Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had
not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask
the following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made
in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not
binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new
Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he
submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have
to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under
reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion,
we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original
decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year
after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the
legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after
an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and
they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is
not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has
been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill
of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among
others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect
the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest
which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In
fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules
and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory
and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made
in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such
decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official
Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in
which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and
that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his
vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore
necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision
supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases
and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the
laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble,
though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has
been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it
exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is
not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no
choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the
said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable
by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do
not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the
least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the
government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify
or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of
the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed
by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded
saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337,
355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644,
658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202,
204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-
299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473,
486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839,
878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-
1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744,
1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-
1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923,
1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-
544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852,
854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said
petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a
rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel
the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while
the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private
or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public
at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs.
Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus
proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of
Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to
proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think
that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not
exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances
which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the
present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for
their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this
Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following
its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts
of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by
law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have
general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at
this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the
people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones,
ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word
"shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of
the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due
process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts
of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force
and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts
done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have
put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to
their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic
course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton
v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered
in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of
the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban  9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law,
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative
fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ...
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not
been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available.
But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or
enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary
to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. "
The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that
"the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published
in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 84111 December 22, 1989

JIMMY O. YAOKASIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, SALVADOR M. MISON and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF TACLOBAN, VICENTE D.
YUTANGCO, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This petition questions the power of automatic review of the Commissioner of Customs over the decision of the Collector of Customs
in protest and seizure cases.

On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/ sacks of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V
Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs.

The petitioner presented a sales invoice from the Jordan Trading of Iloilo (Annex A, Petition) to prove that the sugar was purchased
locally. The District Collector of Customs, however, proceeded with the seizure of the bags of sugar.

On June 3 and 6, 1988, show-cause hearings were conducted. On June 7, 1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered the release
of the sugar as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered subject Nine Thousand (9,000) sacks/bags of refined sugar are hereby ordered released to Mr.
Jimmy O. Yaokasin, consignee/claimant and the immediate withdrawal of Customs Guard within its bodega's premises. (p. 276,
Rollo.)

On June 10, 1988, the decision, together with the entire records of the case, were transmitted to, and received by, the
Commissioner of Customs (Annex H, Petition, p. 277, Rollo).

On June 14, 1988, without modifying his decision, the District Collector of Customs ordered the warehouse, wherein the bags of
sugar were stored, to be sealed.

On June 19, 1988, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Board (EIIB) filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Annex I, Petition, p.
278, Rollo), for "further hearing on the merits" (p. 279, Rollo), based on evidence that the seized sugar was of foreign origin.
Petitioner opposed the motion for being merely pro forma and/or that the same was, in effect, a motion for new trial.

Hearing Officer Paula Alcazaren set the Motion for reconsideration for hearing on July 13, 1988.

But before that, or on July 4, 1988, the Commissioner of Customs by "2nd Indorsement" returned to the District Collector of
Customs the:

... folder of Tacloban S.I. No. 06-01 (R.P. vs. 9000 bags/sacks of refined sugar, MR. JIMMY YAOKASIN, consignee/claimant), together
with the proposed decision, for hearing and/or resolution of the government is motion for reconsideration ... . (p. 437, Rollo,
Emphasis Ours.)

On the same date, July 4, 1988, petitioner applied for and secured a writ of replevin from the Regional Trial Court of Leyte (CC 7627,
Branch VII), through a Petition/Complaint for certiorari Prohibition with Replevin and Damages with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order (Annex L, Petition, p. 288, Rollo).

On July 12, 1988, respondent District Collector of Customs filed an Answer assailing the court's jurisdiction. On the same day, the
District Collector and the Commissioner of Customs filed in the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order to annul the July 4, 1988 — "Order Granting Replevin with
Temporary Restraining Order" (CA-G.R. SP NO. 15090; p. 396, Rollo).

On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reconsidered his June 7, 1988 decision, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the undersigned hereby reconsiders his Decision, finds that the 9,000 bags/sacks of refined sugar in question are of
foreign origin, smuggled into the country, and declares them forfeited in favor of the government.

Considering the provision in the quoted Customs Memorandum Order, especially the latter part thereof prohibiting the release of
the articles in question to the claimant, and considering also that the said sacks of sugar are presently stored in the bodega of
claimant, and considering further that there are no facilities for storage in Tacloban City, for security reasons, the Honorable
Commissioner of Customs is respectfully and earnestly urged to order the immediate transfer of the sugar from the said bodega to
any Customs Warehouse, preferably in Manila and to this end to order the setting aside of such sum of money in order to effectively
accomplish this purpose." (p. 11, Rollo.)

Also, on the same day, the Court of Appeals: (a) gave due course to respondent's petition; and (b) restrained Judge Pedro S. Espina,
Regional Trial Court, Leyte, from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 7627, and from enforcing his Order of July 4, 1988.

It is petitioner's contention that the June 7, 1988 decision of the District Collector of Customs became final and executory, in view of
the absence of an appeal therefrom by the "aggrieved party" (himself) within the 15-day period provided for in Sec. 2313 of the
Tariff and Customs Code. Hence, the release of the 9,000 bags of sugar must be upheld.
On the other hand, the District Collector and the Commissioner of Customs argue that since the June 7, 1988 decision is adverse to
the government, the case should go to the Commissioner of Customs on automatic review, pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 20-
87, dated May 18, 1987, of former Acting Commissioner of Customs Alexander Padilla, which provides:

CUSTOMS MEMORANDUM ORDER

NO. 20-87

TO: All Collectors of Customs and Others Concerned

Effective immediately, you are hereby directed to implement strictly the following —

Decisions of the Collector of Customs in seizure and protest cases are subject to review by the Commissioner upon appeal as
provided under existing laws; provided, however, that where a decision of the Collector of Customs in such seizure and protest cases
is adverse to the government it shall automatically be reviewed by the Commissioner of Customs. (PD. No. 1, Annex C.)

In view thereof, no releases in any seizure or like cases may be effected unless and until the decision of the Collector has been
confirmed in writing by the Commissioner of Customs.

For immediate and strict compliance.

(Sgd.) ALEXANDER A. PADILLA

Acting Commissioner of Customs

(p. 436, Rollo; Emphasis Ours)

The memorandum order implements Section 12 (Art. IV, Part. IV, Vol. I) of the Integrated Reorganization Plan (hereafter, "PLAN")
which provides:

12. The Collector of Customs at each principal port of entry shall be the official head of the customs service in his port and district
responsible to the Commissioner. He shall have the authority to take final action on the enforcement of tariff and customs laws
within his collection district and on administrative matters in accordance with Chapter III, Part II of this Plan. Decisions of the
Collector of Customs in seizure and protest cases are subject to review by the Commissioner upon appeal as provided under existing
laws; provided, however, that where a decision of a Collector of Customs in such seizure and protest cases is adverse to the
government, it shall automatically be reviewed by the Commissioner of Customs which, if affirmed, shall automatically be elevated
for final review by the Secretary of Finance; provided, further that if within thirty days from receipt of the records of the case by the
Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of Finance, no decision is rendered by the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of
Finance, the decision under review shall become final and executory. (Emphasis supplied)

In Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 24, 1972, former President Marcos decreed and ordered that the Plan be (4 adopted,
approved, and made as part of the law of the land." Under the 1987 Constitution, "[a]ll existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instruction, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed, or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII). While some provisions of the Plan have ceased to be operative because of
subsequent reorganizations, other provisions, such as Section 12 have not been repealed by subsequent legislation.

Section 12 of the Plan applies to petitioner's shipment of 9,000 bags of sugar. Taxes being the lifeblood of the Government, Section
12, which the Commissioner of Customs in his Customs Memorandum Order No. 20-87, enjoined all collectors to follow strictly, is
intended to protect the interest of the Government in the collection of taxes and customs duties in those seizure and protest cases
which, without the automatic review provided therein, neither the Commissioner of Customs nor the Secretary of Finance would
probably ever know about. Without the automatic review by the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of Finance, a collector
in any of our country's far-flung ports, would have absolute and unbridled discretion to determine whether goods seized by him are
locally produced, hence, not dutiable or of foreign origin, and therefore subject to payment of customs duties and taxes. His
decision, unless appealed by the aggrieved party (the owner of the goods), would become final with 'the no one the wiser except
himself and the owner of the goods. The owner of the goods cannot be expected to appeal the collector's decision when it is
favorable to him. A decision that is favorable to the taxpayer would correspondingly be unfavorable to the Government, but who
will appeal the collector's decision in that case certainly not the collector.

Evidently, it was to cure this anomalous situation (which may have already defrauded our government of huge amounts of
uncollected taxes), that the provision for automatic review by the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of Finance of
unappealed seizure and protest cases was conceived to protect the government against corrupt and conniving customs collectors.

Section 12 of the Plan and Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code do not conflict with each other. They may co-exist. Section
2313 of the Code provides for the procedure for the review of the decision of a collector in seizure and protest cases upon appeal by
the aggrieved party, i.e., the importer or owner of the goods. On the other hand, Section 12 of the Plan refers to the general
procedure in appeals in seizure and protest cases with a special proviso on automatic review when the collector's decision is adverse
to the government. Section 2313 and the proviso in Section 12, although they both relate to the review of seizure and protest cases,
refer to two different situations — when the collector's decision is adverse to the importer or owner of the goods, and when the
decision is adverse to the government.

The decision of the Court in the case of Sy Man vs. Jacinto (93 Phil. 1093 [19531]), which the petitioner invokes as precedent, is riot
in point. In the present case the Acting Commissioner, in issuing the memorandum circular, was directing strict compliance with
an existing provision of law, which mandates automatic review of decisions of collectors in seizure and protest cases which are
adverse to the government. On the other hand, in Sy Man, the memorandum order of the Insular Collector of Customs directed the
elevation of records in seizure and forfeiture cases for automatic review even if he had not been expressly granted such power
under the then existing law.

The objection to the enforcement of Section 12 of the Plan and CMO No. 20-87 on the ground that they had not been published in
the Official Gazette, is not well taken. The Plan, as part of P.D. No. 1, was "adopted, approved and made as part of the law of the
land" and published in Volume 68, No. 40, p. 7797 of the Official Gazette issue of October 2, 1972.

Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires laws to be published in the Official Gazette, does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 which is only
an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates. the customs collectors.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 (an Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette) enumerates what
shall be published in the Official Gazette besides legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines.
Executive and administrative orders and proclamations, shall also be published in the Official Gazette, except such as have no
general applicability." CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance
which is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors). "It need not be published, on the
assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned" (Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27).

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order which we issued in this case is
hereby made permanent. Cost against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Padilla, Jr., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29972 January 26, 1976

ROSARIO CARBONELL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE PONCIO, EMMA INFANTE and RAMON INFANTE, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.

Petitioner seeks a review of the resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special Division of Five) dated October 30, 1968, reversing its
decision of November 2, 1967 (Fifth Division), and its resolution of December 6, 1968 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The dispositive part of the challenged resolution reads:

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration filed on behalf of appellee Emma Infante, is hereby granted and the decision of
November 2, 1967, is hereby annulled and set aside. Another judgement shall be entered affirming in toto that of the court a
quo, dated January 20, 1965, which dismisses the plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclaim.

Without costs.

The facts of the case as follows:

Prior to January 27, 1955, respondent Jose Poncio, a native of the Batanes Islands, was the owner of the parcel of land herein involve
with improvements situated at 179 V. Agan St., San Juan, Rizal, having an area of some one hundred ninety-five (195) square meters,
more or less, covered by TCT No. 5040 and subject to mortgage in favor of the Republic Savings Bank for the sum of P1,500.00.
Petitioner Rosario Carbonell, a cousin and adjacent neighbor of respondent Poncio, and also from the Batanes Islands, lived in the
adjoining lot at 177 V. Agan Street.

Both petitioners Rosario Carbonell and respondent Emma Infante offered to buy the said lot from Poncio (Poncio's Answer, p. 38,
rec. on appeal).

Respondent Poncio, unable to keep up with the installments due on the mortgage, approached petitioner one day and offered to sell
to the latter the said lot, excluding the house wherein respondent lived. Petitioner accepted the offer and proposed the price of
P9.50 per square meter. Respondent Poncio, after having secured the consent of his wife and parents, accepted the price proposed
by petitioner, on the condition that from the purchase price would come the money to be paid to the bank.

Petitioner and respondent Jose Poncio then went to the Republic Savings Bank and secured the consent of the President thereof for
her to pay the arrears on the mortgage and to continue the payment of the installments as they fall due. The amount in arrears
reached a total sum of P247.26. But because respondent Poncio had previously told her that the money, needed was only P200.00,
only the latter amount was brought by petitioner constraining respondent Jose Poncio to withdraw the sum of P47.00 from his bank
deposit with Republic Savings Bank. But the next day, petitioner refunded to Poncio the sum of P47.00.

On January 27, 1955, petitioner and respondent Poncio, in the presence of a witness, made and executed a document in the Batanes
dialect, which, translated into English, reads:

CONTRACT FOR ONE HALF LOT WHICH I BOUGHT FROM

JOSE PONCIO

Beginning today January 27, 1955, Jose Poncio can start living on the lot sold by him to me, Rosario Carbonell, until after one year
during which time he will not pa anything. Then if after said one can he could not find an place where to move his house, he could
still continue occupying the site but he should pay a rent that man, be agreed.

(Sgd) JOSE PONCIO

(Sgd.) ROSARIO CARBONELL
(Sgd) CONSTANCIO MEONADA
Witness

(Pp. 6-7 rec. on appeal).

Thereafter, petitioner asked Atty. Salvador Reyes, also from the Batanes Islands, to prepare the formal deed of sale, which she
brought to respondent Poncio together with the amount of some P400.00, the balance she still had to pay in addition to her
assuming the mortgaged obligation to Republic Savings Bank.

Upon arriving at respondent Jose Poncio's house, however, the latter told petitioner that he could not proceed any more with the
sale, because he had already given the lot to respondent Emma Infants; and that he could not withdraw from his deal with
respondent Mrs. Infante, even if he were to go to jail. Petitioner then sought to contact respondent Mrs. Infante but the latter
refused to see her.

On February 5, 1955, petitioner saw Emma Infante erecting a all around the lot with a gate.

Petitioner then consulted Atty. Jose Garcia, who advised her to present an adverse claim over the land in question with the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Atty. Garcia actually sent a letter of inquiry to the Register of Deeds and demand letters to private
respondents Jose Poncio and Emma Infante.
In his answer to the complaint Poncio admitted "that on January 30, 1955, Mrs. Infante improved her offer and he agreed to sell the
land and its improvements to her for P3,535.00" (pp. 38-40, ROA).

In a private memorandum agreement dated January 31, 1955, respondent Poncio indeed bound himself to sell to his corespondent
Emma Infante, the property for the sum of P2,357.52, with respondent Emma Infante still assuming the existing mortgage debt in
favor of Republic Savings Bank in the amount of P1,177.48. Emma Infante lives just behind the houses of Poncio and Rosario
Carbonell.

On February 2, 1955, respondent Jose Poncio executed the formal deed of sale in favor of respondent Mrs. Infante in the total sum
of P3,554.00 and on the same date, the latter paid Republic Savings Bank the mortgage indebtedness of P1,500.00. The mortgage on
the lot was eventually discharged.

Informed that the sale in favor of respondent Emma Infante had not yet been registered, Atty. Garcia prepared an adverse claim for
petitioner, who signed and swore to an registered the same on February 8, 1955.

The deed of sale in favor of respondent Mrs. Infante was registered only on February 12, 1955. As a consequence thereof, a Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued to her but with the annotation of the adverse claim of petitioner Rosario Carbonell.

Respondent Emma Infante took immediate possession of the lot involved, covered the same with 500 cubic meters of garden soil
and built therein a wall and gate, spending the sum of P1,500.00. She further contracted the services of an architect to build a
house; but the construction of the same started only in 1959 — years after the litigation actually began and during its pendency.
Respondent Mrs. Infante spent for the house the total amount of P11,929.00.

On June 1, 1955, petitioner Rosario Carbonell, thru counsel, filed a second amended complaint against private respondents, praying
that she be declared the lawful owner of the questioned parcel of land; that the subsequent sale to respondents Ramon R. Infante
and Emma L. Infante be declared null and void, and that respondent Jose Poncio be ordered to execute the corresponding deed of
conveyance of said land in her favor and for damages and attorney's fees (pp. 1-7, rec. on appeal in the C.A.).

Respondents first moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that petitioner's claim is unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds, the alleged sale in her favor not being evidenced by a written document (pp. 7-13, rec. on appeal in the C.A.); and
when said motion was denied without prejudice to passing on the question raised therein when the case would be tried on the
merits (p. 17, ROA in the C.A.), respondents filed separate answers, reiterating the grounds of their motion to dismiss (pp. 18-23,
ROA in the C.A.).

During the trial, when petitioner started presenting evidence of the sale of the land in question to her by respondent Poncio, part of
which evidence was the agreement written in the Batanes dialect aforementioned, respondent Infantes objected to the presentation
by petitioner of parole evidence to prove the alleged sale between her and respondent Poncio. In its order of April 26, 1966, the trial
court sustained the objection and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the memorandum presented by petitioner to prove
said sale does not satisfy the requirements of the law (pp. 31-35, ROA in the C.A.).

From the above order of dismissal, petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-11231) which ruled in a decision dated May
12, 1958, that the Statute of Frauds, being applicable only to executory contracts, does not apply to the alleged sale between
petitioner and respondent Poncio, which petitioner claimed to have been partially performed, so that petitioner is entitled to
establish by parole evidence "the truth of this allegation, as well as the contract itself." The order appealed from was thus reversed,
and the case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings (pp. 26-49, ROA in the C.A.).

After trial in the court a quo; a decision was, rendered on December 5, 1962, declaring the second sale by respondent Jose Poncio to
his co-respondents Ramon Infante and Emma Infante of the land in question null and void and ordering respondent Poncio to
execute the proper deed of conveyance of said land in favor of petitioner after compliance by the latter of her covenants under her
agreement with respondent Poncio (pp. 5056, ROA in the C.A.).

On January 23, 1963, respondent Infantes, through another counsel, filed a motion for re-trial to adduce evidence for the proper
implementation of the court's decision in case it would be affirmed on appeal (pp. 56-60, ROA in the C.A.), which motion was
opposed by petitioner for being premature (pp. 61-64, ROA in the C.A.). Before their motion for re-trial could be resolved,
respondent Infantes, this time through their former counsel, filed another motion for new trial, claiming that the decision of the trial
court is contrary to the evidence and the law (pp. 64-78, ROA in the C.A.), which motion was also opposed by petitioner (pp. 78-89,
ROA in the C.A.).

The trial court granted a new trial (pp. 89-90, ROA in the C.A.), at which re-hearing only the respondents introduced additional
evidence consisting principally of the cost of improvements they introduced on the land in question (p. 9, ROA in the C.A.).

After the re-hearing, the trial court rendered a decision, reversing its decision of December 5, 1962 on the ground that the claim of
the respondents was superior to the claim of petitioner, and dismissing the complaint (pp. 91-95, ROA in the C.A.), From this
decision, petitioner Rosario Carbonell appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals (p. 96, ROA in the C.A.).

On November 2, 1967, the Court of Appeals (Fifth Division composed of Justices Magno Gatmaitan, Salvador V. Esguerra and Angle
H. Mojica, speaking through Justice Magno Gatmaitan), rendered judgment reversing the decision of the trial court, declaring
petitioner therein, to have a superior right to the land in question, and condemning the defendant Infantes to reconvey to petitioner
after her reimbursement to them of the sum of P3,000.00 plus legal interest, the land in question and all its improvements
(Appendix "A" of Petition).
Respondent Infantes sought reconsideration of said decision and acting on the motion for reconsideration, the Appellate Court,
three Justices (Villamor, Esguerra and Nolasco) of Special Division of Five, granted said motion, annulled and set aside its decision of
November 2, 1967, and entered another judgment affirming in toto the decision of the court a quo, with Justices Gatmaitan and
Rodriguez dissenting (Appendix "B" of Petition).

Petitioner Rosario Carbonell moved to reconsider the Resolution of the Special Division of Five, which motion was denied by Minute
Resolution of December 6, 1968 (but with Justices Rodriguez and Gatmaitan voting for reconsideration) [Appendix "C" of Petition].

Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

Article 1544, New Civil Code, which is decisive of this case, recites:

If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first
taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should movable property.

Should it be  immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it  in the
Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith (emphasis supplied).

It is essential that the buyer of realty must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale to merit the protection of the second
paragraph of said Article 1544.

Unlike the first and third paragraphs of said Article 1544, which accord preference to the one who first takes possession in good faith
of personal or real property, the second paragraph directs that ownership of immovable property should be recognized in favor of
one "who in good faith first recorded"  his right. Under the first and third paragraph, good faith must characterize the act of anterior
registration (DBP vs. Mangawang, et al., 11 SCRA 405; Soriano, et al. vs. Magale, et al., 8 SCRA 489).

If there is no inscription, what is decisive is prior possession in good faith. If there is inscription, as in the case at bar, prior
registration in good faith is a pre-condition to superior title.

When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio on January 27, 1955, she was the only buyer thereof and the title of Poncio was still in
his name solely encumbered by bank mortgage duly annotated thereon. Carbonell was not aware — and she could not have been
aware — of any sale of Infante as there was no such sale to Infante then. Hence, Carbonell's prior purchase of the land was made in
good faith. Her good faith subsisted and continued to exist when she recorded her adverse claim four (4) days prior to the
registration of Infantes's deed of sale. Carbonell's good faith did not cease after Poncio told her on January 31, 1955 of his second
sale of the same lot to Infante. Because of that information, Carbonell wanted an audience with Infante, which desire underscores
Carbonell's good faith. With an aristocratic disdain unworthy of the good breeding of a good Christian and good neighbor, Infante
snubbed Carbonell like a leper and refused to see her. So Carbonell did the next best thing to protect her right — she registered her
adversed claim on February 8, 1955. Under the circumstances, this recording of her adverse claim should be deemed to have been
done in good faith and should emphasize Infante's bad faith when she registered her deed of sale four (4) days later on February 12,
1955.

Bad faith arising from previous knowledge by Infante of the prior sale to Carbonell is shown by the following facts, the vital
significance and evidenciary effect of which the respondent Court of Appeals either overlooked of failed to appreciate:

(1) Mrs. Infante refused to see Carbonell, who wanted to see Infante after she was informed by Poncio that he sold the lot to Infante
but several days before Infante registered her deed of sale. This indicates that Infante knew — from Poncio and from the bank — of
the prior sale of the lot by Poncio to Carbonell. Ordinarily, one will not refuse to see a neighbor. Infante lives just behind the house
of Carbonell. Her refusal to talk to Carbonell could only mean that she did not want to listen to Carbonell's story that she (Carbonell)
had previously bought the lot from Poncio.

(2) Carbonell was already in possession of the mortgage passbook [not Poncio's saving deposit passbook — Exhibit "1" — Infantes]
and Poncio's copy of the mortgage contract, when Poncio sold the lot Carbonell who, after paying the arrearages of Poncio, assumed
the balance of his mortgaged indebtedness to the bank, which in the normal course of business must have necessarily informed
Infante about the said assumption by Carbonell of the mortgage indebtedness of Poncio. Before or upon paying in full the mortgage
indebtedness of Poncio to the Bank. Infante naturally must have demanded from Poncio the delivery to her of his mortgage
passbook as well as Poncio's mortgage contract so that the fact of full payment of his bank mortgage will be entered therein; and
Poncio, as well as the bank, must have inevitably informed her that said mortgage passbook could not be given to her because it was
already delivered to Carbonell.

If Poncio was still in possession of the mortgage passbook and his copy of the mortgage contract at the time he executed a deed of
sale in favor of the Infantes and when the Infantes redeemed his mortgage indebtedness from the bank, Poncio would have
surrendered his mortgage passbook and his copy of the mortgage contract to the Infantes, who could have presented the same as
exhibits during the trial, in much the same way that the Infantes were able to present as evidence Exhibit "1" — Infantes, Poncio's
savings deposit passbook, of which Poncio necessarily remained in possession as the said deposit passbook was never involved in the
contract of sale with assumption of mortgage. Said savings deposit passbook merely proves that Poncio had to withdraw P47.26,
which amount was tided to the sum of P200.00 paid by Carbonell for Poncio's amortization arrearages in favor of the bank on
January 27, 1955; because Carbonell on that day brought with her only P200.00, as Poncio told her that was the amount of his
arrearages to the bank. But the next day Carbonell refunded to Poncio the sum of P47.26.
(3) The fact that Poncio was no longer in possession of his mortgage passbook and that the said mortgage passbook was already in
possession of Carbonell, should have compelled Infante to inquire from Poncio why he was no longer in possession of the mortgage
passbook and from Carbonell why she was in possession of the same (Paglago, et. al vs. Jara et al 22 SCRA 1247, 1252-1253). The
only plausible and logical reason why Infante did not bother anymore to make such injury , w because in the ordinary course of
business the bank must have told her that Poncio already sold the lot to Carbonell who thereby assumed the mortgage indebtedness
of Poncio and to whom Poncio delivered his mortgage passbook. Hoping to give a semblance of truth to her pretended good faith,
Infante snubbed Carbonell's request to talk to her about the prior sale to her b Poncio of the lot. As aforestated, this is not the
attitude expected of a good neighbor imbued with Christian charity and good will as well as a clear conscience.

(4) Carbonell registered on February 8, 1955 her adverse claim, which was accordingly annotated on Poncio's title, four [4] days
before Infante registered on February 12, 1955 her deed of sale executed on February 2, 1955. Here she was again on notice of the
prior sale to Carbonell. Such registration of adverse claim is valid and effective (Jovellanos vs. Dimalanta, L-11736-37, Jan. 30, 1959,
105 Phil. 1250-51).

(5) In his answer to the complaint filed by Poncio, as defendant in the Court of First Instance, he alleged that both Mrs. Infante and
Mrs. Carbonell offered to buy the lot at P15.00 per square meter, which offers he rejected as he believed that his lot is worth at least
P20.00 per square meter. It is therefore logical to presume that Infante was told by Poncio and consequently knew of the offer of
Carbonell which fact likewise should have put her on her guard and should have compelled her to inquire from Poncio whether or
not he had already sold the property to Carbonell.

As recounted by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, then Associate Justice, in the preceding case of Rosario Carbonell vs. Jose Poncio,
Ramon Infante and Emma Infante (1-11231, May 12, 1958), Poncio alleged in his answer:

... that he had consistently turned down several offers, made by plaintiff, to buy the land in question, at P15 a square meter, for he
believes that it is worth not less than P20 a square meter; that Mrs. Infante, likewise, tried to buy the land at P15 a square meter;
that, on or about January 27, 1955, Poncio was advised by plaintiff that should she decide to buy the property at P20 a square meter,
she would allow him to remain in the property for one year; that plaintiff then induced Poncio to sign a document, copy of which if
probably the one appended to the second amended complaint; that Poncio signed it 'relying upon the statement of the plaintiff that
the document was a permit for him to remain in the premises in the event defendant decided to sell the property to the plaintiff at
P20.00 a square meter'; that on January 30, 1955, Mrs. Infante improved her offer and agreed to sell the land and its improvement to
her for P3,535.00; that Poncio has not lost 'his mind,' to sell his property, worth at least P4,000, for the paltry sum P1,177.48, the
amount of his obligation to the Republic Saving s Bank; and that plaintiff's action is barred by the Statute of Frauds. ... (pp. 38-40,
ROA, emphasis supplied).

II

EXISTENCE OF THE PRIOR SALE TO CARBONELL

DULY ESTABLISHED

(1) In his order dated April 26, 1956 dismissing the complaint on the ground that the private document Exhibit "A" executed by
Poncio and Carbonell and witnessed by Constancio Meonada captioned "Contract for One-half Lot which I Bought from Jose Poncio,"
was not such a memorandum in writing within the purview of the Statute of Frauds, the trial judge himself recognized the fact of the
prior sale to Carbonell when he stated that "the memorandum in question merely states that Poncio is allowed to stay in the
property which he had sold to the plaintiff. There is no mention of the reconsideration, a description of the property and such other
essential elements of the contract of sale. There is nothing in the memorandum which would tend to show even in the slightest
manner that it was intended to be an evidence of contract sale. On the contrary, from the terms of the memorandum, it tends to
show that the sale of the property in favor of the plaintiff is already an accomplished act. By the very contents of the memorandum
itself, it cannot therefore, be considered to be the memorandum which would show that a sale has been made by Poncio in favor of
the plaintiff" (p. 33, ROA, emphasis supplied). As found by the trial court, to repeat the said memorandum states "that Poncio is
allowed to stay in the property which he had sold to the plaintiff ..., it tends to show that the sale  of the property in favor of the
plaintiff is already an accomplished act..."

(2) When the said order was appealed to the Supreme Court by Carbonell in the previous case of Rosario Carbonell vs. Jose Poncio,
Ramon Infante and Emma Infante
(L-11231, supra), Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, then Associate Justice, speaking for a unanimous Court, reversed the aforesaid
order of the trial court dismissing the complaint, holding that because the complaint alleges and the plaintiff claims that the contract
of sale was partly performed, the same is removed from the application of the Statute of Frauds and Carbonell should be allowed to
establish by parol evidence the truth of her allegation of partial performance of the contract of sale, and further stated:

Apart from the foregoing, there are in the case at bar several circumstances indicating that plaintiff's claim might not be entirely
devoid of factual basis. Thus, for instance,  Poncio admitted in his answer that plaintiff had offered several times to purchase his land.

Again, there is Exhibit A, a document signed by the defendant. It is in the Batanes dialect, which, according to plaintiff's
uncontradicted evidence, is the one spoken by Poncio, he being a native of said region. Exhibit A states that Poncio would stay in the
land sold by him to plaintiff for one year, from January 27, 1955, free of charge, and that, if he cannot find a place where to transfer
his house thereon, he may remain upon. Incidentally, the allegation in Poncio's answer to the effect that he signed Exhibit A under
the belief that it "was a permit for him to remain in the premises in the" that "he decided to sell the property" to the plaintiff at P20 a
sq. m." is, on its face, somewhat difficult to believe. Indeed, if he had not decided as yet to sell the land to plaintiff, who had never
increased her offer of P15 a square meter, there was no reason for Poncio to get said permit from her. Upon the other hand, if
plaintiff intended to mislead Poncio, she would have caused Exhibit A to be drafted, probably, in English , instead of taking the
trouble of seeing to it that it was written precisely in his native dialect, the Batanes. Moreover, Poncio's signature on Exhibit A
suggests that he is neither illiterate nor so ignorant as to sign document without reading its contents, apart from the fact that
Meonada had read Exhibit A to him and given him a copy thereof, before he signed thereon, according to Meonada's uncontradicted
testimony.

Then, also, defendants say in their brief:

The only allegation in plaintiff's complaint that bears any relation to her claim that there has been partial performance of the
supposed contract of sale, is the notation of the sum of P247.26 in the bank book of defendant Jose Poncio. The noting or jotting
down of the sum of P247.26 in the bank book of Jose Poncio does not prove the fact that the said amount was the purchase price of
the property in question. For all we knew, the sum of P247.26 which plaintiff claims to have paid to the Republic Savings Bank for the
account of the defendant, assuming that the money paid to the Republic Savings Bank came from the plaintiff, was the result of
some usurious loan or accomodation, rather than earnest money or part payment of the land. Neither is it competent or satisfactory
evidence to prove the conveyance of the land in question the fact that the bank book account of Jose Poncio happens to be in the
possession of the plaintiff. (Defendants-Appellees' brief, pp. 25-26).

How shall We know why Poncio's bank deposit book is in plaintiffs possession, or whether there is any relation between the P247.26
entry therein and the partial payment of P247.26 allegedly made by plaintiff to Poncio on account of the price of his land, if we do
not allow the plaintiff to explain it on the witness stand? Without expressing any opinion on the merits of plaintiff's claim, it is clear,
therefore, that she is entitled , legally as well as from the viewpoint of equity, to an opportunity to introduce parol evidence in
support of the allegations of her second amended complaint. (pp. 46-49, ROA, emphasis supplied).

(3) In his first decision of December 5, 1962 declaring null and void the sale in favor of the Infantes and ordering Poncio to execute a
deed of conveyance in favor of Carbonell, the trial judge found:

... A careful consideration of the contents of Exh. 'A' show to the satisfaction of the court that the sale of the parcel of land in
question by the defendant Poncio in favor of the plaintiff was covered therein and that the said Exh. "a' was also executed to allow
the defendant to continue staying in the premises for the stated period. It will be noted that Exh. 'A' refers to a lot 'sold by him to me'
and having been written originally in a dialect well understood by the defendant Poncio, he signed the said Exh. 'A' with a full
knowledge and consciousness of the terms and consequences thereof. This therefore, corroborates the testimony of the plaintiff
Carbonell that the sale of the land was made by Poncio. It is further pointed out that there was a partial performance of the verbal
sale executed by Poncio in favor of the plaintiff, when the latter paid P247.26 to the Republic Savings Bank on account of Poncio's
mortgage indebtedness. Finally, the possession by the plaintiff of the defendant Poncio's passbook of the Republic Savings Bank also
adds credibility to her testimony. The defendant contends on the other hand that the testimony of the plaintiff, as well as her
witnesses, regarding the sale of the land made by Poncio in favor of the plaintiff is inadmissible under the provision of the Statute of
Fraud based on the argument that the note Exh. "A" is not the note or memorandum referred to in the to in the Statute of Fraud.
The defendants argue that Exh. "A" fails to comply with the requirements of the Statute of Fraud to qualify it as the note or
memorandum referred to therein and open the way for the presentation of parole evidence to prove the fact contained in the note
or memorandum. The defendant argues that there is even no description of the lot referred to in the note, especially when the note
refers to only one half lot. With respect to the latter argument of the Exhibit 'A', the court has arrived at the conclusion that there is a
sufficient description of the lot referred to in Exh. 'A' as none other than the parcel of land occupied by the defendant Poncio and
where he has his improvements erected. The Identity of the parcel of land involved herein is sufficiently established by the contents of
the note Exh. "A". For a while, this court had that similar impression but after a more and thorough consideration of the context in
Exh. 'A' and for the reasons stated above, the Court has arrived at the conclusion stated earlier (pp. 52-54, ROA, emphasis supplied).

(4) After re-trial on motion of the Infantes, the trial Judge rendered on January 20, 1965 another decision dismissing the complaint,
although he found

1. That on January 27, 1955, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant Poncio a parcel of land with an area of 195 square
meters,  more or less, covered by TCT No. 5040 of the Province of Rizal, located at San Juan del Monte, Rizal, for the price of P6.50
per square meter;

2. That the purchase made by the  plaintiff was not reduced to writing except for a short note or memorandum Exh. A, which also
recited that the defendant Poncio would be allowed to continue his stay in the premises, among other things, ... (pp. 91-92, ROA,
emphasis supplied).

From such factual findings, the trial Judge confirms the due execution of Exhibit "A", only that his legal conclusion is that it is not
sufficient to transfer ownership (pp. 93-94, ROA).

(5) In the first decision of November 2, 1967 of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals composed of Justices Esguerra (now
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court), Gatmaitan and Mojica, penned by Justice Gatmaitan, the Court of Appeals found that:

... the testimony of Rosario Carbonell not having at all been attempted to be disproved by defendants, particularly Jose Poncio, and
corroborated as it is by the private document in Batanes dialect, Exhibit A, the testimony being to the effect that between herself and
Jose there had been celebrated a sale of the property excluding the house for the price of P9.50 per square meter, so much so that on
faith of that, Rosario had advanced the sum of P247.26 and binding herself to pay unto Jose the balance of the purchase price after
deducting the indebtedness to the Bank and since the wording of Exhibit A, the private document goes so far as to describe their
transaction as one of sale, already consummated between them, note the part tense used in the phrase, "the lot sold by him to
me" and going so far even as to state that from that day onwards, vendor would continue to live therein, for one year, 'during which
time he will not pay anything' this can only mean that between Rosario and Jose, there had been a true contract of sale,
consummated by delivery constitutum possession, Art. 1500, New Civil Code; vendor's possession having become converted from
then on, as a mere tenant of vendee, with the special privilege of not paying rental for one year, — it is true that the sale by Jose
Poncio to Rosario Carbonell corroborated documentarily only by Exhibit A could not have been registered at all, but it was a valid
contract nonetheless, since under our law, a contract sale is consensual, perfected by mere consent, Couto v. Cortes, 8 Phil 459, so
much so that under the New Civil Code, while a sale of an immovable is ordered to be reduced to a public document, Art. 1358, that
mandate does not render an oral sale of realty invalid, but merely incapable of proof, where still executory and action is brought and
resisted for its performance, 1403, par. 2, 3; but where already wholly or partly executed or where even if not yet, it is evidenced by a
memorandum, in any case where evidence to further demonstrate is presented and admitted as the case was here, then the oral
sale becomes perfectly good, and becomes a good cause of action not only to reduce it to the form of a public document, but even to
enforce the contract in its entirety, Art. 1357; and thus it is that what we now have is a case wherein on the one hand Rosario
Carbonell has proved that she had an anterior sale, celebrated in her favor on 27 January, 1955,  Exhibit A, annotated as an adverse
claim on 8 February, 1955, and on other, a sale is due form in favor of Emma L. Infante on 2 February, 1955, Exhibit 3-Infante, and
registered in due form with title unto her issued on 12 February, 1955; the vital question must now come on which of these two
sales should prevail; ... (pp. 74-76, rec., emphasis supplied).

(6) In the resolution dated October 30, 1968 penned by then Court of Appeals Justice Esguerra (now a member of this Court),
concurred in by Justices Villamor and Nolasco, constituting the majority of a Special Division of Five, the Court of Appeals, upon
motion of the Infantes, while reversing the decision of November 2, 1967 and affirming the decision of the trial court of January 20,
1965 dismissing plaintiff's complaint, admitted the existence and genuineness of Exhibit "A", the private memorandum dated January
27, 1955, although it did not consider the same as satisfying "the essential elements of a contract of sale," because it "neither
specifically describes the property and its boundaries, nor mention its certificate of title number, nor states the price certain to be
paid, or contrary to the express mandate of Articles 1458 and 1475 of the Civil Code.

(7) In his dissent concurred in by Justice Rodriguez, Justice Gatmaitan maintains his decision of November 2, 1967 as well as his
findings of facts therein, and reiterated that the private memorandum Exhibit "A", is a perfected sale, as a sale is consensual and
consummated by mere consent, and is binding on and effective between the parties. This statement of the principle is correct [pp.
89-92, rec.].

III

ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION OR PRICE FOR THE SALE

IN FAVOR OF CARBONELL

It should be emphasized that the mortgage on the lot was about to be foreclosed by the bank for failure on the part of Poncio to pay
the amortizations thereon. To forestall the foreclosure and at the same time to realize some money from his mortgaged lot, Poncio
agreed to sell the same to Carbonell at P9.50 per square meter, on condition that Carbonell [1] should pay (a) the amount of P400.00
to Poncio and 9b) the arrears in the amount of P247.26 to the bank; and [2] should assume his mortgage indebtedness. The bank
president agreed to the said sale with assumption of mortgage in favor of Carbonell an Carbonell accordingly paid the arrears of
P247.26. On January 27, 1955, she paid the amount of P200.00 to the bank because that was the amount that Poncio told her as his
arrearages and Poncio advanced the sum of P47.26, which amount was refunded to him by Carbonell the following day. This
conveyance was confirmed that same day, January 27, 1955, by the private document, Exhibit "A", which was prepared in the
Batanes dialect by the witness Constancio Meonada, who is also from Batanes like Poncio and Carbonell.

The sale did not include Poncio's house on the lot. And Poncio was given the right to continue staying on the land without paying any
rental for one year, after which he should pay rent if he could not still find a place to transfer his house. All these terms are part of
the consideration of the sale to Carbonell.

It is evident therefore that there was ample consideration, and not merely the sum of P200.00, for the sale of Poncio to Carbonell of
the lot in question.

But Poncio, induced by the higher price offered to him by Infante, reneged on his commitment to Carbonell and told Carbonell, who
confronted him about it, that he would not withdraw from his deal with Infante even if he is sent to jail The victim, therefore, "of
injustice and outrage is the widow Carbonell and not the Infantes, who without moral compunction exploited the greed and
treacherous nature of Poncio, who, for love of money and without remorse of conscience, dishonored his own plighted word to
Carbonell, his own cousin.

Inevitably evident therefore from the foregoing discussion, is the bad faith of Emma Infante from the time she enticed Poncio to
dishonor his contract with Carbonell, and instead to sell the lot to her (Infante) by offering Poncio a much higher price than the price
for which he sold the same to Carbonell. Being guilty of bad faith, both in taking physical possession of the lot and in recording their
deed of sale, the Infantes cannot recover the value of the improvements they introduced in the lot. And after the filing by Carbonell
of the complaint in June, 1955, the Infantes had less justification to erect a building thereon since their title to said lot is seriously
disputed by Carbonell on the basis of a prior sale to her.

With respect to the claim of Poncio that he signed the document Exhibit "A" under the belief that it was a permit for him to remain
in the premises in ease he decides to sell the property to Carbonell at P20.00 per square meter, the observation of the Supreme
Court through Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion in G.R. No. L-11231, supra, bears repeating:

... Incidentally, the allegation in Poncio's answer to the effect that he signed Exhibit A under the belief that it 'was a permit for him to
remain in the premises in the event that 'he decided to sell the property' to the plaintiff at P20.00 a sq. m is, on its face, somewhat
difficult to believe. Indeed, if he had not decided as yet to sell that land to plaintiff, who had never increased her offer of P15 a
square meter, there as no reason for Poncio to get said permit from her. Upon the they if plaintiff intended to mislead Poncio, she
would have Exhibit A to be drafted, probably, in English, instead of taking the trouble of seeing to it that it was written precisely in
his native dialect, the Batanes. Moreover, Poncio's signature on Exhibit A suggests that he is neither illiterate nor so ignorant as to
sign a document without reading its contents, apart from the fact that Meonada had read Exhibit A to him-and given him a copy
thereof, before he signed thereon, according to Meonada's uncontradicted testimony. (pp. 46-47, ROA).

As stressed by Justice Gatmaitan in his first decision of November 2, 1965, which he reiterated in his dissent from the resolution of
the majority of the Special Division. of Five on October 30, 1968, Exhibit A, the private document in the Batanes dialect, is a valid
contract of sale between the parties, since sale is a consensual contract and is perfected by mere consent (Couto vs. Cortes, 8 Phil.
459). Even an oral contract of realty is all between the parties and accords to the vendee the right to compel the vendor to execute
the proper public document As a matter of fact, Exhibit A, while merely a private document, can be fully or partially performed, to it
from the operation of the statute of frauds. Being a all consensual contract, Exhibit A effectively transferred the possession of the lot
to the vendee Carbonell by constitutum possessorium  (Article 1500, New Civil Code); because thereunder the vendor Poncio
continued to retain physical possession of the lot as tenant of the vendee and no longer as knew thereof. More than just the signing
of Exhibit A by Poncio and Carbonell with Constancio Meonada as witness to fact the contract of sale, the transition was further
confirmed when Poncio agreed to the actual payment by at Carbonell of his mortgage arrearages to the bank on January 27, 1955
and by his consequent delivery of his own mortgage passbook to Carbonell. If he remained owner and mortgagor, Poncio would not
have surrendered his mortgage passbook to' Carbonell.

IV

IDENTIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE DISPUTED LOT IN THE MEMORANDUM EXHIBIT "A"

The claim that the memorandum Exhibit "A" does not sufficiently describe the disputed lot as the subject matter of the sale, was
correctly disposed of in the first decision of the trial court of December 5, 1962, thus: "The defendant argues that there is even no
description of the lot referred to in the note (or memorandum), especially when the note refers to only one-half lot. With respect to
the latter argument of the defendant, plaintiff points out that one- half lot was mentioned in Exhibit 'A' because the original
description carried in the title states that it was formerly part of a bigger lot and only segregated later. The explanation is tenable, in
(sic) considering the time value of the contents of Exh. 'A', the court has arrived at the conclusion that there is sufficient description
of the lot referred to in Exh. As none other than the parcel of lot occupied by the defendant Poncio and where he has his
improvements erected. The Identity of the parcel of land involved herein is sufficiently established by the contents of the note Exh.
'A'. For a while, this court had that similar impression but after a more and through consideration of the context in Exh. 'A' and for
the reasons stated above, the court has arrived to (sic) the conclusion stated earlier" (pp. 53-54, ROA).

Moreover, it is not shown that Poncio owns another parcel with the same area, adjacent to the lot of his cousin Carbonell and
likewise mortgaged by him to the Republic Savings Bank. The transaction therefore between Poncio and Carbonell can only refer and
does refer to the lot involved herein. If Poncio had another lot to remove his house, Exhibit A would not have stipulated to allow him
to stay in the sold lot without paying any rent for one year and thereafter to pay rental in case he cannot find another place to
transfer his house.

While petitioner Carbonell has the superior title to the lot, she must however refund to respondents Infantes the amount of
P1,500.00, which the Infantes paid to the Republic Savings Bank to redeem the mortgage.

It appearing that the Infantes are possessors in bad faith, their rights to the improvements they introduced op the disputed lot are
governed by Articles 546 and 547 of the New Civil Code. Their expenses consisting of P1,500.00 for draining the property, filling it
with 500 cubic meters of garden soil, building a wall around it and installing a gate and P11,929.00 for erecting a b ' bungalow
thereon, are useful expenditures, for they add to the value of the property (Aringo vs. Arenas, 14 Phil. 263; Alburo vs. Villanueva, 7
Phil. 277; Valencia vs. Ayala de Roxas, 13 Phil. 45).

Under the second paragraph of Article 546, the possessor in good faith can retain the useful improvements unless the person who
defeated him in his possession refunds him the amount of such useful expenses or pay him the increased value the land may have
acquired by reason thereof. Under Article 547, the possessor in good faith has also the right to remove the useful improvements if
such removal can be done without damage to the land, unless the person with the superior right elects to pay for the useful
improvements or reimburse the expenses therefor under paragraph 2 of Article 546. These provisions seem to imply that the
possessor in bad faith has neither the right of retention of useful improvements nor the right to a refund for useful expenses.

But, if the lawful possessor can retain the improvements introduced by the possessor in bad faith for pure luxury or mere pleasure
only by paying the value thereof at the time he enters into possession (Article 549 NCC), as a matter of equity, the Infantes, although
possessors in bad faith, should be allowed to remove the aforesaid improvements, unless petitioner Carbonell chooses to pay for
their value at the time the Infantes introduced said useful improvements in 1955 and 1959. The Infantes cannot claim
reimbursement for the current value of the said useful improvements; because they have been enjoying such improvements for
about two decades without paying any rent on the land and during which period herein petitioner Carbonell was deprived of its
possession and use.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE SPECIAL DIVISION OF FIVE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OCTOBER 30, 1968 IS HEREBY
REVERSED; PETITIONER ROSARIO CARBONELL IS HEREBY DECLARED TO HAVE THE SUPERIOR RIGHT TO THE LAND IN QUESTION AND
IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO REIMBURSE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS INFANTES THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P1,500.00) WITHIN THREE (3) MONTHS FROM THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION; AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL IS HEREBY
DIRECTED TO CANCEL TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 37842 ISSUED IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS INFANTES
COVERING THE DISPUTED LOT, WHICH CANCELLED TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 5040 IN THE NAME OF JOSE PONCIO, AND
TO ISSUE A NEW TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER ROSARIO CARBONELL UPON PRESENTATION OF PROOF
OF PAYMENT BY HER TO THE INFANTES OF THE AFORESAID AMOUNT OF ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P1,500.00).

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS INFANTES MAY REMOVE THEIR AFOREMENTIONED USEFUL IMPROVEMENTS FROM THE LOT WITHIN THREE
(3) MONTHS FROM THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION, UNLESS THE PETITIONER ROSARIO CARBONELL ELECTS TO ACQUIRE THE SAME
AND PAYS THE INFANTES THE AMOUNT OF THIRTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY-NINE PESOS (P13,429.00) WITHIN
THREE (3) MONTHS FROM THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION. SHOULD PETITIONER CARBONELL FAIL TO PAY THE SAID AMOUNT
WITHIN THE AFORESTATED PERIOD OF THREE (3) MONTHS FROM THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION, THE PERIOD OF THREE (3)
MONTHS WITHIN WHICH THE RESPONDENTS INFANTES MAY REMOVE THEIR AFOREMENTIONED USEFUL IMPROVEMENTS SHALL
COMMENCE FROM THE EXPIRATION OF THE THREE (3) MONTHS GIVEN PETITIONER CARBONELL TO PAY FOR THE SAID USEFUL
IMPROVEMENTS.

WITH COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

Castro, C.J, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984

ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of
Camarines Norte, now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V.
ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order
No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the  confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from
one province to another.

Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2,
1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.

They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised
Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle
issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary
command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the LIvestock
inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.

In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were
confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial
veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no
carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see
fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).

Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery
(Annex 1).

The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at
P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The replevin order could not be executed by the sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge
Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of
cause of action.

The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic
Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a
penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen
days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of
Education, 110 Phil. 150.)

The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales
decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad
(1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.)

Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to
six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000, was acquitted by this Court because the circular was published in the Official
Gazette three months after his conviction. He was not bound by the circular.

That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a
penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette
before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.

The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security
System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the respondents, do not involve the enforcement of any penal regulation.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability should be published in the
Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general
applicability and legal effect."

Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head and
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated". (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)

In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs
Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be
cognizant of such an executive order.

It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The
recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because
they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good
faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside.
Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as
owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Escolin, JJ., concur.

De Castro, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-62243 October 12, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. REGINO VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch I, and
BENITO GO BIO, JR., respondents.

RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in Criminal Case No. 5396 in the then
Court of First Instance of Zambales, presided by respondent judge. The information reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

That on or about and during the second week of May 1979, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, guaranteeing the authenticity and genuineness of the same and with intent to defraud
one Filipinas Tan by means of false pretenses and pretending to have sufficient funds deposited in the Bank of the Philippine Island,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Bank of Philippine Island Check No. D-357726 in the amount of
P200,000.00 Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that he has no sufficient funds at the Bank of the Philippine Island and
upon presentation of the said check to the bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the said accused has
no sufficient funds with the said bank and despite repeated demands made by Filipinas Tan on the accused to redeem the said check
or pay the amount of P200,000.00, said accused failed and continues to fail to redeem the said check or to pay the said amount, to
the damage and prejudice of said Filipinas Tan in the aforementioned amount of P200,000.00 Philippine Currency. (pp. 23-24, Rollo)

Before he could be arraigned respondent Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that the information did
not charge an offense, pointing out that at the alleged commission of the offense, which was about the second week of May 1979,
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 has not yet taken effect.

The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of the check, which is on September
26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense; and that assuming that the effectivity of the law — Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
— is on June 29, 1979, considering that the offense was committed on September 26, 1979, the said law is applicable.

In his reply, private respondent Go Bio, Jr. submits that what Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 penalizes is not the fact of the dishonor of
the check but the act of making or drawing and issuing a check without sufficient funds or credit.

Resolving the motion, respondent judge granted the same and cancelled the bail bond of the accused. In its order of August 23,
1982, respondent judge said: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The Court finds merit to the contention that the accused cannot be held liable for bouncing checks prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 although the check may have matured after the effectivity of the said law. No less than the Minister of Justice
decreed that the date of the drawing or making and issuance of the bouncing check is the date to reckon with and not on the date of
the maturity of the check. (Resolution No. 67, S. 1981, People's Car vs. Eduardo N. Tan, Feb. 3, 1981; Resolution No. 192, S. 1981,
Ricardo de Guia vs. Agapito Miranda, March 20, 1981).

Hence, the Court believes that although the accused can be prosecuted for swindling (Estafa, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code),
the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the above entitled case. (pp. 49- 50, Rollo)

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner submitting for review respondent judge's dismissal of the criminal action
against private respondent Go Bio, Jr. for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

Petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official Gazette. Fifteen (15) days
therefrom would be April 24, 1979, or several days before respondent Go Bio, Jr. issued the questioned check around the second
week of May 1979; and that respondent judge should not have taken into account the date of release of the Gazette for circulation
because Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that for the purpose of ascertaining the date of effectivity of a law
that needed publication, "the Gazette is conclusively presumed to be published on the day indicated therein as the date of issue."

Private respondent Go Bio, Jr. argues that although Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the Official Gazette issue of April 9,
1979, nevertheless, the same was released only on June 14, 1979 and, considering that the questioned check was issued about the
second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 because it was not yet released for circulation
at the time.

We uphold the dismissal by the respondent judge of the criminal action against the private respondent.

The Solicitor General admitted the certification issued by Ms. Charito A. Mangubat, Copy Editor of the Official Gazette Section of the
Government Printing Office, stating-têñ.£îhqwâ£

This is to certify that Volume 75, No. 15, of the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official Gazette was officially released for circulation on June
14, 1979. (p. 138, Rollo)

It is therefore, certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June 14, 1979 and not on the printed date April 9,
1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was the date of publication of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Before the public may be bound by
its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents and/or its
penalties. For, if a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be
violated and, consequently, the accused could not have committed the alleged crime.

The effectivity clause of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 specifically states that "This Act shall take effect fifteen days after publication in
the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, that is, to make known
to the people in general. If the Batasang Pambansa had intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of
reference in determining the effectivity of the statute in question, then it could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

When private respondent Go Bio, Jr. committed the act, complained of in the Information as criminal, in May 1979, there was then
no law penalizing such act. Following the special provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979.
As a matter of fact, in May 1979, there was no law to be violated and, consequently, respondent Go Bio, Jr. did not commit any
violation thereof.

With respect to the allegation of petitioner that the offense was committed on September 26, 1979 when the check was presented
for encashment and was dishonored by the bank, suffice it to say that the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of
a bouncing check and not only the fact of its dishonor. The title of the law itself states:

AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.

and, Sections 1 and 2 of said Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds ... shall be punished ...

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes
or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee
bank.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds ... . (Emphasis supplied)

ACCORDINGLY, the order of respondent judge dated August 23, 1982 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 86675 December 19, 1989

MRCA, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Judge, Regional Trial court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 168,
Pasig, M.M., SPOUSES DOMINGO SEBASTIAN, JR. & LILIA TIOSECO SEBASTIAN, and EXPECTACION P. TIOSECO, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

The petitioner prays this Court to set aside the decision promulgated on January 18, 1989 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP
15745, affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as the
prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses
sought to be recovered by it from the defendants, but left them "to the discretion of this Honorable Court" or "to be proven during
the trial."
Invoking the decision of this Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562, the private
respondents (defendants in Civil Case No. 55740 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, entitled MRCA, Inc. vs. Spouses
Domingo Sebastian, Jr., et al." filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on July 15, 1988. The petitioner opposed the motion, but the
trial court granted it in its order of August 10, 1988 (p. 54, Rollo). The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court, hence, this petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was
filed, the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its
non-observance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and, that it should not apply to the present case because the
petitioner herein (plaintiff in the trial court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive the government of the proper docketing fee, unlike
the Manchester case where enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of the complaint, but the amounts were not
mentioned in the prayer thereof, to mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid.

Petitioner's argument regarding the need for publication of the Manchester ruling in the Official Gazette before it may be applied to
other cases is not well taken. As pointed out by the private respondents in their comment on the petition, publication in the Official
Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule of procedure, for "it is a doctrine well
established that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it does not affect
or change vested rights." (Aguillon vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 508). In a later case, this Court held thus:

It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to
that extent. As the resolution of October 1, 1945, relates to the mode of procedure, it is applicable to cases pending in courts at the
time of its adoption; but it can not be invoked in and applied to the present case in which the decision had become final before said
resolution became effective. In this case, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant was denied on July 17, 1944, and a
second motion for re-hearing or consideration could not be filed after the expiration of the period of fifteen days from promulgation
of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion had been pending in this Court (Section 1, Rule 54); for said
period had already expired before the adoption of the resolution on October 1, 1945. Therefore, the Court cannot now permit or
allow the petitioner to file any pleading or motion in the present case." (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 765- 766.)

The Manchester ruling was applied retroactively in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al. vs. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 7993738, February
13, 1989, a case that was already pending before Manchester was promulgated.

The complaint in this case was filed on March 24, 1988, or ten months after Manchester was promulgated on May 7, 1987, hence,
Manchester should apply except for the fact that it was modified in the Sun Insurance case, where we ruled that the court may allow
payment of the proper filing fee "within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the prescriptive or reglementary period." We
quote:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. (p. 80, Rollo.)

Intent to cheat the government of the proper filing fees may not be presumed from the petitioner's omission to specify in the body
and prayer of its complaint the amounts of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees that it claims to have suffered and/or
incurred in its transaction with the private respondents. The petitioner might not have computed its damages yet, or probably did
not have the evidence to prove them at the time it filed its complaint. In accordance with our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., the
petitioner may be allowed to amend its complaint for the purpose of specifying, in terms of pesos, how much it claims as damages,
and to pay the requisite filing fees therefor, provided its right of action has not yet prescribed. This the petitioner is ready to do.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted.

The Order of the Regional Trial Court is hereby set aside. The complaint in Civil Case No. 55740 (MRCA, Inc. vs. Domingo Sebastian,
Jr. and Lilia Tioseco Sebastian) is reinstated and the petitioner is allowed to amend the same by specifying the amounts of damages
it seeks to recover from the defendants (private respondents) and to pay the proper filing fees therefor as computed by the Clerk of
Court.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 179579               February 1, 2012

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC, Petitioners,

vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, 1 assailing the Decision2 and the Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
nullified the Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-2003 4 on the tariff classification of wheat issued by petitioner
Commissioner of Customs.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes,
wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. 5 The
regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending
on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was
3%, for feed grade, 7%.

CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases.
Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to cover
the tariff differential.6

A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief 7 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the implementation of the regulation on its imported and perishable
Chinese milling wheat in transit from China.8 Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of
the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center.

Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior
assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the
arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was proper.

Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation treated
non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.

Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.

On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20) days from notice. 9

Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss.10 They alleged that: (1) the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case, because respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory
relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of
respondent were speculative and premature, because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent’s products. They
likewise opposed the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that they had not inflicted any injury through the
issuance of the regulation; and that the action would be contrary to the rule that administrative issuances are assumed valid until
declared otherwise.

On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to
Dismiss would just be resolved together in the main case. Thus, on 10 March 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision 11 without having to
resolve the application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss.

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the subject Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003 is declared
INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT. Respondents Commissioner of Customs, the District Collector of Subic or anyone acting in
their behalf are to immediately cease and desist from enforcing the said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue raised by respondent concerned the quasi-
legislative powers of petitioners. It likewise stated that a petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy, and that respondent
was the proper party to file it. The court considered that respondent was a regular importer, and that the latter would be subjected
to the application of the regulation in future transactions.

With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not followed the basic requirements of
hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. It likewise held that petitioners had "substituted the quasi-judicial
determination of the commodity by a quasi-legislative predetermination." 13 The lower court pointed out that a classification based
on importers and ports of discharge were violative of the due process rights of respondent.

Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-
2003.14 The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. It held that, since the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners
and other importers, petitioners should have observed the requirements of notice, hearing and publication.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.

The Petition has no merit.

We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.

Rule 63, Section 1 provides:

Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof,
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. 15 We find that the Petition filed by respondent before
the lower court meets these requirements.

First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs. In Smart
Communications v. NTC,16 we held:

The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the
constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power
to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the
courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary, 17 we said:

xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof. xxx

In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which
the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated
authority of the administrative agency; (ii)  whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure.
But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its
delegation of administrative judgment, has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In
the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of
power a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i)  give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite
extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule.
(Emphasis supplied)

Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily imposing a tariff rate that
respondent is refusing to pay.

Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of CMO 27-2003. Respondent has
adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has actually made shipments of wheat from China to
Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in December 2003. Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003.
The regulation calls for the imposition of different tariff rates, depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent
alleged that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In
addition, respondent would have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which would undoubtedly toll its time and
resources. The lower court correctly pointed out as follows:

xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing wheat, each and every importation will be
subjected to constant disputes which will result into (sic) delays in the delivery, setting aside of funds as cash bond required in the
CMO as well as the resulting expenses thereof. It is easy to see that business uncertainty will be a constant occurrence for petitioner.
That the sums involved are not minimal is shown by the discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in the pleadings filed. It
may be that the petitioner can later on get a refund but such has been foreclosed because the Collector of Customs and the
Commissioner of Customs are bound by their own CMO. Petitioner cannot get its refund with the said agency. We believe and so
find that Petitioner has presented such a stake in the outcome of this controversy as to vest it with standing to file this
petition.18 (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is inevitable 19 for the simple and
uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the enumeration of flour millers classified as food grade wheat importers.
Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file a protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7%
tariff.

It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances of the case.

Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as explained above, it therefore
follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to
wit:
Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall
not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices
of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.

(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of
general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.

(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it
gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule
goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to
be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. 20

Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera,21 we held:

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at
this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the
people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa – and for the diligent ones,
ready access to the legislative records – no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite
way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)

Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must
be struck down.

Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in the same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not
violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all
members of the same class.22

Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports
it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.

Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade wheat, the product would still
be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under
CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due.
The regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.

It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat importations and thus prevent their misclassification."
A careful study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only fails to achieve this end, but results in the opposite. The application of the
regulation forecloses the possibility that other corporations that are excluded from the list import food grade wheat; at the same
time, it creates an assumption that those who meet the criteria do not import feed grade wheat. In the first case, importers are
unnecessarily burdened to prove the classification of their wheat imports; while in the second, the state carries that burden.

Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation limited the customs officer’s duties
mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. The law provides:

Section 1403. – Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise Imported Articles. – The customs officer tasked
to examine, classify, and appraise imported articles shall determine whether the packages designated for examination and their
contents are in accordance with the declaration in the entry, invoice and other pertinent documents and shall make return in such a
manner as to indicate whether the articles have been truly and correctly declared in the entry as regard their quantity,
measurement, weight, and tariff classification and not imported contrary to law. He shall submit samples to the laboratory for
analysis when feasible to do so and when such analysis is necessary for the proper classification, appraisal, and/or admission into the
Philippines of imported articles.
Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are usually bought and sold, and appraise the
imported articles in accordance with Section 201 of this Code.

Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him to the penalties prescribed under Section 3604
of this Code.1âwphi1

The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the imported article before
tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer had the chance
to examine it. In effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with
regard to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of the proper
classification of the wheat.

It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions
that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction to,
but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. 23

In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to observe the
requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated respondent’s right to equal protection of laws
when they provided for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of
Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine
and assess imported articles.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 187587               June 5, 2013

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1 promulgated on 29 April
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.

THE FACTS

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig,
Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William
McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423,
which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng
mga Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
(MSS-PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded
barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for
disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:

"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette 3 on 3 February 1986, without
the above-quoted addendum.

Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially
reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.

Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to
prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for
the following: (1) the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public
land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of
Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants. 4

On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention
substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering
Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan. 5

Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution 6 granting the Petition and declaring the portions of land in question
alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting. 7

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was
therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further,
considering that Proclamation

No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded,
by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476,
as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code,
publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that
there is no occasion for the court to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the
published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.

Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 which was denied by the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24
January 2007.10

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24
January 2007.

Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24,
2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein.
Further, pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.

THE ISSUES

Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT
INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID
PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE
EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS
TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES. 14

On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT
FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION. 15

Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not
alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was
not included in the publication of the said law.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.

Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were anchored on the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all
Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just below
the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.

However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of whether the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly
provides:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has
otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days
following the completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may
be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, 16 in
which we had the occasion to rule thus:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision,
is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission
would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the
legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its
existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like
a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect
the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest
which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In
fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.

xxxx

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory
and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.

xxxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of
the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such
decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official
Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on
this vital law.

xxxx

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed
by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded
saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No.
2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other official
documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to
include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of
the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law. 17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently,
there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, 18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however,
that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where
gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy
sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots
in the reclassification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June
2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson