COLLADO v.

CA

Facts:

 Petitioner Edna Collado filed with the Land Registration Court (LRC) an application for
registration of land1
 The Lot was surveyed and found to be inside the Mariquina Watershed
 Opposition of the Government.
 Collado amended the application to include other applicants affected by the said watershed.
 TRIAL COURTS RULING- believes that applicants have acquired private rights to which the
Pres. Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private
rights
 CA RULING – declared null and void the decision of LRC. Reversed the RTC
-Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the state.
-An applicant such as the respondents, in the case bears the burden of overcoming
such presumption
-There must be a POSITIVE ACT needed to declassify a public land and to convert it
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes
-Private respondents failed to present any evidence


Issue: WON petitioners have registrable title over the Lot

Ruling:

 Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain as well as natural resources
belong to the State. Watersheds, in this case, are considered natural resources.
 The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and
submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need and contribute to the
health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof
and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and recreational purposes.

Therefore, watersheds are not susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. The
statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State.

 In possession of the land since time immemorial (petitioner’s contention) – SC ruled that there
must be a positive act from the government.

(EO 33 protected the watershed)

ARANDA v. REPUBLIC

Facts:

 Petition for original registration of the subject parcel of land (situated in San Andres, Malvar,
Batangas with an area of 9,103 square meters) was originally filed by ICTSI Warehousing Inc.
  The Republic through the OSG filed its opposition on the ground that the subject land is part of
public domain.
 ICTSI filed a leave of court to amend the application. Reasons are:
(1) The petition was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping;
(2) Technical description was based on boundaries set forth in the tax declaration; and
(3) due to a technicality, the sale between the vendor and applicant corporation cannot push
through and consequently the tax declaration is still in the name of vendor Ramon Aranda
and the land cannot be transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI-WI.
 Trial court admitted the Amended Application for Registration of title, this time filed in the
name of Ramon Aranda. He prayed that, should the Land Registration Act be inapplicable,
the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as amended
should be applied, having been in continuous possession of the subject land in the concept
of an owner for more than 30 years prior to filing of application.
 Petitioner presented witnesses and evidence to support claim:
 Petitioner’s sister, Merlita Enriquez testified, that in 1965 her father Anatalio Aranda
donated the land to his brother as evidenced by “Pagpapatunay na Pagkakaloob ng
Lupa” executed in 2000. She further testified that the document of Donation was eaten
by rats.
 Witness, Luis Olan, testified his father, Lucio Olan, originally owned (open, peaceful,
continuous and adverse possession) the land and sold the land in 1946 to Anatalio
Aranda as evidenced by “Pagpapatunay ng Bilihang Lampasan ng Lupa.” (but given
by his mother to Anatalio)
 Trial Court granted the application ordering issuance of decree of registration
 Republic appealed to CA. CA reversed decision of RTC.
-does not satisfactorily establish the character and duration of possession
-failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of possession
-two documents presented have no evidentiary weight as it was registerd only in the year
2000, also the year this application was filed.
 Motion for reconsideration denied, hence the Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45 in
Supreme Court. (CA’s decision is based on misapprehension of facts)

Issue:

Whether or not the Petitioner was able to comply with the requirements of Property Registration
Decree (PD 1529).

Held:

• No, the Petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements. These are:

a) property is alienable and disposable land of public domain;

b) applicants and predecessors-in-interest have been in open and continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession; and

c) possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

  Under the Regalian doctrine which is embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. Unless public land is
reclassified or alienated.
 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established. To prove:
- an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act.
-secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable.
 Petitioner has not explained the discrepancies in the dates of certifications, given by the
DENR CENR Officer, classifying the land as alienable and disposable on March 26, 1928 and
December 22, 1947.

2. Petitioner presented tax declarations and the deeds of confirmation of the 1946 sale from the
original owner (Lucio Olan) to Anatalio Aranda and the 1965 donation made by the latter in favor of
petitioner. The land was only declared for taxation purposes only in 1981 while Petitioner
supposedly received the property in 1965. Petitioner had only been paying taxes beginning 1994 (3
years before filing of application) as stated by the Municipal Treasurer of Malvar.

3. Petitioner failed to prove the alleged possession of his predecessors-in-interest. Luis Olan
claimed that his father cultivated the land since he was 6 years old or as early as 1936 yet there was
no evidence that Lucio Olan declared property for tax purposes before he sold it. No evidence
also that Anatalio Aranda declared the property in his name from the time he bought it from Lucio
Olan. Even if Lucio Olan cultivated the land, mere casual cultivation does not amount to
exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to ownership. Specific acts of dominion
must be clearly shown.

SECRETARY OF THE DENR vs. YAP

Facts:

 Issue here is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their
occupied lands.
 Two consolidated cases:
- The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted
the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al.
and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
-The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 10645" issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay
into reserved forest and agricultural land.

FIRST CASE:

 Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National

Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, which identified several lots as being occupied or
claimed by named persons.
  President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island as
tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated
September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
 Precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes
 Because of this, it raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12,
1945, or earlier since time immemorial.
 Respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief.
 The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain.
 RTC - rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants.
- Respondents-claimants have a right to have their occupied lands titled in their name.
- Neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay
were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.
- Cited also Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging
private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were
declared as part of the forest reserve.
 CA - held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands
they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
 OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule
45.

SECOND CASE:

 During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100
(628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
 Petitioners-claimants filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus,
and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 It infringed on their "prior vested rights" over
portions of Boracay. In continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building
internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. No need for a proclamation
reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. The island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.
 The OSG opposed and argued that they do not have a vested right over their occupied
portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of
PD No. 705. Being public forest, it is inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is
a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
Issue:

 Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for
respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay
Island.
 Whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-
claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay.

Ruling:

 Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

 The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. All
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.
 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. (incontrovertible
evidence)
-A positive act of the government declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.
-A certification from the government that have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable.
 In this case, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
 Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa case is misplaced. Ankron and De
Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify
lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were
free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases.
 If the SC accepted the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified
as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands.
 Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. It is a plain error.
 The term "public land" in Act 926 referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement,
and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.
 Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705.
 Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like.
 Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 (or PTA Circular No. 3-82) as
basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation or circular did not
 convert Boracay into an agricultural land. Nothing in the law is prescribed (not a positive
act) If Pres. Marcos intended to classify such land, he would have identified specific limits of
each as Pres. Arroyo did in Proc. No. 1064. 64 other islands was also covered by said Proc.
No. 1801. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
 It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Merely exercised the authority
granted to her to classify lands of the public domain. Not unconstitutional and does not
violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
 Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive
from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land
of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
 CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously
classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the
agrarian law.
 Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the
said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141
namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
 Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of
1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the
second element of alienable and disposable land. (Also, these 3 laws did not convert
portions of Boracay Island intoa and Agricultural land)
 Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural
lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945. The continued
possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a
vested right in Boracay.
 Tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession.


REPUBLIC V. T.A.N. PROPERTIES INC.

Facts:

 Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous
possession of the subject land (area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares)
  Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio).
 Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children,
Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato).
 Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961,
Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one of
Antonio’s children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting).
 On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to T.A.N. Properties.
 T.A.N. Properties, Inc. filed an Application for Original Registration of Title on the said land.
 T.A.N. Properties presented Community Environment and Natural resources Office
(CENRO) certification that the subject land is within the alienable and disposable zone.
 However, T.A.N. Properties only presented three witnesses during the hearing: Anthony
Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondent’s Operations Manager and its authorized representative
in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
 RTC Ruling - adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.
 The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for registration of
land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30
years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts showed that respondent’s predecessors-in-
interest possessed the land in the concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which
possession converted the land to private property.
 CA Ruling - affirmed RTC ruling in toto.
 The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista’s knowledge of the possession and occupation
of the land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked there for three years but also
because he and Kabesang Puroy were practically neighbors. On Evangelista’s failure to
mention the name of his uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of
Appeals ruled that Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle
when he testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled that at the outset, Evangelista disclaimed
knowledge of Fortunato’s relation to Kabesang Puroy, but this did not affect Evangelista’s
statement that Fortunato took over the possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang
Puroy’s death. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition
and disposition of the land became public knowledge because San Bartolome was a
small community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration of the sole witness’ testimony.

ISSUE/s:

1. WON the land is alienable and disposable;

2. WON respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and

3. WON respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the Public Land Act.

RULING:
1. No. Respondent failed to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. The well-entrenched rule
is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State.

In this case, Under DENR DAO No. 20, series of 1988:

The CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land
classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.

The subject land with an area of 596,116 square meters (56 hectares) is beyond the authority of
the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. The applicant
for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts
must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

In this case, Respondent failed to do so.

2. No. There was no open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner.

Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato. However, he admitted that
he did not know the exact relationship between Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather
unusual for neighbors in a small community. He did not also know the relationship between
Fortunato and Porting. In fact, Evangelista’s testimony is contrary to the factual finding of the trial
court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not by Fortunato who was one of
Antonio’s children. Antonio was not even mentioned in Evangelista’s testimony.

3. No. Respondent corporation cannot apply for registration of the land of the public domain in this
case. The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.

REPUBLIC V. VEGA

FACTS:

 Respondents Vega sought to register a parcel of land, claiming that they inherited the same
from their deceased mother.
 Respondent-intervenors Buhay claimed a portion of the lot in question.
 The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the claim. The Republic
maintains that the parcel of land is public domain, and that respondents failed to
substantiate that such was alienable.
  Respondents presented as witness an officer from CENRO who testified that the land in
question is indeed alienable.
 The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered titles to be issued in favor of Vega and
Buhay.
 The Republic appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the findings of the
lower court. The Republic files a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Republic claims that
respondents were unable to prove that the parcel of land in question is not part of the public
domain.

ISSUE: WON the parcel of land in dispute is part of public domain?

RULING:

 The rule for registration of government land is that there must be open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable government land. The fact of occupation
and that the land is alienable government land must be proven.
 In this case, the Republic does not question the fact of occupation, but that of the
alienability of the land.
 They also contended that the testimony of the CENRO officer is insufficient. It has been held
in Jurisprudence that a CENRO certificate is inadequate proof that the land is alienable.
There must also be certification from the Secretary of Natural Resources.
 However, in light of a recent ruling, the CENRO certification is held to be substantial
compliance to the needed proof. Since respondents sought certification from the CENRO
before, they are in good faith in claiming the land. The proof that they presented may be
considered as competent and sufficient proof. It is to be noted, however, that this ruling
applies pro hac vice.
 Pro hac vice because after the promulgation of the TAN Properties case, respondents in this
case have no opportunity to comply to the recent ruling.
 Substantial compliance must only be applied if:
 The Government shows a positive act
 There is/are no opposition from the Government
 Only apply to applications for registration currently pending before trial (Vega case)

REPUBLIC V. BAUTISTA

FACTS:

 Respondent Prosperidad Bautista filed with the RTC an application for registration of title over
a parcel of land containing an area of 991 square meters and situated in Cagayan de Oro City.
 The Republic filed an Opposition, raising the following grounds:
(a) Part of the public domain
 (b) that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945 or
earlier; and
(c) that the title and/or tax declaration do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence
of bona fide acquisition of the subject land.
 Two more oppositions were filed by the Heirs of Dante P. Sarraga, who claimed that
portions of their property were included in the description of the subject land and by the
Regional Director of the DPWH, who alleged that a portion of the subject land encroaches part
of the National Highway
 RTC- granted the application for registration which was affirmed by the CA. The appellate
court acknowledged that in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Court had already ruled that
an application for original registration must be accompanied by a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR and that CENRO certifications by themselves would
not suffice.

ISSUE: WON respondent is entitled to registration of the subject land.

RULING:

 The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree

Who may apply - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws

From their respective requisites, it is clear that the bases for registration under these two provisions of
law differ from one another. Registration under Section 14(1) is based on possession; whereas
registration under Section 14(2) is based on prescription.24 Thus, under Section 14(1), it is not
necessary for the land applied for to be alienable and disposable at the beginning of the
possession on or before June 12, 1945 - Section 14(1) only requires that the property sought to
be registered is alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application for
registration.25 However, in Section 14(2), the alienable and disposable character of the land, as
well as its declaration as patrimonial property of the State, must exist at the beginning of the
relevant period of possession.

 The present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a
CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
 In this case, it is undisputed that respondent failed to present a copy of the original land
classification covering the subject land; and that she relied solely on the CENRO Certification
 to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Clearly, the evidence presented by
respondent would not suffice to entitle her to a registration of the subject land.
 In Republic v. De Tensuan, the Court recognized that it had been lenient in some cases and
accepted substantial compliance with the evidentiary requirements set forth in T.A.N.
Properties. But despite this recognition, the Court still applied the rule on strict compliance
taking into consideration the Republic's opposition that the land applied for registration is
inalienable.
 Conversely, if there is an opportunity for the applicant to comply with the ruling in T.A.N.
Properties, the rule on strict compliance shall be applied. From the foregoing, it is clear that
substantial compliance may be applied, at the discretion of the courts, only if the trial court
rendered its decision on the application prior to June 26, 2008, the date of the promulgation of
T.A.N. Properties.
 In this case, the RTC granted respondent's application for registration of title to the subject
land on January 8, 2010, or 18 months after the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.
 Accordingly, the rule on strict compliance must be applied. The courts would not have even
theslight discretion to apply the rule on substantial compliance.

JOCSON v. SORIANO

FACTS:

 Silvestre Estacion purchased from the Government lots or parcels

 The lots had therefore been purchased by the Government as part of the Hacienda de los
Frailes en el Municipio de Santa Cruz de Malabon;
 Silvestre Estacion and his predecessors had been in possession, as tenants, of said parcels
of land since before the American occupation of the Philippine Islands; He was the occupant,
as tenant, of said parcels of land at the time the said hacienda was purchased;
 After purchased, he continued to make the partial payments under his contract, up to the time
of his death;
 He left a widow surviving him, who is the present plaintiff Valentina Jocson; She took
advantage of the provisions of section 16 of Act No. 1120, had said lots transferred to her
 The administrator of the estate of Silvestre Estacion took possession of the same, included
them in the inventory of the estate and continued to administer the same as a part of the estate
of the deceased.
 The lower court denied her petition. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed.
 The appellant now contends that the inchoate title to said lots belongs to her and that she has
the sole and exclusive right to occupy and administer them. Her contention is based upon the
provisions of Act No. 1120.

ISSUE: WON Jocson is the rightful owner of subject lots

RULING:
  At the time of the death of Silvestre Estacion, he had nothing but an inchoate right in the
parcels of land. (not done paying) The title was still in the Government. The Government being
the owner, until full payment was made, had a perfect right to prescribe how such property
should be disposed of in case of the death of the husband
 The character of the right of Silvestre Estacion was very analogous to that of a homesteader.
Act No. 926, which provides for the granting of homesteads, in its section 3 contains a very
similar provision to that of section 16 of Act No. 1120, for the disposition of the homestead in
case the applicant dies before title in him is perfected, leaving surviving him a wife. Said
section 3 provides that "in the event of the death of an applicant (for a homestead) prior to the
issuance of a patent (title), his widow shall be entitled to have a patent for the land applied
for issue to her" upon a proper showing, and until a final title or patent is issued for the land
to the applicant the Government remains the owner.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

FACTS:

 From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed.
 A law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to
transfer reclaimed lands.
 In this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private
corporation.
 Under the said Agreement, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred
to AMARI .

ISSUE: WON the stipulations in the Amended JVA violates the Constitution

RULING: It violates the Constitution.

 Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
 Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease
 The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to
the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
 Clearly, the Amended JVA violates Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
  Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary to law,” or
whose “object is outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void from the
beginning.”
 The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares
the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

ALMAGRO v. KWAN

FACTS:

 The subject lot in this case is a 17,181 square meter land which is known as Lot No. 6278-M
located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental and inherited by respondents Kwan from their
parents who died in 1976 and 1986 respectively.
 On September 18, 1996, respondents filed with the MTC an action for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioners as well as those who are occupants within the
boundary of the land in controversy.
 During the pre-trial, the Court and the parties designated geodetic engineer Jorge Suasin to
perform the task of verification and relocation survey of said lot and which was accordingly
executed on September 12-13, 2000.
 In the written report of Engr. Suasin, it contained, inter alia, that the big portion of the lot is
submerged under the sea and a small portion remain as dry land, and that some of the
defendants have constructed buildings or houses inside the dry land.
 the Court's judgment dated May 11, 2001, the MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the remaining dry portion of Lot No, 6278-M has become foreshore land and should
be returned to the public domain.
 Respondents appealed to the RTC, which subsequently concluded upon conducting two ocular
inspections, that the disputed remaining portion is not foreshore land because it remained
dry even during high tides.
 Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but were denied.
 They also filed separate petitions for review with the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed portion of subject lot is still private land or has become foreshore
land which forms part of the public domain, as contended by petitioners

RULING:

 The SC held that the disputed portion is private land and is rightfully owned by
respondents, in contravention to the claim of petitioners that is has become foreshore land
and therefore owned by the public domain, and that they have foreshore lease permits from
the DENR on claimed foreshore land, albeit failing to present evidence to prove validity of such
claim.
 Engr. Suasin was adamant in stating that the remaining portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not
foreshore because “it is already dry land” and is “away from the shoreline.”
 To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high and low
water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY VS. VILLAREAL

FACTS:

 Ruperto Villareal applied for registration of certain parcel of land in Sapian, Capiz (178,113
square meters; mangrove swamps) alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been
in possession of the land for more than 40 years.
 Director of Forestry was one who opposed the application for registration of a parcel land
 Both parties agreed in one point that the disputed land was a mangrove swamp.
 The respondent argued that mangrove swamp are agricultural land but the petitioner
contended that it is a forestall land therefore not disposable.
 The CFI of Capiz however grants the application of the respondent.
 The decision of the lower court was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
 The Director of Forestry elevated the case to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON mangrove swamps are agricultural land or forest land.

RULING:

 The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
 Furthermore the legislative definition embodied in section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 which declares that mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public
forests of the Philippines hence they are not alienable.
 The evidence presented by the respondent in its claim were not sufficient to prove its
possession and ownership of the land, which he only presented tax declaration.
 Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the application for
registration of title by the respondent is dismissed by the Supreme Court.

FARMER-BENEFICIARIES BELONGING TO THE SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG BAGUMBONG

JALAJALA, RIZAL V. HEIRS OF MARONILLA

FACTS:

DAVAO STEEL CORPORATION v. CABATUANDO

FACTS:

 The petitioner, Davao Steel Corporation, is a domestic corporation engaged in the steel and
allied metals industry. It decided upon an area planted to sugarcane and corn, located at
Pakna-an or Umapad, Mandawe, Cebu, and belonging to Domingo Mendoza.
 The corporation negotiated with Mendoza without the latter informing the former that the land
was being tilled by a tenant.
 The corporation bought the land but withheld a part of the purchase price because one
Roberta Ouano claimed ownership over a small portion of the land. With the consent of
 Mendoza, however, the withheld amount was paid to Ouano, thus constituting the corporation
as the acknowledged absolute owner.
 The laborers of the corporation cut down the entire corn crop; residential houses for
employees were constructed along the side; the foundation of a factory was laid out in the
center, a road was constructed, and a stone wall built surrounding the factory site. In the
process, the sugarcane crop was also destroyed, except the part that was planted outside the
wall.

ISSUE: WON the portion of land is still devoted to agriculture?

RULING:

 The petitioner’s theory that the Court of Agrarian Relations had no jurisdiction over the case
because at the time of the filing of the complaint no tenancy relationship existed between it and
respondent Cuyson on account of the conversion of the land into one of industrial character is
devoid of merit.
 When the petitioner corporation purchased the land, the same was still agricultural; it did not
become industrial just because the corporation intended to make it so. The petitioner
corporation, by its purchase, succeeded into the duties of the former landholder (sec. 9,
Tenancy Act), including the obligation to respect the tenure of the tenants.
 While the decision to convert or not to convert the land from agricultural to industrial resides in
the owner-corporation, yet, since the land is tenanted and with growing crops thereon, the
owner cannot, unilaterally and without the consent of the tenant, exercise the right of
conversion.

LUNA ET. AL. v. ALFABLE ET. AL.

FACTS:

 The heirs of Luis A. Luna and Remegio A. Luna, and Luz Luna-Santos (“Heirs”) are co-owners
of a parcel of land, subjected to compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP).
 Respondents Ruben Afable, Tomas Afable, Florante Evangelista, Leovy Evangelista, Jaime
Ilagan, et al. (Afable, et al.) were identified by the DAR as qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
 Hence, Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) were issued to them.
 The heirs sought the cancellation of the said CLOAs before the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) Calapan City. Their petition was anchored mainly on the reclassification of the land
in question into a light intensity industrial zone pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 21, series
of 1981, enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Calapan, thereby excluding the same from
the coverage of the agrarian law.
 DARAB Calapan City ordered the cancellation of the CLOAs.
 Aggrieved, Afable et al. appealed to the DARAB Central Office and the latter ruled in their
favour. The heirs appealed the decision to the Office of the President which ruled that the
parcel of land is excluded from the coverage of CARP.
 Then, Afable et al. appealed the Office of the President’s decision to the Court of Appeals.
The CA granted the appeal. Hence, the heirs appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON Municipal Ordinance No. 21 validly classified the parcel of land from agricultural to non-
agricultural, and therefore, exempt from CARP?

RULING:

 Petition granted.
 Local governments have the power to reclassify agricultural into non-agricultural lands.
 Sec. 345 of RA No. 2264 (The Local Autonomy Act of 1959) specifically empowers municipal
and/or city councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation
with the National Planning Commission.
 By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define, and
apportion the land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the
present, but also on the future projection of needs.
 The regulation by local legislatures of land use in their respective territorial jurisdiction through
zoning and reclassification is an exercise of police power.
 The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from
the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a
locality.
 Gave credence to decision of Sec. Pagdanganan: basis is the subject land is covered by the
municipal ordinance
 AO No. 6 states that "all lands that were already classified as commercial, industrial or
residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance." what AO No. 6
requires is a certification from the HLURB. Although what petitioners submitted was a
certification from the HUDCC, Secretary Pagdanganan apparently considered the same as
sufficient compliance with the requirements of AO No. 6 and in fact never referred to the
certification as coming from the HUDCC but was consistently identified as "certification from
the HLURB" throughout his order.
 nothing irregular in this considering that the HLURB is an agency under the HUDCC59 and
especially since the Certification of the HUDCC is itself "based on the Zoning Ordinance
approval by HLURB Resolution No. R-39-4 dated 31 July 1980."

REPUBLIC V. CA

FACTS:

Description of Subject LAND: The LAND is part of the lake bed of Laguna de Bay. Inundation of
the portion happens as observed four to five months a year during the rainy season.

 LAND was purchased by Benedicto del Rio (Father of Santos del Rio) from Angel Pili on April
19, 1909. The Deed of Sale evidencing said purchase is duly recorded with the Registry of
Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
 When Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the
subject parcel passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's share in the inheritance.
  Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio to
construct duck houses on the LAND.
 Although no definite commitment as to rentals, some of the private oppositors made
voluntary payments to private respondent.
 In violation of the original agreement, private oppositors constructed residential houses on
the land which prompted private respondent to file an ejectment suit
 Latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective
sales applications with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios
application for registration.
 CFI or RTC of Laguna dismissed the application for registration.
 CA set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered the registration of the LAND in favor of
applicant, Santos del Rio. Two petitions were decided by the CA consolidated in one single
decision.
 Opposed by Director of Lands
Contending that LAND is part of the public domain and therefore not registerable.
 Opposed by private oppositors, Aurora Bautista, et.al. (G.R. No. L-43190)
Allege that they reclaimed the land by dumping duck egg shells and that been in possession
for more than twenty (20) years.

ISSUES:

 WON the parcel of land in question is public land; and

 WON applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.

RULING:

 NO
The New Civil Code enumerates properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502
thereof.
In connection with Article 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, as follows:

The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their waters when
at their highest ordinary depth.
“highest ordinary depth” was interpreted in a jurisprudence…to be the highest depth of the
waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the "regular, common,
natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year."
 Thus, the alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could
hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five
months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring about the inundation
of a portion of the land. Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not part of the bed or
basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore land.

Tan Toco v. Municipality of Iloilo, G.R. No. L-24950, March 25, 1926

FACTS:
MIAA v. CA, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006

FACTS:

Manila International Airport Authority administers the land, improvements and equipment within
the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land,
including the runways and buildings ("Airport Lands and Buildings") then under the Bureau of
Air Transportation.
The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy
on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at
public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax
delinquency.
MIAA thus sought a clarification of Office of Government Corporate Coucil Opinion No. 061.
The OGCC pointed out that Section 206 of the Local Government Code requires persons
exempt from real estate tax to show proof of exemption. The OGCC opined that Section 21 of
the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day reglementary
period. The Court of Appeals also denied on 27 September 2002 MIAA's motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, MIAA filed on 5
December 2002 the present petition for review.
City of Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly
withdrew the tax exemption privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations”
upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. An international airport is not among the
exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code.
MIAA’s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government
cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not
inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.

ISSUE:

Whether the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax
imposed by local governments.

1. MIAA is not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation

It is only an instrumentality of the National Government and vested with corporate powers to
perform efficiently its governmental functions. It is not a stock corporation because it has no
members and it has no capital stock divided into shares.
MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying
of fees and charges.
Therefore, it is exempted from local taxation.

2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are owned by the Republic

 The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned
by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.
Article 420 of the Civil Code, like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports” includes seaports and airports.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public
for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects
terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport
Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man,
cannot be the subject of an auction sale.
MIAA is mere trustee. Citing Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows
instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties owned by the Republic.

Pursuant to Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines
or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from payment of the real
property tax.

PNOC-AFC v. NGCP, G.R. No. 224936, September 4, 2019

FACTS:

Respondent National Grid Corporation of the Philippines claims that it is a private corporation
engaged in the business of transmitting electric power from generating plants of power
producers to distrubutors. Respondent NGCP was granted a "franchise to operate, manage
and maintain, and in connection therewith, to engage in the business of conveying or
transmitting electricity under RA 9511
NGCP alleged that in order for it to construct and maintain the Mariveles-Limay 230 kV
Transmission Line Project, it sought to expropriate, upon payment of just compensation, a
certain area of a parcel of land
The Petrochemical Industrial Park was originally part of a parcel of land of the public domain
NGCP invoked its authority to exercise right of eminent domain under Sec 4 of RA 9511.

ISSUE: WON NGCP exercise such right?

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that it may exercise the right of eminent domain.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511 is clear, plain, and free from any ambiguity. Respondent NGCP is
allowed to exercise the right of eminent domain only with respect to private property.
Therefore, this unequivocal provision of the law must be given its literal meaning and applied
without any other interpretation.
Considering that respondent NGCP is empowered to expropriate private properties
exclusively, the concept of private property vis-a-vis land of the public dominion must be
distinguished.
 Hence, based on Article 420 of the Civil Code, there are three kinds of property of public
dominion:
(1) those for public use, which may be used by anybody, such as roads and canals;
(2) those for public service, which may be used only by certain duly authorized persons,
although used for the benefit of the public; and
(3) those used for the development of national wealth, such as our natural resources.
There are certain defining characteristics of properties of the public dominion that distinguish
them from private property.
Land of the public domain is outside the commerce of man and, thus, cannot be leased,
donated, sold, or be the object of any contract, except insofar as they may be the object of
repairs or improvements and other incidental things of similar character." Hence, they cannot
be appropriated or alienated." Inalienability is an inherent characteristic of property of the
public dominion. This characteristic necessarily clashes with an express declaration of
alienability and disposability, in that when public land is explicitly declared by the State to be
subject to disposition, it ceases to be land of the public dominion.
Necessarily, as lands of public dominion are inalienable, they cannot be acquired through
prescription and cannot be registered under the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a
Torrens Title.
Properties owned by the State which do not have the aforementioned characteristics of a
land of public dominion are patrimonial properties of the State. Patrimonial properties are
properties owned by the State in its private.or proprietary.capacity.
The mere fact that a parcel of land is owned by the State or any of its instrumentalities does
not necessarily mean that such land is of public dominion and not private property. If land
owned by the State is considered patrimonial property then such land assumes the
nature of private property

Republic v. Spouses Alejandre, G.R. No. G.R. No. 217336, October 17, 2018

FACTS:

 Spouses Alejandre filed an application for the registration of Lot No. 6487 under P.D. No.
1529, described in plan Ap-CAR-000007, Cad-536, with an area of 256 square meters.
 They alleged that they are the owners of the subject property by virtue of a deed of sale or
conveyance; that the subject property was sold to them by its former owner Angustia
Lizardo Taleon by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on June 20, 1990; that the said
land is presently occupied by the applicants-spouses.
 Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the Republic, entered its appearance.
 Land Registration Authority (LRA, for brevity) submitted a Report noting that there were
discrepancies in the plan submitted by the applicant spouses, which discrepancies were
referred to the Lands Management Sector for verification and correction.
 Trial court granted the applicant spouses' motion to submit original tracing cloth plan and
technical description for purposes of facilitating the approval of the re-surveyed plans as well
 as the submission of the new plan for the scrutiny and approval of the LRA. Thereafter,
corrected advance plan and technical description to the trial court.
 On August 1993, the LRA submitted its Supplementary Report stating that the "polygon does
not close" even after the corrections effected on the bearings and distances of the technical
description were made. Hence, the LRA requested for reverification and correction.
 Subsequently, or on April 15, 1998, the LRA submitted its Final Report stating that it
applied the corrected technical description of the subject lot and no more discrepancy
exists, however, the area was increased by six (6) meters
 The Republic filed its Opposition to the application based on the following grounds:
(1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141
(CA 141), x x x as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073);
(2) that applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title and/or the tax declarations with
the petition to evidence bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of its open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of an
owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; that the tax declaration adverted to in the petition does
not appear to be genuine and the tax declaration indicates pretended possession of applicants
to be of recent vintage[;] and
(3) that the subject property applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines which is not subject to private appropriation.
 Trial Court - grants the application
 CA - affirms the decision and denied the appeal of the Republic
Spouses Ildefonso Alejandre and Zenaida Ferrer Alejandre (respondents) in their application
for land registration and subsequent pleadings, they come under paragraph 4 of Section 14,
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 15298 - those who have acquired ownership of lands in any
manner provided for by law - because they acquired the land in question by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed on June 20, 19909 from Angustia Alejandre Taleon

ISSUE:

Whether the CA seriously misappreciated the facts as well as made findings which are inconsistent
with, or not supported by, the evidence on record; and gravely misapplied the applicable laws and
jurisprudence.

RULING:

 SC in favor of the Republic.

 The applicant spouses acquired ownership over Lot 6487 through a contract of sale, which is
well within the purview of Paragraph 4 of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529.
 As a consequence, the requirement of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and/or occupation in the concept of an owner has no application in this case.
 The Republic argues that under the law, citing Section 24 of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4 of PD 1073, before an applicant can
register his title over a particular parcel of land, he must show that: (a) he, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
 notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and (b) the subject land falls within the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
 That the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be
registered belongs to the public domain or the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain. To prove that the subject land is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government.
 Pursuant to Article 419 of the Civil Code, properties are owned either in a public capacity
(dominio publico) or in a private capacity (propiedad privado).
 Article 420 of the Civil Code provides that there are three kinds of property of public dominion:
(1) those intended for public use; (2) those intended for some public service; and (3) those
intended for the development of national wealth.
 The Civil Code classifies property of private ownership into three categories:
(1) patrimonial property of the State under Articles 421 and 422;
(2) patrimonial property of LGUs under Article 424; and
(3) property belonging to private individuals under Article 425
 The property of private ownership or patrimonial property of the State may be sub-classified
into:
(1) "By nature or use" or those covered by Article 421, which are not property of public
dominion or imbued with public purpose based on the State's current or intended use; and
(2) "By conversion" or those covered by Article 422, which previously assumed the nature of
property of public dominion by virtue of the State's use, but which are no longer being used or
intended for said purpose. Since those properties could only come from property of public
dominion as defined under Article 420, "converted" patrimonial property of the State are
separate from and not a subset of patrimonial property "by nature or use" under Article 421.
 With respect to lands, which are immovable property pursuant to Article 415(1) of the Civil
Code, they can either be lands of public dominion or of private ownership following the general
classification of property under Article 419.
 Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only lands classified as
agricultural may be declared alienable, and thus susceptible of private ownership
 As noted by Justice Edgardo L. Paras:
...Upon the other hand, the public agricultural lands before being made available to the general
public should also be properties of public dominion for the development of the national wealth
(and as such may not be acquired by prescription); but after being made so available, they
become patrimonial property of the State, and therefore subject to prescription. Moreover,
once already acquired by private individuals, they become private property.
 Based on the evidence that they adduced, are apparently claiming ownership over the land
subject of their application for registration by virtue of tradition, as a consequence of the
contract of sale, and by succession in so far as their predecessors-in-interest are concerned.
Both modes are derivative modes of acquiring ownership.
 Yet, they failed to prove the nature or classification of the land. The fact that they acquired the
same by sale and their transferor by succession is not incontrovertible proof that it is of private
dominion or ownership. In the absence of such incontrovertible proof of private ownership, the
 well-entrenched presumption arising from the Regalian doctrine that the subject land is of
public domain or dominion must be overcome. Respondents failed to do this.
 The real property tax declarations (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 20, 1990 (Exhibit "K" to "K5"), and the technical descriptions of the subject property
(Exhibit "J") are insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the land subject of the
registration is inalienable land of public domain or dominion. Thus, respondents' application for
land registration should not have been granted.

Laurel v. Garcia, G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990

FACTS:

 The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May
9, 1956, the other lots being:

(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo which has an area of
approximately 2,489.96 square meters, and is at present the site of the Philippine Embassy
Chancery;

(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of around 764.72 square
meters and categorized as a commercial lot now being used as a warehouse and parking lot for
the consulate staff; and

(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara, Nada-ku, Kobe, a
residential lot which is now vacant

 The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government and listed under the
heading "Government Sector", through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. It
consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became the site of the Philippine
Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the
Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide
necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.
 A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador
to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a
Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation — No change of ownership or title shall occur.
 President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine
government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through Administrative Order No. 3,
followed by Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
 On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of
sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were
specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.
 Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property and argues
that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As such, it is
outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
  Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because
the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies. (the law
where the property is situated)

ISSUE/S

1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.

2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.

RULING:

1. The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly
shown that the property has become patrimonial. The respondents have failed to do so.

The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation
agreements after World War II. They were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi
property was specifically designated under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man and cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in application
to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the
State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and
cannot be the object of appropriation.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service doesn’t
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such.

2. The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A
conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an
immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance,
the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to
be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict
with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property
belongs to the Philippines
The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the
State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine
Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

Chavez v. NHA

FACTS:

Former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez assailed the constitutional issues on the JVA
entered by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.
President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and
implementing the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management
Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made
residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus,
Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place.
RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of
private sectors as contractors in government projects.
President Aquino then proclaimed MO 415 to apply RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others.
Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were published in
newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process.
Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development
into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully
finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the
Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey
Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was
amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work
to be done to successfully implement the project.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both
parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA
reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been
turned over by RBI.

ISSUES:

Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim
lands of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner
Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim
foreshore and submerged lands
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as
alienable and outside the commerce of man
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said
lands are no longer needed for public use
Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands
 Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of
public domain

RULING:

The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the President (which
were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part
of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under
contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose
authority to reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).
DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for
the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project.
ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of
supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs
that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of
public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.
The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable in MO 415 issued by President
Cory Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos.
Lands have been deemed to be no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No.
39 that these are to be “disposed to qualified beneficiaries.”
The Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests
and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate.
RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 states that a contractor can be paid “a portion as
percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino
citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition,
when the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the
state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified person.

Republic of the Philippines v. Manna Properties, Inc.

FACTS:

 This is a Petition for Review seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals' Decision which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court approving the application of respondent Manna
Properties, Inc. for the registration in its name of a parcel of land located in Barangay
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union.
 Petitioner filed an opposition to the application and stated, that the applicant is a private
corporation disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to hold alienable lands of public
domain.

The Regional Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court found that Manna Properties has substantiated by clear and competent evidence all its
allegations in the application for original land registration. The Land Registration Authority ("LRA") did
not present any evidence in opposition to the application.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling and dismissed petitioner's argument that the
applicant failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of Presidential Decree No. 15295 ("PD
1529"). The Court of Appeals pointed out that the 90-day period for setting the initial hearing under
Section 23 of PD 1529 is merely directory and that it is the publication of the notice of hearing itself
that confers jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals stated that the records of the case reveal that the
testimony of Manuel Sobrepeña was not the sole basis for the trial court's finding that Manna
Properties's predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in question as early as
1953. The Court of Appeals added that while tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership,
they are "the best indicia" of possession.

Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application of Manna Properties that, as a private
corporation, Manna Properties is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the public domain,
except by lease. Petitioner cites the constitutional prohibition in Section 3 of Article XII in the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still part of the public domain.

Issue:

WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES HAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN POSSESSION OF THE

PROPERTY FOR THE REQUISITE PERIOD.

Ruling:

No. Petition is granted.

Manna Properties claims that it has established that the land in question has been in the open and
exclusive possession of its predecessors-in-interest since the 1940s. Thus, the land was already
private land when Manna Properties acquired it from its predecessors-in-interest.

The governing law is Commonwealth Act No. 141 ("CA 141") otherwise known as the "Public Land
Act." Section 48(b) of the said law, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure.

These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis
supplied)

Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from the public domain by virtue
of acquisitive prescription. We have held that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by CA 141 ipso jure converts such land into private land.
 Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely confirms the earlier conversion of
the land into private land, the conversion having occurred in law from the moment the required period
of possession became complete.

Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-interest of Manna
Properties have been in possession of the land in question since this date, or earlier, Manna
Properties may rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land. Following our ruling in Director of
Lands v. IAC, Manna Properties, a private corporation, may apply for judicial confirmation of the land
without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in-interest first

We rule, however, that the land in question has not become private land and remains part of the
public domain.

Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. This is
premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

Any applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified to have
the land titled in his name. Although Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise to a right that is only subject to
formal recognition, it is still incumbent upon any claimant to first prove open, continuous and adverse
possession for the requisite period of time. It is only when the applicant complies with this condition
that he may invoke the rights given by CA 141.

The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length of possession consists of
the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest, Manuel Sobrepeña ("Manuel"), transferee's
affidavits, and several tax declarations covering the land in question.

We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve
as sufficient basis for inferring possession. However, the tax declarations presented by Manna
Properties do not serve to prove their cause. Although Manna Properties claimed during trial that they
were presenting the tax declaration proving possession since 12 June 1945, a scrutiny of the tax
declaration reveals that it is not the tax declaration Manna Properties claimed it to be. Exhibit Q-16
was in fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly issued on 28 November 1950. The annotation at
the back of this tax declaration indicates that it was issued to replace the 1945 tax declaration
covering the land in question. A substitute is not enough.

The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12 June 1945, is material to
this case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12 June 1945 or earlier. A tax declaration simply
stating that it replaces a previous tax declaration issued in 1945 does not meet this standard. It is
unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on, before or after 12 June 1945. Tax
declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax declaration issued in 1945 may have been issued
in December 1945. Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the
reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established.

There is another reason why the application for registration of Manna Properties must fail. The tax
declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and marked as Exhibit Q-16 bears several irregularities. A
small annotation found at the bottom of the back page of Exhibit Q-16 states it cancels a previous tax
declaration. Beyond stating that the cancelled tax declaration was issued in 1945, Exhibit Q-16 does
not provide any of the required information that will enable this Court or any interested party to check
whether the original 1945 tax declaration ever existed. The blanks left by Exhibit Q-16 render any
attempt to trace the original tax declaration futile. Moreover, on its face Exhibit Q-16 lacks any
indication that it is only a substitute or reconstituted tax declaration. The net effect is an attempt to
pass off Exhibit Q-16 as the original tax declaration.

The form used to prepare the tax declaration marked as Exhibit Q-16 states that it was "FILED
UNDER SECTION 202 OF R.A. 7160." Republic Act No. 7160 is the Local Government Code of
1991. The sworn undertaking by the Deputy Assessor who allegedly prepared the tax declaration
reads, "Subscribed and sworn before me this 28 (sic) day of Nov. 1950' " This means that the tax
declaration was issued more than forty (40) years before the form used came into existence. Manna
Properties gave no explanation why its tax declaration used a form that did not exist at the time of the
alleged issuance of the tax declaration. The totality of these circumstances leads this Court to
conclude that Exhibit Q-16 was fabricated for the sole purpose of making it appear that Manna
Properties' predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land in question since 12 June
1945.

The earliest of the "un-cancelled" tax declarations presented by Manna Properties is dated 1950. This
is clearly insufficient to prove possession of the land since 12 June 1945. The same can be said of
the transferee's affidavit, which was dated 1955. Manna Properties' reliance on Manuel's testimony is
similarly misplaced. Not only is such evidence insufficient and self-serving on its own but, Manuel did
not also specifically testify that he, or his parents or predecessors-in-interest were in possession of
the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

The only clear assertion of possession made by Manuel was that his family used to plant rice on that
piece of land.

Other than the mentioned pieces of evidence, Manna Properties did not present sufficient proof that
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the land in
question since 12 June 1945. At best, Manna Properties can only prove possession since 1952.
Manna Properties relied on shaky secondary evidence like the testimony of Manuel and substitute tax
declarations. We have previously cautioned against the reliance on such secondary evidence in
cases involving the confirmation of an imperfect title over public land. Manna Properties' evidence
hardly constitutes the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse
occupation under CA 141.

Krivenko v. The Registrar of Deeds of the City of Manila

Aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential
purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary
rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution.

FACTS:

 Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in December
1941.
 The registration was interrupted by the war. WW2
 In May 1945, he sought to accomplish the said registration but was denied by the Register of
Deeds of Manila on the grounds that he is a foreigner and he cannot acquire a land in this
jurisdiction.
 Krivenko brought the case to the CFI of Manila. The CFI ruled that he cannot own a land,
being an alien. Hence, this petition.
 This case also defined the phrase “public agricultural lands”

ISSUE: Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.

RUILING:

 The SC ruled in the negative.

 Sec. 2, Art 12 of the Constitution is the conservation and utilization of natural resources.

All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of
the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, (alienation is limited to Filipino citizens) and
no licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may
be the measure and the limit of the grant.
 The said provision embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain. Its purpose is to
establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural
resources of the nation.
 Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only
whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural
purposes.
 Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a
legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution.
 "Public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or
general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber
nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands
that are strictly agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural purposes;
lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes.
 Prior to the Constitution, aliens may acquire public agricultural lands but after the Constitution
and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of
lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation.
May be sold or leased to aliens also prior the Constitution but after the Constitution it may only
be leased not sold.
 Whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the
Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for
purposes of their disposition. Answer of Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos: Residential,
commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be included in
one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity;
therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
 Section 5, Article XIII is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1.
Both sections must be read together for they have the same purpose and the same subject
matter. (non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens)
 Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning
should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. The only difference between
"agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But such
difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land.
 Opinion of Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of Justice: Residential lands of the public
domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private
ownership cannot be so considered.
 Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121
which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. No private
land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber,
dispose of, or alienate land."
 Commonwealth Act No. 141, sections 122 and 123 are almost literally the same as sections
120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference being that in the new provisions, the right to
reciprocity granted to aliens is completely stricken out.
 The SC decided the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer
to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might
have been.
"no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines"
 The SC hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural
lands, including residential lands
Yap and Maravillas v Hon. Grageda

FACTS:

 Maximino Rico executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 339 and a portion of Lot 327 in
favor of the petitioner Donato Reyes Yap who was then a Chinese national. Respondent Jose
A. Rico is the eldest son of Maximino Rico, one of the vendors.
 Yap as vendee caused the registration of the instrument of sale and the cancellation of
Original Certificates of Title Nos. 29332 and 29410 and the consequent issuance in his favor of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2433 covering the two lots subject matter of the Contract of
Sale.
 After the lapse of nearly fifteen years from and after the execution of the deed of absolute sale,
Donato Reyes Yap was admitted as a Filipino citizen and allowed to take his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. He was, thereafter, issued Certificate of
Naturalization No. 7, File No. 19 of the Court of First Instance of Albay.
 the petitioner ceded the major portion of Lot No. 327 consisting of 1,078 square meters in favor
of his engineer son, Felix Yap, who was also a Filipino citizen because of the Filipino
citizenship of his mother and the naturalization of his father Donato Reyes Yap.
 Lourdes Rico, aunt and co-heir of respondent Jose A. Rico. sold the remaining portion of Lot
327 to the petitioner who had his rights thereon duly registered under Act 496.
 The respondent court considered Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution that "no
private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines" to be
an absolute and unqualified prohibition and, therefore, ruled that a conveyance contrary to
it would not be validated nor its void nature altered by the subsequent naturalization of
the vendee.

ISSUE: WON a vendor may recover the lot?

RULING:

It can be recovered, because the purpose of the constitutional provision has already been achieved.
Note that the buyer has already become a naturalized Filipino.

"But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized
Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was
constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be
served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified
person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons:

"'. . . if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this
Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that
aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.”’
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS

vs.

MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ

(USUFRUCTUARY)

FACTS:

 The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio
Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de
Ramirez (lives in Paris); his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
companion Wanda de Wrobleski (lives in Spain, an Austrian)
 Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only
his widow as compulsory heir.
 His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27,
1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.
 Administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be
divided into two parts.
One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime;
The other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda
propriedad."
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and
the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
 Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds:

(a) provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not
related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree.
(b) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda
Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution; and that
 Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the proposed partition is in accordance with law.

RULING:

 NO. It may be useful to recall that Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that
he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted. As regards
the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is
void for the reason that the substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez)
are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree
from the heir originally instituted."
  From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the
first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary.
 The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is
void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by
aliens.

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)

 The SC are in the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire
private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will
be for naught and meaningless.
 The Court upholds the usufruct in favour of Wanda because a usufruct does not vest title to
the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to aliens which is proscribed by the
Constitution.

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and
the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez.

THOMAS C. CHEESMAN

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA

(MARRIAGE/ CONJUGAL PROPERTY)

FACTS:

 This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen, Thomas Cheesman to annul — for
lack of consent on his part — the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and
building to Estelita Padilla, also a Filipino.
 Aware of the deed, Thomas did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife.
 Also without objection from his end, tax declarations for the property were issued in the
name of Criselda only, while she assumed exclusive management and administration
thereon.
 February 1981, Thomas and Criselda separated.
 In July 1981, Criselda sold the property to Estelita Padilla without the knowledge or consent of
Thomas.
  Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance at Olongapo City against his
wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that
the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent.
 An answer was filed in the names of both defendants, alleging that (1) the property sold was
paraphernal, exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money"); (2) Thomas
Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of
ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith.
 CFI – rendered the sale void in abnitio on the ground that Cheesman is administrator of the
conjugal partnership property
 Estelita filed a petition for relief on the ground of fraud, mistake or excusable negligence
which had seriously impared her right to present her case adequately. Thus, judgement was
set aside, petition for relief was given due course, and a new judge presided over the case.
 Thereafter, a Summary Judgement declared the sale to be valid having satisfactorily
overcame the disputable presumption that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal
property, and that the property was Criselda’s paraphernal property; and said presumption
cannot apply to Thomas being an American citizen, thus disqualified under the Constitution
to acquire and own real properties.
 Thomas appealed before the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) but to no avail. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property in dispute form part of the conjugal property of Thomas and
Criselda.

RULING:

 The Court ruled against Thomas.

 The Court is settled with the facts as determined the lower and appellate courts that the funds
used by Criselda to purchase the property was money she had earned and saved prior to
her marriage to Thomas, and that Estelita did believe in good faith that Criselda was the
sole owner of the property.
 Consequently, these determinations of facts will not be here disturbed since the Court is not a
trier of facts and has not reason to disturb them.
 In this regard, the Constituiton prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Thomas was
charged with the knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the
property be purchased by him and Criselda, he acquired no right whatever over the property
by virtue of the purchase; and in attempting to acquire right or interest in land, vicariously or
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him is void. In any event,
Thomas had no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property
by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property.
 To sustain such a theory would permit indirect violation of the Constitution. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and
right over the land, as he would have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a
right which the Constitution does not permit Thomas to have. As already observed, the finding
that that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this
stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said
 wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out
militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so
acquired or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife
any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized
disposition of conjugal funds is not now inquired into, for the same is purely academic.

Muller v. Muller, G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006

FACTS:

 Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989.
 The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992.
 By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he
sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the
cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00.
 The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
 Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated.
 Trial Court - rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of
property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of
properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located
within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage.
 With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal
funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.
 The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision
of the RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of
the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered the
respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of
the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in
Antipolo, Rizal.
 Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

RULING:

 No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

 There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.
 Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary succession,
no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
 In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put the
property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the fundamental
law bars him to do directly.
 With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit
that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.

Phil. Banking Corp. v. Lui She, G.R. No. L-17587. Sept. 12, 1967

DOCTRINE:

Even if the contract appears to be valid, if the provisions is against a constitutional prohibition, the
same should be considered null and void.

FACTS:

 Justina Santos and her sister Lorenzo were the owners in common of a piece of land in
Manila.
 In it are two residential houses with entrance on Florentino Torres street and the Hen Wah
Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue.
 The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the
restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property, paying a monthly
rental of P2,620.
 Lorenzo died and left the property to her sister Justina who was left with no other relative to
live with.
 The visits of Wong's four children who had become the joy of her life.
 Wong as a trusted friend of Justina, a grateful acknowledgment of the personal services he
made, Justina executed a contract of lease in favor of Wong.
 Such contract covers the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting
Florentino Torres street.
 The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time
from the agreement;
 The contract was amended and included the entire property, including the portion on which the
house of Justina Santos.
 Justina executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for
P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000.
 The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was
then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. But the application for naturalization was
withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal.
 Justina filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption
would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings
were abandoned.
  Justina even extended the term of the contract of lease.
 A sudden change of heart, claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of
machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now directed her executor to secure the
annulment of the contracts.
 A complaint was filed before the CFI of Manila and asked the court to direct the Register of
Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of the contracts.
 Wong denied having taken advantage of the trust and confidence given to him by Justina.
 CFI – rendered its decision annulling all the contracts, except the lease contract, and
condemned Wong to pay Justina the unpaid rentals.
 Both parties filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
 Justina (through Petitioner Philippine Banking Corporation) maintained that the lease contract
should have been annulled as it lacks mutuality, that it was obtained in violation of the fiduciary
relations of the parties, and that her consent was obtained through undue influence, fraud and
misrepresentation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lease contract is valid, thus, granting rights to Wong.

RULING:

 The Court ruled that the least contract is valid.

 The lease contract does not lack mutuality because Wong was never an agent of Justina.
 Actually, it was cited that the lease contract was made on the basis of the data of Wong
given to the lawyer who prepared the contract, and that Justina told him that whatever
Wong wants must be followed.
 Despite the words supplied by Wong, it was testified that Justina was unyielding and firm in her
decision to follow Wong.
 Undue influence cannot stand as well given that the contract was signed in the
presence of Justina’s close friend and maid, who could have testified against it.
 Further, Justina’s consent was given freely and voluntarily as shown by her recited in the
Deed of Conditional Option and emphatic avowal gratitude in the lease contract that Wong
saved her and her sister from the fire that destroyed their house during the liberation of Manila.
 All told, the lease contract stands to be valid.
 However, despite validity of the lease contract, it also gives the clue to a circumvention of
the Constitutional prohibition against transfer of land to aliens. Taken singly, the
contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an
insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits.
 To be sure, a lease to an alient for a reasonable period is valid. So is the option giving an
alien the right to buy the property on condition that he is granted Philippine Citizenship.
 But if an alien is given not only a lease, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of
which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this is to last for 50
years, is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of
the right to enjoy the land but also the right to dispose of it – rights the sum total of which
makes up ownership.
Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, G.R. No. 130115. July 16, 2008

FACTS:

 The instant case is an action for partition filed by petitioners Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho
Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo against their brother, respondent Vicente
Teng Gui, before the RTC.
 The subject property is the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and should be
partitioned equally among each of the siblings.
 According to petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and tax declared under
trust in the name of respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting
Ho who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to own public lands in the Philippines
 Teng countered that on October 11, 1958, Felix Ting Ho sold the commercial and
residential buildings to his sister-in-law, Victoria Cabasal, and the bakery to his brother-
in-law, Gregorio Fontela. He alleged that he acquired said properties from the respective
buyers on October 28, 1961 and has since then been in possession of subject properties in
the concept of an owner.
 RTC – found that Felix Ting Ho, being a Chinese citizen and the father of the petitioners and
respondent, resorted to a series of simulated transactions in order to preserve the right
to the lot and the properties thereon in the hands of the family.
 To transfer the improvements on the land to his eldest son the defendant Vicente Teng Gui, he
first executed simulated Deeds of Sales in favor of the sister and brother-in-law of his
wife in 1958 and after three (3) years it was made to appear that these vendees had sold the
improvements to the defendant Vicente Teng Gui who was then 18 years old. (no
consideration was ever paid by the vendees)
 RTC held that although the sales were simulated, pursuant to Article 1471 of the New Civil
Code it can be assumed that the intention of Felix Ting Ho in such transaction was to
give and donate such properties to the respondent.
 As a result, it awarded the entire conjugal share of Felix Ting Ho in the subject lot and
properties to the respondent and divided only the conjugal share of his wife among the
siblings.
 The petitioners claimed that the RTC erred in awarding respondent the entire conjugal share of
their deceased father in the lot and properties in question contrary to its own finding that an
implied trust existed between the parties.
 The respondent, on the other hand, asserted that the RTC erred in not ruling that the lot and
properties do not form part of the estate of Felix Ting Ho and are owned entirely by him.
 CA – The appellate court held that the deceased Felix Ting Ho was never the owner and
never claimed ownership of the subject lot since he is disqualified under Philippine laws
from owning public lands, and that respondent Vicente Teng Gui was the rightful owner
over said lot by virtue of Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 7457
 As stated by Felix Ting Ho no less in the "Affidavit of Transfer, Relinquishment and
Renouncement of Rights and Interest", he is merely a possessor or occupant
  The affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before a Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands
and in the said affidavit, the late Felix Ting Ho expressly acknowledged that because he is
a Chinese citizen he is not qualified to purchase public lands under Philippine laws for
which reason he thereby transfers, relinquishes and renounces all his rights and interests in
the subject land, including all the improvements thereon to his son, the defendant Vicente
Teng Gui, who is of legal age, single, Filipino citizen and qualified under the public land law
to acquire lands.
 Teng acquired the subject land by sales patent or purchase from the government and not
from his father, the late Felix Ting Ho.
 CA - dismissed the complaint for partition with respect to the lot in question, it awarded the
petitioners a four-fifths (4/5) share of the subject properties erected on the said lot.

ISSUE: Whether both Lot No. 418, Ts-308 and the properties erected thereon should be included in
the estate of the deceased Felix Ting Ho.

RULING:

 The SC affirmed the ruling of CA

 Cited Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution. The right to acquire lands of the public
domain is reserved for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the
capital of which is owned by Filipinos
 In the present case, the father of petitioners and respondent was a Chinese citizen;
therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property in the Philippines. In
fact, he was only occupying the subject lot by virtue of the permission granted him by the
then U.S. Naval Reservation Office of Olongapo, Zambales.
 On the other hand, Teng became the owner of Lot No. 418, Ts-308 when he was granted
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 7457 on January 3, 1978, by the Secretary of Natural
Resources "By Authority of the President of the Philippines," and when Original Certificate
of Title No. P-1064 was correspondingly issued in his name. Such grant show that Teng
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to acquire alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain
 The SC cited the law regarding the Registration of grants and patents involving public lands
which is governed by Section 122 of Act No. 496, which was subsequently amended by
Section 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
Under the law, a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public land
is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to private lands in the
ordinary or cadastral registration proceeding. The effect of the registration of a patent and
the issuance of a certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an incontestable title
to the land, in the same manner as if ownership had been determined by final decree of the
court, and the title so issued is absolutely conclusive and indisputable, and is not subject
to collateral attack
 Petitioners invoke equity considerations and claim that the ruling of the RTC that an implied
trust was created between respondent and their father with respect to the subject lot should
be upheld. It must fail because the prohibition against an alien from owning lands of the
public domain is absolute and not even an implied trust can be permitted to arise on equity
considerations.
  The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by
operation of law in view of petitioner's marriage to respondent. Save for the exception
provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent's disqualification from owning lands in
the Philippines is absolute.
 Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is
likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly...
 The issue of ownership of the properties erected on the subject lot, the Court agrees with the
finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the series of transactions resorted to by
the deceased were simulated in order to preserve the properties in the hands of the family.
The Court holds that the reliance of the RTC on the provisions of Article 1471 of the Civil
Code to conclude that the simulated sales were a valid donation to the respondent is
misplaced because its finding was based on a mere assumption when the law requires
positive proof.
 Court holds that the two-storey residential house, two-storey residential building and sari-sari
store form part of the estate of the late spouses Felix Ting Ho and Leonila Cabasal, entitling
the petitioners to a four-fifths (4/5) share thereof.

Holy See v. The Hon. Eriberto Rosario, G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994

FACTS:

 Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and
is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio.
 Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in
the real estate business.
 This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters
(Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality of Parañaque,
Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner.
 Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the Philippine
Realty Corporation (PRC).
 The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as
agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to Starbright.
 In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to Starbright, a dispute arose as
to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of
squatters. The conflict intensified when the lot was sold to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation by the petitioner.
 Starbright filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court and three other defendants: Msgr.
Domingo Cirilos who acted as agent to the sellers, the PRC and Tropicana. It prayed for: 1)
annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand and
Tropicana on the other; 2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; 3) specific performance of
the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots and; 4) damages.
  The petitioners and Cirilos separately moved to dimiss the complaint: petitioners for lack of
jurisdiction based on soverign immunity from suit and Cirilos for being an improper
party.
 An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent. The trial court issued an order
denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, reason being that the petitioner can no longer be
immune as they entered into a business contract.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration. They then filed a “Motion for Hearing for the Sole
Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for Claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense,”
to facilitate the hearing in its defense of sovereign immunity.
 The trial court ordered the resolution be suspended until after trial on the merits and directing
the petitioner to file its answer.
 Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
 The petitioner invoked its privilege of sovereign immunity only on its behalf and on behalf of its
official representatives, the Papal Nuncio. Eventually, the Department of Foreign Affairs filed
for a Motion of Intervention claiming its legal interest on the outcome of the case concerning
the diplomatic immunity of the petitioner.
 It stated its adoption upon the claim of the petitioner with regard to its claim for sovereign
immunity from suit. This was opposed by the private respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Holy See can invoke its right to Sovereign Immunity to suit.

RULING:

 The Supreme Court granted the petition and the complaint against the petitioner is
dismissed.
 Reason: Generally, there are two accepted concepts of sovereignty: a) classical or
absolute theory, wherein a sovereign cannot be made as respondent to courts of another
sovereign without its consent and; b) restrictive theory, which puts conditions on when to
recognize immunity.
 Under the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity is only recognized with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii (or those in pursuant to governmental functions) . If the act is
private or acts jure gestionis (those that are for profit), then immunity cannot be invoked.
 In this case, the petitioner had denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the Lot
5-A were made for profit. It claimed that it acquired the property for its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. The lot, allegedly, was acquired by donation from
the Archdiocese of Manila for the purpose of building official residence of Papal Nuncio.
 However, when the informal settlers refused to leave the property, the petitioner decided
to dispose the property, not for commercial purpose.
 The DFA intervened as they established in a Memorandum and Certification the privilege
of sovereign immunity of the petitioner, stating that they are a duly accredited diplomatic
mission to the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and has title to all rights, privileges
and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in the country. When the plea of immunity
has been recognized by the executive department, such shall be conclusive to courts.

Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 25, 2008

FACTS:

 Jacobus Hulst filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration insofar as he was ordered
to return to respondent the amount of P2,125,540.00 in excess of the proceeds of the
auction sale delivered to petitioner.
 He contends that the Contract to Sell between petitioner and respondent involved a
condominium unit and did not violate the Constitutional proscription against ownership
of land by aliens.
- Will not get a transfer certificate of title but merely a Condominium Certificate of Title
as evidence of ownership; a perusal of the contract will show that what the buyer
acquires is the seller's title and rights to and interests in the unit and the common
areas.
 Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act, foreign
nationals can own Philippine real estate through the purchase of condominium units or
townhouses constituted under the Condominium principle with Condominium Certificates of
Title. Section 5 of R.A. No. 4726 states “…Where the common areas in a condominium
project are held by a corporation, no transfer or conveyance of a unit shall be valid if the
concomitant transfer of the appurtenant membership or stockholding in the corporation will
cause the alien interest in such corporation to exceed the limits imposed by existing laws.”
 The law provides that no condominium unit can be sold without at the same time selling
the corresponding amount of rights, shares or other interests in the condominium
management body, the Condominium Corporation; and no one can buy shares in a
Condominium Corporation without at the same time buying a condominium unit. (shares
up to not more than 40% of the total and outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or
controlled corporation)
 Ownership of the land is legally separated from the unit itself.
 As long as 60% of the members of this Condominium Corporation are Filipino, the remaining
members can be foreigners.
 There being no circumvention of the constitutional prohibition, the Court's pronouncements on
the invalidity of the Contract of Sale should be set aside.

Political subdivision” ordinarily includes counties, cities, townships, villages, schools, sanitation,
utility, irrigation, drainage and flood-control districts, and similar governmental entities.

Rural Bank of Anda, Inc. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan, G.R. No.
155051, May 29, 2007

FACTS:

 The lot disputed in Pangasinan is Lot 736 which has a total area of about 1,300 square meters
and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot
737 is known as Imelda's Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is
 bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front
of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.
 Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being
claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley.
 In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot
736 from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of
horse manure was already bothering the priests living in the seminary. The concrete fence
enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can
pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day.
 Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot. Resolution
No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the
Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 with an area of 252 square meters.
 Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was being constructed
enclosing a portion of Lot 736.
 Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the Rural
Bank of Anda should be stopped.
 Respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and restore the concrete
fence.
 Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the construction of the building of the Rural Bank
of Anda would resume but that he was willing to discuss with respondent to resolve the
problem concerning Lot 736.
 Respondent then filed a complaint for abatement of illegal constructions, injunction and
damages with writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC
 The trial court held that the said property is part of the public domain and thus it is outside the
commerce of man.
 The Court of Appeals likewise, affirmed the decision of the Trial court and ruled that the
disputed lot is part of the public domain.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed land is a property of public dominion

RULING:

 Yes. The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the
seminary, or the church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736.
 Lot 736 was also used for parking and playground.
 Furthermore, both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over
Lot 736. Since Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any
other mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the
state. The lot in question must be declared to be part of the public domain because there was
no evidence that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands.
  It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law. This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds
that the state owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Municipal corporations cannot
appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior grant from the
government. Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley
exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104
and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of
Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.

Note:

The two Resolutions were voided by the SC because the subject land is owned by the State
therefore cannot be owned by anyone. The Resolutions reclassified the land to alienable and
disposable, but even though, it is still voided because the Municipality exceeded their
authority in reclassifying the subject land.

JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 124293. Jan. 31, 2005

FACTS:

 The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government

corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy Industries,
Ltd. of Kobe, Japan (KAWASAKI) for the construction, operation and management of the Subic
National Shipyard, Inc. (SNS) which subsequently became the Philippine Shipyard and
Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO).
 Under the JVA, NIDC and Kawasaki would maintain a shareholding proportion of 60%-40%
and that the parties have the right of first refusal in case of a sale.
 Through a series of transfers, NIDC’s rights, title and interest in PHILSECO eventually went to
the National Government.
 In the interest of national economy, it was decided that PHILSECO should be privatized by
selling 87.67% of its total outstanding capital stock to private entities.
 After negotiations, it was agreed that Kawasaki’s right of first refusal under the JVA be
“exchanged” for the right to top by five percent the highest bid for said shares.
 Kawasaki that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI), in which it was a stockholder, would exercise this
right in its stead.
 During bidding, Kawasaki/PHI Consortium is the losing bidder.
 Even so, because of the right to top by 5% percent the highest bid, it was able to top JG
Summit’s bid.
 JG Summit protested, contending that PHILSECO, as a shipyard is a public utility and, hence,
must observe the 60%-40% Filipino-foreign capitalization.
 By buying 87.67% of PHILSECO’s capital stock at bidding, Kawasaki/PHI in effect now owns
more than 40% of the stock.

ISSUE:

* Whether or not PHILSECO is a public utility

* Whether or not Kawasaki/PHI can purchase beyond 40% of PHILSECO’s stocks

HELD:

In arguing that PHILSECO, as a shipyard, was a public utility, JG Summit relied on sec. 13, CA No.
146. On the other hand, Kawasaki/PHI argued that PD No. 666 explicitly stated that a “shipyard” was
not a “public utility.”

But the SC stated that sec. 1 of PD No. 666 was expressly repealed by sec. 20, BP Blg. 391 and
when BP Blg. 391 was subsequently repealed by EO 226, the latter law did not revive sec. 1 of PD
No. 666. Therefore, the law that states that a shipyard is a public utility still stands.

A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law is therefore required to
comply with the 60%-40% capitalization under the Constitution. Likewise, the JVA between NIDC and
Kawasaki manifests an intention of the parties to abide by this constitutional mandate.

Thus, under the JVA, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party, Kawasaki could
only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of stock would not exceed 40%
of the entire shares of stock.

The NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares. As a government
corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corporation, there is nothing to prevent its
purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only
foreign capitalization.

Kawasaki was bound by its contractual obligation under the JVA that limits its right of first refusal to
40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO. Thus, Kawasaki cannot purchase beyond 40% of the
capitalization of the joint venture on account of both constitutional and contractual proscriptions.

RD of Rizal v. Ung Siu Temple, G.R. No. L-6776. May 21, 1955

FACTS:

 RD of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed of donation executed in by Jesus Dy, a Filipino
citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, in favor of the unregistered
religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple"operating through three trustees all of Chinese
nationality.
 Accepted by Yu Juan who is a Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple,
acting in representation and in behalf of the latter and its trustees.
 Refusal of the Registrar elevated the case to CFI of Manila which ruled that the deed of
donation in question should not be admitted for admitted for registration.
 Aggrieved by the ruling, donee Uy Siu Si Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that
the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by
Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission (lawful for all religious associations, of whatever
sort or denomination to hold land in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches,
parsonages, or educational or charitable institutions)(2) that the refusal of the Register of
Deeds violates the freedom of religion clause of our Constitution

ISSUE:
RULING:

 The SC upheld the ruling of CFI that in view of the absolute terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the
Constitution, the provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed
repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible.
 Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. Neither is there any such
saving found in sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII, restricting the acquisition of public agricultural
lands and other natural resources to "corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens"
 The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to
escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign
nationality.
 The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or
associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be
controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital
stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.
 To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would
be to drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings in this country.
 Lannd tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or
worship; or that one may not worship the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience
unless upon land held in fee simple. ( SC not convinced)

Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. Land Registration Commission, G.R. No.
L-8451. December 20, 1957

Topic:Nationality of a corporation

Facts:

 On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao,
executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao Inc.,(RCADI) is corporation sole organized and existing in accordance
with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.
 Registry of Deeds Davao (RD) required RCADI to submit affidavit declaring that 60% of its
members were Filipino Citizens. As the RD entertained some doubts as to the registerability of
the deed of sale, the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) en
consulta for resolution.
 LRC hold that pursuant to provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XII of the Philippine
Constitution, RCADI is not qualified to acquire land in the Philippines in the absence of proof
that at leat 60% of the capital, properties or assets of the RCADI is actually owned or
controlled by Filipino citizens. LRC also denied the registration of the Deed of Sale in the
absence of proof of compliance with such requisite. RCADI’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied. Aggrieved, the latter filed a petition for mandamus.

Issue:
Whether or not the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines, or better still, the
corporation sole named the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., is qualified to
acquire private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the
Constitution.

Ruling:

RCADI is qualified.

 While it is true and We have to concede that in the profession of their faith, the Roman Pontiff
is the supreme head; that in the religious matters, in the exercise of their belief, the Catholic
congregation of the faithful throughout the world seeks the guidance and direction of their
Spiritual Father in the Vatican, yet it cannot be said that there is a merger of personalities
resultant therein.
 Neither can it be said that the political and civil rights of the faithful, inherent or acquired under
the laws of their country, are affected by that relationship with the Pope.
 The fact that the Roman Catholic Church in almost every country springs from that society that
saw its beginning in Europe and the fact that the clergy of this faith derive their authorities and
receive orders from the Holy See do not give or bestow the citizenship of the Pope upon these
branches.
 Citizenship is a political right which cannot be acquired by a sort of “radiation”. We have to
realize that although there is a fraternity among all the catholic countries and the dioceses
therein all over the globe, the universality that the word “catholic” implies, merely characterize
their faith, a uniformity in the practice and the interpretation of their dogma and in the exercise
of their belief, but certainly they are separate and independent from one another in jurisdiction,
governed by different laws under which they are incorporated, and entirely independent on the
others in the management and ownership of their temporalities.
 To allow theory that the Roman Catholic Churches all over the world follow the citizenship of
their Supreme Head, the Pontifical Father, would lead to the absurdity of finding the citizens of
a country who embrace the Catholic faith and become members of that religious society,
likewise citizens of the Vatican or of Italy. And this is more so if We consider that the Pope
himself may be an Italian or national of any other country of the world. The same thing be said
with regard to the nationality or citizenship of the corporation sole created under the laws of the
Philippines, which is not altered by the change of citizenship of the incumbent bishops or head
of said corporation sole.
 We must therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church, every Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission and is
lawfully incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country where it is located, is
considered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges granted to such artificial being
under the laws of that country, separate and distinct from the personality of the Roman Pontiff
or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations with the latter which are governed by
the Canon Law or their rules and regulations.
 It has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary corporations which
are formed by no less than 5 incorporators, is composed of only one persons, usually the head
or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of
determining any percentage whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is only the administrator and
 not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said corporation sole;
(3) such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese
or territory of the corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as such, has no nationality and the
citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or
administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with
their respective dioceses or corporation sole.
 In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem obvious that when the
specific provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner (section 1, Art.
XIII), was under consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked this
particular form of corporation. If this were so, as the facts and circumstances already indicated
tend to prove it to be so, then the inescapable conclusion would be that this requirement of at
least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never intended to apply to corporations sole, and the
existence or not a vested right becomes unquestionably immaterial.

Legarda v Saleeby G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915

Facts:

 That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita
in the city of Manila.
 Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said
lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
 Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2nd day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court,
on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered
and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said
registration and certificate included the wall.
 Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March,
1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided
for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant
also included said wall.
 Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the
wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in
the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the
defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the
registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said
lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
 Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of
the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

Issue:

Who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
Ruling:

 The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in
the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto
 Judicial. It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all
the world. It is an action in rem.
 While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary
action. All the world are parties, including the government.
 After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third
parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of
registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties
 The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had
 The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered,
changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by
law.
 The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel
of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties
 The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has
been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions.
 In foreign jurisprudence, it was ruled that where two certificates purport to include the same
land the earlier in date prevails.
 It will be noted, from section 38 of Act 496, that the "decree of registration" shall not be
opened, for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of
one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud,
in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral
proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his
registered title in that way.
 We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the
ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two
persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of
real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it,
who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees
or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon
priority of registration.
 In the present case, the appellee Saleeby was the first negligent (granting that he was the real
owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration
in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the
lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to
oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he
became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants.
 We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the
owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original
parties.
  May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates?
Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his
original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has
no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor
had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against
the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
 It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in
the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law should be protected.
 In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the
jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and
decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the
second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all
other duplicate certificates issued.

Note: Legarda's title is protected by the said system. Certificate of title is presented cannot be said
that it is registered.

Sps. Alde v. Berna lG.R. No. 169336 March 18, 20s

Facts:

 Sps.

Chapter 5 FINALS

Development Bank of the Philppines v. CA

Facts:

 Subject land was orginally owned by Ulpiano Mumar whose ownership since 1917 was
evidenced by tax declaration.
 1950 - Mumar sold the land to Carlos Cajes who was issued a tax declaration that same year.
Cajes occupied and cultivated the land by planting cassava and camote in certain portions of
the land.
 1969 - unknown to Cajes, Jose Alvarez succeeded in obtaining the registration of a parcel of
land and he was issued an OCT. Alvarez never occupied the land not introduced
improvements.
 1972 - Alvarez sold the land to Spouses Beduya to whom TCT was issued. Spouses obtained
a loan from petitioner DBP for 526k, as security, they mortgaged the land covered by TCT to
the bank. Thereafter, they again mortagaged the land.
 Spouses failed pay their loans which resulted the foreclosure of the subject land. DBP was the
highest bidder. Spouses failed to redeem the subject land. DBP then consolidated its
ownership
  1978- Cajes also applied a loan from DBP and was later approved. Petitioner found that the
land mortgaged by private respondent was included in the land covered by TCT No. 10101 in
the name of the spouses Beduya. DBP cancelled the loan.
 More than a year after the foreclosure sale, a re-appraisal of the property was conducted by
petitioner’s representatives. It was then discovered that private respondent was occupying a
portion of the land. Upon refusal to vacate on the part of the private respondent, petitioner filed
a complaint for recovery of possession with damages.
 RTC - declared DBP as lawful owner of the subject land
 CA- declared Cajes as lawful owner

ISSUE:

WON DBP is an innocent mortgagee for value of the land?

RULING:

 No
 Registration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership over an immovable property.
 Purpose of Land Registration: to bring the land titles of the Philippine Islands under one
comprehensive and harmonious system, the cardinal features of which are indefeasibility of
title and the intervention of the State as a prerequisite to the creation and transfer of titles and
interest, with the resultant increase in the use of land as a business asset by reason of the
greater certainty and security of title. It does not create a title nor vest one. It simply confirms a
title already created and already vested, rendering it forever indefeasible.
 It this case, Cajes has been in actual , open, peaceful and continuous possession of the
property since 1950. Corroborated by testimony of one Eleuterio Cambangay who personally
knew Mumar transferred the land to Cajes in 1950. Tax declarations bolstered Cajes' claim
based on actual occupation. (They are good indicia of possession)
 Cajes, having been in possession of the land since 1950, was the owner of the property when
it was registered by Jose Alvarez in 1969, his possession tacked to that of his predecessor-in-
interest, Ulpiano Mumar, which dates back to 1917. (More than 30 years)
 This uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years could only ripen into
ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription which is a mode of acquiring ownership
and other real rights over immovable property.
 Neither Jose Alvarez nor the spouses Beduya were at any time in possession of the property
in question.
 The fact of registration in their favor never vested in them the ownership of the land in dispute.
"If a person obtains a title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight
land which can no longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said
certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included."

Macababad v. Masirag

FACTS:

 The deceased spouses Pedro Masirag (Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan (Pantaleona) were
the original registered owners of the subject land as evidenced by an OCT. The spouses have
 8 children and respondents allegedly did not know of the demise of their respective parents;
they only learned of the inheritance due from their parents in the first week of March 1999.
 The investigation disclosed that the petitioners Macababbad falsified a document entitled
“Extra-judicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144)
dated December 3, 1967”12 (hereinafter referred to as the extrajudicial settlement of estate
and sale). Respondents Masirag were deprived of their shares
 The document ostensibly conveyed the subject property to Macababbad. OCT was cancelled
and Lot No. 4144 was registered in the names of its new owners under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 13408,14 presumably after the death of the spouses. Despite the supposed
sale to Macababbad, his name did not appear on the face of TCT. Despite the exclusion, his
“Petition for another owner’s duplicate copy of TCT" was granted by the CFI.
 A case was filed against Macababad but he was able to file a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint. RTC granted the motion og Masirags for leave to intervene and to admit their
complaint in intervention.
 RTC - dismissed the complaint on the grounds: 1) the action, which was filed 32 years after the
property was partitioned and after a portion was sold to Macababbad, had already prescribed;
and 2) there was failure to implead indispensable parties, namely, the other heirs of Pedro and
Pantaleona and the persons who have already acquired title to portions of the subject property
in good faith
 CA- reversed and set aside RTC's decision. Applied the Civil Code provision on implied trust,
i.e., that a person who acquires a piece of property through fraud is considered a TRUSTEE of
an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property came.
- Reconciling this legal provision with Article 1409 (which defines void contracts) and
Article 1410 (which provides that an action to declare a contract null and void is
imprescriptible), the CA ruled that the respondents’ cause of action had not prescribed,
because “in assailing the extrajudicial partition as void, the [respondents] have the right to
bring the action unfettered by a prescriptive period

ISSUE:

1. WON failure to plead indispensable parties is ground for dismissal? NO

2. WON REMEDY AVAILED OF BY R (ORDINARYAPPEAL RULE41) BEFORE CA IS PROPER?

YES

3. WON R’S ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED? NO

4. Whether dismissal based on laches be applied in this case? No

RULING:

1. Dismissal is erroneous.

 Rule3,Section11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action
 Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the
action dismissed.
  INDISPENSABLEPARTIES: parties in interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action; parties who possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree
would necessarily affect their rights so that the court cannot proceed without their
presence.
 In this case, cannot be dismiss because RTC did not order directing inclusion of
indispensable parties.
 In an ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE, all the owners of the property sought to be recovered
are indispensable parties
 Thus, if reconveyance were the only relief prayed for impleading petitioners Macababbad and
the Spouses Chua and Say would suffice.
 On the other hand, under the claim that the action is for the declaration of the nullity of
extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, all of the parties who executed the same should
be impleaded for a complete resolution of the case. (Note: SC determined this case to be one
for declaration of nullity)
 HOWEVER, RTC never issued an order directing their inclusion. Hence, there can be no basis
for the immediate dismissal of the action.

2. In their Notice of Appeal, the respondents manifested their intention to appeal the assailed RTC
order on legal grounds and “on the basis of the environmental facts.” Further, in their Brief,
the petitioners argued that the RTC erred in ruling that their cause of action had prescribed and
that they had “slept on their rights.” All these indicate that questions of facts were involved, or
were at least raised, in the respondents’ appeal with the CA. Since the appeal raised mixed
questions of fact and law no error can be imputed on the respondents for invoking the
appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal

3. the respondents’ amended complaint sufficiently pleaded a cause to declare the nullity of the
extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, as they claimed in their amended complaint. As the
nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale has been raised and is the primary issue,
the action to secure this result will not prescribe pursuant to Article1410 of the Civil Code. The
action remains imprescriptible, the issuance of the certificates of titles notwithstanding.

4.Dismissal based on laches cannot also apply in this case, as it has never reached the
presentation of evidence stage and what the RTC had for its consideration were merely the
parties’ pleadings. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere allegations
in the pleadings.

Acosta, et.al. v. Salazar, et.al.

FACTS:

 Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar filed a petition for the cancellation of the entries annotated at the
back of OCT registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg, who
died without issue. The Salazars claim that two of the entries - Entry Nos. 19756 and 20102 -
annotated at the back of the aforesaid title are void since no consolidation of rights
appear in the Registry of Deeds (RD) of Tarlac to support the entries; and that TCT, which
supposedly cancelled OCT No. 40287, is non-existent according to a certification issued by
the RD.
  Salazars filed an URGENT MOTION praying for the issuance of an order to direct the RD of
Tarlac to recall all titles issued under Entries and to cancel all the tax declarations issued
based thereon. Filed a SECOND MOTION ordering the appearance of owners of the affected
property to show cause why their titles should not be cancelled.
 Salazars filed a NEW MOTION praying that the RD be ordered to comply with the court's
order. RD explained that to comply would remove the basis for the issuance of TCT which in
turn had been cancelled by many other TCTs and would result in the deprivation of right to due
process of the registered owners.
 RTC denied the motion and advised Salazars to elevate the matter to the Land Registration
Commission (LRA) After Salazars moved for reconsideration, the RTC directed RD to
comply with the court's orders. RD then elevated the matter to Natl. Land titles and Deeds
Reg. Admin., which issued a resolution directing RD to comply with the court orders.
 Petitioners together with other subsequent purchasers for value of the disputed property -
twenty-seven (27) titleholders in all11 - filed their formal written comment. They had acquired
their titles in good faith and for value, and that the lower court, acting as a land
registration court, had no jurisdiction over issues of ownership.
 This prompted the Salazars to file a complaint for quieting of title impleading herein petitioners
as well as other individuals who claim to have purchased the said property from the heirs of
Juan Soriano.
 RTC- dismised the complaint for quieting of title. Salazars failed to present proof that they
are the heirs of Juan Soriano. TCT issued in their names was declared null and void.
 CA - ruled in favor of Salazars. It stated that the previous RTC who issued orders, had
become final and executory, henced covered by res judicata. It ratiocinated that the
proceeding is a land registration proceeding, which is AN ACTION IN REM.

ISSUE:

WON the action taken by the Salazars in RTC (issued court Orders) were valid?

RULING:

 SC ruled in favor of the petitioners and declared the actions taken as invalid.
 the proceedings instituted by the Salazars can hardly be classified as actions in rem.
 Since no indispensable party was ever impleaded by the Salazars in their petition for
cancellation of entry filed before Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac, herein petitioners are not
bound by the dispositions of the said court. Court orders issued never even acquired
finality.
 To allow any individual, such as the Salazars in this case, to impugn the validity of a Torrens
certificate of title by the simple expediency of filing an ex parte petition for cancellation of
entries would inevitably erode the very reason why the Torrens system was adopted in this
country, which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question on the legality of
the title. Once a title is registered under the Torrens system, the owner may rest secure.
unless there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct action filed in court
proceeded in accordance with law.
 SC also noted that more than 30 years from entry was annotated at the back of the OCT in
1950 until the time of the filing of the ex parte petition for cancellation of entris in 1985.
 Salazars remained deafeningly quiet and never made any move to question the issue of
ownership over the said land before the proper forum.

Victor Benin v. Mariano Severo Tuazon De La Paz

FACTS:

Doctrine CFI declared OCT null and void on the ground that the decree of registration was not
transcribed in the registration book in accordance with Section 41 of Act 496. SC disagreed, ruling
that the circumstance that the beginning of the technical descriptions is not found on the face, or on
the first page, of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is a formal defect and not a ground to nullify the
said certificate.

A strict interpretation or construction of Section 41 of Act 496 would certainly not promote the purpose
of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), which generally are to ascertain once and for all the absolute
title over a given landed property; to make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the
court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title; to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever
to any question of legality of title; and to decree that land title shall be final, irrevocable and
indisputable

 On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantially
the same allegations.
 In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the
three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint,located in the
barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province
of Rizal and that they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin;
 In Civil Case No. 3622 the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two
parcels of agricultural land,described in paragraph V of the complaint, and that these parcels of
land were inherited by them from their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara.
 Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel of
agricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of
Caloocan,province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this
parcel of land was inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited
the same from his parents; and they and their predecessors in interest had been in open,
adverse and continuous possession of the same; had said lands declared for taxation
purposes
 The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, that
sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the
defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents and
representatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and
other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and
destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements.
 Plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they
discovered for the first time that their lands, as described in their respective complaint, had
either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what what
appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735
of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for
 registration, now defendants, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz et al Plaintiffs in each of the
three complaints also alleged that:
- The registered owners had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the
Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate). The registration proceedings were docketed as
LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
-The application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical
descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate)
was published in the Official Gazette.
 However, before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries
and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; the area of parcel
No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1 appearing
in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette. The amendments and
alterations, which were made after the publication of the original application, were never
published. ○ Pursuant to the decision in LRC No. 7681, a decree of registration was issued
on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the registration in the names of
the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate) Thus,
Plaintiffs contend inter alia that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null
and void because the Land Registration Court (LRC) had no jurisdiction to render the
decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of
March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was
issued pursuant to a void decision and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to
parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning because it was
issued pursuant to a void decree of registration. CFI rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiffs. A motion for new trial was filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January
30, 1965. However, before the motion for new trial was resolved by the court, said
defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond,
and on February 12, 1965 he filed the record on appeal.The record on appeal, after it had
been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized by the trial court, was
approved on September 29, 1965 WON Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is null and void
because the No. 17431 in LRC No. 7681, assuming the degree to be valid, had not been
inscribed in accordance with the provisions of Section 41 of Act 496 - NO. [relevant] CFI:
OCT No. 735 is null and void because the decree of registration was not transcribed in the
registration book in accordance with Section 41 of Act 496. The technical descriptions of
Parcels 1 and 2 do not begin on the face, or on the first page, of this title, as a technical
description is ordinarily copied on the certificate of title. What appears on the face of this
title is the last part of the technical description of Parcel 2. The technical descriptions of
Parcels 1 and 2 begin on the second page and end on the first page. SC: The formal defect
in the transcription of Decree of Registration No. 17431 in the Registration Book did not
render null and void OCT No. 735. The two parcels of land covered by OCT No. 735 are
properly registered under the Torrens System. (a) On the face, or on the first page, of this
title, there is (1) the certification of the Chief

LAND REGISTRATION COURTS CAN NOW HEAR AND DECIDE CONTROVERSIAL AND
CONTENTIOUS CASES SUCH AS VALIDITY OF A TAX SALE
Jerome Solco vs. Megaworld Corporation G.R. No. 213669; March 5, 2018. Tijam, J.

FACTS:

 This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA).
 The City of Makati issued a Warrant of Levy against Megaworld Corporation for failure to pay
real property taxes over its two parking slots covered by Condominium Certificates of Title
(CCT).
 The properties were sold in a public auction and petitioner Solco was the highest bidder. City
of Makati issued the certificates of sale to Solco.
 There being no redemption by Megaworld, the local treasurer executed a Final Deed of
Conveyance.
 As the CCTs are still under Megaworld's name and the owner's duplicate copies of the same
are still in Megaworld's possession, Solco filed a Petition for Issuance of Four New CCT and to
Declare Null and Void the first issued CCTs before the RTC of Makati. Megaworld filed a
Comment on/Opposition to the Petition averring that it entered into a Contract to Buy and Sell
with other buyers.
 By virtue of such transfers, the buyers assumed all the respective obligations, assessments,
and taxes on the property from the time of delivery pursuant to their agreements.
 Hence, starting year 2000, Megaworld admittedly did not pay the real property taxes thereon. It
also alleged that the auction proceedings were tainted with anomalies.
 RTC rendered an order in favor of Solco.
 On appeal, CA found merit on Megaworld's arguments as to the irregularities which attended
the entire delinquency proceedings. The CA found that Solco failed to present proof of
compliance under the Local Government Code.
-Solco contends that the issue on the validity of a tax sale should be threshed out in a
proper forum as the land registration court has limited jurisdiction, and that he was a buyer in
good faith.
ISSUE: May the validity of a tax sale be the subject of a land registration case?
RULING:
 Yes, the validity of a tax sale may be the subject of a land registration case.
 Court has declared that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, with the intention to avoid
multiplicity of suits and to promote expeditious termination of cases, had eliminated the
distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the latter's
limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land registration court.
 Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even controversial and
contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues.
 Certainly, thus, the courts a quo had jurisdiction to rule on all matters necessary for the
determination of the issue of ownership, including the validity of the tax sale.
 Lastly, in arguing that he was a buyer in good faith, Solco merely relied upon the
presumption of good faith.
 In consonance with the strict and mandatory character of the requirements for validity of a
tax delinquency sale, well-established is the rule that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of a duty enjoyed by public officials, cannot be applied to those involved in the
 conduct of a tax sale. No presumption of regularity exists in any administrative action which
resulted in depriving a citizen or taxpayer of his property. This is an exception to the rule
that administrative proceedings are presumed to be regular.

Republic v. Bantigue

FACTS:

 Respondent filed with the RTC of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of
title over a parcel of land located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas.
 Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration while the records were
still with the RTC.
 The RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San
Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than ₱100,000.
 Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default and commenced with the reception
of evidence.9
 Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax
Declarations, a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favour, and a Certification from the DENR
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot
in question is within the alienable and disposable zone. Thereafter, it awarded the land to
respondent Corporation.
 Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic, the CA ruled that since the petitioner had actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional
challenge, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on
appeal.
 The CA further found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latter’s
registrable title over the subject property after having proven open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself and its predecessors-in-
interest even before the outbreak of World War II. Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioner
Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition and raised the following arguments in support of its
appeal that the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application for original registration of
land title. The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remanded the case to the court a quo
for further proceedings in order to determine if the property in question forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.