Toledo, Rosabell C.

JD 1-2

PUBLICATION AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS

TAÑADA v. TUVERA
G.R. NO. L-63915 24 APRIL 1985
ESCOLIN, J:

DOCTRINE: Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that all laws
be published in the Official Gazette before they may take effect.

FACTS: Petitioners Tañada, et al. sought a writ of mandamus to compel

respondents, including Executive Assistant to the President Tuvera, to publish
several various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative
orders. Petitioners invoked the people’s right to be informed on matters of
public concern, as enshrined in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Respondents argued that publication in the Official Gazette is not a
requirement for the effectivity of laws that specify their own date of effectivity,
as stated in Article 2 of the National Civil Code.

ISSUE: Is publication in the Official Gazette a requisite for the effectivity of

the presidential issuances in question, even if such statutes provide their own
date of effectivity?

RULING: Yes, publication in the Official Gazette is required for presidential

issuances to take effect.
The Court ruled that the “unless it is otherwise provided” clause found in
Article 2 of the Civil Code refers to the date of effectivity and not the
requirement of publication per se.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Hence, the petition is granted, and the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.
Toledo, Rosabell C. JD 1-2

CLARIFICATIONS ON THE PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT

FOR THE EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
TAÑADA v. TUVERA
G.R. NO. L-63915 29 DECEMBER 1986
CRUZ, J:

DOCTRINE: Article 2 of the Civil Code contemplates the need to inform the
public of the content of the laws before it shall take effect.
FACTS: In its April 24, 1985 decision, the Court ordered the respondents
to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, before they may be considered effective and binding.
Petitioners are now seeking clarifications to said decision, in effect suggesting
that (1) there must not be a distinction between laws that are of “general
application” and those which are not, (2) that only publication of statutes in
their full text is recognized as “publication,” and (3) that publication must be
made in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Must all laws, regardless of applicability, be published in full in the
Official Gazette before they take effect?
RULING: Yes. All statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws.
Finally, the Court pronounced that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the
publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as
a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or
after a different period provided by the legislature.
Toledo, Rosabell C. JD 1-2

WHERE IMPLIED REPEALS ARE NOT FAVORED

THORNTON v. THORNTON
G.R. NO. 154598 16 AUGUST 2004
CORONA, J:

DOCTRINE: Article 7 of the National Civil Code expressly states that laws may
only be repealed by subsequent ones.
FACTS: American petitioner Brian Thornton and Filipino respondent Adelfa
Thornton are married. After 3 years, the marriage turned sour. On October
2001, respondent left their family home, bringing with her their infant
daughter, who was 2 years old at the time. Their house help told petitioner that
respondent brought their daughter to Basilan.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in a Makati Family Court, but it
was dismissed due to the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner
then traveled to Basilan but still could not find his wife and child. Petitioner
then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time before the Court of
Appeals, which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire
country.
Said petition was denied, by reason of the Court of Appeals lacking jurisdiction
on the case. CA ruled that since R.A. 8369 provided family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed R.A. 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA)

ISSUE: Does the Court of Appeal hold jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors in light of R.A. 8369 relegating exclusive
jurisdiction over such petitions to family courts?

RULING: Yes, the Court of Appeals hold jurisdiction over this case because
nothing in R.A. 8369 revoked the Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors.
There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have
concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the
custody of minors is involved. Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory
construction that implied repeals are not favored.
Hence. CA took cognizance of the case, and hereby granted the petition.
Toledo, Rosabell C. JD 1-2

JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE LAND

PESCA v. PESCA
G.R. NO. 136921 17 APRIL 2001
VITUG, J:
DOCTRINE: The “doctrine of stare decisis,” established in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines.

FACTS: Petitioner Lorna Pesca and respondent Zosimo Pesca got married in
1975. The union bore four children.
In 1988, petitioner first noticed that respondent showcased signs of “psychological
incapacity” to perform his marital covenant. He has reportedly become cruel and
violent towards his wife and children.
On March 22, 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in
front of her children. Medical examinations show that she sustained contusions
and abrasions.
Petitioner sued respondent for nullity of their marriage, invoking psychological
incapacity, and the RTC declared their marriage to be null and void ab initio.
Respondent appealed this ruling before the CA, which reversed the decision, citing
jurisprudence and stating that the petitioner failed to prove the alleged
“psychological incapacity” of respondent, as the term was so defined in Santos vs.
Court of Appeals and Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina.

ISSUE: Are the guidelines for proving “psychological incapacity” as set in the
cases of Santos and Molina mandatory in the CA decision?

RULING: Yes, the “doctrine of stare decisis,” as ordained in Article 8 of the Civil
Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Thus, the term “psychological incapacity” was given legal life by the Court in the
case of Santos and in the case of Molina. Both judicial decisions in Santos and
Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina
are mandatory in nature.
The petition was denied, and the Court ruled that the appellate court did not err in
its assailed decision for there was absolutely no evidence showed and proved by
petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
Toledo, Rosabell C. JD 1-2

WHERE RETROACTIVE LAWS TAKE AWAY VESTED PRIVILEGE

CAROLINO v. SENGA
G.R. NO. 189649 20 APRIL 2015
PERALTA, J:

DOCTRINE: Retirement benefits due petitioner's husband under RA No. 340, is

an acquired right which cannot be taken away by a subsequent law. PD No.
1638 does not expressly provide for its retroactive application, and without
such express provision, Article 4 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states that
laws shall have no retroactive effect.

FACTS: On December 1976, Petitioner’s husband retired from the AFP with
the rank of Colonel. He started receiving his monthly retirement pay that same
month, pursuant to R.A. 340 until it was withheld by respondents in March
2005.
AFP officials explained that under the new law, P.D. No. 1638, which was
issued in 1979, which provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon such loss.

ISSUE: Are the provisions of P.D. No 1638 applicable to beneficiaries who

retired before said law was promulgated?

RULING: No. The Court found that petitioner’s husband retired as a

commissioned officer of the AFP in 1976; thus, RA No. 340 is the law applicable
in determining his entitlement to his retirement benefits and not PD No. 1638
which was issued only in 1979. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "laws
shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided" and PD No.
1638 does not provide for such retroactive application.
The petition for mandamus filed by petitioner's husband with the RTC was for
the payment of his terminated retirement benefits, which has become vested,
and being a ministerial duty on the part of the respondents to pay such claim,
mandamus is the proper remedy to compel such payment.
The petition is granted.
Toledo, Rosabell C. JD 1-2

WHEN RIGHTS MAY BE WAIVED

GUY v. CA
G.R. NO. 163707 15 SEPTEMBER 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

DOCTRINE: Article 6 of the Civil Code of the Philippines allows for the waiver
of rights. However, it is impossible to waive a right that does not exist in the
first place.

FACTS: Private respondent-minors, represented by their mother Remedios

Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration before the Makati RTC.
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate
children of Sima Wei, who died intestate on 1992, leaving an estate valued at
P10,000,000.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of such petition, arguing that private
respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei, pursuant to Art. 175 of the Family Code.
Petitioner and co-heirs alleged that private respondents’ claim had been paid,
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios signing a
Release and Waiver of Claim in 1993.

ISSUE: Does the Release and Waiver of Claim preclude private

respondents from claiming successional rights, if any?

RULING: No. Private respondents could not have possibly waived their
successional rights in 1993 because they have yet to prove their status as
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased at the time.
It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights
when petitioner claims that they do not have such right.
Toledo, Rosabell C. JD 1-2

USURPATION OF POWERS THROUGH JUDICIAL LEGISLATION

SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 174698 22 OCTOBER 2007
CORONA, J:

DOCTRINE: Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "no judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency
of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation.

FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Silverio, born male, went sex

reassignment surgery in Thailand.
Upon returning to the Philippines, a Filipino surgeon issued a medical
certificate validating that petitioner had in fact undergone the procedure.
Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate, so as to reflect his present sex.
Petition was granted by the RTC, but was later reversed by the CA, citing that
there is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in anyone’s certificate
of birth on the grounds of sex reassignment through surgery.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner entitled to the relief being asked for?

RULING: No. while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "no judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency
of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial
legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make
or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so,
to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
Toledo, Rosabell C. JD 1-2

ON THE OBLIGATORY EFFECT OF PENAL LAWS

DEL SOCORRO v. WILSEM
G.R. NO. 193707 10 DECEMBER 2014
PERALTA, J:

DOCTRINE: Article 14 of the New Civil Code provides that: "penal laws and
those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international
law and to treaty stipulations."

FACTS: Petitioner Norma Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland. The union bore one son. However, their
marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the Dutch court.
Norma and her son then came home to the Philippines, with a promise from
Ernst that he will provide monthly support to their son. However, the same
never happened. Respondent remarried another Filipina and resided with her
in Cebu, where petitioner also resides.
Petitioner sued respondent for violation of RA 9262 for the latter’s failure to
support his minor child. Respondent argued that by reason of the Divorce
Decree secured from Holland, he is not obligated to provide any financial
support.

ISSUE: Can a foreign national be held criminally liable under RA 9262 for
his unjustified failure to support his minor child?

RULING: Yes. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland

or the Netherlands, the Court agrees with the RTC that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This
does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether.
Furthermore, the court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the
foreigner is living here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.
Toledo, Rosabell C. JD 1-2

NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE OF PH LAWS

GARCIA-RECIO v. RECIO
G.R. NO. 138322 2 OCTOBER 2001
PANGANIBAN, J:

DOCTRINE: Article 15 of the Civil Code binds all Filipino citizens, even though
living abroad, to local laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition, and legal capacity of persons.
Furthermore, Article 26(2) of the Family Code states that when a divorce
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly obtained abroad, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry.

FACTS: Respondent Rederick Recio married Australian citizen Editha

Samson. On May 1989,a decree of divorce was issued by an Australian family
court.
In 1994, respondent remarried to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina. In
their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared “single” and
“Filipino.”
On March1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the grounds of bigamy. Petitioner argued that respondent had a
prior subsisting marriage at the time of their marriage, which she did not know
prior to contracting the marriage.
In his Answer, respondent contended that his first marriage was validly
dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha

Samson allows respondent to remarry.

RULING: Yes. Philippine law may not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, however, Article 26 of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
Toledo, Rosabell C. JD 1-2

ON LAWS GOVERNING SUCCESSION OF REAL PROPERTY

TESTATE ESTATE OF BELLIS v. BELLIS
G.R. NO. L-23678 9 JUNE 1967
BENGZON, J.P., J:

DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Article 16(2) of the Civil Code, testamentary

successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration.

FACTS: Amos Bellis, a citizen of the state of Texas, U.S.A., made two wills
prior to his death. One disposes of his Texas properties and the other disposes
his properties in the Philippines In both wills, he did not provide anything to
his illegitimate children. Said children opposed the will, by reason that they
have been deprived of their legitimes to which they are entitled under
Philippine laws.

ISSUE: Do Philippine laws apply in the determination of successional

rights of a foreign citizen’s children if such properties are located in the
Philippines.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled
to their legitimes because under the Texas Law, there are no legitimes.
Further, even if the deceased had given them share, such would be invalid
because the law governing the deceased does not allow such.
Toledo, Rosabell C. JD 1-2

SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS WITH RESPECT TO CHOICE OF LAW

RAYTHEON v. ROUZIE
G.R. NO. 162894 26 FEBRUARY 2008
TINGA, J:

DOCTRINE: Article 17(1) of the Civil Code states that the forms and
solemnities of contracts shall be governed by the laws of the country in which
they are executed.

FACTS: In 1990, Brand Marine Services Inc. (BMSI), a corporation

organized and governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut, USA, and
respondent Stockkton Rouzie, an American citizen, entered into a contract.
BMSI employed respondent as its representative to negotiate sale of its services
for an agreed remuneration of 10% of gross receipts.
In 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the
Philippines for BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Pinatubo
eruption.
Responded filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI for alleged non-payment
of commissions, illegal termination, and breach of contract.
Petitioner sought the dismissal of said complaint by reason of failure to state a
cause of action and forum non convenience, alleging that the written contract
between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, which
allows said contract to be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut.

ISSUE: Should the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum non

conveniens?

RULING: No. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in

conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is
not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded
from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Toledo, Rosabell C. JD 1-2

IN SEEKING FOREIGN COURTS FOR DIVORCE

TENCHAVEZ v. ESCAÑO
G.R. NO. L-19671 29 NOVEMBER 1965
REYES, J.B.L., J:

DOCTRINE: The third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code prescribes the
following: “Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.”

FACTS: Defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño contracted a marriage with

plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez on 1948. The marriage consummated a
love affair, but it was duly registered in the local civil registry.
Amid the confusion and a series of unfortunate events, Vicenta applied for a
passport in 1950, indicating in her application that she was single. She flew to
the United States, where she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
plaintiff. The same year, a decree of divorce, “final and absolute,” was issued in
open court by the said tribunal.
Defendant then married an American citizen, before acquiring American
citizenship on August 1958.
Plaintiff filed a complait against defendant and her parents whom he accused
of estranging his wife against him. He asked for legal separation and one
million pesos in damages.
Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to
her present husband.

ISSUE: Is the absolute divorce decree obtained by defendant in Nevada

valid and binding under Philippine Laws?

RULING: No. A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted
with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree
of divorce, entitled to validity in the country.