Case Digests:

Solid Homes, Inc. v Payawal, 177 SCRA 72

Facts:
Plaintiff Teresita Payawal alleged that defendant Solid Homes, Inc. contracted to sell to her a
subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by
September 10, 1981, she had already paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in
monthly installments and interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the
land but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands
because, as it appeared later, the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a
financing company. The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the
return of all the amounts paid by her plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.

Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction,
this being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied.  

Issue/s:
Whether the NHA has jurisdiction to hear the case.

Ruling:
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the
National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its
Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957." Section 1 of the latter decree provides as
follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory obligations filed by buyers of

subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129, which confers on
regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear and decide cases mentioned in its Section 19.

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P 20,000.00).

It stresses, additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later enactment, having been
promulgated in 1981, after PD No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978. 

This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law
and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment.

Matienzo v Abellera, 162 SCRA 11

Facts:
The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila.
The respondents, however, admittedly operate "colorum" or "kabit" taxicab units. Private
respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board of Transportation for the legalization
of their unauthorized "excess" taxicab units citing Presidential Decree No. 101, promulgated on
January 17, 1973, "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by
replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible operators." Within a matter of
days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the applications for hearing and
granting applicants provisional authority to operate their "excess taxicab units" for which
legalization was sought.

 The petitioners allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to the private respondents.

Issue/s:
Whether the BOT has the power to legalize, at this time, clandestine and unlawful taxicab
operations. 

Ruling:
Justifying its action on private respondent's applications, the respondent Board emphasizes
public need as the overriding concern. It is argued that under PD 101, it is the fixed policy of the
State "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators by replacing or
allowing them to become legitimate and responsible ones" (Whereas clause, PD 101). In view
thereof, it is maintained that respondent Board may continue to grant to "colorum" operators the
benefits of legalization under PD 101, despite the lapse of its power, after six (6) months, to do
so, without taking punitive measures against the said operators.

Indeed, a reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to
issue provisional permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations
without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to
suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather,
it merely provides for the withdrawal of the State's waiver of its right to punish said colorum
operators for their illegal acts. 
It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain
power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it
was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative
intent should be upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is
required, the appropriate means are deemed given.

Senator Robert S. Jaworski v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463, Jan. 14, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner seeks to nullify the "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports
Betting and Internet Gaming," executed by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) in favor of respondent Sports and Games and
Entertainment Corporation (also referred to as SAGE).

PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under Presidential Decree
No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos. 

Petitioner maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He
contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate
gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly
contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet
was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he
argues that the internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily transcends
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate
internet gambling contravenes the limitation in PAGCOR’s franchise, under Section 14 of P.D.
No. 1869 which provides:

Place. – The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or games of chance
on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x 

Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of
the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 which grants
PAGCOR the "right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs,
and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Republic of the Philippines."

Issue/s:
Whether PAGCOR’s legislative franchise include the right to vest another entity, SAGE in this
case, with the authority to operate Internet gambling? Otherwise put, does Presidential Decree
No. 1869 authorize PAGCOR to contract any part of its franchise to SAGE by authorizing the
latter to operate Internet gambling?

Ruling:

PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on or shared its
franchise to SAGE. 
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a
privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be
reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by
public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them
in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of
the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be
granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to be
rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always
defined in clear and unequivocal language.

In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the former grants the
latter the authority to operate and maintain sports betting stations and Internet gaming
operations. In essence, the grant of authority gives SAGE the privilege to actively
participate, partake and share PAGCOR’s franchise to operate a gambling activity. The
grant of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right and a duty to be performed
by the grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but must
abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and
conditionalities. A corporation as a creature of the State is presumed to exist for the
common good. Hence, the special privileges and franchises it receives are subject to the laws
of the State and the limitations of its charter. There is therefore a reserved right of the State to
inquire how these privileges had been employed, and whether they have been abused 

While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management
contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less
grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its
power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as
there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so 

Express and Implied

There must be a delegation of authority, either express or implied. It need not be expressed. It
may be implied from the wording of the law. The quantum of powers possessed by an
administrative agency forming part of the executive branch will be limited to that conferred
expressly or by necessary or fair implication in its enabling act. 

Jurisdiction to hear and decide a case is conferred by law. It cannot be implied from the
language of a statute, in tha absence of a clear legislative intent. The grant of judicial or quasi-
judicial power to try actions carries with it all necessary and incidental powers to employ all
writs, processes and other means essential to make its jurisdiction effective. For it is settled that
where a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred, by necessary
implication. 

Case Digests:
Sarcos v Castillo, 26 SCRA 853
Facts:
Petitioner Domingo N. Sarcos, the duly elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, running as an
independent candidate but winning, nonetheless, in the November 14, 1967 election, was
charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by respondent Recaredo Castillo, the
Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner allegedly "[conniving] with certain private
individuals to cut and fell [timber] and [selling] the [timber] or logs so cut or felled for their own
use and benefit, within the communal forest reserve to the damage and prejudice of the public
and the government.
It was on the basis of the above administrative complaint that respondent Governor, according
to the petition, ordered the "immediate suspension [of petitioner] from his position as Mayor of
Barobo, Surigao del Sur. There was an urgent necessity to order the immediate 'preventive
suspension' of the petitioner, in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, of Republic Act No.
5185, otherwise known as the 'Decentralization Act of 1967.

Issue/s:
Whether respondent Provincial Governor is vested with power to order such preventive
suspension under the Decentralization Act of 1967, more specifically Section 5  

Ruling:

 Respondent Provincial Governor lacks the authority to order the preventive suspension of
petitioner. 

According to the Decentralization Act of 1967, particularly the paragraph dealing with
preventive suspension: "…The President, Provincial Board and City or Municipality Council, as
the case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth or falsity if the charges within 1- days after
receipt of such notice." 

It was the former law Sec. 2188 of Rev. Adm. Code which gives power to the Governor to
order preventive suspension, however, it was already repealed by the Decentralization Act
of 1967. The court was also lead to the suspicion that politics was a cause for the order by
Governor of the preventive suspension of the Mayor, being an independent candidate thus
of a different political persuasion. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are then granted. The
preventive suspension order by Castillo is annulled and set aside. 

Villegas v Subido, 30 SCRA 498

Facts:
Respondent Commissioner directed that petitioners Barbers, Paralejas and Lazaro be replaced
as station commanders of the three police precincts of Manila, as their continued employment
as such was illegal, the eligibility required being that of an inspector first class, allegedly not
possessed by them. 

The petitioner Mayor replied asserting that he felt obliged "to disregard said directive, it being in
excess of the authority vested in CSC." As noted in such communication: "This Office is not
aware of any provision of law requiring that Precinct or Station Commanders should be at least
a Police or Detective Major or an Inspector First Class. Paragraph 4, Section 23 of Republic Act
No. 2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, which that Commission has
invoked. This provision of law cannot cover mere designations or assignments to an area of
command. 

Issue/s:
Whether Commissioner of Civil Service has the power to direct the Mayor of the City of Manila,
Antonio J. Villegas, to replace James Barbers, Antonio Paralejas and Felicisimo Lazaro as
station commanders of the three Manila police precincts.

Ruling:
The power of petitioner City Mayor as to who could be designated as station commanders of the
three Manila police precincts is conceded. No dispute as to his authority to do so exists. The
Charter is clear. The narrow question, therefore, is whether such designation could be frustrated
by the directive of the respondent Commissioner. For this official to be justified in interposing a
negative, he must show that an applicable law authorizes him to do so.

It is well-settled that respondent Commissioner at the most may inquire only as to the eligibility
of the person thus chosen to fill up a vacant position. If he were, then respondent Commissioner
of Civil Service must so attest. The attestation required of the Commissioner of Civil Service is
merely a check to assure compliance with the civil service laws.

CSC can point to no express provision that would confer on him such a power. There is thus an
admission from respondent Commissioner himself that his power is necessarily limited. If such a
purpose were within the contemplation of Congress, an appropriate form of words could have
been utilized. The absence of such language negates its existence. If the statute is silent as to
the existence of power, there the matter rests. Only Congress can remedy the situation.

Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The
government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and
enforced. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a
delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are
devoid of power.

Radio Communications v Santiago, 58 SCRA 493 [1974] 

Facts:
 In 1996, a telegram was filed with respondent-company and the amount of P1.50 was paid for
the transmission of said telegram to Zamboanga City. The telegram, however, was never
transmitted until now. No explanation and no evidence was given why the said telegram was not
forwarded to the addressee until now. This is, therefore, a clear case where the respondent,
taking advantage of the rates fixed by this Commission collected the sum of P1.50 and
promised to render a service to the complainant. 

In another complaint, complainant filed a telegram at the branch office of respondent in

Dumaguete City, addressed to Commissioner Enrique Medina, Public Service Commission,
Manila. The telegram was received by an employee of the respondent, and the sum of P2.64
was collected in payment of said telegram. The telegram, in effect, advised Commissioner
Medina that the Land Registration Case where he was cited by subpoena to testify before the
CFI of Oriental Negros, was transferred and, therefore, there was no necessity for the said
Commissioner to proceed to Negros Oriental. It appears that the said telegram   received   at  
Dumaguete   City   was   transmitted   to   Manila,   but   was   never   delivered   to   the
addressee, and on August 14 and 15, when Commissioner Medina appeared before the
Dumaguete Court,he was advised that the case was postponed and that a telegram was sent to
the said Commissioner. Inquiries were made, why the telegram was not received by the
Commissioner in Manila; the Dumaguete Office communicated with the Manila Office, on the
same date, August 14, 1967 and it was only on August15, 1967 that the telegram was relayed
to the Public Service Commission and was received by one of the employees of the
Commission, in the absence of Commissioner Medina who was then in Negros Oriental. It was
the manifest failure in both cases to render the service expected of a responsible operator that
led to the imposition of the penalty. 
Issue/s: Whether or not the Public Service Commission had the jurisdiction to act on complaints
by dissatisfied customers of Radio Communications of the Philippines Inc., and thereafter to
penalize it with a fine

Ruling:
No. There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission imposing the fines in
these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer. The only power it possessed over radio
companies, as noted was the fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for any
negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. Except for constitutional
officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public official
must locate in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. It need not be
express. It may be implied from the wording of the law. Absent such a requisite, however, no
warrant exists for the assumption of authority. The act performed, if properly challenged, cannot
meet the test of validity. It must be set aside. So it must be in these two petitions.

Grant of particular power must be found in the law itself. 

Azarcon v Sandiganbayan, 79 SCAD 954 [1997]

Facts:
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling "dirt and ore.
His services were contracted by the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) at
its concession in Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-
contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises. A Warrant of
Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) addressed to the Regional Director (Jose Batausa) or his authorized representative of
Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or
effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a
delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon
ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession
owned by taxpayer Ancla.

Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the "Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under
Authority of the National Internal Revenue," assumed the undertakings specified in the receipt
and received the Isuzu Dump Truck with the liabilities of safekeeping and preserving the unit in
behalf of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Azarcon informed the BIR that Ancla withdrew the
equipment from Azarcon’s custody. The Sandiganbayan found that Ancla was renting out the
truck to a certain contractor by the name of Oscar Cueva at PICOP Batausa, the Director filed a
letter-complaint against the (herein Petitioner) and Ancla and was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property. The petitioner filed a
motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan. SandiganBayan finds accused Alfredo
Azarcon y Leva GUILTY.

Issue/s:
Whether the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private individual who is charged with
malversation of public funds as a principal after the said individual had been designated by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue as a custodian of distrained property? 

Whether the accused become a public officer and therefore subject to the graft court’s
jurisdiction as a consequence of such designation by the BIR?
Ruling:

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

It is hornbook doctrine that in order" (to) ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the
provisions of the law should be inquired into." Jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from
the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied. Purpose in
criminal cases, "the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law at the time of
commencement of the action.

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees.

Azarcon: A Public Officer or A Private Individual

The petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR,
commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, obviously may not be
deemed authorized by popular election.

SC finds no  provision  in the  National Internal Revenue Code constituting such  person  a 
public  officer by  reason  of such  requirement.  The BIR's power authorizing a private individual
to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public
officer. The language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who has in his
charge any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts
defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be
penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public officers. 

Article 222 of the RPC reads: Officers included in the preceding provisions. —The provisions of
this chapter shall apply to private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any
insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or
depository of funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such
property belongs to a private individual.

Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private individual falling under said
Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer. 
Taule v Santos, 200 SCRA 512 [1991]
Facts:
The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of
eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of the Association of Barangay Councils
in their respective municipalities. Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel and
others. When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its
members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The
election nevertheless proceeded.

Respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to respondent Luis T.

Santos, the Secretary of Local Government, * protesting the election of the officers of the FABC
and seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was
conducted.

Petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of the FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of
respondent Governor denying the alleged irregularities and denouncing said respondent
Governor for meddling or intervening in the election of FABC officers which is a purely non-
partisan affair and at the same time requesting for his appointment as a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected President of the FABC in
Catanduanes.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest
involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils;

Ruling:
The Secretary of Local Government has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the
election of officers of the FABC. He is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and
regulations and to exercise general supervision over the local government as provided in the
Local Government Code and in the Administrative Code.

It is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the COMELEC
have the appellate jurisdiction over it. Under the law, the sworn petition contesting the election
of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office
within 10 days after the proclamation of the results. 

The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to
supervision of the election of the representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian
in a particular level conducted by their own respective organization.

GSIS v  CSC, 202 SCRA 799

Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6) employees as being
"notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been found to be connected with irregularities in
the canvass of supplies and materials. The dismissal was based on Article IX, Presidential
Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law)
Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found
the dismissals to be illegal because effected without formal charges having been filed or an
opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS
for appropriate disciplinary proceedings.

The GSIS appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By Resolution dated October 21, 1987,
the Commission ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal.

Issue/s:
Whether the Civil Service has the power to enforce its judgments

Ruling:
YES. The Civil Service Commission is a consitutional commission invested by the Constitution
and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also with
quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary
cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. It has the power, too, sitting en banc,
to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its
offices, which rules should not however diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
In light of all the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to
deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority or order execution of its
decisions, resolutions or orders. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide
cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided is
carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to
hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of
authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
Therefore, the GSIS must yield to the order of the CSC. 

Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries 

Cooperative, Inc., 382 SCRA 552 (2002)
Facts:
Cooperative Development Authority received from certain members of the Dolefil Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI for brevity), an agrarian reform cooperative
that owns 8,860 hectares of land in Polomolok, South Cotabato, several complaints alleging
mismanagement and/or misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the then incumbent officers
and members of the board of directors of the cooperative, some of whom are herein private
respondents.

On February 24, 1998, CDA Chairman Jose C. Medina, Jr. issued an order placing the private
respondents under preventive suspension, hence, paving the way for the newly-created
management committee to assume office.

CA issued a TRO enjoing RTC from enforcing the restraining order on the order issued by CDA.
CA declared CDA order null and void and of no legal force and effect. 

Petitioner CDA claims that it is vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate cooperative
disputes in view of its powers, functions and responsibilities under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
6939, confirmed by the DOJ.
Applying the foregoing, the express powers of the CDA to cancel certificates of registration of
cooperatives for non-compliance with administrative requirements or in cases of voluntary
dissolution under Section 3(g), and to mandate and conciliate disputes within a cooperative or
between cooperatives under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6939, may be deemed quasi-judicial in
nature. The reason is that - in the performance of its functions such as cancellation of certificate
of registration, it is necessary to establish non-compliance or violation of administrative
requirement. 

The petitioner avers that when an administrative agency is conferred with quasi-judicial powers
and functions, such as the CDA, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its
specialization are deemed to be covered within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency.  

Issue/s:
Whether petitioner Cooperative Development Authority (CDA for brevity) is vested with quasi-
judicial authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes.

Ruling:
No. It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that when the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation - there is
only room for application.32 It can be gleaned from the above-quoted provision of R.A. No. 6939
that the authority of the CDA is to discharge purely administrative functions which consist of
policy-making, registration, fiscal and technical assistance to cooperatives and implementation
of cooperative laws. Nowhere in the said law can it be found any express grant to the CDA of
authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes. Being an administrative agency, the CDA has only
such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those which are necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof.

The decision to withhold quasi-judicial powers from the CDA is in accordance with the policy of
the government granting autonomy to cooperatives.  

Ministerial and Discretionary

The duties and powers of the public officers may either be ministerial or discretionary. It is
important for it is to determine what remedy may be availed of by an aggrieved party against the
non-performance of duty by the officer. 
Ministerial Act or Duty
 it is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its
performance.
 the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment. 
 an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. 
 Mandamus may lie to compel performance 
Discretionary Act or Duty
 its nature requires the exercise of judgment. 
 e.g. if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how
and when the duty shall be performed.
 Petition for certiorari may lie where there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the official or administrative agency. 
  a discretion entrusted to a public officer may not be delegated, the presumption being
that he was chosen because he is deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment
and discretion, and, unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given
to him, he cannot delegate to another. 
 uncontrolled by judgment of others. 

Case Digests:
Carino v Capulong, 41 SCAD 775 [1993]
Facts:
AMA College filed with RTC a petition for prohibition, certiorari and mandamus against Hon.
Isidro Carino and DECS Sec. and Atty. Venancio Nava, Regional Director, DECS to annul and
set aside the closure order and to enjoin the respondents from closing or padlocking AMACC,
Davao City. Trial court dismissed the petition. AMA filed with CA a petition for certiorari, CA
dismissed the petition. AMA filed another petition for prohibition and/or mandamus with
preliminary injunction with the RTC. The court dismissed the petition. AMA, however, to prevent
padlocking or closure, filed with the RTC presided by respondent Hon. Ignacio Capulong,
another petition for mandamus, with damages, preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
against Hon. Carino, Sec. and Director, DECS, to compel the respondents to approve
petitioners' application for permit to operate retroactive to the commencement of school year
1990-1991. 

Issue/s:
Whether the authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant AMA is a ministerial duty or
discretionary duty.

Ruling:
As ruled by the SC, it is a discretionary duty. As a rule, mandamus will lie only to compel an
officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a discretionary function. 

A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of
discretion in its performance. Obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without the exercise
of his own judgement. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by nature requires
the exercise of judgement. There is right to decide how and when the duty shall be performed.

In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of the
petitioners. It is a discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners because it had to
be exercised in accordance with — and not in violation of — the law and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations. Thus, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Motion to Dismiss the
petition - 

Establishment or recognition of private schools through government grant of permits is

governed by law, specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The authority to grant permit is vested
upon the judgment of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, which prescribes the
rules and regulations governing the recognition on private schools (Section 27, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 232).

Mateo v CA, G.R. No. 83354 April 25, 1991

Facts:
This case is an action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of a two-hectare piece of
land, with damages. That the decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial
court’s denial of both their Petition for Relief from Judgment and the notice of appeal.

Issue/s:
Whether the approval of a notice of appeal by the trial judge is a ministerial duty enforceable by
mandamus

Ruling:
There is no question that the same involved the exercise of discretion by the trial court and
therefore, the granting thereof can not be compelled by mandamus. A petition for mandamus
lies "when any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

Ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of
discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by its
nature requires the exercise of judgment. A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the
propriety of the act done. But if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and
not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor judgment 

In the present case, petitioner lost his right to appeal when he failed to perfect his appeal
within the reglementary period. The Petition for Relief From Judgment granted by Section 2
of Rule 38, does not confer on petitioner the right to appeal which had been lost. And the
remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on any of the grounds mentioned by
said rules, namely: fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.  And the writ of
mandamus can not be issued and is not available to control the discretion of the judge or
compel him to decide a case in a particular way. The trial court, in exercising its discretionary
authority, denied the Petition for Relief from Judgment on a finding that petitioners had no
meritorious defense and that the failure to perfect the appeal on time was not due to
excusable negligence. This is clearly an exercise of power or authority which cannot be
controlled by a writ of mandamus. In this instance, the remedy available to the petitioners is to
appeal the denial of their Petition for Relief from Judgment. 

Hence, the SC agree with the contention of the petitioners that it was the ministerial duty of
the trial court to approve the notice of appeal. The refusal of the trial court, therefore, to
accept the said notice filed by petitioners in pursuance of their statutory right to appeal is clearly
enforceable by mandamus.

Symaco v Aquino, 106 Phil 1130 [1960]

Facts:
Benito Symaco filed an application for building permit with the Office of the Mayor of
Malabon, particularly seeking authority to repair the eaves and partition of Symaco's house of
strong materials. The Municipal Mayor granted or issued a permit pursuant to the application
filed above-mentioned. Mendoza, a duly appointed building inspector, wrote a letter to
Symaco informing the latter that he should file the necessary building permit for the
contract in of a new building, because as per ocular inspection conducted by the said building
inspector, it had been noted and found out that instead of mere repairs of the eaves and
partitions of the old building, the old building was demolished and a new one was then
being constructed. Symaco then applied with District Engr. for the necessary permit for the
new building. However, A.M. Raymundo and Company filed a civil action for forcible entry
against Symaco. Thus, Aquino, Municipal Mayor, denied the application. Citing Article I of
Ordinance No. 20, series of 1941, of the Municipal Council of Malabon, the ordinance requires
the applicant for a building permit to state in his application the name of the owner, the location
of the building, the kind of materials to be used, and the floor area therefore. Said requirement,
it appears, was complied with by Symaco.

Issue/s:
Having thus complied with said requirement, was it a discretionary or ministerial duty on the part
of the Mayor to issue the permit in question?

Ruling:
A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer
or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be per-formed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. The court said that the moment
Symaco complied with the requirements under said ordinance for the issuance of a
building permit, Symaco became entitled to it and the Mayor's duty became ministerial and
it was, thereupon, incumbent upon him to issue the same. There is nothing in the
ordinance which grants the Mayor the discretion to refuse the issuance of a building permit
to an applicant owner, tenant, manager, or contractor. All that the ordinance requires is that said
applicant must state the data mentioned therein. The mayor's failure, therefore, to perform an
act which the ordinance enjoins him to do, upon compliance with the conditions therein
provided, entitled Symaco to the writ of mandamus prayed for.

MERALCO Securities Corp. v Savellano, 117 SCRA 804 [1982]

Facts:
The late Juan G. Maniago (substituted in these proceedings by his wife and children) submitted
to petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue confidential denunciation against the
Meralco Securities Corporation for tax evasion. The Commissioner rejected Maniago's
contention that the Meralco from whom the dividends were received is not a domestic
corporation liable to tax.  This action of the Commissioner was sustained by the Secretary
of Finance. Maniago filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Commissioner to impose
the alleged deficiency tax assessment on the Meralco Securities Corporation and to award to
him the corresponding informer's reward under the law. The Commissioner filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that since in matters of issuance and non-issuance of assessments, he is
clothed under the National Internal Revenue Code and existing rules and regulations with
discretionary power in evaluating the facts of a case and since mandamus win not lie to
compel the performance of a discretionary power, he cannot be compelled to impose the
alleged tax deficiency assessment. 
Issue/s:
Whether mandamus is proper.

Ruling:
The SC ruled in the negative. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be
interfered with by the courts. A well-recognized rule that mandamus only lies to enforce the
performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary
power. Discretion means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially
under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience. 

Moreover, since the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is charged with the
administration of revenue laws, which is the primary responsibility of the executive
branch of the government, mandamus may not be against the Commissioner to compel
him to impose a tax assessment not found by him to be due or proper for that would be
tantamount to a usurpation of executive functions.  

After the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with the task of enforcing and
implementing the tax laws and the collection of taxes had after a mature and thorough study
rendered his decision or ruling that no tax is due or collectible, and his decision is
sustained by the Secretary, such decision or ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the
performance of official duty and cannot be controlled much less reversed by mandamus. 

Binamira v Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154 [1990]

Facts:
Petitioner Binamira, as evidenced by the memorandum which allowed him to qualify, was
designated General Manager (GM) of the Phil Tourism Authority (PTA) by the then Minister
of Tourism and Chair of the PTA Board. He then assumed office. President Aquino, on noting
that he was not designated by herself but merely by said Minister contrary to that required by
law, designated the new Sec. of Tourism respondent Garrucho as the GM until such time she
makes an appointment thereto.

Issue/s:
Whether the removal of the petitioner from office was valid. 

Ruling:
The SC ruled that the petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed position and so
has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. 

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless
he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. 

Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be
delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the
exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or
designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be
validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the
Cabinet. 
Republic v Capulong, 199 SCRA 134 [1991]
Facts:
Air Transportation Office (ATO, for short) and its Pre-qualification, Bidding and Award
Committee (PBAC, for short) publicly invited prequalified bidders to furnish the necessary goods
and services for works under the Nationwide Air Navigation Facilities Modernization Project
Phase II, a government infrastructure project financed from proceeds of a loan. 

Inter Technical Pacific, Inc. (INTER TECHNICAL for short), a Filipino contractor, prequalified as
a bidder and submitted its sealed bidding documents. When INTER TECHNICAL's bidding
documents were opened and examined, it was discovered that the entire set of bidding
documents and eight copies thereof did not contain a Form of Bid. The PBAC allegedly upon
the advice of the assisting Japanese consultants in the committee, refused to read INTER
TECHNICAL's bid and rejected the same as "non complying." 

Issue/s:
1. Whether the failure of INTER TECHNICAL to enclose in its bidding documents the duly
accomplished and signed Form of Bid is, under the circumstances of the case, a valid
ground for the PBAC of ATO to reject its bid 
2. Whether the respondent court may step into the controversy by ordering the award and
bidding committee to reconvene and read INTER TECHNICAL's bid when the discretion
to determine whether or not a bidder complies with the bidding requirements lies with the
said bidding committee.

Ruling:
1.  The Form of Bid, as technically used in this case, contains the offer to undertake the
works for a specified sum of money expressed in foreign currency and Philippine peso
and, it stipulates the terms and conditions in the call for bid which the bidder, thru its duly
authorized signing representative, agrees to undertake and abide once the bid is
accepted by the PBAC. A standard form made available to prequalified bidders.  PBAC
was guided by the rules, regulations or guidelines existing before the bid proposals were
opened on November 10, 1989. The basic rule in public bidding is that bids should be
evaluated based on the required documents submitted before and not after the opening
of bids. Otherwise, the foundation of a fair and competitive public bidding would be
defeated. 
2. It is clear that the complaint is actually one for mandamus. As a rule, mandamus
lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty and not a discretionary act.
Discretion when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon
them by law of acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the
judgment or conscience of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a
discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The
duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion or judgment." As a general rule, a writ of mandamus will not issue to
control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer since it is his judgment that
is to be exercised and not that of the court (see Magtibay vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-28971,
January 28, 1983, 120 SCRA 370). Thus, the courts will not interfere to modify, control
or inquire into the exercise of this discretion unless it be alleged and proven that there
 has been an abuse or an excess of authority on the part of the officer concerned (see
Calvo v. de Gutierrez, et al., 4 Phil, 2033). 

Mandatory and Permissive

 This classification is important in resolving the question of what effect should be given to the
mandate of the statute. The question whether a statutory discretion is to be considered
mandatory or directory us determined by the legislative intent. 
Mandatory statute
 which commands either positively that something be done, or performed in a particular
way, or negatively that something be not done, leaving the person concerned no choice
on the matter except to obey. 
 contains words of command or of prohibition, the omission to follow which renders the
proceeding to which it relates illegal or void, or the violation of which makes the decision
therein rendered invalid. 
 mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever the legislative  purpose can best
be carried out by such construction. 
 Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be
done is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a
matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction. 
 rights are injuriously affected.
Permissive statute
 directory statute - permissive or discretionary in nature; merely outlines the acts to be
done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be
accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same result
obtained. 
 no substantial rights depend on it and no injury can result. 
 can be accomplished in a manner other than prescribed and substantially the same
results obtained

Brehn v Republic, 9 SCRA 172 [1963]

Facts:
Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with temporary assignment at
Subic Bay. On October 9, 1958, he married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter
Elizabeth, by another man, also of the American Navy, who left the country in 1952, and never
heard from since then. After the marriage, the couple established residence at Intramuros,
Manila, and the minor Elizabeth had always been under their care and support of Brehm.

The spouses filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the
adoption of the minor Elizabeth, claiming that they have mutually given their consent to the
adoption, not only to promote her best interest and well-being, but also to give her a legitimate
status.

An opposition to the petition with respect to Gilbert Brehm was registered by the Republic of the
Philippines, it appearing that Brehm testified that his residence in Philippines was merely
temporary, same being effective only for purposes of his tour of duty with the Navy, thus
disqualifying him from making an adoption (Art. 335 [4], New Civil Code; Sec. 2, Rule 100,
Rules of Court), and that being a non-resident alien, the Court has no jurisdiction over him. 

A reply to the opposition was presented by petitioners. They claim that Art. 335 does not apply
in the case, reasoning out that it covers only adoptions for the purpose establishing a
relationship of paternity and filiation, where none existed, but not where the adopting parents
are not total strangers to said child; that there is already a relation between the child and
Brehm, created by affinity that Art. 338 of the New Civil code, expressly authorizes the
adoption of a step-child by a step-father 

The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court rendered judgment, finding that the principal
allegations of the petitioners are true, it is hereby adjudged that henceforth the minor Elizabeth
is freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural father,
and is, to all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners Gilbert R. Brehm and Ester
Mira Brehm, said minor's surname being change from "Mira" to "Mira Brehm".

The Solicitor General took exception from the judgment, claiming that it was error for the Court
in adjudging the minor Elizabeth Mira the adopted child of petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm.

Issue/s:
Whether Brehm is qualified to adopt Elizabeth

Ruling:
No, Brehm is disqualified to adopt Elizabeth

Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Provides that —

The following cannot adopt

xxx     xxx     xxx

(4) Non-resident aliens;

According to Art. 335, it clearly states that non-resident aliens cannot adopt. It is therefore,
mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the negative
terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated. 

par. 3, Art. 338, Civil Code, which states —

The following may be adopted:

(1) The natural child by the natural father

(2) Other legitimate children, by the father or mother

(3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.

On the other hand, Art. 338, can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with
the mandatory provisions of Art. 335.

In the instant case Brehm is clearly a non-resident alien by his own testimony. Therefore he is
disqualified to adopt Elizabeth.
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and Brehm’s Petition to adopt the child
EIizabeth Mira, denied. Without costs.

Serina v CFI of Bukidnon, 24 SCRA 715 [1968]

Facts: 
Arturo Serina(petitioner), Municipal Mayor and a candidate for re-election to the same position
of Kibaw, Bukidnon, filed a petition for certiorari preliminary injunction and mandamus, for
the denial of his motion to permit the Municipal Treasurer to open the ballot box of Precint
No. 20 to retrieve the ballot box copy and granted the motion of Ernesto
Villalon(respondent) to proceed with the canvas of votes in such precinct without first
requiring the Board of Inspectors to fill up such omissions complained.

In an answer filed by Villalon, where he admitted some of the allegations contained in the
petition, but stated that the ballot box in question was opened in the Court of First Instance of
Bukidnon. Villalon prayed for the dismissal of the petition for the reason that the issues raised in
the present petition had already rendered moot and academic. In the memorandum filed by
Serina, he admitted that the respondent Court has in fact reconsidered its order and had
authorized the opening of the ballot box and he also agrees with Villalon has become moot and
academic. 

Issue/s:
Whether the respondent Court correctly considered that the matter of the omitted information in
the election return as to the total number of registered voters, the total number of ballots found
in the compartment for valid ballots and others are mere "Clerical Omissions" that may be
disregarded or rather are "Substantial, Material and Requisite Omissions which must first be
completed by the Board of Inspectors before the Municipal Board of Canvassers can proceed to
the canvass of the votes 

Ruling:
The court ruled that since the principal petition has already been dismissed it follows, as a legal
and logical consequence that the other relief sought, namely, that an order be issued to comply
with the resolution of the Commission on Elections requiring the observance of Section 162 of
the Revised Election Code first require the Board of inspectors to fill up or comply the requisite
information omitted in the election returns, be denied as this is merely ancillary to the principal
petition for judicial recount as adverted to above, has already been dismissed by the Court
below. 

Inferior tribunals must likewise hear in mind that where the provisions of the Election Code as in
Section 142 and 162 are couched in mandatory form, the power does not exist for any court to
distinguish between material and immaterial omissions. What the law decrees must be obeyed.
It is as peremptory and as simple as that.

Prov. Treasurer of Negros Occidental v Azcona, 115 Phil 588

Facts:
A CIvil case questioning the legality of an assessment of properties for taxation purpose
brought within the Court of First Instances. 18 months before the decision in said case was
rendered CFI, RA 1125, was enacted granting to the CTA exclusive appellate jurisdiction
to review by appeal the decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue Commissioner of
Customs, and Provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in all cases involving
disputed assessments of internal revenue taxes, customs duties, and real property taxes
and providing that all said cases that were then pending determination in the CFI shall be
certified and remanded by the respective clerks of court to the Court of Tax Appeals for final
disposition. 

In spite of the fact that when said Act was approved, the
present assessment case was still pending decision by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, the latter court, in open disregard of the mandatory provisions of said Act,
decided the same on the merits, instead of remanding it to the Court of Tax Appeals

Issue/s:
Whether the Court of First instance's decision is valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that hat the provisions of Section 22 of said Act which postulate that
"All cases involving disputed assessment of Internal Revenue taxes or customs duties pending
determination before the Court of First Instance shall be certified and remanded by the
respective clerks of court to the Court of Tax Appeals for final disposition thereof", is
mandatory.The open disregard of The CFI renders its decision  and void.

It is true that under Section 22 of said Act the only cases that are required to be certified and
remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals which upon its approval are pending determination
before a CFI are apparently confined to those involving disputed assessment of internal
revenue taxes or customs duties, and the present case admittedly refers to an assessment of
land tax, but it does not mean that because of that apparent omission or oversight the instant
case should not be remanded to the Court of Tax Appeals, for in interpreting the context of
the section above adverted to not ignore Section 7 of the same Act which defines the extent and
scope of the jurisdiction of the said court. As we have held in a recent case, "Section 22 of RA
1125 should be interpreted in such a manner as to make it harmonize with Section 7 of the
same Act and that the primordial purpose behind the approval of said Act by Congress is to
give the CTA exclusive appellate jurisdiction "over all tax, customs, and real estate
assessment cases throughout the Philippines and to hear and decide them as soon as
possible." Considering this interpretation of the law, it logically follows that the lower court did
not act properly in denying the motion to remand the instant case to CTA. 

Errors in exercise of powers

 The government can do no wrong as it authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Its
officers and agents do wrong or commit unauthorized acts. 
 Thus, the government is never estopped by such mistake or error, neither does it
bar future actions
 Actions done in bad faith and causes prejudice to another, he alone is liable and
cannot invoke non-suability of state.
 Unauthorized acts are not acts of the state.

Case Digests:
Republic v Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 211 [1970]
Facts:
The right of a holder of a backpay certificate to use the same in the payment of his taxes has
been recognized by law. 
The National Treasurer upon whom devolves the function of administering the Back Pay Law
(Republic Act 304 as amended by Republic Act Nos. 800 and 897), to the Chief of the Motor
Vehicles Office who in turn quoted and circularized same in his Circular No. 5 dated September
1, 1958, to draw the attention thereto of all Motor Vehicle Supervisors, Registrars and
employees ..., had approved the acceptance of negotiable certificates of indebtedness in
payment of registration fees of motor vehicles with the view that such certificates 'should be
accorded with the same confidence by other governmental instrumentalities as other evidences
of public debt, such as bonds and treasury certificates'. 

The lower court dismissed a complaint by plaintiff-appellant Republic of the Philippines, seeking
the invalidation of the payment by defendant-appellee Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. for the
registration fees of its motor vehicles in the sum of P78,636.17, in the form of such negotiable
backpay certificates of indebtedness, is the applicability of such a provision to such a situation.

The RP appealed and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, it was certified that the
decisive issue was one of law. The statute having restricted the privilege to the satisfaction of a
tax, a liability for fees under the police power being thus excluded from its benefits, the SC
reversed its decision. 

Issue/s:
Whether the acceptance of the negotiable certificates of indebtedness tendered by defendant
bus (firms to and accepted by the Motor Vehicles Office of Baguio City and the corresponding
issuance of official receipts therefor acknowledging such payment by said office) is valid and
binding on plaintiff Republic.

Ruling:
The SC rendered judgment in favor of defendant-appellee "upholding the validity and efficacy"
of such payment made and dismissing the complaint.

The registration fee which defendant-appellee had to pay was imposed by Section 8 of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law. 12 Its heading speaks of "registration fees." The term is repeated
four times in the body thereof. Equally so, mention is made of the "fee for registration." 13 A
subsection starts with a categorical statement "No fees shall be charged." 14 The conclusion is
difficult to resist therefore that the Motor Vehicle Act requires the payment not of a tax but of a
registration fee under the police power.  It is not held liable for a tax but for a registration fee. It
therefore cannot make use of a backpay certificate to meet such an obligation. The liability of
defendant-appellee under the Motor Vehicle Act does not arise under the taxing power of the
state, there is no need to pass upon this particular question.

The lower court, as pointed out by the then Solicitor General, conclude that the government
was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the auditor
general. It would consider estoppel as applicable. That is not the law. 

Estoppel does not lie. Such a principle dates back to Aguinaldo de Romero v. Director of Lands,
18 a 1919 decision. Insofar as the taxing power is concerned, Pineda v. Court of First
Instance, a 1929 decision, speaks categorically: "The Government is never estopped by
mistake or error on the part of its agents. It follows that, insofar as this record shows, the
petitioners have not made it appear that the additional tax claimed by the Collector is not
in fact due and collectible. The assessment of the tax by the Collector creates, it must be
remembered, a charge that is at least prima facie valid." 
Dir. of Bureau of Telecommunications v Aligaen, G.R. No. L-31135 May 29, 1970
Facts:
Jose Belo filed with CFI a verified petition of injunction with preliminary injunction alleging that
he was the grantee of Congressional franchise to establish, maintain and operate a telephone
system in Roxas City and that petitioners were starting to establish, maintain and operate in the
same geographical area of Roxas which would directly compete with the telephone system he
was already operating.  

Judge Jose Aligaen entered an order authorizing the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction and thus restraining petitioners Dir. of Bureau of Telecom. from constructing another
telephone system.  Belo filed an urgent motion to declare petitioners in contempt of court
because they continued the installation in spite of the injunction.  

The solicitor general filed an answer to the petition for injunction of Belo denying allegations and
setting up special and affirmative defenses that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the
case, it being a suit against the government and that the court had no jurisdiction to issue writ of
injunction against the director of bureau of telecommunications.  Court held Chief Operator
Alagabay of Bureau of Telecom. liable for contempt of court but did not impose penalty because
they had stopped working, and denied the motion for dissolution of the injunction.  

Issue/s:
Whether the court of first instance has jurisdiction, power and authority to issue e writ of
preliminary injunction.

Ruling:
The CFI have jurisdiction to control or restrain acts committed or about to be committed within
the territorial boundaries of their respective provinces and districts by means of the writ of
injunction. 

In the instant case, the acts relative to the establishment of a local telephone system by
petitioners were being done within the territorial boundaries of the province or district of
respondent court, and so said court had jurisdiction to restrain them by injunction. It does not
matter that some of the respondents in the trial court, against whom the injunctive order was
issued, had their official residences outside the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court.  We
believe that respondent court had acted in accordance with the provisions of Section 3, Rule 58
of the Rules of Court. The respondent court considered it necessary to issue the writ because
the continuance of the acts of installing the new telephone system by the respondents below
would render the judgment in the petition for injunction ineffectual.  If the damages that may be
suffered by the defendant by the continuance of the injunction outweigh the damages that may
be suffered by the plaintiff by the dissolution of the injunction, then the injunction should be
dissolved. Respondent court took into consideration that "the petitioner (Belo) will suffer great
and irreparable injury. SC hold, therefore, that respondent court did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion when it refused to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction it had issued.

Leveriza V. IAC, G.R. No. L-66614, January 25, 1988

Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines (RP) through the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) entered
into a lease contract (Contract A) on April 2, 1965 with Rosario C. Leveriza over a parcel of land
containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years.
On May 21, 1965, another lease contract (Contract B and in effect a sublease) was entered into
by and between Rosario C. Leveriza and plaintiff Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. (MOPI) over the
same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years. 

On June 1, 1968, a new lease contract (Contract C) was entered into, by and between CAA and
MOPI over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years, without
the approval of the secretary of the Public Works and Communications (PWC). 

Due to the overlapped term of the lease contracts between CAA, Leveriza and MOPI, the CAA
seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground that Contract A
from which Contract B is derived and depends has already been cancelled by the CAA and
maintains that Contract C with the CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the
parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned. 

On the other hand, Leverizas' (heirs) claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has
never been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between MOPI
and CAA which should be declared void. 

Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such cancellation of Contract A,
claiming that the Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the cancellation. They
maintain that it is only the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, acting for the
President, or by delegation of power, the Director of Civil Aeronautics Administration who could
validly cancel the contract. They do admit, however, and it is evident from the records that the
Airport General Manager signed "For the Director." Under the circumstances, there is no
question that such act enjoys the presumption of regularity, not to mention the unassailable fact
that such act was subsequently affirmed or ratified by the Director of the CAA himself (Record
on Appeal, pp. 108-110).

Petitioners argue that cancelling or setting aside a contract approved by the Secretary is, in
effect, repealing an act of the Secretary which is beyond the authority of the Administrator.

It is further contended that even granting that such cancellation was effective, a subsequent
billing by the Accounting Department of the CAA has in effect waived or nullified the rescission
of Contract "A."
 
It will be recalled that the questioned cancellation of Contract "A" was among others, mainly
based on the violation of its terms and conditions, specifically, the sublease of the property by
the lessee without the consent of the lessor.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not there is a valid ground for the cancellation of Contract "A."
2. Whether the billing of petitioners by Accounting Department of CAA is considered an error.

Ruling:
1. SUCH ARGUMENT IS UNTENABLE. The terms and conditions under which such revocation
or cancellation may be made, have already been specifically provided for in Contract "A" which
has already been approved by the Department Head. It is evident that in the implementation of
aforesaid contract, the approval of said Department Head is no longer necessary if not
redundant.
2.The billing of the petitioners by the Accounting Department of the CAA if indeed it transpired,
after the cancellation of Contract "A" is obviously an error. However, this Court has already
ruled that the mistakes of government personnel should not affect public interest. In San
Mauricio Mining Company v. Ancheta (105 SCRA 391, 422), it has been held that as a matter of
law rooted in the protection of public interest, and also as a general policy to protect the
government and the people, errors of government personnel in the performance of their duties
should never deprive the people of the right to rectify such error and recover what might be lost
or be bartered away in any actuation, deal or transaction concerned. In the case at bar, the
lower court in its decision which has been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, ordered the CAA to
refund to the petitioners the amount of rentals which was not due from them with 6% interest per
annum until fully paid. 

Estoppel
 The government is not estopped and can subsequently correct the mistake or the
erroneous application of the law. 
 it is not bound by the errors committed by its agents. 
 General Rule: The government may be estopped through the affirmative acts of the
public officers acting within their authority.
 Exception: No estoppel if by neglect or omission of public duties. 
 It is axiomatic that the government cannot and must not be estopped particularly in
matters involving taxes.

Shauf v CA, 191 SCRA 713 [1980]

Facts:
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of
the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS17109, in
the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. The
application of Loida Q. Shauf was referred to Mr. Anthony Persi, with the applications of other
applicants. Persi felt that her application was quite complete except for a reply to an inquiry form
attached to the application, which raised some questions regarding her work experience. After
long reservation for that position, one Mr. Isarkon was found to be qualified for the position and
that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf was never appointed to the position. Feeling aggrieved by what
she considered a shabby treatment accorded her, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf wrote the U.S. Civil
Service Commission questioning the qualifications of Edward Isakson. Shauf also filed a
complaint with the RTC for the alleged discriminatory acts of respondents Don Detwiler and
Anthony Persi.

Issue/s:
Whether respondents Detwiler and Persi who are officials of another state are immune from
suit.

Ruling:
No, While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by
them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will
require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must
be regarded as against the state itself although it has been formally impleaded. It must be
noted, however, that the rule is not also all-encompassing as to be applicable under all
circumstances. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity
as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are
not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have
been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that
an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on
the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and
property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority
which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent.

Tatad v Garcia, 60 SCAD 480 [1995]

Facts:
Petitioners Francisco Tatad, John Osmena, and Rodolfo Biazon are members of the Philippine
Senate and are suing in their capacities as Senators and as taxpayers. Respondent Jesus
Garcia was then Secretary of the DOTC, while private respondent EDSA LRT CORPORATION,
Ltd. is a private corporation organized under the laws of Hongkong. DOTC planned to construct
a light railway transit line along EDSA. 

Subsequently, RA No. 6957 referred to as the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) was signed by

then President Corazon Aquino which Act provides for two schemes for the financing,
construction and operation of government projects through private initiative and investment:
BOT or Build-Transfer (BT). In accordance with the provisions of RA 6957 and to set the EDSA
LRT III project underway, the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee and the Technical
Committee were formed.

Of the 5 applicants, only the EDSA LRT Consortium “met the requirements of garnering at least
21 points per criteria, except for Legal aspects, and obtaining an overall passing mark of at least
82 points.” The Legal aspects referred to provided that the BOT/BT contractor-applicant meet
the requirements specified in the Constitution and other pertinent laws. 

DOTC and EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., in substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium, entered
into an “An Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA”
under the terms of the BOT Law. Secretary Prado, thereafter, requested presidential approval of
the contract. The request cannot, however, be granted for failure to comply with the
requirements of the BOT Law. In view whereof, Sec. Drilon, the DOTC, and private respondent
re-negotiated the agreement. Thereafter, the parties entered into a “Revised and Restated
Agreement to Build, Lease and Transfer and Light Rail Transit System for EDSA. 

Petitioners argued that the agreement, as amended by the Supplemental Agreement, in so far
as it grants EDSA LRT CORPORATION, LTD., a foreign corporation, the ownership of EDSA
LRT III, a public utility, violates the constitution, and hence, is unconstitutional. They contend
that the EDSA LRT III is a public utility, and the ownership and operation thereof is limited by
the Constitution to Filipino citizens and domestic corporations, not foreign corporations like
private respondent.

Issue/s:
Can respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation own EDSA LRT III; a public
utility?
Ruling:
YES. What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail
stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to
operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by themselves constitute a public utility.
What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public. The right
to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the
facilities thereof. 
While private respondent is the owner of the facilities necessary to operate the EDSA LRT III, it
admits that it is not enfranchised to operate a public utility as per requirement of Section 11 of
Article XII of the Constitution. In view of this incapacity, private respondent and DOTC agreed
that on the completion date, the private respondent will immediately deliver possession of the
LRT system by of lease for 25 years, during which period DOTC shall operate the same as a
common carrier and private respondent shall provide technical maintenance and repair services
to DOTC.
Since DOTC shall operate the EDSA LRT III, it shall assume all the obligations and liabilities of
a common carrier. For this purpose, DOTC shall indemnify and hold harmless private
respondent from any losses, damages, injuries or death which may be claimed in the operation
or implementation of the system, except losses, damages, injury or death due to defects in the
EDSA LRT III on account of the defective condition of equipment or facilities or the defective
maintenance of such equipment facilities.

Presumption of regularity
 Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong
evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption. 
 Performance of official duties are protected by the presumption of good faith and even
mistakes are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by
malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 

Blue Bar Coconut Phil v Tantuico, 163 SCRA 716[1988]

Facts:
Sometime in 1976, respondent Acting Chairman of COA initiated a special audit of coconut end-
user companies, which included, with respect to their Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund
levy collections and the subsidies they have received. Based on the initial findings, the COA
Chair directed Philippine Coconut Authority Chair and Administrator to collect the short levies
and overpaid subsidies, and to apply subsidy claims to the settlement of short levies should the
petitioners fail to remit the amount due, Petitioners now contend that they are outside the ambit
of respondents' "audit" power which is confined to government-owned or controlled
corporations. 

Issue/s: Whether the respondent COA Chairman may disregard the PCA rules and decisions
has became moot. 

Ruling:
The Constitution formally embodies the long established rule that private entities who handle
government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their handking of said
funds by government auditors. Such has been clearly included in Section 2(1) of Article IX-D of
the Constitution: (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity directly or
indirectly from or through the Government which are required by law or the granting institution to
submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity." The SC applies the principle of primary
jurisdiction. The courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal prior to the decision of that question by the
administrative tribunal. 

Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 716

Facts:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in
Olongapo City. Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which
includes the said station.  Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent
residence in the Philippines, as so was private respondent Wyer, who died two years ago. They
were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the
NAVSTA.

The private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time

In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer’s report of
the reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages.
Respondents allege that the letters contained libelous imputations which caused them to be
ridiculed and thus filed for damages against petitioners. 

Issue/s: Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the
acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents

Ruling:
The SC concluded that the petitioners were being sued as officers of the US government. As
they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that
government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that
the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages,
such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the
United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover
the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its
consent.

IV.  Power  of Control, Supervision and Investigation

 
Executive Power of the President
 President is the Chief Administrative Officer of the Government.
 Administrative powers of the President can be implied from his executive power.
Marcos v Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]
Facts:
This case took place when Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was
declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. 

This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue
travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. 
Issue/s: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling:
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
"arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by
executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by
the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief
clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power
to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress,
and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].

The 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.  

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment
is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.] The
President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.

The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. It is a power borne
by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a
power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. More
particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. 

Control, Supervision and Review 

Power of Control
 Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
 Such power extends to all executive officers from cabinet secretary to the lowliest clerk
in the executive department. 
  Such power implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion may be vested by law in the officer of the executive department, bureaus, or
offices of the national government.
 Exercises such power through the executive departments and executive officials.
 Each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of
that department where the President is required by law to exercise. 
 It includes power to detail an executive officer in the Office of the President in the office
of the President or to any executive office, so long as there is no reduction in rank or
salary and not considered as disciplinary action.
 Cannot be countermanded by a department secretary and acts as the President's alter
ego. 

Doctrine of qualified political agency

 The President is not expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person and there is a need for him to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members. 
 All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department.
 Exception: In cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally
 The acts of the department Secretary are presumed to be the acts of the President.

By the authority of the President

Case Digests:
Carpio v Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 [1992]
Facts:
Republic Act No. 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" as the consolidated version of House Bill No.
23614 and Senate Bill No. 463. Following the said Act's approval by President Corazon C.
Aquino. 

Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the law with the view that RA 6975 emasculated the
National Police Commission by limiting its power "to administrative control" over the Philippine
National Police (PNP), thus, "control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom
both the National Police Commission and the PNP were placed. 

Issue/s:
Whether such contention by the petitioner is correct.

Ruling:
The SC ruled in the negative. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest
clerk and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to mean "the
power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of
the latter." 

Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the "Doctrine
of Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his
Cabinet members.

The circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized
Department of Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative realignment that
would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created
under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national
government. 

Pelaez v Auditor-General, 15 SCRA 569 [1965]

Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. 

Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the
present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the
Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit
any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities. 

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section
68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power.  

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under
the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. 

Issue/s:
Whether the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities 

Ruling:
It is untenable. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in
nature. In the language of other courts, it is “strictly a legislative function” or “solely and
exclusively the exercise of legislative power"

If the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by
creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned
resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power
to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local
officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of
control denied to him by the Constitution.

Also, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.

Basing from the above provision, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the
President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by
conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has
over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

Tecson v Salas, 34 SCRA 275 [1970]

Facts:
Jose C. Tecson, Superintendent of Dredging, Bureau of Public Works, was assigned to the
Office of the President to assist in the San Fernando Port Project, reporting directly to
Commodore Santiago Nuval, the Presidential Assistant on Ports and Harbors. Acting by
Presidential Authority, the Executive Secretary, ordered the nullification of Tecson's detail to the
Office of the President.

Tecson filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, arguing that the Salas detail order although
issued by Authority of the President, should be approved by the Budget Commissioner and
CSC. 

Respondent argued that the petitioner's contention would contravene to the generally accepted
principle which recognizes presidential power to control over the executive department.
Furthermore, the temporary assignment of Tecson is not a demotion in rank and salary, neither
considered as disciplinary and does not involve removal. 

Issue/s:
Whether the assignment of herein petitioner on temporary detail to the office of Commodore
Santiago Nuval, Presidential Assistant on Ports and Harbors, by the President of the Philippines
thru the Executive Secretary, constitutes removal from office without cause.

Ruling:
According to paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
department and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. 

The detail  to the Office of the President is unobjectionable. By no stretch of the imagination
could it be considered a removal. It was not even a transfer. Even if it could be so viewed, the
same conclusion would emerge, as such was allowable under the Civil Service Act provision
then in force, so long as there be no reduction in rank or salary, such transfer therefore not
being considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service. Nor is there any
merit to the assertion made in the brief of petitioner that the directive of the Executive Secretary,
acting upon authority of the President, needed the approval of the Civil Service Commission and
the Commissioner of the Budget for its enforcement. Such a thought is repugnant to the very
concept of a single, not a plural, executive in whom is vested the whole panoply of executive
power. It is not only illogical, but it does not make sense, to require as a prerequisite to its
validity the approval of subordinate to an action taken by their superior, the President, who
tinder the Constitution is the Executive, all prerogatives attaching to such branch being
vested in him solely. In that sense, for those discharging purely executive function in the
national government, he lies, gives orders to all and takes orders from none.  

Frache v Hernandez 109 Phil 782 [1960]

Facts:
This is a special action of mandamus instituted in this Court to compel the Secretary of
Commerce and Industry to authorize the payment of the full salaries to which petitioners are
entitled under their old positions in the National Economic Council within the amounts
appropriated for each and every one of them in the new positions integrated for them into the
Bureau of the Census and Statistics in the Appropriation Act of 1958, known as Republic Act
No. 2080.

Director of the Statistical Survey Project requested information from the Commissioner of Civil
Service whether there was need of issuing any appointments in favor of the incumbents of the
integrated positions, calling attention to the fact that said incumbents hold appointments duly
approved by all the offices concerned. The Commissioner of Civil Service replied that there was
no need for new appointments since the appointments of these employees, whose positions
had been integrated, had previously been approved. The Commissioner of the Budget for his
part stated that the integration affected not only the personnel but also the positions, and further
declared that the reduction in their pay could not be effected. 

Secretary of Commerce and Industry persisted in his opinion and refused to make payments as
authorized in the budget and approved by the Cabinet and by the President. 

Issue/s:
Whether refusal by the Secretary to authorize violated the rights and privileges of petitioners as
civil service employees.
  
Ruling:
The petitioners were already employees in the Civil Service at the time of the approval of the
appropriation act for 1958-1959. The various steps culminating in the approval of the integration
in the appropriation act were made with a view to actual integration, without any further need of
new appointments by the Secretary of Commerce and Industry. The integration or transfer of
the positions from the National Economic Council to the Bureau of the Census and Statistics did
not have the effect of depriving petitioners of their status as employees in the Philippine Civil
Service, or make their salaries subject to reduction at the will and by action of the Secretary of
Commerce and Industry. Since the appropriation act carried the same salaries that they used to
receive in the National Economic Council, the legislative intent is clear that it intended to grant
them the same salaries. The Cabinet and the President had authorized the payment of the
salaries in the meanwhile. Their action can not be countermanded by the Secretary of
Commerce and Industry who is a mere subordinate of the President.

Noblejas v Salas, 67 SCRA 47 [1975]

Facts:
Various land titles (Torrens titles) covering lands situated within the Province of Rizal were
amended by increasing the respective areas covered by said titles through corrective
resurveys issued by Land Registration Office headed then by petitioner Noblejas.
Allegedly, however, it turned out that the increases in said various amendments were far in
excess of the respective corresponding real areas of the lands involve, so much so that
even vast portions of lands and waters of the public domain not capable of appropriation by any
private person or entity have been included within the expanded titles. 

Information about such alleged "land grabbing" must have reached the office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, albeit the record does not show when, how and upon whose initiative, for it is
here mutually agreed among all the parties that investigations thereof were conducted by the
office. On various occasions petitioner Noblejas had been subpoenaed by the fiscal and
that he had actually appeared either personally or by counsel in some of said investigations
and had in fact presented in an affidavit explaining his participation in the matter. 

Issue/s:
1. Whether Fiscals Castillo and De Guzman had the authority to sign and file the amended
information adding petitioner as one of the accused.
2. Whether fiscals have superiority over the finding of the Secretary of Justice. 
Ruling:
1. Fiscals may not overrule resolution of the Secretary of Justice exonerating an accused.
Where the exculpatory memorandum of a Provincial Fiscal, — finding that no criminal
liability may be attached to petitioner for any of the land grabbing cases being
prosecuted by said fiscal, — was approved by the Secretary of Justice, the decision
not to prosecute petitioner may be said to be that of the Secretary already, not of the
Provincial Fiscal; and therefore the successor of the Provincial Fiscal would have
neither the personality nor legal authority to review and overrule said decision.
Thus, he cannot subsequently prosecute petitioner for the alleged offense in which the
latter was exonerated, without first securing previous clearance from the Secretary
who exercises the power of supervision and control over fiscals.
2. It is true that a fiscal in exercising his discretion as to whether to prosecute somebody for
an offense performs a quasi-judicial act, the functions that he discharges as an officer of
the government are basically executive. As a matter of fact, Section 83 of the Revised
Administrative Code places him under the "general supervision and control" of the
Department of Justice together with other prosecuting officers and under Section 74 of
the same code, the Secretary of Justice as "Department Secretary shall assume the
burden and responsibility of all activities of the Government under his control and
supervision."
Part of the President;s duty is to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed and the
Secretary of Justice is, by the nature of his office, the principal alter ego of the President
in the performance of such duty. 

Malayan Integrated Industries Corp v CA, 213 SCRA 640 [1992]

Extensive Ent. Corp. v. Sarbro & Co., Inc. 17 SCRA 41 [1966]

Larin v Executive Secretary, 88 SCAD 212 [1997]
Facts:
Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and
he also appears to be a co- accused in two criminal cases for violating Section 268(4) of the
National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 of R.A. 3019. Subsequently petitioner was
convicted and this was reported to the President, the then Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary by the authority of the president issued Memorandum Order 164 creating an
executive committee to investigate the administrative charges.
The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper with regard to the charges against
him, the petitioner complied, and however his statement was that he cannot comment on
the merits of the case for fear of being cited in contempt by the court. Petitioner also
alleged that the committee doesn’t have any jurisdiction over his person, that the case
cannot be validly filed without violating res judicata, his rights against double jeopardy and lastly
to proceed with the investigation would be redundant and oppressive against him. While all this
is pending, the president issued an order for the streamlining of BIR, in which case the
office of the petitioner was abolished by the order. His office being abolished, the petitioner
was not reinstated as an assistant commissioner of BIR, instead another Administrative order
was issued in which it stated that he is being dismissed for being guilty of grave
misconduct in connection to the criminal cases filed against him.

Issue/s:
Whether the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or not. a. Who has the power to discipline the
petitioner 
b. Was due process observed 
c. What is the effect of the petitioners acquittal in the criminal case 
d. Does the president have the power to reorganize BIR e. Was the reorganization done in bad
faith.

Ruling:
The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the category of Career Executive
Service, which is appointed by the president and being a presidential appointee, it follows
that the president have the power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact that the
constitution grants the president the power to appoint and the inherent power to remove,
such power is not without limit. 
Under the Administrative code of 1987, career services are characterized to have security of
tenure, therefore the petitioner is protected from being willfully removed by the president, the
only way that the petitioner can be validly removed is for a valid cause and in accordance with
the procedural due process. According to the Court it found that, although the procedural due
process was followed and complied with the petitioner was not removed for a valid
cause, since to start with the committee was created to investigate the administrative aspect of
the criminal cases being faced by the petitioner at that time. 

As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR, the court ruled that the president has
the authority to do so, as seen in the preamble of the E.O. which stated the legal basis of
its issuance. Though it is admitted that the president had the power to reorganize the BIR, the
court stated that such power is not limitless, the reorganization to be valid must be done in
good faith. In the instant case the court found that the reorganization was done in bad faith or
at least there are indications of bad faith, such as when the E.O. abolished the intelligence
and investigation office and at the same time creating Intelligence and Investigation service to
do the same functions of the abolished office. Most importantly is the non reappointment of
the petitioner, the petitioner being a holder of a career service, should have been prioritized or
preferred in appointing people to new offices created by the reorganization, but in this case the
petitioner was never reappointed instead he was dismissed from service without any separation
benefits at all. The court ruled that the petitioner is reinstated as an assistant commissioner and
is entitled to back wages. 
Camarines Norte Electric Coop v Torres, 91 SCAD 995
Facts:
Petitioner Camarines Norte Electric Coop is an electric cooperative organized under the
provisions of P.D. No. 269. R.A. No. 6938 and R.A. No. 6939. The former is the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines, while the latter created the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)
and vested solely upon the CDA the power to register cooperatives. 
Issue/s:
Ruling:
Police power cannot be invoked to clothe with validity the assailed Memorandum Order No.
409. Police power is the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional
limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged
primarily in the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be
exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies
on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Delegation of legislative powers to the
President is permitted in Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. The
pertinent laws on cooperatives, namely, R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No. 269 as
amended by P.D. No. 1645 do not provide for the President or any other administrative body to
take over the internal management of a cooperative. Memorandum Order No. 409 has no
constitutional and statutory basis. It violates the basic underlying principle enshrined in
Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that cooperatives are democratic organizations and that their
affairs shall be administered by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed upon by
the members. Likewise, it runs counter to the policy set forth in Section 1 of R.A. No. 6939 that
the State shall, except as provided in said Act, maintain a policy of non-interference in the
management and operation of cooperatives.