1.) Alangdeo v.
The City Mayor of Baguio, he was unable to get a title over the subject property despite his possession
G.R. No. 125233 | March 9, 2000
FACTS:
1. On November 13, 2003, respondent Ernesto Lardizabal (Ernesto) filed ·a
complaint for demolition, 5before the City Engineer's Office 6of Baguio City
(City Engineer's Office), questioning the ongoing construction of a:
residential structure and garage extension by petitioners on a parcel of land,
situated at Barangay Atok Trail, Baguio City (subject property), allegedly
owned by Mariano Pangloy and Ernesto's father, Juanito Lardizabal. 7 Upon
investigation, the City Engineer's Office found out that the construction had
no building permit. Consequently, the City Mayor issued, through the
Secretary to the Mayor, Demolition Order No. 05, series of 2005 (DO No.
05) directing the City Demolition Team to summarily demolish the said
structures, to wit: 8
a. WHEREFORE, the CITY DEMOLITION TEAM is hereby directed to
SUMMARILY DEMOLISH the aforesaid structures of Atty. Leoncio Alangdeo,
Arthur Verceles and/or Danny Vergara in accordance with Section 3[,] par. 2.5 (a)
of the implementing rules and regulations governing summary eviction jointly
issued by the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council pursuant to Section 44,
[A]rticle XII of [Republic Act (RA) No. 7279 9(Emphases supplied)
2. Aggrieved, petitioners moved for a reconsideration of DO No. 05, but was
denied by the City Mayor. Thus, they were prompted to file a complaint for
injunction and prohibition with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 6007-
R, seeking to enjoin the implementation of said order. 10
3. In their complaint, petitioners applied for a temporary restraining order,
which was granted by the RTC. Subsequently, the RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction pending the final determination of the merits of the
case.11
4. During trial, Verceles testified, among others, that he has a Tax Declaration
and a pending application for Ancestral Land Claim over the subject
property filed before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), and that he has been paying taxes therefore and occupying the same
since 1977. 12 He also testified that Ernesto had previously filed a case with
ISSUES:
the Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)-Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), questioning his
possession thereof, as well as, seeking the cancellation of his tax declaration
RATIO:
over the said property.13 The DENR-CAR dismissed the case in his favor,
but Ernesto appealed to the Office of the DENR Secretary. At the time the
appeal was pending, Ernesto filed the complaint for demolition before the
City Engineer's Office. Verceles further testified that Barangay Atok Trail is
covered by Proclamation No. 414, series of 1957 (Proclamation 414), which
declared the same as mineral reservation for Baguio City, for which reason
thereof 14
5. Punong Barangay Stephen T. Aligo was also presented by petitioners as a
witness. He testified that by Resolution No.386, series of 1995, the City
Council requested for the release of the vast area covered by Proclamation
414, for housing purposes to be awarded to the occupants of Barangay Atok
Trail. Also, he narrated that in a census conducted in 2003, it was found that
there were two hundred thirty (230) houses in Barangay Atok Trail and
none of these houses had building permits.15
6. On the other hand, respondents' witnesses, Antonio 0. Visperas, Robert
Albas Awingan, and George Addawe, Jr., all testified that the structures of
petitioners on the subject property were not covered by any building
permit.16Additionally, Ernesto testified that the issue of possession over the
said property was the subject of an appeal pending before the Office of the
DENR Secretary. 17
7. The RTC Ruling: In a Decision 18 dated April 27, 2006, the RTC enjoined the City Government of Baguio
and its agents from implementing DO No. 5 "until and after the resolution of all the cases/issues involving
the subject property and/or area affected by the appropriate government agencies concerned." The injunction
stemmed from its finding that Proclamation 414 declared the entire area of Barangay Atok Trail as a buffer
zone for the mining industry, and, for that reason, all structures constructed thereon (and not only that of
petitioners) were not covered by building permits. Thus, the RTC held that it would violate the equal
protection clause if it would allow the demolition of petitioners' structures while leaving untouched the other
structures in the area.19
8. Dissatisfied, respondents appealed 20 to the CA.
9. The CA Ruling: In a Decision 21 dated June 29, 2012, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, finding that
petitioners failed to show any right to be protected. It relied on the Decision 22 rendered on August 31, 2006
by then DENR Secretary Angelo Reyes in DENR Case No. 5625, which recognized and respected the
ancestral and preferential rights of Mariano Pangloy and the Heirs of Juanito Lardizabal over the subject
property pending the final determination by the NCIP of their ancestral claim. 23 Accordingly, the CA held
that where the plaintiff - as petitioners in this case - failed to demonstrate that he has an existing right to be
protected by injunction, the suit for injunction must be dismissed for lack of cause of action 24
10. Unperturbed, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, raising therein the Decision 25 of the NCIP
Regional Hearing Office dated May 18, 2012, which ruled that between petitioners and Ernesto, the former
have a better right to the issuance of ancestral land titles over the portions they are claiming to be their
ancestral lands. 26 The CA, however, denied the motion in a Resolution 27 dated March 5, 2013, maintaining
that petitioners have no right in esse. Thus, considering that petitioners have no building permit over the
subject constructions, it ruled that the public respondents have the right to demolish the subject structures. 28
11. Hence, this petition.
1. whether the issuance of a writ of injunction is warranted.
1. T The petition is meritorious.
2. DO No. 5 32 states on its face that it was issued in accordance with Section
3, paragraph 2.5 (a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
Governing Summary Eviction (Summary Eviction IRR), to wit:
a. SECTION 3. Procedures and Guidelines
 b. xxxx
c. 2.0 Issuance of Summary Eviction Notice
d. xxxx
e. 2.5 In the Issuance of notice, the following shall be strictly observed:
f. a. For on-going construction, no notice shall be served. Dismantling of the
structures shall be immediately enforced by the LGU or the concerned agency to
demolish.
3. To note, the Summary Eviction IRR was issued pursuant to Section 28,
Article VII of RA 7279, which equally provides for the situations wherein
eviction or demolition is allowed as crafted exceptions to the moratorium on
eviction under Section 44, Article XII 33 of the same law.
a. Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. - Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be
discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following
situations
b. (a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad
tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public
places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;
c. (b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about
to be implemented; or
d. (c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
e. xxxx
f. This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to carry out the above provision. (Emphases supplied)
4. Section 2 of the Summary Eviction IRR provides that only new
squatter 34 families whose structures were built after the effectively of RA
7279, otherwise known as the "Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992," and squatter families identified by the local government unit (LGU)
as professional squatters 35 or members of squatting syndicates shall be
subject of summary eviction:
a. SECTION 2. Coverage - The following shall be subject for summary Eviction:
b. 1.0 New squatter families whose structures were built after the affectivity of RA
7279; and
c. 2.0 Squatter families identified by the LGU in cooperation with the Presidential
Commission of the Urban Poor (PCUP), Philippine National Police (PNP) and
accredited Urban Poor [O]rganization (UPO) as professional squatters or members
of squatting syndicates as defined in the Act.
5. Under the Summary Eviction IRR, the term "summary eviction" has been
defined as "the immediate dismantling of new illegal structures by the local
government units or government agency authorized to [demolish] in
coordination with the affected urban poor organizations without providing
the structure owner(s) any benefits of the Urban Development and Housing
Program. " 36
6. Meanwhile, the terms "new squatter," "professional squatters," and
"squatting syndicates" have been respectively defined as follows:
a. "New squatter" refers to individual groups who occupy land without the express
consent of the landowner after March 28, 1992. Their structures shall be dismantled
and appropriate charges shall be filed against them by the proper authorities if they
refuse to vacate the premises. 37 
b. "Professional squatters" refers to individuals or groups who occupy lands without
the express consent of the landowner and who have sufficient income for legitimate
housing. The term shall also apply to persons who have previously been awarded
home lots or housing units by the Government but who sold, leased or transferred
the same to settle illegally in the same place or in another urban area, and non-bona
fide occupants and intruders of lands reserved for socialized Housing. The term
shall not apply to individuals or groups who simply rent land and housing from
professional squatters or squatting syndicates. 38
c. "Squatting syndicates" refers to groups of persons engaged in the business of
squatter housing for profit or gain. 39
7. In this case, petitioners cannot be considered as new squatters, since,
although their structures were built after March 28, 1992, they or their
predecessors-in-interest had occupied, and were claimants of the subject
property long before the said date. Neither have they been identified by the
LGU as professional squatters nor members of a squatting syndicate. Thus,
since petitioners do not fall under the coverage of the said IRR, the issuance
of DO No. 05 had no legal basis at the onset.
8. More significantly, none of the three (3) situations enumerated under
Section 28, Article VII of RA 7279 as above-cited, when eviction or
demolition is allowed, have been shown to be present in the case at bar.
Specifically, it was not shown that the structures are in danger areas or
public areas, such as a sidewalk, road, park, or playground; that a
government infrastructure project is about to be implemented; and that there
is a court order for demolition or eviction. Therefore, the issuance by the
City Mayor of an order for the summary demolition of petitioners' structures
finds no basis in the said law permitting summary demolition or eviction.
9. While respondents make much ado of petitioners' lack of building permits,
it should be underscored that under Presidential Decree No.
1096, 40 otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the
Philippines" (NBCP), the mere fact that a structure is constructed without a
building permit, as well as non-compliance with work stoppage order,
without more, will not call for a summary demolition, but subjects the
violator to an administrative fine under Section 212, 41 Chapter II of the
NBCP, or a criminal case under Section 213 42 of the same law.
10. Indeed, while Section 301, Chapter III of the NBCP states that " [ n] o
person, firm or corporation, including any agency or instrumentality of the
government shall erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or demolish
any building or structure or cause the same to be done without first
obtaining a building permit therefore from the Building Official assigned in
 the place where the subject building is located or the building work is to be
done," the remedy of summary abatement against the bare absence of a
building permit was not provided for.
11. Meanwhile, Section 215 of the NBCP, and its corresponding IRR provision
(both of which are respectively quoted hereunder) states that before a
structure may be abated or demolished, there must first be a finding or
declaration by the Building Official that the building/structure is a nuisance,
ruinous or dangerous:
a. Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings.
b. When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the
Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the
degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action
that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
c. PROCEDURE FOR ABATEMENT/ DEMOLITION OF DANGEROUS/
RUINOUS BUILDINGS/ STRUCTURES
d. 5. Procedure for Demolition of Buildings
e. The following steps shall be observed in the abatement/demolition of buildings
under this Rule:
f. 5.1 There must be a finding or declaration by the Building Official that the
building/structure is a nuisance, ruinous or dangerous.
g. 5.2 Written notice or advice shall be served upon the owner and occupant/s of such
finding or declaration, giving him at least fifteen ( 15) days within which to vacate
or cause to be vacated, repaired, renovated, demolished and removed as the case
may be, the nuisance, ruinous or dangerous building/structure or any part or portion
thereof.
h. 5.3 Within the fifteen-day (15) period, the owner may, if he so desires, appeal to the
Secretary the finding or declaration of the Building Official and ask that a re-
inspection or re-investigation of the building/structure be made.
i. x x x x 43
12. To this, it bears noting that it is the Building Official, and not the City
Mayor, who has the authority to order the demolition of the structures under
the NBCP. As held in Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City: 44
a. [T]he Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be
demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the
Building Official. The pertinent provisions of the Building Code provide:
b. SECTION 205. Building Officials. - Except as otherwise provided herein, the
Building Official shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code in
the field as well as the enforcement of orders and decisions made pursuant thereto
c. Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent Public
Works District Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers [to] act as
Building Officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction.
d. The designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until
regular positions of Building Official are provided or unless sooner terminated for
causes provided by law or decree.
e. [x x x x]
f. SECTION 207. Duties of a Building Official. - In his respective territorial
jurisdiction, the Building Official shall be primarily responsible for the enforcement
of the provisions of this Code as well as of the implementing rules and regulations
issued therefore. He is the official charged with the duties of issuing building
permits.
g. In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its
premises at all reasonable times to inspect and determine compliance with the
requirements of this Code, and the terms and conditions provided for in the building
permit as issued.
h. When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code, the
Building Official may order the work stopped and prescribe the terms and/or
conditions when the work will be allowed to resume. Likewise, the Building
Official is authorized to order the discontinuance of the occupancy or use of any
building or structure or portion thereof found to be occupied or used contrary to the
provisions of this Code.
i. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
13. In this case, none of the foregoing requisites were shown to concur. Plainly,
records are bereft of any declaration coming from the Building Official, and
it is undisputed that the demolition order was issued by the City Mayor.
Notably, while respondents invoke the City Mayor's authority under Section
455 (b) 3 (vi) 45of the Local Government Code 46to order the demolition or
removal of an illegally constructed house, building, or structure within the
period prescribed by law or ordinance and their allegation that respondents'
structures were constructed without building permits, records disclose that
the same was not raised before the trial court. Since respondents invoked
the said section for the first time in their comment to the instant
petition, 47the argumentation cannot thus be entertained, it being settled that
matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the proceedings below will
ordinarily not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. 48
14. Besides, it is clear that DO No. 05 was not issued pursuant to Section 455
(b) 3 (vi) of the Local Government Code, but pursuant to "Section 3 par. 2.5
(a) of the implementing rules and regulations governing summary eviction
jointly issued by the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council xx
x," 49 implementing Section 28, Article VII of RA 7279, the application of
which, however, has been herein debunked.
15. In fine, DO No. 05, which ordered the summary demolition of petitioners'
structures has no legal moorings and perforce was invalidly
issued.1âwphi1 Accordingly, an injunctive writ to enjoin its implementation
is in order. It is well-settled that for an injunction to issue, two requisites
must concur: first, there must be a right to be protected; and second, the acts
against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said
right. 50 Here, the two (2) requisites are present: there is a right to be
protected - that is, petitioners' right over their structures which should be
 preserved unless their removal is warranted by law; and the act, i.e., the
summary demolition of the structures under DO No. 05, against which the
injunction is directed, would violate said right.51
16. As a final note, the Court exhorts that absent compliance with the laws
allowing for summary eviction, respondents cannot resort to the procedural
shortcut of ousting petitioners by the simple expedient of a summary
demolition order from the Office of the City Mayor. They have to undergo
the appropriate proceeding as set out in the NBCP and its IRR or avail of
the proper judicial process to recover the subject property from petitioners.
In pursuing said recourse, it would also not be amiss for the parties to await
the final resolution of any pending case involving the subject property
between petitioners and Ernesto, before the appropriate government
agencies, in order to avoid any further complication on the matter.
17. That being said, it is then unnecessary to delve into the other ancillary
issues raised in these proceedings.
18. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 29,
2012 and the Resolution dated March 5, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 87439 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
implementation of Demolition Order No. 05, series of 2005 is ENJOINED.
2.) Hipolito v. Cinco
G.R. No. 174143 | 28 November 2011
FACTS:
1. Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great
respect, if not finality, by the courts 1 by reason of the special knowledge and
expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their
jurisdiction.
2. Petitioners beseech this Court to reverse and set aside said Decision and
consequently, to alter a string of consistent Resolutions issued by the OP in
the said O.P. Case No. F-262, the Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) in NBC Case No. 17-03-I-MLA, 7 and the
Office of the Building Official (OBO) of the City of Manila in NBC Case
No. NG-2002-06.8
3. Petitioner-spouses Ricardo Hipolito, Jr. and Liza Hipolito (petitioners)
allege that on June 15, 1989, Edeltrudis Hipolito y Mariano
(Edeltrudis)9 entered into an agreement 10 with Francisco Villena11 (now
deceased) to rent a portion of the property located at 2176 Nakar Street, San
Andres Bukid, Manila and to construct an apartment-style building adjacent
to the existing house thereon. The contract was for a period of 20 years.
Pursuant to the agreement, Edeltrudis built a three-storey apartment
building without securing a building permit. Petitioners inherited the
apartment building upon the death of Edeltrudis.
4. In 2002 or 13 years after the execution of the agreement, petitioners and the
heirs of Francisco Villena, all residing in the property, were informed that
respondent Atty. Carlos D. Cinco (Atty. Cinco) acquired the subject
property through a deed of sale sometime in 1976.
5. On June 17, 2002, herein respondents Atty. Cinco, Teresita Cinco and Dr.
Carlota Balde Cinco (respondents) filed with the OBO a verified
request12 for structural inspection of an old structure located at 2176 Nakar
Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila.
6. Acting on the request, Building Inspector Engineer Leonardo B. Rico (Engr.
Rico) conducted an initial inspection. In his memorandum Engr. Rico
reported that two old and dilapidated buildings made of wooden materials
were found in the premises and recommended that the matter be referred to
the Committee on Buildings (Committee) for further appropriate action and
disposition.
7. Deemed as a petition for condemnation/abatement pursuant to the National
Building Code (NBC) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
verified request of the respondents was referred to the Committee for
Hearing/ Investigation.
8. With prior notices to the parties and the tenants, three hearings were
subsequently held from August 12, 2002 to September 20, 2002 for
purposes of resolving the focal issue of "the structural stability, architectural
presentability, electrical and fire safety aspect to determine [whether] or not
the subject buildings are still safe for continued occupancy." 13 On
September 20, 2002, Victoria Villena, wife and heir of Francisco Villena
and owner of one of the two buildings, filed a counter manifestation
questioning respondents’ personality to file the petition for condemnation,
and refuting the technical evaluation reports of Engr. Rico and respondents’
commissioned engineer. Whereupon, the Committee was constrained to
schedule an ocular inspection of the subject buildings on October 7, 2002. A
report on the ocular inspection conducted was thereafter submitted through
a Memorandum14 dated October 8, 2002, which states:
a. x x x The subject structure is a 3-storey at the rear portion and Two (2)[-] storey at
the front made up of wooden materials with G.I. sheet roofings.
b. II. Findings:
c. 1. Corrugated G.I. sheet roofings and its accessories incurred extensive
deterioration/[dilapidation] due to weathering.
d. 2. Ceiling boards [bulging] attributed to water leaks from defective roofing.
e. 3. Exterior and interior wooden boards deteriorated.
f. 4. Doors/windows including its jambs deteriorated/[dilapidated].
g. 5. No provisions of firewall on the sides abutting private lot.
h. 6. Rafters, purlins, and girts deteriorated due to neglect of maintenance.
i. 7. Vibrations were felt on the wooden flooring when exerting wt. An indication that
 its support suffered [material] fatigue due to wear and tear and termite infestation. actual physical condition of the subject buildings. The Inspectorate Team reported thus:

j. 8. Wooden columns incurred deterioration/[dilapidation] due to weathering and a. There are two (2) Buildings/Structures subject of this appeal. For proper identification of the
termite infestation. two (2) Storey Residential Building located at front No. 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid,
is designated as Building I while the Three (3) Storey Residential Building located at the rear
k. 9. Open wiring installation/fire hazard. portion is designated as [B]uilding 2.

b. Building 1
l. 10. With notices of condemned installation No. 2K3-62042 EPM issued by OIC,
City Electrical Division, DEPW. c. Building I is pre-war vintage (t)wo (2)[-](s)torey structure generally made of wooden materials.
Corrugated G.I. roofing sheets and its accessories are extensively corroded and deteriorated due
m. 11. Inadequate water supply and drainage system. to long existence, weather exposure and improper maintenance. Gutters and [down spouts] are
already missing. Interior and exterior wooden board partitions are deteriorated by about eighty
n. 12. Outmoded T & G due to neglect of maintenance. percent (80%). Roof eaves and media agues are deteriorated and some wooden members are
ready to collapse. Doors and windows including [their] jambs are deteriorated by about eighty
o. 13. Inadequate sanitary/plumbing installation.
percent (80%). Wooden stair[s] leading to second floor is rotten and deteriorated due to long
p. III. RECOMMENDATION: existence and termite infestation. Wooden board floorings are sagging and vibration can be felt
when walking on it. Plywood ceiling boards are deteriorated by about eighty percent (80%).
q. From the foregoing, the subject buildings [appear] to have incurred extensive d. The wooden roof framing parts such as rafters, purlins, and girts are rotten. Majority of the
deterioration/[dilapidation] [attributed] mainly to long weather exposure, poor wooden posts are termite infested and deteriorated. The wooden beams and floor joists are
maintenance and termite infestation on its architectural and structural components noted to have incurred deterioration. Vibration is felt at the second floor wooden flooring when
by 60-80% which constitutes an Architectural eyesore, structurally unsafe as well as walked upon, an indication that its wooden structural supports show signs of material fatigue
fire and electrical hazard thereby endangering the life, safety, health and welfare due to wear and tear and termite infestation. Structural components of the structure were
observed to have deteriorated by about seventy five percent (75%).
[of] the general public specifically the tenants thereat, hence, it is strongly
recommended that the subject building be declared dangerous and ruinous in e. Sanitary/Plumbing fixtures and systems within the building are noted outmoded, inadequate and
pursuance of Sec. 214 and 215 and Rules VII and Rule VIII of the Implementing not properly maintained. Inadequate water supply and drainage system within the building is
Rules and Regulations of P.D. 1096. noted. The comfort room is useable and functioning but is not properly ventilated and
unsanitary.
9. Ruling of the Office of the Building Official
f. The electrical wiring insulation shows sign of brittleness due to excessive exposure to ambient
10. In a Resolution 15 dated March 26, 2003, the OBO declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous, and heat, moisture and time element. Excessive octopus connections and dangling of
recommended their demolition, to wit: wires/extensions [sic] cords are observed. Some switches and convenience outlets are detached
and defective. Junction/pullboxes are not properly covered thus exposing electrical wiring
a. xxxx connections. Some electrical wiring installations are attached to deteriorated parts of the
building. The electrical wiring installations are already old, not properly maintained and
b. On the basis of the ocular inspection report submitted by the Committee on Buildings and the
inadequate to conform to the rules and regulations of the Philippine Electrical Code (PEC).
findings of the OIC, City Electrical Division DEPW which form part of this resolution, it
appearing that the subject structures incurred an extensive degree of [dilapidation]/deterioration g. Building 2
by 60-80% attributed mainly to long weather exposure, termite infestation and neglect of
maintenance on its architectural and structural component which constitute architectural h. Building 2 is a three (3)[-](s)torey structure located at the back of the Building I, and the usage
eyesore, structurally unsafe as well as electrical hazards thereby endangering the life, health is purely for residential purposes. The building is constructed [out] of wooden materials,
property and welfare of the general public particularly the tenants thereat [sic]. corrugated G.I. roofing sheets and plain G.I. sheets for its accessories. The said building was
constructed sometime in 1989, however, the construction is not in accordance with the standard
c. Such sorry condition of said structures exist to the extent that remedial/ rehabilitation which is and the requirements of the National Building Code (PD 1096). Corrugated G.I. roofing sheets
no longer practical and economical as it would entail/ necessitate a total overdone thereof [sic]. are corroded and deterioration is about seventy percent (70%). [Down spouts] and gutters are no
longer in place. Interior and exterior wooden board sidings have incurred about sixty percent
d. WHEREFORE, premises considered the Committee on Buildings and in consonance with the
(60%) deterioration. Some rooms have no proper ventilation due to excessive partitioning.
findings of the OIC, City Electrical Division DEPW the subject buildings are hereby found and
Eaves [have] no ceiling. Wooden board floorings are sagging and vibration is felt when walked
declared Dangerous and Ruinous and strongly recommending the issuance of the corresponding
upon due to undersized wooden framing. Substandard ceiling height. Plywood ceiling boards
Demolition Order in pursuance of Section[s] 214 and 215 of the National Building Code and
are bulging. No fire resistive wall provided between the two buildings.
Rule VII and VIII of its Implementing Rules and Regulations further directing the tenants/
occupants thereat to vacate the premises within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof to pave the i. As to the Structural, Sanitary/Plumbing and Electrical aspects, Building 2 has the same findings
way for its peaceful and orderly [d]emolition activity. as in Building I.
e. SO ORDERED. j. From the foregoing, it appears that the subject building attained a degree of dilapidation that
repair works are no longer practical and economical to undertake.
11. A Demolition Order16 addressed to the respondents was accordingly issued on even date with petitioners and
their tenants duly furnished with a copy thereof. k. Therefore, it is recommended that the Demolition Order issued by the OBO, Manila be
sustained.18
12. Petitioners thus appealed17 to the DPWH.
16. On May 19, 2004, the Secretary of the DPWH rendered a Resolution 19 dismissing the appeal of the
13. Ruling of the Department of Public Works and Highways
petitioners for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the OBO and the issuance of the Demolition
14. In their appeal, petitioners prayed for the reversal of the Resolution of the OBO and for the setting aside of Order.
the Demolition Order on the ground that same were anomalously issued. They likewise contended that
17. In the same Resolution, the Secretary of the DPWH opined:
respondents’ petition for condemnation was actually an attempt to circumvent their rights as builders in good
faith. Petitioners prayed for a separate inspection of the two buildings by an impartial body. a. xxxx
15. Thus, another ocular inspection was conducted by the Inspectorate Team of the DPWH to determine the
 b. In condemnation proceedings of dangerous and ruinous building pursuant to the National
Building Code (NBC) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the authority of the
Building Official is confined to the assessment of the physical condition of the building sought
to be condemned and abated, and depending on the degree of its deterioration and dilapidation,
to issue appropriate order, taking into consideration the welfare and safety not only of its
occupants, but the public in general as well. Corollary thereto, said official is mandated under
the Code, even in the absence of a petitioner or complainant, to motu propio initiate
condemnation proceedings of reported dangerous and ruinous buildings. The inclusion thereof
of the 3-storey building which appellant claims to have been built by Ediltrudis Villena on the
subject property in the hearing/investigation of the case was within the bounds of the duties and
responsibilities of the OBO. In the said proceedings, the Building Official shall not delve on
issues affecting contract involving the property or of the building subject of the case or of
lessee-lessor relationship, since those are matters within the competence of the court to pass
upon.
c. Appellants’ allegation that inspection of the premises was done without their participation and
[that they were] not given the chance to engage the services of an engineer deserves scant
consideration. Records revealed that appellants who actively participated in the proceedings of
the case were duly furnished with copies of appellees’ petition for condemnation and the
technical evaluation report of their (appellees) commissioned engineer, and were enjoined to
submit their counter technical report. They however failed to comply. Appellants who at the
same time are residents of the building subject of the proceedings could have easily participated
or hire[d] an engineer to represent them in the inspection conducted by the Committee on
Buildings on the premises as they were duly notified about it and of which they signified their
conformity during the hearing on September 20, 2002. x x x20
18. Undaunted, petitioners filed an appeal21 with the OP.
19. Ruling of the Office of the President
20. Before the OP, the petitioners asserted that the findings of the DPWH Inspectorate Team is erroneous and
that they are builders in good faith. However, the OP found no reversible error to justify the reversal or
modification of the DPWH Resolution, and thus resolved to dismiss the appeal in a Resolution 22 dated
February 28, 2005.
21. The OP likewise subsequently denied with finality petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration 23 in an
Order24 dated April 25, 2005.
22. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Review25 with the CA.
23. Ruling of the Court of Appeals
24. Before the CA, petitioners again raised the issues they advanced before the administrative bodies,
particularly the issue regarding the ownership of the lot vis-à-vis their right as builders in good faith.
25. However, the CA dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the OP Resolution without addressing the
issue of ownership. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 26 but same was denied in a
Resolution 27 dated August 15, 2006 for being a mere rehash or repetition of the issues raised in the petition.
26. Unwilling to concede, petitioners now come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
1. T The petition lacks merit.
2. As correctly stated by the Secretary of the DPWH in its Resolution, 32 the administrative agencies’
jurisdiction in this case is confined to the assessment of the physical condition of the building sought to be
condemned and the issuance of the appropriate order relative thereto. Issues affecting contract involving the
property or of the buildings subject of the case are not within their competence to rule upon. Lest this Court
becomes a court of first instance instead of a court of last resort, we decline to act on matters that have not
run the proper legal course.
3. Nevertheless, we note that petitioners’ purported right to occupy the
property has already ended two years ago when the 20-year period of the
lease agreement expired in year 2009. There being no provision in the
contract, tacit or otherwise, for renewal or extension of the lease, petitioners
no longer have basis to keep hold of Building 2. Hence, the determination
of whether petitioners are builders in good faith is no longer necessary.
4. As to the other issues, suffice it to say that they boil down to the question of
whether the issuance of the OBO Resolution and Demolition Order was
proper, and whether the CA erred when it affirmed the Resolutions of the
OP and the Secretary of the DPWH, which in turn, likewise affirmed the
said OBO Resolution.
5. A Building Official has the authority to order the condemnation and
demolition of buildings which are found to be in a dangerous or ruinous
condition.
6. "[I]t is unquestionable that the Building Official has the authority to order
the condemnation and demolition of buildings which are found to be in a
dangerous or ruinous condition."33 This authority emanates from Sections
214 and 215 of the National Building Code (Presidential Decree [P.D.] No.
1096) which provides:
a. Section 214. Dangerous and Ruinous Buildings or Structures
b. Dangerous buildings are those which are herein declared as such or are structurally
unsafe or not provided with safe egress, or which constitute a fire hazard, or are
otherwise dangerous to human life, or which in relation to existing use, constitute a
hazard to safety or health or public welfare because of inadequate maintenance,
dilapidation, obsolescence, or abandonment; or which otherwise contribute to the
pollution of the site or the community to an intolerable degree.
c. Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings
d. When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the
Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the
degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action
that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
7. There is, therefore, no question as to the authority of the OBO to render the
challenged issuances. Here, the Building Official was authorized to issue
the questioned Demolition Order in view of his finding that the disputed
structures are dangerous and ruinous buildings within the purview of P.D.
No. 1096, in relation to its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Correspondingly, no irregularity in the process in which the resolution and
demolition order were issued is evident. As found by the CA, the records
show that the OBO issued the resolution and Demolition Order only after
ocular inspections and hearings were conducted. Notably, the Inspectorate
Team of the DPWH came up with the same conclusion as the OBO when it
conducted its own ocular inspection of the premises, that is both Buildings 1
and 2 had structural, sanitary, plumbing and electrical defects of up to
80%.34
8. What is more, contrary to the position of the petitioners that the provisions
of the Civil Code on abatement of nuisances should have been applied in
their case, the fact that the buildings in question could also constitute
nuisances under the Civil Code does not preclude the Building Official from
issuing the assailed Demolition Order. As provided by P.D. No. 1096, the
authority of the Building Official to order the repair, vacation or demolition,
as the case may be, is without prejudice to further action that may be
undertaken under the relevant provisions of the Civil Code.35
9. The position taken by petitioners that the OBO is duty-bound to first order
the repair of ruinous and dangerous buildings is erroneous. Petitioners, in
their Memorandum,36 quoted Section 215 of the National Building Code,
thus:
a. Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings
b. When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the
Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the
degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action
that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.37
10. A careful reading of the provision shows that it does not require the OBO to
take actions in the same order or sequence that Section 215 enumerates
them. Instead, it authorizes the Building Official to order either the repair,
vacation, or demolition of the building depending on the circumstances
presented before it, particularly on the degree of danger to life, health and
safety. In the case at bench, the OBO, based on its assessment of the
buildings, deemed it necessary to recommend and order the demolition of
the said buildings, having found them dilapidated and deteriorated by up to
80%.
11. The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the resolution issued by the Office
of the President
12. Petitioners find error in the CA’s reliance on the report of the OBO in
affirming the resolution of the OP. Petitioners contend that the initiation of
the proceedings in the OBO was calculated to oust them from the property
and to circumvent their rights as builders in good faith thereby making the
findings and issuances of the OBO unreliable. Petitioners thus beseech this
Court to ascertain facts that have already been determined by the
administrative agencies involved and thereafter reviewed and affirmed by
the CA.
13. We find the contention without merit.
14. The mandate of the OBO is to act motu proprio, or upon petition validly
received, on reported dangerous and ruinous buildings and structures that
pose a threat to the life, health and well-being of the inhabitants, and the
general public. Hence, the OBO, based on its findings, can still act on the
matter pursuant to such mandate, notwithstanding petitioners’ claim that
respondents initiated the proceedings to circumvent their rights under the
law as builders in good faith. Otherwise stated, respondents’ motive in
initiating the proceedings which led to the issuance of the challenged OBO
Resolution and Demolition Order is immaterial as far as the OBO is
concerned, so long as it is satisfied that a building or structure is dangerous
and ruinous.
15. Remarkably, both the DPWH and the OP found no irregularities in the
manner that officials of the OBO performed their duties and in coming up
with its Resolution and Demolition Order. This conclusion was affirmed by
the CA when it resolved the petition before it.
16. We find no error on the part of the CA when it relied on the findings of fact
of the OBO and the other administrative bodies. As correctly stated by the
CA in its Decision:
a. The powers granted by law, particularly the National Building Code to the Building
Official regarding demolition of buildings are executive and administrative in
nature. It is a well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary
functions may not be interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have no
supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative
departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving
the exercise of judgment or discretion and findings of fact. The established
exception to the rule is where the issuing authority has gone beyond its statutory
authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without
regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion. None of these obtains in the
case at bar.
17. "By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative
agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard
are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts." 39 Such
findings must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even
preponderant.40 It is not the task of the appellate court to once again weigh
the evidence submitted before and passed upon by the administrative body
and to substitute its own judgment regarding sufficiency of evidence. 41
18. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 19,
2006 and the Resolution dated August 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 89783 are AFFIRMED.
3.) Sanchez v. CA
G.R. No. 152766 | June 20, 2003
FACTS:
1. Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot
owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624
with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez,
 Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow,
Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and
Felipe Sanchez.1  private right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in
2. On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the
name of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 19952 by all six (6) co-
owners in her favor.3 Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her signature
on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting
private respondent Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of
possession of the aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Caloocan City sometime in September 1995, subsequently raffled to Br. 49
of that court.
3. On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor of private respondent
declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining
as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having
been established as a forgery.
4. Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, subsequently
assigned to Br. 120. The trial court affirmed the 27 July 1998 decision of the MeTC.
5. On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in
favor of private respondent Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 November 1999 or a
year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to
heed the Notice.
6. On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s house without any special
permit of demolition from the court. Due to the demolition of her house which continued until
24 May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as
the house’s toilet and laundry area.
7. On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC on the
ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioner’s
appeal memorandum. However the RTC denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration.
8. On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo. On 23 May 2001 the appellate court
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. MR denied.
ISSUES:
1. W/N The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the challenged case before it.
RATIO:
1. Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.
2. This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co-
ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the Court of
Appeals, the notion of co-ownership11 was not sufficiently dealt with. We
attempt to address this controversy in the interest of substantial justice.
Certiorari should therefore be granted to cure this grave abuse of discretion.
3. Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as "the right of common dominion
which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially
or physically divided.12 Manresa defines it as the "manifestation of the
an exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is exercised by two or
more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and
the same."13 
4. The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are
the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that there
is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element
which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which
determines the rights and obligations of the co-owners.14 
5. In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is
fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by
agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is
impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for
the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the
interest of his co-owners.15 
6. Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-
ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of
the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a
trustee for the others.16 
7. Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-
owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner
has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or
thing.17 
8. Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the
property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest.
He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of
the other co-owners.18 But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete,
specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because his right
over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any
physical adjudication.19 
9. Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and
bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to
the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners,
her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be
effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine the
boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice
to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion
of the lot under dispute.
10. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the CA dated
23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59182 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the questioned lot
 with TCT No. 289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly licensed
geodetic engineer and the PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are ORDERED.
11. Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan
City to effect the aforementioned survey and partition, as well as segregate
the 1/6 portion appertaining to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.
12. The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia Teria shall be
RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion of the property is
concerned.
4.) In re Rodriguez & Anita Tan Ong v. Rodriguez,
G.R. No. 230404, 31 January 2018
FACTS:
1. Respondents Rolando Rodriguez, Racquel Gegajo, Rosalinda Landon,
Reynaldo Rodriguez, Jr., Ester Fulgencio, Rafael Rodriguez and Reynest
Rodriguez are children of Reynaldo Rodriguez (Reynaldo) and Ester
Rodriguez (Ester), who died on August 27, 2008 and September 11, 2004
respectively. 4
2. Reynaldo and Ester left several properties to their surviving children. On
February 13, 2009, respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of the late Reynaldo and Ester. 5
3. On the other hand, Anita is a co-depositor in a Joint Account under the
name Anita Ong Tan and Reynaldo with account number 003149-0718-56
in the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). When Reynaldo passed away,
said joint account continued to be in active status.6
4. On August 31, 2009, BPI sent a letter to Anita and informed her that her
joint account with Reynaldo would become dormant if no transaction will
be made. As such, Anita decided to withdraw her funds. BPI, however,
required her to submit additional requirements, one of which is the
extrajudicial settlement of the heirs of Reynaldo. 7 To comply with the
same, Anita approached respondents and asked them to sign a waiver of
rights to the said joint account. Respondents refused to sign the waiver as
they believed that the funds in the said joint account belonged to their
ISSUES:
father. 8
5. Respondents then submitted documents to BPI for the release of half of the
funds deposited in said joint account.9
6. BPI withheld the release of the funds because of the conflicting claims
RATIO:
between Anita and respondents. 10
7. In 2011, Anita filed before the trial court a petition for the: (a) settlement of
the Intestate Estate of the late Reynaldo; and (b) issuance of letters of
administration to any competent neutral willing person, other than any of
the heirs of Reynaldo.
8. Anita alleged that the funds used to open the BPI joint account were her
exclusive funds, which came from her East West Bank (East West) account.
To prove her claim, she presented as evidence a Debit Memo from East
West Bank, which was used for the issuance of a Manager's Check in the
amount of One Million Twenty-One Thousand Eight Hundred SixtyEight
and 30/100 Pesos (₱1,021,868.30), which exact amount was deposited to
the BPI joint account. 11 Anita presented the testimony of Mineleo Serrano,
Branch Manager of East West in Tomas Morato, to corroborate her
testimony that the subject amount came from her East West account. 12
9. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the funds deposited in
the BPI joint account belonged exclusively to Reynaldo.
10. In 2014, Rolando Rodriguez was appointed and took his oath as an
administrator of the subject estate.
11. In an Order13 dated March 13, 2015, the (RTC) ruled in favor of Anita. The RTC held that
Anita sufficiently adduced evidence to rebut the presumption that the funds deposited under the
BPI joint account of Anita and Reynaldo were owned by them in common. The fallo reads:
a. WHEREFORE, petitioner's claim against the estate of deceased Reynaldo G.
Rodriguez is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Rolando Rodriguez, in his capacity
as the appointed Administrator of the intestate estate of Reynaldo G. Rodriguez, is
hereby directed to withdraw, together with the petitioner, the funds under Joint
Account No. 003149-0718-56 deposited with the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
Kamuning Branch, Quezon City and the entire proceeds thereof be given to
petitioner.
12. Respondent MR denied. In a Decision15 dated June 13, 2016, the CA reversed the ruling of the
RTC. In giving credence to respondents' contention, the CA maintained that the presumption of
co-ownership as regards the nature of joint accounts was not sufficiently overturned, as Anita
failed to prove that she is indeed the sole owner of the funds therein. The CA disposed thus:
a. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
assailed Order dated March 13, 2015 and Order dated May 25, 2015 of the
Region[ al] Trial Court[,] Branch 74, Malabon City is hereby MODIFIED.
b. The bank deposit under the Joint Account number 003149-0718-56 is to be divided
in equal shares between Petitioner-appellee on one hand and the Respondents-
appellants on the other on a 50-50 proposition.
13. Anita filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied/
1. W/N the CA erred in declaring Anita and Reynaldo as co-owners of the
subject bank deposits despite the evidence submitted by Anita to prove
otherwise.
1. A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more natural persons, or
by two or more juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the
depositors are joint owners or co-owners of the said account, and their share
in the deposits shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. 19
 The nature of joint accounts is governed by the rule on co-ownership
embodied in Article 485 of the Civil Code, to wit:
a. Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall
be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the
contrary shall be void.
b. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved.
2. While the rule is that the shares of the owners of the joint account holders
are equal, the same may be overturned by evidence to the contrary. Hence,
the mere fact that an account is joint is not conclusive of the fact that the
owners thereof have equal claims over the funds in question.
3. In line with this, it is also indispensable to consider whether or not there
exists a survivorship agreement between the co-depositors. In said
agreement, the co-depositors agree that upon the death of either of them, the
share pertaining to the deceased shall accrue to the surviving co-depositor
or he can withdraw the entire deposit.20
4. It must be noted that there exists no survivorship agreement between Anita
and Reynaldo. Hence, it is but rightful to determine their respective shares
based on evidence presented during trial.
5. On this note, the Court agrees with the findings of the lower court that Anita
sufficiently proved that she owns the funds in the BPI joint account
exclusively.
6. It can be gleaned from the records that the money in the BPI joint account
amounts to (₱1,021,868.30), and it is undisputed that said amount came
from Anita's personal account with East West. In East West, Anita opened a
Trust Placement in August 2007 with the amount of Two Million Fourteen
Thousand Twenty-Four Pesos and Twenty-Five Centavos (₱2,014,024.25).
Based on East West's records, as testified to by· its Branch Manager, two
withdrawals were subsequently made: first, in the amount of
(₱1,021,868.30); and second, in the amount of (₱1,003,111.11 ). In all such
withdrawals, manager's checks were issued.
7. The exact amount which was first withdrawn from the East West account,
i.e., (₱1,021,868.30), was the exact amount used to open the BPI joint
account. Notable is the fact that these transactions occurred within the same
day on November 14, 2007.21 It is also significant to consider that no
further transaction in said joint account was made after the same was
opened until the death of Reynaldo.
8. With all these, it is apparent that Anita owned the funds exclusively as she
sufficiently overturned the presumption under the law. It bears stressing that
despite the evidence shown by Anita, respondents failed to refute her
evidence, other than their bare allegations that Anita and Reynaldo had an
amorous relationship and that Anita had no source of income to sustain the
funds in a bank. 22
9. The Court also takes note of the fact that respondents admitted that they
knew the existence of the joint account, yet they still failed to include the
same in the list of included properties in the inventory when they executed
an extrajudicial settlement. Their failure to include said joint account in the
list of the items owned by Reynaldo for the purposes of determining his
estate obviously refutes their claim that Reynaldo was the sole owner of the
funds in said joint account.
10. Taken together, the Court finds the ruling of the trial court that Anita is the
sole owner of the funds in question proper.1âwphi1
11. Lastly, noteworthy is the fact that even if the probing arms of an intestate
court is limited, it is equally important to consider the call of the exercise of
its power of adjudication especially so when the case calls for the same, to
wit:
a. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity
and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders
involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate
of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over
properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and
reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and
caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.2
12. The facts obtaining in this case call for the determination of the ownership
of the funds contained in the BPI joint account; for the intestate estate of
Reynaldo has already been extrajudicially settled by his heirs. The trial
court, in this case, exercised sound judiciousness when it ruled out the
inclusion of the BPI joint account in the estate of the decedent.
13. Equally important is the rule that the determination of whether or not a particular matter should
be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its
limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land registration, etc.) is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice
"which may be waived."24
14. Such waiver introduces the exception to the general rule that while the probate court exercises
limited jurisdiction, it may settle questions relating to ownership when the claimant and all
other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment.25
15. Such waiver was evident from the fact that the respondents sought for affirmative relief before
the court a quo as they claimed ownership over the funds in the joint account of their father to
the exclusion of his co-depositor.
16. In this case, the Court notes that the parties submitted to the· jurisdiction of the intestate court
in settling the issue of the ownership of the joint account. While respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss, which hypothetically admitted all the allegations in Anita's petition, the same likewise
sought affirmative relief from the intestate court. Said affirmative relief is embodied in
respondents' claim of ownership over the funds in said joint account to the exclusion of Anita,
when in fact said funds in the joint account was neither mentioned nor included in the
inventory of the intestate estate of the late Reynaldo. Therefore, respondents impliedly agreed
to submit the issue of ownership before the trial court, acting as an intestate court, when they
raised an affirmative relief before it. To reiterate, the exercise of the trial court of its limited
 jurisdiction is not jurisdictional, but procedural; hence, waivable.
17. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated June 13, 2016 and Resolution dated March 3, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 105665 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Order dated March 13, 2015 of the Regional Trial'
Court of Malabon City, Branch 74 is REINSTATED.
5.) Torres v. Lapinid
Ga G.R. No. 187987 | November 26, 2014
FACTS:
1. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of CA affirming RTC which
dismissed the complaint for the declaration of nullity of deed of sale against
respondent Lorenzo Lapinid (Lapinid).
2. On 4 February 2006, Vicente V. Torres, Jr. (Vicente), Mariano Velez
(Mariano)5 and Carlos Velez (petitioners) filed a Complaint6 before RTC
Cebu City praying for the nullification of the sale of real property by
respondent Jesus Velez (Jesus) in favor of Lapinid; the recovery of
possession and ownership of the property; and the payment of damages.
3. Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they, including Jesus, are co-
owners of several parcels of land including the disputed Lot. No.
43897 located at Cogon, Carcar, Cebu. Sometime in 1993, Jesus filed an
action for partition of the parcels of land against the petitioners and other
co-owners before Branch 21 of RTC Cebu City. On 13 August 2001, a
judgment was rendered based on a compromise agreement signed by the
parties wherein they agreed that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were jointly
authorized to sell the said properties and receive the proceeds thereof and
distribute them to all the co-owners. However, the agreement was later
amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. Pursuant to their mandate,
the petitioners inspected the property and discovered that Lapinid was
occupying a specific portion of the 3000 square meters of Lot No. 4389 by
virtue of a deed of sale executed by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. It was pointed
out by petitioner that as a consequence of what they discovered, a forcible
entry case was filed against Lapinid.
4. The petitioners prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void
arguing that the sale of a definite portion of a co-owned property without
notice to the other co-owners is without force and effect. Further, the
complainants prayed for payment of rental fees amounting to ₱1,000.00 per
month from January 2004 or from the time of deprivation of property in
addition to attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
5. Answering the allegations, Jesus admitted that there was a partition case
between him and the petitioners filed in 1993 involving several parcels of
land including the contested Lot No. 4389. However, he insisted that as
early as 6 November 1997, a motion 8 was signed by the co-owners
(including the petitioners) wherein Lot No. 4389 was agreed to be
adjudicated to the co-owners belonging to the group of Jesus and the other
lots be divided to the other co-owners belonging to the group of Torres.
Jesus further alleged that even prior to the partition and motion, several
coowners in his group had already sold their shares to him in various dates
of 1985, 1990 and 2004.9 Thus, when the motion was filed and signed by
the parties on 6 November 1997, his rights asa majority co-owner (73%) of
Lot No. 4389 became consolidated. Jesus averred that it was unnecessary to
give notice of the sale as the lot was already adjudicated in his favor. He
clarified that he only agreed with the 2001 Compromise Agreement
believing that it only pertained to the remaining parcels of land excluding
Lot No. 4389.10
6. On his part, Lapinid admitted that a deed of sale was entered into between
him and Jesus pertaining to a parcel of land with an area of 3000 square
meters. However, he insisted on the validity of sale since Jesus showed him
several deeds of sale making him a majority owner of Lot No. 4389. He
further denied that he acquired a specific and definite portion of the
questioned property, citing as evidence the deed of sale which does not
mention any boundaries or specific portion. He explained that Jesus
permitted him to occupy a portion not exceeding 3000 square meters
conditioned on the result of the partition of the co-owners.11
7. Regarding the forcible entry case, Jesus and Lapinid admitted that such case
was filed but the same was already dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court
of Carcar, Cebu. In that decision, it was ruled that the buyers, including
Lapinid, were buyers in good faith since a proof of ownership was shown to
them by Jesus before buying the property.12
8. On 15 October 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint of petitioners in this wise:
a. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint. At the same time, the Court
NULLIFIES the site assignment made by Jesus Velez in the Deed of Sale, dated
November 9, 1997, of Lorenzo Lapinid’s portion, the exact location of which still
has to be determined either by agreement of the co-owners or by the Court in proper
proceedings.13
9. MR denied. On 30 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed 16 the decision of the trial court.
It validated the sale and ruled that the compromise agreement did not affect the validity of the
sale previously executed by Jesus and Lapinid. It likewise dismissed the claim for rental
payments, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of the petitioners.
10. Upon appeal before this Court, the petitioners echo the same arguments
posited before the lower courts. They argue that Lapinid, as the successor-
in-interest of Jesus, is also bound by the 2001 judgment based on
compromise stating that the parcels of land must be sold jointly by Jesus,
 Mariano and Vicente and the proceeds of the sale be divided among the
coowners. To further strengthen their contention, they advance the
argument that since the portion sold was a definite and specific portion of a
co-owned property, the entire deed of sale must be declared null and void.
ISSUES:
1. Admittedly, Jesus sold an area of land to Lapinid on 9 November 1997. To
simplify, the question now is whether Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell
a portion of the property he co-owns in favor of another person. We answer
in the affirmative.
RATIO:
2. a We deny the petition.
3. A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and proindiviso
share in the co-owned property.17 He has the right to alienate, assign and
mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third person in its enjoyment
provided that no personal rights will be affected. This is evident from the
provision of the Civil Code:
a. Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
4. A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the
right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is
truly abstract.18 Hence, his co-owners have no right to enjoin a coowner
who intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion or substitute a third
person in its enjoyment.19
5. In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of
Lapinid, free from any opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a
transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of the
execution of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not perfected,
the validity of sale subsists. In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus
as co-owner of an ideal and proportionate share in the property held in
common.20 Thus, from the perfection of contract on 9 November 1997,
Lapinid eventually became a co-owner of the property.
6. Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation that the
disposition in favor of Lapinid before partition was a concrete or definite
portion, the validity of sale still prevails.
7. In a catena of decisions,21 the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that no
individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion before partition of
co-owned property. Each co-owner only possesses a right to sell or alienate
his ideal share after partition. However, in case he disposes his share before
partition, such disposition does not make the sale or alienation null and
void. What will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share,
subject to the results of the partition. The co-owners who did not give their
consent to the sale stand to be unaffected by the alienation.22
8. As explained in Spouses Del Campo v. Court of Appeals:23
a. We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a
particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-
owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything
atall in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him.
Since the coowner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the
contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale
are the same rights as the vendor had asco-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the
consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the
shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the
property held in common.24
9. Also worth noting is the pronouncement in Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong:25
a. x x x The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portionof
the hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a wellestablished principle that
the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to
do so. "Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantumvalere potest." (When a thing is
of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have).26 (Italics theirs).
10. Consequently, whether the disposition involves an abstract or concrete
portion of the co-owned property, the sale remains validly executed.
11. The validity of sale being settled, it follows that the subsequent compromise
agreement between the other co-owners did not affect the rights of Lapinid
as a co-owner.
12. Records show that on 13 August 2001, a judgment based on compromise
agreement was rendered with regard to the previous partition case involving
the same parties pertaining to several parcels of land, including the disputed
lot. The words of the compromise state that:
a. COME NOW[,] the parties and to this Honorable Court, most respectfully state that
instead of partitioning the properties, subject matter of litigation, that they will just
sell the properties covered by TCT Nos. 25796, 25797 and 25798 of the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Cebu and divide the proceeds among themselves.
b. That Jesus Velez, Mariano Velez and Vicente Torres, Jr. are currently authorized to
sell said properties, receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them to the parties.27
13. Be that as it may, the compromise agreement failed to defeat the already
accrued right of ownership of Lapinid over the share sold by Jesus. As early
as 9 November 1997, Lapinid already became a co-owner of the property
and thus, vested with all the rights enjoyed by the other co-owners. The
judgment based on the compromise agreement, which is to have the covered
properties sold, is valid and effectual provided as it does not affect the
proportionate share of the non-consenting party. Accordingly, when the
compromise agreement was executed without Lapinid’s consent, said
agreement could not have affected his ideal and undivided share. Petitioners
 cannot sell Lapinid’s share absent his consent. Nemo dat quod non habet –
"no one can give what he does not have."28
14. This Court has ruled in many cases that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent tothe sale. This is because the sale or
other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of
the thing owned in common.29
15. We find unacceptable the argument that Lapinid must pay rental payments
to the other co-owners.1âwphi1
16. As previously discussed, Lapinid, from the execution of sale, became a co-
owner vested with rights to enjoy the property held in common.
17. Clearly specified in the Civil Code are the following rights:
a. Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so
in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to
injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by
agreement, express or implied.
b. Art. 493. Each co-owner shall havethe full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rightsare
involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
18. Affirming these rights, the Court held in Aguilar v. Court of Appeals that:30
a. x x x Each co-owner of property heldpro indivisoexercises his rights over the whole
property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall
not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is
made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-
ownerexercises, together with his coparticipants joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. 31 From the
foregoing, it is absurd to rule that Lapinid, who is already a co-owner, be ordered to
pay rental payments to his other co-owners. Lapinid’s right of enjoyment over the
property owned in common must be respected despite opposition and may notbe
limited as long he uses the property to the purpose for which it isintended and he
does not injure the interest of the co-ownership.
19. Finally, we find no error on denial of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
20. Petitioners cite Jesus' act of selling a definite portion to Lapinid as the
reason which forced them to litigate and file their complaint. However,
though the Court may not fault the complainants when they filed a
complaint based on their perceived cause of action, they should have also
considered thoroughly that it is well within the rights of a co-owner to
validly sell his ideal share pursuant to law and jurisprudence.
21. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 30 January 2009 and 14 May 2009
are hereby AFFIRMED.
6.) Cruz v. Catapang,
G.R. No. 164110, 12 February 2008
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-
owners of a parcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located
at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas.5 With the consent of Norma
Maligaya, one of the aforementioned co-owners, respondent Teofila M.
Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of
land sometime in 1992. The house intruded, however, on a portion of the
co-owned property.6
2. In the first week of September 1995, petitioner Leonor B. Cruz visited the
property and was surprised to see a part of respondent’s house intruding
unto a portion of the co-owned property. She then made several demands
upon respondent to demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the
portion encroaching on their property. The respondent, however, refused
and disregarded her demands.7
3. On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint8 for forcible entry
against respondent before the 7th MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided
in favor of petitioner, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to
justify defendant’s construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in
question.9 The dispositive portion of the MCTC decision reads: 
a. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant or any person
acting in her behalf to vacate and deliver the possession of the area illegally
occupied to the plaintiff; ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff reasonable
attorney’s fees of P10,000.00, plus costs of suit. 
4. On appeal, the RTC, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, affirmed the MCTC’s ruling in a Decision
dated October 22, 2001, the dispositive portion of which states:
a. Wherefore, premises considered, the decision [appealed] from is hereby
affirmed in toto.
5. After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, respondent filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC’s decision. The Court of Appeals
held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case because respondent’s entry
into the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be
characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for
forcible entry.12 The Court of Appeals’ decision further held that petitioner’s remedy is not an
action for ejectment but an entirely different recourse with the appropriate forum. The Court of
Appeals disposed, thus:
a. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision dated 22 October 2001 as well as the
Order dated 07 January 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Taal, Batangas, Branch
86, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another is
entered DISMISSING the complaint for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No.
71-T.
 6. After petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated June 11, 2004, she filed the instant petition.
Petitioner prays in her petition that we effectively reverse the Court of
Appeals’ decision.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Simply put, the main issue before us is whether consent given by a
co-owner of a parcel of land to a person to construct a house on the co-
owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by
another co-owner against that person.
RATIO:
1. T In her memorandum,16 petitioner contends that the consent and
knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the action for
forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no
individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or
thing owned in common until partition.
2. On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum 17 counters that the
complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into the
property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the
co-owners. She further argues that since Norma Maligaya is residing in the
house she built, the issue is not just possession de facto but also one
of possession de jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy the
property.
3. As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant
the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the
person who was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned
property, we have held that a co-owner cannot devote common property to
his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. 18 In our view,
a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-
owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his
or her exclusive use.
4. Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide: 
a. Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so
in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to
injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by
agreement, express or implied.
b. Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make
alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would result
therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-
owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate
relief.
5. Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common
provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended
and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving
consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property will
injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from
using the property in accordance with their rights.
6. Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of
the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. It
necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent
of the other co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration
by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common.
Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any
encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of
alteration.19 The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an
act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491
of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners,
respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned
property. 
7. Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by
Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz
Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned
property. Her entry into the property still falls under the classification
"through strategy or stealth." 
8. The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because
respondent’s entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due
to the consent given to her by one of the co-owners. We cannot give our
imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion. Respondent’s entry into the
property without the permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and
clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom
respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected
clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be
categorized as possession by stealth.20 
9. Moreover, respondent’s act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her
sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed
house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to
enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute
forcible entry.
10. Petitioner’s filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within the one-year period
for filing the complaint. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry
is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made
through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the petitioner learned about
it.21 Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was only in September 1995 that
petitioner learned of it when she visited the property. Accordingly, she then made demands on
respondent to vacate the premises. Failing to get a favorable response, petitioner filed the
complaint on January 25, 1996, which is within the one-year period from the time petitioner
 learned of the construction.
11. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. CA REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated October 22, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 86, Taal, Batangas is REINSTATED. Costs against respondent.
7.) Catedrilla v. Lauron,
G.R. No. 179011, 15 April 2013
FACTS:
1. On February 12, 2003, petitioner Rey Castigador Catedrilla filed with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lambunao, Iloilo a Complaint 4 for
ejectment against the spouses Mario and Margie Lauron alleging as follows:
that Lorenza Lizada is the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 183,
located in Mabini Street, Lambunao, Iloilo, which was declared for taxation
purposes in her name under Tax Declaration No. 0363;5 that on February
13, 1972, Lorenza died and was succeeded to her properties by her sole heir
Jesusa Lizada Losañes, who was married to Hilarion Castigador
(Castigador);
2. that the spouses Jesusa and Hilarion Castigador had a number of children,
which included Lilia Castigador (Lilia), who was married to Maximo
Catedrilla (Maximo); that after the death of the spouses Castigador, their
heirs agreed among themselves to subdivide Lot 183 and, pursuant to a
consolidation subdivision plan6 dated January 21, 1984, the parcel of lot
denominated as Lot No. 5 therein was to be apportioned to the heirs of Lilia
since the latter already died on April 9, 1976; Lilia was succeeded by her
heirs, her husband Maximo and their children, one of whom is herein
petitioner; that petitioner filed the complaint as a co-owner of Lot No. 5;
that sometime in 1980, respondents Mario and Margie Lauron, through the
tolerance of the heirs of Lilia, constructed a residential building of strong
materials on the northwest portion of Lot No. 5 covering an area of one
hundred square meters; that the heirs of Lilia made various demands for
respondents to vacate the premises and even exerted earnest efforts to
compromise with them but the same was unavailing; and that petitioner
reiterated the demand on respondents to vacate the subject lot on January
15, 2003, but respondents continued to unlawfully withhold such
possession.
3. In their Answer,7 respondents claimed that petitioner had no cause of action
against them, since they are not the owners of the residential building
standing on petitioner's lot, but Mildred Kascher (Mildred), sister of
respondent Margie, as shown by the tax declaration in Mildred's name; 8 that
in 1992, Mildred had already paid ₱10,000.00 as downpayment for the
subject lot to Teresito Castigador; 9 that there were several instances that the
heirs of Lilia offered the subject Lot 183 for sale to respondents and
Mildred and demanded payment, however, the latter was only interested in
asking money without any intention of delivering or registering the subject
lot; that in 1998, Maximo, petitioner's father, and respondent Margie
entered into an amicable settlement 10 before the Barangay Lupon of
Poblacion Ilawod, Lambunao, Iloilo wherein Maximo offered the subject lot
to the spouses Alfons and Mildred Kascher in the amount of ₱90,000.00
with the agreement that all documents related to the transfer of the subject
lot to Maximo and his children be prepared by Maximo, but the latter failed
to comply; and that the amicable settlement should have the force and effect
of a final judgment of a court, hence, the instant suit is barred by prior
judgment. Respondents counterclaimed for damages.
4. On November 14, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision, 11 the dispositive portion of which reads:
a. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
ordering the defendants:
b. 1. To vacate the lot in question and restore possession to the plaintiff;
c. 2. To pay plaintiff in the reduced amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) as
Atty's fees, plus ONE THOUSAND (₱1,000.00) per Court appearance;
d. 3. To pay plaintiff reasonable compensation for the use of the lot in question ONE
THOUSAND (₱1,000.00) pesos yearly counted from the date of demand;
5. The MTC found that from the allegations and evidence presented, it appeared that petitioner is one of the
heirs of Lilia Castigador Catedrilla, the owner of the subject lot and that respondents are occupying the
subject lot; that petitioner is a party who may bring the suit in accordance with Article 487 13 of the Civil
Code; and as a co-owner, petitioner is allowed to bring this action for ejectment under Section 1, Rule 70 14 of
the Rules of Court; that respondents are also the proper party to be sued as they are the occupants of the
subject lot which they do not own; and that the MTC assumed that the house standing on the subject lot has
been standing thereon even before 1992 and only upon the acquiescence of the petitioner and his
predecessor-in-interest.
6. The MTC found that respondents would like to focus their defense on the ground that Mildred is an
indispensable party, because she is the owner of the residential building on the subject lot and that there was
already a perfected contract to sell between Mildred and Maximo because of an amicable settlement
executed before the Office of the Punong Barangay.
7. However, the MTC, without dealing on the validity of the document and its interpretation, ruled that it was
clear that respondent Margie was representing her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Bienvenido Loraña, in the dispute
presented with the Punong Barangay. It also found that even Mildred's letter to petitioner's father Maximo
recognized the title of petitioner's father over the subject lot and that it had not been established by
respondents if Teresito Castigador, the person who signed the receipt evidencing Mildred's downpayment of
₱10,000.00 for the subject lot, is also one of the heirs of Lilia. The MTC concluded that respondents could
not be allowed to deflect the consequences of their continued stay over the property, because it was their
very occupation of the property which is the object of petitioner's complaint; that in an action for ejectment,
the subject matter is material possession or possession de facto over the real property, and the side issue of
ownership over the subject lot is tackled here only for the purpose of determining who has the better right of
possession which is to prove the nature of possession; that possession of Lot 183 should be relinquished by
respondents to petitioner, who is a co-owner, without foreclosing other remedies that may be availed upon
by Mildred in the furtherance of her supposed rights.
8. Respondents filed their appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, raffled off to Branch 26.
On March 22, 2005, the RTC rendered its Order,15 the dispositive portion of which reads:
 a. WHEREFORE, circumstances herein-above considered, the decision of the court dated
November 14, 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED, except for the payment of ₱20,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
9. The RTC found that petitioner, being one of the co-owners of the subject lot, is the proper party in interest to
prosecute against any intruder thereon. It found that the amicable settlement signed and executed by the
representatives of the registered owner of the premises before the Lupon is not binding and unenforceable
between the parties. It further ruled that even if Mildred has her name in the tax declaration signifying that
she is the owner of the house constructed on the subject lot, tax declarations are not evidence of ownership
but merely issued to the declarant for purposes of payment of taxes; that she cannot be considered as an
indispensable party in a suit for recovery of possession against respondents; that Mildred should have
intervened and proved that she is an indispensable party because the records showed that she was not in
actual possession of the subject lot. The RTC deleted the attorney's fees, since the MTC decision merely
ordered the payment of attorney's fees without any basis. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was
denied in an Order17 dated June 8, 2005.
10. Dissatisfied, respondents filed with the CA a petition for review. Petitioner filed his Comment thereto.
11. On February 28, 2007, the CA issued its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
a. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 26, Iloilo City, dated March 22, 2005, that affirmed the
MTC Decision dated November 14, 2003, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
b. Consequently, the complaint for ejectment of the respondent is DISMISSED.18
12. The CA found that only petitioner filed the case for ejectment against respondents and ruled that the other
heirs should have been impleaded as plaintiffs citing Section 1, 19 Rule 7 and Section 7, 20 Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court; that the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power; that when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed as without the
presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief
in favor of the respondents.
13. The CA also ruled that while petitioner asserted that the proper parties to be sued are the respondents as they
are the actual possessors of the subject lot and not Mildred, petitioner still cannot disclaim knowledge that it
was to Mildred to whom his co-owners offered the property for sale, thus, he knew all along that the real
owner of the house on the subject lot is Mildred and not respondents; that Mildred even paid ₱10,000.00 out
of the total consideration for the subject lot and required respondents' relatives to secure the documents that
proved their ownership over the subject lot; that Maximo and Mildred had previously settled the matter
regarding the sale of the subject lot before the Barangay as contained in an amicable settlement signed by
Maximo and respondent Margie. Thus, the question in this case extends to mere possessory rights and non-
inclusion of indispensable parties made the complaint fatally defective. From the facts obtaining in this case,
ejectment being a summary remedy is not the appropriate action to file against the alleged deforciant of the
property.
14. Hence, this petition for review wherein petitioner raises the following
issues:
ISSUES:
15. a
RATIO:
1. The CA found that petitioner's co-heirs to the subject lot should have been
impleaded as co-plaintiffs in the ejectment case against respondents, since
without their presence, the trial court could not validly render judgment and
grant relief in favor of petitioner.
2. We do not concur.
3. Petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his co-
owners. In Wee v. De Castro, 22 wherein petitioner therein argued that the
respondent cannot maintain an action for ejectment against him, without
joining all his co-owners, we ruled in this wise:
a. Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on this point:
b. ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
c. This article covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible
entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). As explained by
the renowned civilest, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino:
i. A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining
all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the
co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
d. In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman, this Court declared
that a co-owner is not even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for
complete relief can be afforded even in his absence, thus:
i. In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in
interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of
action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of
the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery
of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other
co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary
parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without
their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.23
4. In this case, although petitioner alone filed the complaint for unlawful
detainer, he stated in the complaint that he is one of the heirs of the late
Lilia Castigador, his mother, who inherited the subject lot, from her parents.
Petitioner did not claim exclusive ownership of the subject lot, but he filed
the complaint for the purpose of recovering its possession which would
redound to the benefit of the co-owners. Since petitioner recognized the
existence of a co-ownership, he, as a co-owner, can bring the action without
the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs.
5. Petitioner contends that the CA committed a reversible error in finding that
Mildred Kascher is an indispensable party and that her non-inclusion as a
party defendant in the ejectment case made the complaint fatally defective,
thus, must be dismissed.
6. We agree with petitioner.
7. The CA based its findings that Mildred is an indispensable party because it
found that petitioner knew all along that Mildred is the owner of the house
constructed on the subject lot as shown in the affidavits 24 of Maximo and
petitioner stating that petitioner's co-owners had offered for sale the subject
lot to Mildred, and that Maximo, petitioner's father, and Mildred had
previously settled before the Barangay the matter regarding the sale of the
subject lot to the latter as contained in the amicable settlement.
8. We find that the affidavits of Maximo and petitioner merely stated that the
lot was offered for sale to Mildred, but nowhere did it admit that Mildred is
the owner of the house constructed on the subject lot.
9. Also, it appears that the amicable settlement 25 before the Barangay wherein
it was stated that Maximo will sell the subject lot to the spouses Alfons and
Mildred Kascher was signed by Maximo on behalf of his children and
respondent Margie on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Bienvenido Loraña. Thus,
there is no basis for the CA's conclusion that it was Mildred and Maximo
who had previously settled the sale of the subject lot.
10. Moreover, it appears however, that while there was a settlement, Liah C.
Catedrilla, one of petitioner's co-heirs, wrote a letter 26 dated October 30,
2002, to the Spouses Loraña and respondent Margie stating that the latter
had made a change on the purchase price for the subject lot which was
different from that agreed upon in the amicable settlement. Records neither
show that respondent Margie had taken steps to meet with Liah or any of
her co-heirs to settle the matter of the purchase price nor rebut such
allegation in the letter if it was not true.
11. The letter27 dated July 5, 2003 of respondent Margie's counsel addressed to
petitioner's counsel, stating that his client is amenable in the amount as
proposed in the amicable settlement, would not alter the fact of respondents'
non-compliance with the settlement since the letter was sent after the
ejectment case had already been filed by petitioner.
12. In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,28 we explained the nature of the amicable
settlement reached after a barangay conciliation, thus:
a. Indeed, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable
settlement reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect
of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to nullify the same is
filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its date. It
further provides that the settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong
tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its date, or by action in the appropriate
city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period. This special provision
follows the general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.:
b. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there
shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.1âwphi1
c. Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the
law between the parties themselves. It has upon them the effect and authority of res
judicata even if not judicially approved, and cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed
except for vices of consent and forgery.
d. However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos, we clarified that the broad precept
enunciated in Art. 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code, which provides:
i. If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the
other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded
and insist upon his original demand.
e. We explained, viz.:
i. Before the onset of the new Civil Code, there was no right to rescind
compromise agreements. Where a party violated the terms of a
compromise agreement, the only recourse open to the other party was to
enforce the terms thereof.
ii. When the new Civil Code came into being, its Article 2041 x x x created
for the first time the right of rescission. That provision gives to the
aggrieved party the right to "either enforce the compromise or regard it
as rescinded and insist upon his original demand." Article 2041 should
obviously be deemed to qualify the broad precept enunciated in Article
2037 that "a compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of
res judicata.
f. In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he
chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there
had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for
rescission. This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded by
the breach thereof of the other party.29
13. While the amicable settlement executed between Maximo and respondent
Margie before the Barangay had the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court, it appears that there was non-compliance thereto by respondent
Margie on behalf of her parents which may be construed as repudiation. The
settlement is considered rescinded in accordance with the provision of
Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Since the settlement was rescinded,
petitioner, as a co-owner, properly instituted the action for ejectment to
recover possession of the subject lot against respondents who are in
possession of the same.
14. Even the receipt30 signed by a certain Teresito Castigador, acknowledging
having received from Mildred the amount of ₱10,000.00 as downpayment
for the purchase of the subject lot, would not also prove respondents'
allegation that there was already a perfected contract to sell the subject lot to
Mildred, since the authority of Teresito to sell on behalf of the heirs of Lilia
Castigador was not established.
15. In ejectment cases, the only issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants. 31 In an action for
unlawful detainer, the real party-in-interest as party-defendant is the person
who is in possession of the property without the benefit of any contract of
lease and only upon the tolerance and generosity of its owner.32 
16. Well settled is the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the
latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him.33 His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of
lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the
owner.34
17. Here, records show that the subject lot is owned by petitioner's mother, and
petitioner, being an heir and a co-owner, is entitled to the possession of the
 subject lot. On the other hand, respondent spouses are the occupants of the
subject lot which they do not own. Respondents' possession of the subject
lot was without any contract of lease as they failed to present any, thus
lending credence to petitioner's claim that their stay in the subject lot is by
mere tolerance of petitioner and his predecessors.1âwphi1 It is indeed
respondents spouses who are the real parties-in-interest who were correctly
impleaded as defendants in the unlawful detainer case filed by petitioner.
18. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Decision dated February 28, 2007 and the Resolution dated July 11,
2007 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Order dated March 22, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Iloilo
City, in Civil Case No. 04-27978, is hereby REINSTATED.
8.) Cruz v. Leis,
(G.R. No. 125233, 9 March 2000
FACTS:
1. Private respondents, the heirs of spouses Adriano Leis and Gertrudes
Isidro,1 filed an action before the (RTC) of Pasig seeking the nullification of
the contracts of sale over a lot executed by Gertrudes Isidro in favor of
petitioner Alexander Cruz, as well as the title subsequently issued in the
name of the latter. Private respondents claimed that the contracts were
vitiated by fraud as Gertrudes was illiterate and already 80 years old at the
time of the execution of the contracts; that the price for the land was
insufficient as it was sold only for P39,083.00 when the fair market value of
the lot should be P1,000.00 per square meter, instead of P390.00, more or
less; and that the property subject of the sale was conjugal and,
consequently, its sale without the knowledge and consent of private
respondents was in derogation of their rights as heirs.
2. Adriano and Gertrudes were married on 19 April 1923. On 27 April 1955,
Gertrudes acquired from the then Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (DANR) a parcel of land with an area of one hundred (100)
square meters, situated at Bo. Sto. Niño, Marikina, Rizal and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42245. The Deed of Sale described
Gertrudes as a widow. On 2 March 1956, TCT No. 43100 was issued in the
name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was also referred to therein as a "widow."
3. On 2 December 1973, Adriano died. It does not appear that he executed a
will before his death.
4. On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners, the
spouses Alexander and Adelaida Cruz, in the amount of P15,000.00 at 5%
interest, payable on or before 5 February 1986. The loan was secured by a
mortgage over the property covered by TCT No. 43100. Gertrudes,
however, failed to pay the loan on the due date.
5. Unable to pay her outstanding obligation after the debt became due and
payable, on 11 March 1986, Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of
petitioner Alexander Cruz. The first is denominated as "Kasunduan" which
the parties concede is a pacto de retro sale, granting Gertrudes one year
within which to repurchase the property. The second is a "Kasunduan ng
Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same property for
the price of P39,083.00, the same amount stipulated in the "Kasunduan."
6. For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof was
consolidated in the name of Alexander Cruz in whose name TCT No.
130584 was issued on 21 April 1987, canceling TCT No. 43100 in the name
of Gertrudes Isidro.
7. On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein private
respondents, received demands to vacate the premises from petitioners, the
new owners of the property. Private respondents responded by filing a
complaint as mentioned at the outset.
8. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. The RTC
held that the land was conjugal property since the evidence presented by private respondents disclosed that
the same was acquired during the marriage of the spouses and that Adriano contributed money for the
purchase of the property. Thus, the court concluded, Gertrudes could only sell to petitioner spouses her one-
half share in the property.
9. The trial court also ruled that no fraud attended the execution of the contracts. Nevertheless, the
"Kasunduan," providing for a sale con pacto de retro, had superseded the "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan"
the deed of absolute sale. The trial court did not consider the pacto de retro sale an equitable mortgage,
despite the allegedly insufficient price. Nonetheless, the trial court found for private respondents. It
rationalized that petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring
a judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be recorded in the Registry of
Property.
10. The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads:
a. WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
b. 1. Declaring Exhibit G — "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan" Null and Void and declar[ing] that
the title issued pursuant thereto is likewise Null and Void; 2. Declaring the property in litigation
as conjugal property; 3. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Marikina Branch to reinstate the title
of Gertrudes Isidro; 4. Ordering the plaintiff[s] [sic] to comply with the provision[s] of Article
1607 in relation to Article 1616 of the Civil Code;
11. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in vain. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, holding that since the property was acquired during the marriage of Gertrudes to
Adriano, the same was presumed to be conjugal property under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The appellate
court, like the trial court, also noted that petitioner did not comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the
Civil Code.
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
1. Petitioners are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. First, they contend that the subject property is not
conjugal but is owned exclusively by Gertrudes, who was described in the
Deed of Sale between Gertrudes and the DANR as well as in TCT No.
43100 as a widow. Second, assuming the land was conjugal property,
petitioners argue that the same became Gertrudes' exclusively when, in
1979, she mortgaged the property to the Daily Savings Bank and Loan
Association. The bank later foreclosed on the mortgage in 1981 but
Gertrudes redeemed the same in 1983.
2. The paraphernal or conjugal nature of the property is not determinative of the ownership of the
disputed property. If the property was paraphernal as contended by petitioners, Gertrudes Isidro
would have the absolute right to dispose of the same, and absolute title and ownership was
vested in petitioners upon the failure of Gertrudes to redeem the property. On the other hand, if
the property was conjugal as private respondents maintain, upon the death of Adriano Leis, the
conjugal partnership was terminate,3 entitling Gertrudes to one-half of the property.4 
3. Adriano's rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to
his heirs,5 which includes his widow Gertrudes, who is entitled to the same
share as that of each of the legitimate children. 6 Thus, as a result of the death
of Adriano, a regime of co-ownership arose between Gertrudes and the
other heirs in relation to the property.
4. Incidentally, there is no merit in petitioners' contention that Gertrudes'
redemption of the property from the Daily Savings Bank vested in
ownership over the same to the exclusion of her co-owners. We dismissed
the same argument by one of the petitioners in Paulmitan vs. Court of
Appeals,7 where one of the petitioners therein claimed ownership of the
entire property subject of the case by virtue of her redemption thereof after
the same was forfeited in favor of the provincial government for non-
payment of taxes. We held however, that the redemption of the land "did
not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of
the co-ownership." We expounded, quoting our pronouncement in Adille
vs. Court of Appeals:8 
a. The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive
ownership over the property held in common?
b. Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute
devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption
within the period required by law. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the
old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right
to demand redemption of the entire property.
c. There is no merit in this petition.
d. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share
alone (CIVL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 1514.). While the records
show that petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses
therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put
to end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no doubt that
redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:
e. Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common
and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by
renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of
the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-
ownership.
f. The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a
vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent
to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property
in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the
co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and
consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the provision does not
give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide
for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
5. It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only
dispose of her share in the property owned in common. Article 493 of the
Civil Code:
a. Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
6. Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was registered
in TCT No. 43100 solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where
a parcel of land, forming past of the undistributed properties of the
dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser
who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely
in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land
even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The rationale for this rule
is that "a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the
register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with
notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the
register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one
of the primary objects of the Torrens system."9 
7. As gleaned from the foregoing discussion, despite the Court of Appeals'
finding and conclusion that Gertrudes as well as private respondents failed
to repurchase the property within the period stipulated and has lost all their
rights to it, it still ruled against petitioners by affirming the Regional Trial
Court's decision on the premise that there was no compliance with Article
1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial hearing before registration of the
property in the name of petitioners. This provision states:
a. Art. 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by
virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with the provisions of article 1616 shall
not be recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor
has been duly heard.
8. The aforequoted article is intended to minimize the evils which the pacto de
retro sale has caused in the hands of usurers.1âwphi1 A judicial order is
necessary in order to determine the true nature of the transaction and to
 prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while the determination is
being made. 10  to the Borbe family and the Espiritu family. Those three parcels of land
9. It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the
Registry of Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not
a condition sine qua non to the transfer of ownership. Petitioners are the
owners of the subject property since neither Gertrudes nor her co-owners
redeemed the same within the one-year period stipulated in the
"Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and
ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro,
subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a
retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to
perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law
absolute title and ownership over the property sold. As title is already
vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his title under Article
1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership for the
method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering the
consolidated title. 11 
10. WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA is MODIFIED in that the petitioners are deemed
owners of the property by reason of the failure of the vendor, Gertrudes Isidro, to repurchase
the same within the period stipulated. However, TCT No. 130584, in the name of Alexander
M. Cruz, which was issued without judicial order, is hereby ordered CANCELLED, and TCT
No. 43100 in the name of Gertrudes Isidro is ordered REINSTATED, without prejudice to
compliance by petitioners with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code.
9.) Cabrera v. Ysaac
G.R. No. 166790, 19 November 2014, LEONEN
FACTS:
1. Unless all the co-owners have agreed to partition their property, none of
them may sell a definite portion of the land. The co-owner may only sell his
or her proportionate interest in the co-ownership. A contract of sale which
purports to sell a specific or definite portion of unpartitioned land is
null and void ab initio.
2. It appears that the heirs of Luis and Matilde Ysaac co-owned a 5,517-
square-meter parcel of land located in Sabang, Naga City, covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 506. 4 One of the co-owners is
respondent, Henry Ysaac.
3. Henry Ysaac leased out portions of the property to several lessees. Juan
Cabrera, one of the lessees, leased a 95-square-meter portion of the land
beginning in 1986.5
4. On May 6, 1990, Henry Ysaac needed money and offered to sell the 95-
square-meter piece of land to Juan Cabrera. 6 He told Henry Ysaac that the
land was too small for his needs because there was no parking space for his
vehicle.7
5. In order to address Juan Cabrera’s concerns, Henry Ysaac expanded his
offer to include the two adjoining lands that Henry Ysaac was then leasing
have a combined area of 439-square-meters. However, Henry Ysaac warned
Juan Cabrera that the sale for those two parcels could only proceed if the
two families agree to it.
6. Juan Cabrera accepted the new offer. Henry Ysaac and Juan Cabrera settled
on the price of ₱250.00 per square meter, but Juan Cabrera stated that he
could only pay in full after his retirement on June 15, 1992. 8 Henry Ysaac
agreed but demanded for an initial payment of ₱1,500.00, which Juan
Cabrera paid.9
7. According to Juan Cabrera, Henry Ysaac informed him that the Borbe
family and the Espiritu family were no longer interested in purchasing the
properties they were leasing. Since Mamerta Espiritu of the Espiritu family
initially considered purchasing the property and had made an initial deposit
for it, Juan Cabrera agreed to reimburse this earlier payment. On June 9,
1990, Juan Cabrera paid the amount of ₱6,100.00.10 Henry Ysaac issued a
receipt for this amount. ₱3,100.00 of the amount paid was reimbursed to
Mamerta Espiritu and, in turn, she gave Juan Cabrera the receipts issued to
her by Henry Ysaac.11
8. On June 15, 1992, Juan Cabrera tried to pay the balance of the purchase
price to Henry Ysaac. However, at that time, Henry Ysaac was in the United
States. The only person in Henry Ysaac’s residence was his wife. The wife
refused to accept Juan Cabrera’s payment.12
9. Sometime in September 1993, Juan Cabrera alleged that Henry Ysaac
approached him, requesting to reduce the area of the land subject of their
transaction. Part of the 439-square-meter land was going to be made into a
barangay walkway, and another part was being occupied by a family that
was difficult to eject.13 Juan Cabrera agreed to the proposal. The land was
surveyed again. According to Juan Cabrera, Henry Ysaac agreed to shoulder
the costs of the resurvey, which Juan Cabrera advanced in the amount of
₱3,000.00.
10. The resurvey shows that the area now covered by the transaction was 321
square meters.14 Juan Cabrera intended to show the sketch plan and pay the
amount due for the payment of the lot. However, on that day, Henry Ysaac
was in Manila. Once more, Henry Ysaac’s wife refused to receive the
payment because of lack of authority from her husband.15
11. On September 21, 1994, Henry Ysaac’s counsel, Atty. Luis Ruben General,
wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Leoncio Clemente, Juan Cabrera’s
counsel.16 Atty. General informed Atty. Clemente that his client is formally
rescinding the contract of sale because Juan Cabrera failed to pay the
balance of the purchase price of the land between May 1990 and May 1992.
The letter also stated that Juan Cabrera’s initial payment of ₱1,500.00 and
the subsequent payment of ₱6,100.00 were going to be applied as payment
 for overdue rent of the parcel of land Juan Cabrera was leasing from Henry
Ysaac.17 The letter also denied the allegation of Juan Cabrera that Henry
Ysaac agreed to shoulder the costs of the resurveying of the property. 18 Juan
Cabrera, together with his uncle, Delfin Cabrera, went to Henry Ysaac’s
house on September 16, 1995 to settle the matter. 19 Henry Ysaac told Juan
Cabrera that he could no longer sell the property because the new
administrator of the property was his brother, Franklin Ysaac.20
12. Due to Juan Cabrera’s inability to enforce the contract of sale between him
and Henry Ysaac, he decided to file a civil case for specific performance on
September 20, 1995.21 Juan Cabrera prayed for the execution of a formal
deed of sale and for the transfer of the title of the property in his name. 22 He
tendered the sum of ₱69,650.00 to the clerk of court as payment of the
remaining balance of the original sale price. 23 On September 22, 1995, a
notice of lis pendenswas annotated on OCT No. 560.24
13. In his answer with counterclaim,  Henry Ysaac prayed for the dismissal of
25
Juan Cabrera’s complaint.26  to the City of Naga, an innocent purchaser and for value;
14. Before the Regional Trial Court decided the case, the heirs of Luis and
Matilde Ysaac, under the administration of Franklin Ysaac, sold their
property to the local government of Naga City on February 12, 1997. 28 The
property was turned into a project for the urban poor of the city. 29 During
the trial, Corazon Borbe Combe of the Borbe family testified that contrary
to what Juan Cabrera claimed, her family never agreed to sell the land they
were formerly leasing from Henry Ysaac in favor of Juan Cabrera. 30 The
Borbe family bought the property from Naga City’s urban poor program
after the sale between the Ysaacs and the local government of Naga City.31
15. On September 22, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Naga City ruled that the contract of sale between Juan
Cabrera and Henry Ysaac was duly rescinded when the former failed to pay the balance of the purchase price
in the period agreed upon. 32 The Regional Trial Court found that there was an agreement between Juan
Cabrera and Henry Ysaac as to the sale of land and the corresponding unit price. 33 However, aside from the
receipts turned over by Mamerta Espiritu of the Espiritu family to Juan Cabrera, there was no "evidence that
the other adjoining lot occupants agreed to sell their respective landholdings" to Juan Cabrera. 34 The
Regional Trial Court also doubted that Juan Cabrera was willing and able to pay Henry Ysaac on June 15,
1992. According to the trial court:
a. [A]fter the said refusal of Henry Ysaac’s wife, plaintiff [Juan Cabrera] did not bother to write
tothe defendant [Henry Ysaac] or to any of the co-owners his intention to pay for the land or he
could have consigned the amount in court at the same time notifying [Henry Ysaac] of the
consignation in accordance with Article 1256 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, in September,
1993 [Juan Cabrera] was able to meet [Henry Ysaac] whenthe latter allegedly talked to him
about the reduction of the areahe was going to buy. There is no showing that [Juan Cabrera]
again tendered his payment to Henry Ysaac. Instead, he allegedly made his offer after he had
the land resurveyed but defendant was then in Manila. There is no evidence as to what date this
offer was made. . . . .
b. [T]he court does not see any serious demand made for performance of the contract on the part
of [Juan Cabrera] in 1992 when he allegedly promised to pay the balance of the purchase price.
Neither could he demand for the sale of the adjoining lots because the occupants thereof did not
manifest their consent thereto. At the most, he could have demanded the sale of the lot which he
was occupying. If his payment was refused in 1995, he cannot demand for damages because the
rescission of the contract was relayed to him in writing in Exhibit "4".35
16. The Regional Trial Court dismissed Juan Cabrera’s complaint and Henry Ysaac’s counterclaim.  Juan 36
Cabrera appealed the Regional Trial Court’s decision. 37
17. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Regional Trial Court that there was a perfected contract of sale
between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac. 38 According to the Court of Appeals, even if the subject of the sale
is part of Henry Ysaac’s undivided property, a co-owner may sell a definite portion of the property. 39
18. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the contract of sale between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac was not
validly rescinded.40 For the rescission to be valid under Article 1592 of the Civil Code, it should have been
done through a judicial or notarial act and not merely through a letter. 41
19. However, due to the sale of the entire property of the Ysaac family in favor of the local government of Naga
City, the Court of Appeals ruled that the verbal contract between Juan Cabrera and Henry Ysaac cannot be
subject to the remedy of specific performance. 42 The local government of Naga City was an innocent
purchaser for value, and following the rules on double sales, it had a preferential right since the sale it
entered into was in a public instrument, while the one with Juan Cabrera was only made orally. 43 The only
recourse the Court of Appeals could do is to order Henry Ysaac to return the initial payment of the purchase
price of ₱10,600.00 (₱1,500.00 and ₱6,100.00 as evidenced by the receipts issued by Henry Ysaac to Juan
Cabrera, and ₱3,000.00 for the surveying expenses) as payment of actual damages. The Court of Appeals
likewise awarded attorney’s fees and litigation costs. To wit:
a. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the lower court is hereby SET
ASIDE and a new one is entered as follows:
b. 1. Declaring that there is no valid rescission of the contract of sale of the subject lot between
plaintiff-appellant [Juan P. Cabrera] and defendant-appellee [Henry Ysaac]; however, specific
performance is not an available relief to plaintiff because of the supervening sale of the property
c. 2. Ordering [Henry Ysaac] to pay [Juan P. Cabrera] actual damages in the amount of
₱10,600.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum from September 20, 1995 until paid;
ISSUES:
1. W/N there was a valid contract of sale between petitioner and respondent;
RATIO:
1. The petition should be denied.
2. II. There was no valid contract of sale between petitioner and respondent
3. Petitioner agrees with the decision of the Court of Appeals that there was a perfected contract of sale
between him and respondent.63
4. Respondent, however, argues that there was no contract between him and petitioner because under Article
1475 of the Civil Code, there has to be a meeting of the minds as to the price and the object of the
contract.64 Respondent argues that there was no meeting of the minds as to the final price 65 and size66 of the
property subject of the sale.
5. In addition, while respondent admits that he was willing to sell the property being leased from him by the
Borbe family and the Espiritu family, petitioner presented no evidence to show that these families agreed to
the sale in favor of petitioner. During trial, Corazon Borbe Combe of the Borbe family testified that her
family never agreed to allow the sale of the property in favor of petitioner. 67 Respondent likewise alleged
that Mamerta Espiritu of the Espiritu family eventually bought the property occupied by her family, which is
contrary to the claim that petitioner obtained the consent of Mamerta Espiritu to have the land sold in his
favor.68 Petitioner replied that respondent sold 113 square meters of the 321-square-meter property to the
Espiritu family on January 17, 1996.69 Petitioner argued that Mamerta Espiritu was not a buyer in good faith
because in 1990, she voluntarily agreed to surrender the lot for sale in favor of petitioner because she did not
have the money to pay for the lot. Hence, the sale in favor of Mamerta Espiritu should not supersede the sale
in favor of petitioner.70
6. The Regional Trial Court ruled that there was a valid contract of sale, although it found that there was no
evidence to support petitioner’s claim that he was able to secure the consent of the Espiritu family and the
Borbe family to the sale of the land.71 There was a valid contract of sale subject to a suspensive condition,
but the suspensive condition was not complied with.
7. For the Court of Appeals, there was a valid contract of sale. 72 The Court of Appeals’ ruling was based on the
idea that a co-owner could sell a definite portion of the land owned in common, and not because the
suspensive conditions of the contract were complied with. In ruling this way, the Court of Appeals relied on
Pamplona v. Morato,73 which stated that:
 a. . . . [A] "co-owner may validly sell his undivided share of the property owned in common. (If
the part sold happens to be his allotted share after partition, the transaction is entirely valid).
Now then if there has been no express partition as yet, but the co-owner who sells points out to
his buyers the boundaries of the parthe was selling, and the other coowners make no objection,
there is in effect already a partial partition, and the sale of the definite portioncan no longer be
assailed."74
8. We find that there was no contract of sale. It was null ab initio.
9. As defined by the Civil Code, "[a] contract is a meeting of minds between
two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give
something or to render some service." 75 For there to be a valid contract,
there must be consent of the contracting parties, an object certain which is
the subject matter of the contract, and cause of the obligation which is
established.76 Sale is a special contract. The seller obligates himself to
deliver a determinate thing and to transfer its ownership to the buyer. In
turn, the buyer pays for a price certain in money or its equivalent. 77 A
"contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price." 78 The
seller and buyer must agree as to the certain thing that will be subject of the
sale as well as the price in which the thing will be sold. The thing to be sold
is the object of the contract, while the price is the cause or consideration.
10. The object of a valid sales contract must be owned by the seller. If the seller
is not the owner, the seller must be authorized by the owner to sell the
object.79
11. Specific rules attach when the seller co-owns the object of the contract.
Sale of a portion of the property is considered an alteration of the thing
owned in common. Under the Civil Code, such disposition requires the
unanimous consent of the other co-owners. 80 However, the rules also allow
a co-owner to alienate his or her part in the co-ownership.81
12. These two rules are reconciled through jurisprudence.
13. If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot sell a
definite portion of the land without consent from his or her co-owners.
He or she could only sell the undivided interest of the co-owned
property.82 As summarized in Lopez v. Ilustre, 83 "[i]f he is the owner of an
undivided half of a tract of land, he has a right to sell and convey an
undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and
convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds."84
14. The undivided interest of a co-owner is also referred to as the "ideal or
abstract quota" or "proportionate share." On the other hand, the definite
portion of the land refers to specific metes and bounds of a co-owned
property.
15. To illustrate, if a ten-hectare property is owned equally by ten coowners, the
undivided interest of a co-owner is one hectare. The definite portion of that
interest is usually determined during judicial or extrajudicial partition. After
partition, a definite portion of the property held in common is allocated to a
specific co-owner. The co-ownership is dissolved and, in effect, each of the
former co-owners is free to exercise autonomously the rights attached to his
or her ownership over the definite portion of the land. It is crucial that the
co-owners agree to which portion of the land goes to whom.
16. Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of common
property requires the consent of all co-owners because it operates to
partition the land with respect to the co-owner selling his or her share.
The co-owner or seller is already marking which portion should redound to
his or her autonomous ownership upon future partition.
17. The object of the sales contract between petitioner and respondent was a
definite portion of a co-owned parcel of land. At the time of the alleged sale
between petitioner and respondent, the entire property was still held in
common. This is evidenced by the original certificate of title, which was
under the names of Matilde Ysaac, Priscilla Ysaac, Walter Ysaac,
respondent Henry Ysaac, Elizabeth Ysaac, Norma Ysaac, Luis Ysaac, Jr.,
George Ysaac, Franklin Ysaac, Marison Ysaac, Helen Ysaac, Erlinda
Ysaac, and Maridel Ysaac.85
18. The rules allow respondent to sell his undivided interest in the coownership.
However, this was not the object of the sale between him and petitioner.
19. The object of the sale was a definite portion. Even if it was respondent
who was benefiting from the fruits of the lease contract to petitioner,
respondent has "no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or
determinate part of the thing owned in common, because his right over the
thing is represented by quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication."86
20. There was no showing that respondent was authorized by his coowners
to sell the portion of land occupied by Juan Cabrera, the Espiritu
family, or the Borbe family. Without the consent of his co-owners,
respondent could not sell a definite portion of the co-owned property.
21. Respondent had no right to define a 95-square-meter parcel of land, a 439-
square-meter parcel of land, or a 321-square-meter parcel of land for
purposes of selling to petitioner. The determination of those metes and
bounds are not binding to the co-ownership and, hence, cannot be subject to
sale, unless consented to by all the co-owners.
22. In finding that there was a valid contract of sale between petitioner and
respondent, the Court of Appeals erred in the application of Pamplona v.
Moreto.87 The ruling in Pamplona should be read and applied only in
situations similar to the context of that case.
23. Pamplona involved the Spouses Moreto who owned three (3) parcels of
land with a total area of 2,346 square meters. The spouses had six (6)
children. After the wife had died, the husband sold one of the parcels to the
Pamplona family, even if the conjugal partnership had not yet been
 liquidated. The parcel sold measured 781 square meters, which was less
than the ideal share of the husband in the estate. This court allowed the sale
to prosper because of the tolerance from the husband’s co-heirs. This court
ruled:
a. The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the coowner as vendor
pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences
were to be erected without objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners,
on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and
possession, We rule that a factual partition or termination of the co-ownership,
although partial, was created, and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto,
butalso his heirs, the private respondents herein from asserting as against the
vendees petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by
said vendor Flaviano Moreto.88  32.
24. In Pamplona, the co-heirs of Flaviano Moreto only questioned the sale to
the Pamplona family nine (9) years after the sale. By then, the Pamplona
family had exercised several acts of ownership over the land. That is why
this court considered it acquiescence or tolerance on the part of the co-
heirs when they allowed the Pamplonas to take possession and build upon
the land sold, and only questioned these acts several years later.
25. The ruling in Pamplona does not apply to petitioner. There was no evidence
adduced during the trial that respondent’s co-owners acquiesced or tolerated
the sale to petitioner. The co-owners tolerated petitioner’s possession of a
portion of their land because petitioner was a lessee over a 95-square-meter
portion of the property, not the buyer of the 321-squaremeter portion.
26. There was also no evidence of consent to sell from the co-owners. When
petitioner approached respondent in 1995 to enforce the contract of sale,
respondent referred him to Franklin Ysaac, the administrator over the entire
property. Respondent’s act suggests the absence of consent from the co-
owners. Petitioner did not show that he sought Franklin Ysaac’s consent as
administrator and the consent of the other co-owners. Without the consent
of the co-owners, no partial partition operated in favor of the sale to
petitioner.
27. At best, the agreement between petitioner and respondent is a contract to
sell, not a contract of sale. A contract to sell is a promise to sell an object,
subject to suspensive conditions.89 Without the fulfillment of these
suspensive conditions, the sale does not operate to determine the obligation
of the seller to deliver the object.
28. A co-owner could enter into a contract to sell a definite portion of the
property. However, such contract is still subject to the suspensive condition
of the partition of the property, and that the other co-owners agree that the
part subject of the contract to sell vests in favor of the co-owner’s buyer.
Hence, the co-owners’ consent is an important factor for the sale to ripen.
29. A non-existent contract cannot be
source of obligations, and it cannot
be enforced by the courts
30. Since petitioner believes that there was a perfected contract of sale between him and respondent, he argues
that a deed of sale should be formally executed. Petitioner agrees with the Court of Appeals’ finding that
there was no valid rescission of the contract in accordance with Article 1592 of the Civil Code. 90 However,
petitioner disagrees with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that the contract was no longer enforceable due
to the supervening sale with the local government of Naga City. Petitioner argues that the sale in favor of the
local government of Naga City was not made in good faith. Before the sale was finalized between the local
government and the heirs of Luis and Matilde Ysaac, petitioner had a notice of lis pendens annotated to OCT
No. 506.91 It was presumed that the local government had due notice of petitioner’s adverse claim, thus, it
cannot be considered an innocent purchaser.
31. For respondent, due to the inexistence of a valid contract of sale, petitioner cannot demand specific
performance from respondent.92 Respondent disagrees with the Court of Appeals when it stated that Article
1592 of the rescission of contract of sale applies. There is no need to apply Article 1592 because there was
no contract to begin with.93 The contract between respondent and petitioner was terminated by virtue of the
letter dated September 21, 1994.94
We rule in favor of respondent.
33. The absence of a contract of sale means that there is no source of obligations for respondent, as seller, or
petitioner, as buyer. Rescission is impossible because there is no contract to rescind. The rule in Article 1592
that requires a judicial or notarial act to formalize rescission of a contract of sale of an immovable property
does not apply. This court does not need to rule whether a letter is a valid method of rescinding a sales
contract over an immovable property because the question is moot and academic.
34. Even if we assume that respondent had full ownership of the property and that he agreed to sell a portion of
the property to petitioner, the letter was enough to cancel the contract to sell. Generally, "[t]he power to
rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is
incumbent on him."95
35. For the sale of immovable property, the following provision governs its rescission:
a. Article 1592. In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that
upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right
take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand
for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by notarial act. After
the demand, the court may not grant him a new term.
36. This provision contemplates (1) a contract of sale of an immovable property and (2) a stipulation in the
contract that failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon will cause the rescission of the contract. The
vendee or the buyer can still pay even after the time agreed upon, if the agreement between the parties has
these requisites. This right of the vendee to pay ceases when the vendor or the seller demands the rescission
of the contract judicially or extra judicially. In case of an extra judicial demand to rescind the contract, it
should be notarized.
37. Hence, this provision does not apply if it is not a contract of sale of an immovable property and merely a
contract to sell an immovable property. A contract to sell is "where the ownership or title is retained by the
seller and is not to pass until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive
condition and failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event that prevented the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force."96
38. In a similar case entitled Manuel v. Rodriguez, 97 Eusebio Manuel offered to buy the land owned by Payatas
Subdivision, Inc. The Secretary Treasurer of Payatas Subdivision, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., agreed to sell the
land to Eusebio Manuel after negotiations. Similar to this case, the agreement was only made orally and not
in writing. An initial payment was made, and a final payment was to be madenine (9) to ten (10) months
later. Manuel never paid for the latter installment; hence, Eulogio Rodriguez cancelled their agreement and
sold the land to someone else.
39. In Manuel, this court categorically stated that Article 1592 "does not apply to a contract to sell or promise to
sell, where title remains with the vendor until fulfillment to a positive suspensive condition, such as full
payment of the price."98 This court upheld that the contract to sell was validly cancelled through the non-
payment of Eusebio Manuel. The same conclusion applies in this case.
40. The law does not prescribe a form to rescind a contract to sell immovable property. In Manuel, the non-
payment operated to cancel the contract. If mere non-payment is enough to cancel a contract to sell, the letter
given to petitioner’s lawyer is also an acceptable form of rescinding the contract. The law does not require
notarization for a letter to rescind a contract to sell immovable property. Notarization is only required if a
a contract of sale is being rescinded.
41. Petitioner argued that he was willing to comply with the suspensive condition on the contract to sell because
he was ready to pay the balance of the purchase price on June 15, 1992. 99 However, his argument is
 unmeritorious. As ruled by the Regional Trial Court, petitioner should have resorted to the various modes of
consignment when respondent’s wife refused to accept the payment on respondent’s behalf.100
42. Therefore, even if we assumed that the contract between petitioner and respondents were perfected, the strict
requisites in Article 1592 did not apply because the only perfected contract was a contract to sell, not a
contract of sale. The courts cannot enforce the right of petitioner to buy respondent’s property. We cannot
order the execution of a deed of sale between petitioner and respondent.
43. The question of double sale also becomes moot and academic. There was no valid sale between petitioner
and respondent, while there was a valid sale between the local government of Naga City and respondent and
his coowners. Since there is only one valid sale, the ruleon double sales under Article 1544 of the Civil Code
does not apply.101
44. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' decision
dated June 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 65869 is SET ASIDE. The
contract between petitioner and respondent is DECLARED invalid and,
therefore, cannot be subject to specific performance. Respondent is
ORDERED to return ₱10,600.00 to petitioner, with legal interest of 12%
per annum from September 20, 1995 until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum
from July 1, 2013 ·until fully paid.
10.) Arambulo v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 189420, 26 March 2014
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their
mother Rosita Vda. De Arambulo, and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma.
Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana Maria V. Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo,
Julio V. Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo Nolasco (Iraida) are co-owners of
two (2) parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila, with an aggregate size of
233 square meters.
2. When Iraida passed away, she was succeeded by her husband, respondent
Genaro Nolasco and their children, Iris Abegail Nolasco, Ingrid Aileen
Arambulo and respondent Jeremy Spencer Nolasco.
3. On 8 January 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief under Article 491 of
the Civil Code with the RTC of Manila, alleging that all of the co- owners,
except for respondents, have authorized petitioners to sell their respective
shares to the subject properties; that only respondents are withholding
their consent to the sale of their shares; that in case the sale pushes
through, their mother and siblings will get their respective 1/9 share of the
proceeds of the sale, while respondents will get 1/4 share each of the 1/9
share of Iraida; that the sale of subject properties constitutes alteration; and
that under Article 491 of the Civil Code, if one or more co-owners shall
withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in common, the
courts may afford adequate relief.4
4. In their Answer, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for being
premature. Respondents averred that they were not aware of the intention of
petitioners to sell the properties they co-owned because they were not called
to participate in any negotiations regarding the disposition of the property. 5
5. After the pre-trial, two (2) issues were submitted for consideration:
a. 1.Whether or not respondents are withholding their consent in the sale of the subject
properties; and 2.In the affirmative, whether or not withholding of consent of sale
by the respondents is prejudicial to the petitioners.6
6. On 19 September 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to
give their consent to the sale. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
a. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the petitioners and against the respondents:
b. 1. Directing respondents Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Spencer A. Nolasco to give
their consent to the sale of their shares on the subject properties;
c. 2. Allowing the sale of the aforementioned properties;
d. 3. Directing the petitioners and the co-owners, including the respondents herein to
agree with the price in which the subject properties are to be sold and to whom to be
sold; and
e. 4. Directing the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned
properties in the following proportion:
f. a.) Rosita V. Vda. De Arambulo -1/9; b.) Primo V. Arambulo -1/9
g. c.) Maximiano V. Arambulo -1/9; d.) Ana Maria V. Arambulo -1/9
h. e.) Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez -1/9; f.) Julio V. Arambulo -1/9
i. g.) Raul V. Arambulo -1/9; h.) Teresita A. dela Cruz -1/9
j. i.) Genaro Nolasco, Jr. -1/4 of 1/9; j.) Jeremy Spencer A. Nolasco -1/4 of 1/9
k. k.) Iris Abegail A. Nolasco -1/4 of 1/9; l.) Ingrid Aileen Arambulo -1/4 of 1/97
7. Going along with petitioners’ reliance on Article 491 of the Civil Code, the trial court found
that respondents’ withholding of their consent to the sale of their shares is prejudicial to the
common interest of the co-owners.
8. Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal and the trial court gave due course to the appeal and the
entire records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 7 October
2008, the Court of Appeals granted the appeal and reversed the trial court’s decision. The
Court of Appeals held that the respondents had the full ownership of their undivided interest in
the subject properties, thus, they cannot be compelled to sell their undivided shares in the
properties. It referred to the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code. However, the Court of
Appeals, implying applicability of Article 491 also observed that petitioners failed to show
how respondents’ withholding of their consent would prejudice the common interest over the
subject properties.
9. Hence, the instant petition seeking the reversal of the appellate court’s
decision and praying for the affirmance of the trial court’s decision that
ordered respondents to give their consent to the sale of the subject
properties. Petitioners emphasize that under Article 491 of the Civil Code,
they may ask the court to afford them adequate relief should respondents
refuse to sell their respective shares to the co-owned properties. They refute
the appellate court’s finding that they failed to show how the withholding of
consent by respondents becomes prejudicial to their common interest.
10. Citing the testimony of petitioner Teresita A. Dela Cruz, they assert that one
 of the two subject properties has an area of 122 square meters and if they
decide to partition, instead of selling the same, their share would be reduced
to a measly 30-square meter lot each. The other property was testified to as
measuring only 111 square meters. Petitioners reiterate that all the other co-
owners are willing to sell the property and give respondents their share of
the proceeds of the sale.
ISSUES:
1. whether respondents, as co-owners, can be compelled by the court to give
their consent to the sale of their shares in the co-owned properties.
RATIO:
1. Until it reached this Court, the discussion of the issue moved around Article
491 of the Civil Code. We have to remove the issue out of the coverage of
Article 491. It does not apply to the problem arising out of the proposed sale
of the property co-owned by the parties in this case.
2. The Court of Appeals correctly applied the provision of Article 493 of the
Civil Code, which states:
a. Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
3. Upon the other hand, Article 491 states:
a. Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make
alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would result
therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-
owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate
relief.
4. As intimated above, the erroneous application of Article 491 is, in this case,
an innate infirmity. The very initiatory pleading below was captioned
Petition For Relief Under Article 491 of the New Civil Code.
5. Petitioners, likewise petitioners before the RTC, filed the case on the
submission that Article 491 covers the petition and grants the relief prayed
for, which is to compel the respondent co-owners to agree to the sale of the
co-owned property. The trial court took up all that petitioners tendered, and
it favored the pleading with the finding that:
a. x x x To this court, the act of respondents of withholding consent to the sale of the
properties is not only prejudicial to the common interest of the co-owners but is also
considered as an alteration within the purview of Article 491 of the New Civil
Code. x x x. Hence, it is deemed just and proper to afford adequate relief to herein
petitioners under Article 491 of the New Civil Code.8
6. That a sale constitutes an alteration as mentioned in Article 491 is an
established jurisprudence. It is settled that alterations include any act of
strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been
held implicitly to be an act of alteration. 9 Alienation of the thing by sale of
the property is an act of strict dominion.10
7. However, the ruling that alienation is alteration does not mean that a sale of
commonly owned real property is covered by the second paragraph of
Article 491, such that if a co- owner withholds consent to the sale, the
courts, upon a showing of a clear prejudice to the common interest, may, as
adequate relief, order the grant of the withheld consent. Such is the
conclusion drawn by the trial court, and hinted at, if not relied upon, by the
appellate court.
8. Ruling that the trial court erred in its conclusion, the Court of Appeals
correctly relied on Article 493 in support of the finding that respondents
cannot be compelled to agree with the sale. We affirm the reversal by the
Court of Appeals of the judgment of the trial court.
9. 1. There is co-ownership whenever, as in this case, the ownership of an
undivided thing, belongs to different persons.11 Article 493 of the Code
defines the ownership of the co-owner, clearly establishing that each co-
owner shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits.
10. Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein
as co-owners with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned
part. The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full
ownership by the respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their
part which petitioners will sell shall be that which may be apportioned to
them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. With the full
ownership of the respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners’ sale of
their parts, the nature of the property, as co-owned, likewise stays. In lieu
of the petitioners, their vendees shall be co-owners with the
respondents. The text of Article 493 says so.
11. 2. Our reading of Article 493 as applied to the facts of this case is a
reiteration of what was pronounced in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of
Appeals.12 The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly
specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code. Thus:
a. As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other
co-owners who did not consent to the sale.13 This is because under the
aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his
undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor
in the partition of the thing owned in common. 14 Consequently, by virtue of the
sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their
proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to
private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co- owner of
the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales
produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof.15
b. From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co- owner without the consent
 of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
12. Nearer to the dispute at hand are the pronouncements in the 1944 case of
Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong.17 Citing Manresa on Article 399 which is the
present Article 493 of the Civil Code, the Court said:
a. x x x Article 399 shows the essential integrity of the right of each co-owner in the
mental portion which belongs to him in the ownership or community.
b. xxxx
c. To be a co-owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every
recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right within the
circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for the use and
enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the
interested parties be obtained.18(Underscoring supplied).
13. The Court in Lopez further cited Scaevola:
a. 2nd. Absolute right of each co-owner with respect to his part or share. – With
respect to the latter, each co-owner is the same as an individual owner. He is a
singular owner, with all the rights inherent in such condition. The share of the co-
owner, that is, the part which ideally belongs to him in the common thing or right
and is represented by a certain quantity, is his and he may dispose of the same as he
pleases, because it does not affect the right of the others. Such quantity is equivalent
to a credit against the common thing or right and is the private property of each
creditor (co-owner). The various shares ideally signify as many units of thing or
right, pertaining individually to the different owners; in other words, a unit for each
owner.19  is no legal justification for the apportionment of the property not agreeable to any of
14. The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such by the Court, agree
that co-owners such as respondents have over their part, the right of full and
absolute ownership. Such right is the same as that of individual owners
which is not diminished by the fact that the entire property is co- owned
with others.
15. That part which ideally belongs to them, or their mental portion, may be
disposed of as they please, independent of the decision of their co-owners.
So we rule in this case. The respondents cannot be ordered to sell their
portion of the co-owned properties. In the language of Rodriguez v. Court
of First Instance of Rizal, 20 "each party is the sole judge of what is good for
him."21
16. 3. Indeed, the respected commentaries suggest the conclusion that, insofar
as the sale of co-owned properties is concerned, there is no common
interest that may be prejudiced should one or more of the co-owners
refuse to sell the co-owned property, which is exactly the factual situation
in this case. When respondents disagreed to the sale, they merely asserted
their individual ownership rights. Without unanimity, there is no common
interest.
17. Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co-owners may bring a
suit for partition, which is one of the modes of extinguishing co- ownership.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any
time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned.
18. Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil Code states that whenever the
thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and
its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (a) when the right to
partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the
nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would
prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co- owners are not in
agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire
property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. 22 This is the result
obviously aimed at by petitioners at the outset. As already shown, this
cannot be done while the co-ownership exists.
19. Essentially, a partition proceeding accords all parties the opportunity to be
heard, the denial of which was raised as a defense by respondents for
opposing the sale of the subject properties.
20. The necessity of partition could not be more emphasized than in Rodriguez
v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,23 to wit:
a. x x x That this recourse would entail considerable time, trouble and expense,
unwarranted by the value of the property from the standpoint of the [respondents],
the co-owners. Disagreements and differences impossible of adjustment by the
parties themselves are bound to arise, and it is precisely with such contingency in
view that the law on partition was evolved.24
21. WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED without
prejudice to the filing of an action for partition. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76449 is AFFIRMED.
11.) Uy v. Estate of Fernandez
G.R. No. 200612, 5 April 2017
FACTS:
1. Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay (Vipa) is the registered owner of a parcel of
land situated in Lopez Jaena Street, Jaro, Iloilo City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-26576 (subject property). [4] Vipa and her husband,
Levi Lahaylahay (Levi), have two children – Grace Joy Somosierra (Grace
Joy) and Jill Frances Lahaylahay (Jill Frances). [5]
2. Sometime in 1990, a contract of lease was executed between Vipa and
 Rafael Uy (Rafael) over the subject property and the improvements thereon,
pursuant to which, Rafael bound himself to pay Vipa, as consideration for
the lease of the property, the amount of P3,000.00 per month, with a
provision for a 10% increase every year thereafter. [6]
3. On March 5, 1994, Vipa died leaving no will or testament whatsoever.
Grace Joy became the de facto administrator of the estate of Vipa. After
Vipa's death, Levi lived in Aklan.[7]
4. In June 1998, Rafael stopped paying the monthly rents. [8] Consequently, on
June 12, 2003, the Estate of Vipa, through Grace Joy, filed a complaint [9] for
unlawful detainer with the (MTCC) of Iloilo City against Rafael. It was
alleged therein that, as of June 1998, Rafael was already bound to pay rent
at the amount of P3,300.00 per month and that his last payment was made in
May 1998. Accordingly, at the time of the filing of the Complaint, Rafael's
unpaid rents amounted to P271,150.00.[10] The Estate of Vipa claimed that
despite repeated demands, Rafael refused to pay the rents due.[11]
5. In his Answer,[12] Rafael denied that he refused to pay the rent for the lease
of the subject property. He claimed that sometime in June 1998 Patria
Fernandez-Cuenca (Patria), Vipa's sister, demanded for the payment of the
rents, claiming that she is the rightful heir of Vipa. [13] Since he had no idea
on who is entitled to receive the rent for the subject property, he deposited
the amount of P10,000.00 with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
(RTC) of Iloilo City on November 20, 1998 and that Grace Joy was
informed of such consignation.[14] He claimed that a case for the settlement
of the Estate of Vipa was instituted by Patria with the RTC, which was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 6910. He averred that he is willing to
pay the rent on the leased property to the rightful heirs of Vipa and that he
made another consignation with the RTC in the amount of P6,000.00.[15]
6. On June 12, 2008, the MTCC rendered a Decision,[16] the decretal portion of which reads: 
a. WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing ratiocination, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the [Estate of Vipa] and against [Rafael], ordering the latter, to
wit:  MTCC that Rafael's consignation of the rent to the RTC is ineffective. It ruled that Rafael
b. to vacate the premises subject of this case and covered by TCT No. T-26576 and to
peacefully turn over the possession of the same to the [Estate of Vipa]; 
c. to pay the [Estate of Vipa] the amount of Php271,150.00 as payment for the unpaid
rentals with 12% interest per annum from the last demand on May 3, 2003 until the
whole amount is paid;  16. Hence, the instant petition.
d. to pay the [Estate of Vipa] the amount of Php3,000.00 per month with 12% interest
per annum for the use and occupancy of the premises computed from the date of the
filing of this case on June 12, 2003 until fully paid;
7. The MTCC found that after Vipa's death in 1994 until 1998, Rafael was paying the rent for the
lease of the subject property to Grace Joy. [18] That the real reason why Patria claimed to be the
heir of Vipa is because she owed Rafael money which she could not pay. Patria then charged
the debt she owes to Rafael from the monthly rent of the subject property, an arrangement that
Rafael took advantage to avoid paying Grace Joy the monthly rents. The MTCC further opined
that the consignations made by Rafael in the total amount of P16,000.00 are not valid since
there was no prior tender of payment.[19]
8. On appeal, the RTC, in its Decision[20] dated April 15, 2009, reversed the MTCC's Decision
dated June 12, 2008 and, thus, dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the Estate
of Vipa. Thus: REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the herein complaint is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit; and further DISMISSING [Rafael's] counterclaim for failure to substantiate
9. The RTC opined that Grace Joy was actually the plaintiff in the case and not the Estate of
Vipa. It then pointed out that Grace Joy failed to bring the dispute to the barangay for
conciliation prior to filing the complaint for unlawful detainer.[22]
10. The RTC further held that the MTCC erred in including the entire subject property as part of
the Estate of Vipa. The RTC explained that the subject property was acquired by Vipa during
the subsistence of her marriage with Levi and, as such, is part of their conjugal properties. That
after Vipa's death, the conjugal partnership was terminated, entitling Levi to one-half of the
property.[23] The RTC then pointed out that Levi sold his share in the subject property to Rafael,
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale [24] dated December 29, 2005.[25] Accordingly, the RTC ruled
that Rafael, as co-owner of the subject property, having bought Levi's one-half share thereof,
had the right to possess the same.[26]
11. The Estate of Vipa sought a reconsideration[27] of the Decision dated April 15, 2009, but it was
denied by the RTC in its Order dated July 28; 2009.[28]
12. The Estate of Vipa then filed a Petition for Review [29] with the CA. On November 26, 2010, the
CA rendered a Decision,[30] which declared: 
a. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
GRANTED and the April 15, 2009 Decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No.
08-29842 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the June 12, 2008
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, Iloilo City, in Civil Case No. 03-
208 is hereby REINSTATED.
13. The CA held that there was no necessity to bring the dispute before the barangay for
conciliation since the Estate of Vipa, being a juridical person, cannot be impleaded to a
barangay conciliation proceeding. The CA likewise pointed out that any allegations against
Grace Joy's authority to represent the Estate of Vipa had been laid to rest when she was
appointed as administrator of the Estate of Vipa in Special Proceedings No. 6910 pending
before the RTC.[32]
14. Further, the CA held that Rafael raised the issue of ownership of the subject
property,  i.e., Levi's sale of his one-half share in the subject property to Rafael, only for the
first time in his appeal with the RTC. Accordingly, it was error on the part of the RTC to have
resolved the issue of ownership of the subject property. [33] Furthermore, the CA agreed with the
made the consignation only twice and the amount consigned was patently insignificant
compared to the amount of rent due.[34]
15. Rafael's motion for reconsideration[35] was denied by the CA in its Resolution[36] dated January
24, 2012. 
 
17. Rafael maintains that Grace Joy has no authority to represent the Estate of
Vipa and, when she filed the complaint for unlawful detainer with the
MTCC, she did so in her personal capacity. Thus, Rafael claims that the
dispute should have been brought to the barangay for conciliation before the
complaint was filed in the MTCC.[37] He further claims that the CA erred in .
reversing the RTC's ruling on the issue of ownership of the subject property.
He insists that he already purchased Levi's one-half share in the subject
property.[38]
 18. On the other hand, the Estate of Vipa, in its Comment, [39] avers that the
supposed lack of authority of Grace Joy to file the complaint for unlawful
detainer and the ownership of the subject property were never raised in the
proceedings before the MTCC and, hence, could not be passed upon by the
RTC in the appellate proceedings. In any case, it pointed out that the RTC's
Decision[40] dated October 28, 2005 in Special Proceedings No. 6910, which
appointed Grace Joy as the administrator of the intestate estate of Vipa,
recognized that the latter and Jill Frances are legitimate children of Vipa
and Levi.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Essentially, the issue set forth for the Court's resolution is whether the
CA erred in reversing the RTC's Decision dated April 15, 2009.
RATIO:
1. The petition is partly meritorious.  with the MTCC.
2. Rafael's claim that the complaint below should have been dismissed since Grace Joy has no authority to
represent the Estate of Vipa and that there was lack of prior barangay conciliation is untenable. Unlawful
detainer cases are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. [41] Section 5 of the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure provides that affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded in the answer shall be
deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
3. Rafael failed to plead in the answer he filed with the MTCC that Grace Joy has no authority to represent the
Estate of Vipa. Neither did he raise therein the lack of barangay conciliation between the parties herein prior
to the filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer. Accordingly, the foregoing defenses are already deemed
waived.  10. Levi and Vipa were married on March 24, 1961 [48] and, in the absence of a
4. In any case, the issue of the supposed lack of authority of Grace Joy to represent the Estate of Vipa had
already been rendered moot with the RTC's appointment of Grace Joy as the administrator of the Estate of
Vipa in Special Proceedings No. 6910.  the conjugal properties of Vipa and Levi considering that the same was
5. Also, there was no need to refer the dispute between the parties herein to the barangay for conciliation
pursuant to the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.[42] It bears stressing that only individuals may be parties to
barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents. Complaints by or against
corporations, partnerships or other juridical entities may not be filed with, received or acted upon by the
barangay for conciliation. [43] The Estate of Vipa, which is the complainant below, is a juridical entity that has
a personality, which is separate and distinct from that of Grace Joy. [44] Thus, there is no necessity to bring the
dispute to the barangay for conciliation prior to filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer with the
MTCC. 
6. The CA, nevertheless, erred in hastily dismissing Rafael's allegation as
regards the ownership of the subject property. In disregarding Rafael's claim
that he owns Levi's one-half undivided share in the subject property, the CA
ruled that the said issue was raised for the first time on appeal and should
thus not have been considered by the RTC, viz.: 
a. On the second issue, the records show that [Rafael] raised the issue of ownership
only for the first time on appeal; hence, the [RTC] erred in deciding the appeal
before it on the findings that part of the subject premises is owned by petitioners,
allegedly having bought the same from [Levi], the husband of [Vipa].
b. The Court is not unmindful that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the
MTC may rule on the issue [of] ownership in order to determine the issue of
possession. However, the issue of ownership must be raised by the defendant on
the earliest opportunity; otherwise, it is already deemed waived. Moreover, the
instant case was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which expressly
provide that affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed
waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, the [RTC]
erred in resolving the issue of ownership for the first time on appeal. [45](Citations
omitted)
7. It is true that fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should
not raise for the first time on appeal issues that they could have raised but
never did during trial. However, before a party may be barred from raising
an issue for the first time on appeal, it is imperative that the issue could
have been raised during the trial.[46]
8.  What escaped the appellate court's attention is that the sale of the one-half
undivided share in the subject property to Rafael was consummated only
on December 29, 2005, more than two years after Rafael filed with the
MTCC his answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer on July 18,
2003.[47] Obviously, Rafael could not have raised his acquisition of Levi's
share in the subject property as an affirmative defense in the answer he filed
9. Moreover, Rafael's ownership of the one-half undivided share in the subject
property would necessarily affect the property relations between the parties
herein. Thus, the CA should have exerted efforts to resolve the said issue
instead of dismissing the same on the flimsy ground that it was not raised
during the proceedings before the MTCC. 
marriage settlement, the system of conjugal partnership of gains governs
their property relations.[49] It is presumed that the subject property is part of
acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no proof
to the contrary.[50]
11. When Vipa died on March 5, 1994, the conjugal partnership was
automatically terminated.[51] Under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
conjugal partnership property, upon its dissolution due to the death of either
spouse, should be liquidated either in the same proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased or, in the absence thereof, by the surviving
spouse within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. That absent
any liquidation, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership
property is void. Thus: 
a. Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership
property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased.
b. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of
the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall
be void.
c. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance
 with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of
property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (Emphasis
ours) 
12. Article 130 of the Family Code is applicable to conjugal partnership of
gains already established between the spouses prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code pursuant to Article 105 thereof, viz.: 
13. Rafael bought Levi's one-half share in the subject property in consideration
of P500,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Sale [52] dated December 29,
2005. At that time, the conjugal partnership properties of Levi and Vipa
were not yet liquidated. However, such disposition, notwithstanding the
absence of liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, is not
necessarily void.  and is thus obliged to pay the rent for his possession thereof.
14. It bears stressing that under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the
husband and wife are co-owners of all the property of the conjugal
partnership.[53] Thus, upon the termination of the conjugal partnership of
gains due to the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse has an actual
and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not
consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and
partition of the conjugal partnership.[54] With respect, however, to the
deceased spouse's share in the conjugal partnership properties, an implied
ordinary co-ownership ensues among the surviving spouse and the other
heirs of the deceased.[55]
15. Thus, upon Vipa's death, one half of the subject property was automatically
reserved in favor of the surviving spouse, Levi, as his share in the conjugal
partnership. The other half, which is Vipa's share, was transmitted to Vipa's
heirs – Grace Joy, Jill Frances, and her husband Levi, who is entitled to the
same share as that of a legitimate child. The ensuing implied co-ownership
is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code, which provides:  hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rafael C. Uy is hereby
a. Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. (Emphasis ours) 
16. Although Levi became a co-owner of the conjugal partnership properties
with Grace Joy and Jill Frances, he could not yet assert or claim title to any
specific portion thereof without an actual partition of the property being
first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Before the partition of a
land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to
any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract
quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.[56]
17. Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Levi had
the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest. Thus, the sale
by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the subject property was not
necessarily void, for his right as a co-owner thereof was effectively
transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the subject
property. It must be stressed that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut
ago, valeat quantum valere potest).[57]
18. However, Rafael became a co-owner of the subject property only on
December 29, 2005 – the time when Levi sold his one-half undivided share
over the subject property to the former. Thus, from December 29, 2005
Rafael, as a co-owner, has the right to possess the subject property as an
incident of ownership. Otherwise stated, prior to his acquisition of Levi's
one-half undivided share, Rafael was a mere lessee of the subject property
 
19. Accordingly, Rafael could no longer be directed to vacate the subject
property since he is already a co-owner thereof. Nevertheless, Rafael is still
bound to pay the unpaid rentals from June 1998 until April 2003 in the
amount of P271,150.00.
20. Further, Rafael is likewise bound to pay reasonable rent for the use and
occupancy of the subject property from May 2003 until December 28, 2005
at the rate of P3,000.00 per month with interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date of the last demand, i.e., the filing of the complaint with
the MTCC on June 12, 2003, until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from
July 1, 2013 until fully paid.
21. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for
review on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 26, 2010 and Resolution dated January 24, 2012 issued by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04481 are
directed to pay the Estate of Vipa Fernandez the following: 
22. The amount of P271,150.00, representing the unpaid rentals, with interest at
the rates of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of the last
demand on May 3, 2003 until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per
annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid; 
23. Reasonable rent for the use and occupancy of the subject property from
May 2003 until December 28, 2005 at the rate of P3,000.00 per month with
interest at the rates of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of the
last demand, i.e., the filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer on June
12, 2003, until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1,
2013 until fully paid; and The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. 
12.) PNB v. Garcia
a G.R. No. 182839 | June 2, 2014
FACTS:
1. The subject of the present case is a parcel of residential land with all its
improvements (subject property) located in Barrio Olango, Mallig, Isabela.
The land is covered by (TCT) No. T-44422 under the name of Jose Garcia
Sr. (Jose Sr.) who acquired the subject property during his marriage with
Ligaya Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987.
2. The marriage of Jose Sr. and Ligaya produced the following children: Nora,
Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, all surnamed Garcia, who are the respondents in
the present case.
3. Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses
Garcia) obtained a loan facility from the petitioner, Philippine National
Bank (petitioner bank), initially for ₱150,000.00. The loan was secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage over their property covered by TCT No. 177585. The
spouses Garcia increased their loan to ₱220,000.00 and eventually to
₱600,000.00. As security for the increased loan, they offered their property
covered by TCT No. 75324 and the subject property covered by TCT No.
T-44422.
4. Jose Sr. agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering the subject
property as additional collateral security for the latter’s increased loan.
For this purpose, Jose Sr. executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs)
dated April 14, 1992 and October 6, 1993, respectively, expressly
authorizing the Spouses Garcia to apply for, borrow, or secure any loan
from the petitioner bank, and to convey and transfer the subject property by
way of mortgage. Jose Sr. also executed an Amendment of Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of the petitioner bank. The SPAs and the Amendment of
Real Estate Mortgage are both inscribed on TCT No. T-44422. All of these
transactions, however, were without the knowledge and consent of Jose
Sr.’s children.
5. On maturity of the loan on April 20,1994, the spouses Garcia failed to pay
their loan to the petitioner bank despite repeated demands.
6. On January 12, 1996, the respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for
Nullity of the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage, Damages with
Preliminary Injunction against the spouses Garcia and the petitioner bank.
They claimed that the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage was null
and void as to respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy as they
were not parties to the contract.
7. The respondents alleged that the subject property was a conjugal property of
Jose Sr. and his deceased spouse, Ligaya, as they acquired the subject
property during their marriage; that upon Ligaya’s death, Jose Sr., together
with his children Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, by law, became owners
pro indiviso of the subject property; that the petitioner bank was at fault for
not including Jose Sr. as payee to the check representing the loan despite its
knowledge that Jose Sr. was a signatory to the real estate mortgage; that the
real estate mortgage executed by Jose Sr. could not bind his children as they
did not give their consent or approval to the encumbrance; and that the real
estate mortgage was also void as to Jose Sr. since he never benefitted from
the loan.
8. In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr. was indebted to
them in the amount of ₱133,800.00. To settle this indebtedness, Jose Sr.
volunteered to give the subject property as additional security for their (the
Garcias’) loan to the petitioner bank.
9. The petitioner bank, on the other hand, claimed that the mortgage was made
in good faith and for value, and maintained that the respondents’ complaint
stated no cause of action against it. It alleged that the real estate mortgage
over the properties was duly registered and inscribed on their titles and was
thus binding on the whole world.
10. In the course of the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy executed
an SPA dated May 31, 1996 authorizing Jose Sr. to act as their attorney-in-
fact during the pretrial of the case.
11. The Ruling of the RTC
12. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The court held that the subject property was a
conjugal property since it was acquired by Jose Sr. during his marriage with his now deceased wife. As a
conjugal property, it is presumed that upon the death of his spouse, one-half of the property passed on to Jose
Sr., while the other half went to Jose and his children as co-owners and as forced heirs of his deceased
spouse. Without the consent of the children, the trial court ruled that the conjugal property could only be
transferred or encumbered to the extent of Jose Sr.’s share in the conjugal partnership, plus his share as an
heir in the other half pertaining to the estate of his deceased spouse.
13. The RTC nevertheless declared that by virtue of the SPA executed by Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy in
this suit, they are already estopped from questioning the mortgage and from alleging lack of consent or
knowledge in the transaction. It held Jose Sr. liable as an accommodation party and upheld the petitioner
bank’s right to collect the debt.
14. The respondents disagreed with the RTC ruling and elevated the case to the CA via an ordinary appeal.
15. The Ruling of the CA
16. On September 26, 2007, the CA upheld the trial court’s finding that the subject property was conjugal, but
reversed and set aside its ruling in so far as it declared valid and binding the Amendment of Real Estate
Mortgage between the petitioner bank, on one hand, and the spouses Garcia and Jose Sr., on the other hand,
with respect to respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy. Relying on the Court’s ruling in Nufable v.
Nufable,4 the CA ruled that the encumbrance Jose Sr. made over the entire conjugal property, without his
children’s conformity, was null and void because a mere part owner could not alienate the shares of the other
co-owners.
17. The CA also declared that the conjugal property could only be liable to the extent of Jose Sr.’s shares; Jose
Sr.’s acts could not affect his children’s pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. It disagreed with the trial
court’s estoppel theory and held that their execution of the SPA should not be construed as acquiescence to
the mortgage transaction. Lastly, it ruled that Jose Sr. could not escape liability from the mortgage since he
voluntarily bound himself as the Spouses Garcia’s accommodation mortgagor.
18. The petition
19. The petitioner bank disputes the CA’s finding that the subject property was
conjugal in nature. It argues that, as can be gleaned from TCT No. T-44422,
the subject property was registered in the name of Jose Sr. alone, who
was described in the title as "widower" and not "married." The
petitioner bank posits that as a mortgagee in good faith, it had the right to
rely on the mortgagor’s certificate of title; in the absence of any indication
 that could arouse suspicion, it had no obligation to undertake further
investigation and verify whether the property was conjugal or was acquired
during marriage or thereafter.
20. Since the subject property belonged to Jose Sr., insofar as petitioner bank as
mortgagee was concerned, Jose Sr. had the right under Article 428 of the
Civil Code to mortgage it without the consent of his children. Accordingly,
the mortgage in its entirety should be declared valid.
ISSUES:
1. W/N
RATIO:
1. We deny the petition for lack of merit.
2. The Subject Property is Conjugal
3. a. All property acquired during marriage is presumed conjugal
4. Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, their property relations were governed by the conjugal partnership of
gains as provided under Article 119 of the Civil Code. Under Article 160 of
the Civil Code, "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife."
5. In his testimony, Jose Sr. admitted that at the time he acquired the land
through sale, he was already married. The material portion of his
testimony is as follows:
a. Q: Is that land titled in your names?:A:Yes, sir.
b. Q: You and your wife acquired that piece of land? A: Yes, sir.
c. xxxx
d. Q: May we know from you[,] Mr. Witness, how did you acquire this parcel of land
presently embraced and covered by TCT No. T-44422? A: I purchased that piece of
land from the Baniqued Family during my incumbency as Municipal Mayor, sir.
e. Q: What was your civil status at the time you purchased that piece of land? A: I was
already married, sir.(Emphasis ours, TSN, July 24, 1997, Jose Garcia Sr.)7
6. Because of the petitioner bank’s failure to rebut the allegation that the
subject property was acquired during the former’s marriage to Ligaya, the
legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property, in line with Article
160 of the Civil Code, applies to this property. Proof of the subject
property’s acquisition during the subsistence of marriage suffices to render
the statutory presumption operative.8
7. b. Registration of the subject property in the name of one spouse does not
destroy the presumption that the property is conjugal
8. The petitioner bank claims that the CA failed to consider that the subject
property was registered in the name of Jose Sr. alone.1a\^/phi1 Likewise, it
raises the argument that Jose Sr.’s change of status in the subject property’s
title from "married" to "widower" prior to the constitution of the real estate
mortgage showed that the property was no longer conjugal.
9. We do not consider this argument persuasive.
10. Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not
destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the
property was acquired.9 The registration of the property is not conclusive
evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although
the property appears to be registered in the name of the husband, it has the
inherent character of conjugal property if it was acquired for valuable
consideration during marriage.10
11. It retains its conjugal nature.
12. In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the property, the
petitioner must present strong, clear and convincing evidence of exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses. 11 The burden of proving that the property
belongs exclusively to the wife or to the husband rests upon the party
asserting it.
13. In the present case, aside from its allegation that the subject property is no
longer conjugal and its assertion that it is a mortgagee in good faith, the
petitioner bank offered no evidence, convincing to this Court, that the
subject property exclusively belonged to Jose Sr. As stated earlier, the
petitioner bank failed to overcome the legal presumption that the disputed
property was conjugal. Thus, the conclusion of both lower courts that the
subject property was conjugal property holds. Factual findings of the CA
affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court unless there is a
clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness,
capriciousness or palpable error.12
14. The conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-
ownership upon the death of Ligaya
15. Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved and terminated pursuant to Article 175(1) of the
Civil Code,13 and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided under
Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that"[t]he rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
16. Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied
ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, on the one hand,
and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.14 This resulting ordinary co-
ownership among the heirs is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code:
a. Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
 involved. But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership." (Emphasis supplied)
17. Under this provision, each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or
share in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it
except when personal rights are involved. Should a co-owner alienate or
mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall
remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. 15 In Carvajal
v. Court of Appeals,16 the Court said:
a. While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited, by mandate of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or
alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the
exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the thing is represented
by an abstract or Ideal portion without any physical adjudication.3 An
individual co- owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite
portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition by agreement
or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract
quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-
owners.4 What a co owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share, which
shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition. [emphasis
supplied].
18. In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject
property after the death of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. While under Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had the
right to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the disputed
property, he could not dispose of or mortgage the entire property without
his children’s consent. As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr.’s
right in the subject property is limited only to his share in the conjugal
partnership as well as his share as an heir on the other half of the estate
which is his deceased spouse’s share. Accordingly, the mortgage contract
is void insofar as it extends to the undivided shares of his children
(Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because they did not give their
consent to the transaction.17
19. Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage constituted by Jose
Sr. over the entire property without his co-owners' consent is not necessarily
void in its entirety. The right of the petitioner bank as mortgagee is
limited though only to the portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr. in
the event of a division and liquidation of the subject property.
20. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the Decision
dated September 26, 2007of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71356. Costs against petitioner Philippine National Bank.
13.) Anzures (Heirs of Carolina) v. Erlinda Ventanilla
G.R. No. 222297, 9 July 2018
FACTS:
1. On October 12, 2012, respondents filed a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer3 before the (MTC) against Fortunato Anzures (petitioner). In their
complaint, respondents alleged, among others, that they were the owners of
a residential house situated in Barangay Sta. Ines, Bulakan, Bulacan; that
the house had been declared for taxation purposes in their names for the
year 2012;4 that the property stands on a 289 square meters parcel of land
under OCT No. 2011000008 and registered in the names of petitioner and
his wife Carolina Anzures (Carolina); that later, by virtue of a Deed
ofDonation,5 dated March 21, 2011, petitioner and his wife Carolina
donated 144 square meters portion of the land in favor of respondents;
that Erlinda Ventanilla "indicated to partition the said property," 6 but the
house situated on said property constitutes a stumbling block on the
partition of the said property; that being the owners of the property,
respondents merely tolerated the occupation of the property by petitioner;
that they demanded he vacate the house to give way to the subdivision and
partition of the property but to no avail; and that respondents filed a
complaint with the office of the Barangay but no amicable settlement was
effected.
2. In his Answer with Counterclaim,7 petitioner sought the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of cause of action. He averred that he and his late spouse
Carolina were the owners of the residential house; that he was also the
registered owner of the 289 square meters parcel of land, having bought the
same from Erlinda Ventanilla for ₱150,000.00 as evidenced by
the Pagpapamana sa Labas ng Hukuman na may Pagtalikod sa Bahagi ng
Lupa at Bilihang Tuluyan sa Lupa, 8 dated August 2, 2000; that his
possession and ownership of the land was evidenced by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 2011000008; that he was the rightful owner of the
residential house as shown by the tax receipts confirming the religious
payments he made from 1998 to 2011.9
3. Petitioner also denied the genuineness and authenticity of the March
21, 2011 deed of donation because at that time, Carolina was mentally
and physically incompetent to execute the same. He contended that he had
no knowledge of the deed and he never affixed his signature thereon. 10
4. The MTC Ruling
5. On August 16, 2013, the MTC ruled in favor of respondents and granted their complaint for unlawful
detainer against petitioner. It rendered judgment as follows:
a. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant
ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under him-
b. 1. To vacate the residential house consisting of 144 square meters standing on the lot embraced
in OCT No. 2911000008 (sic) situated in Sta. Ines, Bulakan, Bulacan and surrender possession
thereof to plaintiffs;
c. 2. To pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱1,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the subject property from filing of the complaint (October 19, 2012), until the
 same is vacated or the possession thereof is surrendered to plaintiffs;
d. 3. To pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱5,000.00 as attorney's fees, aside from the costs.
6. Unconvinced, petitioner appealed to the RTC.
7. The RTC Ruling
8. On June 30, 2014, the RTC affirmed in toto the judgment of the MTC. It held that respondents have a better
right over the subject property than petitioner. The RTC also affirmed that respondents merely tolerated the
possession of petitioner. The dispositive portion of the RTC ruling reads:
9. Aggrieved, petitioner sought relief before the CA arguing that the RTC committed grave error in affirming
the MTC's decision as it is not in accord with law and jurisprudence and, if not corrected, said error will
cause injustice and irreparable damage to petitioner. 13
10. In his petition for review with the CA, petitioner raised two (2) points: 1] that respondents have no cause of
action as they failed to sufficiently aver in their complaint the jurisdictional fact of unlawful withholding of
the subject premises - when and how the matter of the entry and dispossession thereof were effected; 14 and
2] the deed of donation was a forged document as his wife Carolina was seriously ill at the time of its alleged
execution. 15
11. The CA Ruling
12. In its decision dated July 24, 2015, the CA denied the petition.
13. On the issue of lack of cause of action, it concluded that respondents' allegations in their complaint clearly
make a case for unlawful detainer. The CA explained that the complaint sufficiently averred the unlawful
withholding of the subject residential house by petitioner, constitutive of unlawful detainer, although the
exact words "unlawful withholding" were not used. 16
14. The CA also noted that respondents asserted that petitioner's occupancy was through their tolerance. Thus, it
reiterated the ruling that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Possession by
tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate
upon demand made by the owner. 17
15. With regard to the forgery of the deed of donation, the CA stated that forgery cannot be presumed. It must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. 18 The CA observed that not a modicum of evidence was
adduced by petitioner to substantiate his claim of forgery and, thus, such claim was merely self-serving. 
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
16. Hence, this petition raising the following:
ISSUES:
1. W/N respondents have a cause of action to eject petitioner from the subject
property.
RATIO:
1. The petition is meritorious.
2. Recovery of possession
in general
3. There are four (4) remedies available to one who has been deprived of possession of real
property. These are: (1) an action for unlawful detainer; (2) a suit for forcible entry; (3) accion
publiciana; and (4) accion reinvidicatoria.23
4. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry are summary ejectment suits where the only issue to be
determined is who between the contending parties has a better possession of the contested
property.24 On the other hand, an accion publiciana, also known as accion plenaria de
posesion, is a plenary action for recovery of possession in an ordinary civil proceeding in order
to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title, 25 while an accion
reinvidicatoria, involves not only possession, but ownership of the property.26
5. The present case is one for unlawful detainer, which is "an action to recover
possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds possession
after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied."27 In this case, respondents alleged that
petitioner has been occupying their property by tolerance and has
refused to vacate it despite their repeated demands.
6. The possession of the defendant in an unlawful detainer case is originally
legal but becomes illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the parties. When the defendant, however,
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession. 28 (italics supplied)
7. The Present Controversy
8. In this case, both parties claim ownership over the subject property. Each
presented documents to support their respective claim, enumerated in their
chronological sequence as follows:
9. As can be gleaned from the records, the preponderance of the evidence
shows that the property was originally owned by one Vicenta Galvez,
who died intestate on October 6, 1967. After her death, Filomena
Rodriguez Rivera, Enriqueta Rodriguez and Rosalina Rodriguez, claiming
to be her sole heirs, executed a "Waiver of Rights over the Unregistered
Parcel of Land"29 in favor of their nieces, Erlinda Rodriguez and
Carolina Rodriguez on May 31, 2000. The property contains 289 square
meters more or less.
10. To confirm and firm up the waiver and transfer, on August 2, 2000,
Filomena Rodriguez Rivera, Enriqueta Rodriguez and Rosalina Rodriguez
executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land" 30 in favor of
Erlinda and Carolina. In said document, the three sold, transferred and
conveyed, absolutely and unconditionally, the subject "parcel of land with
improvements" to the two, "their heirs or assigns, free from all liens and
encumbrances."
11. The waiver of rights over unregistered parcel of land and the deed of
absolute sale of unregistered land were both notarized by Atty. Jose S. Tayo
on September 22, 2000 and were identified as Document Nos. 231 and 232,
respectively, on Page No. 48; Book 31, Series of 2000, of his notarial book.
12. It appears that on the same day of August 2, 2000, the three heirs of Vicenta
Galvez, namely, Filomena Rodriguez Rivera, Enriqueta Rodriguez and
Rosalina Rodriguez, executed a "Pagpapamana sa Labas ng Hukuman na
may Pagtalikod sa Bahagi ng Lupa at Bilihang Tuluyan sa
Lupa "31 embodying a) a waiver of rights over parcel of land in favor of
 Erlinda; and b) an absolute sale by Erlinda of the said parcel of land in favor
of Carolina.
13. The document was notarized by Atty. Jose S. Tayo, but the date of its
notarization is unknown. It was, however, likewise identified as Document
No. 231; Page No. 48, Book No. 31, Series of 2000, of his notarial book.
14. Based on the foregoing, the Court agrees with the MTC that as between the
Waiver of Rights over Unregistered Parcel of Land and the Deed of
Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land on one hand, and the Pagpapamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman na may Pagtalikod sa Bahagi ng Lupa at Bilihang
Tuluyan sa Lupa on the other, the two former documents prevail because
they bore the rubber stamp of the notary public and the signatures
appearing thereon were similar with each other.32
15. Further, the Pagpapamana sa Labas ng Hukuman na may Pagtalikod sa
Bahagi ng Lupa at Bilihang Tuluyan sa Lupa, which shows that the heirs of
Vicenta waived their rights over the entire parcel of land in favor of only
Erlinda, who in turn sold the same to Carolina, is clearly inconsistent with
the intention of the said heirs of Vicenta to absolutely and
unconditionally transfer the property to both their nieces, Erlinda and
Carolina.
16. On October 31, 2008, citing as the basis of their right the Deed of Absolute
Sale of Unregistered Land,33 Carolina and Erlinda executed a "Pagkakaloob
ng Bahagi ng Lupa na may Kasunduan, "34 whereby the two gave 1/3 of the
subject property to their brother, Emiliano; the three siblings agreed to
place the property in the name of Carolina; and that they stated that
although the property would be registered in her name, the three of
them would still be the co-owners of the property.
17. On January 19, 2010, Emiliano executed a "Pagwawaksi ng Karapatan sa
Pag-aari ng Bahagi ng Lupa, "35 whereby he waived his right over 1/3 of
the property in favor of Carolina and Erlinda, thus, cementing the
coownership of the two sisters.
18. On September 23, 2010, the property was placed under the operation of the
Torrens system of land registration with the issuance of the OCT No.
2011000008. Pursuant to their agreement, it was registered in the name
of "Carolina R. Anzures, Filipino, na may sapat na gulang, kasal kay
Fortunato Anzures."36
19. On March 21, 2011, Carolina executed a deed of donation, 37 which donated
144 square meters of the subject property to Erlinda as an acknowledgement
of their co-ownership thereof. The donation does not appear to have been
registered, but it is a recognition that they are both co-owners with equal
shares.
20. On October 11, 2011, Filomena and Rosalina executed an "Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights," 38 whereby they waived their
rights over the house in favor of Erlinda.
21. On the basis of this extrajudicial settlement of estate with waiver of rights,
the respondents claim that they are the owners of the house; that the
petitioner is occupying the house by virtue of their tolerance; that they have
demanded that he vacate the same; and that despite demands, he refused to
do so. As petitioner refuses to vacate the premises, respondents claim they
were constrained to file an action for unlawful detainer.
22. Carolina and Erlinda are
co-owners of the house
subject of litigation
23. From the documentary records, the property covered by OCT No.
2011000008 is co-owned by Carolina and Erlinda. Being co-owners of
the property, they are also the co-owners of the improvement thereon,
including the subject house. This is clear from the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land39 dated August 2, 2000, executed in favor of Erlinda and
Carolina, whereby the three heirs of Vicenta Galvez, namely, Filomena
Rodriguez Rivera, Enriqueta Rodriguez and Rosalina Rodriguez sold,
transferred and conveyed, absolutely and unconditionally, the
subject "parcel of land, with improvements" to the "two," "their heirs or
assigns, free from all liens and encumbrances."40
24. Respondents cannot rely on the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Waiver of Rights41 dated October 11, 2011, whereby Filomena and Rosalina
waived their rights over the house in favor of Erlinda. The reason is as clear
as daylight. On said date, Filomena and Rosalina no longer had the
right to convey the house as they were no longer the owners thereof. As
evidenced by the August 2, 2000 deed of sale of unregistered land, they
already sold the property together with the improvements to the two
sisters, Carolina and Erlinda. In fact, the title has been placed in
Carolina's name, pursuant to their agreement, "Pagkakaloob ng Bahagi ng
Lupa na may Kasunduan. "42 No one can give what one does not
have (Nemo dat quad non habet). 43
25. Petitioner cannot claim
sole ownership either
26. Although the Court found that Carolina and Erlinda are co-owners, it must
also be determined whether petitioner is the absolute owner of the subject
property and the house erected thereon to remove all doubts.
27. Petitioner insists that the March 21, 2011 deed of donation allegedly
executed by his wife, Carolina, in favor of Erlinda, was a forgery.
28. There is, however, no evidence of forgery. Thus, the Court agrees with the
CA that it was a self-serving claim. The CA wrote:
a. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of
 proof lies on the party alleging it. One who alleges forgery has the burden to
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater
weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it.
b. Here, not a modicum of evidence was adduced by petitioner to substantiate his
claim of forgery. No sufficient and convincing proof was proffered to demonstrate
that the signature of his wife Carolina on the Deed of Donation was not hers, and
therefore forged. Perceivably, his claim of forgery is merely self-serving. 44
29. Moreover, petitioner did not assail the genuineness and authenticity of the
waiver of rights over the unregistered parcel of land, dated May 31, 2000, as
well as the deed of absolute sale of unregistered land, dated August 2, 2000.
In fact, he acknowledged that their aunts waived their rights over the parcel
of land in favor of the siblings, Erlinda and Carolina, and then sold it to
them.
30. Further, there were two (2) other documents that would disprove his
claim. First, the Pagkakaloob ng Bahagi ng Lupa na may Kasunduan, dated
October 31, 2008, executed by the siblings Erlinda and Carolina with their
brother, Emiliano, stated the following:
a. Na kami, ERLINDA R. VENT ANILLA kasal kay Arturo C. Ventanilla at
CAROLINA R. ANZURES kasal kay Fortunato Anzures, mga Filipino, may mga
sapat na gulang at naninirahan sa Brgy. Sta. Ines, Bulakan, Bulacan.
b. Na sa bisa ng "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF UNREGISTERED LAND, Doc.
No. 232, Page No. 48, Book No. 31, Series of 2000, Jose S. Tayo-NP" ay kami na
ang mga lihitimung nagmamay-ari ng isang (1) parsela ng lupa na matatagpuan sa
Brgy. Sta. Ines, Bulakan, Bulacan na nakatala sa pangalan ni VICENT A GALVEZ
na mas makikilala sa ganitong palatandaan:
c. Na dahil at alang-alang sa pagmamahal namin sa aming kapatid na si EMILIANO
A. RODRIGUEZkasal kay Alicia Z. Rodriguez ay
aming PINAGKAKALOOBAN ng IKA TLONG PARTE o 1/3 SHAREng
karapatan sa pagmamay-ari sa lupang aming binabanggit si Emiliano A. Rodriguez.
d. Na kami, ERLINDA R. VENT ANILLA, CAROLINA R. ANZURES at
EMILIANO A. RODRIGUEZ ay nagkaruon ng kasunduan na ipangalan sa
aming kapatid na si CAROLINA R. ANZURES ang titulo ng lupa na binabanggit
sa kasulatang ito na aming kasalukuyang ina-apply sa Bureau of Lands.
e. Na, kahit iisang tao lamang ipapangalan ang titulo nito, ang lupang
binabanggit sa kasulatang ito ay pag-aari pa rin naming tatlong (3)
magkakapatid. [emphases in the original]45
31. Second, the Pagwawaksi ng Karapatan sa Pag-aari ng Bahagi ng
Lupa, dated January 19, 2010, where Emiliano waived his 1/3 share in favor
of his two siblings, thereby returning his share to his two sisters. In these
documents, petitioner was a signatory.
32. Evidently, by his participation, petitioner is estopped from questioning
them. He cannot be permitted to assail the genuineness of the March 21,
2011 deed of donation because the execution of the said deed by Carolina in
favor of Erlinda was merely in keeping with the wishes of Filomena,
Enriqueta and Rosalina to transfer the property to both of them.
33. In sum, the totality of documentary evidence inevitably shows that Carolina
and Erlinda are co-owners of the 289 square meters parcel of land with
improvement thereon, as originally intended by their predecessors-
ininterest, Filomena, Enriqueta and Rosalina.
34. Being a co-owner,
petitioner cannot be ordered to
vacate the house
35. Being a co-owner of the property as heir of Carolina, petitioner cannot
be ejected from the subject property. In a co-ownership, the undivided
thing or right belong to different persons, with each of them holding the
property pro indiviso and exercising [his] rights over the whole property.
36. Each co-owner may use and enjoy the property with no other limitation than
that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying
rationale is that until a division is actually made, the respective share of
each cannot be determined, and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants, joint ownership of the pro indiviso property, in addition to
his use and enjoyment of it.46
37. Ultimately, respondents do not have a cause of action to eject petitioner
based on tolerance because the latter is also entitled to possess and
enjoy the subject property. Corollarily, neither of the parties can assert
exclusive ownership and possession of the same prior to any partition. If at
all, the action for unlawful detainer only resulted in the recognition of co-
ownership between the parties over the residential house.
38. The remedy of the
respondents is partition
39. The Court notes that respondents have recognized the co-ownership insofar
as the parcel of land is concerned when they alleged47 in their complaint for
unlawful detainer their intention to partition the same. They assert,
however, exclusive ownership over the residential house standing thereon
by virtue of the deed of donation and extra judicial settlement of estate. The
documentary evidence, however, shows that the parties are also co-owners
of the residential house.
40. The parties, being co-owners of both the land and the building, the remedy
of the respondents is to file an action for partition. Article 494 of the New
Civil Code reads:
a. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share
is concerned.
41. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 24, 2015 Decision
and the December 18, 2015 Resolution of the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No.
136514, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for unlawful
detainer is DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
 action.
14.) Quintos v. Nicolas
a G.R. No. 210252 | June 16, 2014
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and
respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra,
David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings. Their
parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject
property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion
C, Camiling, Tarlac, covered by (TCT) No. 318717.
2. By 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already passed away, leaving
to their ten (10) children ownership over the subject property. Subsequently,
sometime in 2002, respondent siblings brought an action for partition
against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52 and was
raffled to the RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac. However, in an
Order4 dated March 22, 2004, the trial court dismissed the case disposing as
follows:
a. For failure of the parties, as well as their counsels, to appear despite due notice, this
case is hereby DISMISSED.
3. As neither set of parties appealed, the ruling of the trial court became final,
as evidenced by a Certificate of Finality 5it eventually issued on August 22,
2008.
4. Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, respondent
siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication 6 on September
21, 2004 to transfer the property in favor of the ten (10) siblings. As a
result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484
was issued in its place by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names of
the ten (10) heirs of the Ibarra spouses.
5. Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the
property in favor of their co-respondents, the spouses Recto and
Rosemarie Candelario. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale 7 dated April
17, 2007 executed in favor of the spouses Candelario and an Agreement of
Subdivision8 purportedly executed by them and petitioners, TCT No.
390484 was partially canceled and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name
of the Candelarios, covering the 7/10 portion.
6. On June 1, 2009, petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and
Damages against respondents wherein they alleged that during their parents’
lifetime, the couple distributed their real and personal properties in favor of
their ten (10) children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that they
received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their
share. They likewise averred that they have been in adverse, open,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over four (4)
decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable title thereto. They also deny any
participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deed of Adjudication
dated September 21, 2004 and the Agreement of Subdivision.
7. Respondents countered that petitioners’ cause of action was already barred
by estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the
7/10 undivided share of the respondent siblings. They point out that this is
an admission on the part of petitioners that the property is not entirely
theirs. In addition, they claimed that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra
mortgaged the property but because of financial constraints, respondent
spouses Candelario had to redeem the property in their behalf. Not having
been repaid by Bienvenido and Escolastica, the Candelarios accepted from
their co-respondents their share in the subject property as payment. Lastly,
respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.
8. Docketed as Civil Case No. 09-15 of the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac, the
quieting of title case was eventually raffled to Branch 68 of the court, the
same trial court that dismissed Civil Case No. 02-52. During pre-trial,
respondents, or defendants a quo, admitted having filed an action for
partition, that petitioners did not participate in the Deed of Adjudication that
served as the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 390484, and that the
Agreement of Subdivision that led to the issuance of TCT No. 434304 in
favor of respondent spouses Candelario was falsified.9 
9. Despite the admissions of respondents, however, the RTC, through its May 27, 2012 Decision, dismissed
petitioners’ complaint. The court did not find merit in petitioners’ asseverations that they have acquired title
over the property through acquisitive prescription and noted that there was no document evidencing that their
parents bequeathed to them the subject property. Finding that respondent siblings were entitled to their
respective shares in the property as descendants of Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra and as co-heirs of
petitioners, the subsequent transfer of their interest in favor of respondent spouses Candelario was then
upheld by the trial court. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
a. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled case is hereby Dismissed.
b. Also, defendants-spouses Rosemarie Candelario and Recto Candelario are hereby declared as
the absolute owners of the 7/10 portion of the subject lot.
c. Likewise, the court hereby orders the partition of the subject lots between the herein plaintiffs
and the defendants-spouses Candelarios.
10. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA, pleading the same allegations they
averred in their underlying complaint for quieting of title. However, they added that the partition should no
longer be allowed since it is already barred by res judicata, respondent siblings having already filed a case
for partition that was dismissed with finality, as admitted by respondents themselves during pre-trial.
11. On July 8, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying the appeal. The fallo reads: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision dated May 7, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac,
Branch 68, in Civil Case No. 09-15, is hereby AFFIRMED.
12. Similar to the trial court, the court a quo found no evidence on record to support petitioners’ claim that the
subject property was specifically bequeathed by Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra in their favor as their
share in their parents’ estate. It also did not consider petitioners’ possession of the property as one that is in
the concept of an owner. Ultimately, the appellate court upheld the finding that petitioners and respondent
spouses Candelario co-own the property, 30-70 in favor of the respondent spouses.
13. As regards the issue of partition, the CA added:
a. x x x Since it was conceded that the subject lot is now co-owned by the plaintiffs-appellants,
(with 3/10 undivided interest) and defendants-appellees Spouses Candelarios (with 7/10
 undivided interest) and considering that plaintiffs-appellants had already constructed a 3-storey
building at the back portion of the property, then partition, in accordance with the subdivision
plan (records, p. 378) undertaken by defendants-appellants [sic] spouses, is in order.10
14. On November 22, 2013, petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
15. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
2. W/N 1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over
the property;
3. 2. Whether or not the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is already
barred by laches or res judicata; and
4. 3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision
agreement as basis for the partition of the property.
RATIO:
1. The petition is meritorious in part.
2. Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the
property
3. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud,
doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. 12 For an action to quiet
title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or efficacy.13 In the case at bar, the CA
correctly observed that petitioners’ cause of action must necessarily fail
mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.
4. At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of whether or
not petitioners sufficiently proved their claim of ownership or equitable title
is substantially a factual issue that is generally improper for Us to delve
into.
5. In any event, a perusal of the records would readily show that petitioners, as
aptly observed by the courts below, indeed, failed to substantiate their
claim. Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted
possession of the subject property is belied by the fact that respondent
siblings, in 2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico
Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot without any objection from
the petitioners.16  respondent spouses Candelario were not party-litigants in the earlier case
6. Petitioners’ inability to offer evidence tending to prove that Bienvenido and
Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over the property in favor of
petitioners is likewise fatal to the latter’s claim. On the contrary, on May 28,
1998, Escolastica Ibarra executed a Deed of Sale covering half of the
subject property in favor of all her 10 children, not in favor of petitioners
alone.17
7. The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden
of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his or her case by preponderance of
evidence.18 Regrettably, petitioners, as such plaintiff, in this case failed to
discharge the said burden imposed upon them in proving legal or equitable
title over the parcel of land in issue. As such, there is no reason to disturb
the finding of the RTC that all 10 siblings inherited the subject property
from Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, and after the respondent siblings
sold their aliquot share to the spouses Candelario, petitioners and
respondent spouses became co-owners of the same.
8. The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment
9. This brings us to the issue of partition as raised by respondents in their
counterclaim. In their answer to the counterclaim, petitioners countered that
the action for partition has already been barred by res judicata.
10. The doctrine of res judicata provides that the judgment in a first case is final
as to the claim or demand in controversy, between the parties and those
privy with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received
to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible
matter which must have been offered for that purpose and all matters that
could have been adjudged in that case. 19 It precludes parties from
relitigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final
judgment.20 
11. The rationale for this principle is that a party should not be vexed twice
concerning the same cause.
12. There is res judicata when the following requisites are present: (1) the formal judgment or
order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered
after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the
case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action.24
13. In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they filed an action for
partition docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52, which the RTC dismissed
through an Order dated March 22, 2004 for the failure of the parties to
attend the scheduled hearings. Respondents likewise admitted that since
they no longer appealed the dismissal, the ruling attained finality.
Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the subject property in Civil Case No.
02-52 and in the present controversy are one and the same, and that in both
cases, respondents raise the same action for partition. And lastly, although
for partition, there is identity of parties not only when the parties in the case
are the same, but also between those in privity with them, such as between
their successors-in-interest.25
14. With all the other elements present, what is left to be determined now is
whether or not the dismissal of Civil case No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal
on the merits that would complete the requirements of res judicata.
15. In advancing their claim, petitioners cite Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
a. Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to
the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate
action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise declared by the court.
16. The afore-quoted provision enumerates the instances when a complaint may
be dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date
for the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint; (2) if he fails
to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails
to comply with the Rules or any order of the court.
17. The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication
on the merits, and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing
of another action, unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal.
Stated differently, the general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to
prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with
prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception is when the
order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is
without prejudice.26 In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the Order does
not in any language say that the dismissal is without prejudice and, thus, the
requirement that the dismissal be on the merits is present.
18. Truly, We have had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice under
the above-cited rule amply satisfies one of the elements of res judicata. 27 It
is, thus, understandable why petitioners would allege res judicata to bolster
their claim. However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of
the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for
partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of
ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto is Article 494 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
a. Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar
as his share is concerned.
b. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time,
not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new
agreement.
c. A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed
twenty years. Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No
prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (emphasis
supplied)
19. From the above-quoted provision, it can be gleaned that the law generally
does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property relation, and is
interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners’ specific shares so as to
prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the
law provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common.
20. Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right
granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must
prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-
owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is
not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation,
that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. 28 This
further finds support in Art. 496 of the New Civil Code, viz:
a. Article 496.Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings.1âwphi1 Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as
they are consistent with this Code.
21. Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, We hold
that Art. 494, as cited, is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to
prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be
deemed to be without prejudice.
22. This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred
by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning
the same parties and the same subject matter once the respective shares of
the co-owners have been determined with finality by a competent court
with jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper
for co-ownership does not or no longer exists.
23. So it was that in Rizal v. Naredo,29 We ruled in the following wise:
a. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in the
co-ownership, and his proper remedy is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court, which he may bring at anytime in so far as his share is concerned.
Article 1079 of the Civil Code defines partition as the separation, division and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. It has
been held that the fact that the agreement of partition lacks the technical description
of the parties’ respective portions or that the subject property was then still
embraced by the same certificate of title could not legally prevent a partition, where
the different portions allotted to each were determined and became separately
identifiable.
b. The partition of Lot No. 252 was the result of the approved Compromise Agreement
in Civil Case No. 36-C, which was immediately final and executory. Absent any
showing that said Compromise Agreement was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress,
the court cannot set aside a judgment based on compromise. It is axiomatic that a
compromise agreement once approved by the court settles the rights of the parties
and has the force of res judicata. It cannot be disturbed except on the ground of vice
of consent or forgery.
 c. Of equal significance is the fact that the compromise judgment in Civil Case No.
36-C settled as well the question of which specific portions of Lot No. 252 accrued
to the parties separately as their proportionate shares therein. Through their
subdivision survey plan, marked as Annex "A" of the Compromise Agreement and
made an integral part thereof, the parties segregated and separately assigned to
themselves distinct portions of Lot No. 252. The partition was immediately
executory, having been accomplished and completed on December 1, 1971 when
judgment was rendered approving the same. The CA was correct when it stated that
no co-ownership exist when the different portions owned by different people are
already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described.
24. In the quoted case, We have held that res judicata applied because after the
parties executed a compromise agreement that was duly approved by the
court, the different portions of the owners have already been ascertained.
Thus, there was no longer a co-ownership and there was nothing left to
partition. This is in contrast with the case at bar wherein the co-ownership,
as determined by the trial court, is still subsisting 30-70 in favor of
respondent spouses Candelario. Consequently, there is no legal bar
preventing herein respondents from praying for the partition of the property
through counterclaim.
25. The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches
26. We now proceed to petitioners’ second line of attack. According to
petitioners, the claim for partition is already barred by laches since by
1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had already died and yet
the respondent siblings only belatedly filed the action for partition,
Civil Case No. 02-52, in 2002. And since laches has allegedly already set in
against respondent siblings, so too should respondent spouses Candelario be
barred from claiming the same for they could not have acquired a better
right than their predecessors-in-interest.
27. The argument fails to persuade.
28. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which––by the exercise of due diligence––could or should have been done earlier. It is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. 30 The principle is
a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon
one’s right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
inequitable situation.
29. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of
the petitioners’ title, but only with whether or not by reason of the
respondents’ long inaction or inexcusable neglect, they should be barred
from asserting this claim at all, because to allow them to do so would be
inequitable and unjust to petitioners.31
30. As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be said to
have neglected to assert their right over the subject property. They cannot
be considered to have abandoned their right given that they filed an action
for partition sometime in 2002, even though it was later dismissed.
31. Furthermore, the fact that respondent siblings entered into a Contract of
Lease with Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject property is
evidence that they are exercising rights of ownership over the same.
32. The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision
33. There is merit, however, in petitioners’ contention that the CA erred in
approving the proposal for partition submitted by respondent spouses. Art.
496, as earlier cited, provides that partition shall either be by agreement of
the parties or in accordance with the Rules of Court. In this case, the
Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses
Candelario and petitioners cannot serve as basis for partition, for, as stated
in the pre-trial order, herein respondents admitted that the agreement
was a falsity and that petitioners never took part in preparing the same.
34. The "agreement" was crafted without any consultation whatsoever or any
attempt to arrive at mutually acceptable terms with petitioners. It, therefore,
lacked the essential requisite of consent. Thus, to approve the agreement in
spite of this fact would be tantamount to allowing respondent spouses to
divide unilaterally the property among the co-owners based on their own
whims and caprices. Such a result could not be countenanced.
35. To rectify this with dispatch, the case must be remanded to the court of
origin, which shall proceed to partition the property in accordance with the
procedure outlined in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
36. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTLY
GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R.
CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013 and November 22, 2013, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for purposes of
partitioning the subject property in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court.
15.) Ining v. Vega
G.R. No. 174727, 12 August 2013
FACTS:
1. One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from
the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property.
Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the
estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.
2. Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a
3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-6305 (OCT RO-
630). Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his
siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria),
 who are now both deceased.
3. Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson,
herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased).
Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I.
Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the
substituted respondents.
4. Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners
Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores),
Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto
Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo Ibea-Fernandez,
Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria
Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is survived by
8.
Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora),
Camilo Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco,
Jr. (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and
Herminigildo Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa
Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is
not clear from the records if he was made party to the proceedings, or if he
is alive at all.
5. In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and
Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses
thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).
and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against
them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through
Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan
Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and
Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in continuous, actual,
adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the property with a just title;
that they have been paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardo’s claim
is barred by estoppel and laches; and that they have suffered damages and
were forced to litigate as a result of Leonardo’s malicious suit. They prayed
that Civil Case No. 5275 be dismissed; that Leonardo be declared to be
without any right to the property; that Leonardo be ordered to surrender the
certificate of title to the property;
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer
Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the property. 10 The
resulting Commissioner’s Report and Sketch, 11 as well as the
Supplementary Commissioner’s Report,12 were duly approved by the
parties. The parties then submitted the following issues for resolution of the
trial court:
a. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate;
b. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
c. Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or
laches.13

6. In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to
him as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 6 for partition, recovery
of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In his
Amended Complaint,7 Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he
demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed
his demands; that the matter reached the level of the Lupon Tagapamayapa,
which issued a certification to file a court action sometime in 1980; that
Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership of the property; that portions of the
property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be
collated and included as part of the portion to be awarded to Gregoria’s
heirs; that in 1979, Lucimo Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein
petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed absolute ownership of the property and
transferred in his name the tax declaration covering the property; that from
1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him (Leonardo) of the fruits
of the property estimated at ₱1,000.00 per year; that as a result, he incurred
expenses by way of attorney’s fees and litigation costs. Leonardo thus
prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property; that the
same be partitioned after collation and determination of the portion to which
he is entitled; that Gregoria’s heirs be ordered to execute the necessary
documents or agreements.
7. In their Answer8 with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr.
9. In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was duly substituted by his
heirs, the respondents herein.14
10. During the course of the proceedings, the following additional relevant facts
came to light:
11. 1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners Civil Case No. 4983 for
partition with the RTC Kalibo, but the case was dismissed and referred to
the Kalibo Municipal Trial Court (MTC), where the case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1366. However, on March 4, 1997, the MTC dismissed Civil
Case No. 1366 for lack of jurisdiction and declared that only the RTC can
take cognizance of the partition case;15
12. 2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through an
unnotarized document dated April 4, 1943.16 Enriquez in turn allegedly sold
the property to Lucimo Sr. on November 25, 1943 via another private sale
document;17
13. 3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for more than 30
years, while Leonardo acquired custody of OCT RO-630;18
14. 4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit of Ownership of
Land19 claiming sole ownership of the property which he utilized to secure
in his name Tax Declaration No. 16414 (TD 16414) over the property and
to cancel Tax Declaration No. 20102 in Leon’s name;20
15. 5. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991; and
16. 6. The property was partitioned among the petitioners, to the exclusion of
Leonardo.21
17. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
18. On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision,22 which decreed as follows:
a. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
b. Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs’ right of action has long
prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;
c. Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630 (24071) to be the common
property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-
630 (24071) is ordered cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Aklan is directed to issue a transfer certificate of title to the heirs of Natividad
Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs
of Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; and Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4)
share.
d. For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaim is ordered dismissed.
e. With cost against the plaintiffs.
19. The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale to be spurious. It
concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the
property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leon’s estate at the time
of his death in 1962. Leon’s siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property
in equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to Romana’s share as the latter’s
successors.
20. However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon’s death in 1962 – or
up to 1992 – within which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition suit
only in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription. It held that under Article 1141 of
the Civil Code,24 an action for partition and recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land is a real action over immovable property which prescribes in 30 years. In addition, the
trial court held that for his long inaction, Leonardo was guilty of laches as well. Consequently,
the property should go to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively.
21. Respondents moved for reconsideration25 but the same was denied by the RTC in its February
7, 2002 Order.26
22. Ruling of the Court of Appeals
23. Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74687, the
appeal questioned the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 5275, its
application of Article 1141, and the award of the property to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively.
24. On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned Decision, 27 which contained the following
decretal portion:
a. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is GRANTED. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Br. 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5275 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is rendered as follows:
b. 1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-
interest of Romana Roldan;
c. 2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as successors-in-
interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;
d. 3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the portion described in
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Commissioner’s Report (Supplementary) to the herein
plaintiffs;
e. 4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-630 (24071) in the name of Leon
Roldan and the Register of Deeds of Aklan is directed to issue transfer certificates
of title to the plaintiffs in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of the sketch plan as
embodied in the Commissioner’s Report (Supplementary) and the remaining
portion thereof be adjudged to the defendants.
f. Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.
g. Costs against the defendants-appellees.
25. The CA held that the trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25,
1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was
settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same. Proceeding from the premise that no valid
prior disposition of the property was made by its owner Leon and that the property – which
remained part of his estate at the time of his death – passed on by succession to his two
siblings, Romana and Gregoria, which thus makes the parties herein – who are Romana’s and
Gregoria’s heirs – co-owners of the property in equal shares, the appellate court held that only
the issues of prescription and laches were needed to be resolved.
26. The CA did not agree with the trial court’s pronouncement that Leonardo’s action for partition
was barred by prescription. The CA declared that prescription began to run not from Leon’s
death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979,
which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying
the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription
shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held that it was only when
Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax
declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of his co-
ownership with Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the running of
the 30-year prescriptive period under Article 1141.
27. The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.’s sole possession of the property for more than 30 years to
the exclusion of Leonardo and the respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership
either, stating that his exclusive possession of the property and appropriation of its fruits – even
his continuous payment of the taxes thereon – while adverse as against strangers, may not be
deemed so as against Leonardo in the absence of clear and conclusive evidence to the effect
that the latter was ousted or deprived of his rights as co-owner with the intention of assuming
exclusive ownership over the property, and absent a showing that this was effectively made
known to Leonardo. Citing Bargayo v. Camumot29 and Segura v. Segura,30 the appellate court
held that as a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the other
co-owners but will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of an
inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs if he
administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation to deliver the same to his co-
owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.
28. The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo Sr. and the issuance of a new tax
declaration in his name do not prove ownership; they merely indicate a claim of ownership.
Moreover, petitioners’ act of partitioning the property among themselves to the exclusion of
Leonardo cannot affect the latter; nor may it be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership
as it has not been shown that the partition was made known to Leonardo.
29. The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the
respondents. It held that laches is controlled by equitable considerations and it cannot be used
to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to deprive the respondents of their
rightful inheritance.
30. On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA granted respondents’ prayer for partition,
directing that the manner of partitioning the property shall be governed by the Commissioner’s
 Report and Sketch and the Supplementary Commissioner’s Report which the parties did not
contest.
31. Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration 31 which the CA denied in its assailed
September 7, 2006 Resolution.32  with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure
32. Hence, the present Petition.
ISSUES:
2. W/N
RATIO:
1. Petitioners’ Arguments
2. Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply 34 that Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in
1943 and his possession thereof amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership, and that
Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.’s possession for such length of time
operated to bestow upon petitioners – as Lucimo Sr.’s successors-in-interest – the benefits of
acquisitive prescription which proceeded from the repudiation.
3. Petitioners contend that Leonardo’s inaction – from Lucimo Sr.’s taking possession in 1943, up
to 1995, when Leonardo filed Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo –
amounted to laches or neglect. They add that during the proceedings before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo was informed of Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in
1943; this notwithstanding, Leonardo did not take action then against Lucimo Sr. and did so
only in 1995, when he filed Civil Case No. 4983 – which was eventually dismissed and
referred to the MTC. They argue that, all this time, Leonardo did nothing while Lucimo Sr.
occupied the property and claimed all its fruits for himself.
4. The Court denies the Petition.
5. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been
settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the
property remained part of Leon’s estate.
6. One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial court is whether
Leon sold the property to Lucimo Sr. The trial court, examining the two
deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them to
be spurious. It then concluded that no such sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr.
ever took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal.
Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter should be considered
settled. Thus, petitioners’ insistence on Lucimo Sr.’s 1943 purchase of the
property to reinforce their claim over the property must be ignored. Since
no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly
remained part of Leon’s estate upon his passing in 1962.
7. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
8. Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s
and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein – became entitled to the property
upon the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of death.
9. Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property.
10. Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana,
petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they
may use the property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance
the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
according to their rights.37 They have the full ownership of their parts and of
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign or
mortgage them, and even substitute another person in their enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. 38 Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.39 Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs
against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.40
11. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.
12. Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation
of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-
owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing."41
13. From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial court erred in
reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may seek partition
from the death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth
paragraph) provide that prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-
owner and against the other co-owners only from the time he positively
renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the other
co-owners.
14. Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardo’s co-ownership of the property only
sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the former executed the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in his name,
and informed the latter – before the Lupon Tagapamayapa – of his 1943
purchase of the property. These apparent acts of repudiation were followed
later on by Lucimo Sr.’s act of withholding Leonardo’s share in the fruits of
the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself claims in his
Amended Complaint. Considering these facts, the CA held that prescription
began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it has
been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-
ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus
concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20
years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under
Article 1141.
15. What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is that
 while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be
characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not
a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is
merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter
Teodora.42 Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the
primary basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity.
a. Art. 150. Family relations include those:
b. (1) Between husband and wife;
c. (2) Between parents and children;
d. (3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
e. (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
16. In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property;
Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-
ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not
run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the
property has not been lost.
17. Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s admission and
acknowledgment in his pleadings – that Lucimo Sr. was in possession of the
property since 1943 – should be taken against him, is unavailing. In 1943,
Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this
very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of
Leon. More significantly, the property, which is registered under the
Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon’s name. Leon’s
ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the property passed on
to his heirs by operation of law.
18. In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing
co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.
19. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14, 2006
Decision and the September 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 74687are AFFIRMED.
16.)Heirs of Marasigan v. Marasigan,
G.R. No. 156078, 14 March 2008
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are asking this Court to (a) give due course to their petition; and (b) reverse and set
aside, and thus, declare null and void the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67529. However, petitioners are asking for the following reliefs in their Memorandum: (a) the
dismissal of the complaint for partition of the estate of the late Alicia Marasigan, docketed as
Special Civil Action No. P-77-97, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili,
Camarines Sur; (b) annulment or rescission of the public auction sale of petitioners’ 1/7th
undivided share in the estate of Alicia Marasigan, and direct Apolonio Marasigan to restore the
same to petitioners; or (c) in the alternative, allowance of the physical partition of the entire
496 hectares of Hacienda Sta. Rita.
2. Central to the instant Petition is the estate of Alicia Marasigan (Alicia).
3. Alicia was survived by her siblings: Cesar, Apolonio, Lilia, and Benito;
Marissa, a sister-in-law; and the children of her brothers who predeceased
her: Francisco, Horacio, and Octavio. She died intestate and without issue
on 21 January 1995.
4. On 17 December 1997, a Complaint for Judicial Partition of the Estate of
Alicia Marasigan was filed before the RTC by several of her heirs and
private respondents herein, namely, Apolonio, Lilia, Octavio, Jr., Horacio,
Benito, Jr., and Marissa, against Cesar, docketed as Special Civil Action
No. P-77-97.
5. According to private respondents, Alicia owned in common with her
siblings 13 parcels of land called Hacienda Sta. Rita in Pili and Minalabac,
Camarines Sur, with an aggregate area of 4,960,963 square meters or 496
hectares, and more particularly described as follows:
6. Alicia left behind her 2/21 shares in the afore-described 13 parcels of land.
7. In answer to the private respondents’ Complaint, Cesar enumerated Alicia’s
several other properties and assets which he also wanted included in the
action for partition, to wit:
a. 1. 1/8 share in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 10947 located at Poblacion,
San Juan, Batangas, containing an area of 4,827 square meters, more or less;
b. 2. 1/8 share in the parcel of land with improvements thereon (cockpit arena) located
in Poblacion, San Juan, Batangas covered by TCT No. 0-3255;
c. 3. A parcel of commercial land under property Index No. 024-21-001-25-005
situated in Poblacion, San Juan Batangas containing an area of 540 square meters,
more or less;
d. 4. A parcel of land situated in Yabo, Sipocot, Camarines Sur containing an area of
2,000 hectares and covered by Tax Declaration No. 7546;
e. 5. A parcel of land located at Brgy. Yabo, Sipocot, Camarines Sur with an area of
21,000 square meters, more or less, covered by Tax Declaration No. 6622;
f. 6. A parcel of land located at Brgy. Yabo, Sipocot, Camarines Sur with an area of
2,6750 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 5352;
g. 7. A parcel of land located at Barrio Yabo, Sipocot, Camarines Sur with an area of
2,3750 hectares and covered by Tax Declaration No. 3653, and
h. 8. Shares of Stock in Bolbok Rural Bank, Inc., a family owned rural bank consisting
of 3,230 shares at ₱100.00 per share.4
8. Cesar’s request for inclusion was contested by private respondents on the
ground that the properties he enumerated had already been previously
partitioned and distributed to the appropriate parties.5
9. On 4 February 2000, the RTC decided in favor of private respondents and issued an Order of
Partition of the Estate of Alicia Marasigan, decreeing that:
 a. As regards to [sic] the real properties located in Hacienda Sta. Rita in the
municipalities of Pili and Minilabac, Camarines Sur as described in par. 3 of the
complaint, the actual area representing the 2/21 pro-indiviso share having been
determined consisting of 422,422.65 sq. meters, more or less (Exhibit 0-2)
therefore, the share of each heir of the late Alicia Marasigan is 1/7 or equivalent to
67,496.09 square meters each (Exh. 0-3).
b. Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered.
c. 1. Ordering the partition of the estate of Alicia Marasigan in Hacienda Sta. Rita
located in the municipalities of Pili and Minalabac, Camarines Sur consisting of
422,422.65 sq. meters among her surviving brothers and sisters namely:
APOLONIO, LILIA, BENITO and CESAR, all surnamed MARASIGAN who will
inherit per capita and her nephews and nieces who are the children of deceased
brothers – the children of Francisco Marasigan and children of Horacio Marasigan
who will inherit per stirpes and Octavio Marasigan, Jr., who will inherit by right of
representation of his deceased father, Octavio Marasigan, Sr.
d. 2. Declaring the partition of the San Juan, Batangas properties made by the heirs of
Alicia Marasigan as contained in the minutes of the Board Meeting of the Rural
Bank of Bolbok valid and binding among them.
e. 3. Ordering the partition of the real properties located in San Juan, Batangas as
shown and reflected in Exhibits 1 to 10 inclusive presented by defendant, in the
same sharing and proportion as provided in paragraph one above-cited in this
dispositive portion.
10. As the parties could not agree on how they shall physically partition among themselves
Alicia’s estate, private respondents filed a Motion to Appoint Commissioners 7 following the
procedure outlined in Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, citing, among
other bases for their motion:
a. That unfortunately, the parties could not agree to make the partition among
themselves which should have been submitted for the confirmation of the
Honorable Court more so because no physical division could be had on the 2/21
pro-indiviso shares of the decedent [Alicia] due to different locations, contours and
conditions;
11. The RTC granted the Motion and appointed Myrna V. Badiong, Assistant Provincial Assessor
of Camarines Sur, as Chairman of the Board of Commissioners. 8 Private respondents
nominated Sandie B. Dacara as the second commissioner. Cesar failed to nominate a third
commissioner despite due notice. Upon lapse of the period given, only two commissioners
were appointed.
12. On 26 October 2000, the two Commissioners conducted an ocular inspection of Hacienda Sta.
Rita, together with the Local Assessment Operations Officer IV of the Provincial Assessor’s
Office, the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairman, and the Marasigans’
caretaker. However, Cesar contended that he did not receive any notice from the
Commissioners to attend the ocular inspection and he was, thus, not present on said occasion.
13. The Commissioners’ Report9 was released on 17 November 2000 stating the following findings
and recommendations:
a. The undersigned Commissioners admit the 472,472.65 (47.2472.65) square meters
representing the 2/21 pro-indiviso share of the deceased Alicia Marasigan and the
1/7 share of each of the heirs of Alicia N. Marasigan equivalent to 67,496.09 square
meters or 6.7496.09 hectares determined by Geodetic Engineer Roberto R. Revilla
in his Compliance with the Order of the Honorable Court dated November 18,
1998.
b. Considering that the physical division of the 2/21 pro-indiviso share of the
decedent, Alicia Marasigan cannot be done because of the different locations and
conditions of the properties, undersigned Commissioners hereby recommend that
the heirs may assign their 1/7 share to one of the parties willing to buy the same
(Sec. 5, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court) provided he pays to the heir[s] willing to
assign his/her 1/7 share such amounts the Commissioners have recommended and
duly approved by the Honorable Court.
c. In consideration of such findings and after a careful and thorough deliberations by
the undersigned on the subject matter, considering the subject properties’
classification and actual predominant use, desirability and demand and together
with the benefits that may be derived therefrom by the landowners, we have decided
to recommend as it is hereby recommended that the price of the 1/7 share of each of
the heir[s] is ₱700,000.00 per hectare, thus:
d. ₱700,000.00 x 6.7496.09 hectares = P4,724,726.30 or in words:
e. FOUR MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED TWENTY SIX AND 30/100 PESOS FOR THE 1/7 SHARE
(6.7496.09 HECTARES) OF EACH OF THE HEIRS.10
14. Cesar opposed the foregoing findings and prayed for the disapproval of the Commissioners’
Report. In his Comment/Opposition to the Commissioners’ Report, he maintained that:
a. He does not expect that he would be forced, to buy his co-owner’s share or to sell
his share instead. Had he known that it would be the recourse he would have
appealed the judgment [with petitioners referring to the RTC Order of Partition].
But the findings of facts in the Decision as well [as] dispositive do not show that
any valid grounds for exception to partition is even present in the instant case.11
15. Cesar alleged that the estate is not indivisible just because of the different locations and
conditions of the parcels of land constituting the same. Section 5, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
can only be availed of if the partition or division of the real properties involved would be
prejudicial to the interest of any of the parties. He asserted that despite the segregation of his
share, the remaining parcels of land would still be serviceable for the planting of rice, corn, and
sugarcane, thus evidencing that no prejudice would be caused to the interests of his co-heirs.
16. Countering Cesar’s arguments, private respondents contended that physical division is
impossible because Alicia’s estate is equivalent to 2/21 shares in Hacienda Sta. Rita, which is
composed of 13 parcels under different titles and tax declarations, situated in different
barangays and municipalities, and covers an area of 496 hectares.
17. After a serious consideration of the matters raised by the parties, the RTC issued an Order
dated 22 June 2001 approving in toto the recommendations embodied in the Commissioners’
Report, particularly, the recommendation that the property be assigned to one of the heirs at
₱700,000.00 per hectare or a total amount of ₱4,724,726.00,12after finding the same to be in
accordance with the Rules of Court and the New Civil Code. Pertinent portions of the Order
are reproduced below:
a. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Commissioners Report dated
November 17, 2000 is hereby approved in toto, more specifically its
recommendation to assign the property to any one of the heirs interested at the price
of ₱700,000.00 per hectare or in the total amount of ₱4,724,726.00 per share.
b. Regarding the properties of deceased Alicia Marasigan located at San Juan,
Batangas, the herein Commissioners, Mrs. Myrna V. Badiong and Engr. Sandie B.
Dacara are hereby directed to proceed with utmost dispatch to San Juan, Batangas
and inspect said properties (Exhibits 1 to 10 inclusive) and thereafter to submit a
Supplemental Report as to its partition or other disposition with notice to all parties
and their counsels all at the expense of the estate, within a period of thirty (30) days
from receipt hereof.
18. Dissatisfied, Cesar filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which was denied by the RTC for lack
of merit.14
19. In the meantime, Cesar died on 25 October 2001. He was substituted by his heirs and herein
petitioners, namely, Luz Regina, Cesar, Jr., Benito, Santiago, Renato, Jose, Geraldo, Orlando,
Peter, Paul, Mauricio, Rommel, Michael, Gabriel, and Maria Luz, all surnamed Marasigan.
20. Upon the denial by the RTC of Cesar’s Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners elevated their
case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 67529.15 They claimed that the RTC
judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
approving the Commissioners’ Report although the facts would clearly indicate the following:
a. (a) The procedure taken by the Commissioners violated the procedure for partition
provided in Section 4, Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure because there was no
notice sent to them for the viewing and examination of the properties of the estate;
neither were they heard as to their preference in the portion of the estate, thus
depriving them of due process;
b. (b) The ground used by the Commissioners resulting in their recommendation to
assign the property is not one of those grounds provided under the Rules
c. (c) Article 492 of the New Civil Code is inapplicable
d. (d) Assignment of the real properties to one of the parties will not end the co-
ownership.
21. Moreover, petitioners accused the RTC of committing grave abuse of discretion in solely
relying on the testimony of Apolonio to the effect that physical division is impractical because,
while other portions of the land are suitable for agriculture, the others are not, citing the
different contours of the land and unavailability of water supply in some parts.
22. The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in a
Decision16 promulgated on 31 July 2002, and ruled that the RTC acted within its authority in
issuing the Order of 22 June 2001. The Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to
discharge the burden of proving that the proceedings before the Board of Commissioners were
unfair and prejudicial. It likewise found that the petitioners were not denied due process
considering that they were afforded the opportunity to be heard during the hearing for approval
of the Commissioners’ Report on 18 January 2001. According to the appellate court, whether
or not the physical division of the estate will cause prejudice to the interests of the parties is an
issue addressed to the discretion of the Commissioners. It further held that it would be absurd
to believe that the prejudice referred to in Section 5, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court does not
embrace physical impossibility and impracticality. It concurred in the finding of the RTC that:
a. It is not difficult to believe that a physical partition/division of the 2/21 pro-indiviso
shares of the decedent Alicia Marasigan contained in and spread throughout thirteen
(13) parcels of the Hacienda Sta. Rita with a total area of 946 (sic) hectares would
be quite impossible if totally impractical. The said parcels are of different
measurements in terms of areas and shapes located in different barrages of the
Municipalities of Pili and Minalabac, Camarines Sur.17
23. The Court of Appeals also noted that whether or not the RTC correctly applied Section 5, Rule
69 of the Rules of Court and Article 492 of the New Civil Code, would involve an error of
judgment, which cannot be reviewed on certiorari. Finally, the Court of Appeals found
unmeritorious petitioners’ argument that the assignment of the estate to one of the parties does
not end the co-ownership, considering that it questions the 4 February 2000 18 Decision of the
RTC which had already become final and executory.
24. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 19 of the foregoing Decision but the same was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 13 November 2002. Still aggrieved,
petitioners filed on 31 December 2002 this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 156078.
25. Pending resolution of the instant Petition by this Court, the RTC granted private respondents’
Urgent Motion for Execution on 26 December 2002. The RTC ordered the sale of petitioners’
1/7 pro-indiviso share in Alicia’s estate upon the urgent motion of private respondents dated 27
September 2002 for the partial execution of the judgment of the Court approving the
Commissioners’ report pending certiorari.20
26. Petitioners’ share in Alicia’s estate was sold in a public auction on 26 February 2003. 21 Based
on the Commissioners’ Report on the Auction Sale, there were two bidders, Apolonio
Marasigan and Amado Lazaro. Apolonio, with a bid of ₱701,000.00 per hectare, won over
Amado Lazaro, whose bid was ₱700,000.00 per hectare. Petitioners’ 1/7 share as Cesar’s heirs
in Alicia’s estate was sold in the public auction for ₱3,777,689.00.
27. This amount is lower than the ₱4,724,726.30 price of the 1/7 share in Alicia’s estate as earlier
determined by the Commissioners due allegedly to the acquisition by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) of a portion of Hacienda Sta. Rita located in Minilabac, Camarines
Sur which was placed under Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law, with 100.00 hectares thereof compulsorily acquired.
28. On 24 March 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Declare Failure of Bidding and
to Annul Public Auction Sale.
29. On 5 May 2003, however, the RTC released an Omnibus Order 22 ruling, among other things,
that the objection of petitioners as to the difference of the value of their 1/7 share as determined
by the Commissioners vis-à-vis the winning bid was no longer an issue since Apolonio
Marasigan indicated his willingness to pay for the deficiency.
30. Following the public auction and sale of their 1/7 share in the property, 23 petitioners filed a
Notice of Appeal24 with the RTC on 26 May 2003 indicating that they were appealing the 5
May 2003 Omnibus Order of the RTC 25 to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, or on 9 June 2003,
petitioners filed a Record on Appeal26 pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
praying that it be approved and transmitted to the Court of Appeals.27
31. On 2 July 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to petitioners’ Notice of Appeal
on the ground that the proper remedy is not appeal, but certiorari. Petitioners then filed on 27
August 2003 another Petition before the Court of Appeals for Certiorari and
Mandamus,28 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78912, praying that the RTC be directed to approve
their Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, and to forward the same to the appellate court.
32. In a Resolution29 dated 10 October 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No.
78912 outright on the ground that the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping of the
petition was signed by only Cesar Marasigan, Jr., without any accompanying document to
prove his authority to sign on behalf of the other petitioners. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution 30 dated 12 July
2004.31
33. Cesar G. Marasigan, Jr., in a Petition for Certiorari filed with this Court on
4 September 2004 and docketed as G.R. No. 164970, prayed for the reversal
and setting aside of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated 10 October 2003
dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 78912, and Resolution dated 12 July 2004
denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof. This Court, however,
issued a Resolution on 13 October 2004 denying the petition for failure of
the petitioner to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error. The same has become final and executory.
ISSUES:
5. W/N whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming in toto the
RTC Order adopting the Commissioners’ recommendation on the manner of
partition of the estate of Alicia Marasigan.
RATIO:
1. Petitioners failed to heed the Court’s prohibition on the raising of new issues in the Memorandum.
2. Moreover, Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that:
a. SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has not jurisdiction over the subject matter,
that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the
claim.
3. First, it bears to point out that Cesar, petitioners’ predecessor, did not file any motion to dismiss, and his
answer before the RTC did not bear the defenses/objections of lack of jurisdiction or cause of action on these
grounds; consequently, these must be considered waived. The exception that the court may still dismiss a
case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, although the same is not pleaded, but is apparent in the
pleadings or evidence on record, does not find application to the present Petition. Second, petitioners’
arguments37 on the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the case more appropriately pertain to venue, rather
than jurisdiction over the subject matter, and are, moreover, not apparent from the pleadings and evidence on
record. Third, the property subject of partition is only the 47.2 hectare pro-indiviso area representing the
estate of Alicia. It does not include the entire 496 hectares of land comprising Hacienda Sta. Rita.
4. After an exhaustive study of the merits of the case and the pleadings
submitted by the parties, this Court is convinced that the Court of Appeals
did not err in affirming the Order of the RTC which approved the
Commissioners’ recommendations as to the manner of implementing the
Order of Partition of Alicia’s estate. There is no reason to reverse the Court
of Appeal’s dismissal of petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
and ruling that the RTC acted well-within its jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Order. Nowhere is it shown that the RTC committed such patent,
gross and prejudicial errors of law or fact, or a capricious disregard of
settled law and jurisprudence, as to amount to a grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdiction on its part, in adopting and confirming the
recommendations submitted by the Commissioners, and which would have
warranted the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
5. This petition originated from an original action for partition. It is governed
by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, and can be availed of under the following
circumstances:
a. Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right
to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting
forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description
of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property.
6. In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first,
the trial court, after determining that a co-ownership in fact exists and that
partition is proper, issues an order for partition; and, second, the trial court
promulgates a decision confirming the sketch and subdivision of the
properties submitted by the parties (if the parties reach an agreement) or by
the appointed commissioners (if the parties fail to agree), as the case may
be.44
7. The delineations of these two phases have already been thoroughly
discussed by this Court in several cases where it explained:
a. The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise
legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition
is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-
ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting
of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in
order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition
among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm
the partition so agreed upon. In either case – i.e., either the action is dismissed or
partition and/or accounting is decreed – the order is a final one, and may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
b. The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree
upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for
the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have been accorded
opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or
parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
question. Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable.45
8. Trouble arose in the instant petition in the second phase.
9. Petitioners postulate that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that notice to the heirs
regarding the examination and viewing of the estate is no longer necessary given the
circumstances. They aver that, in effect, the Court of Appeals was saying that such notice is
only necessary when the Commissioners actually distribute the properties, but is not mandatory
when the Commissioners recommend the assignment of the properties to any of the heirs.
Petitioners contend that this is prejudicial to their right to due process since they are deprived
of the opportunity to be heard on the valuation of their share in the estate.
10. Petitioners’ opposition is anchored on Section 4 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
a. Section 4. Oath and duties of commissioners. Before making such partition, the
commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform
their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other
proceedings in the case. In making the partition, the commissioners shall view and
examine the real estate, after due notice to the parties to attend at such view and
examination, and shall hear the parties as to their preference in the portion of the
property to be set apart to them and the comparative value thereof, and shall set
apart the same to the parties in lots or parcels as will be most advantageous and
equitable, having due regard to the improvements, situation and quality of the
different parts thereof.
11. Petitioners insist that the above provision is explicit and does not allow any qualification,
contending that it does not require that the lack of notice must first be proven to have caused
prejudice to the interest of a party before the latter may object to the Commissioners’ viewing
and examination of the real properties on the basis thereof. They maintain that they were
prejudiced by the mere lack of notice.
12. We, on the other hand, find that the scales of justice have remained equal throughout the
proceedings before the RTC and the Commissioners. This Court, in the performance of its
constitutionally mandated duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, is duty-bound to ensure that due process is afforded to all
the parties to a case.
13. As the Court of Appeals declared, due process is not a mantra, the mere invocation of which
 shall warrant a reversal of a decision. Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is
the opportunity to be heard. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 46 the Court held that as long as
parties to a case were given the opportunity to defend their interest in due course, they cannot
be said to have been denied due process of the law. Neither do the records show any indicia
that the preference of petitioners for the physical subdivision of the property was not taken into
consideration by the Commissioners.
14. Petitioners’ persistent assertion that their rights were prejudiced by the lack of notice is not
enough. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word prejudice as damage or detriment to one’s
legal rights or claims. Prejudice means injury or damage. 47 No competent proof was adduced
by petitioners to prove their allegation. Mere allegations cannot be the basis of a finding
of prejudice. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
not evidence.48
15. It should not be forgotten that the purpose of the rules of procedure is to secure for the parties a
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. 49 The ultimate
purpose of the rules of procedure is to attain, not defeat, substantial justice.50
16. Records reveal that the parties were given sufficient opportunity to raise their concerns. From
the time the action for partition was filed by private respondents, all the parties, including the
late Cesar, petitioners’ predecessor, were given a fair opportunity to be heard. Since the parties
were unable to agree on how the properties shall be divided, Commissioners were appointed by
the Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
a. Section 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree. - If the
parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall appoint not more than
three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the
partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest
such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct.
17. While the lack of notice to Cesar of the viewing and examination by the Commissioners of the
real properties comprising Alicia’s estate is a procedural infirmity, it did not violate any of his
substantive rights nor did it deprive him of due process. It is a matter of record, and
petitioners cannot deny, that Cesar was able to file his Comment/Opposition to the
Commissioners’ Report. And after the RTC adopted and confirmed the Commissioners’
recommendations in its Order dated 22 June 2001, Cesar was able to file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Order. He had sufficient opportunity to present before the RTC
whatever objections or oppositions he may have had to the Commissioners’ Report, including
the valuation of his share in Alicia’s estate.
18. Petitioners also allege that the ruling of the Court of Appeals -- that physical
impossibility and impracticality are embraced by the word "prejudice,"
referred to in Section 5 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court -- violates the
constitutional limitation on the rule-making power of the Supreme Court,
according to which, the Rules of Court shall not increase, decrease or
modify substantive rights.
19. According to petitioners, Section 5 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
a. Section 5. Assignment or sale of real estate by commissioners. - When it is made to
appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be
divided without prejudice to the interests of the parties, the court may order it
assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other
parties such amounts as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the
interested parties asks that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in
which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public
sale under such conditions and within such time as the court may determine.
20. should be read in conjunction with Articles 494 and 495 of the New Civil.
21. Article 498 of the New Civil Code, referred to by Article 495 of the same
Code, states:
a. Article 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot
agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be
sold and its proceeds distributed.
22. Evidently, the afore-quoted Civil Code provisions and the Rules of Court
must be interpreted so as to give effect to the very purpose thereof, which is
to put to an end to co-ownership in a manner most beneficial and fair to all
the co-owners.
23. As to whether a particular property may be divided without prejudice to the
interests of the parties is a question of fact. To answer it, the court must take
into consideration the type, condition, location, and use of the subject
property. In appropriate cases such as the one at bar, the court may delegate
the determination of the same to the Commissioners.
24. The Commissioners found, after a viewing and examination of Alicia’s
estate, that the same cannot be divided without causing prejudice to the
interests of the parties. This finding is further supported by the
testimony of Apolonio Marasigan that the estate cannot be divided into
smaller portions, since only certain portions of the land are suitable to
agriculture, while others are not, due to the contours of the land and
unavailability of water supply.
25. The impracticality of physically dividing Alicia’s estate becomes more
apparent, considering that Hacienda Sta. Rita is composed of parcels and
snippets of land located in two different municipalities, Pili and Minalabac,
Camarines Sur. The actual area representing Alicia’s 2/21 pro-indiviso
shares in Hacienda Sta. Rita is 422,422.65 square meters, more or less. Each
of Alicia’s heirs is entitled to 1/7 share in her estate equivalent to 67,496.09
square meters or roughly seven hectares. 51 Cesar and his heirs are entitled
only to his 1/7 share in the yet unidentified, unsegregated 2/21 pro-indiviso
shares of Alicia in each of the 13 parcels of land that comprises Hacienda
Sta. Rita. Dividing the parcels of land even further, each portion allotted to
Alicia’s heirs, with a significantly reduced land area and widely scattered in
two municipalities, would irrefragably diminish the value and use of each
portion, as compared to keeping the entire estate intact.1avvphi1
26. The correctness of the finding of the RTC and the Commissioners that
dividing Alicia’s estate would be prejudicial to the parties cannot be passed
upon by the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. Factual questions
are not within the province of a petition for certiorari.
27. The writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
writ of certiorari cannot be legally used for any other purpose. 53 At most, the
petition pertains to an error of judgment, and not of jurisdiction, for clearly
 under Section 5 of Rule 69, the question of whether a party’s interest shall courts’ duty has been satisfactorily fulfilled.
be prejudiced by the division of the real property is left to the determination
34. Thus, contrary to petitioners’ averments, this Court finds that the Court of
and discretion of the Commissioners.
Appeals did not err in ruling that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
28. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this Court can only presume that discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting and
the proceedings in Special Civil Action No. P-77-97 before the RTC, confirming the recommendations of the Commissioners.
including the recommendation made by the Commissioners, were fairly and
35. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
regularly conducted, meaning that both the RTC and the appointed
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision dated 31 July
Commissioners had carefully reviewed, studied, and weighed the claims of
2002 of the Court of Appeals in docket no. CA-G.R. SP No. 67529 is
all the parties.lavvphil
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
29. Petitioners’ argument that the assignment of the property will not terminate
the co-ownership is specious, considering that partition, in general, is the
separation, division, and ASSIGNMENT of a thing held in common by
those to whom it may belong.56
30. Inasmuch as the parties continued to manifest their desire to terminate their
co-ownership, but the co-heirs/co-owners could not agree on which
properties would be allotted to each of them, this Court finds that the Court
of Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC did not act with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved
the Commissioners’ recommendation that the co-heirs/co-owners assign
their shares to one of them in exchange for proper compensation.
31. This Court has consistently held that one of the purposes for which courts
are organized is to put an end to controversy in the determination of the
respective rights of the contending parties. With the full knowledge that
courts are not infallible, the litigants submit their respective claims for
judgment, and they have a right at some time or another to have final
judgment on which they can rely over a final disposition of the issue or
issues submitted, and to know that there is an end to the
litigation;57 otherwise, there would be no end to legal processes. 58
32. Finally, petitioners raise before this Court the issue that the public auction
sale of their shares is null and void; at the same time they allege deficiency
in the bid price for their 1/7 share in Alicia’s estate vis-à-vis the valuation of
the same by the Commissioners. 59 This Court is already barred from ruling
on the validity of the public auction sale. This Court’s ruling dated 13
October 2004 in G.R. No. 164970 denying their petition for certiorari lays
to rest petitioners’ questioning of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution
dismissing their appeal therein of the issue of the validity of the public sale
of their share in Alicia’s estate. Such decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may have been.60
33. Indeed, while it is understandable for petitioners to protect their rights to
their portions of the estate, the correlative rights of the other co-owners/co-
heirs must also be taken into consideration to balance the scales of justice.
And, by finding the course of action, within the boundaries of law and
jurisprudence, that is most beneficial and equitable for all of the parties, the