BOLOS V.

BOLOS
634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which
the Court promulgated on 15 March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered into during
the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits,
the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent
Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for
reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the
order declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and executory and
granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with
the CA a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they
were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential
marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family
home and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring
the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement
of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not
apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14,
1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before
the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code”
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”
Such that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No.
even if the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on
February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.
HELD:
No, it does not.
RATIO:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15,
2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
“Section 1. Scope. —This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to
subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN v. CA, GR No. 125183, 1997-09-29
Facts:
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716
reserving for Municipal Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of the public
domain located in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned proclamation was occupied by
squatters, the Municipality of San Juan purchased an 18-hectare land in Taytay, Rizal as
resettlement center for the said squatters.
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of San Juan started to
develop its government center
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987, former President
Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716. Said
amendatory proclamation pertinently reads as follows: together with other parcels of land not
covered by Proclamation No. 1716 but nevertheless occupied for residential purposes, open to
disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act,... On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus
Homeowners Association, Inc., one of herein private respondents, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with
urgent prayer for restraining order against... the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and
the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either removing or demolishing the
houses of the association members who were claiming that the lots they occupied have been
awarded to them by Proclamation No. 164.
the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling that the property in question is being
utilized by the Municipality of San Juan for government purposes and thus, the condition set
forth in Proclamation No. 164 is absent.
The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed
This decision became final and the said judgment was duly entered
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, private respondents hired a private
surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner municipality filed a
petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private respondent Corazon de Jesus
Homeowners Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR from disposing
and awarding the parcels of land covered by Proclamation No. 164.
The Court of Appeals reversed,... Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court of
Appeals by hammering on the issue of res judicata in view of the fact that an earlier judgment,
which had become final and executory, had already settled the respective rights of the parties
under
Proclamation No. 164.
Issues:
issue of res judicata insofar as the particular area covered by Proclamation No. 164, which was
the subject matter of the earlier case,... Proclamation No. 1716 was... a valid act of legislation
Proclamation No. 164 is... a valid act of legislation.
Ruling:
The existence of the first three elements can not be disputed. As to identity of parties, we have
ruled that only substantial identity is required and not absolute identity of parties
The addition of public... respondent DENR in the second case will thus be of no moment.
Likewise, there is identity of cause of action... all remain to be the same in both the first and the
second actions despite the fact that in the first action, private respondents were the plaintiff
while in the second action, they were the respondents.
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17,
1978 in the due exercise of legislative power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6 introduced
in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended by an... equally
valid act of legislation
Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation.
President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power under a revolutionary government. On
March 24, 1986, she issued her... historic Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional
Constitution, or more popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution
Under Article II, Section 1 of the Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise
legislative power until a legislature is elected... and convened under a new constitution.
Then came the ratification of the draft constitution
When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power
under the Freedom Constitution
Proclamation No.
164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power
was already solely on Congress.
this unauthorized act by... the then president constitutes a direct derogation of the most basic
principle in the separation of powers... we cannot simply close our eyes and rely upon the
principle of the presumption of validity of a... law.
We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid exercise of
legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. Public
respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources is hereby permanently
ENJOINED from enforcing Proclamation No. 164.
Principles:
The basic elements of res judicata are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court
which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions... identity
of parties, subject matter, and cause of action
There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed to be valid
However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted by legislature. This...
presumption cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of legislative power by the executive
branch.
Manila Prince Hotel v GSIS (DIGEST)

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997
TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions

FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the
contracts, the MPHC matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to
the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC came to the
Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-
executing.
RULING:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation.
Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% of the special allowance for judges be
included in the computation of his retirement benefits; Callejo Sr., J., AM No. RTJ-04-1868

I. The Facts:
In his letter dated May 26, 2004 addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Judge Tito G.
Gustilo requested that, considering his retirement is “barely one month from November 2004,”
the second tranche of the Special Allowance granted to judges under the Republic Act No. 9227
included in the computation of his retirement benefits. In support thereof, Judge Gustilo points
out that “in the past, Judges who retire in October are included in the grant of the December
13th month pay, invoking the “liberal policy” of the Court in granting benefits to the underpaid
Trial Court Judges.”

To recall, Rep. Act No. 9227 granting additional compensation in the form of Special Allowance
to judges took effect in November 11, 2003. The special allowances shall be equivalent to 100%
of the basic monthly salary specified for their respective salary grades to be implemented
uniformly in 4 years in such sums or amounts equivalent to 25% of the basic salaries of the
positions covered thereof. Subsequent implementation shall be in such sums and amounts and
up to the extent only that can be supported by the funding source specified in Section 3
thereof. It is likewise reiterated that for purposes of computing the retirement benefits, only
the special allowance actually received and that which accrued at the time of retirement shall
be included.

II. The Issue:

Whether or not the Court can adopt a liberal stance in interpreting the retirement laws in favor
of retiree Judge Gustilo.

III. The Ruling:

No. The court denied Judge Gustilo's request for the inclusion of the second 25% of the special
allowance in the computation of his retirement benefits because Sec 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is
quite clear and unambiguous which, in plain reading, shows that only the allowances “actually
received” and the tranche or tranches “already received and implemented,” upon date of
retirement, shall be included in the computation of the retirement benefits. As such, there is no
room for interpretation but only simple application of the law.