Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the
December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under
Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as
CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner
and respondent final and executory.

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as
JDRC No. 6211.

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2,
2006, with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S.
BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under
Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of
this decision.

SO ORDERED.2

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of
Appeal on September 11, 2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure
to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilo’s
appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the September 19,
2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final
and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the
essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family
home and their children.

As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the
RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the
"coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."

Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of
Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable
Court’s Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009
Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period
to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration
was likewise denied.

Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following

ISSUES

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION

DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS.

MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING
THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE
INSTANT CASE.

B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE

HONORABLE COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN
ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE
PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO
THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD "MARRIAGES."

C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON

DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES
SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY
HEREIN RESPONDENT.
 D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A
PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS
NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION

DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.

III

THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE
ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A
LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT
PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5

From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or not
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to
an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code.

She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a
decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the
factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be
declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity
of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage
was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action
was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.

Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage
with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses
the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null
and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the parties
who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as required
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its
scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code
and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word
"marriages."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.9 As
the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is
expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there
is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."10

There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and
importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in
her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully
complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial
merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain
proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and
promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.12

The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 13

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The
Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the
Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto. 1avv phil

Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not
suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration.
Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed its
motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already beyond the review
jurisdiction of this Court.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration.

Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final
judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of his right to appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the
Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an
essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage.

No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This
constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and
inviolability, thus:

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16

Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their
preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order
No. 905 dated October 5, 2010.

1Rollo, pp. 43-48. Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with

Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a member of this Court) and Romeo F.
Barza, concurring.

2 See Rollo, p. 8; see also Annex A of petition, rollo, p. 44.

3 G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418, 427-428.

4 Annex B of petition; rollo p. 49.

5 Rollo, pp. 12-14.

6 Id. at 329.

7Supra note 3, citing Modequillo v. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990, 185 SCRA
766,722.

8 Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 116, 132.

9Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189600, June 29,2010,
citing Twin Ace Holdings Corporation v. Rufina and Company, G.R. No. 160191, June 8,
2006, 490 SCRA 368, 376.

10Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 519, 531, citing R. Agpalo,
Statutory Construction 124 (5st ed., 2003).

11Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009, 594 SCRA
139, 143, citing Yutingco v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 83 (2002).
12 Id., citing Gonzales v. Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1653, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 490.

13 510 Phil. 268, 274 (2005).

14 Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil 456, 460 (1995).

15G.R. No. 179620, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 447, 460-461, citing Salazar v. Court of
Appeals, 426 Phil 864, 877 (2002), citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines,
414 Phil 815, 826 (2001).

16Almelor v. Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, Br. 253, G.R. No. 179620, August 26,
2008, 563 SCRA 447 citing 1987 Philippine Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 12 which provides:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x

Art. XV, Secs. 1-2 which provides:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.

Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.

17
Azcueta v. Republic, G.R. No. 180668, May 26, 2009, 588 SCRA 196, 205, citing Ancheta
v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740; Tuason v. Court of
Appeals, 326 Phil 169, 180-181 (1996).
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 133763 November 13, 2002

THE UNITED HARBOR PILOTS’ ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC., petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING LINES, INC., in its own
behalf and in representation of its members
and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

As the maritime horizons of the world expanded with each new discovery and
conquest, it became apparent that the safety of a vessel while operating in strange
harbors would be enhanced if, in addition to the regular ocean pilot, an individual
learned in the tides, currents and depths of the particular harbor were engaged to assist
the master in moving his vessel through such waters. Thus, there arose the practice of
pilotage service.1 Concomitantly, guilds or associations of harbor pilots were
established for the purpose of securing the best compensation for their members. The
practice continues to this day.

In an ardent desire to secure for its members the payment of nighttime and overtime
pay, petitioner United Harbor Pilots’ Association of the Philippines, Inc. (UHPAP)
filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure against respondents Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc.
(AISL) and Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). UHPAP assails the (a) Decision 2 dated
January 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Manila granting AISL’s
petition for declaratory relief; and (b) Order3 dated May 26, 1998 denying its
(UHPAP’s) motion for reconsideration of the Decision.

The facts are undisputed.

Petitioner UHPAP is the umbrella organization of various groups rendering pilotage
service in the different ports of the Philippines. It services foreign and domestic
shipping companies, including the members of private respondent AISL.

On March 1, 1985, public respondent PPA issued PPA Administrative Order (AO)
No. 03-85 substantially adopting the provisions of Customs Administrative Order
(CAO) No. 15-654 on the payment of additional charges for pilotage service rendered
"between 1800H to 1600H," or on "Sundays or Holidays," practically referring to
"nighttime and overtime pay." Quoted hereunder is Section 16 of PPA AO No. 03-85:

"Section 16. Payment of Pilotage Service Fees – Any vessel which employs a Harbor
Pilot shall pay the pilotage fees prescribed in this Order and shall comply with the
following conditions:

xxxxxxxxx

"c) When pilotage service is rendered at any port between 1800H to 1600H, Sundays
or Holidays, an additional charge of one hundred (100%) percentum over the regular
pilotage fees shall be paid by vessels engaged in foreign trade, and fifty (50%)
percentum by coastwise vessels. This additional charge or premium fee for nighttime
pilotage service shall likewise be paid when the pilotage service is commenced before
and terminated after sunrise.

"Provided, however, that no premium fee shall be considered for service rendered
after 1800H if it shall be proven that the service can be undertaken before such hours
after the one (1) hour grace period, as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, has
expired."5 (emphasis supplied)

On February 3, 1986, in response to the clamor of harbor pilots for the rationalization
of pilotage fees, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 1088
providing for uniform and modified rates for pilotage services rendered in all
Philippine ports. It fixes the rate of pilotage fees on the basis of the "vessel’s tonnage"
and provides that the "rate for docking and undocking anchorage, conduction and
shifting and other related special services is equal to 100%," thus:

"SECTION 1. The following shall be the rate of pilotage fees or charges based on
tonnage for services rendered to both foreign and coastwise vessels;

For Foreign Vessels Rate in US $ or its Peso Equivalent

Less than 500GT $ 30.00

 500GT to 2,500GT 43.33

2,500GT to 5,000GT 71.33

5,000GT to 10,000GT 133.67

10,000GT to 15,000GT 181.67

15,000GT to 20,000GT 247.00

20,000GT to 30,000GT 300.00

30,000GT to 40,000GT 416.67

40,000GT to 60,000GT 483.33

60,000GT to 80,000GT 550.00

80,000GT to 100,000GT 616.67

100,000GT to 120,000GT 666.67

120,000GT to 130,000GT 716.67

130,000GT to 140,000GT 766.67

"Over 140,000 gross tonnage $0.05 or its peso equivalent every excess tonnage. Rate
for docking and undocking anchorage, conduction and shifting and other related
special services is equal to 100%. Pilotage services shall be compulsory in
government and private wharves or piers,

For Coastwise Vessels: Regular

100 and under 500 gross tons P 41.70

500 and under 600 gross tons 55.60

600 and under 1,000 gross tons 69.60

1,000 and under 3,000 gross tons 139.20

3,000 and under 5,000 gross tons 300.00

 5,000 and over gross tons

"SEC. 2. With respect to foreign vessels, payment of pilotage services shall be made
in dollars or in pesos at the prevailing exchange rate."6

In addition, E.O. No. 1088 contains a repealing clause stating that all orders, letters of
instruction, rules, regulations and issuances inconsistent with it are repealed or
amended accordingly.7

Pursuant to E.O. No. 1088, PPA issued several resolutions disallowing overtime
premium but authorizing reasonable night premium pay and differential, viz.:

a. PPA Resolution No. 14868 dated May 22, 1995, disallowing the overtime premium
or charge collected by Harbor Pilots under Section 16 (c) of PPA Administrative
Order No. 03-85, for services rendered during holidays;

b. PPA Resolution No. 15419 dated November 13, 1995, affirming Resolution No.
1486 and directing the PPA management to adopt a policy of no overtime pay for
pilotage services on holidays and to recommend a reasonable night premium pay or
night differential pay for the conduct of basic pilotage services;

c. PPA Resolution No. 155410 dated December 19, 1995 (1) recalling PPA Resolution
No. 1541 insofar as it recommended the grant of reasonable night premium pay or
night differential pay; (2) reaffirming PPA Resolution No. 1486; and (3) deferring for
further legal review by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel the passage
of the proposed PPA AO No. 19-95. PPA Administrative Order No. 19-95 was
supposed to provide the amendments to Section 16 (c) of PPA Administrative Order
No. 03-85, by disallowing overtime pay for holiday’s work and authorizing the
collection of nighttime premium pay for pilotage services rendered from 1800H to
1600H.

On the basis of PPA Resolution No. 1486, AISL refused to pay UHPAP’s claims for
nighttime and overtime pay. This constrained the latter to declare May 19, 1996 as the
cut-off date for shipowners and agents to pay the said claims, otherwise, its harbor
pilots would not render pilotage services and would work only from sunrise to
sundown.11

To resolve the conflict, AISL filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36,
Manila a petition for declaratory relief seeking the declaration of its rights and
obligations under E.O. No. 1088 in relation to PPA AO No. 03-85. The issues
presented therein are (a) whether E.O. No. 1088 authorizes the payment of nighttime
and overtime pay; and (b) whether the rate of pilotage fees enumerated in E.O. No.
1088 is for "every pilotage maneuver" or for the "entire package of pilotage services."

On January 26, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision12 in favor of AISL, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the petition herein and it is

hereby declared that (1) respondent PPA is bereft of authority to impose and
respondent UHPAP is not authorized to collect any overtime or night shift differential
for pilotage services rendered; and (2) the rates of fees for pilotage services rendered
refer to the totality of pilotage services rendered and respondent UHPAP cannot
legally charge separate fees for each pilotage service rendered. All billings
inconsistent with this decision are declared null and void and petitioners are not liable
therefor.

"SO ORDERED."

In so holding, the RTC ratiocinated that in view of the repealing clause in E.O. No.
1088, it is axiomatic that all prior issuances inconsistent with it are deemed repealed.
Consequently, the provisions of Section 16 of PPA AO No. 03-85 on nighttime and
overtime pay are "effectively stricken-off the books." On the second issue, the RTC
held that since the rate of pilotage fees enumerated in E.O. No. 1088 is based on the
"vessel’s tonnage," it means that such rate refers to the "entire package of pilotage
services." To rule otherwise, according to the RTC, is to frustrate the uniformity
envisioned by the rationalization scheme.

Unsatisfied, UHPAP filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the
present recourse. UHPAP presents the following issues for our determination:

"I

WHETHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1088 REPEALED THE PROVISIONS OF

CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 15-65 AND PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 03-85, AS AMENDED, ON
PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL PAY FOR HOLIDAYS WORK AND PREMIUM
PAY FOR NIGHTTIME SERVICE.

II

WHETHER THE RATES, AS FIXED IN THE SCHEDULE OF FEES BASED ON

TONNAGE IN EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1088, ARE TO BE IMPOSED ON
EVERY PILOTAGE MOVEMENT.
 III

WHETHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1088 DEPRIVED THE PHILIPPINE

PORTS AUTHORITY, OF ITS RIGHT, DUTY AND OBLIGATION TO
PROMULGATE NEW RULES AND RATES FOR PAYMENT OF FEES,
INCLUDING ADDITIONAL PAY FOR HOLIDAYS AND PREMIUM PAY FOR
NIGHTTIME SERVICES."13

UHPAP contends that E.O. No. 1088 does not repeal the provisions of PPA AO No.
03-85 on nighttime and overtime pay. It also asserts that the rate of pilotage fees fixed
by E.O. No. 1088, though based on tonnage, is to be imposed on "every pilotage
maneuver" and not on the "entire package of pilotage services." A contrary argument
would place the harbor pilots on a worse position than prior to the enactment of E.O.
No. 1088. And lastly, UHPAP claims that E.O. No. 1088 does not deprive the PPA of
its right to impose new rates, such as nighttime and overtime pay. Citing Philippine
Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,14 it
maintains that PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those
mandated by E.O. No. 1088.

In its comment,15 AISL argues that there exists an actual inconsistency between the
two orders, thus, E.O. No. 1088 should be construed as an implied repeal of PPA AO
No. 03-85 provisions on nighttime and overtime pay. Likewise, the rate of pilotage
fees under E.O. No. 1088 applies to the "entire package of pilotage services" for three
reasons: (1) under Section 1 of E.O. No. 1088, the rate of pilotage fees is based on the
"vessel’s tonnage;" (2) the use of the words "and" and "is" in the provision – "rate for
docking and undocking anchorage, conduction, and shifting, and other related special
services is equal to 100%" – means that all the enumerated pilotage services may not,
absent any contract increasing it, exceed 100% of the rate schedule; and (3) since the
object of the law is to standardize the pilotage services in all Philippine ports, it
follows that the intent of E.O. No. 1088 is to treat the package of pilotage services as a
whole.

PPA, through the Solicitor General, filed its comment16 also contending that there is
an irreconcilable conflict between E.O. No. 1088 and the provisions of PPA AO No.
03-85 on nighttime and overtime pay, resulting in an implied repeal. But unlike AISL,
PPA is of the position that (1) the rate of pilotage fees under E.O. No. 1088 refers to
each pilotage service of "docking," "undocking anchorage," "conduction," "shifting,"
and "other related special services;" and (2) E.O. No. 1088 does not divest PPA of its
authority to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees for pilotage
services.

We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.

 I

Section 3 of E.O. No. 1088 is a general repealing clause, the effect of which
falls under the category of an implied repeal as it does not identify the orders,
rules or regulations it intends to abrogate. A repeal by implication is frowned
upon in this jurisdiction. It is not favored, unless it is manifest that the
legislative authority so intended17 or unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the subject laws or orders are clearly
repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is because
the legislative authority is presumed to know the existing law so that if repeal is
intended, the proper step is to express it.18

There is nothing in E.O. No. 1088 that reveals any intention on the part of
Former President Marcos to amend or supersede the provisions of PPA AO No.
03-85 on nighttime and overtime pay. While it provides a general repealing
clause, the same is made dependent upon its actual inconsistency with other
previous orders, rules, regulations or other issuances. Unfortunately for AISL,
we find no inconsistency between E.O. No. 1088 and the provisions of PPA
AO No. 03-85. At this juncture, it bears pointing out that these two orders
dwell on entirely different subject matters. E.O. No. 1088 provides for uniform
and modified rates for pilotage services rendered to foreign and coastwise
vessels in all Philippine ports, public or private. The purpose is to rationalize
and standardize the pilotage service charges nationwide. Upon the other hand,
the subject matter of the controverted provisions of PPA AO No. 03-85 is the
payment of the additional charges of nighttime and overtime pay. Plainly, E.O.
No. 1088 involves the basic compensation for pilotage service while PPA AO
No. 03-85 provides for the additional charges where pilotage service is
rendered under certain circumstances. Just as the various wage orders do not
repeal the provisions of the Labor Code on nighttime and overtime pay, the
same principle holds true with respect to E.O. No. 1088 and PPA AO 03-85.
Moreover, this Court adheres to the rule that every statute must be so construed
and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.19 E.O. No. 1088 and PPA AO No. 03-85 should thus be read
together and harmonized to give effect to both.

II

We now come to the issue of whether the rate of pilotage fees fixed by E.O.
No. 1088 is to be imposed for "every pilotage maneuver" or for the "entire
package of pilotage services."
While E.O. No. 1088 prescribes the rates of pilotage fees on the basis of the
"vessel’s tonnage," however, this does not necessarily mean that the said rate
shall apply to the totality of pilotage services. If it were so, the benefit intended
by E.O. No. 1088 to harbor pilots would be rendered useless and ineffectual. It
would create an unjust if not an absurd situation of reducing the take home pay
of the harbor pilots to a single fee, regardless of the number of services they
rendered from the time a vessel arrives up to its departure. It must be
remembered that pilotage services cover a variety of maneuvers such as
"docking," "undocking anchorage," "conduction," "shifting" and other "related
special services." To say that the rate prescribed by E.O. No. 1088 refers to the
totality of all these maneuvers is to defeat the benefit intended by the law for
harbor pilots. It should be stressed that E.O. No. 1088 was enacted in response
to the clamor of harbor pilots for the increase and rationalization of pilotage
service charges through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates. Hence, in
keeping with the benefit intended by E.O. No. 1088, the schedule of fees fixed
therein based on tonnage should be interpreted as applicable to "each pilotage
maneuver" and not to the "totality of the pilotage services."

The use of the word "and" between the words "docking" and "undocking" in
paragraph 2 of Section 1 of E.O. No. 1088 should not override the above-
mentioned purpose of said law. It is a basic precept of statutory construction
that statutes should be construed not so much according to the letter that killeth
but in line with the purpose for which they have been enacted. Statutes are to be
given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and
secure the benefits intended.20

Furthermore, as can be gleaned from the drafts submitted by the PPA on the
guidelines pertaining to the uniform pilotage services to be rendered in all
pilotage districts,21 the PPA is of the interpretation that the rate of pilotage fees
fixed by E.O. No. 1088 is to be separately imposed on every pilotage manuever
done by the harbor pilots. This interpretation is likewise made clear in PPA
Memorandum Circular No. 42-98, dated October 8, 1998, which clarifies
pilotage charges for docking and undocking, as follows–

"To prevent disruption in pilotage service and considering the pendency of the
final and executory decision of the Supreme Court on the pilotage rates issue, it
is hereby clarified that pilotage fees for docking and undocking of vessels shall
be paid as two (2) separate services x x x."

The PPA is the proper government agency tasked with the duty of
implementing E.O. No. 1088. As such, its interpretation of said law carries
great weight and consideration. In a catena of cases, we ruled that the
 construction given to a statute by an administrative agency charged with the
interpretation and application of a statute is entitled to great respect and should
be accorded great weight by the courts. The exception, which does not obtain in
the present case, is when such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp
conflict with the governing statute or the Constitution and other laws. The
rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious
needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse
administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs, it also relates
to accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the
administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute.22

The charges and fees provided for in E.O. No. 1088 are therefore to be imposed
for every pilotage maneuver performed by the harbor pilots, as properly
interpreted by the PPA, the agency charged with its implementation.

III

Finally, on the third issue, we rule that E.O. No. 1088 does not deprive the PPA
of its power and authority to promulgate new rules and rates for payment of
fees, including additional charges. As we held in Philippine Interisland
Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals:23

"The power of the PPA to fix pilotage rates and its authority to regulate
pilotage still remain notwithstanding the fact that a schedule for pilotage fees
has already been prescribed by the questioned executive order (referring to
E.O. No. 1088). PPA is at liberty to fix new rates of pilotage subject only to the
limitation that such new rates should not go below the rates fixed under E.O.
1088. x x x." (emphasis supplied)

Our pronouncement is clearly in consonance with the provisions of Presidential

Decree No. 857 which vests upon the PPA the power and authority (1) "to supervise,
control, regulate… such services as are necessary in the ports vested in, or belonging
to the Authority;"24 (2) "to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and the conduct of
pilots in any Port District;"25 and (3) "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease
such rates, charges or fees… for the services rendered by it or by any private
organization within a Port District."26

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated January 26,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Manila is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes

1
As defined, pilotage service consists of navigating a vessel from a specific
point, usually about two (2) miles off shore, to an assigned area at the pier and
vice versa. Thus, when a vessel arrives, a harbor pilot takes over the ship from
its captain to maneuver it to a berth in the port, and when it departs, the harbor
pilot also maneuvers it up to a specific point off shore. The set up is required by
the fact that each port has a peculiar topography with which a harbor pilot is
presumed to be more familiar than a ship captain. (Philippine Interisland
Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 489,
495 (1997).
2
Rollo, pp. 38-42.
3
Id., at 63.
4
CAO 15-65, Chapter II, Paragraph VII provides:

"When pilotage service is rendered at any port between sunset and

sunrise, an additional charges of one hundred percentum (100%) over
the regular pilotage fees shall be paid for vessels engaged in foreign
trade and fifty (50%) percentum for coastwise vessels. This additional
charge or premium fee for night time pilotage service shall likewise be
paid when the pilotage service is commenced before and finished after
sunset or commenced before and finished after sunrise." (Rollo, p. 15)
5
Rollo, p. 15.
6
Id., at 74-76.
7
Section 3 of E.O. No. 1088.
8
Rollo, p. 107.
 9
Id., at 108.
10
Id., at 111-112.
11
UHPAP Resolution No. 1-96, id., at 115.
12
Id., at 38-42.
13
Id., at 12.
14
Supra.
15
Id., at 283-290.
16
Id., at 349-371.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 SECOND DIVISION

August 2, 2017

G.R. No. 226345

PIONEER INSURANCE and SURETY CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
APL CO. PTE. LTD.,, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the May 26, 2016 Decision1 and
August 8, 2016 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 143912, which reversed
the November 3, 2015 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City (RTC). The
RTC affirmed in toto the March 9, 2015 Decision4 of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati
City (MTC).

On January 13, 2012, the shipper, Chillies Export House Limited, turned over to respondent APL Co.
Pte. Ltd. (APL) 250 bags of chili pepper for transport from the port of Chennai, India, to Manila. The
shipment, with a total declared value of $12,272.50, was loaded on board MN Wan Hai 262. In turn,
BSFIL Technologies, Inc. (BSFIL), as consignee, insured the cargo with petitioner Pioneer Insurance
and Surety Corporation (Pioneer Insurance). 5

On February 2, 2012, the shipment arrived at the port of Manila and was temporarily stored at North
Harbor, Manila. On February 6, 2012, the bags of chili were withdrawn and delivered to BSFIL. Upon
receipt thereof, it discovered that 76 bags were wet and heavily infested with molds. The shipment
was declared unfit for human consumption and was eventually declared as a total loss.6

As a result, BSFIL made a formal claim against APL and Pioneer Insurance. The latter hired an
independent insurance adjuster, which found that the shipment was wet because of the water which
seeped inside the container van APL provided. Pioneer Insurance paid BSFIL Pl 95,505.65 after
evaluating the claim.7

Having been subrogated to all the rights and cause of action of BSFIL, Pioneer Insurance sought
payment from APL, but the latter refused. This prompted Pioneer Insurance to file a complaint for
sum of money against APL.

MTC Ruling
In its March 9, 2015 decision, the MTC granted the complaint and ordered APL to pay Pioneer
Insurance the amount claimed plus six percent (6%) interest per annum from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid, and ₱10,000.00 as attorney's fees. It explained that by paying BSFIL,
Pioneer Insurance was subrogated to the rights of the insured and, as such, it may pursue all the
remedies the insured may have against the party whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss.
The MTC declared that as a common carrier, APL was bound to observe extraordinary diligence. It
noted that because the goods were damaged while it was in APL's custody, it was presumed that
APL did not exercise extraordinary diligence, and that the latter failed to overcome such
presumption. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant APL Co. Pte
Ltd. to pay plaintiff the amount of ₱195,505.65 plus 6% interest per annum from the filing of this case
(01 February 2013) until the whole amount is fully paid and the amount of ₱10,000.00 as attorney's
fees; and the costs.

SO ORDERED.8

Aggrieved, APL appealed to the RTC.

The RTC Ruling

In its November 3, 2015 decision, the RTC concurred with the MTC. It agreed that APL was
presumed to have acted negligently because the goods were damaged while in its custody. In
addition, the RTC stated that under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COOSA), lack of written
notice shall not prejudice the right of the shipper to bring a suit within one year after delivery of the
goods. Further, the trial court stated that the shorter prescriptive period set in the Bill of Lading could
not apply because it is contrary to the provisions of the COGSA. It ruled:

WHEREFORE, PREMISESCONSIDERED, the Decision dated March 9, 2015 of the Metropolitan

Trial Court Branch 65, Makati City is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against defendant-
appellant APL.

SO ORDERED.9

Undeterred, APL appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its May 26, 2016 decision, the CA reversed the decisions of the trial courts and ruled that the
present action was barred by prescription. The appellate court noted that under Clause 8 of the Bill
of Lading, the carrier shall be absolved from any liability unless a case is filed within nine (9) months
after the delivery of the goods. It explained that a shorter prescriptive period may be stipulated upon,
provided it is reasonable. The CA opined that the nine-month prescriptive period set out in the Bill of
Lading was reasonable and provided a sufficient period of time within which an action to recover any
loss or damage arising from the contract of carriage may be instituted.

The appellate court pointed out that as subrogee, Pioneer Insurance was bound by the stipulations
of the Bill of Lading, including the shorter period to file an action. It stated that the contract had the
force of law between the parties and so it could not countenance an interpretation which may
undermine the stipulations freely agreed upon by the parties. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated November 3, 2015 of the RTC, Branch 137, Makati City in Civil Case No.
15-403 is hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE. Respondent Pioneer Insurance & Surety
Corporation's Complaint is accordingly DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.10

Pioneer Insurance moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion in its August 8, 2016
Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED

THAT PETITIONER'S CLAIM AGAINST THE RESPONDENT IS ALREADY BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION; AND

II

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOSULY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE ONE YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD PROVIDED UNDER THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY
SEA ACT (COGSA) IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.11

Pioneer Insurance insists the action, which was filed on February 1, 2013, was within the one year
prescriptive period under the COGSA after BSFIL received the goods on February 6, 2012. It argues
that the nine-month period provided under the Bill of Lading was inapplicable because the Bill of
Lading itself states that in the event that such time period is found to be contrary to any law
compulsorily applicable, then the period prescribed by such law shall then apply. Pioneer Insurance
is of the view that the stipulation in the Bill of Lading is subordinate to the COOSA. It asserts that
while parties are free to stipulate the terms and conditions of their contract, the same should not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

Further, Pioneer Insurance contends that it was not questioning the validity of the terms and
conditions of the Bill of Lading as it was merely pointing out that the Bill of Lading itself provides that
the nine-month prescriptive period is subservient to the one-year prescriptive period under the
COOSA.

In its Comment,12 dated November 3, 2016, APL countered that Pioneer Insurance erred in claiming
that the nine-month period under the Bill of Lading applies only in the absence of an applicable law.
It stressed that the nine-month period under the Bill of Lading applies, unless there is a law to the
contrary. APL explained that "absence" differs from "contrary." It, thus, argued that the nine-month
period was applicable because it is not contrary to any applicable law.

In its Reply,13 dated February 23, 2017, Pioneer Insurance averred that the nine-month period shall
be applied only if there is no law to the contrary. It noted that the COGSA was clearly contrary to the
provisions of the Bill of Lading because it provides for a different prescriptive period. For said
reason, Pioneer Insurance believed that the prescriptive period under the COGSA should be
controlling.
 The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious

It is true that in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc. (Philippine
American), 14 the Court recognized that stipulated prescriptive periods shorter than their statutory
counterparts are generally valid because they do not affect the liability of the carrier but merely
affects the shipper's remedy. The CA, nevertheless, erred in applying Philippine American in the
case at bench as it does not fall squarely with the present circumstances.

It is elementary that a contract is the law between the parties and the obligations it carries must be
complied with in good faith.15 In Norton Resources and Development Corporation v. All Asia Bank
Corporation, 16 the Court reiterated that when the terms of the contract are clear, its literal meaning
shall control, to wit:

The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is embodied in the first paragraph of
Article 1370 of the Civil Code: 11 [i]f the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt
upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control. "This provision is akin to the "plain meaning rule" applied by Pennsylvania courts, which
assumes that the intent of the parties to an instrument is "embodied in the writing itself, and when
the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from the express language
of the agreement". It also resembles the "four corners" rule, a principle which allows courts in some
cases to search beneath the semantic surface for clues to meaning. A court's purpose in examining
a contract is to interpret the intent of the contracting parties, as objectively manifested by them. The
process of interpreting a contract requires the court to make a preliminary inquiry as to whether the
contract before it is ambiguous. A contract provision is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two
reasonable alternative interpretations. Where the written terms of the contract are not
ambiguous and can only be read one way, the court will interpret the contract as a matter of
law. If the contract is determined to be ambiguous, then the interpretation of the contract is left to the
court, to resolve the ambiguity in the light of the intrinsic evidence.17 [Emphases supplied]

After a closer persual of the the Bill of Lading, the Court finds that its provisions are clear and
unequivocal leaving no room for interpretation.

In the Bill of Lading, it was categorically stated that the carrier shall in any event be discharged from
all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods, unless suit is brought in the proper forum within nine
(9) months after delivery of the goods or the date when they should have been delivered. The same,
however, is qualified in that when the said nine-month period is contrary to any law compulsory
applicable, the period prescribed by the said law shall apply.

The present case involves lost or damaged cargo. It has long been settled that in case of loss or
damage of cargoes, the one-year prescriptive period under the COOSA applies.18 It is at this juncture
where the parties are at odds, with Pioneer Insurance claiming that the one-year prescriptive period
under the COOSA governs; whereas APL insists that the nine-month prescriptive period under the
Bill of Lading applies.

A reading of the Bill of Lading between the parties reveals that the nine-month prescriptive period is
not applicable in all actions or claims. As an exception, the nine-month period is inapplicable when
1âwphi1

there is a different period provided by a law for a particular claim or action-unlike in Philippine
American where the Bill of Lading stipulated a prescriptive period for actions without exceptions.
Thus, it is readily apparent that the exception under the Bill of Lading became operative because
there was a compulsory law applicable which provides for a different prescriptive period. Hence,
strictly applying the terms of the Bill of Lading, the one-year prescriptive period under the COOSA
should govern because the present case involves loss of goods or cargo. In finding so, the Court
does not construe the Bill of Lading any further but merely applies its terms according to its plain and
literal meaning.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 3, 2015 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 137, Makati City in Civil Case No. 15-403 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justice
Priscilla J. BaltazarPadilla and Associate Justice Melchor Quirino C. Sadang,
concurring; rollo, pp.16-26.

2
Id. at 27-31.

3
Penned by Presiding Judge Ethel V. Mercado-Gutay; id. at 82-89.

4
Penned by Presiding Judge Henry E. Laron; id. at 7 4-81.

5
Id. at 6.

6
Id.

7
Id. at 6-7.

8
Id. at 81.

9
Rollo, p. 89.

10
Id. at 26.

11
Id. at 8.

12
Id. at 94-99.

13
Id. at 103-105.

14
287 Phil. 212 (1992).

15
Morla v. Belmonte et.al., 678 Phil. 102, 117 (2011 ).

16
620 Phil. 381 (2009), citing Benguet Corporation v. Cabildo, 585 Phil. 23 (2008).

17
Id. at 388.

Mitsui 0.S.K. Lines Ltd. v. CA, 350 Phil. 813, 817-818 (1998); Belgian Overseas Chartering
18

and Shipping N. V. v. Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc., 432 Phil. 567, 585 (2002); Asian
Terminals, Inc. v. Phi/am Insurance Co., Inc., 715 Phil. 78, 98 (2013).
 EN BANC

April 24, 2018

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

peralta, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse
and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-
0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation
of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce
Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice
of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general
circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence
(consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the
Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012)
for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf.
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended
Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgment alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO
MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband
are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said
Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously
registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said
Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be
bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her
marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in
form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the

Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether
they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to
Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity
to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et
al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of
the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still
married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court,
the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case
was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was
dissolved filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction,
the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10

2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles
36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was
originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and
approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now
states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under
Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on
the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the
spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to
avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is
recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino
women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even
after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and
perhaps have already married again.25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired
foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree.
We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized
American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the
way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married
under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but
their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter
to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically,
Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese
court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would
not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her
husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she
shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their
minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the
Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial
court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce
decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to
reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In
ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which
is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v.
Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged
post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the
Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the
ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that
was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment
in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her
ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal
property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending
in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the
other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay,
et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to
obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her
second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of
whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce,
which was granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of
1âwphi1

foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The
RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that,
consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the
CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent
factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short
in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce
is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe
fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic
relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to
Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained
under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of
the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of
the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore,
bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that
the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the
foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put
words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to
have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in
the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be
departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the
letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law
is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the
Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of
an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses
are severed by operation on the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of
the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind
adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts
have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are
constitutional.43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be
subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental
right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations
arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary
to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause
are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to
free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to
vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights
and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest
of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public
interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that,
because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over
the latter.52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect
to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the
court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites53 of
the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce
decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and
whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a
foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should
not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are
political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to
contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another
Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is
recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have
the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were
it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer
their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial
difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment

because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or
her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and
38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be
accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed
with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that
all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in
accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For
the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail
what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who
are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same.
Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of
our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to
marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign
nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what
he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under
the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by
other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to
the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she
opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are
entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We
take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature
and that they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us
to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated
on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live
together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause
for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general
prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question
by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass
a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily
to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that
the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a
divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine
courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On
March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the
Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which
repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or
unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living
together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and
the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710
again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New
Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer
recognized.70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to
re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills,
H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on
Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading -
with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of
absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as
follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a

petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
even if pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the

Philippines or abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's
spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child
is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a
victim of rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a
petitioner; and
 j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1)
year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or
both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of
legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18)
years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the
consent of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over the
party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and
wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and
such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or
appears to be incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition
for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether
or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to
another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the
marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and
traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion,
it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt
their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other
groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus
establish a state religion.76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest
of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that
they are good for country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any
ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino
family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated
to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State
cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26
only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and
children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact,
among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No.
9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna
Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and
strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose
sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect
for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article
26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any
subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in
the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the
stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under
Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions
not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too
uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate
reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not
found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of
existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v.
San Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is
find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute
may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel
the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of
foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese
Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu
the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce
Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing
the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree
was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the
validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or
law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating
it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on
persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know
by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision
and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are
AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED