”)[22] Parenthetically, this
seems to be the curious reason why it was made to
appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was
represented in this case only by its said supervisor
and not by its highest ranking officers who would
otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation. [23]
Verily, private respondent’s act of concealing the true
nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly
characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was
moved to act the way she did mainly because she
wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company.
In other words, she was practically forced by that
very same illegal company policy into
misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being
disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a
just cause for termination of employment, it should
not be simulated.[24] It must rest on an actual breach
of duty committed by the employee and not on the
employer’s caprices.[25] Furthermore, it should never
be used as a subterfuge for causes which are
improper, illegal, or unjustified.[26]
1. PT&T v. NLRC and Grace de Guzman,
G.R. No. 118978 (1997): Under American
jurisprudence, job requirements which establish
employer preference or conditions relating to the
marital status of an employee are categorized as a
“sex-plus” discrimination where it is imposed on one
sex and not on the other. Further, the same should be
evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on
a racial or sexual group which is protected by federal
job discrimination laws. Further, it is not relevant that
the rule is not directed against all women but just
against married women. And, where the employer
discriminates against married women, but not against
married men, the variable is sex and the
discrimination is unlawful.[36] Upon the other hand, a
requirement that a woman employee must remain
unmarried could be justified as a “bona fide
occupational qualification,” or BFOQ, where the
particular requirements of the job would justify the
same, but not on the ground of a general principle,
such as the desirability of spreading work in the
workplace. A requirement of that nature would be
valid provided it reflects an inherent quality
reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule
applicable to both male and female flight attendants,
was regarded as unlawful since the restriction was not
related to the job performance of the flight attendants.
[37]
2. Duncan and Tecson v. Glaxo, G.R. No. 162994
(2005): aNo reversible error can be ascribed to the
Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxo’s policy
prohibiting an employee from having a relationship
with an employee of a competitor company is a valid
exercise of management prerogative. Glaxo has a
right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential
programs and information from competitors,
especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in
the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry. The
prohibition against personal or marital relationships
with employees of competitor companies upon
Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature
might compromise the interests of the company. In
laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only
aims to protect its interests against the possibility that
a competitor company will gain access to its secrets
and procedures. That Glaxo possesses the right to
protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the right of
enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to
protect its right to reasonable returns on investments
and to expansion and growth.[20] Indeed, while our
laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy
on social justice and the protection of labor, it does
not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in
favor of the workers.
As held in a Georgia, U.S.A case,[22] it is a
legitimate business practice to guard business
confidentiality and protect a competitive position by
even-handedly disqualifying from jobs male and
female applicants or employees who are married to a
competitor. Consequently, the court ruled than an
employer that discharged an employee who was
married to an employee of an active competitor did
not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
[23] The Court pointed out that the policy was
applied to men and women equally, and noted that
the employer’s business was highly competitive and
that gaining inside information would constitute a
competitive advantage.
2. Duncan and Tecson v. Glaxo, G.R. No. 162994
(2005): Significantly, the company actually enforced
the policy after repeated requests to the employee to
comply with the policy. Indeed, the application of
the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed
manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual
provision and the policy in its employee handbook,
it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute
prohibition against relationships between its
employees and those of competitor companies. Its
employees are free to cultivate relationships with and
marry persons of their own choosing. What the
company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of
interest between the employee and the company that
may arise out of such relationships. As succinctly
explained by the appellate court, thus: The policy
being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An
employee of the company remains free to marry
anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not
aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that
belongs only to the individual. However, an
employee’s personal decision does not detract the
employer from exercising management prerogatives
to ensure maximum profit and business success. . .
[28]
3. Star Paper v. Simbol, Comia and Estrella, G.R.
No. 164774 (2006): We do not find a reasonable
business necessity in the case at bar. It is significant
to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired
after they were found fit for the job, but were asked
to resign when they married a co-employee.
Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of
Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma
Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section,
could be detrimental to its business operations.
Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment
will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a
Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who
married Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-
machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear
that employees married to each other will be less
efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without
valid justification, the employer can create policies
based on an unproven presumption of a perceived
danger at the expense of an employee's right to
security of tenure. Petitioners contend that their
policy will apply only when one employee marries a
co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other
than co-employees. The questioned policy may not
facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it
creates a disproportionate effect and under the
disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass
judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable
despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate,
effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate
business concern in imposing the questioned policy
cannot prejudice the employee's right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of
married persons working together in one company.
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting
marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot
benefit the petitioners. Thus, for failure of petitioners
to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business
necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an
invalid exercise of management prerogative.
3. Star Paper v. Simbol, Comia and Estrella, G.R.
No. 164774 (2006): We note that since the finding of
a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an
employer's no-spouse rule, the exception is
interpreted strictly and narrowly by these state courts.
There must be a compelling business necessity for
which no alternative exists other than the
discriminatory practice.[32] To justify a bona fide
occupational qualification, the employer must prove
two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job
involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons meeting
the qualification would be unable to properly perform
the duties of the job.[33]
ARTICLE 2.
1. Rommel Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No.
174689 (2007): Under the Civil Register Law, a birth
certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a
person is determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a person’s sex made at the time
of his or her birth, if not attended by error,[30] is
immutable.[31]
1. Rommel Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No.
174689 (2007): The trial court opined that its grant of
the petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the
petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to
anyone. This is wrong. The changes sought by
petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. First, even the trial
court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s
first step towards his eventual marriage to his male
fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred
social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman.[37] One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.
[38] To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union
of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which
apply particularly to women such as the provisions of
the Labor Code on employment of women,[39]
certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code[40]
and the presumption of survivorship in case of
calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,[41]
among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to
be granted.
2. Republic v. Jennifer Cagandahan, G.R. No.
166676 (2008): a Biologically, nature endowed
respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition. Respondent has
female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent's
body system naturally produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has
ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a
male. Ultimately, we are of the view that where the
person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks
of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a
male and considering that his body produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen) there is
preponderant biological support for considering him
as being male. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Respondent
here has simply let nature take its course and has not
taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what
he was born with. And accordingly, he has already
ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could
have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking
lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the
categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose
not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course
in respondent's development to reveal more fully his
male characteristics. In the absence of a law on the
matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one's
sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on
whether or not to undergo medical treatment to
reverse the male tendency due to CAH. Respondent is
the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy.
Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of
what courses of action to take along the path of his
sexual development and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an "incompetent"[27] and
in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under
the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondent's position and his personal judgment of
being a male. In other words, we respect respondent's
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person.
3. Republic v. Liberty Albios, G.R. No.
198780 (2013): Respondent’s marriage not void.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must
be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be
real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud,
force, intimidation, and undue influence.[24] Consent
must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently understanding
the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act.[25] Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication,
drugs, or hypnotism.[26]
3. Republic v. Liberty Albios, G.R. No.
198780 (2013): Based on the above, consent was not
lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their
consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a
real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish
their goal.
3. Republic v. Liberty Albios, G.R. No. 198780
(2013): In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for
lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a
pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as
a joke, with no real intention of entering into the
actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be
bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.[27]
It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and
with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages
in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of
consent. There is no genuine consent because the
parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in
any way or for any purpose. The respondent’s
marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.
Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be
bound in order to create the very bond necessary to
allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a
valid marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to
enter into the actual marriage status and to create a
legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine
consent was, therefore, clearly present.
3. Republic v. Liberty Albios, G.R. No. 198780
(2013): The avowed purpose of marriage under
Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility
that the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law . A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided
by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void
if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition
of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the
essential and formal requisites precribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
[28]
3. Republic v. Liberty Albios, G.R. No.
198780 (2013): Motives for entering into a marriage
are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and
would raise serious constitutional questions.[29] The
right to marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see
fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or
no children, to love one another or not, and so on.[30]
Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes,
limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided
that they comply with all the legal requisites,[31] are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in
a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law,
may validly support a marriage. Although the Court
views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize
marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the
marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for
the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio
and continues to be valid and subsisting. The Cout1
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the
parties fail to quality for immigration benefits, after
they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no
further use for it. Albios already misused a judicial
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience;
she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get
herself out of an inconvenient situation.
4. Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz v. Brent
Hospital and Colleges, Inc., G.R. No. 187417 (24
February 2016): Marriage as a condition for
Reinstatement The doctrine of management
prerogative gives an employer the right to "regulate,
according to his own discretion and judgment, all
aspects of employment, including hiring, work
assignments, working methods, the time, place and
manner of work, work supervision, transfer of
employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline,
dismissal, and recall of employees."48 In this case,
Brent imposed on Cadiz the condition that she
subsequently contract marriage with her then
boyfriend for her to be reinstated. According to
Brent, this is "in consonance with the policy against
encouraging illicit or common-law relations that
would subvert the sacrament of marriage."49
Statutory law is replete with legislation protecting
labor and promoting equal opportunity in
employment. The Labor Code of the Philippines,
meanwhile, provides:" Art. 136. Stipulation against
marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation
of employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon
getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of her marriage."
With particular regard to women, Republic Act No.
9710 or the Magna Carta of Women51 protects
women against discrimination in all matters relating
to marriage and family relations, including the right
to choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage
only with their free and full consent.52 Weighed
against these safeguards, it becomes apparent that
Brent's condition is coercive, oppressive and
discriminatory. There is no rhyme or reason for
it.1âwphi1 It forces Cadiz to marry for economic
reasons and deprives her of the freedom to choose her
status, which is a privilege that inheres in her as an
intangible and inalienable right. 53 While a marriage
or no-marriage qualification may be justified as a
"bona fide occupational qualification," Brent must
prove two factors necessitating its imposition, viz: (1)
that the employment qualification is reasonably
related to the essential operation of the job involved;
and (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that
all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the
duties of the job.54 Brent has not shown the presence
of neither of these factors. Perforce, the Court cannot
uphold the validity of said condition.
******ARTICLE 4. ****
1. Syed Azhar Abbas v. Gloria Goo Abbas,
G.R. No. 183896 (2013): Respondent Gloria failed to
present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof,
and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of
said license. To prove that no such license was
issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he
requested certification that no such license was
issued. The Court held in that case that the
certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed
probative value, as his duty was to maintain records
of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect
that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was
issued, and that the serial number of the marriage
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of
Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which
was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the
names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
document.
1. Syed Azhar Abbas v. Gloria Goo Abbas,
G.R. No. 183896 (2013): In reversing the RTC, the
CA focused on the wording of the certification,
stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. The CA deduced that from
the absence of the words “despite diligent search” in
the certification, and since the certification used
stated that no marriage license appears to have been
issued, no diligent search had been conducted and
thus the certification could not be given probative
value. To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals.[45] It is worth
noting that in that particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a
marriage license was lacking, relied on the
Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
which merely stated that the alleged marriage license
could not be located as the same did not appear in
their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical
declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court to apply. Under Sec. 3(m),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to
the contrary. We held, “The presumption of regularity
of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.”[46] No such affirmative evidence was shown
that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their
office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof
does exist of a diligent search having been conducted,
as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located
and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in
said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and
Syed does not overturn the presumption that the
registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of
her office.
1. Syed Azhar Abbas v. Gloria Goo Abbas,
G.R. No. 183896 (2013): In the case of Cariño v.
Cariño,[47] following the case of Republic,[48] it
was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of
said license. The case of Cariño further held that the
presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had
been overcome, and that it became the burden of the
party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the
marriage was valid, and that the required marriage
license had been secured.[49] Gloria has failed to
discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that
can be reached is that no valid marriage license was
issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple
irregularity in the marriage license that would not
affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was
presented by the respondent. No marriage license was
proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based
on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a
copy of the alleged marriage license.
1. Syed Azhar Abbas v. Gloria Goo Abbas, G.R.
No. 183896 (2013): As to the motive of Syed in
seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well
be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to
evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does
not make up for the failure of the respondent to
prove that they had a valid marriage license, given
the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The
lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed
to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure
the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
2. Sally Go-Bangayan v. Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.,
G.R. No. 201061 (2013): At the time Benjamin and
Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March
1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
was valid and subsisting. On the purported marriage
of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros),
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros
confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100
to 6648150 were issued for the month of February
1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match
the series issued for the month. Oliveros further
testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did
not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin
and Sally. The certification from the local civil
registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value,
being issued by the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.[11] Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and
Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage
was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license.[12]
2. Sally Go-Bangayan v. Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.,
G.R. No. 201061 (2013): It was also established
before the trial court that the purported marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with
the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B.
Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;
[13] Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives
Division of the Records Management and Archives
Office, National Commission for Culture and the
Arts;[14] and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil
Registration Department of the National Statistics
Office.[15] The documentary and testimonial
evidence proved that there was no marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court,
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally “was made
only in jest”[16] and “a simulated marriage, at the
instance of [Sally], intended to cover her up from
expected social humiliation coming from relatives,
friends and the society especially from her parents
seen as Chinese conservatives.”[17] In short, it was a
fictitious marriage. The fact that Benjamin was the
informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and
Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin
was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which
stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 1982[18] while Sally was the informant in
Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.
[19] Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on
7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected
on the birth certificates.
2. Sally Go-Bangayan v. Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.,
G.R. No. 201061 (2013): Under Article 35 of the
Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34 where no
license is necessary, “shall be void from the
beginning.” In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage
license was issued to them and that Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license
numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig
City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly
falls under Section 3 of Article 35[20] which made
their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying
the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and
void from the beginning.”[21] Thus, the Court of
Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s
ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
2. Sally Go-Bangayan v. Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.,
G.R. No. 201061 (2013): On whether or not the
parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage
is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former
marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of
the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one
that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary
and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on
the face of their marriage contract. However, if the
second marriage was void not because of the
existence of the first marriage but for other causes
such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G.,
4079], it was held that what was committed was
contracting marriage against the provisions of laws
not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised
Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the
parties is therefore not bigamous because there
was no marriage license. The daring and repeated
stand of respondent that she is legally married to
petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained.
2. Sally Go-Bangayan v. Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.,
G.R. No. 201061 (2013): For bigamy to exist, the
second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was
really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally
just signed a purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage.
3. Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the Philippines
and Veronica B. Kho, G.R. No. 187462 (2016): On
the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former
Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the
absence of the subject marriage license. The Court
agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be
resolved as the evidence is clearly in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.
[18] There, it was held that the certification of the
Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record
of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-
issuance of said license.[19] As stated above,
petitioner was able to present a Certification issued
by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage
license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho
[petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent]
whose marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972."[21]
Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed
validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent
has been overcome and it becomes the burden of
respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is
she who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC,
respondent was not able to discharge that burden.
3. Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the
Philippines and Veronica B. Kho, G.R. No. 187462
(2016): It is telling that respondent failed to present
their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage[22]
issued by the officiating priest does not contain any
entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent
could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract
from the National Archives and Records Section,
where information regarding the marriage license,
i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be
obtained. However, she also failed to do so. The
Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement
with petitioner's observation that the statements of the
witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent
herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony
was conducted but neither one of them testified that a
marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and
respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical
claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a
marriage license, she failed to present evidence to
prove such allegation. Based on the Certification
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to
produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of
any evidence to show that such license was ever
issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that
no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued.
3. Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the Philippines
and Veronica B. Kho, G.R. No. 187462 (2016): As
to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG
further argues that, on the basis of this Court's ruling
in Sevilla v. Cardenas,[24] the certification issued by
the local civil registrar, which attests to the absence
in its records of a marriage license, must categorically
state that the document does not exist in the said
office despite diligent search. However, in Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court
considered the certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar as a certification of due search and inability
to find the record or entry sought by the parties
despite the absence of a categorical statement that
"such document does not exist in their records
despite diligent search." The Court, citing Section
28,[26] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the
certification of due search and inability to find a
record or entry as to the purported marriage license,
issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value.
Based on said certification, the Court held that there
is absence of a marriage license that would render the
marriage void ab initio. Moreover, as discussed in the
abovestated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,[27]
this Court considered the marriage of the petitioner
and her deceased husband as void ab initio as the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their
office has no record of such marriage license. The
court held that the certification issued by the local
civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license.
3. Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the Philippines
and Veronica B. Kho, G.R. No. 187462 (2016):
Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the
officer involved conducted a diligent search. In this
respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court does not require a categorical
statement to this effect. From these cases, it can be
deduced that to be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties.[32] Indeed, all the evidence cited by the
CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted
and a marriage contract was signed does not operate
to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.[33]
4. Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406 (2016),
LEONEN: The prosecution allegedly fails to prove
the validity of his first marriage with Gina because
the civil registrar of the municipality where they were
married had no record of the marriage license
allegedly issued in their favor. Contrary to petitioner's
claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this
case. Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when
he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly
convicted him of the crime charged. Based on the
marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner's
first marriage was solemnized on July 17, 1987. This
was before the Family Code of the Philippines
became effective on August 3, 1988.[35]
Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines[36] govern the validity of his first
marriage. Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the
requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which
renders the marriage void from the beginning:[37 (4)
A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character." The fourth requisite—the
marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar
of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides.[38]
4. Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406 (2016),
LEONEN: To prove that a marriage was solemnized
without a marriage license, "the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported
by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties."[40]
Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:
"[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry
Book on Application for Marriage License and
License Issuance available in this office, no record
could be found on the alleged issuance of this office
of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR.
NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M.
GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987." This Certification
does not prove that petitioner's first marriage was
solemnized without a marriage license. It does not
categorically state that Marriage License No.
8683519 does not exist.[42]
4. Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406 (2016),
LEONEN Moreover, petitioner admitted the
authenticity of his signature appearing on the
marriage contract between him and his first wife,
Gina.[43] The marriage contract between petitioner
and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the
existence of petitioner's first marriage.[44] This
"should be given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of
the marriage[.]"[45] Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Castro[46] was originally an action for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage.[47] As part of its
evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that
states that the marriage license "cannot be located as
said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil
registrar's] records."[48] This court held that "[t]he
certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local
civil registrar] being the officer charged under the
law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license."[49] This court further
said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, a certificate of 'due search and
inability to find' sufficiently proved that [the local
civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . .
to the contracting parties."[50]
4. Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406 (2016),
LEONEN The circumstances in Castro and in this
case are different. Castro involved a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage that does not
involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification
in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy
involved. On the other hand, the present case
involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our
mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the
Certification having been issued to Norberto for
him to evade conviction for bigamy. The
appreciation of the probative value of the certification
cannot be divorced from the purpose of its
presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the
context of the presentation of the certification in
relation to the other evidence presented in the case.
We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a
certification that a marriage license cannot be found
may substitute for a definite statement that no such
license existed or was issued. That the license now
cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could
not have been issued. A different view would
undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as
marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses may be
conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration.
The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the
benefit is to evade prosecution.
4. Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406 (2016),
LEONEN This case is likewise different from
Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño. In Cariño,[51] the
marriage contract between Santiago Cariño and his
first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license
number.[52] In addition, the local civil registrar
certified that it has no record of any marriage license
issued to Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.[53]
This court declared Santiago Cariño's first marriage
void for having been solemnized without a marriage
license.[54] In this case, there is a marriage contract
indicating the presence of a marriage license number
freely and voluntarily signed and attested to by the
parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing
officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17,
1987. The second marriage was entered into on
December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years,
four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner
did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
his first marriage. Even while the bigamy case was
pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as
spurious was presented. In other words, petitioner's
belief that there was no marriage license is rendered
untrue by his own actuations.
4. Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406 (2016),
LEONEN This factual context makes the use and
issuance of the Certification from the Office of the
Civil Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove
that despite the existence of a valid first marriage,
petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or
subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage
contract with proof of its authenticity and due
execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists.
The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to the
defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the
civil registrar that the marriage license cannot be
found is not enough to discharge the burden of
proving that no such marriage license was issued. The
parties clearly identified Marriage License No.
8683519 in the marriage contract.[55] There is no
evidence to show that the number series of that
license is spurious or is not likely to have been issued
from its source. There is no proof as to whether the
licenses issued before or after the document in
question still exists in the custody of the civil
registrar. There is no evidence that relates to the
procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents.
This would have shown whether there was unfettered
access to the originals of the license and, therefore,
would have contributed to the proper judicial
conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil
registrar implies.
4. Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406 (2016),
LEONEN However, even the conclusion of good
faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage
contract duly executed by petitioner and his first
spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The
marriage contract is in the custody of the civil
registrar. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions by a public officer
should likewise be applicable to infer a conclusion
that the marriage license mentioned in that contract
exists. Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to
a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a
deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched
conclusion—although this is not always the case—
that a well-connected accused will use all means, fair
or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases
can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of
which is within the discretion of a government
employee. The temptations for the employee to issue
a document, which may be accurate but which he
knows the accused will be able to use for a different
purpose, can easily be created by an accused. Much
of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how
the trial court judge evaluates the demeanor of the
witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as much as
to make our own judgment based on evidence
conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial court.
Using both, we have no reason to disturb the
conclusions of the trial court.
ARTICLE 7
1. Keuppers v. Murcia, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860,
(2018): a We hold and find respondent Judge guilty
of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for solemnizing the
marriage of the complainant and her husband outside
his territorial jurisdiction, and in the office premises
of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City. Such
place of solemnization was a blatant violation of
Article 7 of the Family Code, which pertinently
provides: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction" Furthermore, in
solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her
husband in the office premises of the DLS Tour and
Travel in Davao City despite the foregoing provision
of the Family Code, respondent Judge flagrantly
violated the spirit of the law. Article 8 of the Family
Code disallows solemnizing the marriage in a venue
other than the judge's courtroom or chambers, viz.:
Respondent Judge's explanation of having done so
only out of pity for the complainant after she had
supposedly claimed that her German fiancé was soon
returning to Germany and wanted to bring with him
the certified copy of the marriage certificate did not
diminish his liability, but instead highlighted his
dismissive and cavalier attitude towards express
statutory requirements instituted to secure the
solemnization of marriages from abuse. By agreeing
to solemnize the marriage outside of his territorial
jurisdiction and at a place that had nothing to do with
the performance of his duties as a Municipal Trial
Judge, he demeaned and cheapened the inviolable
social institution of marriage. Article 8 of the Family
Code contains the limiting phrase and not elsewhere,
which emphasizes that the place of the solemnization
of the marriage by a judge like him should only be in
his office or courtroom. Indeed, the limiting phrase
highlighted the nature and status of the marriage of
the complainant and her husband as "a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman," and as "the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation."7 The only exceptions to
the limitation are when the marriage was to be
contracted on the point of death of one or both of the
complainant and her husband, or in a remote place in
accordance with Article 29 of the Family Code,8 or
where both of the complainant and her husband had
requested him as the solemnizing officer in writing to
solemnize the marriage at a house or place designated
by them in their sworn statement to that effect. The
recommendation did not take into account that the
present charge was the second offense respondent
Judge committed in relation to his office of
solemnizing marriages. Given that the charge was
committed with a wilful intent to violate the letter and
the spirit of Article 7 and Article 8 of the Family
Code, and to flagrantly disregard the relevant rules
for the solemnization of marriages set by the Family
Code, the proper penalty was dismissal from the
service.
ARTICLE 21
2. Grace Garcia v. Rederick Recio, G.R. No. 138322
(2001)
ARTICLE 23
2. Simplicia Cercado-Siga and Ligaya Cercado-
Belison v. Vicente Cercado, Sr., et. al., G.R. No.
185374 (2015): In support of the existence of the
alleged first marriage, petitioners presented a copy of
the Contrato Matrimonial. There is no dispute that
said marriage contract was issued by Iglesia Filipina
Independiente church. The Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that it is a private document. As early as in the
case of U.S. v. Evangelista, it has been settled that
church registries of births, marriages, and deaths
made subsequent to the promulgation of General
Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no
longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly
authorized public officials. They are private writings
and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are
all other private writings in accordance with the rules
of evidence.
ARTICLE 26
6. Pastor Tenchavez v. Vicenta Escano, G.R. No.
L-19671 (1965): It is equally clear from the record
that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and
Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved
under Philippine Law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on
21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District
Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character". At the time the divorce decree was issued,
Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.[4] She was then subject to
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines (Republic Act No. 386), already in
force at the time, expressly provided: "Laws relating to
family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of person are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad." The Civil Code of the
Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute
divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact it
does not even use that term, to further emphasize its
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the
preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce
on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of
the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the
present Civil Code only provides for legal separation
(Title IV, Book K, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that
case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds
shall not be severed" (Art 106, subpar. 1). For the
Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or
effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the
declared public policy of the state, specially in view
of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code
that prescribes the following: "Prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country".
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction
to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give
rise to an irritating and scandalous decimation in
favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those
members of our polity whose means do not permit
them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces
outside the Philippines.
6. Pastor Tenchavez v. Vicenta Escano, G.R. No.
L-19671 (1965): From this point of view, it is
irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should
have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily
because the policy of our law can not be nullified by
acts of private parties (Civil Code, Art. 17, am qout.);
and additionally, because the mere appearance of a
non-resident consort can not confer jurisdiction
where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier,
86 Phil. 579). From the preceding facts and
considerations, there flows as a necessary
consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicente Escaño's
divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent
and undisolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal
to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of
consortium and her desertion of her husband
constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault,
for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
unsubstantiated charge of deceit, nor an anonymous
letter charging immorality against the husband
constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with
Russell Leo Moran is technically "inter-course with a
person not her husband" from the standpoint of
Philippine law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our
law, on the basis of adultery (Revised Penal Code,
Art. 333).
7. Rebecca Bayot v. Court of Appeals and Vicente
Bayot, G.R. No. 155635/163979 (2008)
8. Gerbert Corpuz v. Daisylyn Sto. Tomas and the
Solicitor General, G.R. No. 186571 (2010)
9. David A. Noveras v. Leticia T. Noveras, G.R.
No. 188289 (2014): At the outset, the trial court erred
in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the
bond of marriage between the parties. The
requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree
and the national law of the foreigner must comply
with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for
Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25,
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.[15] Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record
of public documents of a sovereign authority or
tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication
thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such official publication or
copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting
officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate
may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be,
and must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer. Section 25 of the same Rule states that
whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state,
in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk
of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
9. David A. Noveras v. Leticia T. Noveras, G.R.
No. 188289 (2014): Based on the records, only the
divorce decree was presented in evidence. The
required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well
as the pertinent California law on divorce were not
presented. It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of
Appeals,[16] we relaxed the requirement on
certification where we held that “[petitioner therein]
was clearly an American citizen when she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in
any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a
copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by
the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient.” In this case however, it appears that there
is no seal from the office where the divorce decree
was obtained. Even if we apply the doctrine of
processual presumption[17] as the lower courts did
with respect to the property regime of the parties, the
recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter
because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized
between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a
valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that
the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.
10. Republic v. Marelyn Manalo, G.R. 221029
(24 April 2018)
ARTICLE 34
1. OCA v. Judge Necessario, et. al., A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1691 (2013): Fourth, Judges Necessario,
Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross
ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family
Code[119] with respect to the marriages they
solemnized where legal impediments existed during
cohabitation such as the minority status of one party.
[120] The audit team cites in their Supplemental
Report that there were parties whose ages ranged
from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who
were married by mere submission of a pro forma joint
affidavit of cohabitation.[121]These affidavits were
notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.
[122]
1. OCA v. Judge Necessario, et. al., A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1691 (2013): The Court does not accept the
arguments of the respondent judges that the
ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license
is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing
officer especially when there are glaring pieces of
evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly
observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity
accorded to a marriage license disappears the moment
the marriage documents do not appear regular on its
face. This Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas,[125]
that “the presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.” The visible
superimpositions on the marriage licenses should
have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity
of the issuance.
1. OCA v. Judge Necessario, et. al., A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1691 (2013): The judges’ gross ignorance
of the law is also evident when they solemnized
marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code
without the required qualifications and with the
existence of legal impediments such as minority of a
party. Marriages of exceptional character such as
those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the
formal requisite of a marriage license.[126] Under the
rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a
general rule should be strictly but reasonably
construed. The affidavits of cohabitation should not
be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view
of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The
five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a
perfect union valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. The parties should have been capacitated
to marry each other during the entire period and
not only at the time of the marriage.
Article 35
1. People v. Edgardo Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566
(2013)
2. Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, et. al. v. Ma. Lourdes
Belen for and in behalf of Ma. Lourdes Elise
Quiazon, G.R. No. 189121 (2013)
3. Renato Castillo v. Lea Castillo (2016)
Article 36
1. Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos, G.R. No. 112019 (1995)
2. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Roridel
Molina G.R. No. 108763 (1997)

3. Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793 (2009)
4. Ma. Socorro Camacho-Reyes v. Ramon
Reyes, G.R. No. 185286 (18 August 2010)
5. Danilo Aurelio v. Vida Ma. Corazon
Aurelio, G.R. No. 175367 (6 June 2011)
6. Republic v. Nestor Galang, G.R. No. 168335
(2011)
7. Republic v. Cesar Encelan, G.R. No. 170022
(2013)
8. Valerio E. Kalaw v. Ma. Elena Fernandez
(“Malyn”), G.R. No. 166357 (2015)
9. Republic v. Reghis Romero and Olivia
Lagman Romero, G.R. No. 209180 (2016)
Article 38
1. Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No.
181409 (2010)
ARTICLE 40
1. Social Security Commission v. Edna Azote, G.R.
209741 (2015) : Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.
A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal spouse of
the deceased-member is qualified to be the
beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. In this case,
there is a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an
earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced
by their marriage contract. Edgardo even
acknowledged his married status when he filled out
the 1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his
spouse. It is undisputed that the second marriage of
Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time when
the Family Code was already in force. Article 41 of
the Family Code expressly states: Using the
parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code,
Edna, without doubt, failed to establish that there was
no impediment or that the impediment was already
removed at the time of the celebration of her marriage
to Edgardo. Settled is the rule that “whoever claims
entitlement to the benefits provided by law should
establish his or her right thereto by substantial
evidence.” Edna could not adduce evidence to prove
that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was either
annulled or dissolved or whether there was a
declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death before
her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that
Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering
that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal
spouse of a deceased-member, she would not qualify
under the law to be the beneficiary of the death
benefits of Edgardo. The Court does not subscribe to
the disquisition of the CA that the updated Form E-4
of Edgardo was determinative of Edna’s status and
eligibility to claim the death benefits of deceased-
member. Although an SSS member is free to
designate a beneficiary, the designation must always
conform to the statute. To blindly rely on the form
submitted by the deceased-member would subject the
entire social security system to the whims and
caprices of its members and would render the SS Law
inutile.
1. Social Security Commission v. Edna Azote, G.R.
209741 (2015) : Although the SSC is not
intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of
marriages, it is required by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A.
No. 8282[29] to examine available statistical and
economic data to ensure that the benefits fall into the
rightful beneficiaries. The existence of two Form E-
4s designating, on two different dates, two different
women as his spouse is already an indication that
only one of them can be the legal spouse. As can be
gleaned from the certification issued by the NSO,[31]
there is no doubt that Edgardo married Rosemarie in
1982. Edna cannot be considered as the legal spouse
of Edgardo as their marriage took place during the
existence of a previously contracted marriage. For
said reason, the denial of Edna’s claim by the SSC
was correct. It should be emphasized that the SSC
determined Edna’s eligibility on the basis of available
statistical data and documents on their database as
expressly permitted by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No.
8282. It is of no moment that the first wife,
Rosemarie, did not participate or oppose Edna’s
claim. Rosemarie’s non-participation or her
subsequent death on November 11, 2004[32] did not
cure or legitimize the status of Edna.
ARTICLE 41
Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino (Bermudez-Lorino),
in which this Court held: In Summary Judicial
Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an
appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247,
Family Code, supra, are “immediately final and
executory.” It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of
the RTC to give due course to the Republic's appeal
and order the transmittal of the entire records of the
case to the Court of Appeals. An appellate court
acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which,
by express provision of law, is immediately final and
executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec,
“the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a
part of due process, for it is merely a statutory
privilege.” Since, by express mandate of Article 247
of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in
summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are
“immediately final and executory,” the right to appeal
was not granted to any of the parties therein. The
Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the
petition for declaration of presumptive death, should
not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the
RTC decision of November 7, 2001.
1. Republic v. Narceda, G.R. No. 182760 (10 April
2013): The appellate court argues that there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an
appeal in summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code, because the judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Article 247, are
immediately final and executory upon notice to the
parties. We agree. Article 41 of the Family Code
provides … This Court has already declared in
Republic v. Granda[25] that Jomoc cannot be
interpreted as having superseded our pronouncements
in Bermudez-Lorino, because Jomoc does not
expound on the characteristics of a summary
proceeding under the Family Code; Bermudez-
Lorino, however, squarely touches upon the
impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for
questioning a trial court’s decision in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code.When the OSG
filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed
itself of the wrong remedy. As a result, the running of
the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari
continued to run and was not tolled. Upon lapse of
that period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer
be questioned. Consequently, petitioner’s contention
that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded
belief that his absentee spouse is dead[28] may no
longer be entertained by this Court.
As explained in Republic v. Tango, the remedy of a
losing party in a summary proceeding is not an
ordinary appeal, but a petition for certiorari, to wit:
By express provision of law, the judgment of the
court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows
that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article
41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition
should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party
may then file a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme
Court. This is because the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely
errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
appeal.
2. Republic v. Jose Sareñogon, Jr.. G.R. No. 199194
(2016): a
3. Republic v. Nilda Tampus, G.R. No. 214243
(2016): Before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that
the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article
41[19] of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent
spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive
years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse
wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4)
that the present spouse files a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee. The burden of proof rests on the present
spouse to show that all the foregoing requisites under
Article 41 of the Family Code exist. Since it is the
present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the
affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the
burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation
is not evidence.[21]
3. Republic v. Nilda Tampus, G.R. No. 214243
(2016): The "well-founded belief in the absentee's
death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her
belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts
to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive
one. As such, the mere absence of the spouse for such
periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news
that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to
communicate, or general presumption of absence
under the Civil Code would not suffice.[22] The
premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places
upon the present spouse the burden of complying
with the stringent requirement of "well-founded
belief which can only be discharged upon a showing
of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter
is still alive or is already dead. In this case, Nilda
testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to
locate him by making inquiries with his parents,
relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but
unfortunately, they also did not know where to find
him. Other than making said inquiries, however,
Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband.
She could have called or proceeded to the AFP
headquarters to request information about her
husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek
the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in
finding him. Considering her own pronouncement
that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission
to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she
could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the
said mission, or from the members of the AFP who
were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore,
Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband,
and her purported earnest efforts to find him by
asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not
satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence
required to create a "well-founded belief of his death.
3. Republic v. Nilda Tampus, G.R. No. 214243
(2016): Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's
family, relatives, or neighbors as witnesses who could
have corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly
looked for Dante. These resource persons were not
even named. In Republic v. Nolasco, it was held that
the present spouse's bare assertion that he inquired
from his friends about his absent spouse's
whereabouts was found insufficient as the names of
said friends were not identified in the testimony nor
presented as witnesses. Finally, other than Nilda's
bare testimony, no other corroborative evidence had
been offered to support her allegation that she exerted
efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What
appears from the facts as established in this case was
that Nilda simply allowed the passage of time without
actively and diligently searching for her husband,
which the Court cannot accept as constituting a "well-
founded belief that her husband is dead. Whether or
not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief
of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
extent of the inquiries made by the present spouse. In
fine, having fallen short of the stringent standard and
degree of due diligence required by jurisprudence to
support her claim of a "well-founded belief that her
husband Dante is already dead, the instant petition
must be granted.
4. Republic v. Leveste, G.R. No. 235580 (2019):
The OSG noted that the certification of the police
from whom she sought assistance is not sufficient and
should be authenticated; adding that the several
persons she inquired regarding the whereabouts of
Rodrigo-relatives, friends, etc.-were not presented in
court. As noted by the OSG: "As to respondent's
testimony that Rodrigo had gone missing and that she
inquired from family, relatives, and friends for his
possible whereabouts, she did not present any
corroborative evidence to establish her claims. She
did not name Rodrigo's family, relatives, or friends
whom she approached for assistance nor present them
as witnesses to show that no one has heard from him
for the last ten (10) years. Neither did she present any
proof or document to show that Rodrigo's family and
friends also looked for him or had any knowledge of
his whereabouts. As to her testimony that she
reported Rodrigo missing to the police or that she
made inquiries as to Rodrigo's whereabouts in
Valenzuela City, she did not present any
corroborative evidence such as the police report.
Other than Rodrigo's absence and lack of
communication, there are no other instances or events
cited that would lead one to conclude that Rodrigo is
already dead. Simple inquiries do not suffice as they
are deemed to be mere passive search that do not
engender the formation of well-founded belief that
the absent spouse is already dead. xx xx x x x
Respondent [Josie's] bare assertions should not be
given credence as mere allegation is not equivalent to
proof. It is apparent that respondent failed to conduct
a diligent search because her alleged efforts are
insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her
husband is already dead. In short, there is a dearth of
evidence to support the trial court's Decision." The
Court deems it proper to remand the case to the RTC
and receive further evidence from petitioner Josie,
testimonial and documentary, according to the
parameters and guidelines spelled out by the Supreme
Court in the cases referred to above to establish a
well-founded belief that Rodrigo can be declared
presumptively dead in accordance with Article 41 of
the Family Code.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court o f Appeals
(Tenth Div.), the Court ruled that the present spouse
failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that
his absent spouse was already dead before he filed his
petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly
consisted of the following:
(1) He went to his in-laws' house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captain's aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends' houses to find her and
inquired about her whereabouts among his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi
driver to look for her in malls during his free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for
her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police
station and to the NBI.
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still
ruled against the present spouse. The Court found that
he failed to present the persons from whom he
allegedly made inquiries and only reported his
wife's absence after the OSG filed its notice to
dismiss his petition in the RTC.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
(Tenth Div.), The Court also provided the following
criteria for determining the existence of a "well-
founded belief"' under Article 41 oft he Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of
proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts
to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already
dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a
well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great
many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse.
Republic v. Granada: the Court ruled that the absent
spouse failed to prove her "well-founded belief"' that
her absent spouse was already dead prior to the filing
of the petition. In this case, the present spouse alleged
that her brother had made inquiries from their
relatives regarding the absent spouse's whereabouts.
The present spouse did not report to the police nor
seek the aid of the mass media. Applying the
standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals (Tenth Div.), the Court ruled against the
present spouse.
ARTICLE 42
1. Celerina Santos v. Ricardo Santos, G.R. No.
187061 (2014), LEONEN : a
ART. 46
1. Orlando Villanueva v. Court of Appeals and
Lilia Canalita-Villanueva, G.R. No. 132955 (2006):
We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married private
respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress
or violence compelled him to do so, thus - To begin
with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance
that despite the alleged coerced consent which
supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on
April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or
after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight
(8) months when Orlando took serious step to have
the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the
prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia's
allegation that this annulment suit was filed by
Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment
thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether
bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for
bigamy which was then already pending against him.
Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the
criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with a
judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even
the very outcome of the present case disappointed his
expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the
bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x
Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a
decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may
yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge.
Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is,
therefore, understandable. But even in terms of merit,
the recourse must have to fall. Appellant anchored his
prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the
ground that he did not freely consent to be married to
the appellee. He cited several incidents that created
on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of
an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety,
to wit: the harassing phone calls from the appellee
and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three
men at the premises of the University of the East after
his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a
certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New
People's Army whom appellant claimed to have been
hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going
to her home province of Palawan to marry her. The
Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension
of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a
contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the
time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant
worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his
employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume
that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or,
at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out
of harm's way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats
were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with
the fact that he never sought the assistance of the
security personnel of his school nor the police
regarding the activities of those who were threatening
him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
1. Orlando Villanueva v. Court of Appeals and
Lilia Canalita-Villanueva, G.R. No. 132955 (2006):
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage,
as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter
was pregnant with his child when they were married.
Appellant's excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an
outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any
reference to his inability to copulate with the
appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower
court that his client had a sexual relationship with the
appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime
in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel
where "the sexual act was consummated, with the
defendant on top" x x x. Instead of providing proofs
that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant
resorted to undermining the credibility of the latter by
citing her testimony that her child was born, and died,
on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988,
the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry of
deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto
Princesa City x x x. To Our mind, appellant cannot
make capital of the lapse because it is
inconsequential, as there is no controversy regarding
the date of death of appellee's fetus. Nevertheless,
during the continuation of the cross-examination of
the appellee, she declared that her child was
prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the
date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x.
The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee
and throw overboard her entire testimony simply on
account of her confusion as to the exact date of the
death of the fetus, especially when she herself had
presented documentary evidence that put August 29,
1988 as the date her fetus died. Appellant's
propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the
appellee's evidence continues in his argument that if
indeed there is truth to her claim that she was
impregnated sometime in December 1987, then she
could not have a premature delivery on August 29,
1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the
35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that
time. Whether the appellee's impression that she had
delivered prematurely is correct or not will not affect
the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29,
1988. In the light of appellant's admission that he
had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January
1988, and his failure to attribute the latter's pregnancy
to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he
was deceived by the appellee into marrying her. x x
x. The letters admitted by the appellant contained
expressions of love and concern for his wife, and
hardly the rantings of a man under duress.
ART. 48
1. Florence Malcampo-Sin v. Philipp Sin, G.R. No.
137590 (2001): We note that throughout the trial in
the lower court, the State did not participate in the
proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson[15]
filed with the trial court a manifestation dated
November 16, 1994, stating that he found no
collusion between the parties,[16] he did not actively
participate therein. Other than entering his
appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing
more was heard from him. Neither did the presiding
Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal to
contribute to the proceedings. Art. 48 states…. It can
be argued that since the lower court dismissed the
petition, the evil sought to be prevented (i.e.,
dissolution of the marriage) did not come about,
hence, the lack of participation of the State was
cured. Not so. The task of protecting marriage as an
inviolable social institution requires vigilant and
zealous participation and not mere pro-forma
compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as
well. This is made clear by the following
pronouncement: "(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
[17] briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095 (underscoring ours)."
The records are bereft of any evidence that the State
participated in the prosecution of the case not just at
the trial level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals
as well. Other than the "manifestation" filed with the
trial court on November 16, 1994, the State did not
file any pleading, motion or position paper, at any
stage of the proceedings. Having so ruled, we decline
to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being
within the province of the trial court upon proper re-
trial.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias
Dagdag, while we upheld the validity of the
marriage, we nevertheless characterized the decision
of the trial court as "prematurely rendered" since the
investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity
to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered. This stresses the importance
of the participation of the State.
2. Estrellita Juliano-Llave v. Republic, Haja Putri
Zorayda Tamano and Adib Ahmad Tamano, G.
R. No. 169766 (2011): a The Public Prosecutor
issued a report as to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9,
Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC)[44] also requries the participation of the
public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages.
It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his
investigation report to determine whether there is
collusion between the parties: Sec. 9. Investigation
report of public prosecutor.- (1) Within one month after
receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8
above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court
stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof
on the parties and their respective counsels, if any. (2) If the public
prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall slate the basis
thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective
comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt
of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing
and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss
the petition. (3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion
exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty
of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately
directed the public prosecutor to submit the required
report,[45] which we find to have been sufficiently
complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo
T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30,1995,
[46] wherein he attested that there could be no
collusion between the parties and no fabrication of
evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of
the private respondents.
2. Estrellita Juliano-Llave v. Republic, Haja Putri
Zorayda Tamano and Adib Ahmad Tamano, G.
R. No. 169766 (2011): Furthermore, the lack of
collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming
that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of
participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held
in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, the lack of
participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the
proceedings in the trial court: The role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of
marriage and legal separation proceedings is to
determine whether collusion exists between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not
suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates
the conclusion that collusion existed between the
parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the
parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced
that the nonintervention of a prosecuting attorney to
assure lack of collusion between the contending
parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in
the trial court.
ARTS. 50-51
1. Valdes v. RTC, G.R. No. 122749 (1996)
2. Nicdao Carino v. Carino, G.R. No. 132529 (2001)
3. Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538 (2014)
Art. 61
1. Gandianco v. Penaranda, G.R. No. 79284 (1987)
2. Sabalones v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106169
(1994)
Art. 63
1. Antonio Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals and
Filomena Macadangdang, G.R. No. L-38287 (1981)
Art. 68
1. Alfonso Lacson v. Carmen San Jose-Lacson, 24
SCRA 837 (1968)
2. Mariano Arroyo v. Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo,
G.R. No. L-17014 (1921)
3. Aleko Lilius v. Manila Railroad, G.R. No. L-39587
(1934)
ACP Cases
1. Efren Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite,
Jr. (G.R. No. 164201, 10 December 2012)
2. Josefina Nobleza v. Shirley B. Nuega (G.R. No.
193038, 11 March 2015)
3. Lilibeth Sunga-Chan and Cecilia Sunga v. Court of
Appeals, et. al. (G.R. No. 164401, 25 June 2008)
4. Spouses Atty. Erlando Abrenica and Joena
Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica (G.R. No. 180572,
18 June 2012)
5. David Noveras v. Leticia Noveras (G.R. No.
188289, 20 August 2014)
CPG Cases
1. Franciso Muñoz, Jr. v. Erlinda Ramirez & Eliseo
Carlos (G.R. No. 156125, 25 August 2010)
2. Security Bank v. Mar Tierra Corp., Wilfrido
Martinez, Miguel Lacson and Ricardo Lopa (G.R.
No. 143382, 23 February 2004)
3. Estrella Dela Cruz v. Severino Dela Cruz (G.R.
No. L-19565, 30 January 1968)
4. Purita Alipio v. CA & Romeo Jaring represented
by Ramon Jaring (G.R. No. 134100, 29 September
2000)
5. Josephine Go & Henry Go v. Leonardo Yamane
(G.R. No. 160762, 3 May 2006)
6. Antonia and Alvin John Dela Pea v. Gemma Avila
& Far East Bank (G.R. No. 187490, 8 February 2012)
7. Ayala Investment & Abelardo Magsajo v. Court of
Appeals & Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching
(G.R. No. 118305, 12 February 1998)
8. Joe Ros & Estrella Aguete v. Philippine National
Bank-Laoag Branch (G.R. No. 170166, 6 April 2011)
9. Brigido Quiao v. Rita, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie
Quiao, represented by their mother, Rita Quiao (G.R.
No 176556, 4 July 2012)
Cases
1. Virginia Ocampo v. Deogracio Ocampo
(G.R. No. 198908, 3 August 2015)
2. Uy v. Spouses Lacsamana (G.R. No. 5. Enrique and Jesus Jocson v. Empire
206220, 19 August 2015) Insurance (G.R. No. No. L-10792, 30 April 1958)
6. Gotardo v. Buling (G.R. No. 165166, 15
3. Ventura v. Spouses Paulino (G.R. No. August 2012)
202932, 23 October 2013) Cases on Parental Authority
1. Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
4. Soledad L. Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces 116773, 16 January 1997)
Luna (G.R. No. 171914, 23 July 2015) 2. Dempsey v. RTC (G.R. Nos. 77737-38, 15
August 1988)
Cases on the Family 3. Cang v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105308,
1. Magbaleta v. Gonong (G.R. No. L-44903, 25 September 1998)
22 April 1977) 4. Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto (G.R. No.
154994, 28 June 2005)
2. Sps. Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan (G.R. No. 5. Beckett v. Sarmiento (A.M. No. RTJ-12-
178288, 15 August 2012) 2326, 30 January 2013)

3. De Mesa v. Acero (G.R. No. 185064, 16 1. Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248, 18
January 2012) February 2014)

4. Eulogio v. Bell (G.R. NO. 186322, 8 July

2015)

Cases on Paternity and Filiation

1. Narciso Salas v. Annabelle Matusalem (G.R.
No. 180284, 10 April 2013)
2. Rodolfo S. Aguilar v. Edna G. Siasat (G.R.
200169, 28 January 2015)

3. Eugenio San Juan Geronimo V. Karen

Santos (G.R. No. 197099, 28 September 2015)
4. Jesse U. Lucas v. Jesus S. Lucas (G.R. No.
190710, 6 June 2011)
5. BBB v. AAA, (G.R. No. 193225, 9 February
2015)
Cases on Support
1. Susan Lim Lua v. Danilo Lua (G.R. No.
175279-80, 5 June 2013)
2. Teodoro Lerma v. Court of Appeals and
Concepcion Diaz (G.R. No. L-33352, 20 December
1974)
3. Ma. Carminia Calderon v. Roxas, Jose
Antonio and CA (G.R. No. 185595, 9 January 2013)
4. Ma. Belen Mangonon for and in behalf of
her minor children Rebecca and Regina Delgado v.
CA, Federico and Francisco Delgado (G.R. No.
125041, 30 June 2006)