TAÑADA VS.

TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia
legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if
the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.
People vs Que Po Lay

TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay

CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954

FACTS:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders
amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the
act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No.
20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and
subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:

It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central
Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based
on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including
its penalties.
G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996

Justice Torres Jr.

FACTS: The Petitioner Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01, 1 under which, applications to the PITC for importation from the People's Republic of China (PROC, for
brevity) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried
out by the improper himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of
the importation from PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.

Private respondents Remington and Firestone individually applied for authority to import from PROC with the
petitioner. They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for importers, and after they
executed respective undertakings. Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export
credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were withheld by petitioner PITC
from private respondents, such that the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC. As a result, the
private respondents filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against the PITC.

The court ruled that declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the same was not published,
contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the Administrative Order issued by PITC is null and void on the ground that it was not published
in accordance with Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

HELD: Yes. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article
2 of Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided. . . .

The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their applications
for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The fact that the
amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in
the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative
Order.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.
G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993
Chief Justice Narvasa

FACTS: Petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against
the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was
deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the
bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was
filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case
eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged.

He argued on appeal that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4)
years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a
"rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an
official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.

ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be applied retroactively to the prejudice of the
accused.

HELD: No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of
the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have
no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex
prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or
impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional

The weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21,
1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance
of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the
prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of
Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 125539 July 27, 1999
Facts:
Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr, were charged before Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court
of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of robbery. The Amended information was dated
October 11, 1985.

In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305, accused-
appellants Alex Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged before the same court with the crime of
robbery with multiple rape.

They were convicted of robbery with multiple rape committed in the evening of August 11, 1984 against the Aliman
family. They were meted the death penalty. At the time the crimes were committed in 1984, robbery with rape was
punishable by death, however, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the death penalty was abolished
and all death penalties already imposed were reduced to reclusion perpetua. In 1987, when the 1987 Constitution
suspended the imposition of the death penalty, the trial has not yet been finished, hence, it was overtaken by the Death
Penalty Law effective January 1, 1994. Appellants now opposed that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty
as the same was suspended upon ratification of the constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the death penalty can be imposed upon the accused.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that before the 1987 Constitution, death penalty as a capital punishment could be
imposed on certain heinous crimes like robbery with rape (Article 294, Revised Penal Code). From 1987, however,
until the passage of the death penalty law or on January 1, 1994, the imposition of death penalty was suspended. In
the case of the three convicts, an issue came up regarding the imposition of death penalty. Although the time of the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution the present case was still its trial stage.

According to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect only insofar as they
favor a person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, although at the time of the publication of such a law
a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

The abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused by virtue of Art 22 of the RPC which provides that penal
laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony who is not a habitual criminal.
Hence, they are subject to a reduction of penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. A subsequent statute cannot be
applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law.
 Ernestina Beranabe, petitioner, versus Carolino Alejo as guardian ad litem for the minor
Adrian Bernabe, respondent
January 21, 2002

Facts:

Fiscal Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of 23 years Carolina Allejo. The son was born on
September 18, 1981 Adrian Beranabe. FiscalBernabe died August 13, 1993 while his wife died December 3
of the same year leaving Ernestina as sole surviving heir. On May 16, Carolina in Behalf of Adrian filed
complaint praying Adrian be declared illegitimate son of FiscalBernabe. On July 16, 1995, the RTC
dismissed the complaint that under the family code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. CA the complaint
is now barred.

Issues:

Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate daughter of
the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative father’s death in the
absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four years from the
attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in
complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code and the applicable
jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.

Held:

The Petition has no merit. Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action
for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family
Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be
impaired. Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive
law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority
age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition,
because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

With regard to third issue, the court ruled that Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court,
it is no longer required to implead “the lower courts or judges either as petitioners or respondents.” Under
Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of
petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct
procedure.
TITLE: Emetrio Cui v Arellano University

CITATION: GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135

FACTS:

Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law
from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded
scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took
his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he
needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he
had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without
Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of
private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the amount in tuition and
other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students
when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered
merely to attract and keep students in a school”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided
by Arellano University.

HELD:

The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was
advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to
pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy
and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.

The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate
from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendant’s
counterclaim.
Leah v. IAC, G.R. No. L-65425

IRENEO LEAL, JOSE LEAL, CATALINA LEAL, BERNABELA LEAL, VICENTE LEAL EUIOGIA LEAL
PATERNO RAMOS, MACARIO DEL ROSARIO, MARGARITA ALBERTO, VICTORIA TORRES, JUSTINA
MANUEL, JULIAN MANUEL, MELANIA SANTOS, CLEMENTE SAMARIO, MARIKINA VALLEY, INC.,
MIGUELA MENDOZA, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division), and VICENTE
SANTIAGO (Substituted by SALUD M. SANTIAGO), respondents.

Facts:

A document entitled “Compraventa”, involving three parcels of land, was sold with annotations of right to
repurchase only by the Santiago brothers themselves or by their heirs to Cirilio Leal the deceased father of
some of the petitioners, when Cirilo died on December 10, 1959, the subject lands were inherited by his six
children.

Sometime before 1966-1967, Vicente Santiago offered to repurchase the subject properties. The petitioners
refused the offer. Vicente Santiago instituted a complaint for specific performance before the then Court of
First Instance of Quezon City on August 2, 1967.

All the trial, rendered its decision dismissing the complaint, the private respondent appealed. The
petitioners filed a motion to amend the annotations at the back of the Transfer certificates of Title. The
private respondent filed a timely motion for reconsideration of the above decision and an opposition to
petitioners’ motion to amend.

The decision is hereby reversed and set aside and another one is rendered ordering petitioner-appellees to
accept the sum of P5,600.00 from respondent-appellant as repurchase price of the lots and thereafter to
execute a deed of repurchase to appellant Salud M. Santiago.

Issue:

whether or not the annotation at the back of the title is contrary to law.

Held:

Yes. The condition present on the contract is contrary to public policy because of the restriction to the right
of ownership, specifically the owner’s right to freely dispose of his properties. According to Art. 1306, which
states: “That contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.”
DM Consunji v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001

FACTS: A construction worker died when he fell 14 floors when the platform which he was on board fell from the
Renaissance Tower in Pasig City. He works for DM Consunji Inc. It was noted that this happened because the pin
inserted to the platform loosened and there was no safety lock. His widow filed with RTC of Pasig a complaint for
damages against DM Consunji Inc. The employer averred that the widow already availed benefits from the State
Insurance Fund and that she cannot recover civil damages from the company anymore.

ISSUE: W/N the widow is already barred from availing death benefits under the Civil Code because she already
availed damages under the Labor Code

HELD: Although SC ruled that recovery of damages under the Worker’s Compensation Act is a bar to recover under
a civil action, the CA ruled that in this case, the widow had a right to file an ordinary action for civil actions because
she was not aware and ignorant of her rights and courses of action. She was not aware of her rights and remedies.
Thus, her election to claim from the Insurance Fund does not waive her claim from the petitioner company. The
argument that ignorance of the law excuses no one is not applicable in this case because it is only applicable to
mandatory and

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Valenzuela Hardwood vs. CA

(GR 102316, 30 June 1997)

FACTS:
Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. (VHIS) entered into an agreement with the Seven
Brothers whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the former’s
lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila. VHIS insured
the logs against loss and/or damage with South Sea Surety and Insurance Co.

The said vessel sank resulting in the loss of VHIS’ insured logs. VHIS demanded from South Sea Surety
the payment of the proceeds of the policy but the latter denied liability under the policy for non-payment of
premium. VHIS likewise filed a formal claim with Seven Brothers for the value of the lost logs but the latter
denied the claim.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.Both Seven Brothers and South Sea Surety appealed. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment except as to the liability of Seven Brothers.South Sea Surety and VHIS
filed separate petitions for review before the Supreme Court. In a Resolution dated 2 June 1995, the
Supreme Court denied the petition of South Sea Surety. The present decision concerns itself to the
petition for review filed by VHIS.

ISSUE:
Is a stipulation in a charter party that the “(o)wners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing,
breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo” valid?

HELD:
Yes. Xxx [I]t is undisputed that private respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting
petitioner’s lauan logs. Thus, Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were
cited by petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter party.

In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests
solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused
even by the negligence of the ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, such stipulation is
valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of
adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and
obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier,
private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting
commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not
contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in
contracts involving common carriers.

The general public enters into a contract of transportation with common carriers without a hand or a voice
in the preparation thereof. The riding public merely adheres to the contract; even if the public wants to, it
cannot submit its own stipulations for the approval of the common carrier. Thus, the law on common
carriers extends its protective mantle against one-sided stipulations inserted in tickets, invoices or other
documents over which the riding public has no understanding or, worse, no choice. Compared to the
general public, a charterer in a contract of private carriage is not similarly situated. It can -- and in fact it
usually does -- enter into a free and voluntary agreement. In practice, the parties in a contract of private
carriage can stipulate the carrier’s obligations and liabilities over the shipment which, in turn, determine
the price or consideration of the charter. Thus, a charterer, in exchange for convenience and economy,
may opt to set aside the protection of the law on common carriers. When the charterer decides to
exercise this option, he takes a normal business risk.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION,
HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995

FACTS:

The case arose from the conviction of two individuals by the respondent judge with the crime of Rape with
Homicide of seven-year old girl. The accused on the incident also caused fatal injuries to the minor child by
slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick peace of wood and stabling her neck, which were all the
direct cause of her immediate death. Respondent-judge however, instead of imposing the corresponding
death penalty, imposed rather the reclusion perpetua to each accused.

The City Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the decision be modified that the
penalty be death instead of reclusion perpetua. Respondent-judge still denied the motion citing
religious convictions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent-judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessof
jurisdiction when he failed to attach the corresponding penalty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.

HELD:

Yes, respondent-judge clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the attaching the proper corresponding penalty of the crime of Rape with Homicide. The
Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty
provided for by law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. Respondent-judge is
duty bound to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety
of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as penalty in specific and
well defined instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an
ancient one, but is a matter upon which judges have no choice. This is consistent in the rule laid down in
the Civil Code Article 9, that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

Thus, the petition was granted, the Court remanded the case back to the respondent-judge for the
imposition of death penalty of the accused.
 In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
GR 148311, March 31, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner HonoratoCatindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie, and that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother’s
surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.

ISSUE:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name?

RULING:

YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
surname of her father and her mother. Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle
name will maintain her maternal lineage. The Adoption Act and the Family Code provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can assert
her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.