PRELIMINARIES ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION ABAKADA GURO V ERMITA ; January 22, 1973 JAVELLANA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ; March 31,

1973 SANIDAD V CO MMISSION ON ELECTIONS ; October 12, 1976 MITRA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ; April 4, 1981 LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES V AQUINO EN BANC; May 22, 1986 FACTS/ISSUES Petitioners questioned legitimacy of Aquino government. - Her govt w as said to be illegal since it was not established pursuant to 1973 Consti. - Pr oclamation No. 3- Aquino govt is installed through direct exercise of power of the Filipino people, in defiance of the provisions of 1973 Consti. - April 10- Court already voted to dismiss. - April 17- Atty. Lozano withdrew petitions and said t hat they would pursue it by extra-judicial methods. HELD Petitions have no merit . (1) Petitioners have no personality and no cause of action. (2) Legitimacy of govt is NOT justiciable, and is a political question where people are the only ju dge. (3) People have already accepted such govt, which is in effective control of the country, making it a de jure govt. (4) Community of nations has also accepte d it. (5) Eleven members of SC have sworn to uphold law under her govt. METHOD AND INTERPRETATION ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, LEGAL REALISM, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THIS CONSTITUTIO N ROBERT CLINTON (1987) CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM: QUASINEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND CON STITUTIONAL TRUTHS TIMOTHY ZICK (2003) Atty. Jesus Delfin filed to the COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution thr ough a peoples initiative. In his petition, he wanted to amend Sec 4 and 7 of Art icle 6, Sec 4 of Article 7 and Sec 8 of Article 10 in order to lift the term lim its of all elective government officials. He asks the COMELEC to assist them in gathering the sufficient number of signatures by setting up signature stations a ll over the country, as required by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The COMELEC too k cognizance of their petition and set the case up for hearing. Senator Raul Roc o then filed a motion to dismiss before the COMELEC, stating that it was not the initiatory petition properly cognizable before the COMELEC. Sen. Miriam Defenso r Santiago, on the other hand, filed a special civil action for prohibition, say ing that RA 6735 is deficient insofar as the initiative for amending the Constit ution is concerned. She further alleges that what the petitioners are willing to propose are not amendments, but revisions. Thereafter, LABAN, DIK and MABINI fi led their motions for intervention, arguing on the same points. ISSUES 1. WON th e court can take action of this case despite there being a pending case before t he COMELEC 2. WON RA 6735 is an adequate enabling law for peoples initiative 3. W ON the COMELEC resolution no. 2300 is valid 4. WON the COMELEC acted without jur isdiction or in grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin petition HE LD 1. Yes. Comelecs failure to act on rocos motion to dismiss and its insistence t o hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under se c 2 rule 65 of rules of court - Case may be treated as a special civil action fo r certiorari since delfin didnt come up with the minimum number of signatures - C ourt may brush aside technicalities in cases of transcendental importance. 2. No . The law is inadequate. - First, in Sec 2 of the Act (Statement and Policy), it seems that the word Constitution was a delayed afterthought. The word Constitut ion was neither germane nor relevant to the said section. It only proves that it is silent to amendments in the constitution. - Second, in the Act does not prov ide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the constitution. - Third, there is no separate subtitle for initiative for the Constitution. - Therefore, it seems that the main thrust of the act is on initiative and referendum of nati onal and local laws. It failed to provide for details in implementation of initi ative on amendments to the Constitution. ART XVII: REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION MALOLOS: THE CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC TEODORO AGONCILLO (1997) FROM MCKINLEYS INSTRUCT IONS TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM V ICENTE MENDOZA (SEE LEGAL HISTORY REVIEWER) MABANAG V LOPEZ VITO GONZALES V COMM

ISSION ON ELECTIONS ; November 9, 1967 TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ; Oct ober 16, 1971 PLANAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ ;October 24, 1986 DE LEON V ESGUERRA ; August 31, 1987 SANTIAGO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS DAVIDE; March 19, 1997 FACTS

- Comelec cannot be delegated power, since the law is incomplete as it fails to provides a sufficient policy and standard for the delegated power. 3. No. It onl y follows that since the RA 6735 is incomplete, it does not have the power to pr escribe rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 4. Yes. There was insufficient number of signatures. Also, comelec acquires jurisdiction upon filing of the petition. The delfin petition was only in its initiatory pleading. Decision Petition granted SEPARATE OPINION PUNO [concur and dissent] RA 6735 is not defective. The intent of the framers was to provide for a law for initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (he cited the sponsorship remarks of Roco) VITUG The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition, since it did not have the requir ed number of signatures. FRANCISCO [concur and dissent] looking at the definition of terms in the said RA, the law clearly intends to in clude amendments to the Constitution. PANGANIBAN RA 6735 is not perfect but taken together with the Constitution and COMELEC Res. No. 2300, it is sufficient to implement Constitutional initiatives. RESOLUTION ; ESTRADA V DESIERTO PUNO; FACTS - Nature: Writ of Preliminary Injunction against complaints against him un til his term is over - May 11, 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President; Arroyo was VP; some 10 million Filipinos voted for Estrada and both Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a 6-year term. - Oct. 4, 2000 ~ Estradas "sharp decent from power" be gan; Chavit Singson, Estradas long time friend, publicly accused Estrada, Estra das family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. - Oct. 5, 2000~ Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. delivered a speech entitled "I ACCUSE " wherein he accused Estrada of receiving 220 million pesos worth of jueteng mon ey from Gov. Singson from November 1998 till August 200 and obtained another 70 million peson on excise tax still from Gov. Singson - The privilege speech was r eferred by Sen. Drilon to the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice for joint investigation - The House of Reps also decided to investigate the exp ose of Gov. Singson. - Reps. Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defen sor spearheaded the move to impeach Estrada. - Oct. 11, 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement asking Estrada to step down from the pr esidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern - Oct. 13, 2000~ CBCP also cried out for Estradas resignation - Oct. 17, 2000~ Former Pres. Aquino joined the calls for resignation and former Pres. Ramos joined the chorus as well. - B ut before that, on Oct 12, Arroyo already resigned as DSWD Secretary and also as ked for Estradas resignation but Estrada really held on to his office and refus ed to resign. (According to J. Puno: "The heat is on.") - November ended with a "big-bang" because on November 13, House Speaker Manuel Villar transmitted the A rticles of Impeachment (which was based on the grounds of bribery, graft and cor ruption, betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution) si gned by 115 representatives to the Senate. - Nov. 20, 2000~ Senate finally opene d the impeachment trial. 21 senators took their oath as judges with SC Chief Jus tice Hilario G. Davide Jr, presiding. - Dec. 7, 2000~ The impeachment trial star ted. - Dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Oca mpo, the SVP of Equitable-PCI BANK. Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a 500 million pesos investment account with their bank on Feb 4 2000. - Impeach ment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas and when January came, more bombshells were exploded. > Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrad

a jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charg es of insider trading. > Jan. 16, 2001~ with a vote of 11-10, the Senator judges ruled against opening the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showi ng that petitioner held 3.3 billion pesos in a secret bank account under the nam e "Jose Velarde." > In short, this resulted to what we know as "EDSA II" - Janua ry 19, 2001~ withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces, PNP and mass resignati ons ensued - Jan 20, 2001~ Estrada surrendered. At 12 nn, CJ Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as the President of the Philippines. > Estrada left Malacaang and issued a press statement saying that he now leaves M alacaang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process o f our nation. > He also wrote a letter saying that the VP shall be the acting pr esident and said letter was transmitted to former Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. P res. Pimentel. - Jan 21, 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties of the Pr esidency. The SC issued a resolution, which confirmed the authority given by the 12 members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice to administer the oat h of office to GMA. - Jan. 24, 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estradas letter, Ho use of Reps. passed House Resolution No. 175 experiencing full support to GMAs administration and also HR no. 176 - Feb 7, 2001~ Despite receipt of Estradas l etter claiming inability, Senate passed Resolution No. 82 confirming GMAs nomin ation of Teofisto Guingona as VP and the Senates support of the new govt. and also in the same date, Senate passed Res. No. 83 recognizing that the impeachmen t court is functus offictio. - Feb. 8, 2001~ Senate passed Res. No. 84 certifyin g vacancy in the Senate. - Feb 15, 2001- CJ Davide and J. Panganiban inhibited t hemselves from participating in this case as per Saguisags motion. They of cour se debunked his charge "that they have compromised their weight on one side" but nonetheless recused themselves. ISSUES 1. WON the petitions present a justiciab le controversy 2. WON the petitioner resigned as president 3. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as president 4. WON the petitioner enjoys imm unity from suit (and assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity) 5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity. HELD 1. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of WON the change in the presidency was done in the manner prescribed by the 1987 Constitu tion. (In this part, the ponente differentiated EDSA I from EDSA II saying that EDSA I was a revolution, change of presidency was done extra-constitutionally wh ereas EDSA II was not a revolution, the change was done to an element of the gov ernment only and it was done intraconstitutionally because GMA swore to uphold o r protect the 1987 Constitution. Read it if u want a better understanding. Also, the Court is interpreting ART II sec 1, ART VII Sec 8 and ART VII Sec 11 in thi s case so look at those provisions too. ) 2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined from the totality of prior, contemporaneous and

posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. (In relation to this, see Art. VII, Section 8) 3. The Court held that the question WON it may review and revise the decision of both Houses of Congress r ecognizing GMA as the de jure President of the Philippines is a political one. ( Congress has laid Estradas claim of inability to rest because of its recognitio n of GMA as president. The issue is a political question and the Court cannot re view Congress decision without violating the principle of separation of powers. ) 4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys immunity only during his tenure. (Reasoning in the In Re: Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune from suit or from being brought to court during his period of his incu mbency and tenure but not beyond.) 5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a fin ding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judge s have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Deicison The petition s of Joseph E. Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as th e de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED. > seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants > prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain matters. ISSUES 1. WON the case has become moot and academic 2. WON peti tioner has standing as a citizen 3. WON petitioner has standing as a taxpayer 4. WON the President has power to create positions (70) in the Office of the Presi dent and appoint presidential consultants (20), advisers (22) and assistants (28 ) 5. WON the Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora to provide petitioner with names of executive officials holding multiple positi ons in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang. HE LD 1. Ratio An act is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable c ontroversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead. It is beyon d the scope of judicial power to give advisory opinion. Obiter The case has alre ady become moot and academic as the PCCR has already ceased to exist. Relief pra yed for by Gonzales (prohibition) is impossible to grant and is an inappropriate remedy as body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. Any ruling regarding the PCCR would only be in the nature of an advisory opinion. 2. Ratio A citizen has standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatene d injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the inj ury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Obiter The interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to s how that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate d anger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not m erely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.1 3. Ratio A taxpayer has s tanding to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution, th e action of which is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. Obiter Under Sec 7 of EO No 43 which created t he PCCR, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational expenses to b e sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. The appropriations were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no appropriatio n at all since appropriation has 1 GONZALES V NARVASA GONZAGA-REYES; August 14, 2000 FACTS - Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform or PCCR was created by t hen President Joseph Estrada on Nov 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same. > The PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999. On Feb 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 which extended the time frame of the PCCRs work un til Dec 31 1999. > The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on De

c 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. - Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and m andamus, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR on two grou nds: > it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of law > by creating the PCCR, the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the Constitution, i.e. the amendment of the fundamental charter. - In this regard, Gonzales: > seeks to enjoin the PCCR and the presiden tial consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as such > seeks to enjoin Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury. The funds for the PCCR was taken from the funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exerci se of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec 25 (5) Art VI of Constitution. 4. Appointment is not synonymous with creation. - Petitioner do es not have the personality to raise this issue as he has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointme nt, and he has not alleged the necessary facts to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest. 5. As enshrined in Sec 7 of the Bill of Rig hts, the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subje ct to such limitations as may be provided by law. - The right to information is a public right, and the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and therefore part of the general public whic h possesses the right. - matters of public concern is a term which embrace(s) a bro ad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. Decision Petition is dismiss ed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner w ith information requested. THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE (ART I, II, IV, V) STATE DEFINED COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V CAMPOS RUEDA FERNANDO; October 29, 1971 FACTS - Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrato r of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the st un of P 161,974.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer o f intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish nat ional having in Kilosbayan v Morato citing Valmonte v Phil Charity Sweepstakes Office

been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 195 5. - Ruedas request for exemption was denied on the ground that the law of Tangie r is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. - Rued a requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax ex emption. However, respondent denied this request on the grounds that there was n o reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a fore ign country. - Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression foreign country, used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an internationa l person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death ta xes upon intangible personal properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not nec essary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order to en title the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last proviso of Section 12 2 of our Tax Code. ISSUE Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international per sonality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code HELD - Supreme Court affir med Court of tax Appeals Ruling. - If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pounds formulation that it be a politicall y organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government fu nctioning under a regime of law. - it is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with t he legal competence to exact obedience to its commands. - The stress is on its b eing a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals w ithin it and maintaining its separate international personality. - State is a te rritorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allo tted area a supremacy over all other institutions. Moreover, similarly would poi nt to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood. - Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara: There can be no doubt that Californi a as a state in the American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite of inter national personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within th e meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. - This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenst ein, hardly an international personality in the traditional sense, did fall unde r this exempt category. SOVEREIGNTY IMMUNITY AND SOVEREIGN ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates form them. ART V SUFFRAGE Sec 1: Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwi se disqualified by law, who are at least 18 years of age, and who shall have res ided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they prop ose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No lite racy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercis e of suffrage Sec 2: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrec

y and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualifie d Filipinos abroad. The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, the y shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect secrecy of the ballot. To submit the WTO agreement to competent authorities for their approval o Adopt the ministerial declarations and decisions (Basically, the final act aims to lib eralize and expand world trade and strengthen the interrelationship between trad e and economic policies affecting growth and development.) - The president then sent to the senate a letter which submits the Uruguay Round Final Act for their concurrence - Another letter was sent by the president. This time, he submits th e Uruguay Final Round Act, the Agreement Establishing the WTO, the Ministerial D eclarations and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Serv ices to the Senate for its concurrence. - The Senate adopted Resolution number 9 7, which expresses their concurrence in the ratification of the president of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. - The President signed the Instrument of Ratifi cation of the Agreement Establishing the WTO and the agreements and associated l egal instruments of that agreement. - The final act signed by Secretary Navarro, on the other hand, embodies not only the WTO agreement but also the ministerial declarations and decisions and the understanding on commitments in financial se rvices. - Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the treaty. They also clai m that since the Senate only concurred with the WTO agreement and not on all the contents of the Final act, they impliedly rejected the Final act. o ISSUES 1. W ON the case is justiciable. 2. WON the parity provisions and national treatment clauses in the WTO agreement violates Sec. 19 Article 2, Sec. 10 and 12 Article 12 of the Constitution (economic nationalism clauses). 3. WON the WTO agreement un duly limits, restricts and impairs legislative power of the Congress. 4. WON the WTO agreement intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules co ncerning pleading, practice and procedures. 5. WON the concurring of the senate only in the WTO agreement and not in the final act implies rejection of the fina l act. HELD - Petition dismissed. 1. Yes. - The judiciary has the duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumen tality of government including Congress 2. No - The declaration of principles ar e not intended to be self-executing, rather, they are just aid and guides by the judiciary in judicial review, and by TANADA V ANGARA PANGANIBAN; May 2, 1997 FACTS - Petition for Certiorari - DTI secretary Rizalino Navarro signed the Fina l Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. ( Final Act). By signing it, he agreed on behalf of the Philippines

the legislature in enacting laws. These broad principles need legislative enactm ents to implement them. - The economic nationalism provisions should be read wit h other constitutional mandates, especially Sec 1 and 13 of Article 12. - The WT O protects the weak economies. There are specific provisos in the agreement with respect to tariffs, domestic subsidies and protection from unfair competition w hich are intended to help developing economies. - The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy. - The Constitution has not really shown any unb alanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any spe cific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with total prescr iption of foreign competition. - Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even futur e and unknown circumstances. 3. No - Sovereignty is not absolute because it is s ubject to restrictions and voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines. - The Const itution did not envision a hermit type isolation of the country. - By their inhe rent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty There are certain restrictions to the Constitution - Limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations. - Limitations imposed by tr eaty stipulations - When the Philippines join the UN, it consented to restrict i ts soverign rights under the concept of autolimitation. (Reagan vs Commission of Internal Revenue) - The underlying concept in the partial surrender of sovereig nty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states granting the sa me privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. 4. No. - The burden of proof is not transferred in cases of patent infringement. It is still on the patent owner to introduce evidence of the existence of the a lleged identical product. - The new rule should not really present any problem i n changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the subject, RA 165 (Pate nt Law), provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patent desig n. - Conclusion in the third issue also applies. 5. No. - The final act need not be ratified. It is not the treaty itself. Rather, it is just a summary of the p roceedings. The final act only required that the senate concur with the WTO agre ement, which they did. - The Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring to as shown by the members deliberations. REAGAN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE FERNANDO; December 27, 1969 FACTS APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals Petitioner: William Rea gan civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance t o the United States Air Force in the Philippines Respondent: Commissioner of Int ernal Revenue July 7, 1959 Reagan was assigned at the Clark Field Air Base April 22, 1960 He imported a tax-free Cadillac with accessories valued at $6,443.83 Jul y 11, 1960 petitioner asked Base Commander for permit to sell the car which was g ranted provided that he sell it to a member of the US Armed Forces or a US citiz en employed in the Philippine military bases. On the same date, he sold his car for $6,600.00 to Willie Johnson, Jr. of the US Marine Corps. - As a result of th e transaction, respondent, after deducting the landed cost of the car as well as petitioners personal exemption, fixed his net taxable income arising from the sa le at P17,912.34 rendering him liable for P2,979.00 income tax. After paying the sum, petitioner sought a refund claiming that he was exempt, but pending action on his request, he filed the case with the Court of Tax Appeals which denied hi s petition. - Petitioner asserts that he is exempt from paying the income tax. H e contends that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine terr itory and therefore beyond its jurisdiction to tax. - Petitioner relies on a sta tement of Justice Tuason in Co Po v. Collector of Internal Revenue: While in army bases or installations within the Philippines those goods were in contemplation of law on foreign soil. The court resolved this by pointing out that the stateme nt was merely obiter dictum in that case and therefore, cannot be invoked in thi s case. ISSUE WON the Clark Field Air Base is Philippine territory HELD Yes. Bas es under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agre

ement of 1947 remain part of Philippine territory. - The Philippines being indep endent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. Wit hin its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Likewise, it ha s to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty . - Concept of auto-limitation: Any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. It is not precluded from allow ing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over ce rtain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as nat ive soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be dimin ished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the Ame rican armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are n ot and cannot be foreign territory. - Therefore, the Philippines jurisdictional r ights over the bases, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preser ved. As to certain tax matters, an appropriate exemption was provided for. - Jud gment (7 concur, 2 concur in the result, 1 did not take part) The decision of th e Court of Tax Appeals denying the refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN CORONA; July 15, 2003 FACTS - Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. - Dec 17 1991, th e Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government or PCGG, file d a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, entitled Republic of the P hilippines vs. Ferdinand E. - Marcos, represented by his Estate/heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 13792. PCGG was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 1 issued on February 28, 1986 by then President Corazon Aquino, and was char ged with the task of assisting the President in the recovery of all ill-gotten we alth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during is administration, directly or t hrough nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using t heir powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship. - In said case, p etitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sou ght: 2 An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unla wfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedur e Therefor.

a. the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (estimated to be US$65 8 million inclusive of interest as of the time of decision) deposited in escrow3 in the Philippine National Bank (PNB), as ill-gotten wealth. *The ff account gr oups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks, previously held the funds: 1. Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts 2. Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scol ariValamo-SpinusAvertina-Foundation accounts 3. Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts 4. Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts 5. Maler Foundation accounts th e forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couples salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimat ely acquired property. These treasury notes are frozen at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas by virtue of freeze order issued by PCGG. - Oct 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R Marcos, Ma. Imelda M Manotoc, Irene M Araneta and Ferdinand R Marcos, J r. filed their answer. The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements - Before ca se was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements da ted Dec 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Mag tanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family - T he General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos fa mily under the conditions contained therein. - It was stated in one of the wherea s clauses the fact that petitioner Republic obtained a judgment from the Swiss Fed eral Tribunal on Dec 21 1990 that the US$356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditions are met. The decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorne y Peter Cosandey granting legal assistance to Republic. Cosandey declared the va rious deposits in the name of the foundations to be of illegal provenance and or dered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties ent itled to restitution. - Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion to approv e the General/Supplemental Agreements. 3 Money or a deed or other instrument deposited with a third person for a delivery to a given party upon the fulfillment of some condition. While in the keeping o f the third party, the money or instrument is said to be in escrow. (Random House Websters Legal Dictionary, Random House, New York, 1996) - Oct 18 1996 petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondents filed their opposition. - Nov 20 1997 Sandiganbayan d enied petitioners motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement (took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment - May 26 1998 Mrs. Marcos filed manifestati on claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agr eement and that the owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to t he Marcos estate. The Fund Transfer - Aug 10 1995 petitioner Republic filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland an additional request for the imme diate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in PNB. This was granted. Marcoses appealed, Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed ruling of District Attor ney of Zurich, and funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow in 1998. The Petition for Summary Judgment - Mar 10 2000 petitioner filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on ff grounds: a. essential facts which warrant the forfeiture of the funds are admit ted by respondents in their pleadings and other submissions made in the course o f the proceeding b. respondents admission made during pre-trial that they do not have any interest or ownership over the funds tenders no genuine issue or contro versy as to any material fact in the present action - Mrs. Marcos filed her oppo sition, which was later adopted by co-respondents Marcos children. - Mar 24 2000 hearing on motion for summary judgment was conducted - Sep 19 2000 Sandiganbaya n granted petitioners motion for summary judgment, stating that there is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, and declared the funds, w hich were deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth, forfeited in favor of

the State. - Mrs. Marcos filed motion for reconsideration on Sep 26 2000; Marco s children followed. - In Jan 31 2002 resolution, Sandiganbayan reversed its Sep 19 2000 decision, stating that the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spou ses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marco ses of the funds, and thus denied petitioners motion for summary judgment. Hence, the present petition. - Petitioner asserts in the main that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions and their authenticated t ranslations have not been submitted to the Court, when in fact the Sandiganbayan quoted extensively a portion of the Swiss decisions in denying a previous motion dated July 29 1999. Petitioner adds that nowhere in the respondents motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the authenticit y, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged. - Responde nts, of course, assert that the petition should be denied. Analysis of Responden ts Legitimate Income the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in t otal income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984. - This amount includes Ferdinand Marcos salary as Senate President in 1965, (P15,935) and as President f rom 1966 to 1985 (1966-1976 at P60,000/year; 19771985 at P100,000/year), Imelda Marcos salary as Minister of Human Settlements from 1976 to 1986 (P75,000/year), income from legal practice (P11,109,836), plus other sources. - Ferdinand Marcos made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he bec ame President, and that he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after Computations establish the total net worth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 to 1984, in the amount of US$957,487.75. (assuming income from le gal practice is valid) - The five group accounts have a total balance of US$356 million. ISSUES 1. WON petitioner Republics action for certiorari is proper. 2. W ON respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or ne gate summary judgment. 3. WON petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. HELD 1. Ratio Where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existe nce and availability of the remedy of appeal. Obiter Almost two decades have pas sed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of illgotten wea lth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is long overdue. b.

2. Ratio Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and wi ll not defeat a motion for summary judgment Obiter Court held that respondent Ma rcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Summary jud gment should take place as a matter of right. - a genuine issue is an issue of f act which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in s ubstance. - Respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation co ntained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules (Sec 10 Rule 8 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Their answers include they have no suff icient knowledge or they could not recall because it happened a long time ago or the funds were lawfully acquired without stating the basis of such assertions. - Que stion: Whether the kind of denial in respondents answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. No. The Court holds that if an allegation direc tly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categor ical and express denial must be made. - The allegations for forfeiture on the ex istence of the Swiss bank deposits, not having been specifically denied by respo ndents in their answer, were deemed admitted pursuant to Sec 11 Rule 8 of 1997 R ules on Civil Procedure. a. Propriety of Summary Judgment - Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the act ion. The Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary j udgment if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that the issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious. motion for summary judgment is pr emised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either beca use these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of a ctions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as t o any material fact. b. Whether petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to tr ial and had legally waived right it had to move for summary judgment. - Court ru les that petitioner could validly move for summary judgment any time after the r espondents answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the l itigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any wa y prevent it from moving for summary judgment. Whether by the time motion for summary judgment was filed on Mar 10 2000, estopp el by laches had already set in against petitioner. - Doctrine of estoppel or la ches does not apply when government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy. estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should ha ve been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it. in invoking doctrine of estoppel by laches, res pondents must show not only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injur y to them might result unless the action is barred. 3. Ratio The prima facie pre sumption raised by the law that a property is unlawfully acquired when the amoun t or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawfu l income of the public officer who owns it stands as proved unless defendant sho ws, and proves, that these were lawfully acquired and that there are other legit imate sources of income. Obiter burden of proof was on respondents to dispute pr esumption and show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presu mption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and, unless the fact thus prim a facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved. - the Court not only took into consideration that respondents themselves made ad missions in their pleadings and testimonies, but that petitioner was able to pre sent sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses par ticipation in the illegal acquisition of funds. c.

- substantive due process refers to intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property - there is no showing that RA 1379 i s unfair, unreasonable or unjust. Respondents were not deprived of their propert y through forfeiture for arbitrary reasons. procedural due process means complia nce with procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in confor mity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of tho se who are called upon to administer it. RESOLUTION CORONA; November 18, 2003 - SC: Respondents in their motions for reconsideration do not raise any new matt ers for the Court to resolve. Is summary judgment in forfeiture proceedings a vi olation of due process? - Respondents: RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence they are entitled to constitutional safeguards enjoyed by accused. - SC: Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. There must be a compliance with both substantive and procedural requirements in order that a par ticular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause. forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem, thus civil in nature, contrary to res pondents contention that they are penal in character. The proceedings under RA 13 79 do not terminate in the imposition of penalty but merely in the forfeiture in favor of the State of properties illegally acquired. - Civil suits to recover u nlawfully acquired property under RA 1379 may be proven by preponderance of evid ence. The Government is required only to state the known lawful income of respon dents for the prima facie presumption of illegal provenance to attach. Petitione r Republic having established this presumption, burden of proof shifted to respo ndents to show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were law fully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. Respondents failed on this part. - essence of due process is found in the reasonable opport unity to be heard and submit ones evidence in support of his defense - Respondent s were repeatedly accorded full opportunity to present their case, defenses and pleadings. They obstinately refused to do so and have tried to confuse the issue s and the Court and to delay the disposition of the case - the people and the Sta te are entitled to favorable judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and oppre ssive delays, the salutary objective being to restore the ownership of the Swiss deposits to the rightful owner that is, the Republic of the Philippines in the shortest possible time. Motions for reconsiderations denied with finality. DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM

CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT HOLMES; February 23, 1909 FACTS - Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet, contests dismissal of application of registration of their ancestral land through writ of error. Carinos ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated some parts, and pastu red parts for cattle for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11 , 1899). This land is also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom. - Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 18961897, no document of title was issued by Spanish Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under mortgag e law and the lands were registered to him but it only established possessory ti tle. - Procedure - Court - application of land registration granted (March 4, 190 4 ) - CFI of Benguet appeal on behalf of Government of the Philippines and US ha ving taken possession of property for military and public purposes; application dismissed - Philippine SC affirmed decision of CFI Benguet - Federal SC writ of error reviewing judgment of Philippine SC - Respondents argue: - Given that - Sp ain assumed and asserted that they had title to all the land in the Philippines except to permit private lands to be acquired - No prescription against the Span ish Crown - Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration within a limited time to make the title good - And US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris) - Plaintiffs land not registered and he had lost all rights and a mere tre spasser - Also, Benguet never brought under civil or military government of the Spanish Crown, so it is not certain whether registration granted was under Spani sh laws - Plaintiff argues: - Argument seems to amount to denial of native title s throughout an important Island of Luzon ISSUE WON Carino owns the land HELD Ratio Prescription, mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states: Where such poss essors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription. - Decree of June 25, 1880 states: possession for certain times shall be deemed owners; cult ivated land 20 years, uncultivated 30 years. Plaintiffs father was owner of land by the very terms of this decree. - By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the prop erty and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered for th e benefit of the inhabitants thereof. Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court (Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main. - Every presumption is and ought to be against the gover nment in a case like present. - The reason for taking over the Philippines was d ifferent (compared to occupation of white race against Native Americans). Our fi rst object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for private gain. - The effect of proof wa s not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the de cree, if not by earlier law. Decision REVERSED - Applicant should be granted wha t he seeks and should not be deprived of what by the practice and belief of thos e among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. - While the motion was pending, a new circular of the Department of Justice (Cir cular No. 128) dated August 12, 1947 was issued, instructing all register of dee ds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. - RDM naturally obeyed the circular. ISSUE Jurisdiction: WON the Court should grant t he motion withdrawing an appeal with the issuance of the said circular of the DO J Primary Issue: WON an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential lan d. HELD The Court denied the motion withdrawing the appeal. Granting a withdrawa l of appeal is discretionary upon the Court after the briefs have been presented . - It cannot grant appellants motion withdrawing his appeal only because the c onstitutional issue should be avoided. - Also, the withdrawal was denied because under the circumstances, particularly (1) the circular of the Dept. of Justice issued while this case was pending before the Court and ordering all registers o f deed to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens, t ogether with the circumstance that (2) probably a similar question may never com e up again before the Court, the effect of the withdrawal would be offensive to the opinion reached by a majority of the members of the Court after long and exh

austive deliberations on the constitutional question. - To allow the withdrawal under such circumstances is equivalent to tolerating an offense to the constitut ion, offense that may be permanent. - The Court held that NO, aliens may not acq uire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands. (The vot es were: 8-3) - The case was decided under section 5 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it PROHIBITS THE TRANSFER TO ALIENS OF ANY PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND INCLUDING RES IDENTIAL LAND WHATEVER ITS ORIGIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN. - This provision closes the o nly remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. - This provision should be read in connection with section 1 of Article X III "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall no t be alienated" and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. - This provision secures the policy of national ization in Sec. 1 of Art. XIII. - It would be futile to prohibit the alienation of public lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so KRIVENKO V REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA MORAN; November 15, 1947 FACTS - Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila - December, 1941-Krivenko, a lien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate. Inc - The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war. - May, 1945-Krivenko sought to accomplis h said registration but the Register of Deeds of Manila (RDM) denied on the grou nd that he is an alien and cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. - Krivenko filed as suit in the CFI of Manila by means of a consulta. - CFI affirmed RDMs refusal hence this appeal. - After the briefs have been presented, Krivenko file d a motion to withdraw the appeal. - The case was already voted upon and the maj ority decision was being prepared. - Rule 52, section 4 of the Rules of Court: C ourts discretion to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been pre sented. - The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever and the Solicito r General was agreeable to it.

alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of the Fil ipino citizens. - Ratio The Court shall rule that it cannot grant a motion withd rawing an appeal if such a withdrawal would result to a permanent offense to the Constitution. - The Court shall rule that under the provisions of the Constitut ion, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lan ds in the Philippines and as a consequence, all acquisitions made in contraventi on of the prohibitions since the Constitution became effective are null and void per se and ab initio. LEE HONG HOK V DAVID FERNANDO; December 27, 1972 FACTS - Pedro, Simeon, Rosita and Leoncio LEE HONG HOK, petitioners - Aniano DAV ID, the Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Director of Lan ds and Court of Appeals - APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of A ppeals. - Petitioners wanted to declare null and void Davids Torrens Title (OCT N o. 510) because they alleged to own the disputed lot (226 m2 Lot 2892, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre) through accretion. - Jun 18, 1958 Di rector of Lands issued David a sales patent of the lot - Aug 26, 1959 Undersecre tary of Agricultural and Natural Resources issued David a Miscellaneous Sales Pa tent No. V-1209 - Oct 21, 1959 Naga City Register of Deeds issued David OCT No. 510 ISSUES 1. WON Lot 2892 came into being not by reclamation but by accretion, therefore a private not public domain (this court says it does not warrant any f urther consideration) 2. WON authoritative doctrines do not preclude a party oth er than the government to dispute the validity of a grant (this court says it do es) 3. WON the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year sho uld not be recognized (this court says it should be). HELD 1. Imperium is the go vernment authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and dominium is the states capacity to own or acquire pr operty. Dominium enables the state to provide for the exploitation and use of la nds and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. The present Constitution adopts the modified concept of jur e regalia, in which all lands in Spain and its earlier decrees were held by the Crown, and the present Constitution holds that it is the state which possess es ownership (Cario v Insular Government). In Valenton v Murciano (1904), all lan ds held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us (the Spanish st ate) according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all wh at to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for pu blic squares, ways, pastures and commons in those places which are peopled, taki ng into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future an d their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be nec essary for tillage and pasturage, confirming in them in what they now have and g iving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and une ncumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish. In Montano v Insular Government, unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power is ves ted in Congress. The land in question is not private property; the Director of L ands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustaine d the public character thereof by virtue of reclamation (and not by accretion wh ich the petitioners claim). Therefore, the only remedy for the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud committed by respondents. There w as no fraud; everything was done in the open notices were published, sale and aw arding of land to David were public official acts of a Government officer. The d isputed lot is a therefore a public land. result of reclamation, application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the app ellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplica te certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of RA 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein. After registration and issuance of the certificate and duplica te certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land is automatically

covered by RA 496 --RA 496 48 says that any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year from t he date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible. In Aquino v Director of Lands (1919), [t]he procee dings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final. In Cabacug v Lao, a holder of a land acquired un der a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Titl e, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor th e right to repurchase within a period of five years. Davids application was a rene wal of his deceased wifes application, wherein his deceased wife occupied Lot 289 2 since 1938. The decision of Court of Appeals of January 31, 1961 and its resol ution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed 2. Only the government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary o f Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certif icate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. Plaintiffs are private parties and not government officials, and therefore cannot institute for the nullificati on of Davids Torrens Title, since they are not the registered owners of the land and they had not been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Ca dastre after claiming it as their private property. Maninang v Consolacion state s that [t]he fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whethe r the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the govern ment may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defe ndant (in this case, the respondents) cannot question it. The legality of the gr ant is a question between the grantee and the government. Only the government can question the validity of the title which it gave. 3. Since the filing of the sa les application of David and during all the proceedings in connection with said GONZALES V MARCOS FERNANDO; July 31, 1975 FACTS - Gonzales assailed the validity of EO 30 as an impermissible encroachment by the President on the legislative prerogative - EO 30 has the creation of a t rust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the name and style of the Cult ural Center of the Philippines to awaken our peoples consciousness in the nations cultural heritage and encourage its preservation, promotion and development - In the Court of First Instance, stress was laid on the funds administered by the C enter as coming from donations and contributions and not a single centavo raised by taxation

- Respondents argue EO 30 as: 1) legitimate exercise of executive power and that 2) this is supplementary to rather than a disregard of RA 4165 creating the Nat ional Commission on Culture and that 3) petitioner Gonzales did not have the req uisite personality to contest as a taxpayer the validity of EO 30 as the funds h eld by the Cultural Center came from donations and contributions and not one cen tavo came from taxation - Later, PD 15 was issued creating the Cultural Center o f the Philippines ISSUES 1. WON petitioner has standing 2. WON EO 30 encroached on the legislative prerogative 3. WON the issue on the validity of EO 30 became moot and academic HELD 1. The court shall rule that taxpayer has no legal standi ng to question executive acts that do not involve the use of public funds 2.The court shall rule that the President had the power to administer a trust created by an agreement with a foreign country 3.EO 30 was superseded by PD 15, hence th e suit has assumed a moot and academic character Obiter (1)-The funds administer ed by the President of the Philippines came from donations and contributions and not by taxation -There was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest (2) As head of State, as Chief Executive, as spokesman in domestic and f oreign affairs, in behalf of the estate as parens patriae, the President has aut hority to implement for the benefit of the Filipino people by creating the Cultu ral Center consisting of private citizens to administer the private contribution s and donations given not only by the US government but also by private persons -Creation of rules governing the administration of a trust may be concurrently e xercised by the President and Congress Decision DISMISSED, No standing and even if there was, still no encroachment and that it is already moot and academic ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on comm unally bounded and defined territory; - Ancestral lands (sec.3b IPRA) - Land occ upied by members of the ICC/IP since time immemorial, by themselves or through t heir predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group o wnership,... including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private fores ts, swidden farms, and tree lots. - Ancestral domains (sec.3a IPRA) - Areas gene rally belonging to ICC/IP comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas and nat ural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed b y ICC/IP, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually s ince time immemorial continuously to the present... including ancestral lands, f orests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and oth er resources, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by ICC but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of ICC who are still nomadi c or shifting cultivators. - Procedure: CRUZ and EUROPA, as citizens and taxpaye rs (upon the plea that questions raised are of "transcendental importance"), fil ed for PROHIBITION (directing NCIP to cease from implementing IPRA and its IR; D ENR Secretary to cease from implementing Circular 2; DBM Secretary to cease from disbursing public funds) and MANDAMUS (commanding DENR Secretary to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional mandate) assailing certain provisions of RA8371 (IPRA) as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. ISSUES The following provisions of RA8371 and its Implementing Rules were questioned (1) Sections 3a, 3b, 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over LA NDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (including the minerals and other natural resources the rein) in violation of the REGALIAN DOCTRINE. (2) Sections 3a and 3b violate the RIGHTS OF PRIVATE LANDOWNERS. (3) Sections 51, 52, 53, 59, 63, 65, 66 which defi ne the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and make customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and lands, violate the DU E PROCESS clause of the Constitution. (4) Rule 7, Part 2, Section 1 of the NCIP Admin. Order No.1, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the N CIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination", is invalid as it infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments. HELD There was NO MAJORITY VOTE reached as the Justices were equally divided at 7-7. The case was then redeliberated upon, but the voting still remained the sam

e. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. - Those in favor of dismissing petition: J. Kapunan, J . Davide Jr., J. Bellosillo, J. Quisumbing, J. Santiago, J. Puno, J. Mendoza - T hose in favor of granting petition: J. Panganiban, J. Vitug, J. Melo, J. Pardo, J. Buena, J. Gonzaga-Reyes, J. De Leon SEPARATE OPINIONS PUNO [dismiss] - Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System A. Laws of the Indies: All lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanis h Crown. B. Valenton vs. Murciano (1904): "While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before t he proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he d id that the State remained the absolute owner." C. Public Land Acts (PLA) and th e Torrens System: Under the PLA, "public land" referred to all lands of the publ ic domain whose title still remained in the government. The Torrens system requi res that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of such property described. The certific ate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible. D. Philippine Constitutions: T he Regalian Doctrine was established 1935 Constitution, and it was reiterated in the 1973 and 1987 Consti. -Provisions of IPRA do NOT contravene the Constitutio n (1) AD and AL are the private property of the IP and do not constitute part of the land of the public domains, as they have acquired such properties by NATIVE TITLE (AD/AL) and TORRENS TITLE (AL). a. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Carino is the only case that specifically and cat egorically recognizes native title. b. For purposes of registration under the PL A and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts AL into public agri cultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication i s that AL is private. (2) The right of ownership and possession by the ICC/IP to their AD is a LIMITED form of ownership and does not include the right to alien ate such AD. a. It is private because it is not part of the public domain. But t he AD is owned in common by the ICC/IP and not by CRUZ V SECOF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RES PER CURIAM; 6 December 2000 FACTS - Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) - Indigeno us peoples/cultural communities (IP/ICC) -Group of people identified by self-asc ription and

one particular person. Communal rights to the land are held not only by the pres ent possessors but extends to all generations of the ICC/IP. b. Lands may be tra nsferred only to the members of the same ICC/IP; in accord with customary laws; and subject to the right of redemption of IP for a period of 15 years if transfe rred to a non-member of IP. c. The indigenous concept of ownership exists even w ithout a paper title. (3) The Regalian Doctrine has not been violated as the rig ht of ICC/IP to develop lands and NR within the AD does not deprive the State of ownership over the NR, and of control and supervision in their development and exploitation. a. Sec.7a limits the right of ownership of the IP. But the Impleme nting Rules of IPRA included the term "natural resources" in such rights of owne rship which is CONTRARY to Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti. b. The small-scale u tilization of NR in Sec.7b of the IPRA is allowed under par.3, Sec.2 Art.12 of t he 1987 Consti. Managing and conserving these resources, by their very nature, n ecessarily reject utilization in a large-scale. c. The large-scale utilization o f NR in Sec.57 of IPRA may be harmonized with par.1 and 4, Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1 987 Consti. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources and who has the power to grant such preferential righ ts. (4) IPRA is a recognition of our active participation in the International I ndigenous Movement. VITUG [grant] (1) IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the ancestral domains, as the notion of community property involves matters of proprietary interest AND al so some forms of self-governance over the property. (2) The decision of the US C ourt in Carino vs. Insular Government cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. (3) Art.12 sec.5 par.2- "The constitution al aim is to get Congress to look closely into the customary laws and, with spec ificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of the stream of laws." There should be a balancing of interests between specific need of IP and imperatives of national interest. KAPUNAN [dismiss] ~Preliminary issues(1) The petition presents an actual controversy. (2) Petition ers have the requisite standing. As citizens, they possess the public right to e nsure that the national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in violation o f the Constitution. As taxpayers, they possess the right to restrain officials f rom wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. (3) The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy. (4) No twithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, (petition should have been filed in the lower court fir st) the Court assumes jurisdiction in view of the importance of the issues raise d. ~Substantive issues(1) The provisions recognizing ownership of IP over the an cestral lands and domains are not unconstitutional. a. The Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial . b. Sec.1 Art.12 of 1935 Constitution does not state that certain lands which a re "absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence," shall then be owned by the State. c. Sec.5 Art.12 expresses sovereign intent to "protect the rights of IP to their AL." Framers did not intend Congress to decide whether AD shall b e public or private property, as they have acknowledged that AD shall be treated as private property. (2) The provisions of RA8371 do not infringe upon the Stat es ownership over the natural resources within the ancestral domains. a. Sec.3a merely defines coverage of AD; its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title. It does not ipso facto convert the character of such natura l resources as private property of the IP. b. The concept of native title to nat ural resources, unlike native title to land, has NOT been recognized in the Phil ippines. (3) The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural res ources are not unconstitutional. a. Sec.2(3) Art.12 of the 1935 Consti allows sm all-scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens. The State retains fu ll control over such activities, through the imposition of requirements and cond

itions for the exploration, development and utilization of the NR. b. Under sec. 7b, rights given to IP are duly circumscribed and are limited: to manage and con serve NR within territories; to benefit and share the profits from allocation an d utilization of NR; to negotiate the terms and conditions for exploration of NR in the area (refers only to the preliminary activity of search and prospecting of mineral resources); to an informed and intelligent participation in the formu lation and implementation of any project that will affect AD; to receive just an d fair compensation for any damages sustained by such projects; to effective mea sures by the government to prevent any interference with these rights c. Priorit y rights do not mean exclusive rights. The grant of said priority rights is not a blanket authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. ~Corollary issu es(1) IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause. a. The property rights referred to in Sec.56 ("Existing property regimes should be protected") belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or no nindigenous. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distingui sh. b. The fact that NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of IP does no t mean that the NCIP is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of deliver ing justice to the non-IP. c. The application of customary law is limited to dis putes concerning property rights or relations in determining the ownership and e xtent of the AD, where ALL parties involved are members of IP. (2) Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the Presidents power of control over the E xecutive Department. Although NCIP is independent to a certain degree, it was pl aced by Congress "under the Office of the President" and as such, is still subje ct to the Presidents power of control and supervision under Sec.17 Art.7 of the Consti. MENDOZA [dismiss] (1) It is not a justiciable controversy. Judicial power cannot be extended to ma tters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting balan ce of power. (2) Petitioners do not have legal standing. In Tanada v. Tuvera, wh en the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in i nterest. But in this case, what public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general and in common with other citizens?? PANGANIBAN [grant] - RA8371 is unconstitutional in thatA. It recognizes and grants rights of owners hip over "lands of the public domain which are owned by the State." B. It lessen s the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration, development, and utili zation of natural resources" which should under be the full control and supervis ion of the State." (1) All Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Because of the States implementation of policies considered t o be for the common good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain con ditions, even vested rights of ownership. (2) The concept of ownership of ICC/IP , even if it is a collective right, still perpetually withdraws such property fr om the control of the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens of the Repu blic. Ownership of NR is in ALL the Filipino people. (3) Sec.3 Art.12 of the Con sti provides that Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of alie nable public land, but RA8371 speaks of no area or

term limits to ancestral lands and domains. Based on ethnographic surveys, solic itor general estimates that AD cover 80% of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 milion hectares of land in the country. (4) Sec.2 Art.1 2 of the Consti provides that the State may directly undertake exploration, deve lopment and utilization of NR or it could enter into co-production, joint ventur e or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities at least 6 0% Filipino-owned (and such agreements shall not exceed 25 years). RA 8371 relin quishes this power in favor of ICC/IP and they may even exercise such right with out any time limit. (5) Yes, ICC/IP should be given priority in the use of their AD and AL but they should not be granted perpetual ownership and control of the nations substantial wealth to the exclusion of other law-abiding Filipino citi zens. 2. 3. immune from suit (even w/o consent of the State). WoN the respondents are guilty of discrimination against petitioner Shauf. WoN Shauf should be awarded compens atory damages. SUITS AGAINST THE STATE ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS Sec 3: The State shall not be sued without its consent SHAUF V COURT OF APPEALS REGALADO; November 27, 1990 FACTS Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Bas e, for which she is eminently qualified. She had functioned as a Guidance Counse lor at the Clark Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. her application was forward ed to Anthony Persi, who had some reservations regarding Shaufs work experience. Persi then requested the Civilian Personnel Office to initiate immediate inquiry to the Central Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO). Persi was then i nformed by CORRO that an Edward B. Isakson was selected for the position. Isakso n was placed on the rolls at Clark Air Base on January 1977. By reason of her no n-selection to the position, Loida Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity c omplain against respondents for alleged discrimination against the former by rea son of her nationality and sex. Trial court held in favor of Shauf, while Court of Appeals reversed decision. ISSUES 1. WoN the officers of the US Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them under the Philippine American Military Bases Agreement are HELD As expressed in Art. XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Consti, the state may not b e sued without its consent. This is a generally accepted principle of Internatio nal law under Art II, Section 2. The case at hand may be construed as a suit aga inst the US, since the damages to Shauf will be taken from funds of the US. Howe ver, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state fo r acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. Unauthorize d acts of government officials are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials by one whose rights have been invaded by such offenses, is not a s uit against the State covered by the rule of immunity. The respondents are being sued in their private and personal capacity. The rationale for this ruling is t hat the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrat ing an injustice. A public official may be liable in his personal private capaci ty for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. Doctrine Yes. Rega lado is concurred with by MelencioHerrera, Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento. 1. The US officers are NOT IMMUNE from suit even without the consent of the State. 2. Yes the petitioners are guilty of discrimination against Shauf. Despite Shaufs qu alifications, Persi did not even consider the formers application. Since the peti

tioner was able to prove the discrimination in the nonconsideration of her appli cation, the burden shifted to the respondents. The respondents however answered with mere denials of the charges. Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as t he merchandise control guard. Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the public ation of the Plan of the Day a daily publication that featured among others, an act ion line inquiry. On feb.3,1978, an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the merchandise control inspector and that a certain Auring was, in herself, a disgrace to the office. Ra rang, being the only person named Auring in the said office, went to press an ac tion for damages against Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent publication.) She alleged that the article c onstituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impea ch her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt an d ridicule. Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties inv olved. Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official acts of the US government, but personal and tortious acts (which are not includ ed in the rule that a sovereign country cant be sued without its consent). Suit a gainst US Naval Base was dismissed. ISSUES 1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine Territory, in discharge of their official duties, are immune from suit. 2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortious act while dischargi ng official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit ? HELD 1. Yes, they are immune. Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentaliti es of the US government are immune from suit (but only when they are acting/ dis charging their official functions. this is part of the second issue) Art.XVI, se c.3 of 1987 consti provides that state may not be sued without its consent. But even without this affirmation, court is still bound by the doctrine of incorpora tion4. The doctrine is applicable not only to suits against the state but also t o complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly performed by them in dis charge of their official duties. 4 3. Shauf need not be awarded compensatory damages. There was no proof that she real ly was to earn $39,662 if she was employed at the time. Damages which are merely possible are speculative. There must be an actual proof of loss. WYLIE V RARANG GUTIERREZ; May 28, 1992 FACTS Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the assistant administrative officer a nd commanding officer, respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a cond ition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admi ssion to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states

The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts o f another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary conseque nce of the principles of independence and equality of States. Because the activi ties of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and prop rietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends onl y to acts jure imperii. There is no question, therefore, that the petitioners ac tively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that th e petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication. It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. 2. No. Ratio Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty. The general rule is that public officials c an be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in con nection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibili ty and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged t o pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is gover ned by the provisions of this Chapter. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the character and repu tation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Off ice of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Aurin g if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent becaus e under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "A uring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the p rivate respondent. - Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the RTC of Angeles City - This case is a consolidation of four s eparate cases, all involving state immunity. G.R. No. 76607 - Private respondent s Valencia, Tanglao and del Pilar sued officers of the U.S. Air Force in Clark A ir Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbe ring services in the said base. - Respondents sought to compel the Philippine Ar ea Exchange (PHAX) and individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant D izon, to conduct rebidding and to allow respondents by a writ of preliminary inj unction to continue operating concessions pending litigation. - Respondent court issued an order directing petitioners to maintain the status quo. - Petitioners filed motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injuncti on on the ground that the action was a suit against the United States, which has not waived its non-suability, and that as officials/employees of the U.S. Air F orce, defendants were also immune from suit. - Trial Court denied the applicatio n for a writ of preliminary injunction as well as the motion to dismiss. - Petit ioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the S C. G.R. No. 79470 - Genove filed a complaint for damages against Lamachia, Belsa , Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreati on Center at John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. After investigation, the ff: f acts were ascertained: - Genove poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking vegetables served to club customers. - Lamachia, as club manager, suspended Gen ove and referred the case to the Board of Arbitrators, which found him guilty an d recommended his dismissal. - Defendants, joined by the United States of Americ a, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force, was immune from suit, and that the suit was in effect against th e United States, which has not given its consent to be sued. - Said motion was d

enied. - Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injun ction in the SC. G.R. No. 80018 - Luis Bautista, was employed as barracks boy in Camp O Donnel, an extension of Clark Air Base. - He was arrested following a buy -bust operation conducted by individual petitioners King, Dye and Bostick, offic ers of the United States Air Force and special agents of the United States Air Force Office of Special Operations, for violating R.A. 6425, or the Dangerous Drugs Act. - Bautista was dismissed from e mployment. - He then filed a complaint for damages against individual petitioner s. - Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the defendants were acting in their official capacity when they did the acts complai ned of and that the suit was against the United States without its consent. - Mo tion was denied by respondent judge. - Petitioners filed for certiorari and proh ibition with preliminary injunction in the SC. G.R. No. 80258 - Private responde nts filed a complaint for damages for injuries sustained as a result of the acts of herein petitioners. - According to plaintiffs (herein respondents), defendan ts (herein petitioners) beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them and caused them extensive injuries. - According to defendants, t he plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they w ere struggling and resisting arrest. - The United States of America and the indi vidually named defendants moved to dismiss the case and argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States which has not given its consent to b e sued. The defendants also claimed immunity for acts done by them in the perfor mance of their official functions. - Trial court denied the motion to dismiss, a s well as the motion for reconsideration. - Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in the SC. ISSUES 1. WON the cases agai nst the petitioners were suits against the United States, to which it has not co nsented 2. WON the individual petitioners may invoke immunity from suit by mere assertion that the acts were done by them in the performance of their official f unctions as officers or agents of the United States HELD 1) Ratio If the case in volves the state entering into a contract in the discharge of its commercial, pr oprietary and private function, then the state will be deemed to have impliedly consented to the suit. Reasoning - The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law. - All states a re sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over the other. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V GUINTO CRUZ; February 26, 1990 FACTS

- The rule says that a state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. - Consent may be express or implied. - Express-embodied in a general or special law - Implied-when the state enters into a contract or it commences litigation - However, not all contracts operate as a waiver of nonsuabilitya distinction must be made between contracts entered i nto in a states governmental and sovereign capacity or private, proprietary and c ommercial capacity - The latter implies waiver of non-suability, the former does not. * If it is not proven that the acts were done by the individual petitioner s in the performance of their official functions as officers or agents of the Un ited States, then they may not invoke immunity form suit. - The doctrine of stat e immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. - The fa ct that the acts were done by the individual petitioners in the performance of t heir official functions as officers or agents of the United States is a matter o f evidence, and charges against them may not be dismissed just by mere assertion . If the individual petitioners are found liable for personal torts in which the US itself is not involved, then they alone must satisfy the judgment. 2) Ruling : (Application of ratio in the different cases) G.R. No. 76607 - Barbershops sub ject of the concessions granted by US are commercial enterprises operated by pri vate persons. The contracts being decidedly commercial, petitioners cannot plead any immunity. - Petition is dismissed. G.R. No. 79470 - Restaurant services off ered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity. Petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage sui t against them. - However, notwithstanding these considerations, complaint in th e court below must still be dismissed. Although suable, the petitioners are not liable because of the strength of evidence that they acted properly in terminati ng Genove for his disgusting offense. - Petition is granted, case against petiti oners is dismissed. G.R. No. 80018 - Individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions, and not in their private or unoffic ial capacity. - It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the Un ited States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their princ ipal, which has not given its consent to be sued. - Petition is granted, case against petitioners is dismissed. G.R. No. 80258 - T he court hesitates to make a conclusion because the record is too meager to indi cate if the individual petitioners were acting in the discharge of their officia l functions, or had actually exceeded their authority. - Only after needed inqui ry in the lower court shall have determined in what capacity the individual peti tioners were acting will the Court determine if the doctrine of state immunity i s applicable. - Petition is dismissed and the respondent court is directed to pr oceed with the hearing and decision. JUSMAG PHILIPPINES V. NLRC PUNO; December 15, 1994 FACTS - Florencio Sacramento was one of the 74 security assistance support perso nnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG Phils.; he had been with JUSMAG for more than 20yr s (1969-1992); was dismissed on April 27, 1992 - He filed a complaint with the D ept. of Labor and Employment (March 31, 1992) on the ground that he was illegall y suspended and dismissed; asked for reinstatement - JUSMAG filed a Motion to Di smiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of US; also alleged lack of e mployer-employee relp and it has no juridical personality to sue and be sued - La bor Arbiter Daniel Cueto dismissed complaint for want of jurisdiction - NLRC rev ersedJUSMAG had lost its right not to be sued based on: 1) estoppel- JUSMAG faile d to refute the employer-employee relp under the control test and 2) it has waive d its right to immunity from suit when it hired Sacramentos services. - NLRC reli ed on Harry Lyons vs. USA (US Govt waived its immunity from suit by entering into a contract of stevedoring services, and thus, it submitted itself to the jurisd iction of local courts) - JUSMAG now contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the labor arbiters decision, in saying that JUSMAG wa ived its immunity from suit, in finding an employeremployee relp between JUSMAG

and Sacramento, and in considering JUSMAG estopped from denying that respondent is its employee for failure to present proof. ISSUE Is the Joint United States M ilitary Assistance Group to the RP (JUSMAG-PHIL) immune from suit? HELD Ratio As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been r estricted to sovereign or governmental activities. The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to comm ercial, private and proprietary acts. Reasoning - When JUSMAG took the services of Sacramento, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the US pur suant to the Military Assistance Agreement. The suit is, in effect, one against the US and, considering that the US has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint cannot prosper. - Immunity of State from suit is one of the universal ly recognized principles of international law that the Phils. Recognizes and ado pts as part of the law of the land. This is anchored on the principle of soverei gn equality of states (an equal has no power over an equal). Discussion - Histor ical Background of JUSMAG - was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agre ement dated March 21, 1947 between the Philippines and the US; primary task was to advise and assist the Philippines on air force, army and naval matters - in 1 991, US manifested its preparedness to provide funds to cover the salaries of SA SP and security guards, the rent of bldgs, and housing, and cost of utilities Memorandum of Agreement between AFP and JUSMAG-Phils - Salaries- for security gu ards and SASP - SASP are employees of the AFP; under the total operational contr ol of the Chief JUSMAGPhils; AFP to assume the severance/retirement pay liabilit y for all appointed SASP - It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the U S. Hence, the suit is, in effect, one against the US Government. - In this juris diction, Immunity of State is a universally accepted principle. Immunity is unde rstood as the exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdicti on of another state. - A state cannot be sued in the courts of another state, wi thout its consent or waiver. An exception to the doctrine, however, was recogniz ed in Santos, et al vs. Santos, et al: the state itself may be sued, even without its consent, because by entering into a contract, the sovereign state has desce nded the level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the ver y act of entering into such contract. - it was in this light that the state immun ity issue in Harry Lyons vs. USA was decided - Exception evolved: existence of c ontract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts.

US vs. Ruiz: ...does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions US vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al: petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immun ity...the reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. - SASP are employees of the AFP as consistently co ntended by JUSMAG, thus it is not estopped from denying employer-employee relati onship Dispositive Petition for certiori is granted, resolution of NLRC is rever sed and set aside HELD No. Theres no grave abuse of discretion. Ratio 1. RA No. 4201 has already re pealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. Therefore, the Clerk of this Court has the authority to issue writs of execution and notices 2. First, t he tone in asserting this argument was even irresolute. And 2nd, the Peoples Home site and Housing Corporation had a juridical existence enabling it to sue and be sued. The premise that the funds spoken of are public in character may be accep ted in the sense that it was government-owned. However, it does not follow that they were exempt from garnishment. Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Courts decision. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUES (1) WON the Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would have warranted the publications of the notices of as would have foreclosure (2) WON the SSS is immune from suit (3) WON SSS can be held liable for damages. HELD (1) Ratio On questions of appre ciation of evidence, factual findings of the lower court are not subject to revi ew by this Court. Reasoning The reasoning used precedence to arrive at this rati o. Applying the rule, it can be said therefore, that the findings of the Court o f Appeals that the mortgagedebtors have not in fact violated their contract beca use SSS accepted their installment payments although given late will not be dist urbed on appeal. (2) Ratio An entity performing governmental functions, by virtu e of the explicit provision of an enabling law, is deemed to have waived immunit y from suit, although it does not thereby concede its liability. Reasoning Again , the leg of reasoning is ratio by precedence, citing Rayo v. Court of First Ins tance of Bulacan, (110 SCRA 457), which involved the National Power Corporation as an entity performing governmental functions. In that case it said, It is suffi cient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to site and be sued in any court under its charter. The enabling law is R.A. No. 6395. Applying this rule in the present case, the SSS ow n organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court, the en abling law being R.A. 1161 and P.D. 24. Hence, theres a statutory consent by the SSS to waive right of immunity from suit. (3) Ratio No moral and/or temperate da mages is to be adjudged against a party which commenced foreclosure proceedings in view of the irregular payments of the debtor of his installments. Decision (1 ) The ruling of the lower courts remain. While it is true that the payments of t he monthly installments were previously not regular, it is a fact that as of Jun e 30, 1968 the appellee, David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-date a nd current in the payment of their monthly installments. Having accepted the pri or late payments of the monthly installments, the appellant could no longer sudd enly and without prior notice to the mortgagors apply for the extra-judicial for eclosure of the mortgage. (2) SSS is deemed to have waived its immunity from sui t. (3) SSS cannot be held liable for damages. Voting 10 justices concur, 1 disse nt, 3 took no part. PNB V CIR FERNANDO; January 31, 1978 FACTS - Petitioner PNB received a notice of garnishment which was served upon it s branch on QC by an authorized deputy sheriff of the court *** What was sought

to be garnished was the money of the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation dep osited at the petitioners branch in QC in order to satisfy the decision of the re spondent court - PNB filed a motion to quash the notice based on 2 grounds: 1. t he appointment of respondent Gilbert Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to ser ve the writ of execution was contrary to law *** PNB contends that the service o f notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of this court contravenes Sec. 11 of C ommonwealth Act No. 1055 *** It argues that it is the sheriff of QC and not the Clerk of this court who is its Ex-officio Sheriff, that has the authority to ser ve the notice of garnishment and that the actual service of the latter officer o f said notice is therefore not in order 2. the funds subject of the character may be public in character - COIR denied PNBs motion to quash a notice of garnishment ISSUE WON an order of Court of Industrial Relations (COIR) denying, for lack of merit, petitioner PNBs motion to quash a notice of garnishment6 can be stigmatiz ed as a grave abuse of discretion. 5 SSS v CA MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 21. 1983 FACTS - In March 1963, spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Cancio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot locat ed at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificat e of Title No. 2000 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal its collateral. Pursuant t o this real estate loan said spouses executed on March 26, 1963 the correspondin g real estate mortgage originally in the amount of P39,500.00 which was later in creased to P48,000.00 covering said property. - On July 9, 1968, defendant SSS f iled an application with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground, among others that the conditions of the mortgage have been broken since October 1967 with the default on the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due a nd payable on the principal debt and the interest thereon, and all of the monthl y installments due and payable thereafter up to the present date. Notice of the Sheriffs Sale of the mortgaged property was initially published in the Sunday C hronicle in its issue of July 14, 1968 announcing the sale at public auction of the said mortgaged property. Despite plaintiffs letter to defendant demanding the latter to withdraw foreclosure and discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to date in the payment of their monthly amortizations, defendant SSS still went on to publish second an d third publications of foreclosure. - On July 24, 1968, the plaintiff Cruz spou ses instituted before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorneys fees against the SSS and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal allegin g, among other things, that they had fully and religiously paid their monthly am ortizations and had not defaulted in any payment. Trial Court rendered judgment against defendant SSS. All writs and processes issued by the court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial sheriffs or by any person authorized by this court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance 6 Garnishment a l egal warning concerning the attachment of property to satisfy a debt -- also the attachment of such property

SEPARATE OPINION MAKASIAR [dissent] What was committed in this case was a tortious act (grossly n egligent bordering on malice or bad faith) of the employees of the SSS in forecl osing the mortgage of the wrong mortgage-debtor SSS cannot be held liable for th e damages caused by the tortious acts of its employees in the performance of the ir regular functions SSS as a public instrumentality for social welfare is immun e from suit despite its Charter provision that it can sue and be sued. SSS exerc ises purely governmental functions and cannot be sued without its consent for th e tortious acts of its personnel 1. WON the compensation awarded by the court is proper 2. WON the attorneys fees awarded were exorbitant HELD 1) In a review of the relevant Article of the New C ivil Code, the Court noted that the provision applies only if there was a contra ct or agreement. Using the precedent, Velasco vs Manila Electric (L-19390 Decemb er 29, 1971), the court expressed the view that the taking of private property b y the government in the exercise of its eminent domain does not give rise to a c ontractual obligation. Since there is no contract to speak of because the obliga tion of the government sought to be enforced does not originate from contract, t hen Article 1250 does not apply. The just compensation is the value of the prope rty at the time it was taken. - Amigable is still entitled to interest on the pr ice of the land as there was no motion of reconsideration from the Solicitor Gen eral before the decision became final. 2) The Court noted that Amgable only sked for P5,000 attorneys fees and hence the amount requested is reasonable. Disposit ive Judgment appealed is reversed as to the basis of determining the price of th e land. And the price of P2.37 per square meter or total amount is P14,615.79 pl us six percent per annum interest reckoned from the time the property was taken to the time the compensation is paid. members, for instance the appointment of one Tecson as justice of the peace and the branding of Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera as a coward and a rascal, were expli citly raised among others. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES 1. What is meant in sectio n 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression the Insular Government of the Philippines?8 2 . Whether the article constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No. 292? HEL D 1. Ratio The term government as employed in Act No. 292 of the United States Phi lippine Commission is used in the abstract sense of the existing political syste m as distinguished from the concrete organism of the Government the Houses of Co ngress and the Executive. Reasoning There are two admissible meanings of the ter m government provided: a. in a general and abstract sense, the existing laws and i nstitutions of the Islands, or b. the aggregate of the individuals by whom the G overnment of the Islands is, for the time being, administered. The first admissi ble definition is derived from the act of (the U.S.) Congress on July 14, 1798, commonly known as the Sedition Act)9 2. Ratio The publication of an article can not be punished under Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission as having seditious tendencies unless it has a tendency to produce disaffection or a feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to its laws. - The publication of an article abusive of the United Stat es Philippine Commission and its members is not a libel upon the Government and does not fall within said Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission . Reasoning The article in question contains no attack upon the government syste m of the U.S., and though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a b ody and some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmen tal system by which authority of the U.S. is enforced in these Islands. Furtherm ore, it is the character of the men who are intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and their private morals, a nd the wisdom of 8 COMMISIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS V BURGOS DE CASTRO; March 31, 1980 FACTS - Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu - The fact

s of the case is as per above except that the compensation determined is now the issue. The value of the property was pegged at P 2.37 per square meter based on the price used in the conveyance of several pieces of property in the same area at about the same time. However, the court a quo in determining due compensatio n, considered the value of the pesos to the dollar at the time the case was bein g decided. So instead of just P14,615.79 the amount awarded became P49,459.34. ( the original amount of 14,615.79 divided by 2 {the exchange rate at the time of the taking to be P2.00 to US$1.00} and the product being multiplied by 6.775). B ased on this amount, the court determined interest to be P145,410.44. Total due from the government, including attorneys fee of ten percent amounted to P214,356. 75. - Apparently, the court a quo, in revising upward the compensation, relied o n Article 1250 of the New Civil Code which provides for payment of an obligation in an amount different from what has been agreed on because of the supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or deflation. - The government, through the Solicit or General, appealed the decision contending that the court a quo erred in apply ing its method and violated the high courts order to make as a basis of compensat ion the price or the value of the land when it was taken. The Solicitor General also took issue with the award of ten percent as attorneys fees as exhorbitant co nsidering that Amigable only sought P5,000.00. ISSUES GOVERNMENT UNITED STATES V DORR LADD; May 19, 1903 FACTS The defendants, Fred Dorr et al., have been convicted upon a complaint cha rging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Commission7. The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of Manila Freedom of April 6, 1902. Virulent attacks on the Civil Commission and its 7 Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circ ulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insul ar Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct an y lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to c abal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellio us conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall unknowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be p unished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exce eding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court. (Italics mine) N.B. We need to answer this question first in order to be able to resolve the ne xt issue. 9 It is made an offense to write, print, utter, publish or cause to pro cure to be written, printed, uttered, or published or to knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalo us, and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United State s, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said Governm ent, or either House of said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them or eith er any of them the hatred of the good people of the United States"

their policy. The publication of the article therefore, no seditious tendency be ing apparent, constitutes no offense under section 8 of Act No. 292) Dispositive The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted. has acquired dominion September 18, 1968. and sovereignty. Approved PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596 June 11, 1978 - Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1596 declaring certain area (the Kalaya an Island Group or more commonly known as the Spratly Islands) as Philippine terri tory as well as providing for its Government and Administration. said area is vi tal to the security and economic survival of the Philippines and much of it is p art of the continental margin of the Phil. archipelago the area does not legally belong to any state or nation and by reason of history, indispensable need, eff ective occupation and control established in accordance with international law, said area (including its sea-bed, subsoil, continental margin and air space) mus t be deemed to belong to and subject to the sovereignty of the Phil. other state s claims to some of the area cannot prevail over the claims of the Philippines on legal, historical, and equitable grounds named it Kalayaan and constituted it as a distinct and separate municipality of Palawan administration and government sh all be vested in the Secretary of National Defense or in other Civil govt. or AF P officers as may be designated by the Pres. TERRITORY ART I NATIONAL TERRITORY The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the island s and water embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippin es has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and a erial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insul ar shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connectin g the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, fo rm part of the internal waters of the Philippines. - It also restricts other countries from exercising the rights above in our EEZ. - Recognizes that other countries have EEZs - The President may authorize a gov ernment agency to promulgate rules for the purposes of this decree - Anyone who violates any provision of the decree shall be subject to a fine (P2,000-P100,000 ) or imprisonment (6 mos 10 yrs) or both. Vessels and other equipment or article s used shall be confiscated. PEOPLE PREAMBLE We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order t o build a just and humane society and establish s Government that shall embody o ur ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our pat rimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, lo ve, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046 An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of t he Philippines - Approved: 17 June 1961 Whereas clauses 1. The following form part of territori al sea of the Phils: All waters within limits set forth in Treaty of Paris (1898 ), US-Spain treaty (1900), and USBritain treaty (1930). All waters around, betwe en and connecting the various islands of the archipelago. All waters beyond oute

rmost islands of archipelago but within limits of boundaries set forth in such t reaties. 2. The baselines from which the territorial sea of Philippines is deter mined consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of the outermost isla nds of the archipelago. Section 1 It defines and describes the baselines for the territorial sea of the Phils. Section 2 All waters within the baselines provide d in sec1 are considered inland or internal waters of the Phils. ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. Sec 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may c all upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all cit izens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, mil itary or civil service. Sec 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. Sec 16: The S tate shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthf ul PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1599 Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and for Oth er Purposes - Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a seazone over which a state has special righ ts over the exploration and use of marine resources Wikipedia - It extends from two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territor ial sea - when it overlaps another EEZ, the common boundaries shall be determine d by countries - What can be exercised in EEZ? o Sovereignty rights for the purp ose of exploration and exploitation, conservation and management of the natural resources o Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and st ructures, the preservation of the marine environment, including the prevention a nd control of pollution, and scientific research o Other rights recognized by in ternational law or state practice ART III BILL OF RIGHTS Sec 2: Sec 7: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446 R.A. 5446 is simply an Act to correct typographical errors in Section 1 of R.A. 3046 defining the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippines. It furthe r says that the definition of the baselines of the territorial seas of the Phili ppine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineatio n of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situate d in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Phils. ART VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Sec 4: ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS Sec 2:

ART XVIII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS Sec 25: TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS VITUG; March 3, 2004 FACTS - On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the pos ition of President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipi no (KNP). - In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a nat ural-born citizen. - His real name was stated to be Fernando, Jr. or Ronald Allan Po e, born in Manila on August 20, 1939. - On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that FPJ made a material m isrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-bor n Filipino citizen. - According to Fornier, FPJs parents were foreigners his moth er Bessie Kelley Poe was an American and his father Allan F. Poe was a Spanish n ational being a son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. - Even if Allan F. Poe wa s a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate. - Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before marrying Bessie Kelley according to an uncertified copy of a supposed certification of the marriage in July 5, 1936. - Even if no s uch prior marriage existed, Allan F. Poe married Bessey Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ. The marriage certificate of their marriage reflected the date of their marriage to be on September 16, 1940 where Allan was 25, unmarried and Filipino, and Bessie was 22, unmarried and American. - FPJs earliest established ascendant was his grandfather Lorenzo Pou. - No birth certificate for Lorenzo b ut his death certificate issued upon his death in September 11, 1954 at age 84 i dentified him as a Filipino residing in San Carlos, Pangasinan. - Lorenzo marrie d Marta Reyes and their son Allan was born on May 17, 1915. The birth certificat e of Allan showed that his father was an Espaol father and to a mestiza Espaol mot her. Procedure - In the January 19, 2004 hearing before the COMELEC, Fornier presented the foll owing pieces of evidence: - Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ - Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita Gomez-Poe attesting that she had filed a bi gamy case against Allan F. Poe because of his relationship with Kelley (in Spani sh) English translation of (b) - Certified copy of the certificate of birth of A llan F. Poe - Certification from the director of the Records Management and Arch ives Office stating that a Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the Philippines before 190 7 - Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives sta ting that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe - FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among others: - Certification that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in t he registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan - Certification by the OIC of t he Archives Division of the National Archives that there was no available inform ation about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez - Certificate of birt h of Ronald Allan F. Poe - Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds o f Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Pou, - Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Pou - Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou - Copy of marr iage contract of Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley - Certification issued by the Ci ty Civil Registrar of San Carlos, Pangasinan stating that the records of the bir th of the said office from 1900 to May 1946 were destroyed during World War II January 23, 2004 COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition for lack of merit and F ornier filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 2004. The motion was de nied by the COMELEC en banc on February 6, 2004. - February 10, 2004 Fornier fil ed a petition before the Supreme Court, praying for TRO, a writ of preliminary i njunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. - The two other petitions (Tecson and Desidero v. CO MELEC and Velez v. Poe) challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and assert tha t only the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case. ISSUES 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the thr ee cases filed? 2. Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the gr

ound that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino? HELD 1. Ratio Juri sdiction issue - The COMELECs decision on disqualified cases involving a presiden tial candidate could be elevated to and could be taken cognizance by the Supreme Court. - The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would not include cases directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the preside ncy or vice-presidency before the elections are held. Reasoning - Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed? - Fornier petition - Yes - In see king the disqualification of FPJ before the COMELEC, Fornier relied on the follo wing: - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any mate rial representation contained therein as required under Section 74 is false (Omnib us Election Code, Sec. 78) - the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enf orcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of enduring free, orderly and honest elections (Sec. 52, same) - any i nterested party authorized to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the cert ificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate (Art. 69, same) - Decisions of th e COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court under t he Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65). Aside from that, according to Art . 9, Sec. 7 of the Constitution, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof. - Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Cour t which includes the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jur isdiction on the part of any branch of instrumentality of the government. (Art. 8, Sec. 1, Constitution). - Tecson petition and Velez petition - No - The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art. 7, Sec 4(7) of the Constitution in assaili ng the COMELECs jurisdiction when it took cognizance of

the Fornier petition because the Supreme Court sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of th e President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. - A co ntest refers to a post-election scenario. Election contests are either election p rotests or a quo warranto which would have the objective of dislodging the winne r from office. The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal state: - Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contestsrelating to qualifications of the Preside nt or Vice-President of the Philippines. (Rule 12) - An election contest is initia ted by the filing of an election contest or a petition for quowarranto against t he President or VicePresident. (Rule 13) - Only the registered candidate for Presi dent or Vice-President who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the VicePresidentby filing a verifie d petitionwithin 30 days after the proclamation of the winner. (Rule 14) - The rul es speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the elect ion, returns and qualifications of the President and the Vice President and not candidates for President or Vice-President. 2. Ratio FPJs citizenship issue (Voti ng 6 concur, 7 dissent, 1 abstention and 1 separate opinion) - The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should only remain in the sphere of civil la w and should not unduly impinge on the domain of political law. - The 1935 Const itution confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino regardless of whether such children are legitimate of illegitimate. Reasoning - Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he materially misre presented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino? Concept of citizenship - Aristotle described a citizen as a man who shared in t he administration of justice and in the holding of an office and the state would be composed of such individuals in order to achieve a self-sufficient existence . - Citizenship deals with rights and entitlements on the one hand and with conc omitant obligations on the other. - Citizenship underwent changes in the 18th to 20th centuries. - In the 18th century, the concept was civil citizenship which established the r ights necessary for necessary for individual freedom (eg. Rights to property, pe rsonal liberty and justice) - In the 19th century, it expanded to include politi cal citizenship which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of po litical power. - In the 20th century, there was the development of social citize nship which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security. - Internationalization of citizenship is an ongoing developmen t. - Citizenship in the Philippines from the Spanish times to the present - Duri ng the Spanish period, no such term as Philippine citizens, only Spanish subjects. I n church records, natives were identified as indios. - Spanish laws on citizenship included: - Order de la Regencia of 1841 - Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 (defi ned the political status of children born in the Philippines) - Ley Extranjera d e Ultramar of 1870 - The 1876 Spanish Constitution was not extended to the Phili ppines because the colony was to be governed by special laws. - According to the Civil Code of Spain, the following were Spanish citizens: - Persons born in Spa nish territory - Children of a Spanish father or mother even if they were born o utside Spain Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers - Those who, wit hout such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monar chy - Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated that the civil and political stat us of the native inhabitants would be determined by the US Congress. Spanish sub jects and natives who choose to remain in the territory may preserve their alleg iance to the Crown of Spain by making a declaration of their decision within a y ear from the date of the ratification of the treaty. If no such declaration is m ade, their allegiance shall be held renounced and they would have adopted the na tionality of the territory in which they reside. - Upon ratification of the trea ty, the native inhabitants of the Philippines became Spanish subjects. - They di d not become American citizens but were issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to protection of the US. - Philippine Organ ic Act of 1902 first appearance of the term citizens of the Philippine islands. A

citizen of the Philippine islands under this Act was: - An inhabitant of the Phi lippines and a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899. - An inhabitant meant: - A nat ive born inhabitant - An inhabitant who was a native of Spain - An inhabitant wh o obtained Spanish papers on or before April 11, 1899. - Controversy as to the c itizenship of a child born between April 11, 1899 and July 1, 1902 as there was no citizenship law in the Philippines. The common law principle jus soli (princi ple of territoriality) was said to govern those born in the Philippines during t his time. - Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) A native born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 i f: - A Spanish subject on April 11, 1899 - Residing in the Philippines on the sa id date - Since that date, not a citizen of another country - 1935 Constitution provided that jus sanguinis (blood relationship) be the basis for citizenship, a s stated in Sec. 1, Art. 3: - Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands a t the time of the adoption of the Constitution - Those born in the Philippine Is lands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands - Those whose fathers are ci tizens of the Philippines - Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship - Those who are naturalized in accordance with law - 1973 Constitution Corrected Sec. 1, Art . 3 (4) of the 1935 Constitution, which, when taken together with the existing c ivil law provisions would provide that women would automatically lose their Fili pino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands. This was deemed dis criminatory in that it incapacitated the Filipino woman from transmitting her ci tizenship to her legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filip ino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majorit y. The provisions of Sec. 1, Art. 3 of the 1973

Constitution state that the following are citizens of the Philippines: - Those w ho are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitut ion - Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines - Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the 1935 Constitutio n - Those who are naturalized in accordance with law - Add Sec. 2 of the same ar ticle which provided that a female citizen of the Philippines who marries an ali en retainers her Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission she is dee med to have renounced her citizenship under the law. - 1987 Constitution aimed t o correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1 935 Constitution which outlines in Article 4, Sec. 1 that the following are Fili pino citizens: - Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the ad option of this Constitution - Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of th e Philippines - Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority - Those who are natura lized in accordance with law. - The Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines should be, among the many requirements, a natural-born citizen o f the Philippines (Art. 7, Sec. 2). - Natural born citizen citizens of the Phili ppines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship - Citizenship of FPJ in relation to grandfather Lorenzo P ous citizenship and father Allan F. Poes citizenship - Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen because his father Lorenzo was also Filipino. - Conclusions with some d egree of certainty to be drawn from the documents presented: - The parents of FP J were Allen Poe and Bessie Kelley. - FPJ was born to them on August 20, 1939. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on September 16, 1940 . - The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Pou. - At the time of his death on September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. - The public documents submitted are deemed trustworthy. The three documents (bi rth certificate of FPJ, marriage certificate of Bessie and Allan and the death c ertificate of Lorenzo) were certified true copies of the originals. - The Rules of Court (130, Section 3) state that when the subject of the inquiry is the cont ent of the document, no evidence shall be admissible except the original documen t itself. One of the exceptions however is when the original is a public record in the custody of a public office is recorded in a public office. - As public do cuments, the three documents are prima facie proof of their contents as stated i n the Rules of Court (130, Section 44) that the entries in official records made by a public officer in the performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. This is grounded on: of official duty in the preparatio n of the statement made. The penalty affixed to a breach of that duty. Routine a nd disinterested origin of most such statements. Publicity of the record which m akes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred - It i s safe to assume that Lorenzo Pous place of residence at the time of death was th e same as his residence before death in the absence of evidence that would attes t otherwise. In that case, Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Fil ipinization that the Philippine Bill effected in 1902. This citizenship would the n extend to his son Allan F. Poe, FPJs father. - Lorenzo born sometime in 1870 du ring the Spanish colonization period. - Fornier argues that Lorenzo was not in t he Philippines during the crucial period of 1898 to 1902 but there is no existin g record to attest to that claim. - Fornier failed to show that Lorenzo was out of the country during that same time period. - Lorenzos residence at the time of death was in San Carlos, Pangasinan. - For proof of filiation or paternity, the mandatory rules of civil law would not apply in this case. The duly notarized declaration by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, FPJs matern al aunt and sister of his mother Bessie, proving the acts of Allan F. Poe, recog nizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ (living with Bessie and the childr en in one house as one family) would be accepted. - Fornier argues that the mand atory rules under civil rule should apply because FPJ was an illegitimate son. A cknowledgement needed to establish paternity (eg. Acknowledgement in the birth c ertificate by signing name) - In the FPJ case, there was no signature of Allan F

. Poe in the birth certificate of FPJ. - 1950 Civil Code acknowledgement of ille gitimate children of three types which had to be done during the lifetime of the presumed parent: - Voluntary (expressly made in record birth, will or a stateme nt before the court in authentic writing) - Legal (in favor of full blood brothe rs and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized as natural) Compulsor y (demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to p rove filiation) - The Family Code has liberalized the rules as stated in Article s 172, 173 and 175 and the rules have retroactive effect (Article 255). These pr ovisions are there to govern the private and personal affairs of the family. The re is little indication that this should also govern his political rights. - Thi s should be taken in the context of civil law, being that branch of law which is concerned with the organization of the family and regulation of property. The r elevance of citizenship is exemplified in Art. 15 of the Civil Code. - The proof of filiation for purposes of determining citizenship status should be deemed in dependent from those prescribed for civil code purposes. The ordinary rules shou ld govern. - DNA testing to prove paternity could also be resorted to. - There i s no jurisprudence to prove that an illegitimate child cannot inherit his fathers citizenship.

- Fornier argues that even if Allan F. Poe were Filipino, Allans citizenship woul d not have been transmitted to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate. - FPJ was alleg ed to be illegitimate because of the bigamous marriage between his parents Allan and Bessie for the reason that Allan allegedly had a prior existing marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez. The Court held that the veracity of this marriage betw een Paulita and Allan is doubtful. - Fornier also contended that even if Allan a nd Bessies marriage was not bigamous, FPJ was still illegitimate because his pare nts were married after he was born. Fornier based his arguments on the cases of Morano v. Vivo, Chiongbian v. de Leon and Serra v. Republic. - In the cases cite d above, it is important to note the lis mota in each case. If the pronouncement of jus sangunis was in the lis mota, it would constitute doctrine courtesy of s tare decisis. If not, it is mere obiter dictum. - In all of the mentioned cases, there was no jus sanguinis in the lis mota of the cases. If there was jus sangu nis mentioned, it was mere obiter dictum. - The pronouncement that an illegitima te child cannot inherit the fathers citizenship has no textual basis in the Const itution and violates the equal protection clause. - For jurisprudence that regar ded an illegitimate child to inherit the mothers citizenship, it was there to ens ure a Filipino nationality for the child with the assumption that the mother wou ld gain custody. - The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ since he was born during that time period and it states that Filipino citizens include those whose fathe rs are citizens of the Philippines. Decision 1. The evidence does not establish conclusively FPJs citizenship but the evidence preponderates in his favor to hold that he could not be guilty of misrepresentation in his certificate of candidac y. Fornier v. COMELEC DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for dismissing the original petition. 2. Tecson v. COME LEC and Velez v, Poe DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction. SEPARATE OPINION PUNO Jurisdiction - SC is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction - Tecson and Valdez petitions petitioners cannot invoke Art VII S4 of the Consti tution because the word contest means that the Court can only be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no cont est before a winner is proclaimed. - Fornier petition as a review under R64 in re lation to R65 of the RoC, Court has jurisdiction. - COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to prove by substantia l evidence that FPJ deliberately misrepresented that he is a natural-born Filipi no citizan in his CoC - Certiorari power of the SC to review COMELEC decisions i s a limited power - Can only reverse or change the COMELEC decision on the groun d that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion (despotic, arbitrary or capri cious) - The ruling of the COMELEC denying the petition to disqualify respondent Poe is based on substantial evidence, hence is not despotic, whimsical or capri cious Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC misrepresentation must not only be material but also deliberate and willful - Petitioner has burden to prove evidence to show t hat (1) respondent made misrepresentation in his CoC, (2) that misrepresentation is material to the position to which he is candidate and (3) that material misr epresentation was made deliberately and willfully - Analysis of petitioners evide nce - Certificate of birth only proved the date of birth of FPJ, not that he is not a natural-born citizen - Sworn statements of Paulita Gomez charging Allan Po e with bigamy and marriage license of between Allan Poe and Paulita Gomez, prese nted thru Dir. Manapat pulled out because they were fabricated - Respondent subm itted affidavits that show that the files submitted by the petitioner are fabric ated by Manapats instructions - Petitioner claims that the affidavits must not be considered because of technical grounds - SC ruled that the COMELEC is a quasij udicial body and are not bound by the technical rules of evidence. - Birth certi ficate of Allan Poe also fabricated; does not prove anything besides birth - Cer tification of Dir. Manapat that the National Archives has no record that Lorenzo Pou entered or resided in the Philippines before 1907 manufactured - Certificat ion of Estrella Domingo, OIC Archives Div that the Register of Births that there is no information on the National Archives on the birth of Allan Poe to the spo

use Lorenzo Pou and Marta Reyes lack of information is not proof - Poe from the time of his involuntary birth has always conducted himself as Fil ipino - For failure of the petitioner to discharge the burden of proof, Poe is en titled to an outright dismissal of the Fornier petition. Poe does not need to pre sent contrary evidence for the burden of proof is not shifted to him. - Assuming that COMELEC gravely abused its jurisdiction and the issue of whether responden t Poe is a naturalborn citizen Filipino should now be resolved, the Fornier peti tion need not be remanded to the COMELEC for further reception of evidence - Rem and to the COMELEC to give the petitioner a second opportunity to prove his case is a palpable error - In light of these erudite opinions of our amici curae, it is daylight clear that petitioner Fornier is not only wring with his facts but a lso wrong with his law. - Remand means a new round of litigation in the COMELEC when its proceedings have long been closed and terminated; to give another chanc e to prove facts which he failed to prove before - Favors of remand cannot be ex tended to the litigant because of political neutrality - Remand will change the nature of a Sec 78 proceeding by judicial legislation, hence, unconstitutional Principal issue: whether respondent deliberately made a material misrepresentat ion in his CoC when he wrote that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen - Remand ing the case to COMELEC will change the character of a S78 proceeding (WON FOJ i s a natural-born Filipino citizen will be the main issue and not just an issue i ncidental to the issue of material misrepresentation) - SC cannot engage in judi cial legislation as it is something only legislature can change by another law Remand will violate respondent Poes right to due process, hence, unconstitutiona l - If case were remanded to the COMELEC, the body is no longer an impartial tri bunal is there are three of the seven members of the commission that have given firm view that Poe is not a natural-born Filipino citizen - Remand will delay th e resolution of the issue of whether respondent Poe is qualified. Delay will als o prejudice his candidacy and will favor his political opponents. - The right to run for public office includes the right to equal chance to compete. The right t o run is empty if the chance to win is diminished of denied a candidate. - To av oid delay, the court should itself decide the issue and declare respondent Poe a s a natural-born citizen on the basis of the evidence adduced before the COMELEC

- Whether respondent Poe is illegitimate is irrelevant in determining his status as natural-born citizen --- that is the law. - The law does not make any distin ction in applying jus sanguinis to illegitimate children. - Morano v Vivo WON th e stepson was to file the natural cerebral house. - Chiongbian v de Leon a legit imate son whose father became Filipino because of election to a public office be fore the 1935 constitution - Serra v Republic an illegitimate son of a Chinese f ather and a Filipino mother - Paa v Chan Quintin claims that his father is Filip ino because his grandmother is a Filipina. The court ruled that since there is n o proof that his grandmother is Filipino then his father is not Filipino thereby not making him Filipino as well. The courts ruling should have stopped here but the SC followed with an obiter dictum that even if Quintins father were Filipino, he would not be Filipino because he was illegitimate. - The statements on the i llegitimate child were unnecessary and were just obiter dicta and not ratio deci dendi, therefore do not constitute stare decisis. - Obiter dicta do not establis h doctrine even if repeated endlessly. - Reasons why court should create new doc trine: - There is no textual foundation - It violates the equal protection claus e - People v Cayat established the doctrine on constitutionally allowable distin ctions. Such distinction must be germane to the purpose of the law. - Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrin e or rule found to be in violation of the law in force. - Ubi les non distinguit ne nos distinguere debemus, especially if the distinction has no textual - Merli n Magallona transmissive essence of citizenship - To establish that respondent P oe is a natural-born citizen, all that is needed is proof of his filiation to hi s father Allan Poe, a Filipino citizen --- that is the critical fact. - Filipino citizenship of Allan Poe, respondents father is well established. - To disqualif y respondent Poe because he is illegitimate will violate our treaty obligation. Dispositive Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for Preside nt involves a constitutional issue but its political tone is no less dominant. T he Court is split down the middle on the citizenship of respondent Poe, an issue of first impression made more difficult by the interplay of national and intern ational law. Given the indecisiveness of the votes of the members of this Court, the better policy approach is to let the people decide who will be the next Pres ident. For on political questions, this Court may err but the sovereign people w ill not. To be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the unelected members of this Court the right to elect in behalf of the people. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the peti tions in G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824 are DISMISSED. DAVIDE FACTS - January 9, 2004 Fornier filed petition to disqualify FPJ and to cancel h is certificate of candidacy for the May 10 elections because of he is not a natu ral-born Filipino citizen - January 23, 2004 COMELEC dismissed the case declarin g that its jurisdiction is limited to all matters relating to election, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, but not those of national officials like the president. - but it has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of citizenship of national officials under sec 78 of OECon petitions to deny due course or cancel certificates of candidacy on the ground o f false material representation. - Findings: - Fornier evidence is not substanti al - FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material representation when he stated that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen - Tecson and Desiderio, Jr prayed spe cial civil action of certiorari under R65 RoC to challenge jurisdiction of COMEL EC over the issue of FPJs citizenship. They claim that only the Sc has jurisdicti on (ArtVII S4, consti) - January 29, 2004 - Velez filed petition with the ff iss ues: - Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitions to deny due course or cancel certificated of candidacy of Presidential candidates - Whether SC has ju risdiction over the petitions of Tecson, Velez and Fornier - Whether FPJ is a Fi lipino citizen, and if so, if hes a natural-born Filipino citizen Jurisdiction Tecson and Velez petitions - The provision in the constitution only refers to pa st-election remedies, they should have resorted to pre-election remedies in the OEC which are implemented by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure - Pre-election remed

ies are not within the jurisdiction of the SC - Under the OEC, COMELEC has origi nal jurisdiction to determine whether a candidate for an elective office ineligi ble for the office for which he filed his certificate of candidacy because of an y of the recognized grounds for disqualification. - Fornier petition - SC has jurisdiction over the case under (Art IX-A S7 Consti ) - SC can take co gnizance of issue of WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting t o lack or excess of jurisdiction in the challenged resolution by virtue of (ArtV III S1 Consti) WON FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen Facts: 1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines. 2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bess ie Kelley. 3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940. 4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish subje ct, was not shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Trea ty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902. Ratio For the purposes of citizensh ip, an illegitimate child whose father is Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizensh ip of the father COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen pursuant to Art IV S1 per 3 consti. The provisio n did not make any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children of F ilipino fathers. Petitions are dismissed. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ May court exercise judicial power to disqualify a candidate before the election? - Court may not. It will wreck the constitutional right of the people to choose their candidates. Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC - Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a retired member of this Court, in his Separate Opinion said, In my view, the iss ue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disquali fy candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which t hey seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a pet ition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum. - Ruling of COMELEC is the same as Mandoza opinion. - Disqualifying respondent Poe will b e viewed as directed against the masses, a situation not allowed by the Constituti on. The SC may become like the Iranian Guardian Council.This Court, as the last guardian of democracy, has the duty to protect the right of our nation to a genu ine, free and fair election. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discre tion in dismissinG Forniers petition for disqualification against respondent

- Salcedo v COMELEC the only instance when a petition raising the qualifications of a registered candidate is before election (S78 OEC) - To justify the cancell ation of CoC, false representation mentioned must pertain to material matter - T here must be deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide fact which would render a candidate ineligible - Fornier petition brought under R65 RoCP where CO MELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in Jan 23 and Feb 6 resolutions holdi ng that considering the evidence presented by the petitioner is not substantial, we declare that the respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation whe n he stated in his CoC that he is a natural born Filipino citizen Allegations in the COMELEC petition: 1. Respondent Poe committed false material representation by stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural born Filipino ci tizen; and 2. He knowingly made such false representation. - FPJ is not a citize n because both his parents are aliens. - Director Manapat of the National Archiv es falsified the marriage contract of FPJs parents and his fathers birth certifica te. - Ei incumbit probation qui decit, non que negat. he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove; S1 R131 RroE; Borlongan v Madrideo burden of proof is on th e party asserting the affirmative of an issue - Fornier failed to prove allegati ons; writ of certiorari can only be granted if it can be proven that COMELEC com mitted a grave abuse of discretion; -Grave abuse of discretion capricious and wh imsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross that it amounted to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law - We cannot discern from the records any indicati on that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Forniers petition . Indeed, his availment of the extraordinary writ of certiorari is grossly mispl aced. Whether the respondent committed a material and false representation when he declared in his CoC that he is a natural-bron Filipino citizen - COMELEC held that the FPJ did not commit any material misrepresentation in his CoC because h is father is a Filipino by virtue of jus sanguinis and under the 1935 constituti on. - Valles v COMELEC Philippine law on citizenship adheres to jus sanguinis FPJ is Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father - Petitioners claim that Allan Fernando Poe is a citizen of Spain because his Marriage Contract with Paulita Gomez shows that his parents are citizens of Spai n. - The marriage certificate was shown to have been falsified. - Fornier did no t dispute that Allan Fernando Poe is the father of FPJ - Allans father, Lorenzo P ou is a Spanish subject and an inhabitant of the Philippines on April 11, 1899 w hen Spain ceded the Philippines (Treaty of Paris, Phil Bill 1902 and Jones Law) - In re Bosque expiration of the term of 18 months without making an express dec laration of intention to retain their Spanish nationality resulted in the loss o f the latter and thereby becoming subjects of the new sovereign in the same mann er as the natives of these islands - Palanca v Republic - A person, who was an in habitant of the Philippine Islands and a naturalized subject of Spain on the 11t h day of April 1899, is a Filipino citizen, by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 4 of the Act of Congress on 1 July 1902 and of Sec. 2 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. Under the Constitution, he is also a citizen of the Philippines because he was such at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. - Constituti on did not specify in referring to those whose fathers are Filipino citizens as to whether this only applies to legitimate children or not. - Ubi lex non distin guit nec nos distinguere debemus, especially if the distinction has no textual f oundation in the Constitution, serves no state interest, and even imposes an inj ustice on an innocent child. (Fr Bernas) - To introduce a distinction between le gitimacy or illegitimacy in the status of the child vis--vis the derivation of hi s citizenship from the father defeats the transmissive essence of citizenship in blood relationship. (Dean Merlin Magalona) In fine, I reiterate that the COMELE C did not gravely abuse its discretion in rendering its assailed Resolutions dat ed January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004. WHEREFORE, I concur with Justice Jose C. Vitug in his ponencia and with Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno in his Separate Opinion DISMISSING Forniers petition 3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino and therefore qualified to seek electi

on as President. 1) Jurisdiction: - Petitions in G.R. Nos. 161464 and 161634 - P etitioners Tecson et al. and Velez assert that this Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to determine whether FPJ is qualified to be a candidate for Presid ent: paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution: - The Supreme Co urt, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the el ection, returns, and qualifications of the President or VicePresident, and may p romulgate its rules for the purpose. - refers to this Courts jurisdiction over el ectoral contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Pre sident, and not to the qualifications or disqualifications of a presidential can didate. FPJ is still just a candidate; petition: premature. - Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez claim that the issue of FPJs qualification for the Presidency m ay also be brought directly to this Court on the basis of Section 1 of Article V III of the Constitution through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the R ules of Court, specially considering that the instant case is one of transcenden tal importance. - a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not available where there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of lawlike in this case: (to intervene in the Petition for Disqu alification) - in determining whether procedural rules, such as standing, should be relaxed on the ground of transcendental importance, the following should be co nsidered: the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest i n raising the questions being raised. Considering that the substantive issues ra ised by petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634, resp ectively, are virtually identical to those raised by petitioner Fornier in G.R. No. 161824, this Court is not convinced that the transcendental importance of the issues raised herein justifies a direct resort to this Court under Rule 65 of th e Rules of Court or the exercise of its expanded certiorari jurisdiction under S ec. 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. - Petition in G.R. No. 161824 CARPIO-MORALES Issues for Resolution: 1) Whether this Court has original and exclusive jurisdic tion to pass upon the qualifications of presidential candidates; 2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issues its Resolutions of J an. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004, dismissing the Petition for Disqualification;

- this Court definitely has jurisdiction over the petition for Certiorari questi oning the Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004, issued by COMELEC: Sect ion 7 of Art. IX-A of the Constitution vests this Court with the power of review over decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC. - COMELECs Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter of the Petition for Disqualification Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. - not really a constitutional question 2) Whether The COME LEC Acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Petition for is quali fication for Lack of Merit. - the COMELEC did indeed act with grave abuse of dis cretion in issuing them: - By resolving to dismiss the petition in the Petition for Disqualification without stating the factual bases therefore: - Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the l aw on which it is based. - By resolving to dismiss the Petition for Disqualificat ion without ruling categorically on the issue of FPJs citizenship. - To justify i ts evasion of the duty to rule squarely on the issue of citizenship, the COMELEC relies on this Courts ruling in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, and held that held that Fornier should have presented proof of misrepresentation with a de liberate attempt to mislead on the part of FPJ confined the issue in the Petition for Disqualification to whether FPJ must have known or have been aware of the fal sehood as [allegedly] appearing on his certificate. - Carpio-Morales: it is impos sible for the COMELEC to determine whether FPJ was aware of a false material rep resentation in his Certificate of Candidacy without first determining whether su ch material representation (in this case, his claim of natural-born citizenship) was false. The fact alone that there is a public document (i.e., his birth cert ificate) which FPJ might have relied upon in averring natural-born citizenship d oes not automatically exclude the possibility that (a) there is other evidence t o show that such averment is false, and (b) that FPJ was aware of such evidence. 3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino - Five crucial factual questions (1) Whether Lorenzo Pou has been established to be a Filipino citizen at the time of the birth of his son, Allan F. Poe; - the evidence presented does not show that Lorenzo Pou acquired Philippine citi zenship by virtue of the Treaty of Paris or the Organic Acts covering the Philip pine Islands. (no evidence as to his residence, only prima facie evidence.) (2) Whether Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ was a Filipino at the time of t he birth of the latter; - Claim: Allan F. Poe acquired Filipino citizenship inde pendently of his fathers by virtue of jus soli, Allan F. Poe having been allegedl y born in the Philippines on November 27, 1916. - even assuming arguendo that Al lan F. Poe was born in the Philippines on November 27, 1916, such fact, per se, would not suffice to prove that he was a citizen of the Philippine Islands absen t a showing that he was judicially declared to be a Filipino citizen: In Tan Cho ng v. Secretary of Labor, this Court ruled that the principle jus soli or acquis ition of citizenship by place of birth was never extended or applied in the Phil ippine Islands: (3) Whether FPJ is a legitimate or illegitimate child; - FPJs bir th certificate indicates that his parents were married, and that he is a legitim ate child. However, the Marriage Contract of his putative parents, Fernando R. P ou and Bessie Kelley, is dated September 16, 1940, thereby indicating that he wa s born out of wedlock. Since, in the Marriage Contract, the two contracting part ies, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, participated in its execution, the entry th erein with respect to the date of their marriage should be given greater weight than the birth certificate, which was executed by a physician who had to rely on hearsay as regards FPJs legitimacy. - FPJ was born out of wedlock, and was thus an illegitimate child at birth. (4) Whether Allan F. Poe has been legally determ ined to be the father of FPJ (Assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe has been shown to have acquired Philippine citizenship) - As proof of his filiation, FPJ relie s upon (1) the stipulation by petitioner Fornier, both before the COMELEC and th is Court that Allan F. Poe is indeed the father of FPJ; (2) the declaration of R uby Kelley Mangahas; and (3) a certified copy of an affidavit of Fernando R. Poe f or Philippine Army Personnel. - none of the proofs supplied are sufficient proof s of filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code. (5) Whether FPJ is a natura

l-born Filipino Citizen. - Carpio-Morales adopts the rule that an illegitimate, child of an alien-mother who claims to be an offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a natural-born citizen if he was duly acknowledged by the latter a t birth, thus leaving the illegitimate child with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship (nothing more to do to acquire citizenship = natural born). - no evidence has been submitted to show th at Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge FPJ as his own son at birth - Since FPJ t hen was born out of wedlock and was not acknowledged by his father, the only pos sible Filipino parent, at the time of his birth, the inescapable conclusion is t hat he is not a natural-born Philippine citizen. Conclusion WHEREFORE, I vote to : (1) DISMISS the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 for being premature, (2) DECLARE COMELEC Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004, ren dered in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 NULL AND VOID, and (3) DIRECT the COMELEC to can cel the Certificate of Candidacy of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe Jr., for containing a false material representation. IN RE: CHING KAPUNAN; October 1, 1999 FACTS - Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar - April 1964: Vicente D Ching bor n as the legitimate son of sps Tat Ching, Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay, F ilipina, in La Union. Since birth, Ching has resided in the Phils - During this time, the governing charter is the 1935 Constitution. Fathers citizenship is foll owed, with a right to elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority - July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed a n application to take the 98 Bar Examinations. - Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching t o take the exams provided he must submit proof of his Phil citizenship - Nov 199 8: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA, Voter Cert from COMELEC, and Ce rt as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union also from COMELEC. April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and Ching passed. He was further required to submit more proof of citizenship. - July 1999: Ching filed Manifesta tion w/ Affidavit of Election of Phil Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance. OSG commented that Ching being the legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Fil ipino mother and born under the 1935 Consti was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Phil citizenship. If Ching formally elects Phil citizenship, it would already be beyond the reason able time allowed by present jurisprudence - Two conditions of an effective elec tion of Phil citizenship (from OSG):

1st the mother of the person making the election must be a Phil citizen 2nd elec tion must be made upon reaching the age of majority (w/c means a reasonable time interpreted by the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs, from the Velayo case; in Cuenco, no ted that this pd not inflexible, however, held in the same case that 7 yrs not r easonable time) - Ching, to support his cause, invokes these special circumstanc es: continuous and uninterrupted say in the Philippines, being a CPA, a register ed voter, and elected public official ISSUE 1. WON Ching has elected Phil citize nship w/in a reasonable time and if so, WON his citizenship has retroacted to th e time he took the bar. 2. WON Chings special circumstances entitle him to citize nship HELD 1. No, Chings election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick , the allowable pd w/in which to exercise the privilege. Being born in April 196 4, he was already 35 yrs old when he complied w/ the requirements of C.A. No 625 in June 99. He was already more then 14 yrs over the age of majority. Although t he Court is sympathetic of his plight, controlling statues and jurisprudence com pel the Court in its decision. Also, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Phil citizenship, the latter not being a tedious and painstaking process. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. It should be availed of w ith fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. 2. No, the abovementioned special circum stances cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays d own the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. Deci sion Court denies Vicente D Chings application for admission to the Philippine Ba r 5, 1985 he enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the consent of the Republic o f the Philippines. He took an oath of allegiance to the US and as a consequence he lost his Filipino Citizenship because under the Commonwealth Act no. 63 a Fil ipino may lose his citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission i n the armed forces of a foreign country. Any doubts as to his citizenship at the time was settled by his naturalization as a US citizen on June 5, 1990. - May 1 7, 1994 he reacquired his citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. - He w as elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in 1998 an d his opponent was Bengson. - Bengson filed a case Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with HRET claiming Cruz, not being a natural-born citizen by the contention that Ari cle IV, Sec 2 of the Consti defines natural-born citizens as citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship, was no t eligible to be member of the House. ISSUES 1. WON Cruz, a natural born Filipin o who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipin o upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship via Repatriation, so that the question of WON he is eligible to be a member of the House might be addressed 2 . - WON the HRET committed serious erros and grave abuse of discreation amountin g to excess of jurisdiction in ruling in favour of Cruz as natural-born citizen HELD 1. Yes. Ratio Two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship o By birth natural born citizens o Naturalization Naturalized citizens (those who become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under the Commonwealth Act no. 473. T o be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualificat ions and none of the disqualifications - 1987 Constitution only provides for 2 c lasses of citizens: o Natural born o Naturalized - Filipino citizens who have lo st their citizenship may reacquire it by naturalization, repatriation or by dire ct act of Congress. o Naturalization mode for acquisition and reacquisition of P hilippine citizenship. o Repatriation available for those who have lost their ci tizenship due to desertion of the armed forces, service in the armed forces of t he allied forces in WWII, service in the armed forces of the US at any other tim e, marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien, and political and economic necessity. Process: taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering it in the Local Civil Registrar of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. - Repatriation would result in the recovery of the original nationality. He wil l be restored to his former status as a natural-born citizen. Cruz recovered his

original status as a natural-born citizen because of his repatriation. Note: As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply c onsists of taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath with the Local Civil Registry - 1987 Constitution does not provide a separate catego ry for persons who after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquires it because they are either natural born or naturalized depending on the reason f or the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law f or reacquisition. - Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization pr oceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born F ilipino. 2. No. Ratio HRET has been empowered by the Consti to be the sole judge o f all contests relating to the elction, returns and qualifications of the member s of the House. Courts jurisdiction is merely to check WON there has been grave a buse; absent such showing, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its co rrective power SEPARATE OPINION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Additional Facts: - In the 1995 local elections, Cruz filed his certificate of c andidacy for Mayor declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen - Ther eafter, Cruz ran for Congres, this time declaring himself as natural-born Petiti oner and respondent present opposing interpretation of the phrase from birth in Ar t IV, Sec 2 of the Consti - Petitioner avers: means starting from a definite poi nt and must be continuous, constant and without interruption - Respondent conten ds: refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-b orn - J. Sandoval-Gutierrez holds: - Natural-born citizens are so by virtue of bi rth without performing any acts. To repatriate, Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen. Therefore, he does not reaquir e natural-born citizenship - The history of the Consti shows that the meaning an d application of the requirement of being naturalBENGZON III V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL KAPUNAN; May 7, 2001 FACTS - Constitutional requirement for members of the House of Representatives: n o person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natura l born citizen. - Teodoro Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He w as born in Tarlac on April 27, 1960. On November

born have become more narrow and qualified over the he decision of HRET in the case at bar reverses the ntendment of the Consti, a matter which can only be amendment; clearly, HRET has acted with grave abuse

years, more stringent; and t historical trend and clear i accomplished through consti of discretion.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473 An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of the Citizenshi p by Naturalization, and to repeal Acts 2927 and 3448 Sec 1: Title: Revised Naturalization Law Sec 2: Qualifications: Who may become cit izens of the Philippines by naturalization? 1. >21 years old at the day of the h earing of the petition 2. resided in the Philippines for CONTINUOUS period of >1 0yrs 3. of good moral character + believes in principles underlying the Philippi ne Constitution (1935 Consti) + conducted himself in proper and irreproachable m anner during entire period of residence in the Philippines in relation with cons tituted government and community with community in which he is living 4. (must o wn real estate in the Philippines > P5000) or Philippine currency or lucrative t rade/profession/lawful occupation 5. able to speak and write English/Spanish + a ny one of the principal Philippine language 6. enrolled his MINOR children of sc hool age in any of the public schools/private schools during the entire period o f residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petit ion School: - recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines teaches Philippine history, government and civics and prescribes it as part of t he school curriculum Sec 3: Special qualifications: when the 10 year qualificati on required in Sec2(2) could be reduced to a continuous 5 years? 1. had honorabl y held office under the Government of the Philippines/ under that of any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof [aliens, pa rticularly American citizens, were the ones who were governing the country prior to the Commonwealth] 2. established new industry/ introduced a useful invention in the Philippines 3. married to a Filipino woman engaged as a teacher in the Philippines for >2 yrs school: public/recognized pri vate school + not established for exclusive instruction of children of persons o f particular nationality/race 5. born in the Philippines Sec 4: Who are disquali fied? Persons a. opposed to organized government/affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized govt b. def ending/teaching the necessity or propriety of violence/personal assault/assassin ation for the success and predominance of their ideas c. Polygamists/believers o f polygamy d. Convicted of crimes (moral turpitude) e. Suffering from mental ali enation/incurable contagious disease f. Not mingled socially w/ Filipinos, have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace customs, traditions, and ideal s of Filipinos g. Citizens/subjects of nations w/whom US and the Philippines are at war during such war Citizens/subjects of foreign country [OTHER THAN US!] wh ose laws dont grant Filipinos right to become naturalized citizens/subjects Sec 5 . Declaration of intention: file declaration that it is his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines - under oath - 1 year prior to the filing of petition for admission to Philippine citizenship of the Bureau of Justice -c ontents+ name + age + occupation + personal description + place of birth +last f oreign residence and allegiance +date of arrival +name of vessel/aircraft (if an y) in which he came to the Philippines +place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration *to be valid: establish lawful entry for per manent residence + issued certificate showing date, place, and manner of arrival *also state that he had enrolled his minor children in school (see sec2(6)) *2 pictures of himself Sec 6. Widow and minor children of aliens dying after declar ation of intention not required to file declaration of intention Sec 7. Petition for citizenship: requirements filed with competent court *a petition in triplic ate contents of petition: +name and surname 4. h.

+present and former places of residence +occupation +place and date of birth +st atus; if married and the father, include name, age, birthplace and residence of wife and each child +approximate date of his/her arrival in the Philippines +nam e of the port of debarkation + name of ship (if remembered) +declaration of qual ifications and non-disqualification +declaration that he has complied with sec. 5 +declaration of continuous residence in RP from date of filing petition to adm ission as RP Citizen *2 photographs of petitioner *petition signed by applicant + supported by affidavit of at least 2 credible persons (see provision for requi rements) Sec 8. Competent court: CFI of province in w/c the petitioner has resid ed for at least 1 yr immediately preceding the filing of the petition Sec 9. Not ification and appearance. Tasks of clerk of court publish petition for 3 consecut ive weeks in OG and in one of gen circulation newspapers in the province where p etitioner resides post copies of petitions in conspicuous places (contain name, b irthplace and residence of petitioner, date and place of arrival, names of witne sses, date of hearing the petition) *hearing shall not be held w/n 90 days from date of last publication of notice forward copies of the petition, sentence, natu ralization certificate and pertinent data to Department of the Interior, Bureau of Justice, Provincial Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary of the province, and justice of peace of the municipality where petitioner resides Sec 10. Heari ng of the petition. *no hearing w/n 30 days preceding any election *public heari ng *Solicitor-General/representative/provincial fiscal appear for Commonwealth a t all proceedings *upon belief of court of qualifications and nondisqualificatio n of petitioner, court order proper naturalization certificate in proper civil r egistry (required in Sec. 10, Act No. 3753) Sec 11. Appeal: to the SC Sec 12: Is suance of the Certificate of Naturalization: 30 days after and from date of noti ce to the parties (in case of appeal, SC confirmed deci), clerk of court issue n aturalization certificate contents of certificate of naturalization *file no. of petition *number of naturalization certificate *signature of the person naturali zed affixed in the presence of the clerk of court *personal circumstances of the person naturalized *dates of filing of declaration of intention and petition *d ate of decision granting petition

*name of the judge who rendered deci *photograph of peti with dry seal of court w/c granted petition *oath declared in open court [refer to the original] Sec 13 . Record Books: clerk of court keep 2 books: (1) record of petition and declarat ions of intentions in chronological order; (2) record of naturalization certific ate Sec 14. Fees. *P30.00 (for recording of petition and for proceedings + issua nce of certificate) *P24.00 (for each appeal and for connected services rendered ) sec 15. Effect of naturalization on wife and children *on wife: shall be deeme d a citizen of Philippines (if just married or also naturalized) *on minor child ren: if born in the Philippines: Filipino if foreign-born but dwelling in the Phil ippines during naturalization of parent: Filipino if foreign-born, not dwelling i n the Philippines during naturalization of parent: Filipino during minority, unl ess resides in the Philippines permanently and still a minor, then legally Filip ino upon age of majority if foreign-born after naturalization of parent: Filipino unless fails to register and take oath 1 yr after age of majority Sec 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners_who_have_died: continue proceedings, same legal effect Sec 17. Renunciation of title or orders of nobility: unless w/ expr ess consent of the National Assembly Sec 18. Cancellation of naturalization cert ificates issued *upon motion made in proper proceedings by SolicitorGeneral/repr esentative/proper provincial fiscal *cancelled by competent judge on the ff. gro unds: a. naturalization certificate obtained fraudulently/illegally b. person na turalized establishes permanent residence outside Philippines w/n 5 yrs after is suance of naturalization certificate c. petition made on invalid declaration of intention d. minor children shown to have failed to graduate from school in sec 2 (6) through fault of parents either by neglect to support or by transferring t hem to another school(s) e. naturalized citizen only used as a dummy to violate constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine citizenship Sec 19 Penalt ies for violation of this Act: fine < P5,000.00 or imprisonment< 5 yrs or both, naturalization cancelled Sec 20. Prescription: file complaint w/n 5 yrs from det ection/discovery of commission of offense Sec. 21. Regulation and blanks. *Secre tary of Justice: issue necessary regulations *Solicitor-General, subject to approval of Secretary of Justice: naturalization certificate blanks, etc. Sec 22. Repealing clause: Repeals Act. No. 2927 as amen ded by Act No. 3448 [Naturalization Law] REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530 An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization - Requires the publication of petitions for citizenship (also required by previo us law, prob. Act 423, below) - Court will hear petitions for citizenship 6 mont hs after the publication - Decisions granting the application become executory o nly after 2 years, and - The Solicitor General or his representative finds that NOT left the Philippines Dedicated h during the intervening time, applicant has: imself continuously to lawful calling or profession NOT been convicted of any of fense or violation of govt. rules NOT committed any act prejudicial to the inter est of the nation or contrary to any govt. announced policies - After the findin g, the order of the court granting citizenship will be registered and the oath t aken by the applicant before he will be entitled to the privileges of citizenshi p. - Repealed inconsistent parts of Act No. 423. - Approved, June 16, 1950. COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63 An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine Citize nship may be lost or reacquired Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; (3) subscribing to an oath of allegian ce to support constitution or laws of foreign country upon +21y.o.: a Filipino m ay not divest himself of Philippine citizenship while the RP is at war; (4) rend ering services to/accepting commission in, the armed forces of foreign country: rendering of service to/the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces o f foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, wit h the consent of RP, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship i f either of the ff. is present: (a) RP has defensive and/or offensive pact of al liance with the said foreign country; or (b) said foreign country maintains arme

d forces on Philippine territory w/ consent of RP: Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service/or acceptance of said commissio n, & taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country: & provided that any Fil ipino citizen who is rendering service to/or is commissioned in, the armed force s of foreign country under (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of RP during period of service to/commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. automatically entitled to full enjoyment of civ il and political rights as a Filipino citizen upon his discharge; (5) cancellati on of certificates of naturalization; (6) having been declared by competent auth ority, a deserter of the AFP in time of war, unless pardon or granted amnesty; & (7) woman: marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her hu sbands country, she acquires his nationality. *** Sec 1 amended by RA 106, sect ion 1, approved June 2, 1947 *when dual citizenship was allowed at that time: acq uisition of citizenship by natural born Filipino citizen from Iberian/democratic Ibero-American countries/ United Kingdom if the law of that country grants same privilege to its citizens agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and fore ign country from which citizenship is acquired. Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. (1) naturalization: applicant possess none of the disqualificatio ns prescribed in sec 2, Act No. 2927 (repealed by CA 473 so sec 4) (2) repatria tion of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, woman by sec 1(7) may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the terminat ion of the marital status;(see PD 725 for more details) (3) direct act of the Na tional Assembly. Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine ci tizenship. Apply Act No. 2927 (now CA 473) to the reacquisition of Philippine ci tizenship by naturalization provided for in the next preceding sec: Provided, qu alifications and special qualifications prescribed in sec 3 & 4 of Act 2927 shal l not be required (sorry guys, I cant find a copy of Act 2927 in the net so I dont know what these sections are in CA 473): further, applicant (1) at least 21 y.o. + resided in RP at least 6 mos. before he applies for naturalization; (2) have conducted himself in proper and irreproachable manner during +the entire period of his residence in RP +in his relations with the constituted government +with t he community in which he is living; and (3) subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and

allegiance to the foreign authority/state/sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject. Section 4. Repatriation: effected by merely taking the necessary oat h of allegiance to the Commonwealth of the Philippines (RP) and registration in the proper civil registry. (used in the Bengzon Case) Section 5. Similar to Sec 21 of CA 473 YU V DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO PADILLA; January 24, 1989 FACTS - Petition for Habeas Corpus - 1971 Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971 valid for 5 years & renewed for same period upon presentment before Portug uese consular officer - Feb. 10, 1978 He was naturalized as a Phil. citizen - Ap ril 1980 signed commercial documents in Hong Kong (Companies Registry of Tai Shu n Estate, Ltd.) and he declared his nationality as Portuguese - July 21, 1981 He applied & was issued another Portuguese passport in Tokyo. Passport will expire July 20, 1986. Procedural Facts: - July 4, 1988 He filed for a petition for hab eas corpus. He was detained because the Commission on Immigration & Deportation was processing his deportation. CID claims that his acts are tantamount to an ex press renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. - July 20, 1988 oral arguments - Nov. 10, 1988 SC resolution denied petition for habeas corpus & resolved issu ed on jurisdiction of CID over naturalized Filipino citizen & validity of warran tless arrest & detention. Yu filed MFR, denied w/finality. Filed urgent motion f or issuance of restraining order, denied. - Dec. 5, 1988 Yu filed motion for cla rification w/prayer for restraining order. - Dec. 7, 1988 SC issued TRO. CID ord ered to cease & desist from deporting Yu pending conclusion of hearings before B oard of Special Inquiry of CID. - Dec. 13, 1988 Respondent commissioner filed mo tion to lift TRO saying the commission already issued a summary judgment of depo rtation against Yu on Dec. 2, 88. - Dec. 13, 1988 Yu filed an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention. Opposed vigorously to lifting of TRO. - Yu ord ered to explain why he should still be considered a Phil citizen. He complied. H is reply revealed aforementioned substantive facts. ISSUE WON the acts of Yu con stitute an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. HELD Yes. Motion for release from detention denied. TRO lifted. Ratio - Renunciation made known distinctly & explicitly and not left to interference or implication ( BI Commissioners vs. Go Gallano). His resumption/reacquisition of his Portuguese citizenship and passport and representation as a Portuguese even after he has a cquired Filipino citizenship are proof enough of his renunciation. - He does not dispute the facts. He was given the opportunity to show proof of continued Phil ippine citizenship but he failed. There is no denial of due process. - Trial cou rt should have jurisdiction over this case. But due to petitioners insistence, SC had to do it. - Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be display ed when required and suppressed when convenient. mere use of passport or different citizenship has been signed. SC is not a trier of facts. Yus morality is beside the point. He deserves his full day in court. CORTES [dissent] CID findings are subject to judicial review. Loss of Yus Filipino citizenship has not been established. Evidence presented were not authenticated by proper Phili ppine consul, thus not substantial and are inadequate. PEOPLE V AVENGOZA RELOVA; December 7, 1982 FACTS - Criminal Case; Appeal from Decision of CFI of Camarines Sur - Anselma Av engoza and husband Go Gam, a Chinese, together with the formers mother Gavina Ave ngoza and Rafaela Anfante are being charged with violation of the Anti-Dummy Law on transactions for the spouses to own agricultural lands in the Philippines. Anselma Avengoza, upon marriage to Go Gam, acquired Chinese citizenship - The A nti-Dummy Law provides that only Filipino citizens may own local agricultural la nd. - Pending litigation, Go Gam and Gavina passed away. - Upon Go Gams passing, Anselma executed an oath of allegiance to the RP and filed it with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer for the purpose of reacquiring her citizenship by repat

riation, averring by reason whereof that her criminal liability is thereby extin guished; and that the issue of the criminal case is rendered moot and academic Trial court dismissed case principally predicated on its opinion that Anselma h ad validly reacquired Philippine citizenship ISSUES 1. WON Anselma reacquired ci tizenship after executing an oath of allegiance to the RP and filing it with the Municipal Treasurer 2. if so, WON such reacquisition of citizenship exempted he r from liability for the violation of the Anti-Dummy Law HELD 1. No. Ratio Mere taking of oath of allegiance insufficient for reacquisition of Filipino citizens hip. Would-be repatriate should show conclusive proof that she has the qualifica tions to be so repatriated. Anselma became an alien by reason of her lawful marr iage to a Chinese citizen; however this does not necessarily mean that she was a Filipino citizen prior to such marriage. 2. No. Ratio Even had she been conside red repatriated, like an alien who became a naturalized Filipino citizen, her re patriation will not exempt her from criminal liability for violation of the Anti -Dummy Law. SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [concur] Yu has failed to overcome presumption that he has forfeited his status as natura lized Filipino by obtaining Portuguese passport. Passports are generally issued only to nationals. No proof of Yus unequivocal & deliberate renunciation of Phi. Citizenship w/ full awareness of its significance & consequences as provided for in CA No. 63. Commercial documents signed are not proof enough of renunciation. FERNAN [dissent] Summary procedure & pieces of documentary evidence are not enough to reach such decision. Evidence must be clear & express w/o room for interference or implicat ion. In a deportation proceeding where alien claims citizenship w/substantial ev idence, hes entitled to have his status determined by judicial & not an executive tribunal. He deserves a full-blown trial under more rigid rules of evidence in a court proceeding. SC is not a trier of facts. GUTIERREZ [dissent] Summary procedure would not suffice. Something as important as denaturalization should be filed & prosecuted in proper trial court in accordance w/the due proce ss clause. When a person pleads vigorously that he has not renounced his citizen ship, he should at least be given a full trial where his actions may be explored & the facts fully ascertained. Dangerous precedent to allow administrative offi cials to rule that one has renounced his citizenship based on informal evidence. Mere use of a foreign passport is not express renunciation. He may have passpor t for other purposes (employment, convenience). Some high govt officials have don e acts w/c are more indicative of express renunciation than

JAO V REPUBLIC VASQUEZ; March 29, 1983 FACTS - Modesta Jao claims to be a Philippine citizen because she was born of a Chinese father and an illiterate Filipina mother who were not legally married. She married a Chinese man and therefore lost her Philippine citizenship but he is now dead. - Her handicapped mother erroneously registered her as an alien and she was issued an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). - She is claiming ba ck her Phil. citizenship, by way of a petition for repatriation filed in CFI of Davao. - CFI issued an order declaring petitioner as judicially repatriated, and o rdered cancelled her ACR. - Provincial Fiscal in behalf of the Republic, appeale d the case. ISSUE WON the judicial decree by the RTC was necessary for repatriat ion. HELD Ratio Proceedings to declare a person as judicially repatriated are a co mplete nullity. There is no law requiring or authorizing that repatriation shoul d be effected by a judicial proceeding. Reasoning In Lim v. Republic, 37 SCRA 78 3, it was held that there is no proceeding established by law or the rules by whi ch any person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justi ce to that effect or in regard to his citizenship. All that is needed for a femal e citizen of the Phil. who lost her citizenship to an alien to reacquire her Phi l. citizen, upon the termination of her martial status, is for her to take necess ary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Phil. and to register the said oat h in the proper civil registry. Disposition Decision appealed from is revoked and set aside. 5 Justices concur. Obiter Petitioners claim of Phil. citizenship prio r to her marriage for being allegedly an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother may not be established in an action where the mother or he r heirs are not parties. It is the consistent rule in this jurisdiction that Phi l. citizenship may not be declared in a nonadversary suit where the persons whos e rights are affected by such a declaration are not parties, such as an action f or declaratory relief, petition for judicial repatriation, or an action to cance l registration as an alien. FACTS - Manila Mayor, Justo Lukban, wanting to exterminate vice, ordered the clo sing of the citys red light district. The brothels were closed and the workers (1 70 women) were rounded up and kept confined to their houses in the district by t he police for a little more than a week. On the night of Oct.25, 1918, the women were forcibly hustled aboard the steamers Corregidor and Negros and sent off to Davao to work as laborers without their consent, without opportunity to consult with friends/family or to defend their rights. They reached Davao 4 days later and were met by Francisco Sales, governor of Davao and by hacendero Feliciano Yig o and Rafael Castillo, etc. - During their voyage, the womens relatives and frien ds initiated an application for habeas corpus, alleging that Justo Lukban, along with Anton Hohmann (the police chief), and others deprived the women of their l iberty. The court awarded the writ of habeas corpus (w of hc) and ordered Lukban and co. to bring the women before the court. Although they returned with none o f the women, they were given another chance. The court issued another order this time calling for the respondents to produce all of the women not in Manila. The respondents were only able to bring forward 8 women and challenged the issuance of the writ. ISSUES 1. Re: the proper granting of the writ: a. WON the petition ers had standing b. WON the S.C. erred in assuming jurisdiction c. WON the women were actually restrained of their liberty 2. WON there was compliance with the court orders 3. On contempt of court HELD 1a. Yes Ratio When it is is impossible for a party to sign an application for the w of hc, another person may submit i t in his/her behalf. Reasoning It was impossible for the women to have signed a petition for habeas corpus with the way their expulsion was conducted. They were first isolated from society and then shipped. It was consequently proper for th e writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. 1b No Ratio The w of hc may b e granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the P hilippines. The SC can decide upon where the writ shall be made returnable to (w hether before the SC or before a lower court). Reasoning The CFI of Davao was no t in session. The case involves parties from different parts of the country. Hab eas Corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 1c. Yes

Ratio The forcible taking, isolation, and transfer of the women is constitutive of deprivation of freedom of locomotion. Reasoning The essential object and purp ose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary re straint as distinguished from voluntary and to relieve a person from such restra int if it is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is suf ficient. 2. 1st order: No. Respondents were not able to bring the women before t he court on the day named. The court could have sent the respondents to jail how ever, the court forebore drastic action because it did not want the public to se e a clash between executive officials and the judiciary and because it wanted to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to miti gate their wrong. 2nd order: Yes. Respondents (through better effort) were able to produce 8 women. The mandate called for all of the women not in Manila. Howev er, the court decided that there was substantial compliance, noting the effort ( placards were posted, police helped, free shipping to Manila was provided) and t he fact that they had a sincere desire to see the unhappy incident finally close d. 3. Ratio Only Lukban is guilty of contempt. His intentions were commendable, his methods were unlawful. An officers failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus, when he has power to do so, is contempt c ommitted in the face of the court. Reasoning He was primarily responsible for se tting forth this whole chain of events and had under his power as head of the ci ty government to facilitate the return of the women to Manila but failed. The re st of the respondents other than Lukban are not guilty of contempt. Some were me rely following the orders of their superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. Anothe r was merely drawn into the case through miscommunication. Disposition No furthe r action on the w of hc. Lukban found in contempt of court and shall pay Php 100 within 5 days. Rest of respondents found not to be in contempt of court. KURODA JALANDONI MORAN; March 26, 1949 FACTS Kuroda, a high ranking Japanese army official is being charged by the Mili tary Commission with failure to perform duties as commander in preventing crimes /atrocities against civilians, and POWs. In defense, he is alleging that Executi ve Order No. 68 (EO68) which established a Natl. War Crimes Office is unconstitu tional and that 2 prosecuting attorneys, Hussey and Port (both American) have no authority to practice law in the VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBAN MALCOLM; March 25, 1919

country. As such, the respondents should be prohibited from proceeding with this case. ISSUES 1. WON EO68 is unconstitutional 2. Re: Attys. Hussey and Port A. W ON they are qualified to practice in accordance with the Rules of Court B. WoN t heir appointment as prosecutors is violative of the Constitution HELD 1. Ratio T he President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate an unfinishe d aspect of war which is the trial and punishment of war criminals through the i ssuance and enforcement of EO68. Reasoning EO68 was issued by the President to e stablish a Natl. War Crimes Office and provide for rules and regulations in tryi ng accused war criminals. It conforms to the generally accepted principles/polic ies of international law, including the Hague Convention and the Geneva Conventi on, which are part of the law of the nation. Its promulgation was an exercise of the President of his powers as Commander in Chief of the whole armed forces. Ii n Yamashita v. Tyer, the court held that the power to create a military commissio n for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. A mi litary commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues . 2A. Ratio The Military Commission is special military tribunal governed by a sp ecial law and not by the Rules of Court. Reasoning There is nothing in EO68 whic h requires that counsel appearing before said commissions must be attys. qualifi ed to practice law in the Phil. in accordance with the Rules of Court. 2B. No Ra tio The appointment of the 2 American attorneys is not violative of our national sovereignty. Reasoning It is only fair and proper that the US, which has submit ted the vindication of crimes against her govt. and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. Disposition The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid la w, with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitione r by having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with t he due processes of such Military Commission. Petition denied. With costs de ofi cio. - The Legislature enacted RA 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail Business . It prohibits aliens and associations, partnerships, or corporations, which are not wholly owned by citizens, to engage directly or indirectly in the retail tra de. In effect it nationalizes the retail business. - Procedure Lao Ichong, in hi s own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations, and partnersh ips adversely affected by RA 1180 filed a petition for Injunction and Mandamus a gainst Jaime Hernandez, Secretary of Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City Treas urer of Manila. - Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved A. Poli ce Power - the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable - necessary esp. in a modern democratic fra mework B. Equal Protection Clause - against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality; it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions - is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within suc h class, and reasonable grounds exists for making distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. - Criteria for Test of EPC 1. prese nce of public interest and welfare 2. existence of reasonable relation between p urposes and means 3. existence of reasonable basis for distinction and classific ation made C. Due Process clause - has to do with reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power - Questions for test: 1. Is there is a public interest/purpose? 2. Is the Act is reasonably necessary for the accomplis hment of the legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressiv e? 3. Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used or is it merely an un justified interference with private interest? ISSUES 1. WON RA 1180 denies to al ien residents the equal protection of the laws. 2. WON RA 1180 deprives alien re sidents of their liberty and property without due process of law. 3. WON the tit le of the Act is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill, which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from enga ging therein. 4. WON RA 1108 violates international and treaty obligations of th

e Republic of the Philippines. HELD 1. No. The act does not transcend the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution if there is a question of public interest involved or pursu ed and the classification or distinction used by the legislature, in this case b etween nationals and aliens, is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that classification is pat ently unreasonable and unfounded. Reasoning a. Based on experience of the countr y, alien retailer has shown disregard for his customers and the people on whom h e makes his profit. Aliens lack spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the country . Alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by intolerable pract ices like the ff: - hoarding essential commodities - violating price control law s - boycotting honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to thei r demands - believed to have evaded tax laws - bribing public officials b. Econo mic reason alien retailer never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth since the gains and profits he makes are not invested in indus tries that would help the countrys economy and increase national wealth. c. prece dents Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, Gibbon vs. Ongden Commonwealth vs. Hana, A nton vs. Van Winkle, Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners - Essentially held that the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a ba sis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. Takahashi vs. Fish and game Commission, Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley - held that the distinct ion between aliens and citizens is not valid because the laws were found to be a rbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial an tagonism and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. 2. No. There is due process if the laws passed are seen to have reason able relation to a proper legislative purpose, the means are reasonably necessar y for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individu als. Reasoning a. legitimacy of the purpose of the law - Its purpose is to preve nt persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold u pon our economic life\ - Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the pe ople are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. ICHONG V HERNANDEZ AND SARMIENTO LABRADOR; May 31, 1957 FACTS - Injunction and Mandamus

b Nationalistic protective policy laid down in the Constitution - Section 8 of A rticle XIV provides that no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authoriz ation for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines c. Provisions of law not unreasonable - The legislature is pri marily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, a nd every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not in excess of the legislative power. 3. No. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title. The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of the bill and the title need not be an index to the entire conten ts of the law. Reasoning a. The term regulate is a broader term than either proh ibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the t erm regulation. 4. No treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and t he police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other c onventional agreement. - Also, they say its not under RA 3452 bec. the RAs prohibit importation of rice and corn by government agency and not the government itself. - Even if the propose d importation violated the RAs, it can still be permitted because it is for the benefit of the people. - The Phils is already under executive agreements with co ntracts for purchase of rice with Vietnam and Burma. In case of conflict between the RAs and the contracts, the contracts should prevail because it came later. These contracts have been consummated bec. the Phils. has already paid. ISSUE WO N respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction HELD - RA 3452 says that the govt policy is to purchase basic foods directly from farm ers in Phils. Petitioner has sufficient interest. - Case at bar involves questio n which is a purely legal one. It falls under the exemption from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. - The proposed importation is governed b y RA 2207 and RA 3452 bec it covers all importations of rice and corn into the Ph ils. - RA 2207 and 3452 also applies to importations of the government itself bec . RA 2207 talks about imports authorized by the President, by and on behalf of g overnment. RA 3452 also indicates that only private parties may import rice unde r its provisions. These RAs are only in addition to Commonwealth Act No. 138 whi ch says that in all purchases by govt, incl. those for armed forces, preference i s given to materials produced in the Phils. - The benefit of the people argument c ant be accepted because there is no local rice shortage. And the importation is s aid to be for stockpile of Army, not for the civilian population. - The contract s w/ Vietnam and Burma are not executive agreements. Even if they were, they are unlawful, being against the RAs. The alleged consummation does not render this case academic. The contracts may have already been entered into and the payment may have been made but the actual importation has not yet taken place. Dispositi on- For lack of requisite majority, injunction prayed for is DENIED. - It is dec lared that Exec. Sec. has no power to authorize importation in question and he e xceeded jurisdiction in granting authority. The importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions. GONZALES V HECHANOVA CONCEPCION; October 22, 1963 FACTS - Respondent Exec. Sec. authorized importation of foreign rice and created rice procurement committee. Gonzales, a rice planter and President of Iloilo Pa lay and Corn Planters Association, filed petition. Procedure Case is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain implementation o f decision of Exec. Sec. to import rice. Respondents were required to file answe r and hearing was set. - on WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or i n excess of jurisdiction Petitioners stand: - Yes, bec. RA 3452 explicitly prohib its importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration and any other g ovt agency. Respondents stand: - Petitioner has no sufficient interest to file pet ition. - Petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies available befo re coming to court. - Petitioners action is not sufficient and not governed by RA 3452 because importation was authorized by President as Commander in Chief for military stock pile purposes. As such, Pres must prepare for threats without wai

ting for any special authority. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SECRETARY OF DAR CRUZ; July 14, 1989 FACTS - The Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insur e the well-being and economic security of all the people," especially the, less privileged. - In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifical ly that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and pr ofits. Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and i mplement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bo ndage of the soil." - The 1987 Constitution, besides echoing these sentiments, a lso adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Righ ts. One of its sections: - SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agraria n reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who ar e landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultur al lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Cong ress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity con siderations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining rete ntion limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State s hall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing. - R.A, No. 3844, othe rwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by th e Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated p rinciples. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 2 7, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-f armers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. - On July 17, 198 7, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownershi p in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation o f still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their paym ent. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, in stituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, prov iding the mechanics for its implementation. - With its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines (formally convened on July 27, 1987) took ov er legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, inclu ding extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No . 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This

law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provi sions. ISSUES 1. WON petitions are justiciable. 2. WON P.D. No. 27, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 and R.A. 6657 contravene the Consti tution on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal pro tection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be take n for public use without just compensation. Sub issues a. The determination of j ust compensation may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. b. The just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable only in money or in cash but not in the form of bonds or other thing s of value. c. In considering rentals as advance payment on the land, E.O. No. 2 28 deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process . d. The equal protection clause is violated when the burden of solving the agra rian problems is placed on the owners only of agricultural lands. e. In declarin g the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. f. The power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although petitioners agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress wa s convened, they contend that she could do so only to enact emergency measures d uring the period. g. The money needed to create the P50 billon special fund unde r Proc. No. 131 is in futuro, not in esse, i.e., it has yet to be raised and can not be appropriated at that time. h. The sugar planters argued that they are a s eparate group with problems exclusively their own and by being lumped in the sam e legislation with other farmers, their right to equal protection has been viola ted. i. There was a failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ne cessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of t he fundamental right to own property. j. The petitioners also decry the penalty for nonregistration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land fo r an amount equal to the government assessors valuation of the land for tax pur poses. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation, he is unj ustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.10 k. E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title. HELD 1. RD: Yes. The Court will assume ju risdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied but e ven if they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discr etion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. 2a. The de termination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties c oncerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review w ith finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judi cial function. (Sec. 16f) 2b. It cannot be denied that the traditional medium fo r the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, h as just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain.11 T his is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relativel y limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of exp ropriation. 2c. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that: A ll qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1 972 of the land they acquired by virtue of P.D. No. 27. It was obviously referri ng to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of fullf ledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just compensa tion. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its S ection 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of jus t compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land. 2d. Equal

protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be tr eated alike both as to 10 This was not discussed directly but may be construed as being under No. 1 above. It will still be the courts who will decide what just compensation would be. 11 The power of eminent domain is one of the three inherent powers of the State. I t is the power to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon pay ment of just compensation to the owner. It is inherent because it exists without need for legislation, i.e., even if it is not sanctioned by any law or even the Constitution, the State may exercise it. Why? Because these powers are necessary for a state to exist. The other two are police power and taxation. the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The argument that not only lan downers but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction be tween these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who wi ll not see.12 2e. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownersh ip of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the correspondin g payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds wit h an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. 2f. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is not correct to s ay that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power fo r, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that en acted it. Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not re jected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specif ically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inco nsistent with its provisions. 2g. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its princ ipal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of wh ich is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform. Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicab le. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been co nvened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely v ested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress. 2h. No evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisite s of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particular s and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial disti nctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of 12 Frankly, I dont like the way this ponente argues. Hes like saying, now I dont want to explain why. If you cant see the reasoning its your fault. Anyway, were infallib le remember? His next sentence: There is no need to elaborate on this matter. Ts k

the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these r equisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discrim inatory. 2i. The power of expropriation is by no means absolute. The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be ta ken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requi rements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just comp ensation.13 Some of the petitioners invoked their right of maximum retention und er Art. XIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution and under P.D. 316 which was promulgate d in implementation of P.D. 27. 2j. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits n ow in Sec. 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisio ns. (Sec 6: Max per landowner is 5 hec. 3 hec may be awarded to each child at le ast 15 yrs old and actually tilling or directly managing the land) 2k. It is set tled that the title of a bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents an d will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other. D ecision WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows: 1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Pr oc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutio nal objections raised in the herein petitions. 2. Title to all expropriated prop erties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners. 3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farm ers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. 4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retenti on rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. 5. S ubject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. (Unanimous court) - 6/10/88: Pres. Aquino approved RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform La w which includes the raising of livestock, swine and poultry 1/2/89: Sec. of Agr arian Reform (SAR) promulgated Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing for RA 6657 (S13 & S32) - 1/9/89: SAR promulgated Rules and Regulations implementing S11 (commercial farms) -Luz Farms, petitioner, is a cor poration engaged in livestock/poultry, adversely affected by RA 6657 -petition p rays that RA be declared unconstitutional; it is also prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the enforcement of the said law (injunction denie d) 8/24/89: court granted motion for reconsideration on injunctive relief -Luz F arms questions the following provisions of RA 6657: S3(b): includes raising of l ivestock in definition of Agricultural Enterprise/Activity S11: defines commercial farms as agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine rai sing S13: calls for production-sharing plan (distribute 3% of gross sales & 10% of gross profits to workers as additional compensation) S16(d) & 17: vests in DA R authority to determine compensation to be paid for lands covered by RA 6657 S3 2: spells out production-sharing plan in S13 -the constitutional provision under consideration is A13, S4, Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform which grants farm ers and farm-workers who are landless, the right to directly or collectively own the land they are tilling -livestock and poultry raising is different from crop farming in that land is not a primary input in the former ISSUE WON S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional insofar as said law includes the raising o f livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as in its Implementing Ru les and Guidelines HELD Instant petition GRANTED. S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional insofar as said law includes the raising of livestock, poultr y and swine in its coverage as well as in its Implementing Rules and Guidelines are hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of pre liminary injunction issued is hereby made permanent Ratio the question raised is one of constitutional construction; in construing any ambiguous provisions, the courts may look to the debates of the concon -the transcripts of the 1986 conco n clearly show that the meaning of the word agricultural (its dictionary meaning aside) was never meant to include livestock and poultry industries in it s coverage; there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in agraria

n reform -S13 & 32 calling for production-sharing is confiscatory and is thus vi olative of due process SEPARATE OPINION SARMIENTO -agrees that petition be granted but not that main issue is one of consti constr uction and interpretation A13, S4: ..in case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereofthis phrase provides a possible coverage of livesto ck, poultry and swine -every presumption should be indulged in favor of the cons titutionality of a statute ISSUE: WON assailed provisions violate equal protecti on clause of the consti -clearly, livestock & poultry lands and crop & tree farm s are not similarly situated, hence the inclusion of the former in CARP would be violative of the equal protection clause GARCIA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CRUZ; December 2, 1991 FACTS Petitioner challenges RA7042 on the ground that: - It defeats the constitu tional policy of developing a selfreliant and independent national economy effec tively controlled by Filipinos and the protection of Filipino enterprises agains t unfair foreign competition and trade practices - He claims that the law abdica tes all regulation of foreign enterprises in this country and gives them unfair advantages over local investments which are practically elbowed out in their own land with the complicity of their own government - Under Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may do business in the Philippines or invest in a domesti c enterprise up to 100% of its capital without need of prior approval o All that it has to do is register with the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Bur eau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection in the case of a single propriet orship o The SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, shall not impose any limitations o n the extent of foreign ownership in an enterprise additional to those provided in the Act - Under Section 7, non-Philippine nationals may own up to one hundred p ercent (100%) of domestic market enterprises unless foreign ownership therein is prohibited or limited by existing law or the Foreign Investment Negative List u nder Section 8 hereof." LUZ FARMS V SECRETARY OF DAR PARAS; December 4, 1990 FACTS - Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform 13 There was a shift in subject after this. He tackled the argument on why the Stat e did not distribute public lands only by pointing out the Constitutions the just distribution of all agricultural lands clause. Then he plays the political questi on card on the issue of why the distribution would be private lands first.

- However, the system of negative list under Section 8 abandons the positive asp ect of regulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. In effect, it assumes that so long as foreign investments are not in areas covered by the list, such investments are not detrimental to but are good for the national econ omy. o List A merely enumerate areas of activities already reserved to Philippin e nationals by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws o List B - contain areas of activities and enterprises already regulated according to law and inclu des small and medium-sized domestic market enterprises or export enterprises whi ch utilize raw materials from depleting natural resources with paid-in equity ca pital of less than the equivalent of US$500,000.00; meaning, SMEs are for Filipi nos. Or even, Filipinos are not encouraged to go big. o List C - contain areas o f investment m which "existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumers and do not need further foreign investments."; Ho wever, existing enterprises must be qualified as Filipino, if not, it shall prot ect foreign enterprises too - Section 9 is also attacked, because if a Philippin e national believes that an area of investment should be included in list C, the burden is on him to show that the criteria enumerated in said section are met Articles 2, 32, & 35 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1982 are done away with by RA 7042. - By repealing Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus Inves tments Code, RA No. 7042 further abandons the regulation of foreign investments by doing away with important requirements for doing business in the Philippines. - The Transitory provisions of RA 7042, which allow practically unlimited entry of foreign investments for three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory F oreign Investment Negative List, not only completely deregulates foreign investm ents but would place Filipino enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own c ountry. Sol-Gen answers: - phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to eq uity restrictions alone o prior to the effectivity of RA 7042, Article 46 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (EO No. 226), provided that a non-Philippine n ational could, without need of prior authority from the Board of Investments (BO I), invest in: (1) any enterprise registered under Book I (Investments with Ince ntives); and (2) enterprises not registered under Book I, to the extent that the total investment of the non-Philippine national did not exceed 40% of the outst anding capital o On the other hand, under Article 47 thereof, if an investment b y a non-Philippine nationals in an enterprise not registered under Book I was such that the total participation by non-Philippine nationals in the outstanding capital thereof exceeded 40%, prior authority from the BOI was requi red. - With the introduction of the Negative List under Sections 8 & 15, the are as of investments not open to foreign investors are already determined and outli ned; hence, registration with the SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, is now the i nitial step to be taken by foreign investors. - This registration constitutes re gulation and exercise of authority over foreign investments. Under SEC and BTRCP rules and regulations, foreign investors must first comply with certain require ments before they can be issued a license to do business in the Philippines. - S ection 7 of RA 7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to own up to 100% of domesti c market enterprises only in areas of investments outside the prohibitions and l imitations imposed by law to protect Filipino ownership and interest. - The Fore ign Investment Negative List under Section 8 reserves to Filipinos sensitive are as of investments. List C prohibits foreign investors from engaging in areas of activities where existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the consumer. o The Act opens the door to foreign investments only a fter securing to Filipinos their rights and interests over the national economy. o List A The provisions of the Constitution and other specific laws regulate or limit the extent of foreign ownership in enterprises engaged in areas of activi ty reserved for Filipinos o List B - contains areas already regulated pursuant t o law already makes it clear that it is regulatory. It channels efforts at promo ting foreign investments to bigger enterprises where there is an acute lack of F ilipino capital; scheme is for foreign investments to supplement Filipino capita l in big enterprises. o List C - to allow healthy competition, Activities which do not adequately meet-the needs of the consumers should not be included in list

C; if not, consumers would be at the mercy of unscrupulous producers o Foreign Corporations under a valid license prior to the enactment of RA 7042 necessarily come within the protection of the law. - Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDA in determining the areas of investment for inclusion in List C o Petition for inclusion therein requires "a public hearing at which affected pa rties will have the opportunity to show whether the petitioner industry adequate ly serves the economy and the consumers." o Provision is designed to protect the consumers as not all existing enterprises satisfy the criteria inclusion in List C. - Regarding the repealing of provisio ns of the Omnibus Investment Code o purposely removed because the determination of the areas of investment open to foreign investors is made easy by the Foreign Investment Negative List formulated and recommended by NEDA following the proce ss and criteria provided in Sections 8 & 9 of the Act - Re the Transitory Foreig n Investment Negative List o it practically includes the same areas of investmen t reserved to Filipino under Section 5", and the SEC shall disallow registration of the applying non-Philippine national if the existing joint venture enterprise s, particularly the Filipino partners therein, can reasonably prove they are cap able to make the investment needed for the domestic market activities to be unde rtaken by the competing applicant. Senator Paterno as Intervenor: - the over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a self-reliant economy, as well as the provisions designed to promote full employment for Filipinos - suggests that the constitutional challenge should be rejected outright for noncompliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question, to wit: (1) th ere must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at t he earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question m ust be necessary to the decision of the case. ISSUES 1. WON 2. WON 3. WON 4. WON there is actual controversy petitioners have legal standing constitutionality l is mota of the case this entails a political question HELD 1. There is at this point no actual case or controversy, particularly becau se of the absence of the implementing rules that are supposed to carry the Act i nto effect a. A controversy must be one that is appropriate or "ripe" for determ ination, not conjectural or anticipatory 2. The petitioner, as a citizen and tax payer, and particularly as a member of the House of Representatives, comes under the definition that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. 3. The constitutional question has not been raised tardily but in fact, as just remarked, prematurely .

- The constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to show that there i s an indubitable ground for it, not to say even a necessity to resolve it. a. Po licy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. b. based on th e doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments c. theory is that as the joint ac t of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully stu died and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was f inally enacted. - the cause of unconstitutionality has not been proved by the pe titioner d. Act does not violate any of the constitutional provisions the petiti oner has mentioned 4. What we see here is a debate on the wisdom or the efficacy of the Act, but this is a matter on which we are not competent to rule. a. In A ngara v Electoral Commission: "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wis dom, justice or expediency of legislation." b. allowed only "to settle actual co ntroversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," 5 an d may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical. c. There is no irregularity also, that shows that there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Decision Petiti on dismissed. - Commonwealth Act No. 548 gives the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of the Public Works and Communications the authority to promul gate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on nat ional roads. Procedure Maximo Calang, in his capacity as private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the Cha irman of NTC, Director of PW, Acting Secretary of PWC, Mayor of Manila and Actin g Chielf of Police of Manila. ISSUES 1. WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconsti tutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. 2. WON the rules and regulations promulgated constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freed om of locomotion. 3. WON the rules and regulations complained of infringe the up on the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insur e the well-being of all the people. HELD 1. No.The Legislature cannot delegate p ower to make law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fa ct or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own acti on depend. Reasoning 1. adherence to precedent Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mind oro, Wayman vs. Southard it was held here that discretion may be delegated to ex ecutive departments or subordinate officials the execution of certain acts, fina l on questions of fact. 2. textual interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 548 Th e provision that .the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of the Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads, is an administra tive function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. 3. p racticality The complexities of modern governments, the multiplication of the su bjects of govtl regulations, and the increased difficulty in administering the la w give rise to the adoption, within certain limits, the delegation of greater po wers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrat ive and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations. 2. No. The state may enact la ws that may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business an d occupation if the said laws are intended to promote the welfare of the public. ( police power of the State) Reasoning 1. 2. precedents (US vs. Gomez, Dobbins vs. Los Angeles & People vs. Pomar) Paradox -

The apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation 3. No. Social justice is promoted if the greatest good is brought about to the g reatest number. BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION PARAS; May 14, 1991 FACTS - PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A and was granted franchise unde r PD 1067-B to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos. PAGCOR proved t o be a potential source of revenue. Thus, PD 1399 was passed for PAGCOR to fully attain its objectives. PD 1869 was passed later on to enable PAGCOR/government to regulate and centralize all games of chance, giving it territorial jurisdicti on all over the Philippines. PAGCOR became 3rd largest source of govt revenue, ne xt to BIR and Bureau of Customs. It sponsored sociocultural and charitable proje cts and at that time employed 4,494 employees in its 9 casinos. Procedure This i s petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869 ISSUES Procedural Issue W ON petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers can question and seek the an nulment of PD 1869 Substantive Issue/s WON PD 1869 should be annulled based on t he ff grounds: 1. it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order 2. it waived and intruded into the Manila City governments right to impose taxes an d license fees 3. it violates equal protection clause in that it legalizes PAGCO R but outlaws other forms of gambling and vices 4. it violates trend of governme nt away from monopolistic and crony economy HELD Procedural Issue: - Considering transcendental public interest and the Courts duty to check on limits of other b ranches of govt, SC brushed aside technicalities of procedure and took cognizance of the petition. Substantive Issues: CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS LAUREL; December 2, 1940 FACTS - The Secretary of Public Works and Communications (PWC) approved with mod ification the recommendation that originated from the National Traffic Commissio n (NTC), which was favorably indorsed by the Director of Public Works (PW), that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that th e Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and cau sed to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

1. Gambling, unless allowed by law, is prohibited. But prohibition does not mean that govt cant regulate it in exercise of police power. Police power is state auth ority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. PAGCOR has been beneficial, not just to govt, but to society as well. 2. Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no i nherent right to impose taxes, its power to tax must always yield to a legislati ve act. Municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress, therefore Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. If Congress can grant a municipal corporation the power to tax, it can also provide exemptions or even take back t he power. Also, Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling has long been re voked. The power is now vested exclusively on national government. Local governm ents, too, have no power to tax instrumentalities of national government, such a s PAGCOR. PAGCOR is exempt from local taxes. The power of local govt to impose ta xes and fees is always subject to limits w/c Congress may provide. It cant be vio lative, but consistent with principle of local autonomy. Local autonomy doesnt ma ke local govt sovereign w/in state; it simply means decentralization. The local g ovt has been described as a political subdivision of state constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It can only be an intra sovereign sub division of a sovereign nation, it cant be an imperium in imperio. 3. Equal prote ction doesnt preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded diff. tre atment as long as classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The fact that so me gambling activities (e.g. sweepstakes, lottery, races, cockfighting, etc.) ar e legalized while others are prohibited does not render applicable laws such as PD 1869 unconstitutional. Whether or not PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine. But as of now, every law has in its favor the presumptio n of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there must be a showing of cl ear and unequivocal breach of Constitution. 4. If PD 1869 runs counter to govt po licies, it is for Executive to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment. Ju diciary does not settle policy issues. Disposition Petition is DISMISSED. OPOSA V FACTORAN DAVIDE; July 30, 1993 FACTS - The overarching theme of the case deals with the prevention the misappro priation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrh age of the countrys vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth . - In 1991 a case was filed by minors (represented by their parents) and the Phil ippine Ecological Network (PENI) against the then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. who was subst ituted by the new secretary, Angel Alcala. The complaint was instituted to be a taxpayers class suit as it alleges that all citizens of the Philippines are entitl ed to benefit, use and enjoyment of the countrys virgin tropical rainforests. The suit also alleges that this suit represents people who are sharing the same sen timent towards the preservation of our natural resources (since not all of them could go before the court). Furthermore, this was also asserted to be representa tive of the current generation and generation that are yet to be born. - The sui t calls for two primary actions that orders the Department of Environment and Na tural Resources (DENR), its agents, representatives, and those acting on its beh alf to, 1. Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and 2. t o cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, and renewing or approv ing new timber license agreements. - The suit starts off with statement of facts regarding the country, the countrys islands, its natural resources, and scientif ic evidences pointing to the requirement for the country to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology (54% should be use for forest cover and 46% for agricultur al, residential, industrial, commercial, and other uses). They asserted that def orestation resulted in, a. water shortages b. salinization c. massive erosion an d loss of soil fertility d. extinction of some of the countries flora and fauna e. disturbance and dislocation of indigenous cultures f. siltation of rivers and seabed g. drought h. increasing velocity of typhoon winds i. flooding of lowlan ds j. siltation and shortening of the life span of dams k. reduction of earths ca

pacity to process carbon dioxide. - Initially the petition was dismissed on the grounds of lack of cause of action, of being political question, and of causing the impairment of contracts. The petitioners filed for certiorari hence this cas e. They contend that there is a cause of action using articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code (the right to a sound environment), Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 that calls for the creation of the Department of Environment and Natura l Resources (DENR) to safeguard the peoples right to a healthful environment, Sec tion 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1151 ( Philippine Environmental Policy), and S ection 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution that recognizes the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. As well as the concept of generation al genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of mans inalienable right to self-pre servation and self-perpetuation in natural law. ISSUES 1. Locus Standi: WON the case is a class suit? 2. WON minors can assert that they represent other generat ions and those succeeding theirs? 3. Merits: WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amountin g to lack of jurisdiction by declaring the petitioners to have no legal right? 4 . Whether or not granting the petition would violate the non-impairment clause f ound in the Constitution? HELD 1. Yes it is a class suit because the subject mat ter of the complaint is of common and general interest to all citizens of the Ph ilippines and that it would be impracticable to bring them all to court. The pla intiffs in this case are numerous and representative enough to ensure that all i nterests is protected. 2. Yes they can, following the concept of intergeneration al responsibility. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful envir onment. 3. Yes respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction because it failed to recognize the legal right of the peti tioners which is the right to a balanced and healthful ecology that is incorpora ted in the 1987 Constitution under Section 16 Article II. - Moreover, this right s need not be written in the Constitution for this deals with rights that are as sumed from the very inception oh humankind. The reason why it was written was be cause the framers feared that without a mandate as stated in the state policies future generations would inherit nothing to sustain life. It is clear then that there is a legal right for a balanced healthful ecology and the right to health. Given that it could also be said that this right is further supported by Execut ive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 making the cause of action existent. 4. No it does not violate the non-impairment clause because licenses are not contracts, properties or a property right that is protected by the due p rocess clause of the Constitution. As the court held in Tan v. Director of Fores try, a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unl awful and is not a contract. It is not irrevocable. The Chief Executive may vali dly amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses when national interests so requi re. Given that it is not a contract, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked . - Even if the licenses are contracts, the action stated in the case still does not affect it given that no law or action by the Chief Executive to amend, modi fy, replace, or rescind licenses so it is could not as of the moment be invoked. And furthermore, if there would be a law passed it would not be considered as a violation of the non-impairment clause as the very nature of the law deals with the exercising of the police power of the state to advance the right of the peo ple to a balanced and healthful ecology. The non-impairment clause yields to the police power of the state.

Decision Petition is granted. Petitioners may amend complaint to implead as defe ndants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. DECS V SAN DIEGO CRUZ; December 21, 1989 FACTS - decided en banc, unanimous decision - Respondent Roberto Rey C. San Dieg o is a BS Zoology graduate from UE. He has taken the NMAT four times and flunked it as many times. His application to take a fifth examination was denied by pet itioner DECS on the basis of the three-flunk rule under MECS Order #12, Series of 1972. San Diego filed a petition for mandamus at the Valenzuela RTC, invoking hi s constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. In an amended complaint, he raised the additional grounds of due process and equal protection and also challenged the constitutionality of the aforementioned order. - Penden te lite, with the agreement of both parties, he was allowed to take a fifth atte mpt at NMAT. This attempt he also failed. - RTC decision released 4 July 1989 gr anted the petition and declared the challenged order invalid. It held that the p etitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through a n arbitrary exercise of the police power. ISSUE WON a person who has thrice fail ed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. Or, WON the three-flunk rule is a proper exercise of the police power of the State M easures, such as admission exams and the three flunk rule, designed to gauge the academic preparation of an applicant fall within the valid exercise of the poli ce power of the State. Reasoning 1. use of precedent: In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, unanimous Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended t o limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. - analogy: Tablarin c ase & case at bar issue is academic preparation of the applicant. Admission test and the three-flunk rule are both valid measures in the regulation of the medic al profession. The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. This pow er to regulate and control the practice of medicine also includes the power to H ELD Ratio regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. 2. The police power of the State is validly exercised if - (a) the interests of the pu blic generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the i nterference of the State <lawful subject>; & (b) the means employed are reasonab ly necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished, not undu ly oppressive upon individuals <lawful method> - The case at bar complies with t his requisites... <subject> It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. <method> The three -flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medic al profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. 3. The ri ght to quality education is NOT absolute. The Constitution also provides that "e very citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements." - It is no t enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the C onstitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. 4. What the equal protection clause requires is equality among equa ls. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. - A substantial di stinction exists between medical students and other students who are not subject ed to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do n ot require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for example, while belongin g to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate responsi bility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated. - There wo uld be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admit ted and others who have also qualified are denied entrance. Note While every per son is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional righ

t to be a doctor. The Court suggests the notion of appropriate calling. It is ti me indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system o f education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited a s determined by initial tests and evaluations. Decision Petition is granted. Dec ision of Valenzuela RTC reversed. Costs against private respondent San Diego. CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT MALCOLM; February 23, 1909 FACTS - An appeal to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands which affirmed a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet, dismissing an application for the registration of certain land. - M ateo Carino, an Igorot, filed an application for the registration of a certain l and in the Province of Benguet. For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Pari s, in 1899, the applicant and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His gra ndfather had lived upon it and maintained fences sufficient for the holding of c attle. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle. He had received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot customs and h ad used it for pasture. They all had been recognized as owners of the land by th e Igorots. No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish crown and although I, in 1893-1894, and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one un der the royal decrees then in force, nothing has come of it. In 1901, he filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were regist ered to him, that process establishing only a possessory title. - Applicant clai ms that he now owns the land, and is entitled to registration under the Philippi ne Commissions Act No,496 of 1902, which established a court for that purpose wit h jurisdiction throughout the Philippine Archipelago, and authorized in general terms applications to be made by persons claiming to own the land. - The governm ent claims that Spain had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescr iption against the crown and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, requ ired registration within a limited time to make the title good; that the applica nts land was not registered, and therefore became public land; that he United Sta tes succeeded to the title of Spain, and that the he has no rights that the Phil ippine government is bound to respect. ISSUE WON the applicant owns the land HEL D - Yes. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquire d by the United States are to be administered for the benefits of the inhabitant s of the Philippines. Thus, when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the l and has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it shall be presumed

to have been held in the same way before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. - Under the laws of Spain, there is no clear proof that he do es not own the land. Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitant o f the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. The fact was th at titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain. - Roy al Cedula of October 15, 1754 Where such possessor shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as valid title by prescription. As prescription, even against the Crown, was rec ognized by the laws of Spain, the court sees no sufficient reason to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over which Spain had onl y a paper sovereignty. - Decree of June 25, 1880 For private ownership, there mu st have been a grant by competent authority. For all legal effects, those who ha ve been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated l and, 20 years; for uncultivated, 30 years. When this decree went into effect, th e applicants father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. This b eing the case and the fact that his possession was not unlawful (no attempt at a ny such proceedings against him or his father was ever made), the regulation for the registration of royal land wrongfully occupied does not apply to him. Moreo ver, the decree was not calculated to the mind of an Igorot Chief the notion tha t ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. Di sposition Judgment reversed. Law and justice require that the applicant should b e granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what by practice and beli ef of those among whom he live, was his property. habeas corpus in this court, alleging that they are deprived of their liberty in violation of law. - The return of the Solicitor-General alleges that on Februar y 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 signed by t he provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, jr.. The laws primary objective is the advancement of the welfare of the nonChristian people of Mindoro. In one of the Whereas clauses, it was stated that the provincial governor is of the opinion t hat the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the Mangya nes to live on. Pursuant to the Governors powers under section 2077 of the Admini strative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake was selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro sub ject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior. Under the resol ution of the Provincial Board, any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceeding sixty days in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. The resolution of the pro vincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the go vernor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for t he protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public fo rests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. ISSUES 1. WON the Mangyans were deprived of due process when their liberty to choose the ir homes were limited by the law. 2. WON the Legislature exceeded its authority in enacting the law mandating the forcible transfer of the Mangyanes. HELD 1. NO . None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of l aw. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been of ten held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true where m uch must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is d ue process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enf orced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devise d in the discretion of the legislative power in furtherance of the public good w hich regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado

RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO MALCOLM; February 28, 1919 FACTS - Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were ordere d by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their nat ive habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Provin ce of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escape d. This reservation, as appears from the resolution of the provincial board, ext ends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2,000 acres, o n which about three hundred Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Daba los, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sherif f and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservatio n. The Manguianes sued out a writ of vs. California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply * * * "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the r egular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Cour t.1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances it varies with the sub ject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peabody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.) - There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right concep tion of liberty and does not practise liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will-going from one place to another i n the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereo n. Not knowing what true liberty is and not practicing the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law? - But does the Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practice liberty in a rightful way? - To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancem ent of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even th e remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense. In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has be en placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience. - The Mangyans will ultimately becom e a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary s ervitude by those who may want to abuse them.. They understand liberty as the ri ght to do anything they will-going from one place to another in the mountains, b urning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon. To allow them t o successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the G overnment without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making the m useful citizens. They will thus be left in a permanent state of savagery and b ecome a vulnerable point of attack by those who doubt, may challenge the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.

- Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are r estrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can on e say that due process of law, has not been followed. To go back to our definiti on of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; t he law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods o f procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. 2. NO. Considere d, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairl y say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, a n unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. - As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which in case of doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid, i s the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gamble vs. Vand erbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supr eme Court of Tennessee writes: We can see no objection to the application of pub lic policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing conflicting soluti ons, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule 2145 of t he Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due proc ess of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that c onfinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute s lavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 214 5 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somew hat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Adm inistrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Decision Petitioners are not unlawfu lly imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. that term is used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its membership the general laws and r egulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial, which control the conduct of the admittedly civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life, further more, which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend t o brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or pra ctices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with the members of the tribe. - So the standard of civilizat ion to which any given number or group of inhabitants of a particular province i n these Islands, or any individual member of such a group must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the class embraced wi thin the statutory description of "nonChristian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence to a "nonChristian" tribe had they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify th em whether they reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life independent of and apart from that maintaine d by such tribe, but a mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or pro perty or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom t hey are brought in contact. - The contention that in this particular case, and w ithout challenging the validity of the statute, the writ should issue because of the failure to give these petitioners as well as the rest of the fifteen thousa nd Manguianes by the reconcentration order an opportunity to be heard before any attempt was made to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount to a contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance of such an o rder.

MOIR - I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but my sense of jus tice will not permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing my strong dissent from the opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority o f the court. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into the questi ons in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be the legal and human si de of the case as it presents itself to my mind. - The Manguianes are not a sepa rate state. They have no treaty with the Government of the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a certain district where they are accorde d exclusive rights. They are citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they ar e Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other cit izen of this country. And when the SEPARATE OPINION CARSON - The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly d iscloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be fou nd to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraced within the d escriptive term "non-Christian," as provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take them from their native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about 800 hectares , he deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due process of law, and they were denied the equal protection of the law. The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines ." They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced Filipinos whether they want it or not. They are backward and deficient in culture and mus t be moved from their homes, however humble they may be and "brought under the b ells" and made to stay on a reservation. Are these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return of the Solicitor-General of the Philipp ine Islands of any crime having been committed by these "peaceful, timid, primit ive, semi-nomadic people." - It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is no arbitrary body of individuals; that the constit utional principles upon which our government and its institutions rest do not le ave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power, but tha t all in authority are guided and limited by these provisions which the people h ave, through the organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of all con trol exercised over them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal protection clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall be subj ected to any arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; it was intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or ar bitrary spoliation of property. - As we have seen, a statute which makes a purel y arbitrary or unreasonable classification, or which singles out any particular individual or class as the subject of hostile and discriminating legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the fourteenth amendment and espec ially to the equal protection clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further discussion." (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U. S. Supreme Court Reports, p . 366.) When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of govern ment, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the histor y of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sover eignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remain with the people by whom and for whom a ll government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of p ower. It is, indeed, quite true, that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and, in many cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying exce pt to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the pres sure

of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, libe rty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are sec ured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the v ictorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of Massa chusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of Commonwealth may be a government of law and not of men. For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country whe re freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yiek Wo vs. Hopki ns, 118 U. S., 374.) - It is said that the present law is an old Act being in su bstance Act No. 547 of the Philippine Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for determination of its constitutionality. No matter how bene ficient the motives of the lawmakers if the law tends to deprive any man of life , liberty, or property without due process of law, it is void. In my opinion the acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section 2145 of the Admi nistrative Code not only deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of law, but will in all probability deprive them of their life, without due process of law. History teaches that to take a semi-nomadic tribe from their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow confines of a reservation is to invite disease and suffering and death. - From my long experience in the I slands, I should say that it would be a crime of little less magnitude to take t he Ifugaos from their mountain homes where they have reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness and to transfer them to the more ferti le, unoccupied, malaria infested valleys which they look down upon from their fi elds-than it would be to order their decapitation en masse. There can be no deni al that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly th e same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation-in effect an open air jail-th en so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than t he Ifugaos, and so may the Moros. - There are "non-Christian" in nearly every pr ovince in the Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-nine governors upon the prio r approval of the head of the department have the power under this law to take t he non-Christian inhabitants of their different provinces from their homes and p ut them on a reservation for "their own good and the general good of the Philipp ines," and the courts will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens of t he Philippine Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives, may be subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial governor. And who would be safe? After the reservation is once established might not a provincial governor decide that some political enemy was a nonChristian, and that he would be safer on the reservation. No matter what his education and culture, he could have no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of the court might be in a di stant province and not within reach, and the provincial governors fiat is final . - There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "nonChristians," or "wild tribes " and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation-in eff ect an open air jail-then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have ma de more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros. - I think this Court sh ould declare that sections 2145 and 2759 of the Administrative Code of 1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the petitioners are illegally restrain ed of their liberty, and that they have been denied the equal protection of the laws, and order the respondents immediately to liberate all of the petitioners. PIT-OG V PEOPLE FERNAN; October 11, 1990 FACTS - Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals - There was a communal land in Laog, Mainit, Mt. Province called the tayan. It was owned by the tomayan group whose members were descendants of the original owners thereof named Jakot and Pang-o. One of their descendants, Pel-ey Cullalad, was requested by the tom ayan to act in their behalf in selling the 400-sqm residential portion of the ta

yan, in order that the tomayan would have something to butcher and eat during a celebration called ato. The sale was made in consideration of P1,500 and was mad e in favor of Edward Pasiteng, whose house had been built thereon. It was agreed that the unregistered property would be registered under Sec. 194 of the Revise d Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344. Besides Cullalad, several memb ers of the tomayan affixed their signatures or thumb marks on the notarized deed of sale. Thereafter, Pasiteng declared the property as his own for taxation pur poses and paid taxes thereon. - In 1983, while Pasiteng was out hunting, Erkey P it-og (aka Mary Pit-og) and her companions destroyed the fence erected by Pasite ng and cut down and took away the sugarcane worth P1,000 and the banana fruits v alued at P100 found in the area. Pasiteng reported the matter to the police. Thr ee days later, the police filed a complaint for theft against Erkey Pit-og in th e Municipal Trial Court of Bontoc. - Pit-og pleaded not guilty of theft on the g round that the tayan belonged to her, her father Lobchoken being a descendant Ja kot. She did not declare the land for taxation purposes because no one in the to mayan was allowed to declare the land as his own. However, any member of the tomayan could make improvements on the land and claim them as his own. Anyone who abandoned the land would be succeeded only by other members. No person outside the tomayan could succeed to the cultivation of the tayan. - Lobc hoken, planted sugarcane in the tayan in Loag and when he died, his widow Pidcho y and their children continued cultivating the land. They also built a granary t hereon. The land was later given to Pit-og by Pidchoy for cultivation. Thereafte r, the family allowed Pasiteng to build a house behind the place where Pit-og an d her family used to have a house because Edward was Erkeys uncle being the bro ther of her father. Erkey planted the bananas and avocado trees in the area and harvested the sugarcane. No one had ever prevented her from cutting the sugarcan e and the other plants. The municipal trial court discredited Pit-ogs story emp hasizing that her claim of continuous occupation and possession of the land was baseless as she had "no papers to show" or prove such claim. It found that an th e elements of theft under Article 308 of the RPC were present and accordingly re ndered the judgment of conviction. - On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed th e decision of the lower courts with the following findings and observations: - P asitengs claim of ownership is documented by a Deed of Conveyance, a public docum ent which was executed between him and the members of the tomayan group. The val idity of this public document has never been questioned by any one of the previo us owners belonging to the tomayan group. Furthermore, the tax declarations in t he name of and the realty tax payments by, Pasiteng, although not conclusive pro ofs of ownership, are, nevertheless, prima facie evidence of his possession of t he land in question. In contrast to these documentary evidence, petitioner offer s nothing better than her bare claim. The personal property taken by accused-pet itioner not being hers but those of Pasiteng, and she gained from the taking the reof without the consent of the owner, accused-petitioner is guilty of the crime of theft. ISSUES 1. WON Pit-og had criminal intent in taking the sugarcane and the bananas. 2. WON the present case is criminal or civil in nature. HELD 1. Erk ey Pit-og could not have had criminal intent because she took the sugarcane and bananas believing them to be her own. - Edward Pasiteng relied heavily on his do cumentary evidence to prove ownership over the sugarcane and bananas. A careful study of these documents, in conjunction with the testimonial evidence extant in the record, however, discloses matters which put a cloud of doubt upon Pit-ogs c ulpability. The deed of sale

describes the property as containing an area of 400 sqm, while the tax declarati ons show that the property contains an area of 512 sqm. The testimonies presente d by the prosecution and the defense show that the areas cultivated by Pasiteng and Pit-og were adjacent and so close to each other that the possibility of conf usion as to who planted which plants is not remote. In fact, before the filing o f this case, Pit-og had sued Pasitengs son, Donato, who allegedly cut down bana nas she had planted in the area. The fact that Edward had built a fence around t he area he claimed as his does not necessarily prove that he enclosed only the 4 00 square meters he had purchased from the tomayan. After all, he had declared a s his own for taxation purposes 112 square meters more than the area he bought. - There is on record a survey plan of the 512 squaremeter area claimed by Edward but there are no indications therein of the exact area involved in this case. P roof on the matter, however, is important for it means the Identification of the rightful owner of the stolen properties. It should be emphasized that to prove the crime of theft, it is necessary and indispensable to clearly Identify the pe rson who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him. 2. The legal issues that must b e ironed out with regard to claims of ownership over the tayan should be threshe d out in an appropriate civil action. - Obiter dicta related to Article II Secti on22 re Indigenous Community - We see this case as exemplifying a clash between a claim of ownership founded on customs and tradition and another such claim sup ported by written evidence but nonetheless based on the same customs and traditi on. when a court is beset with this kind of case, it can never be too careful Mo re so in this case, where the accused, an illiterate tribeswoman who cannot be e xpected to resort to written evidence of ownership, stands to lose her liberty o n account of an oversight in the courts appreciation of the evidence. Dispositi on Erkey Pit-og is ACQUITTED for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt that she committed the crime of theft. No costs. can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operat ing an on-line lottery, and these questions can no longer be reopened. - Petitio ners argue that the two justices who changed their votes did not act according t o law and that the two new appointees regardless of the merits of the case must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who were dissenters in the first case and constitute the new majority in the second lotto case. - SC said the decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the retirem ent of one of the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the first case was later r eversed. - SC cited the case of Feliciano v. Aquinas (also a split decision) whi ch was overturned in People v. Yang. ISSUES 1. WON the constitutional policies a nd principles (Art II Sec 5 ,Sec 12, Sec 13, Sec 17) invoked by the petitioners may be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are inconsis tent with them 2. WON the petitioners have standing to sue on constitutional gro unds, given that the Constitution guarantees to peoples organizations effective an d reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decis ion making (Art XIII Sec 16). 3. WON, as settled in the first case, the PCSO und er its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) cannot enter into any form of associa tion or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. HELD 1. NO . As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do n ot confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not il legal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]). 2. N O. It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law all owing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutiona

lity but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agree ment, cannot raise. - Kilosbayans status as a peoples organization does not gi ve it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of indep endent peoples organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective in terests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, 15-16) - These provi sions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest o r those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The ju risdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is l imited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requiremen t lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates dec ision-making in the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party. - Petitioners right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained because this case does not involve illegal disbursement of public funds. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the pet itioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any infringement of their rights as l egislators. 3. Indeed in the first case it was held that the PCSO under its char ter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) cannot enter into any form of association or col laboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery HOWEVER THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN THIS CASE ARE LEGAL QUESTIONS AND THE CLAIMS INVOLVED ARE SUBSTANTIALL Y DIFFERENT FROM THOSE INVOLVED IN THE PRIOR CASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. AS ALREAD Y STATED, THE ELA IS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CONTRACT OF LEASE DECLARED VOID IN THE FIRST CASE. Also, the Court noted in its decision that the provisio ns of the first contract, which were considered to be features of a joint ventur e agreement, had been removed in the new contract. KILOSBAYAN, INC V MORATO MENDOZA; November 16, 1995 FACTS - Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case Petitioner s contend that the decision in the first case has already settled (1) whether pe titioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2) whether under its charte r (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office VALMONTE V BELMONTE, JR CORTES; February 13, 1989 FACTS - Petitioners are media practitioners who wish to confirm reports that cer tain members of the Batasang Pambansa, including some members of the opposition, were granted clean loans from the GSIS before the February 1986 elections. Petiti oner Valmonte filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunct ion, praying that respondent Belmonte, in his capacity as GSIS General Manager, be directed to: 1. Furnish petitioners with a list of the names of the members o f the defunct Batasang Pambansa who were

able to secure clean loans from the GSIS immediately prior to the February 7, 1986 elections through the intercession of then-First Lady Imelda Marcos. 2. Furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing said loans. 3. Allow petitioners access to public records for the subject information. ISSUE S Procedural: Have petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies? Substa ntive: 1. Does the information sought by petitioners fall under matters of public concern? 2. Does a confidential relationship exist between GSIS and its borrower s? 3. Are loan transactions of the GSIS, being merely incidental to its insuranc e function, private in nature? HELD Procedural: No. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved. The issue raised by petitioners, which requ ires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, can be passed upon by the court more competently than GSIS or its Board of Trus tees. Substantive: 1. Yes. The public nature of GSIS funds and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of p ublic interest and concern. 2. No. The right to privacy belongs to the individua l in his private capacity and not to public and governmental agencies like the G SIS. The right cannot be invoked by juridical entities, as a corporation has no right to privacy in its name. The entire basis of the right to privacy is an inj ury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief. However, even the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they chose to invoke this right. Public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to clo ser public scrutiny. 3. No. The constituent-ministrant dichotomy characterizing go vernment function has long been repudiated. The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. That the GSIS was exercising a proprietary function i n granting the loans would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from th e coverage and scope of the right to information. Transactions entered into by t he GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation, are within the ambit of the peoples right to be informed pursuant to the constitutio nal policy of transparency in government dealings. Petitions are entitled to access to the documents subject to reasonable regulati ons. The petition is held to be meritorious as to the 2nd and 3rd alternative ac ts sought by petitioners. The same cannot be said, however, of the 1 st act soug ht. Although citizens are entitled to access to official records, the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of public records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern. It is essential for a writ of mandamus to lie that the applicant has a welldefined, clear and certain right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. ISSUES Procedural: 1. WON the petitioner has the personality or legal standing t o file the instant petition; and 2. WON this Court is the proper court before wh ich this action may be filed. Substantive: 1. WON this Court could require the P CGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, wi th the Marcoses; and 2. WON there exist any legal restraints against a compromis e agreement between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses illgotten wealth. HELD Procedural: 1. Yes. When the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that pet itioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the act ion. 2. Yes. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibiti on, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. The argument of respondent that pe

titioner should have properly sought relief before the Sandiganbayan in which en forcement of the compromise agreements was pending resolution seems to have meri t, if petitioner was merely seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose to the public the terms contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the public disclosure of all nego tiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and documents related or r elating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs. In other words, the petition is not merely confined to the Agreements that have already been drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking tow ards any settlement on the alleged Marcos loot. The core issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional provision s on public transactions. Substantive: 1. Yes. There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbu ed with public interest. Ill-gotten wealth, by its very nature, assumes a public c haracter. The assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the g overnment itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the peo ple. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution that transactions c ontemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of a transacti on, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its CHAVEZ V PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT PANGANIBAN; December 9, 1998 FACTS - These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately enterin g into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late Pre sident Ferdinand E. Marcos x x x relating to and concerning the properties and a ssets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos gold hoard; and (2) to compel respondents to make public all neg otiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marc os heirs. - Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, former solicitor general, brought thi s action in response to news reports in September 1997 referring to (1) the alle ged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks, and (2) the reported execution of a compromise between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share th ese assets. Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a temporary restr aining order dated March 23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their agents and/or re presentatives from entering into, or perfecting and/or executing any agreement wi th the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concernin g their ill-gotten wealth. On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teres a, all surnamed Jopson, filed before the Court a motion for intervention. They a ver that they are among the 10,000 claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos family and/or the Marcos estate is recognized by the decision in In re Estate o f Ferdinand Marcos.

officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient pu blic information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with th e ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. 2. Yes. A cursory perusal of the General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs reveals serious legal flaws. i) While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal liab ility. The authority must be specifically conferred. In the present case, the po wer to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14 a s amended by EO No. 14-A. However, the Agreements do not conform to the requirem ents of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity cannot be granted to the Marcoses , who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now p ending before the Sandiganbayan. The provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused i n an ill-gotten wealth case. ii) Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the property to be retained by th e Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in Congress and, to a certain extent, in t he local legislative bodies. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemp tions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise illgotten wealth case s. Even granting that Congress enacts the law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the eq ual protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of exemption i n favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that taxation shall be uniform and equitable. iii ) The government binds itself under the General Agreement to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and oth er courts. This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in reg ard to criminal jurisdiction. Well settled is the doctrine that once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge. Jurisdic tion, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even b y the justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to dismiss the complaint . Thus, the PCGG cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases again st the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion. iv) The government also waives all claims and counterclai ms, whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate, against the Marcoses. T his allencompassing stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an act ion for future fraud may not be waived. This is a palpable violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law. v) The Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill their respective pre stations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses submit an inventory of thei r total assets. vi) The Agreements do not state with specificity the standards f or determining which assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses. While the Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the $356 million Swiss deposits (l ess government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only to the said deposit. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the other properties. Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the bas is for the 25-75 percent sharing ratio. vii) The absence of then-President Fidel Ramos approval of the principal Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, even if such approva l were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid. submission by the movants of the Motion for Approval of Compromise Agreements to the Sandiganbayan; 4. WON there was ratification of the Agreements by partial i mplementation; and 5. WON the issue raised by petitioner presented an actual cas e and a justiciable question. HELD Procedural: No. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rul

es of Court, provides that a motion to intervene should be filed before renditio n of judgment. Intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already terminate d by final judgment. Substantive: 1. No. A contract that violates the Constituti on and the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obl igations. In legal terms, the movants have really no interest to protect or righ t to assert in this proceeding. Moreover, the movants are merely incidental, not indispensable, parties to the instant case. The petition of Francisco I. Chavez sought to enforce a constitutional right against the PCGG and to determine whet her the latter has been acting within the bounds of its authority. 2. No. The pr inciple of hierarchy of the courts generally applies to cases involving factual questions, since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Inasmuch as the peti tion at bar involves only constitutional and legal questions concerning public i nterest, the Court resolved to exercise primary jurisdiction on the matter. 3. N o. The Chavez petition was not confined to the concluded terms contained in the Agreements, but likewise concerned other ongoing and future negotiations and agr eements, perfected or not. It was therefore not rendered moot and academic simpl y by the public disclosure of the subject Agreements. 4. No. The PCGGs grant to t he claimants mother of access rights to one of their sequestered properties canno t ratify the Agreements. Being null and void, they are not subject to ratificati on. 5. Yes. Mandamus, over which this Court has original jurisdiction, is a prop er recourse for a citizen to enforce a public right. There is no political quest ion involved. The power and authority of the PCGG to compromise is not the issue . But, clearly, by violating the Constitution and the laws, the PCGG gravely abu sed its discretion. RESOLUTION PANGANIBAN; May 19, 1999 FACTS Ma. Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Irene Marcos-Araneta filed before the court a motion for leave to intervene and a motion for partial reconsideration, alleging that they were parties and signatories to the General and Supplemental Agreements which this Court declared NULL AND VOID for being co ntrary to law and the Consitution. They claim to have a legal interest in the matt er in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties or an interest agai nst both as to warrant their intervention. They add that their exclusion from the instant case resulted in a denial of their constitutional rights to due process and to equal protection. They also the raise the principle of hierarchical admin istration of justice to impugn the Courts cognizance of petitioners direct action b efore it. ISSUES Procedural: WON the Motion for Leave to Intervene should be all owed. Substantive: 1. WON the exclusion of the movants from the proceedings rega rding the Agreements to which they were parties and signatories was a denial of t heir property right to contract without due process of law; 2. WON the Court viol ated the principle of hierarchical administration of justice by ruling upon the validity of the Agreements; 3. WON the issue of right to information raised by p etitioner was rendered moot and academic by the BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) V ZAMORA BUENA; October 10, 2000 FACTS - This is a consolidation of 5 petitions assailing the constitutionality o f the Visiting Forces Agreement. (Trivia: Si Prof Te ang counsel para sa ibang p etitioners)

- March 14, 1947 The Philippines and USA forged a Military Bases Agreement, form alizing, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by U S military personnel. - August 30, 1951 The Philippines and USA entered into a M utual Defense Treaty. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any ext ernal armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft . - 1991- RP-US Military Base Agreement expired. Senate rejected proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security. (Goodbye but Mutual Defense Treat y still in effect.) - February 10, 1998 President Ramos approved Visiting Forces Agreement, after a series of conferences and negotiations. - October 5, 1998 Pr esident Estrada, through Secretary of Foreign affairs, ratified VFA. - May 27, 1 999- Senate passed Resolution No. 18, concurring with the ratification of the VF A. (Who concurred: Fernan, Ople, Drilon, Biazon, Tatad, Cayetano, Aquino-Oreta, Barbers, Jaworski, Magsaysay Jr, Osmea, Flavier, Defensor-Santiago, Ponce-Enrile, Sotto, Revilla, Coseteng, Honasan. Total=17. Who rejected: Guingona, Roco, Osmea III, Pimentel, Legarda-Leviste. Total=5) - The VFA provides for the mechanism f or regulating circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defen se personnel may be present in the Philippines. The VFA is an agreement which de fines treatment of US troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It also def ines the rights of the US and the Phil government in the matter of criminal juri sdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipm ent, materials and supplies. ISSUES 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing a s concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionalit y of the VFA. 2. WON the VFA is governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VI I (concurrence of 2/3 of the members of the Senate) or Sec 25 Art XVIII of the C onstitution (foreign military bases, troops, or facilities not allowed in the Ph ils except under a treaty duly concurred in by Senate, and when Congress require s, ratification by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referend um, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State) 3. WON VFA consti tute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty. a. WON the Philippine Courts will be deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by the US M ilitary personnel. b. WON the Supreme Court will be deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher. 4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with the VFA? 5. WON the VFA violates Sec 1 Artic le III (equal protection clause), Sec 8 Article II (prohibition against nuclear weapons), and Sec 28(4) Article VI (taxation) of the 1987 Constitution. HELD 1. No (and Yes). As taxpayers, petitioners have NO legal standing as there are no p ublic funds raised by taxation in the case. Also, petitioner-legislators do not possess the requisite locus standi as there is absence of clear showing of any d irect injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong. HOWEVER , the issues raised in the petitions are of paramount importance and of constitu tional significance. It is of TRANSCENDENTAL importance, so the Court brushes as ide procedural barriers and takes cognizance of the petitions. 2. It is governed by BOTH provisions. Section 25 Article XVIII applies as it specifically deals w ith treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. (The or is i mportant to take note as it signifies independence of one thing from the others. Thus, it can just be an agreement covering only troops not bases like the VFA. A lso, Section 25 Article XVIII makes no distinction whether the troops or facilit ies will be transient or permanent, so the VFA is covered by this provision). On the other hand, Section 21 Article VII find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain t he valid concurrence of the Senate (Sec 21 Art VII requires 2/3 of the members o f the Senate, while Sec 25 Art XVIII just says duly concurred in by the Senate wit h no specified number). - Were the requirements of Section 25 Art XVIII complied with? Section 25 Art XVIII requires the following conditions: a) it must be und er a treaty. -- Complied with. We treat VFA as a treaty. by the international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or m ore related instruments. - In international law, there is no difference between t

reaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. 3. S ection 2 Article II of the Constitution declares that the xxx Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land xxx (this doesnt really answer the issue above, but the ponente didnt really discuss an answer WON the VFA is an abdication of sovereignty.. oh well here goes) - With the ratification of the VFA, it becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part to be bound by the terms of the agreement. As a member of the family of nat ions, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the con duct of its international relations. We cannot readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and respons ibilities under international law. - Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International Law Commision 1949 provides that every state has a duty to carry out in good faith its obligations. Article 26 of the Convention: pacta sunt servanda. 4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with the VF A? No. - Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercis e of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is ex ercised in an arbitrary or despostic manner. - The Constitution vests the power to enter into treaties or International agreements in the President, subject onl y to the concurrence of the members of Senate. The negotiation of the VFA and th e ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts of the the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted by the Const itution. - As to the power to concur with treaties, the Constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone. Thus once the Senate performs that power, or exercis es its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the con currence cannot be viewed to constitute an abuse of power. Decision Petitions Di smissed 11 concurring, 3 dissenting, 1 take no part. b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and so required by the Congr ess, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national refere ndum. -- Complied with. 17 of 23 Senators concurred (Senator Gloria Arroyo was e lected VP). Requirement of ratification in a national referendum unnecessary sin ce Congress has not required it. recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State (US).-- Complied with. Ambassador Hubbards letter states that the VFA is b inding on the US govt and that in international legal terms such agreement is a tr eaty. - A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is an international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed c) SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO [dissent] - Most significant issue is whether the VFA violates Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Con stitution (see requirements above). - POINT 1: Respondents claim that the requir ements do not apply as the VFA contemplates a temporary visit of the troops, whi le the provision applies to a permanent presence of foreign troops. The said tem porary nature of the VFA cannot stand. Neither the VFA nor the Mutual Defense Tr eaty between RP and US provides the slightest suggestion on the duration of the visits. VFA does not provide for a specific and limited period of effectivity. POINT 2: The requirement that it be recognized as a treaty by the other contract ing state is crystal clear and was put there by the framers inorder not to repeat the anomalous asymmetry of the 1947 Military bases agreement where we recognize d it as a treaty but the US treated it as an executive agreement. - The VFA is e quivalent to a sole executive agreement in the US. The Court will be standing on unstable ground if it places a sole executive agreement like the VFA on the sam e constitutional plateau as a treaty, as there are still questions on the consti tutional basis and legal effects of sole executive agreements under the US law. - With the cloud of uncertainty still hanging on the exact legal force of sole ex ecutive agreements under the US constitutional law, this Court must strike a blo w for the sovereignty of our country by drawing a bright line between the dignit y and status of a treaty in contrast with a sole executive agreement. However we may wish it, The VFA as a sole executive agreement cannot climb to the same lof ty height that the dignity of a treaty can reach. Consequently, it falls short o f the requirement set by Sec 25 Art XVIII of the 1987 Constitution that the agre ement allowing the presence of foreign military troops on Phil soil must be recog nized as a treaty by the other contracting state. I vote to grant the petitions. KILOSBAYAN, INC. V GUINGONA, JR. DAVIDE; May 5, 1994 FACTS Nature: Special civil action for prohibition and injunction, praying for a TRO and preliminary injunction, to prohibit and restrain implementation of "Con tract of Lease" between PCSO and PGMC in connection with online lottery system a .k.a. "lotto". 1. Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), PCSO ine lottery system for the purpose of increasing its ng its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, s interested in operating an on-line lottery system, tinational company in decided to establish an onl revenue base and diversifyi after learning that PCSO wa Berjaya Group Berhad, a mul

Malaysia, became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO and orga nized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a corporation known as the Phil ippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). 2. Before August 1993, PCSO finally formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease of Contract of an on -line lottery system for PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement in the RF P ("Lessor shall be a domestic corporation, with at least 60% of its shares owne d by Filipino shareholders"), PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%, by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreig n stockholdings to local investors. 3. Aug. 15, 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO. The bids were evaluated by the Special PreQualification Bids and Awards co mmittee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was thereafter submit ted to the Office of the President. (This was preceded by complaints from the Co mmittes Chairperson, Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera.) 4. Oct. 21, 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given PGMC the go-signal to operate the cou ntrs on-line lottery system. Announcement was published in Manila Times, PDI, a nd Manila Standard on Oct. 29. 5. Nov. 4, 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter t o President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an on-line lotttery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. KILOSBAYAN reiterated its vigorous opposition to lotto at the meeting of the Committee on Games and Amu sements of the Senate on Nov. 12, 1993 6. Nov. 19, 1993, the media announced tha

t despite the opposition, Malacanang will push through with operation of lotto, that it is actually PCSO which will operate the lottery while winning corporate bidders merely lessors. 7. Dec. 1, 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all docu ments pertaining to the lottery award from Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona , Jr., who informed KILOSBAYAN that the documents will be transmitted before the end of the month. However on the same date, an agreement denominated as Contract of Lease was finally executed by PCSO and PGMC. 8. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can stop Malacaang," and t he imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN , with its copetitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition. PETITIONERS C LAIM - Petitioners claim that PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contra ct of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would ho ld and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." And that there are terms and conditions of the Contract "showing that respondent PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO." - The petitioners a lso point out that the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establis h a telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and citi es in the territory. However, PGMC cannot do that because it has no franchise fr om Congress to construct, install, establish, or operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended. - Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermor e, since "the subscribed foreign capital" of the PGMC "comes to about 75%, as sh own by paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation," it cannot lawfully ent er into the contract in question because all forms of gambling and lottery is on e of them are included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital is allowed. - Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of Incorporatio n of PGMC do not authorize it to establish and operate an on-line lottery and te lecommunications systems. RESPONDENTS COMMENTS - Private respondent PGMC assert s that "(1) [it] is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work and (2) as such independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the lottery franch ise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, in collaboration, association or joint venture with PGM. - Finally, it states that the execution and impleme ntation of the contract does not violate the Constitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is politic al and not judicial or legal, which should be ventilated in another forum; and t hat the "petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest i n the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought." - Executive Secreta ry Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona, and the PCSO maintain that the contract of lease in question does not violate Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and that the petitioners interpre tation of the phrase "in collaboration, association or joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow, strained and utterly devoid of logic" for it "ignores th e reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is vested with the basic and essenti al

prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or contracts as may be neces sary for the attainment of its purposes and objectives." What the PCSO charter " seeks to prohibit is that arrangement akin to a "joint venture" or partnership w here there is "community of interest in the business, sharing of profits and los ses, and a mutual right of control," a characteristic which does not obtain in a contract of lease." They further claim that the establishment of the telecommun ications system stipulated in the Contract of Lease does not require a congressi onal franchise because PGMC will not operate a public utility - They also argue that the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize it to enter into the Contract of Lea se; and that the issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the execut ive department are beyond the ambit of judicial review." Finally, they allege th at the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit. ISSUES Procedu ral: WON the petitioners have locus standi. Substantive: WON the Contract of Lea se is legal and valid in light of RA 1169 as amended by BP Blg. 42, which prohib its PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association, o r joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domest ic or foreign." HELD 1. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitio ners should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discreti on, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Em ergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the tr anscendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settle d promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedu re. - The Court found the instant petition to be of transcendental importance t o the public. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, e conomic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of th e country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expecte d to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the pr ocedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of 2. Contract of Lease is void for being contrary to law. PGMC is not only a Lessor, PCSO in the least will be conducting lotteries in collaboration or association and in the mo st in joint vernture with PGMC. The manegerial and technical expertise of PGMC are indespensible to the operation of the on-line lottery system, whereas PCSO only has its franchise to offer. - By the exception explicitly made in paragraph B, S ection 1 of its charter, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer , or lease such franchise. - It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the gov ernment to individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly against the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of the common rights of the public must pr ove his title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable inferenc es. Whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere im plication." - Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PG MC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which ma y be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est ani ma scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. - A carefu l analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a consideration of the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the c ontract is not in reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, but one where the statutorily proscr ibed collaboration or association, in the least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the contracting parties. (Collaboration is defined as the acts of working together in a joint project. Association means the act of a number of p ersons in uniting together for some special purpose or business. Joint venture i

s defined as an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking some com mercial enterprise; generally all contribute assets and share risks. ) - The con temporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC reveal that the PCSO had neither fund s of its own nor the expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery system, and that although it wished to have the system, it would have it "at no expense or risks to the government." Because of these serious constraints and unwillingn ess to bear expenses and assume risks, the PCSO was candid enough to state in it s RFP that it is seeking for "a suitable contractor which shall build, at its ow n expense, all the facilities needed to operate and maintain" the system; exclus ively bear "all capital, operating expenses and expansion expenses and risks." - PGMC is plainly a partner of PCSO in violation of the law no matter how the as sistance is called or the contract denominated. PADILLA [concurring] - Contract of Lease between PCSO and PGMC is a joint venture because each part c ontributes its share in the enterprise project. PGMC contributes the facilities, technology and expertise, while PCSO contributes the market through the dealers and in the totality the mass of Filipino gambling elements. PGMC will get its 4 .9% of gross receipts; the residue of the whole exercise will go to PCSO, this i s a joint venture plain and simple. MELO [dissenting] - This case does not involve a challenge on the validity of a statute nor an att empt to restrain expenditure of public funds. The contract involves strictly cor porate money. - By considering this case as a taxpayers suit could not cure the lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners. The contract does not invo lve an illegal disbursement of public funds. No public fund raised by taxation i s involved. PUNO [dissenting] - Courts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps no r are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grieva nce. - It is clear that the requirement of locus standi has not been jettisoned by the Constitution for it still commands courts in no uncertain terms to settle only actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enfo rceable/ - Rationale for the standard of locus standi is to assure a vigorous adv ersary presentation of the case, and perhaps more importantly to warrant the jud iciarys overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected or gan of government. KILOSBAYAN, INC., ET AL. VS. MORATO MENDOZA; July 17, 1995 FACTS - As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994) invalidating the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Manageme nt Corp. (PGMC) on the ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the PCSO, the parties entered into negotiations for a new agreement that woul d be "consistent with the latters [PCSO] charter . . . and conformable to this Honorable Courts aforesaid Decision." - On January 25, 1195 the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (thereafter called ELA) whereby the SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [concurring]

PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in considerati on of a rental equivalent to 4.3 % of the gross amount of ticket sale derived by the PCSO from the operation of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in Commercial Operation. Th e rental is to be computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly rental s in any year fall short of the annual minimum fixed rental thus computed, the P CSO agrees to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket sales . (Pars. 1-2) Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets is alloted to charity. (R.A. 1169, (B) ) The term of the leases is eight (8) years , commencing from the start of commercial operation of the lottery equipment fir st delivered to the lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule. (Par. 3) - In the op eration of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ its own personnel. (Par. 5) It is responsible for the loss of, or damage to, the equipment from any cause and for the cost of their maintenance and repair. (Pars. 7-8) Upon the expiration of the leases, the PCSO has the option to purchase the equipment for the sum of P25 mi llion. - A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court by the PGMC in accordance with its manifestation in the prior case. On February 21, 1995 this suit was fil ed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground as the Contract of Leases nu llified in the first case. Petitioners seek the declaration of the amended ELA a s null and void. - The PCSO and PGMC filed a separate comments in which they que stion the petitioners standing to bring suit. The Kilosbayan, In. is an organiz ation described in its petition as "composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors , priests, nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice , and national renewal." Its trustees are also suing in their individual and col lective capacities as "taxpayers and concerned citizens." The other petitioners (Sen. Freddie Webb, Sen. Wigberto Taada and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo) are members of the Congress suing as such and as "taxpayer and concerned citizens." - Responden ts question the right of petitioners to bring this suit on the ground that, not being parties to the contract of lease which they seek to nullify, they have no personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of the contract. Petitioners on the other hand contend that the ruling in the previous case sustaining their standing to challenge the validity of the first contract for the operation of lottery is now the "law of the case". and therefore the que stion of their standing can no longer be reopened. - Petitioners likewise invoke the following Principles and State Policies set forth in Art. II of the Constit ution: The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the employm ent by all the people of the blessings of democracy. (5)] The natural and primary right and duty of the parents in the rearing of the yout h for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. (12) The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall promote their physical, moral, spiritual, intellect ual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nacio nalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. The state s hall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and spor ts to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development. (17) (Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 7) ISSUES 1. Does Kilosbayan et. al. have standing to sue? 2. Does the decision in Kilosbayan v. Guingona constitute the law of the case, thus precluding respondents from assailing the legal standing of petitioners? 3. May the provisions under t he Declaration of Principles and State Policies be readily invoked by any person in the absence of Congressional legislation (i.e., selfexecuting)? HELD Ratio 1 . A ruling in a previous case is binding only insofar as the specific issue in t hat case is concerned. Parties may be the same but cases are not. 2. Provisions under the Declaration of Principles and States are not self-executing. General R easoning - Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that of "law of the case", nor that of conclusive of judgment poses a barrier to a determination of petitio ners right to maintain this suit. - Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. B ut in this case, concern for stability in decisional law does not call for adher

ence to what has recently been laid down as the rule. The previous ruling sustai ning petitioners intervention may itself be considered a departure from settled rulings on "real parties in interest" because no constitutional issues were act ually involved. Just five years before that ruling this Court had denied standin g to a party who, in questioning the validity of another form of lottery, claime d the right to sue in the capacity of taxpayer, citizen and member of the Bar. ( Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, G.R. No. 78716, Sept . 22, 1987) Onl y recently this Court held that members of Congress have standing to question th e validity of presidential veto on the ground that, if it true, the illegality o f the veto would impair their prerogative as members of Congress. Conversely if the complaint is not grounded on the impairment of the powers of Congress, legis lators do not have stnding the question the validity of any law or official action (Philippine Constitution Association v Enriquez, 2 35 SCRA 506 (1994)) - There is an additional reason for a reexamination of the r uling on standing. The voting on petitioners standing in the previous case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members sustaining petitioners standing and six (6 ) denying petitioners right to bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In additio n, there have been changes in the members of the Court, with the retirement of J ustices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and Jus tice Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenanc e of the ruling as to petitioners standing. Specific Reasoning 1. NO. The quest ion whether the petitioners have standing to question the Equipment or ELA is a legal question. As will presently be shown, the ELA, which the petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different from the 1993 Co ntract of lease entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that the petitioner had standing to challeng e the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not preclude de termination of their standing in the present suit. - Not only is petitioners st anding a legal issue that may be determined again in this case. It is, strictly speaking, not even the issue in this case, SINCE STANDING IS A CONCEPT IN CONSTI TUTIONAL LAW AND HERE NO CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS ACTUALLY INVOLVED. 14 The is sue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties in interest" withi n the meaning of Rule 3, 2 of the Rules of Court which requires that "Every actio n may be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest." - N oting this distinction, petitioners have not shown that they are the real party in interest. They have not demonstrated that the Contract entered into by the PC SO would directly injure or affect their rights. 2. NO. Petitioners argue that i nquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of the case." We do not think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its continuation: The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a rulin g by an appellate court. - The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate court, ,merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It differs from res judicata in that the conclu sive of the first 14 COMMENT OF BRYAN_SJ: The logic of the Court in this case now becomes e concept of legal standing is a constitutional law concept which is E IN CASES WHERE THERE ARE NO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED. In cases nstitutional issues are raised the governing principle should be the eal party in interest in the Rules of Court. clearer: Th INAPPLICABL where no co concept of r

judgment is not dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is generally, if not universally, not final, It relates entirely to questions of law, and is con fined in its questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent pr oceedings in the same case . . . ." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 9 3 SCRA 503, 521 (1979) ) - It follows that since the present case is not the sam e one litigated by he parties before in G.R. No. 113375, the ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case." The parties are the same bu t the cases are not. - Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this s uit foreclosed by the related doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment." Accordin g to the doctrine, an issue actually and directly passed upon the and determined in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different of action. (Pealosa v. Tuason , 22 Phil. 303, 313 (1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 (1960)) - It has been held t hat the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 , 222 (1979); BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND T HE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 (3rd Ed., 1988)) Following this ruling it was held in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed. 898 (1947) that where a taxpa yer assigned to his wife interest in a patent in 1928 and in a suit it was deter mined that the money paid to his wife for the years 1929-1931 under the 1928 ass ignment was not part of his taxable income, this determination is not preclusive in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts to his wife under another deed of assignment for other years (1937 to 1941). For income tax purposes what is decided with respect to one contract is not conclusive as to any other contr act which was not then in issue, however similar or identical it may be. The rul e on collateral estoppel. it was held, "must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first preceding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rul es remain unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599-600, 92 L. Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if the relevant facts in the two cases are separate even though they may be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which occur in the second case. Thus the second proceeding may involve an instrument or tran saction identical with but in a form separable form, the one dealt with in the f irst proceeding. In that situation a court is free in the second proceeding to m ake an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. . . ." (333 U.S. a t 601, 92 L. Ed. at 908) 3. NO. These are not, however, self executing provisions, the disregard which ca n give rise to a cause of action in the courts. - They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. Thus, while co nstitutional policies are invoked, this case involves basically questions of con tract law. More specifically, the question is whether petitioners have legal rig ht which has been violated. SEPARATE OPINION FELICIANO [dissent] - I find myself regretfully quite unable to join the majority opinion written by my distinguished brother in the Court, Mendoza, J. - I join the penetrating dis senting opinions written by my esteemed brothers Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ. I n respect of the matter of locus standi, I would also reiterate the concurring o pinion I wrote on that subject in the first Kilosbayan case.1 All the factors wh ich, to my mind, pressed for recognition of locus standi on the part of petition ers in the first Kilosbayan case, still exist and demand, with equal weight and insistence, such recognition in the present or second Kilosbayan case, I fear th at the Court may well have occasion in the future profoundly to regret the doctr inal ball and chain that we have today clamped on our own limbs. PADILLA [concur] - I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in this case. It is the duty of the Supreme Court to apply the laws enacted by Congress and ap

proved by the President, (unless they are violative of the Constitution) even if such laws run counter to a Members personal conviction that gambling should be totally prohibited by law. - In my separate concurring opinion in the first lot to case (G.R. No. 113375), expressed the view that the rule on locus standi, bei ng merely a procedural rule, should be relaxed, as the issue then was of paramou nt national interest and importance, namely, the legality of a lease contract in to by PCSO with PGMC whereby the former sought an "on-line high-tech" lottery, u ndeniably a form of gambling, the terms of which clearly pointed to an "associat ion, collaboration or joint venture" with PGMC. REGALADO [dissent] - Be that as it may, since the majority opinion has now evolved other adjective theories which are represented to be either different from or ramifications of t he original "standing to sue" objection raised in the first lotto case. I will h azard my own humble observations thereon. 1. There is, initially, the salvo agai nst the adoption of the "law of the case" doctrine in the original majority pone ncia. It is contended that this doctrine requires, for its applicability, an iss ue involved in a case originating from a lower court which is first resolved by an appellate court, that case bein g then remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and with the prio r resolution by the higher court of that issue being the "law of the case" in an y other proceeding in or a subsequent appeal from the same case. It is insinuate d that said doctrine exists only under such a scenario. - It may be conceded tha t, in the context of the cited cases wherein this doctrine was applied, two "app eals" are generally involved and the issue resolved in the first appeal cannot b e reexamined in the second appeal. If so, then what is necessarily challenged in the first recourse to the higher court is either an interlocutory order of the court a quo elevated on an original action for certiorari or an appealable adjud ication which nonetheless did not dispose of the entire case below because it wa s either a special proceeding or an action admitting of multiple appeals. - That is the present reglementary situation in the Philippines which, unfortunately, does not appear to have been taken into account when the double-appeal procedure involved in one particular American concept was cited as authority in the major ity opinion. No attempt was made to ascertain whether in the American cases cite d the lex fori provided for identical or even substantial counterparts of our pr ocedural remedies of review by a higher court on either an appeal by certiorari or writ of error, or through an original action of certiorari, prohibition or ma ndamus. Yet on such unverified premises, and without a showing that the situatio ns are in pari materia, we are told that since the case at bar does not posses t he formatted sequence of an initiatory action in a lower court, an appeal to a h igher court, a remand to the lower court, and then a second appeal to the higher court, the "law of the case" doctrine cannot apply. I have perforce to reject t hat submission as I cannot indulge in the luxury of absolute espoused by this ma jority view. - I fear that this majority rule, has unduly constricted the factua l and procedural situations where such doctrine may apply, through its undue ins istence on the remedial procedure involved in the proceedings rather than the ju ridical effect of the pronouncement of the higher court. Even in American law, t he "law of the case" doctrine was essentially designed to express the practice o f courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided 5 and, thereby, to emphasize the rule that the final judgment of the highest court is a final deter mination of the rights of the parties. 6 That is the actual and basic role that it was conceived to play in judicial determinations, just like the rationale for the doctrines of res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment. - Accordingly, th e "law of the case" may also arise from an original holding of a higher court on a writ of certiorari, 7 and is binding not only in subsequent appeals or procee dings in the same case, but also in a subsequent suit between the same parties. 8 What I wish to underscore is that where, as in the instant case, the

holding of this highest Court on a specific issue was handed down in an original action for certiorari, it has the same binding effect as it would have had if p romulgated in a case on appeal, Furthermore, since in our jurisdiction an origin al action for certiorari to control and set aside a grave abuse of official disc retion can be commenced in the Supreme Court itself, it would be absurd that for its ruling therein to constitute the law of the case, there must first be a rem and to a lower court which naturally could not be the court of origin from which the postulated second appeal should be taken. 2. Obviously realizing that conti nued reliance on the locus standi bar to petitioners suit is not an ironclad gu aranty against it, the majority position has taken a different tack. It now invo ked the concept of and the rules on a right of action in ordinary civil actions and, prescinding from its previous positions, insists that what is supposedly de terminative of the issue of representation is contract law and not constitutiona l law. On the predicate that petitioners are not parties to the contract, primar ily or subsidiarily, they then are real parties in interest, and for lack of cau se of action on their part they have no right of action. Ergo, they, cannot main tain the present petition. As a matter of a conventional rule of procedure, the syllogism of the majority can claim the merit of logic but, even so, only on ass umed premises. More importantly, however, the blemish in its new blueprint is th at the defense of lack of a right of action is effectively the same as lack of l ocus standi, that is, the absence of the remedial right to sue. As the commentat ors of Castille would say, the objection under the new terminology is "lo mismo perro con distinto collar." That re-christened ground, as we shall later see, ha s already been foreclosed by the judgment of the Court in the first lotto case. It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to enforce a cause of action. For its purposes, the majority urges the adoption of the standard conce pt of a real party in interest based on his possession of a cause of action. It could not have failed to perceive, but nonetheless refuses to concede, that the concept of a cause of action in public interest cases should not be straitjacket ed within its usual narrow confines in private interest litigations. Thus, adver ting again to American jurisprudence, there is the caveat that "the adoption of provision requiring that an action be prosecuted in the name of the real party i n interest does not solve all questions as to the proper person or persons to in stitute suit, although it obviously simplifies procedures in actions at law. . . There is no clearly defined rule by which one may determine who is or is not re al party in interest, nor has there been found any concise definition of the ter m. Who is the real party in interest depends on the peculiar facts of each separ ate case, and one may be a party in interest and yet not be the sole real party in interest." 9 (Emphasis supplied.) The majority opinion quotes the view of a foreign author but unfortunately fail s to put the proper emphasis on the portion thereof which I believe should be th at which should correctly be stressed, and which I correspondingly reproduce: It is important to note. . . that standing because of its constitutional and publi c policy underspinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has the capacity to sue. A lthough all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain p arties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial considera tion of the merits, as well as of broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. 10 Indeed, if the majority would have i ts way in this case, there would be no available judicial remedy against irregul arities or excesses in government contracts for lack of a party with legal stand ing or capacity to sue. This legal dilemma or vacuum is supposedly remediable un der a suggestions submitted in the majority opinion, to wit: Denial to petitione rs of the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any perceived illegal ity in the execution of government contracts. Questions as to the nature or vali dity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before they may b e made can be raised in an appropriate complaint before the Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. . . In addition, the Solicitor General is authorized to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be thought that a government corp

oration . . . has offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchis e. . . - The majority has apparently forgotten its own argument that in the pres ent case petitioners are not the real parties, hence they cannot avail of any re medial right to file a complaint or suit. It is, therefore, highly improbable th at the Commission on Audit would deign to deal with those whom the majority says are strangers to the contract. Again, should this Court now sustain the assaile d contract, of what avail would be the suggested recourse to the Ombudsman? Fina lly, it is a perplexing suggestion that petitioners ask the Solicitor General to bring a quo warranto suit, either in propria persona or ex relatione, not only because one has to contend with that officials own views or personal interests but because he is himself the counsel for respondents in this case. Any proposed remedy must take into account not only the legalities in the case but also the realities of life. 3. The majority believes that in view of the retirement and r eplacement of two members of the Court, it is time to reexamine the ruling in th e first lotto case. A previous judgment of the Court may, of course, be revisite d but if the ostensible basis is the change of membership and known positions of the new members anent an issue pending in a case in the Court, it may not sit w ell with the public as a judicious policy. This would be similar to the situation where a judgment promulgated by the Court is held up by a motion for reconsideration an d which motion, just because the present Rules do not provide a time limit for t he resolution thereof, stays unresolved until the appointment of members sympath etic thereto. Thus, the unkind criticisms of "magistrate shopping" or "court pac king" levelled by disgruntled litigants is not unknown to this Court. - I hold t he view that the matter of the right of petitioners to file and maintain this ac tion - whether the objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or righ t of action - has already been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto cas e, G.R. No. 113375. If the majority refuses to recognize such right under the "l aw of the case" principle, I see no reason why that particular issue can still b e ventilated now as a survivor of the doctrinal effects of res judicata. 11 It i s undeniable that in that case and the one at bar. there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Evidently, the judgment in G.R. No. 113375 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, it was an adjudication on the merits, and has long become final and executory. There is, to be sure, an attem pt to show that the subject matter in the first action is different from that in the instant case, since the former was the original contract and the latter is the supposed expanded contract. I am not persuaded by the proffered distinction. The removal and replacement of some objectionable terms of a contract, which ne vertheless continues to operate under the same basis, with on the property, fore the same purpose, and the same contracting parties does not suffice to extingui sh the identity of the subject matter in both cases,. This would be to exalt for m over substance. Furthermore, respondents themselves admitted that the new cont ract is actually the same as the original one, with just some variants in the te rms of the latter to eliminate those which were objected to. The contrary assump tion now being floated by respondents would create chaos in our remedial and con tractual laws, open the door to fraud, and subvert the rules on the finality of judgments. - Yet, even assuming purely ex hypothesi that the amended terms in th e expanded lease agreement created a discrete set of litigable violations of the statutory charter of the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes Office, thereby collec tively resulting in a disparate actionable wrong or delict, that would merely co nstitute at most a difference in the causes of action in the former and the pres ent cases. Under Section 49(c). Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, we would still ha ve a situation of collateral estoppel, better known in this jurisdiction as conc lusiveness of judgment. Hence, all relevant issues finally adjudged in the prior judgment shall be conclusive between the parties in the case now before us and that definitely includes at the very least the adjudgment

therein that petitioners have the locus standi or the right to sue respondents o n the contracts concerned. In their case - whether of res judicata, on which I i nsist, or of conclusiveness of judgment, which I assume arguendo - what is now b eing primarily resisted is the right of petitioners to sue, aside from the postu lated invalidity of the contract for the government-sponsored lottery system. It does seem odd, if not arcane, that petitioners were held to have the requisite locos standi or right of action on said G.R. No. 113375 and, for that matter, we re likewise so recognized in the expanded value added tax (EVAT) case, 12 but ar e now mysteriously divested of the "place of standing" allegedly due to, for leg al purposes, a compelling need for reexamination of the doctrine, and, for econo mic reasons, an obsession for autarky of the nation. 4. I repeat what I said at the outset that this case should be decided on the merits and on substantive con siderations, not on dubious technicalities intended to prevent on inquiry into t he validity of the supposed amended lease contract. The people are entitled to t he benefit of a duly clarified and translucent transaction, just as respondent d eserve the opportunity, and should even by themselves primarily seek, to be clea ned of any suspicions or lingering doubts arising from the fact that the sponsor s for jail alai and, now, of lotto are different. - On the merits, to obviate un necessary replication I reiterate my concurrence with the findings and conclusio ns of Mr. Justice Davide in this dissenting opinion, the presentation whereof is completely devoid of strained or speculative premises, and moreover has the vir tue of being based on his first-hand knowledge as a legislator of the very provi sions of the law now in dispute. In this instance and absent any other operative data. I find the same to be an amply sufficient and highly meritorious analysis of the controversy on the contract. - One concluding point. I am not impressed by their stance of the majority that our taking cognizance of this case and reso lving it on the merits will hereafter invite others to unduly overburden this Co urt with avoidable importunities. This sounds like a tongue-in-riposte since the Court has clearly indicated that it sets aside objections grounded on judge-mad e constitutional theories only under cogent reasons of substantial justice and p aramount public interest. On the contrary, to pay unqualified obedience to the b eguiling locos standi or right of action doctrines posited by the majority in th is case would only not be an abdication of a clear judicial duty. It could conce ivably result in depriving the people of recourse to us from dubious government contracts through constitutionally outdated or procedurally insipid theories for such stultification. This is a contingency which is not only possible, but prob able under our oligarchic society in esse; and not only undesirable, but repugna nt within a just regime of law still in posse. DAVIDE [dissent] - I register a dissenting vote. - I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our r ulings in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Guingona, et al. 1 referred to as the fir st lotto case) regarding the application or interpretation of the exception clau se in paragraph B, Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169), as amen ded by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue of locus standi of the petitioners to que stion the contract of lease involving the on-line lottery system entered into be tween the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of t he law of the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. It puts to jeopardy the fai th and confidence of the people, specially the lawyers and litigants, in the cer tainly and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the floodgate s to endless litigations for re-examination of such pronouncements and weakens t his Courts judicial and moral authority to demand from lower courts obedience t hereto and to impse sanctions for their opposite conduct. - It must be noted tha t the decision in the first lotto case was unconditionally accepted by the PCSO and the PGMC, as can be gleaned from their separate manifestations that they wou ld not ask for its reconsideration but would, instead, negotiate a new equipment lease agreement consistent with the decision and the PCSOs charter and that th ey would furnish the Court a copy of the new agreement. The decision has, thus, become final on 23 May 1994. 2 - As the writer of the said decision and as the a

uthor of the exception to paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, I cannot accept the strained and tenuous arguments adduced in the majority opinio n it justly the reversal of our rulings in the first lotto case. While there are exceptions to the aforementioned doctrines and I am not inexorably opposed to u psetting prior decisions if warranted by overwhelming considerations of justice and irresistible desire to rectify an error, none of such considerations and not hing of substance or weight can bring this case within any of the exceptions. In the said case, we sustained the locus standi of the petitioners, and in no un certain terms declared: We find the instant petition to be of transcendental imp ortance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and m oral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lotte ry system are as staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise. Th e legal standing than of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exerci se of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. - In this concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano further showed substantive grounds or considerations of importance which strengt hened the legal standing of the petitioners to bring and maintain the action, na mely: (a) the public character of the funds or other assets involved in the cont ract of lease; (b) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or legal provision by the public respondent agency; (c) the lack of any other p arty with a more direct and specified interest in raising the questions involved therein; and (d) the wide range of impact of the contract of lease and of its i mplementation. Only last 6 April 1995, in the decision in Tatad vs. Garcia, 3 th is Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason who had joined in the d issenting opinions in the first lotto case the petitioners, locus standi therein , invoked and applied the ruling on locus standi in the first lotto case. He sta ted: The prevailing doctrines in taxpayers suits are to allow taxpayers to ques tion contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or co ntrolled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994] and to disallow the same when only municipal cont racts are involved (Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron, 17 6 SCRA 240 [1989]. For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is no t reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action. - Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, who had also dissented in the first lotto case on the issue of locu s standi; unqualifiedly concurred with the majority opinion in Tatad. Mr. Justic e Vicente V. Mendoza, the writer of the ponencia in this case, also invoked the locus standi ruling in the first lotto case to deny legal standing to Tatad, et al. He said: - Nor do petitioners have standing to bring this suit as citizens. In the cases in which citizens were authorized to sue, this Court found standing because it though the constitutional claims pressed for decision to be of "tran scendental importance," as in fact it subsequently granted relief to petitioners by invalidating the challenged statutes or governmental actions. Thus in the Lo tto case [Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)] relief by the majo rity for upholding petitioners standing, this Court took into account the "para mount public interest" involved which "immeasurably affect[ed] the social, econo mic, and moral well-being of the people . . . and the counter-productive and ret rogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system." Accordingly, the C ourt invalidated the contract for the operation of the lottery. - Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Associate Justice Abdulwahid A Bidin, Jose A.R. Melo, Reyn ato S. Puno, Jose C. Vitug, and Ricardo J. Francisco, joined him in his

concurring opinion. Except for the Chief Justice who took part in the first lott o case and Justice Francisco who was not yet a member of this Court at the time, the rest of the Justice who joined the concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza ha d dissented in the lotto case on the said issue. - Under the principle of either the law of the case of res judicata, the PCSO and the PGMC are bound by the rul ing in the first lotto case on the locus standi of the petitioners and the appli cation or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended. Moreover, that application or interpretation has been l aid to rest under the doctrine of stare decisis and has also become part of our legal system pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides: Judicial d ecisions applying interpreting the laws or the constitution shall from part of t he system of the Philippines." - These doctrines were not adopted whimsically or capriciously. They are based on public policy and other considerations of great importance and should not be discarded or jettisoned in a cavalier fashion. Yet , they are now put to naught in this case. - The principle of the law of the cas e "is necessary as a matter of policy to end litigation. There would be no end t o a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticism on their opinions, or speculate on chances from changes i n its members." 7 - It is, however, contended that the law of the case is inappl icable that doctrine applies only when a case is before an appellate court a sec ond time after its remand to a lower court. While indeed the statement may be co rrect, it disregards the fact that the case is nothing but a sequel to and is, t herefore, for all intents and purposes, a continuation of the first lotto case. By their conduct, the parties admitted that it is, for which reason the PGMC and the PCSO submitted in the first lotto case a copy of the ELA in question, and t he petitioners commenced the instant petition also in the said case. Our resolut ion that the validity of the ELA could not be decided in the said case because t he decision therein had became final does not detract from the fact that this ca se is but a continuation of the first lotto case or a new chapter in the raping controversy between the petitioners, on the one hand, and the PCSO and the PGMC, on the other, on the operation of the on-line lottery system. Equally unaccepta ble is the majority opinions rejection of the related doctrine of conclusivenes s of judgment of the ground that the question of standing is a question, as this case involves a different or unrelated contract. The legal question of locus st andi which was resolved in favor of the petitioners in the first lotto case is t he same in this case and in every subsequent case which would involve contracts relating or incidental to the contract or holding of lotteries by the PCSO in co llaboration, association; or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity. And, the contract in question is not different f rom or unrelated to the first nullified contract, for it in nothing but a substi tute for the latter. Respondent Morato was even candid enough to admit that no n ew and separate public bidding was conducted for the ELA in question because the PCSO was of the belief that the public bidding for the nullified contract was s ufficient. Its reliance on the ruling in Montana vs. United States 8 that preclu sion or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when subst antially unrelated claims are involved, is misplaced. For one thing, the questio n of the petitioners legal standing in the first lotto case and in this case is one and the same issue of law. For another, these cases involve the same and no t substantially unrelated subject matter, viz., the second contract between the PCSO and the PGMC on the operation of the on-line lottery system. The majority o pinion likewise failed to consider that in the very authority it cited regarding the exception to the rule of issue preclusion (Testament of the Law, 2d Judgmen ts $ 28), the second illustration stated therein is subject to this NOTE: "The d octrine of the stare decisis may lead the court to refuse to reconsider the ques tion of sovereign immunity," which simply means that stare decisis is an effecti ve bar to a re-examination of a prior judgment. The doctrine of stare decisis em bodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been establishe d by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in oth er cases involving a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for secur

ing certainty and stability in the law and does not require identity or privity of parties. 9 This is explicitly fleshed out in Article 8 of the Civil Code whic h provides that decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system. Such decisions "assume the same authority a s the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, t o the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actua tions not only of those called upon to aside thereby but also of those in duty b ound to enforce obedience thereto."10 Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons - which I do not find in this case - otherwise, th e becoming virtue of predictabiity which is expected from this Court would be im measurably affected and the publics confidence in the stability of its solemn p ronouncements diminished. The doctrine of res judicata also bars a relitigation of the issue of locus standi and a re-examination of the application or interpre tation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as am ended. Section 49 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on effects of judgment expr essly provides: (b)In all other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly a djudged or as to other matter that could have been parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceedings, litigating for the same thing in the same title and in the same capacity. This doctrine has dual aspects: (1) as a bar to the prosecution o f a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action; and (2) as pr eclusion to the relitigation of particular facts of issues in action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. 11 Public policy, judicia l orderliness, economy of judicial time, and the interest of litigants as well a s the peace and order of society, all require that stability should be accorded judgments: that controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in repos e; that inconsistent judicial decisions shall not be made on the same set of fac ts; and that there be an end to litigation which, without the said doctrine, wou ld be endless. It not only puts an end to strife, but recognizes that certainty in legal relations must be maintained. It produces certainty as to individual ri ghts and gives and respect to judicial proceedings. 12 The justifications given in the majority opinion to underrate the ruling locus standi and to ultimately d iscard it are unconvincing. It is not at all true, as the majority opinion conte nds, that "[t]he previous sustaining petitioners intervention may in fact be con sidered a departure from settled ruling on real party in interest because no con stitutional issues were actually involved." It must be pointed out that the rule in ordinary civil procedure on real party in interest was never put in issue in the previous case. It was the clear understanding of the Members of the Court t hat in the light of the issues raised and the arguments adduced therein, only lo cus standi deserved consideration. Accordingly, the majority opinion and the sep arate dissenting opinions therein dwelt lengthily on locus standi and brought in the process a vast array of authorities on the issue. Moreover, as explicitly s tressed in the concurring opinion of Justice Feliciano, both constitutional and legal issues were involved therein. Finally, as shall hereafter be discussed, in public law the rule of real party in interest is subordinate to the doctrine of locus standi. - Equally unconvincing is the majority opinions contention that the ruling locus standi in the first lotto case may not be preserved because the majority vote sustaining the petitioners standing was a "tenuous one" that may not be maintained in a subsequent litigation, and that there had been changes i n the membership of the Court due to the retirement of Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Abdulwahid A. Bidin and the appointment of Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and R icardo J. Francisco. It has forgotten that, as earlier stated, the ruling was re iterated in Tatad vs. Garcia. Additionally, when in his concurring opinion in th e Tatad case, Justice Mendoza denied locus standi to Tatad, et al., because thei r case did not have the same importance as the lotto case, he thereby accepted t he concession of standing to the

petitioners in the lotto case. I wish to stress the fact that all the Justices w ho had dissented in the first lotto case on the issue of locus standi were eithe r for the majority opinion or for the concurring opinion in the Tatad case. Henc e, I can say that the Tatad case has given vigor and strength to the "tenuous" m ajority in the first lotto case. The majority opinion declares that the real iss ue in this case is not whether the petitioners have locus standi but whether the y are the real parties-in-interest. This proposition is a bold move to set up a bar to taxpayers suits or cases invested with public interest by requiring stri ct compliance with the rule on real party in interest in ordinary civil actions, thereby effectively subordinating to that rule the doctrine of locus standi. I am not prepared to be a party to that proposition. - The downgrading of locus st andi and its subordination to the restrictive rule on real party in interest can not be justified by the claim that is involved here is contract law, not constit utional law. True, contract law is involved. We are not, however, dealing here w ith an ordinary contract between private parties, but a contract between a corpo ration wholly owned by the government - hence, an instrumentality of the governm ent - and a private corporation for the contract of the lotto, which is invested with paramount and transcendental public interest and other public policy consi derations because the lotto has counter - productive and retrogressive effects w hich are as staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise and prov okes issues that immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people. We said so in the first lotto case. GARCIA V BOARD OF INVESTMENTS GUTIERREZ; November 9, 1990 FACTS - A petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investmen ts (BOI)/ Department of Trade and Industry approving the transfer of site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG ). - P.D. No. 1803 reserved 576 hectares of public domain in Lamao, Libay, Bataa n for the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration, management and ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). - Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals. It specified Bataan as plant site, and one of the terms and conditions for regi stration was the use of naphtha cracker and naphtha as feedstock for fuel for it s plant, which was to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on Feb. 24, 1988. - BPC was given pioneer status ands accorded fiscal and other incentives, like, (1) exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2) eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it is u sed as raw materials for the petrochemical plant. - In February 1989, A.T. Chong , Chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major investor in BPC expressed to D TI Secretary his desire to amend the original registration certification of its project by changing the job site from Bataan to Batangas because of the insurgen cy and unstable labor situation in Bataan and the presence in Batangas of a huge LPG depot owned by Philippine Shell Corporation. Other requested amendments are as follows: (1) increasing the investment amount from $220 million to $320 mill ion; (2) increasing the production capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) changing the feedstock from naphtha only to n aphtha and/or LPG. - On May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision stating that, Th e BOI recognizes and respects the principle that the final choice is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis provide the funding or risk capita l for the project. - In the petition entitled Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v. Th e Board of Investments, this court ordered BOI as follows: (1) to publish the ame nded application for registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) t o allow the petitioner to have access to its records on the original and amended applications for registration, as a petrochemical manufacturer, of the responde nt Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding, however, privileged papers conta ining its trade secrets and other business and financial information, (3) to set for hearing the petitioners opposition to the amended application in order that

he may present at such hearing all the evidence in his possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site of the BPC petrochemical plant to Bat angas. - Garcia filed motion for reconsideration asking the Court to rule on whe ther or not the investor given the initial inducements and other circumstances s urrounding its first choice of plant site may change simply because it has the f inal choice on the matter. The Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest in the case by his failure to appear in the hearing that was set by BOI. - A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed, asking that the Court resolve whether or not the foreign investor has the right of fin al choice of plant site; that the non-attendance of the petitioner at the hearin g was because the decision was not yet final and executory, and therefore petiti oner has not waived his right. Court resolution stated that BOI, not the investo r has final choice on the matter and that even a choice approved by BOI may not be final for supervening circumstances and changes in the conditions of a place ma y dictate a corresponding change in the choice of plant site in order that the p roject will not fail. However, petition was denied. - Instant petition relies on the ruling that investor has no right of final choi ce. ISSUES 1. WON the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be t ransferred to Batangas 2. WON its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha and/or LPG the approved amended application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC) 3. WON the categorical admission of the BO I that it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding HELD 1. On Justic iablity: There is an actual controversy. The Court has constitutional duty to st ep into this controversy to determine the paramount issue. 2. The decision to tr ansfer to Batangas and to shift the use of feedstock is unjustified. - The Bataa n site is ideal, the result of careful study. - The respondents have not shown n or reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable l abor situation warrant a transfer to the plant site in Batangas. - The Bataan Re fining Corporation, a government owned Filipino corporation, can provide the fee dstock requirement of the plant in Bataan, whereas the country is short of LPG a nd there is a need to import for the use of the plant in Batangas. Transfer will divert scarce dollars unnecessarily. - R.A. 6767 exempted naphtha as feedstock from ad valorem tax but excluded LPG from the exemption. This law was specifical ly for the petrochemical industry. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should dis regard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG. - Capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to b uy the land for the project and its feedstock shall be limited to naphtha. - Wit h the plant site in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner, thus giving the governm ent participation in the management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation. 3. BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and au thorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for th e main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to t he contrary not withstanding. - The government has already granted incentives fo r this particular venture. Through the BOI decision, it surrenders even the powe r to make a company abide by its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicio n of unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best int erests of the Filipino people.

- This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government numerous laws (i.e. Art. 2, 1987 Omnibus Investments Code) and the (Sec. 1 and 10, Art. XII; Sec. 19, Art. II) to run its own affairs eems best for the national interest. Disposition: Petition granted. aside as null and void.

expressed in Constitution the way it d Decision set

SEPARATE OPINION GRINO-AQUINO [dissenting] - There is no provision in the 1987 Investments Code prohibiting the amendment o f the investors application for registration of its project, neither does the law prohibit the BOI from approving the amended application. - The matter of choosi ng an appropriate site for the investors project is a political and economic deci sion which only the executive branch, as implementer of policy formulated by the legislature, is empowered to make. It is not for this Court to determine what i s, or should be, the BOIs final choice of plant site and feedstock. - The petitione rs recourse against the BOIs action is by an appeal to the President (Sec. 36, 198 7 Investments Code), not to this Court. MELENCIO-HERRERA [dissenting] - [The majority Decision] has made a sweeping policy determination and has unwit tingly transformed itself into what might be termed a government by the Judiciary , something never intended by the framers of the Constitution when they provided for separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of government and exc luded the Judiciary from policymaking. ART VI: LEGISLATURE TOLENTINO V SECRETARY OF FINANCE MENDOZA; August 25, 1994 FACTS - These are original actions in SC. Certiorari and prohibition, challengin g the constitutionality of RA 7716. - RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system by amending National Internal Revenue Code. Bet Jul 22, 199 2 and Aug 31, 1993, bills were introduced in House of Reps to amend NIRC relativ e to VAT. These were referred to House Ways and Means Committee w/c recommended for approval H No 11197. - H No. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was approved by House of Reps aft er third and final rdg. - It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate C ommittee on Ways and Means. The Committee submitted report recommending approval of S No 1630, submitted in substitution of S No 1129, taking into consideration PS Res No 734 and H No 11197 - Senate approved S No 1630 on second rdg, and on third rdg by affirmative votes of 13 and 1 abstention. H No 11197 and S No 1630 were referred to conference committee w/c after meeting 4 times, recommended tha t HB in consolidation w/ SB be approved in accordance w/ bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees. - The Conference Committee Bill was approved by House of Reps and Senate. The enrolled bill was presented to President who, on May 5, 1994 signed it. It became RA 7716. On May 12, it was published in 2 newspapers of gen circulation and it took effect on May 28. - RA 7716 amended 103 and made print media subject to VAT in all aspect of operations. However, Sec of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94 exempting circulation income of print media . Income fr advertisements are still subject to VAT. - Implementation was suspen ded until Jun 30 to allow time for registration of businesses. Implementation wa s stopped by TRO fr Court, by vote of 11 to 4. - Petitioners contend: Re: Art VI Sec 24 1. Although H No 11197 originated fr House of Reps, it was not passed by Senate but was consolidated w/ Senate version in the Conference Committee to pr oduce the bill. The verb shall originate is qualified by the word exclusively. 2. Th e constitutional design is to limit Senates power in revenue bills to compensate for the grant to the Senate of treaty-ratifying power. 3. S No 1630 was passed n o in substitution of H No 11197 but of another Senate bill (S No 1129). Senate m erely took H No 11197 into consideration in enacting S No 1630. Re: Art VI Sec 2 6(2) 1. The second and third rdgs were on the same day, Mar 24, 1994. 2. The cer tification of urgency was invalid bec there was no emergency. The growing budget deficit was not an unusual condition in this country. 3. Also, it was S No 1630

that was certified urgent, not H No 11197. Re: BCC acted within its power 1. RA 7716 is the bill which the BCC prepared. BCC included provisions not found in t he HB or SB and these were surreptitiously inserted. BCC met behind closed doors. 2. Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the stenographic notes by ellipse s. 3. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in preparation of BCC Report b ecause Report didnt contain detailed and explicit statement of changes 4. It is req uired that the Committees report undergo three rdgs in the two houses. - Petition er Philippine Airlines Inc contends: Re: Art VI Sec 26(1) 1. Neither H No 11197 nor S No 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions fr payment o f VAT and this was made only by the BCC. This was not reflected in the title. 2. Besides, amendment of PALs franchise may be made only by special law which will expressly amend the franchise (24 of PD 1590). - Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines contends: Re: Art III Sec 1 1. Withdrawal of exemption of some c ooperatives while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives not only goe s against policy to promote cooperatives but also violate equal protection of la w. Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends: 2. VAT w ill reduce mark up of its members by as much as 90%. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends: 3. VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends: Re: Art III Sec 4 1. It questio ns law bec exemption previously granted to press under NIRC was withdrawn. Altho ugh exemption was subsequently restored, PPI says theres possibility that exempti on may still be removed by mere revocation by Secretary of Finance. Also, there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of VAT on gross re ceipts on advertisements. 2. RA 7716 singled out press for discriminatory treatm ent, giving broadcast media favored treatment. 3. Imposing VAT only on print med ia whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000 is discriminato ry. 4. The registration provision of the law is invalid when applied to the pres s. - Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends: Re: Art III Sec 5 1. Secretar y of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because that power is vested in Congress and the Secretarys duty is to execute the law and the removal of exempt ion of religious articles violates freedom of thought/conscience. - Petitioner C hamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends: Re: Art III Sec 10 1. I mposition of VAT violates constitutional provision on no law impairing obligatio n of contracts

- Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association contends: Re: Art II Sec 17 1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will violate govt mandat e to prioritize education ISSUES Procedural 1. WON theres violation of Art VI 24 of Consti (revenue bill originating exclusively fr House of Reps) 2. WON theres v iolation of Art VI 26(2) of Consti (three readings on separate days) 3. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee acted within its power 4. WON theres violation of Art VI 26(1) of Consti (only one subject which is expressed in title) / WON amen dment of 103 of NIRC is fairly embraced in title of RA 7716 although no mention is made therein Substantive: 5. WON Art III 1 (deprivation of life/liberty/prope rty; equal protection) is violated 6. WON Art III 4 (freedom of speech/expressio n/press) is violated 7. WON Art III 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated 8. WON Art III 10 (no law impairing obligation of contracts) is violated 9. WON Ar t VI 28(1) (uniform/equitable; evolve progressive system of taxation) is violate d 10. WON Art VI 28(3) (church/parsonage etc. for religious purpose exempt) is v iolated 11. WON Art II 17 (govt priority on education, science and tech) is viola ted HELD - Not all are judicially cognizable, bec not all Consti provisions are self executing. Other govt depts. are also charged w/ enforcement of Consti. Pro cedural Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of the RA must be resolved in its favor. An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. This is not to say that the enrolled bill doctrine is absolute. But where allegations are nothing more than surreptiti ously inserting provisions, SC declines going behind enrolled copy of bill. SC gi ves due respect to other branches of govt. 1. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 24 a. Its not the law but the revenue bill which is required to originate exc lusively in the House of Reps. A bill originating in House may undergo extensive changes in Senate. To insist that a revenue statute (and not the bill) must be the same as the House bill would deny the Senates power to concur with and propos e amendments. It would violate coequality of the legislative power of the two ho uses. b. Legislative power is issue here. Treaty-ratifying power is not legislative po wer but an exercise of check on executive power. c. Theres no difference bet Sena te preserving house bill then writing its own version on one hand and on the oth er hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the subject matter. Consti s imply says that its the initiative for filing the bill that must come fr House of Reps. The Reps are expected to be more sensitive to the local needs. Nor does C onsti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill in anticipation of its receip t of bill fr House so long as action by Senate is withheld pending receipt of Ho use bill. It was only after Senate rcvd H No 11197 that legislation in respect o f it began w/ referral to Senate Committee on Ways and Means. 2. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2) a. It was because Pres certified S No 1630 as urge nt. This certification dispensed w/ printing and rdg the bill on separate days. The phrase except when the President certifies to the necessity qualifies two state d conditions: (1) the bill has passed 3 rdgs on separate days and (2) it has bee n printed in final form and distributed 3 days before finally approved. To const rue that the except clause dispenses only with printing would violate grammar rule s and would also negate the necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill. Ex ample is RA 5440 which had 2nd and 3rd rdgs on the same day after bill had been certified urgent. b. No Senator controverted factual basis of the certification and this should not be rvwd by the Court. c. It was S No 1630 that Senate was co nsidering. When matter was before the House, Pres likewise certified H No 9210 t hen pending. 3. YES the BCC acted within its power a. Give and take often marks th e proceedings of BCC. There was also nothing unusual in the executive sessions o f the BCC. Under congressional rules, BCCs are not expected to make material cha nges but this is a difficult provision to enforce. The result could be a third v ersion, considered an amendment in nature of substitute, the only requirement th at the 3rd version be germane to subject of the HB and SB. It is w/in power of B CC to include an entirely new provision. After all, report of BCC is not final a nd still needed approval of both houses to be valid. b. This could have been cau sed by stenographers limitations or to incoherence that sometimes characterize co

nversations. c. Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes . This is standard practice in bill-drafting. Also, SC is not proper forum for t hese internal rules. d. If this were the case, there would be no end to negotiat ion since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. That requirement must be construed only to mean bills intro duced for the first time in either house, not the BCC report. 4. NO, there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) a. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the VAT system, one way is to widen the base by withdrawing some exemptio ns. To insist that PD 1590 in addition to 103 of NIRC be mentioned in title, wou ld be to insist that title of a bill be a complete index of its content. b. That was just to prevent amendment by an inconsistent statute. And under Consti, gra nt of franchise for operation of public utility is subject to amendment, alterat ion, repeal by Congress when common good requires. Substantive - as RA 7716 mere ly expands base of VAT as provided in the orig VAT law, debate on wisdom of law should be in Congress. 5. NO there is no clear showing that Art III Sec 1 is vio lated - When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that command s respect; when property is imperiled, lawmakers judgment prevails. a. This is ac tually a policy argument. b. This is a mere allegation. c. This is also short of evidence. 6. NO Art III Sec a is not violated a. Theres no violation of press fr eedom. The press is not immune fr general regulation by the State. b. Its not tha t it is being singled out, but only because of removal of exemption previously g ranted to it by law. Also, the law would be discriminatory if the only privilege withdrawn is that to the press. But that is not the case. The statute applies t o a wide range of goods and services. c. It has not been shown that the class su bject to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. This limit does not apply to press alone but to all sales. d. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of th e cost of registration. Registration is a central feature of the VAT system. It is a mere administrative fee, not a fee on exercise of privilege or right. 7. NO Art III Sec 5 is not violated a. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally ap plicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious org. 8. N O Art III Sec 10 is not violated a. Parties to a contract cant fetter exercise of taxing power of State. Essential attributes of sovereign is read into contracts as a basic postulate of legal order. 9. VAT distributes tax burden to as many g oods and svcs as possible, particularly to those w/in reach of higher

income grps. Business establishments with annual gross sales of < P500,000 are e xempted. Also, regressivity is not a negative standard. What is required is that we evolve a progressive taxation system. 10. Consti does not prohibit imposing ge nerally applicable sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious org. 11. NO there is no violation of Art II Sec 17 a. Same reason/ratio under i ssues on free speech/press. Decision Petitions are dismissed. Notes VAT is levie d on sale, barter/exchange of goods and svcs. Then, its equal to 10% of gross sel ling price Narvasa, Separate Opinion Cruz, Separate Opinion Padilla, Separate Op inion Vitug, Separate Opinion Regalado, Dissenting Opinion Davide, Dissenting Op inion Romero, Dissenting Opinion Bellosillo, Dissenting Opinion Puno, Dissenting Opinion was later consolidated the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Bicameral Confere nce Committee inserted and deleted some of the original provisions. The Bill was approved on the 11th of May 2005 by the Senate and 10th of May 2005 by the Hous e of Representatives. ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the Bicameral Conference Committe e has strictly complied with the rules of both houses thereby remaining within t he jurisdiction conferred upon it by congress. 2. WON the Bicameral Conference C ommittee violated Article VI Sec 26 that states that no amendment would be done after three readings. 3. WON there was a violation of the Origination Clause as stated in Art VI Sec 24. Substantive 4. WON there was undue delegation to the Pr esident and Secretary of Finance. 5. WON a VAT law such as that of RA 9337 is in violation of the Constitutional provision Art VI Sec 28 (1) that requires taxat ion to be uniform, equitable and that the Congress shall evolve a progressive sy stem of taxation. HELD 1. The Supreme Court decided that it would not rule on th e violation of the senate and house rules unless there is a showing that it is i n clear violation of a constitutional provision or of the rights of private indi viduals. (favorite ratio ) 2. No, because the amendment rule refers only to the p rocedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills in each o f the said respective houses before the bill is transmitted to the other house f or its concurrence and amendment. 3. No, the Senate within the said provision on ly proposed amendments after the House Bills were approved. The Bill still origi nated through the House of Representatives. 4. No, because the President is just executing the law and is still working within the standard and policy of the la w. The Secretary of Finance is also not given undue delegation as he is consider ed as an alter ego of the president thus following the same logic, he is only ex ecuting the law. 5. While the VAT is currently not yet progressive it still is d irected towards a goal of a progressive taxation. reduction of the allowable deduction for interest expense were not really part o f the House version of the E-VAT Law therefore in violation of the origination c lause in Article VI Section 24. BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE PADILLA; November 20, 1991 FACTS - Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbo n Committee - 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed w/ the Sandiganbayan the civil case no. 0035, RP vs. Ben jamin Kokoy Romualdez, et al. -The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and J uliette Romualdez took advantage of their relationship w/ Defendants Ferdinand a nd Imelda Marcos to engage in schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of the Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others: -obtaining control over Meralc o, Benguet Mining Co., Shell, PCI Bank, etc., selling interests to PNI Holdings, Inc. (corporators, Bengzon Law Offices), the concealment of the assets subject to the complaint from the PCGG under the veil of corporate identity, etc. 8/2-6/ 1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez companies for 5M (far below market value) without PCGG approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group, owned by Pres. A quinos brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa Sen. Enrile called upon the Senate to investig ate a possible violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice s Act w/c prohibits any relative of the President by affinity or consanguinity u p to the 3rd civil degree, to intervene in any transaction w/ the government -th

e matter was referred to the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Office rs (Blue Ribbon Committee) -the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to testify on what they know about the sale of the 36 Romualdez corporations -at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify, the former invoking the due process clause, and both averring that such testimonies would unduly prejudic e the defendants of civil case no.0035 -petitioners thus filed the present petiti on for prohibition, praying for a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legi slative purpose -the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the Congress or its committees from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrin e of separation of powers (quoting Angara v. Comelec) -the Court finds this cont ention untenable and is of the view that it has the jurisdiction to delimit cons titutional ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V ERMITA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005 FACTS - The increasing budget problems of the government in the form of fiscal p roblems, revenue generation, and fiscal allocation inadequacy prompted the congr ess to create a law to address such problems. This gave way to the Expanded Vat Law (E-Vat Law) otherwise known as Republic Act No. 9337. The case revolves arou nd the constitutionality of the Republic Act 9337 that increased the Value-Added Tax percentage from 10% to 12%. In this case there were 4 different petitioners : Abakada Guro Party List, Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers/Petron/Caltex, Senators Pimentel/ Estrada, L./ Estrada, J. / Lacson/ Lim/ Madrigal/ Osmea, Cong ressman Escudero, and Governor Garcia. All of them question the constitutionalit y of RA 9337. - Backgrounder on Value-Added Tax (VAT): > VAT is a tax on spendin g or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange, or lease of goods or properties and services. > It is an indirect tax on expenditure. The seller o f goods or services may pass on the amount of tax paid to the buyer. VAT is inte nded to fall on the immediate buyers and end-consumers. - RA 9337s legislative hi story is as follows: It originated from House Bill 3555 that was approved on the 27th of January 2005 and House Bill 3705 that was approved on the 28th of Febru ary 2005 and Senate Bill 1950 that was approved on the 13th of April 2005. This SEPARATE OPINION PANGANIBAN Sections 1, 2, and 3 of RA 9337 is unconstitutional as 1) the increase of tax ra tes on domestic, resident foreign and nonresident foreign corporations, 2) the i ncrease of tax credit against taxes due from nonresident foreign corporations on intercorporate dividends, and 3) the

boundaries and determine the scope and extent of the power of the Blue Ribbon Co mmittee ISSUES 1. WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation . 2. WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of go vernment. 3. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process. HELD 1. NO Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is not in aid of legislation - Sen. Enriles i nquiry merely intended to find out WON Ricardo Lopa had any part in the alleged sale of the Romualdez corporationsthere was no intended legislation as required b y A6 S21 of the constitution. As held in Jean L. Arnault v. Leon Nazareno et al. , the inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power vested in the Committee by the Constitution. In Watkins v. US it was held that Congress po wer of inquiry is broad but limited, that is, it may not pry into private affair s if such actions are not in furtherance of a legitimate task of congressno inqui ry is an end in itself. 2. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain o f another branch of government - Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sand iganbayan, any further investigation by Congress would only serve to complicate matters and produce conflicting opinionsas held in Baremblatt v. US, Congress can not inquire into matters w/c are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. 3. YE S the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process - It has been held th at a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitati ons placed by the Constitution on governmental action, includingthe Bill of Right s. As held in Hutcheson v. US, it cant be assumed that legislative purpose is alwa ys justified by public need; Congress cannot tread on private rights. The doctri ne in Cabal v. Kapunan states that the Constitutional right against self-incrimi nation extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and in cases in w/c the witn ess is an accused. Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by the Commi ttee to appear, testify, and produce evidence before it because such inquiries w ould not be in aid of legislation and if pursued, would be violative of the prin ciple separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments, as ordained by the Constitution. The petition is GRANTED. Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation. -the power o f Congress to conduct investigations is inherent and needs no textual granteven s o, it is expressly granted by A6 S21. Barsky v. US: the possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit the pow er of inquiry US v. Deutch: Congress has the right to secure information in orde r to determine WON to legislate on a particular subject matter on w/c it is w/in its constitutional powers to act. US v. Orman: where the information sought con cerns what Congress can legislate, a legitimate legislative purpose must be pres umed. -the requirement that an inquiry be in aid of legislation is easier to estab lish here where Congress legislative field is unlimited unlike in the US. Also, i t is not necessary that every question be material to the proposed legislation, but directly related to the subject of the inquiry. -the legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose; Congress may investigate for its own purposes even thought the subjects of the investigation are currently under trial. Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process. -A6 S2 1 provides that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. However, such a restriction does not call for the complete pr ohibition of such investigations where a violation of a basic right is claimed, but rather only requires that such rights be respected. -the right against selfincrimination may only be invoked when incriminating questions are posed, but th e witness may not refuse to take the witness stand completely. In the case at ba r, no incriminating questions had been asked, hence the allegation of violation of rights is premature. Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process. -the petitione rs are not facing criminal charges; as ordinary witnesses, they may only invoke the right against self-incrimination only when such a question is posed, and can not refuse taking the witness stand outright. SENATE V ERMITA CARPIO-MORALES;

FACTS - this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari and prohibit ion challenging the constitutionality of E.O. no. 46415 issued Sept. 28, 2005 Consti Provisions allegedly violated: Art. VI Sec. 1, 21, 22,; Art. III Sec. 4, 7; Art. II Sec. 28; Art. XI Sec 1; Art. XIII Sec. 16 - Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate Investigation Committees issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Dept. including the AFP and PNP for them to appear i n public hearings on inquiries concerning mainly: (A) The alleged overpricing in the NorthRail Project (B) the Wire-Tapping activity (C) the Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable contract - The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed re quests for postponement of hearings for varying reasons such as existence of urg ent operational matters, more time to prepare a more comprehensive report, etc. Sen. Drilon, however, did not accede to their requests because the requests were sent belatedly and that preparations and arrangements have already been complet ed. - On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which took effect immediat ely. Citing E.O. 464, the Executive Dept. officials subject to Senate investigat ions claimed that they were not allowed to appear before any Senate or Congressi onal hearings without consent (written approval) from the President, which had n ot been granted unto them; their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to E.O. 464. Thereafter, several cases were fi led challenging E.O. 464 and praying for the issuance of a TRO enjoining respond ents from implementing, enforcing, and observing the assailed order. Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita et al., prayed for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit. ISSUES Primary Issue CRUZ [dissent] Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation. Arnault v. N azareno: the Court is bound to presume that an action of a legislative body is w / legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and It has no right to assume the contrary. -an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money, in this case, the possible violation of RA 3019 in the disposition of the Romualde z corporations, is an indispensable duty of the legislature Mcgrain v. Daugherty : it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation expressly sta te that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislati on SEPARATE OPINION GUTIERREZ [dissent] 15 E.O. 464 Ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public official s appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under the Constitutio n, and for other purposes.

1. WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress Secondar y Issues 2. Justiciability of the case: a. Legal standing of petitioners: G.R. 1 69777 Senate of the Phils. G.R. 169659 BAYANMUNA, COURAGE, CODAL G.R. 169660 Fra ncisco Chavez G.R. 169667 Alternative Law Groups (ALG) G.R. 169834 PDP-Laban G.R . 121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) b. Actual Case or Controversy 3. WON E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public c oncern. 4. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they im plemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulatio n. HELD Primary Issue 1. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive branch to withhold information sought by the Congress in aid of legislation, without i t asserting a right to do so, and without stating reasons therefor. - Although t he executive Dept. enjoys the power of executive privilege, Congress nonetheless has the right to know why the executive dept. considers requested information p rivileged. E.O. 464 allows the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without the need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or pr offering its reasons therefor. By mere expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power of Congress is frustrated. Resort to any means by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed to be valid. Reasoning Executive Privilege -The power of the President and other high-level executive branch officers to withhold certain types of information o f a sensitive character from Congress, the courts and the public. - The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. VI Sec.21 This is the power of the Legisla ture to make investigations and exact testimony that it may exercise its legisla tive functions advisedly and effectively. It gives the Congress the power to com pel the appearance of executive officials to comply with its demands for informa tion. - Inquiry in Art. VI Sec. 22 (question hour) As determined from the delibe rations of the Constitutional Commission, this provision was intended to be dist inguished from inquiries in aid of legislation, in that attendance here is merel y discretionary on the part of the department heads. - Sec. 1 of E.O. 464 Its re quirement to secure presidential consent, limited only to executive dept. heads and to appearances in the question hour (because of its specific reference to sec. 22 of art VI) makes it valid on its face. - Sec. 2 (a) of E.O. 464 It merely provides guidelines bindin g only on the heads of office mentioned in section 2(b), on what is covered by t he executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branch es of government. It may be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the Pre s. regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege. - Sec. 2 (b) of E.O. 4 64 Provides that once the head of office determines that a certain info. is priv ileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has t he effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, only to th e express pronouncement of the Pres. that it is allowing the appearance of such official. It allows the Pres. to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence, and such presumptive authorization is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Due to the fact that executive privilege is of extraordinary power, t he Pres. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it. Such power must be w ielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. - Sec. 3 of E.O. 464 Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the cons ent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enu meration is broad. It is invalid per se. In so far as it does not assert but mer ely implies the claim of executive privilege. It does not provide precise and ce rtain reasons for the claim. Mere invocation of E.O. 464 coupled with an announc ement that the President has not given her consent, is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case, severely frustrating its power of inquiry. Seco ndary Issues 2. a. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners: Rule 1: Legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges veste d by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the val idity of any official action which they claim infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental

importance there must be a showing of: 1. the character of the funds (public)/as sets involved 2. a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory proh ibition 3. lack of a party with a more direct and specific interest in raising t he questions raised. The Senate of the Philippines - The Senate, including its i ndividual members, by virtue of their fundamental right for intelligent public d ecisionmaking and sound legislation is the proper party to assail an executive order which allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information crucial to law-making. It has a substantial and d irect interest over the outcome of such a controversy. Party List (BayanMuna, CO URAGE, CODAL) - The party-list representatives have standing, it is sufficient t hat a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and d uties as members of Congress to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. IBP, Chavez, ALG (in voking right to info. on matters of public concern) - When suing as a citizen, t he interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws must be direct and personal. The Court held in Francisco v. Francisco that when a proce eding involves assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the person filing is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. PDP-Laban (claimin g standing due to the transcendental importance of issue) - There being no publi c funds involved and there being parties with more direct and specific interest in the controversy (the Senate and BayanMuna), gives PDPLaban no standing. b. Ac tual case or controversy (was not taken up by the Court) - A challenged order wh ich has already produced results consequent to its implementation and where such results are the subject of questions of constitutionality, is ripe for adjudica tion. - The implementation of E.O. 464 has resulted in the officials excusing th emselves from attending the Senate hearings. It would be sheer abandonment of du ty if the Court would refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of E.O. 46 4. 3. Yes. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation are presumed to be a matter of public concern, therefore, it follows that any executive issuance t ending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations deprive s the people of information. 4. Yes. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it has a direct effect on the right of the people to i nformation on matters of public concern therefore it is not exempt from the need of publication. Due process requires that the people should have been apprised of the issuance of E.O. 464 before it was implemented. Decision Petitions are PA RTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void while sections 1 and 2(a) are VALID. GUINGONA V CARAGUE GANCAYCO; April 22, 1991 FACTS

- The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4B in automatic appropriation (86.8 going to debt service) and P155.3 from the General Appropriations Act or a total of P233. 5B; only P27B was allotted for DECS. Petitioners, as members of the Senate, ques tion the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in th e said budget as provided for by Presidential Decrees 81, 117, and 1967. - Petit ioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of t he Constitution. And as provided by Art. 7 of the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary to the Constitution, it shall be void. - They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no longer operative since they became functus oficio af ter President Marcos was ousted. With a new congress replacing the one man-legis lature, new legislation regarding appropriation should be passed. Current approp riation, operating on no laws therefore, would be unenforceable. - Moreover, the y contend that assuming arguendo that the said decrees did not expire with the o uster of Marcos, after adoption of the 1987 Constitution, said decrees were inco nsistent with Sec. 24, Article VI of the Constitution which stated that: Sec. 24 . All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclu sively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur wit h amendments. whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law mus t be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, peti tioners state said decrees violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constituti on which provides as follows Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treas ury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in a dvance the amount appropriated for the debt service. - SolGen argues, on the oth er hand, that automatic appropriation provides flexibility: ". . . First, for ex ample, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market conditions by redeeming high interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangeme nts that could lighten our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset , debt-to-debt or other such schemes. Second, the automatic appropriation obviat es the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from wh at has been previously programmed. The annual debt service estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based on a mathematical set or matrix or, in laymans parlance, basket of foreign exchange and interest rate assumptions which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automat ic appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time this comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically ch anged. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have supervene d, only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediate-payment even before due dates. - Clearl y, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes aga inst the intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person of Marcos." ISSUES 1. WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt service as compared to its appropriation of P27.7B for education in violation o f Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution. The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retai n its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment. 2. WON the Presidential De crees are still operative, and if they are, do they violate Sec. 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitutional. 3. WON there was undue delegation of legislative powe r by automatic appropriation. HELD 1. The Court disagrees that Congress hands are hamstrung by the provision provided. There are other imperatives of national in terest that it must attend to; the amount allotted to education, 27.8B, is the h ighest in all department budgets thereby complying with the mandate of having th

e highest priority as stated above. The enormous national debt, incurred by the previous administration, however, still needs to be paid. Not only for the sake of honor but because the national economy is itself at stake. Thus, if Congress allotted more for debt service such an appropriation cannot be considered by thi s Court as unconstitutional. 2. Yes, they are still operative. The transitory pr ovision provided in Sec. 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that: A ll existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructi ons and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. - This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by i ts framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then Presiden t Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless t hey are inconsistent with the Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked. - Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is fr owned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Consti tution and law is generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated. 3. No. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philip pines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor e as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to m ake prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the cre dit standing of the country. - Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the proble m being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay onl y the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other eviden ces of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implement ation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasu ry. SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [dissent] He sees that an essential requirement for valid appropriation is that the sum au thorized for release should be determinate or determinable. The Presidential Dec rees do not satisfy this requirement. As to the ponencias reference to legislative parameters provided by law, Cruz says no such regulatory boundaries exist. PADILLA [dissent]

- He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by saying that Sec. 29(1)Article VI implies that a law enacted by Congress (and approved by the President) appro priating a particular sum or sums must be made before payment from the Treasury can be made. Laws should be construed in light of current laws and not those mad e by a one-man legislative branch. - Besides, these decrees issued by President Marcos relative to debt service were tailored for the periods covered by said de crees. Today it is Congress that should determine and approve the proper appropr iations for debt servicing, as this is a matter of policy that, in his opinion, pertains to the legislative department, as the policy-determining body of the Go vernment. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION V ENRIQUEZ QUIASON; August 19, 1994 FACTS - House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 199 4), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. - O n December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the sa me to have become Republic Act No. 766316, the General Appropriation Act (GAA) o f 1994. On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions. No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes . - In G.R. No. 113105, Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) et al. p rayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Art icle 41 on the Countrywide Development Fund or pork barrels, the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, (b) A rticle 48 on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount appropriated under said Article 48 in excess of the P37.9 B allocated for the DECS; and (c) the ve to of the President of the Special Provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994 In G.R. No. 113174, 16 Senators question: (1) the constitutionality of the condi tions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supr eme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs) and (f) St ate Universities and Colleges (SUCs); and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service. - In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Romulo and Taada together with the Freedom from De bt Coalition, a nonstock domestic corporation, sued as taxpayers, challenging th e constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the special provision in the app ropriations for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefor. - In G.R. No. 113888, Senators Romulo and Taada contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for t he Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implemen tation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Hou sing Authority (NHA). - In view of the importance and novelty of most of the iss ues raised in the four petitions, the Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae. G.R. No . 113105 ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing17 Substant ive 2. WON the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) or pork barrels is an encroachme nt by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation a ct is in implementation of a law 3. WON the act of Congress giving debt service and not education18 as the highest priority in the allocation of budget unconsti tutional 4. WON the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign h is allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category is unconsti tutional, as it is contrary to Article VI Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution 19 HELD Procedural 1. A member of Congress has the legal standing to question th e validity of a presidential veto or any other 17 act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress. Reasoning: Ponen cia relied on precedent (Gonzales v. Macaraig) and a US case (United States v. A merican Tel. & Tel. Co) as secondary source to recognize legal standing. Then in

forming the ratio decidendi, it again relied on US cases as secondary sources ( Coleman v. Miller, Holtzman v. Schlesinger) as well as the opinion of Justice Fe rnando as Amicus Curiae. Substantive 2. The power of appropriation lodged in Con gress carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress want s it to be. Reasoning: The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastruc ture, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activ ities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries" It was Congress itself th at determined the purposes for the appropriation. Executive function under the C DF involves implementation of the priority projects specified in the law. The au thority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify project s to be implemented by the President. Hence, under Article 48 of the GAA of 1994 , if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the CDF, it is the Presiden t who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory. 3. The constitutional provisi on which directs the State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to educat ion is merely directory. Reasoning: It relied on precedence, Guingona, Jr. v. Ca rague. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution , Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education it do es not thereby follow that Congress is deprived of its power to respond to the i mperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state polici es or objectives. 4. The members only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating expenses but it is the Sen ate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives who shall approve the realignment. Decision Procedural 1. Petitioners, as members of Congress have locus standi Substantive 2. No. The CDF is not an encroachment by the legislatu re on executive power, hence constitutional 3. No. Congress act is not unconstitu tional. It simply exercises its power to respond to the imperatives of the natio nal interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. 4. No . It is not unconstitutional. G.R. No. 113105 G.R. No. 113174 16 Entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY -FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitio ns is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits. 18 Article XIV Section 5( 5) of the 1987 Constitution states that: "The State shall assign the highest bud getary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain it s rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment." 19 "No law shall be passed au thorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respe ctive offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."

ISSUE WON veto of the special provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994 in the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire P86.3 B for said purpo se is unconstitutional Or, simply put: WON the President exceeded the itemveto p ower accorded by the Constitution20 HELD Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropr iation, is considered an inappropriate provision21 which can be vetoed separately from an item. Reasoning: The issue, according to the ponencia is a mere rehash o f the one put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. Hence, it used this case as p recedent. It also cited another case, Henry v. Edwards to support its ratio. Cit ing Gonzales: As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particul ar appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriat ion, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately f rom an item. Citing Henry v. Edwards: When the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as items for purposes of the Governors (Presidents) item veto power over general appropriation bills. Decision Yes. The President vetoed the entire paragraph 1 o f the Special Provision of the item on debt service, including the provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for payment of the pri ncipal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case s hall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of L iquidators." The said provisos, being appropriate provisions since they germane to and have a direct connection with the item on debt service, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions is void. G.R. No. 113174 G.R. No. 113766 G.R. No. 113888 20 ISSUES 1. WON the veto for revolving funds of State Universities and Colleges (S UCs) is unconstitutional 2. WON the veto of the provision in the appropriation fo r the Department of Public Works and Highways on 70% (administrative) / 30% (con tract) ratio for road maintenance is unconstitutional 3. WON the veto of the pro vision on purchase of medicines by AFP is unconstitutional 4. WON the veto of sp ecial provisions on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipmen t is unconstitutional 5. WON the veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds is unconstitutional 6. WON the Presidents directive that the im plementation of the Special Provision to the item on the CAFGUs shall be subjec t to prior Presidential approval is tantamount to an administrative embargo of t he congressional will to implement the Constitutions command to dissolve the CA FGUs, therefore unconstitutional (Issue on Impoundment22) 7. WON veto of the Pr esident setting conditions or guidelines in the appropriations for the Supreme C ourt, Ombudsman, COA, DPWH and CHR is unconstitutional HELD [1] to [5] Any provi sion which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its opera tion beyond an item of appropriation, is considered an inappropriate provision whi ch can be vetoed separately from an item23 Reasoning: Same ratio decidendi from the issue in the previous section is applied in the 5 issues in this section. He nce the reasoning for the ratio is the same as well. (Notice how the ratio is ap plied in the ruling or dispositive) 6. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law requiring legislative approval of executive acts mu st be incorporated in a separate substantive bill. Reasoning: The ponencia simpl y cited notes from journals24 in discussing the issue of Impoundment to support his reasoning in the present case. 7. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds authorized by Congress is simply an 22 exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that laws are faithf ully executed. Decision 1. No. There was no undue discrimination when the Presid ent vetoed said special provisions. 2. Yes. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not al

ien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifi es how the said item shall be expended - 70% by administrative and 30% by contra ct. 3. Yes. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation ite m on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed b y the President without also vetoing the said item. 4. No. Any provision blockin g an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approv al of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Th erefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. 5. No. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff t o use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP R etirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5)25 and 29 (1)26 of the Article VI of the Constitution. Thus veto is not unconstitutional. 6. No. The provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws. Impliedly, this is an inappropriate provision which can be vetoed sepa rately. 7. No. By setting guidelines or conditions in his veto, the President is simply exercising his constitutional duty to implement the laws faithfully. Dis positive Petitions DISMISSED, except with respect with respect to [1] G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domesti c indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilitie s of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and [2] G.R. No. 113888 only insofa r as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the 2nd paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of appropriation for the DPWH; and (b) Special Prov ision 25 Article VI Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution states that: The President shal l have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, reven ue, or tariff bill, but veto shall mot affect the item or items to which he does not object. 21 Also included in the category of inappropriate provisions which are intended to amend our laws, because clearly these laws have no place in an appr opriations bill, and therefore unconstitutional. This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to imp ound is put in issue. Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for what ever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spe nd or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of Funds, Harvar d Law Review) 23 Note that this ratio is also applied in issue [6] aside from th e ratio which I formulated there. This can be implied from, Again we state: a pro vision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend other laws. Hen ce, this is an inappropriate provision which can be vetoed separately. 24 Notes: I mpoundment of Funds, Harvard Law Review; Notes: Presidential Impoundment Constit utional Theories and Political Realities, Georgetown Law Journal; Notes Protecti ng the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, Yale Law Journal "No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representat ives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Co mmissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropri ations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their res pective appropriations." 26 "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except i n pursuance of an appropriation made by law"

No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the AFP which is GRANTED. Voting: 14 Conc ur, 1 Dissent SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [concur and dissent] I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms the Courts decision in Gonzalez v. Macaraig - An inappropriate provision is still as provision, not an item and therefore outside the veto power of the Executive. VITUG [concur] - I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the President and his colleagues, would have the best feel on the needs of their own respecti ve constituents. It is not objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate fu nds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, howe ver, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible. GONZALES V MACARAIG MELENCIO-HERRERA; November 19, 1990 FACTS - The Senate questioned the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of special and general provisions, particularly Sec. 55 of the General Appropriatio ns Bill for 1989 - The petitioners claim they have locus standi on the ground of : - being member and ex-officio members of the Finance Committee - substantial t axpaers whose vital interests might be affected - The respondents in this case a re member of the Cabinet who are sued in their official capacity for the impleme ntation of the General Appropriations Act of 1989 - December 16, 1988 - The Hous e of Representatives passed HB 19186 (GA Bill for 1989) - eliminated/decreased i tems included in the proposed Budget of the President - presented to President f or approval - December 29, 1988 - The bill was signed into law (became RA 6688) - The President vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec. 55 - February 2, 1989- Sena te expressed through Senate Resolution No. 381 that the veto of Sec. 55 was unconstitutional - April 11, 1989 - Petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed - assailed the legality of veto of Sec. 55 - enjoined the implementation of RA 6 688 - No restraining order was implemented by the Supreme Court - September 7, 1 989 - Court resolved to give due course to the petition - Jan. 17, 1990 - Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Supplementary Petition which raised the same iss ue as the original petition (questioning the presidential veto) - The vetoed pro visions include: - Sec. 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 - an item submitted by the President which has been reduced by Congress cannot be restored/increase d. An item is deemed disapproved if there is no corresponding appropriation in t he Act. - Sec. 16 of the Appropriations Act of 1990 - similar to Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Act except that this was lumped together with the use of sav ings - The basic difference between both provisions is that in the 1989 Appropri ations Act, the "use of savings" is in Section 12, apart from Section 55 whereas in the 1990 \Appropriations Act, "use of savings" and the vetoed provision are both in Sec. 16 - The reason for the veto: - Violates Art. 6, Sec 25(5) - Nullif ies the constitutional and statutory authroity of the President, the Senate Pres ident, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice of the Supreme Cou rt and the Heads of Con-Coms to augment any item in the General Appropriations l aw - If allowed, the President and the other abovementioned officials cannot aug ment any item and appropriation from their savings even if special circumstances like calamity - Petitioners arguments: 1) The presidents line veto power rega rding the appropriations bill is limited to item/s and does not cover provisions and therefore exceeded her authority (Sections 55 and 16 are provisions) 2) Whe n the president objects to provisions of an appropriation bill, it is not possib le to exercise the item veto power but should veto the whole bill as well 3) The item veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or re strictions for that would be legislation already (violative of separation of pow ers) 4) Power of augmentation in Article 6, Sec. 25(5) is provided by law so Con gress has prerogative to impose restrictions in the exercise of that power - Sol Gens arguments: 1) The issue is a political question and the petitioners have a

political remedy which is to override the veto. 2) Sec. 53 is a rider which is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and should merit a veto. 3) The power of the president to augment items in appropriations for the executi ve branches already provided for in Budget Law (specifically Sec. 44 and 45 of P D 1177 as amended by RA 6670) 4) The President is empowered to veto provisions o f other distinct and severable parts. ISSUES 1. WON the issue is justiciable 2. WON the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and its counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is unconstitutional and wit hout effect HELD 1. The issue is justiciable, not political. a) There is an actu al case or justiciable controversy between the Senate and the Executive that the Supreme Court may take cognizance of. The Demetria v. Alba case declared that t he Supreme Court has the duty to declare acts of a government branch void if bey ond that branchs powers b) Judicial arbitration needed because the petitioners stress the imperative need for definitive ruling by the Court c) The petitioners have locus standi because the suit is a taxpayers suit. The Sanidad ruling (th e Court may or may not entertain a taxpayers suit) and the Tolentino v. COMELEC ruling (members of the Senate have personality when a Constitutional issue is r aised) were used. This is also not the first time that the veto power was discus sed. i) Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice - Court upheld the veto but reversed by the US Supreme Court because of the Appropriations Bill was not involved. ii) Bo linao Electronics v. Valencia - rejected the veto in an Appropriations Bill 2. N O the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and its c ounterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is constitutional *The extent of item veto power still includes the vetoing of provisions. - Art. 6 Sec. 27 Veto power of the President Paragraph 1 - general veto power of the President a nd if exercised would veto the entire bill Paragraph 2 - the item-veto of line-v beto allows a veto over a particular item in an appropriations, revenue or tarif f bill. The president may not veto less than all of an item (no authority to vet o part of an item and approve the remaining portion of that item). - Originally referred to veto of items of appropriations bills in the Organic Act of Aug. 29, 1916 - 1935 Constitution, Art. 6, Sec 11(2) - The veto was more expansive since it included provisions and items in revenue and tariff bills - 1973 Constitutio n - more compact version and refers to the Prime Minister as the only official w ho has the power - 1987 Constitution - verbatim reproduction of 1973

provision except that a different public official (the President) was now involv ed and eliminated the reference to a veto of a provision - The Court held that e ven if there was an elimination of any reference to the veto provision, the exte nt of the Presidents veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. - An item in a bill relates to the particulars, details, distin ct and severable parts of the bill whereas a provision is of a more general natu re. - A restrictive interpretation as espoused by the petitioners disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of the bill may be the subje ct of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any pro vision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some part icular appropriation and that any such provision shall be limited in its operati on to the appropriation to which it relates. - A provision does not relate to th e entire bill. - The exercise of veto power does not partake of a legislative po wer as stated in the Bengzon case: - The legislature has the power to enact laws while the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the legislature. - The President finds its a uthority in the Constitution. - The Courts indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same way that they presume constitutional ity of an act passed by the Legislature. * Secs. 55 and 16 are inappropriately c alled provisions. - Even if assuming that provisions are beyond the executive po wer to veto, Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are not provisions in the budgetary sense. - Ba sed on Art. 6, Sec. 25(2), a provision should relate specifically to some partic ular appropriation therein. Secs. 55 and 16 do not fit this requirement. a) no r elation to a particular or distinctive requirement. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. b) disappro ved or reduced items are nowhere to be found in the Bill. c) vetoed sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from s avings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Secs. 55 and 16 are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the veto power. *S ections 55 and 16 are inappropriate conditions and are therefore susceptible to a veto. - Petitioners argue that Congress is free to impose conditions in an App ropriations Bill and where conditions are attached, veto powers do not have the power to strike them out. - These rules are settled in the sense that Congress c an impose conditions on expenditure of funds and that the Executive cannot veto a condition of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. - But for the rule to apply, r estrictions should be in the real sense of the term. Restrictions should exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditu res. The test is appropriateness. - Secs. 55 and 16 are held to be inappropriate conditions. - Actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive an d therefore separate legislation. - Neither shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. Items reduced or disapproved by Congress are not on the enrolled bill and can only be detected when compared with the original budge tary submittals of the President. * The power of augmentation and the validity o f the veto - The President vetoed Sections 55 and 16 because they nullified the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government t o augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective office s from savings in other items of their respective appropriations (with reference to Art. 6, Sec. 25(5)). - The power to augment lies dormant until authorized by law. - The constitution allowed the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmen ting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of a government b ranch so as to afford considerable flexibility in the use of public funds. - Sep aration of powers is endangered in no way. - Secs. 55 and 16 prohibit this augme ntation and impair the constitutional and statutory authority of the President i n the interest of expediency and efficiency. - The special power of augmentation from savings is merely incorporated in the GA Bill. The GA Bill is one of prima ry and specific aim to make appropriation of money from the public treasury. The power of augmentation from savings is not considered a specific appropriation o f money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure. -

To sanction this practice would withhold the power from the Executive and other officials and put in jeopardy the exercise of that power. - If the legislature d oes believe that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were unconstit utional, a veto may be overriden by the votes of 2/3 of the members of Congress. But Congress made no attempt to do so. 8760 (General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000. Also seeking the issuance of a w rit of preliminary injunction or TRO to enjoin implementation of the questioned provision. However, the 2000 GAA has long been implemented, the issuance is alre ady moot and academic. But the Court shall pass upon the constitutional issues. - Brief historical account of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR): - Pres ident Aquino initiated a series of peace talks to deal with insurgency in the Co rdilleras. These dialogues focused on the establishment of an autonomous governm ent in the Cordilleras. - Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras, a nd Section 18, Article X mandates the congressional enactment of the organic act s for each of the autonomous regions. - President Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 22 0 on July 15, 1987, creating the CAR, which is the interim and preparatory body tasked to administer the affairs of government in the Cordilleras. -Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, on October 23, 1989, Congress enacted RA 6766 (An Act Pro viding for an Organic Act for for the Cordillera Autonomous Region). A plebiscit e was held where the people of the Cordilleras could ratify the Organic Act. How ever, the creation of an autonomous region was overwhelmingly rejected in all of the Cordilleras except for the Ifugao province. The Court ruled that Ifugao alo ne cannot validly constitute the CAR and upheld the disapproval of the Organic A ct. The Court also declared E.O. No. 220 to be still in force and effect. -Febru ary 15, 2000: President Estrada signed into law the 2000 GAA which includes the assailed Special Provisions: 1. Use of Fund. The amounts herein appropriated shal l be used to wind up the activities and operations of the CAR, including the pay ment of separation and retirement benefits of all affected officials and employe es -July 20, 2000: President Estrada issued E.O. No. 270 extending the implementat ion of the winding up of operations of the CAR. ISSUES 1. WON the assailed Speci al Provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional 2. WON the P hilippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal E.O. No. 2 20 3. WON the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in EO 220. HELD 1. NO the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is not a rider TF it is constitutional a. A rider is a provisions which is alien to or not ger mane to the subject of the bill in which it is incorporated. 2 provisions of the Constitution prohibit them: Art VI: Sec ATITIW V ZAMORA TINGA; September 30, 2005 FACTS - This is a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and declaratory relief as taxpayers, seeking the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the Special Prov isions of RA

25(2) No provisions or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein and S ec 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which s hall be embraced in the title thereof - The rule should not be construed so stric tly as to tie the hands of Congress: it simply requires that all the provisions are either appropriation items, or nonappropriaton items which relate specifical ly to appropriation items. - Test: It must be 1) Particular if it relates specif ically to a distinct item of appropriation; 2) Unambiguous when its application is apparent on the face of the bill and needs no reference to details/souces out side the bill; 3) Appropriate when its subject does not necessarily have to be t reated in a separate legislation. - The assailed provision does not constitute a rider: it passes the above test. Ratio when a provision is particular, unambigu ous, and appropriate to the appropriations bill to which it belongs, it shall no t be considered to be a rider b. Petitioners allege: that instead of providing a budget for the CAR, it had the effect of abolishing the CAR since a special law created the CAR, the 2000 GAA is not the place for amending or repealing a stan ding law. - However, the CAR was not abolished. It has only been deactivated. Abolish to do away with, annul, abrogate, destroy completely, office ceases to e xist; - Deactivate render inactive, break up by discharging or reassigning perso nnel, office continues to exist, albeit dormant. - But even if the limitation of the CARs budget had the effect of abolishing certain offices, the Congress has h e power to do so. - creation of public offices is primarily a legislative functi on - office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may abolish the office if it sees fit. c. The CAR created through EO 220 is not the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. EO 220 has not es tablished an autonomous regional government; rather, it has only created an admi nistrative region. It can be considered a regional coordinating agency of the Na tional Government. 2, 3: Except for the contention that the assailed paragraph i s a rider, the rest of the arguments look into the wisdom and efficacy of said p rovisions. Political questions Still 1. Contention that Congress cant unilaterally amend or repeal EO 220: Rejected. T here is no such thing as an irrepealable law. 2. Implementation of EO 220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of funds to support CARs activities is l egislative. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot correct the acts of the Executive or Congress. decision also refers the case to COMELEC & the Office of the special Prosecutor for appropriate actions. - Without filing MFR, JA files the present case before SC. ISSUES 1. WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in a. proceeding to d ecide the protest based on AS precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" th eory; b. rendering judgment on the kind of evidence before it and the manner in which the evidence was procured; & c. annulling election results in some contest ed precincts. 2. WON Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt HELD 1. YES HR ET committed grave abuse of discretion a. The "precinct level document based ano malies/evidence" theory - This innovative theory broadened the scope of the elec tion protest beyond what AS originally sought. This is clearly substantial amend ment of the election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET interna l rules. Impropriety of private respondents belated shift of theory was sensed by majority members of HRET but they still resolved not to dismiss the protestthi s a clear indication of grave abuse of discretion. No further hearings were cond uctedJAs right to due process was clearly violated. - Substantial amendments to the protest maybe allowed only within the same period for the filing of the elec tion protest 15 which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules, is ten (10) days after t he proclamation of the winner. The rule in an election protest is that the prote stant or counterprotestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in h is original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for the filing of protest or counter protest. A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted after ha ving lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt another

and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal. < principle of estoppel> b. The kind of evidence used and how they were procured Photocopies violate the best evidence rule: no evidence shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its nature so long as the original evidence can be had. Certain vital election documents (such as certified xerox copy of the numb er of registered voters per precinct and photocopies of statements of votes) wer e procured at the sole instance of the ponente of the majority decision, never o ffered in evidence by either of the parties. - Majority congressmen-members of t he Tribunal by themselves without the participation of any of the three ARROYO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL FRANCISCO; July 14, 1995 FACTS - Petition for review of the decision of the HRET - 11 May 1992: Augusto L . Syjuco, Jr. (AS) & Joker P. Arroyo (JA) ran for congressman for the lone distr ict of Makati. Board of canvassers proclaims A as winner. AS files an election p rotest before HRET, seeking revision and recounting of ballots in 75% of the pre cincts. His grounds: alleged irregularities/anomalies in the tabulation and entr ies of votes & massive fraud. JA files counter-protest questioning residence qua lification of AS; dismissed by HRET. - HRET undertakes revision of ballots. Seri ous irregularities found. Justice Gancaycos Report and Recommendation confirm irr egularities and anomalies engineered by some HRET officials and personnel: Arroy o votes were consistently reduced while Syjuco was always constant - Revision comp leted. Reception of evidence followed. JA submits certified true copies of the R evision Reports and election returns. AS submits over 200,000 pages of documenta ry evidence, mere photocopies and not certified or authenticated by comparison wi th the original documents or identification by any witness." - In his memorandum cum addendum, AS changes his original posture (revision and recount of ballots) to what he calls a truly innovative and NON-TRADITIONAL process" the PRECINCT-LEV EL DOCUMENT-BASED EVIDENCES. - By reason of the new allegations and substantial amendments (which broaden the scope of his protest, change his theory of the cas e or introduce additional causes of action in violation of Rule 28 Revised Rules of the Tribunal), HRET ordered him to show cause why his protest should not be dismissed. - 15 February 1994: by a 6-3 vote (the six Congressmenmembers as agai nst the three Justices-members), HRET resolved not to dismiss the protest, to co ntinue with the examination and evaluation of the evidence on record, and therea fter to decide the case on the merits. - JA moved to dismiss the protest but to no avail. No hearings were conducted thereafter. - 25 January 1995: HRET, by the same 6-3 vote rendered its now assailed Decision annulling JAs proclamation, & declaring AS as the duly elected congressman. Said

(3) remaining Justices-members, declared that 10,484 of the contested signature are fake. This grossly violates Rules 68 &5 of HRET Rules (all questions shall b e submitted to the Tribunal as a body; and presence of at least one (1) Justicemember is required to constitute a valid quorum). c. Nullification of election r esults - HRET proceeded to annul votes without a dint of compliance with the 2 m andatory requisites for the annulment of election returns based on fraud, irregu larities or terrorism: i. that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total number of votes in the precinct or precincts were involved, & ii. that the votes must be shown to have been affected or vitiated by such fraud, irregularities or terr orism. - Elections should never be held void unless they are clearly illegal; it is the duty of the court to sustain an election authorized by law if it has bee n so conducted as to give a free and fair expression of the popular will, and th e actual result thereof is clearly ascertained. Absent fraud, mere irregularitie s or omissions committed by election officials which do not subvert the expressi on of popular will cannot countenance the nullification of election results. Cor ollarily, the misconduct of election officers or irregularities on their part wi ll not justify rejecting the whole vote of a precinct (as was done in this case) where it does not appear that the result was affected thereby, even though the circumstances may be such as to subject the officers to punishment. 32 These omi ssions are not decisive since actual voting and election by registered voters ha d taken place in the questioned precincts. - General rule: a tribunal rendering a decision must be given an opportunity to rectify its error through a motion fo r reconsideration. BUT partiality of the majority of the members of the Electora l Tribunal having been shown, recourse for a reconsideration of its decision bec omes nugatory and an immediate recourse to this Court can be had based on the fu ndamental principle of due process. A prior motion for reconsideration can be di spensed with if petitioners fundamental right to due process was violated. - Pe rsistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunals own governing rules and of e ven the most basic rules of evidence cannot be justified by simply invoking that procedural rules should be liberally construed. Rule 80 of the very same intern al rules expressly makes the Rules of Court, Supreme Court decisions, and Electo ral Tribunal decisions of suppletory application. - Unwavering reverence to the rules of evidence as provided by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence is because they have been tested through years of experience as the most effective means o f ferreting out the truth in any judicial controversy. Rules and uniformity of p rocedure are as essential to procure truth and exactness in elections as in anyt hing else. - Thus, with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings before HRET and its ma jority decision in the election protest filed by AS, Joker Arroyos proclamation a s the winning congressman of the then lone district of Makati is deemed not to h ave been challenged at all. 2. YES Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt - Since his statements in his Addendum which he prepared without aid of counsel appear to seriously undermine the integrity of some members of the Court - Want of intention to undermine the integrity of the Court is no excuse for the langua ge employed by private respondent for it is a well-known and established rule th at derogatory words are to be taken in the ordinary meaning attached to them by impartial observers Decision WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition i s hereby GRANTED, and public respondent HRETs majority decision dated January 2 5, 1995 is SET ASIDE. Private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., having been fou nd guilty of indirect contempt, is hereby fined the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to be paid within five (5) days from receipt of this decision. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member Cong, 1st Dist., Davao del Sur, LDP JOSE E. CALI NGASAN Member Cong, 4th Dist., Batangas, LDP ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member Cong, 2n d Dist., Zamb del Sur, (GAD, now NP). - July 1989 Bondoc filed petition - Oct 19 90 - Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, delaying the finalization of the decision by at least (4) months . The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bo

ndocs lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Cong Camasura voted with the SC Justices a nd Cong Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest. - March 4, 1991 C ong Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Sec Gen that he voted for Bondoc in the final tally in the case. This revelation stirred a hornets n est in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutral ize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal. - March 5, 1991 - HRET issued a Not ice of Promulgation of Decision on March 4, 1991 in HRET Case No. 25. - March 13 , 1991 Cong. Cojuangco informed Cong. Camasura by letter that on Feb 28, 1991 LD P had already expelled him and Cong Benjamin Bautista for having allegedly helpe d to organize the Partido Pilipino of "Danding" Cojuangco, and for having invite d LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party. Cong Cojuangco noti fied Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP , and asked the HoR, through the Speaker, to take note of it especially in matte rs where party membership is a prerequisite. - March 14, 1991 - the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Jus Herrera, received a letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Sec Gen of the HoR, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of t he letter from the LDP, the HoR decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind t he election of Cong Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. - Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the CJ and Assoc Jus of the SC o f this "distressing development and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because promulgation of the decision previously scheduled for 14 Ma rch 1991, is sought to be aborted. The decision reached (5 to 4 vote) may now be expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated. It was also said that: > Proportional represent ation in the Tribunal (Art VI, Sec 17 Const) should be amended to provide instea d for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935 Const: (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest BONDOC V PINEDA GRINO-AQUINO; September 26, 1991 FACTS - In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of Repres entative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. - On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election with a lead of 3,300 votes. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of (9) members: 3 Justices of the S upreme Court and 6 members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis o f proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or orga nizations registered under the party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, A rt. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows: AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman Associate J ustice, SC ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member Associate Justice, SC FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member Associate Justice, SC HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member Cong, 1st Dist., Benguet, LDP DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member Cong, 1st Dist., Palawan, LDP SIMEON E. GARCI A, JR. Member Cong 2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija, LDP

number of votes and (3) of the party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the SC > Suggesti ons: + The Senate Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the HoR and vice versa. So that there would be lesser chances of nonjudicial elements playin g a decisive role in the resolution of election contests. + There should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in the Elec toral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their independence and objectivit y. (like thats possible) - During HRET open session, Tribunal issued a resolution canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 because the deci sion lacks the concurrence of the 5 members without Cong Camasuras vote as requ ired by Sec 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly pr omulgated. - March 19, 1991 - SC declined the request of the justices to be reli eved of their membership in the tribunal and directed them to do their duties. T he court even said that all members of these bodies are appropriately guided onl y by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and th at in the contemplation of the Constitution the memberslegislators, sit in the T ribunal no longer as reps of their political parties but as impartial judges. Th e term of office of every member thereof should be considered coextensive with t he corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not inc luding political disloyalty. - March 21, 1991 - petition for certiorari, prohibi tion and mandamus was filed by Dr. Bondoc against Reps Pineda, Palacol, Camasura , Jr., or any other rep who may be appointed Vice Rep and HRET praying this Cour t to: 1. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13, 1991, to withdraw the nomin ation and to rescind the nomination of Rep. Camasura, Jr. to HRET 2. Issue a wri t of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in place of Camasura f rom assuming and discharging functions as a member of the HRET 3. Issue a writ o f mandamus ordering Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of the HRET; and 4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equi table. - The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition > Cong Ju anito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition. > Cong Marciano M. Pinedas plea for the dismissal of the petition as the Congress is the sole authority th at nominates and elects from its members. HRET allegedly has the sole power to remo ve any member whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, re moval or expulsion from the political party; that a Tribunal members term of of fice is not co-extensive with his legislative term, for if a member of the Tribu nal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the cons titutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation wou ld be completely nullified; and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP and the decision to rescind his m embership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House-o f-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyon d the reach of judicial review. > Cong Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the pet itioner has no cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET. Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, no t the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasuras membership in the HRET. > Sol Gen also argued that the inclusion of the HRET as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribuna l. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the HoR of withdrawing the nomination , and rescinding the election, of Camasura as a member of the HRET. - Bondoc rep lied that HRET acknowledged that decision by canceling the promulgation of its d ecision in HRET Case No. 25 to his prejudice. Bondoc also explained that Cong Pa lacol was impleaded as one of the respondents because after the HoR had announce

d the termination of Cong Camasuras membership in the HRET several newspapers r eported that the HoR would nominate and elect Palacol to take Camasuras seat in t he Tribunal. ISSUE WON the HoR can interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HRET through "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal o f the majority party HELD - Sec 17 reechoes Sec 11, Article VI of the 1935 Const itution, except the provision on the representation of the main political partie s in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three members from each o f the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. - The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1 1 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribu nal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representative s Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was create d to function as a nonpartisan court. It is a non-political body in a sea of pol iticians. - To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must be inde pendent. The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specif ic purpose of determining contests relating to election returns and qualificatio ns of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judicia ry when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Cou rt has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the commission a s sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 .) + Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. The resolution of the HoR is a clear impairment of the constitutional pre rogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election co ntest between Pineda and Bondoc. + Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. As judges, the members of the tribunal mu st be nonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to wh ich they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. + Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. Members of th e HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests are entitled to securi ty of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in t he House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the term of office, his death, permanent disability, resig nation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliatio n with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may n ot be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of p roof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the record s of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered me mber of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET wa s not for a valid cause; hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

- Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly i nterfere with the tribunals disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondo c of the fruits of the Tribunals decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) - Ratio The House Electoral Tribunal, being an agen cy independent of the legislature, may not be interfered with by the House Decis ion WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the HoR withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Cong Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a me mber of the HRET. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelin g the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay inc urred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolu tion of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGAT ED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediat ely by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda. Narvasa, Paras , Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., J., c oncurs as certified to by the Chief Justice. Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cru z and Feliciano, JJ., took no part. - The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative ac t is, does the House of Representatives have the power to do what it has done an d not whether the House of Representatives should have done what it has done. The judiciary cannot question a legislative act done within the constitutional a uthority of the legislature The judicial department has no power to review even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the Constitution. To hold othe rwise would be to invalidate the principle of separation of powers. that they filed this petition in behalf of all other Filipinos since subjects ar e of profound and general interest. ISSUES 1. WON petitioners had standing to fi le for petition for mandamus 2. WON SC has jurisdiction to entertain this petiti on 3. WON Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution applies to the Interim B atasang Pambansa HELD 1. petitioners had no standing to file for petition for ma ndamus - As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowher e therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. Action complain ed of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, and therefore i nvolves no expenditure of public funds. It is only when an act complained of, wh ich may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expendi ture of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed. - As voter s, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to qualify the m to maintain and prosecute the present petition, for to have legal standing is to have personal and substantial interest in the case, or sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Interest held in common by all members of the pu blic is of abstract nature (as is the injury that will be sustained) and may not be used as standing to sue. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is t hat indispensable element for one to have personality in a dispute. 2. SC has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition - The Supreme Courts jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latters decision, orders or ru lings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section II of the 1973 Cons titution29. In this case, there is no such decision, order or ruling. Even from the standpoint of an action for mandamus, with the total absence of a showing th at COMELEC has unlawfully neglected or refused the performance of a ministerial duty, it is not shown that petitioners have a clear right to the holding of a sp ecial election which is equally the clear and ministerial duty of COMELEC. - Onl y the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary appropriation for special election

s, and this power of the may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much l ess may COMELEC compel the Batasan to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role Batasan Pambansa has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the in itiative on the matter must come from said body, not the 29 SARMIENTO [dissent] - I believe that the questions as Jus Padilla raised it can the Court annul an a ct of Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? is a political question and a question in which the Court cannot intervene. - The jurisdiction of this C ourt includes the power to strike down excesses of any agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle of separation of powers. - E vidently, Congressman Camasuras ouster from the Tribunal was a result of politi cal maneuvers within the lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of pol itics. If they do, they risk their independence. LOZADA V COMELEC DE CASTRO; January 27, 1983 FACTS - Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada and Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus as a representative suit27 to compel the respondent COMELEC to call a special elec tion to fill up existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. The petition is based on Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Consti tution28. - Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bona fide elector of Cebu City and a transient voter of Quezon City, who desires to run for the position i n the Batasan Pambansa; while Igot alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the 197 3 Constitution. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege that they are d eeply concerned with their duties as citizens, and SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [dissent] -A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of gove rnment are distributed among three (3) great departments. Each separate from, ye t coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its authority direct ly from the fundamental law. - This does not extend to the point that those in a uthority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority i n the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every other department. - The HoR has the power to nominate the memb ers of the House Electoral Tribunal provided that the proportional representatio n of parties is maintained. - The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must nec essarily include the power to remove said member. 27 for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation 28 Article VIII, Sec.5 (2): In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commis sion on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term. Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Co urt on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.

COMELEC. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the l egislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition f or mandamus. 4. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasang Pambansa - The cited provision of the 1973 Constitution is not intended to apply to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. - The strongest reason f or this is the fact that the Interim Batasang Pambansa was to be composed by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, as well as the then incumbent Presi dent and Vice-President, and the members or the Senate and House of Representati ves of Congress under the 1935 Constitution. With such number of representatives representing each congressional district, or a province, not to mention the Sen ators, there was felt absolutely no need for filling vacancies occurring in the Interim National Assembly, considering the uncertainty of the duration of its ex istence. - The provision is intended to apply to the regular Batasang Pambansa, because a province or representative district would have only one representative in said body. The need to fill up the Interim Batasang Pambansa is neither impe rative nor urgent, as there would always be adequate representation for every pr ovince which forms only part of a certain region, specially considering that the Body is only transitory in character. - That the provision is found in the main body of the Constitution and not in included in Transitory Provisions adds to t he intention that the provision applies only to the regular, and not interim, Ba tasang Pambansa. Decision Petition dismissed. the appointment in view of derogatory information which he had received. ISSUES 1. WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on Appointmen ts (CA), without being acted on, suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly m ade of an ad interim appointment. 2. WON the issue is a justiciable question, wi th the CA being an independent organ of the Constitution. HELD consent of the CA may the person assume office. As with ad interim appointments, the appointment takes effect at once. The appointment is effective until disapp roval by the CA or until the next adjournment in Congress. There must either be a rejection by the CA or nonaction on its part. 2. The insistence of respondent that the question involved is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court is untenable . It would extend the boundaries of the political question doctrine beyond its l egitimate limits. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights ar e not invaded. - Although the CA is not a power in our tripartite system of gove rnment, it is to all intents and purposes, like the Electoral Tribunals, when ac ting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. Its actuation in the exercise of its power to approve appointment submitted to it by the Presiden t of the Philippines is exempt from judicial supervision and interference, excep t on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the powers as will constitute a denial of due process. 1. PACETE V SECRETARY OF COMMISSION FERNANDO; July 23, 1971 FACTS Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As hi s appointment was made during recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commis sion on Appointments at its next session in 1965. Appointment was unanimously co nfirmed on May 20, 1965 (with Senate President and Chairman of Commission on App ointments Ferdinand Marcos even sending him a congratulatory telegram). Nine mon ths after his confirmation, on February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice a dvised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge. Petitioner was info rmed that on May 21, 1965, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the Commission on Appointments) wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for rec

onsideration of As per Altarejos v. Molo, the confirmation stands; it must be given force and ef fect. Ratio Petitioner buttresses his plea for prohibition on the ground that th e letter of then Senator Ganzon, even on the assumption that it was a motion to reconsider an appointment duly confirmed, was without force and effect as it was not approved by the body as a whole. Reasoning a. The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than o ne (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion. Holding of the Court was that the mere fil ing of a reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation . In the case, Aldeguers (respondent in Altarejos case) theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it would have if th e motion approved, and hence, would dispense with the necessity of such approval , for which the concurrence of a majority of the members present is necessary. T his is inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission. In case of an adjournment sine die the period for filing the motion for reconsideration having expired, under Section 22, then the motion for reconsideration not havin g been acted upon is not approved and therefore, has no effect whatsoever. What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified simply by a motion of reconsideration being filed, without its being voted upon and approved. b. Th e President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the C ongress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress. - A distinction is made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the CA when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the President n ominates, and only upon the AVELINO V CUENCO PER CURIAM; March 4, 1949 RESOLUTION on Original action in the SC FACTS - Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial review of internal affa irs of the legislature. The Court refused to look into the legality of the elect ion of a Senate President, in view of the separation of powers, the political na ture of the controversy and the Senates constitutional power to elect its own pre sident Before the opening of a morning session of the Senate, Senators Lorenzo T aada and Prospero Sanidad prepared a resolution enumerating charges30 against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. AVELINO presided the session and called the meeting in order, and except for a senator who was confined in a hospital and a nother who is in the United States, all the Senators were present.31 - TAADA soug ht to be recognized, but AVELINO and his followers prevented TAADA from deliverin g his privilege speech. A commotion later ensued, upon which AVELINO and 9 other senators left the session hall. Subsequently, the Senate President Pro-tempore took the Chair and proceeded with the session. The remaining 30 BRYAN SJ: Among which were advocacy of the graft and corruption in the governmen t (particularly those committed by the Liberal Party, to which AVELINO was a mem ber); questionable possession of checks totaling more than P500,000 after AVELIN Os assumption of office; and justification of electoral fraud. 31 Similar to the 1987 Const, the Senate is composed of 24 senators under the 1935 Const.

senators unanimously approved, among others, a resolution declaring vacant the po sition of the President of the Senate and designating Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." The next day the President of the Philippines recogni zed CUENCO as acting Senate President. - Hence, the present petition, AVELINO as king the Court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust CUENCO. ISS UE WON SC has jurisdiction over the subject matter HELD NO (6-4 vote) Ratio The issue of the validity of the election of the new Senate President is a political question. Reasoning - The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We should abstain in this ca se because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators them selves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinst ate them. If the majority of the Senators want AVELINO to preside, his remedy li es in the Senate Session Hall, not in the Supreme Court. - The Court will not sa lly into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to int ercede might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as peaceful and law-a biding citizens. It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to CUENCO makes it advisable, to adopt the hands-off policy enu nciated by this Court in matters of similar nature. Decision Petition dismissed. the presiding officer to decree motu propio said adjournment, and the sound parl iamentary practice and experience in this country and in the United States of Am erica, upon which ours is patterned, would not authorize the existence of such a provision. - AVELINO alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of a senator to said effect was properly made and met with no objection. The ev idence, however, fails to support AVELINOs claim. The circumstances lead us to th e conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of AVELINO and his suppor ters from the session hall had the purpose of defeating or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed investigation of the charges against AVELINO and of his i mpeding ouster, by the decisive votes of CUENCOs group. - The rump session (i.e . the session after the AVELINO group walkout) had no valid quorum to transact b usiness. The Constitution provides: A majority of each House shall constitute a q uorum to do business [cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The majority mentioned in the provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual members of the Senate. The words "each House" in the above provision refer to the full members hip of each chamber of Congress. The Senate is composed of 24 Senators, and a ma jority of them cannot be less than 13. 12 is only half of 24. Nowhere and at no time has one-half ever been the majority. Majority necessarily has to be more th an one-half. ISSUES 1. WON SC will assume jurisdiction over this case 2. WON election of Cuen co as Senate President is valid HELD 1. The Court has resolved (7-4 vote) to ass ume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify i ts intervention. 2. Partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of thi s Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Feria [and] Perfecto, JJ. in their separate opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session where CUEN CO was elected acting Senate President. Chief Justice [Moran] agrees with the re sult of the majoritys pronouncement on the quorum, it appearing from the eviden ce that any new session with a quorum would result in CUENCOs election as Senat e President, and that the CUENCO group has been trying to satisfy [the constitut ional] formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the AVELINO group, but to no avail, because of the latters persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, [the Chief Justice] belie ves that the CUENCO group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Con stitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial justi ce and with the requirements of public interest. Decision The judgment of the Co urt is, therefore, that CUENCO has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.

FERIA [concur] - If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it vali dly constituted? Yes. At the beginning of the rump session there were at least 1 4 senators. Also, in view of the absence from the country of one senator, 12 sen ators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23 senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. There is a difference between a majority of "al l the members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the membe rs of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senat e for the purpose of a quorum. SEPARATE OPINION FERIA [concur] I maintain my opinion that there was a quorum in the (rump) session. Among other s, the amendment of the quorum provision from "the majority of all the members o f the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business," into "a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business," shows the intention of th e framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or p rovided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this m ust be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their du ties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the Hou se or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each House is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. SEPARATE OPINION PERFECTO [dissent] - There was illegal adjournment of the morning session. The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be exercis ed by any single individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. The functions of the Senate and its opportunity to transact official business ca nnot be left to the discretion of a single individual without jeopardizing the h igh purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is established in a democ ratic social order. - There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate w hich expressly or impliedly authorizes an adjournment without the consent of the body or one which authorizes RESOLUTION on Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - In Avelino II, the Court, in light of events subsequent to Avelino I (i. e., refusal of the Avelino group to return to the session hall despite the compu lsory process served upon them), reversed its original decision and now assumed jurisdiction over the case PERFECTO [concur]

- The words "all the members" used in the original, for the determination of the quorum of the National Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as rega rds the Houses of Congress, because they were a mere surplusage. I, as Member of the Second National Assembly and in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one who proposed the elimination of said surplusage, bec ause "majority of each House" can mean only the majority of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the members. The word majority is a m athematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning. A m ajority means more than one-half (1/2). It can never be identified with one-half (1/2) or less than one-half. The Senate is composed of 24 senators. The majorit y of said senators cannot be less than thirteen 13. 12 do not constitute the maj ority in a group composed of 24 units. No amount of mental gymnastics or juristi c logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of two equal numbers constitute a ma jority part of the two numbers combined. The 5 fingers of one hand cannot be the majority of the combined 10 fingers of the two hands. Majority is incompatible with equality. It implies the idea of superiority. Majority presupposes the exis tence of a total and, in the present case, the total number of 24 senators compo sing the Senate. - The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of choosing CUENCO merely as Acting Senate Pre sident, the presence of the 12 senators was enough quorum. The Constitution prov ides: A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may provide" [again, cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The "smaller number" referred to has to act collective ly and cannot act as collective body to perform the functions specifically veste d in it by the Constitution unless presided by one among their number. The colle ctive body constituted by said "smaller number" has to take measure to "compel t he attendance of absent members," so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber. Said "smaller number" may be 12 or even less than 12 senators to constitute a quorum for the election of a temporary or acti ng president, who will have to act until normalcy is restored. - At the hearing of this case, CUENCO manifested that he was looking for an opportunity to renoun ce the position of Acting Senate President, and that if AVELINO should attend th e sessions of the Senate and insist on claiming the presidency thereof, CUENCO w ould allow AVELINO to preside over the sessions. AVELINOs refusal to attend the s essions, notwithstanding CUENCOs commitment to allow him to preside over them, ca n and should logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office. OSMENA V PENDATUN BENGZON; October 28, 1960 FACTS - On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., in a privilege speech de livered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the Pr esident. The House of Representatives, through Resolution No. 59, created a spec ial committee of 15 members to investigate the truth of the charges against the President. It summoned Osmea to appear before it to substantiate his charges. - O n July 14, 1960, Osmea filed with the Supreme Court a petition for "declaratory r elief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressm an Salipada Pendatun and the fourteen other members of the Special Committee. He asked that said resolution be annulled and that said members of the special com mittee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the porti on authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the Presi dent, with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him. Osmea alleged: (1) the Constitution gave him comple te parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not t o be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for whi ch he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline d therefor, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other business has intervened after the Member ha d uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House - Aware of the petition, the special committ

ee continued to perform its task, and after giving Osmena a chance to defend him self, submitted its report on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. Acting on such report, the House approved on the sa me day-before closing its session-House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months. - Thereafter , Osmea took the additional position that the House has no power, under the Const itution, to suspend one of its members. - On July 19, 1960, the respondents file d their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the petiti on, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, up held House Resolution No. .175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congr ess having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee-whose members are t he sole respondentshad thereby ceased to exist. ISSUES 1. WON the Constitution gives members of Congress complete parliamentary immunit y for words spoken in the House 2. WON the Speech of Osmea constituted unruly beh avior for which he could be punished 3. WON Osmea can be held to answer for or be censured by the House, given that other business had intervened after gave the speech in question 4. WON the House has the power to suspend its members HELD 1. NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution which provides that "for any spe ech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representati ves "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause I of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States, wh erein the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members o f Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. - Our Constituti on enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished i n every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislat or complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in crim inal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congre ssional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legisla tive body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter dis orderly or unbecoming a member thereof. 2. YES. The House is the judge of what c onstitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circ umstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black a nd white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeas conduct constituted dis orderly behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which th e Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Governme nt. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, dema nds in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has be en said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supr eme within its own sphere. - "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress i s plenary, subject only to such limitations as are found in the Republics Const itution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is ne cessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)

3. YES. Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, such approval a mounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliame ntary practice may be done by unanimous consent. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be w aived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conf orm to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite num ber of members has agreed to a particular measure." 4. YES. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, c ommitted to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. T he practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take, discipl inary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsio n have been recognized in the United States. The Rules of Philippine House of Re presentatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the Un ited States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings. Decision P etition DISMISSED. ASTORGA V VILLEGAS MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1974 FACTS - Original Action in the SC. Mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction - HB No. 9266 was filed and was passed on the third reading without amendments in the House of Representatives (HoR). It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Govern ments and Cities headed by Sen. Roxas. Sen. Roxas suggested a minor amendment on HB 9266. However, this recommendation was not acted upon by the Senate during i ts second hearing, and instead, approved in toto Sen. Tolentinos substantial amen dment on the section definig the powers and duties of the VM. - After that the S ecretary of the Senate sent a letter to the HoR that HB. No. 9266 had been passe d by the Senate with amendments. However, the attached amendments were not Sen. Tolentinos but Sen. Roxasamendments. The HoR signified its approval of HB No. 9266 (with Roxas amendment) and printed copies of it which were certified and attest ed by the Secretary of the HoR, the Speaker of the HoR, the Secretary of the Sen ate, and the Senate President. The Secretary of the House transmitted 4 copies o f the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures by wa y of approval enacted the bill into R.A. No. 406532 32 - The respondent mayor (Villegas) publicly denounced the RA, then Sen. Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed by the Presiden t is not the version passed by the Senate since it did not contain the amendment s he made. The Senate President then informed the President that the enrolled co py of the signed HB 9266 was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that his signature is invalid and had no effect, and could not validate the bill which w as not the version approved by the Congress. The President then withdrew his sig nature on the HB 9266. - With the withdrawal of signatures of the Senate Preside nt and the President of the Philippines, Villegas issued circulars ordering city government officials and operators of business establishments to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise ordered the Chief of Police to recall the pol ice officers assigned to the vicemayor presumably under the said RA. - As a reac tion, the petitioner vice mayor (Astorga) filed a petition for Mandamus, Injuncti on and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to co mpel respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. - Respondents argued that RA 4056 never became law since (1) it was not the bill approved by Congress and (2) entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill should be decisive in the resolution of the issue. Since Mayor Villegas was going abroad on an official trip, Court issued restraining order for Astorga to not exercise the powers vested to him as Acting Mayor under the RA 4065. ISSUES an ordinance thereto had been passed by a vote for three-fourths of all the membe rs of the Senate and of the House of Representatives pursuant to Article XV of th e Constitution, saying that it involved a political question (enrolled bill doct rine) which is not in the province of the judiciary. - using J. Bengzons separate

opinion in the same case, J. Makalintal said that the case at bar is justiciabl e since enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclus ive upon the courts based on Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as proof of due enactment of provisions of acts. - basis of the enrolled bill t heory: respect due to coequal and independent departments which requires the jud icial department to accept, as having passed the Congress, all bills authenticate d by it. 2. Ratio NO. The final passage of the bill ends the lawmaking process and the certi fication/attestation of the bill is only a mode of authentication devised by the Congress which does not add the validity of the bill nor cure any defect alread y present upon it. Obiter effects of Attestation of the bill: just a mode of aut hentication; signify the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him ha s been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or disapproval 3. 1. 2. 3. 4. 1. WON the Court could resolve regarding the enrolled bill doctrine the issue WON the attestation of the presiding officers of the Congress approves the bill and validates it into a law WON in the absence of the attestation of the presidi ng officers, the journal entry in the Journals of Congress could constitute proof of due enactment WON RA 4065 was duly enacted and therefore did not become a law Ratio YES. If attestation is absent and is not mandated in the Constitution for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other recor ds of Congress for proof of its due enactment. Obiter Attestation by the presidi ng officers is not mandated in the Constitution as a proof of due enactment of a bill, but requires a Journal of the Congress proceedings [comparison of Constitu tions: 1935 consti vs 1987 Consti: Sec 10(4) = Art VI, sec 26 (2); Sec. 21(2) = Art VI, sec 27(1)] 4. HELD Ratio YES. The enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon the Courts under Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as evidence for the due enactment of a bill. Obiter - compared this ca se to the Mabanag v. Lopez Vito where the Court denied to resolve the issue of W ON a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the 1935 Co nstitution to be appended as An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of M anila, Further Amending for the Purpose Section 10 and 11 of RA No. 409, Otherwi se known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila Ratio NO. Given that (1) the Court could resolve the issue regarding the enrolle d bill doctrine, (2) that the Court could use the attestation of the presiding o fficers of Congress and, in the absence of the latter, the records of the procee dings of the Congress entered into the Journals of Congress as proof of the due enactment of RA 4065 since the law is deemed enacted after the passage of the bi ll in the 3rd reading and the attestation of the presiding officers just serve a s a mode of authenticating the bill, (3) that, upon referring to the journal ent

ries of the proceedings of congress, the Court discovered that substantial and l engthy amendments were introduced to the HB but were not incorporated in the pri nted text which was signed by the President of the Philippines, and (4) that the President of the Philippines and of the Senate already withdrew their signature s, then RA 4065 was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.

Decision RA 4065 was declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did no t become law. TRO made permanent. [8 concur, 2 no part, 1 did not take part (I d ont know the difference), 1 on leave = 12 only] MARTINEZ V MORFE FERNANDO; March 24, 1972 FACTS - Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates of the 1971 Constitutional Convention facing criminal prosecution o Martinez was c harged with falsification of a public document for stating under oath in his cer tificate of candidacy for delegate to the Constitutional Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when in truth he was born on June 20, 1946 o Bautista was accused of violating Section 51 of the Revised Election Code in that he gave an d distributed free of charge, food, drinks, and cigarettes at two public meeting s - Both wanted the respective warrants of arrest issued against them to be quas hed, by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates, traceable to Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code ISSUES 1. WON the petitioners are immune from arre st 2. WON Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution should be construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby expanding congressional imm unity HELD 1. No. Parliamentary immunity does not cover criminal arrests. Under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a sena tor or a representative. Article VI Section 15 of the Constitution provides: The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except t reason, felony, and breach of peace, be privileged from arrest during their atte ndance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the s ame; and for any speech o debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any ot her place. Immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felon y and breach of peace o Treason-levying war against the Republic and adhering to enemies and giving them aid and comfort o Felony-an act or omission punishable by law o Breach of peace-covers any offense whether defined by RPC or any special statu te History of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members of the National Assembly from criminal arrest The power or right of the State to claim privileges is due to the fact that it has the right to carry out its function without obstacle In England, operation of parliamentary privilege e xcludes all crimes, applies only to prosecutions of civil nature There is a full recognition of the necessity to have members of the Congress, and likewise, del egates of the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enabl e them to discharge responsibilities However, when it comes to freedom from arre st, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class if notwithstanding the ir liability for a criminal offense, they would be immune during their attendanc e in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. A legislator or a del egate can perform his functions efficiently and well without the need for any tr ansgression of criminal law. If a legislator or delegate is facing criminal pros ecution, he should be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that a crime should not go unpunished. 2 . No. Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code is inoperative. Article 145 penalize s a public officer or employee who shall, during the session of Congress, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under the RPC by a penalty higher than prision mayor. RPC took effect on January 1, 1932, before the enforcement of the 1935 Constitution Art. XVI, S ec, 2 of the 1935 Constitution states: All laws of the Philippine Islands shall c ontinue in force until the inauguration the Commonwealth of the Philippines; the reafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constit ution, until amended, altered, modified or repealed by the Congress of the Phili ppines Article 145 which accords legislators a generous treatment exempting them f rom arrest even if warranted under the penal law, is inconsistent with the Const itution, and is consequently inoperative.

- Ordinary Civil Action for the recovery of several sums of money by way of dama ges for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome C abangbang - Defendant moved to dismiss upon ground that letter is a privileged c ommunication and not libelous since he was a member of the House of Representati ves and Chairman of House Committee on National Defense - The letter in question is an open letter to the President of the Philippines dated Nov 14, 1958 while congress was presumably not in session. - Defendant caused the publication of th e letter in several newpapers. - The open letter was an expos on allegedly three operational plans. The first plan is said to be an insidious plan or a massive p olitical build up of then Sec. of Natl Defense, Jesus Vagas, by propagandizing an d glamorizing him in such a way as to be prepared to become candidate for Presid ent in 1961. (Plan II A coup detat;Plan III A modification of Plan I) - The lette r also implicated that the planners have under their control the following : (1) C ol. Nicanor Jimenez , (2)Lt.Col. Jose Lukban,(3) Capt. Carlos Albert, (4)Col Fid el Llamas, (5) Lt. Col Jose regala, (6)Maj. Jose Reyna.It is of course possible tha t the officers mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. - Lower Court dismissed - Petitioners appealed ISS UES 1. WON the publication is a privileged communication 2. (if not) WON it is l ibelous HELD 1. NO. The publication in question is not absolutely privileged. It was an open letter to the President published by the defendant when the Congres s was not in session. And in thus causing it to be published he was not performi ng his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any House Committee. - The phrase speech or debate therein as used in Article VI, Sec 15 of the 1935 Constitution refers to utterances made by congressmen in the performanc e of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or v otes cast in the halls of Congress while it is in session, as well as bills intr oduced in Congress whether it is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Commit tees duly authorized to perform its function as such, at the time of the perform ance of the acts in question. 2. NO. The letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the planners, the defendant likewise added that it was possible that JIMENEZ V CABANGBANG CONCEPCION; August 3, 1966 FACTS

plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no kno wledge. The statement is not derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entit ling them to recover damages. PELAEZ V AUDITOR GENERAL CONCEPCION; September 24, 1965 FACTS - During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Adminis trative Code, issued Executive Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creatin g 33 municipalities. - RAC Section 68 - provides, among others, that the Preside nt may by executive order define the boundary of municipality, increase or dimin ish its territory provided that the authorization of the Congress of the Phil sh all first be obtained. - The petitioner argued that these EOs are null and void because of RA 2370 Section 3 which provides that barrios may not be created or th eir boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Acts of Congress or of t he corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in ar eas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality in which th e proposed barrio is situated. - Procedure Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to res train him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or an y disbursement by said municipalities. - The mayors who were adversely affected by the EOs intervened in the case. - Atty. Enrique Fernando and Emma QuisumbingF ernando appeared as amici curiae. ISSUES 1. WON the executive orders are null an d void upon the ground that Section 68 of RAC, which was the basis of the EOs ha s been impliedly repealed by RA 2730. 2. WON the power of the President to creat e municipalities under RAC amount to an undue delegation of legislative power. H ELD 1. Yes. RA 2370s denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which c onsists of several barrios. 2. Yes. The authority to create municipal corporatio ns is essentially legislative in nature. There could only be a due delegation of legislative power if the law is (a) complete in itself it must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or i mplemented by the delegate - and (b) fix a standard the limits of which the delega te must conform in the performance of his functions. - Sec 28 of RAC does not me et these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix th e details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be ca rried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard suffi ciently precise to avoid the evil effects of the power the President. Reasoning a. adherence to precedent (Schechter Poultry Corp vs. US) - It was held here tha t in Recovery Act there was an undue delegation of legislative power because it supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. b. Constitutional pro vision (incompatible and inconsistent with RAC) - Sec 10 of Art VII of 1935 Cons titution ordains: The President shall have control of all the executive departmen ts, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by LAW. (take note: such control does not include the author ity either to abolish or create) Decision The Executive Orders are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent are permanently restrained from passing i n audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Eos or any dis bursement by the municipalities concerned. ARNAULT V NAZARENO OZAETA; July 18, 1950 FACTS - This refers to two land deals entered into by the Philippine government as follows: 1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE - The Philippine government leased from San Jua n de Dios Hospital for twenty five years the Buenavista estate and had an option to purchase the same for P 3.0 million. This purchase option was exercised by t he then occupation republic by tendering the owner the sum of P 3.0 million and, on its rejection, depositing the said funds in Court on June 21, 1944 together with the accrued rentals of P 324,000. - San Juan de Dios on June 29, 1946 sold

this same property to Ernest H. Burt, an non-resident American for P 5,000,000 w ith the initial downpayment of P 10,000 with the balance payable under very favo rable terms. Burt was unable to comply with the terms agreed. 2. TAMBOBONG ESTAT E - On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase from Philippine Trust Corporation, th e Tambobong estate for P 1.2 million with a downpayment of P 10,000.00 and terms which are as generuous as those from San Juan de Dios. There was however no other payment received from Burt. - The Philippine go vernment, through the Rural Progress Administration, acquired this same property from its original owner for the sum of P 750,000 and subsequently instituted a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with Philippine Trust for non payment. The Court of First Instance in this case ordered the cancellation of Burts title and the issuance of a new one u nder the name of Rural Progress Administration. - For one reason or another, des pite the fact the Philippine government already owned both the above estate, it again bought the same from Burt for a total consideration of P 5,000,000 (P 4.5 million for Buenavista and P 500,000 for Tambobong). The government paid initial ly P 1,000,000 for Buenavista and the full amount of P 500,000 for the Tambobong estate through two corporations acting as Burts attorneys-infact. These two were represented in the trasaction by one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault. - It was also brought out that the Rural Progress Administration was headed at that time by the Justice secretary who was at the same time Chairman of the Philippin e National Bank, the institution that lent the funds to Rural Progress. - The tr ansactions resulted into a public outcry which led into the Philippine Senate ad opting Resolution 8 which created a special committee to investigate the Buenavi sta and Tambobong Estates deal. - The committee was tasked, among others, with d etermining: a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchase b. the fairness of the purchase price c. the parties involved/responsible for the deal - During the public hearings of the Committee, various witnesses were called. Among them and apparently the most important was Jean Arnault, the person who represented B urt in the transactions. - During the said hearing, Arnault confirmed receiving the money from the government and withdrawing, in cash, P 440,000 which he gave to someone on instruction of Burt. When asked to identify the person he gave the money to, he replied that he did not know his name despite the fact that he met the person on many occasions. When pressed to answer, he also said that answeri ng the question might incriminate him. Based on this refusal, the senate approve d a resolution on May 15, 1950 arraigning him for contempt and subsequently foun d him guilty of the charge. He was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergea nt at arms until he reveals the name of the person he gave the money to. The Sen ate adjourned three days later. The work of the Committee however was extended v ia Resolution 16. - Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court to obtain his release cited the followin g grounds:

a. the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt since the requested inform ation is not material to the intended legislation and his refusal to answer has not impeded or obstructed the legislated process. The Senate has already approve d bills related to the transactions. b. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in contempt for a term beyond its legislative session. c. the information s ought will be self-incriminating - rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Co urt went into the general principles of law with regard the power of either hous e of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt as this case is the f irst of its kind to be tried under the Philippine constitution. In so doing, the Supreme Court had to draw from American precedents in recognition of the fact t hat the Constitution of the Philippines were patterned after largely American in stitutions and practices. The discussions were as follows: a. There is no expres sed provisions in the constitution which grant power to either House to investig ate or exact testimonies to exercise legislative function. However, this power o f inquiry, and the process to enforce it, is a necessary element to enable the b ody to wisely and effectively perform their respective legislative functions. In the absence of information that it requires, Congress has no other recourse but to get the same from others who have them. At times, the information required a re not entirely accurate or complete. Given this, Congress has the implied coerc ive to obtain such information. b. The power to compel is limited to information required in a matter into which Congress has jurisdiction to inquire. ISSUES WO N the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted HELD a. The requested information is needed to comply with the direction of the senate as contained in Resolution Nos. 8 & 16 to secure the names of the persons responsible for the transaction. The materiality of the question asked in the public hearing should be determined by its direct relation to the matter being inquired into and not by its indirec t relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The only time that the Supre me Court may interfere with the Senate is when a petitioner is being forced to a nswer questions which are not pertinent to the matter inquiry. In this case and citing McGrain vs Daugherty, Congress would be guilty of a clear abuse of author ity in the exercise of its power. As to whether the information sought to be eli cited is material to an proposed legislation, the Court could not say as this is not within their scope. - Citing the case Re: Chapman, where the petitioner was jailed for contempt of the US Senate for refusing to answer questions with rega rd accounts of Senators in his company, the Supreme Court held that the Philippine Senate has the authority to compel Arnault and if he so refuses to give the information, also the power find him in contempt and to imprison him until he complies with said requirement. b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison does not end with the termi nation of the legislative session. The opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with regard the Candido Lopez case where he opines that the imprisonment of Lopez te rminates when the House of Representatives adjourns. Citing however the McGrain case again, the Court said that, unlike the House of Representatives which losse s all its members every four years (hence its term is only four years), the Sena te is deemed as a continuing body whose members are elected for a six year term and are so divided that only a third of the seats become vacant every two years. Hence, the power of the Senate to hold Arnault is a continuing power. The only caveat of the Supreme Court in this case is that if the Senate disregards the pr oper limitation to jail parties in contempt, the remedy is with the Court. c. Ar naults claim to self incrimination cannot be sustained citing Mason vs US as a pr ecedent. The Court must be given the chance to determine from all the facts and circumstances whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer any questio n which could incriminate him. Arnaults testimony was obviously false. He obvious ly knew the name of the person he gave the money to. His refusal to testify trut hfully is punishable with contempt. Decision Petition is denied - The Committees report has been submitted to the entire Senate. And as a matter of fact three bills were passed by the Senate in connection with the investigati on. This being the case there is no need to extract names. The importance of nam

es is when it comes to a criminal prosecution. - In ending, Justice Tuason state d that the investigation of the Senate is commendable and legal. His main object ion lies in the fact that the Senate has overstepped its authority and trespasse d on the territory of other braches of government when it imprisoned a witness fo r contumacy on a point that is unimportant, useless, impertinent and irrelevant, let alone moot. LIDASAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SANCHEZ; October 25, 1967 FACTS - On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, k nown as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced i n haec verba, reads: SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sara kan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatag an, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatu ng, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independ ent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianato n, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall b e in Togaig. SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new munic ipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections f or local officials. SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. - It c ame to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarak an, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are p arts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. Bara Lidasan, a resident and tax payer of Parang, Cotabato, prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstituti onal; and that Comelecs resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 i mplementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified. ISSUES 1. WON the tit le of RA 4790 conforms with the constitutional requirement that the subject of a bill shall be expressed in the title NO SEPARATE OPINION TUASON [dissent] - The power of the legislative body to punish for contempt is based on the neces sity for its attainment of the ends. The power is however not absolute. And this is precisely where disagreement occur. - Justice Tuason is of the opinion that the question being asked has no relation whatsoever to the contemplated legislat ion. A stated reason for the insistence on getting an answer to the question as to who received the money is supposedly to vindicate or clear the names of the p ersons suspected of getting the money (Antonio Quirino, one of the suspects, is the brother of President Quirino). The Senate is not the proper forum for such v indication. The Senate investigation seems to have only one objective and this i s to prepare the way for court action since they could not expect the Justice de partment to take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the responsible par ties as it seems that the Secretary of the Justice department had a hand in the transaction. This is not the a duty of the Legislative department.

2. WON RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in Lanao del Sur NO 3. WON petitioner has legal standing to challenge the statute YES HE LD 1. The title - "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" 8 - projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation i s there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated i n this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," re ad without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. Such t itle did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken awa y from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. 2. Where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutio nal and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for eac h other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, a nd that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the pro visions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them . When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totalit y of the twenty-one barrios - not nine barrios - was in the mind of the proponen t thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togai g, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the red uced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progre ssive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to mai ntain an independent municipality, still apply to a motely group of only nine ba rrios out of the twenty-one? 3. Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to v ote in the 1967 elections His right to vote in his own barrio before it was anne xed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are formed into the new town; he m ay prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and cont inue to enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyo ne of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for t he benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby, 16 it stands to r eason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citiz en of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the consti tutionality of the Act as passed by Congress. ISSUES 1. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A, prepared and submitted under the authori ty of RA 997 as amended by RA 1241, is valid, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor to decide on claims of labor ers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. 2. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A was validly passed by Congress HELD 1. No it is not valid. - While the Reorgani zation Commission could create functions, it referred merely to administrative a nd not judicial functions such as deciding on money claims. Judicial power rests exclusively on the judiciary - While legislature may confer administrative boar ds quasi-judicial powers, it must be incident to the exercise of administrative dunctions - Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannot be implied from a mere grant of power to create functions in connection with reorganization of the Exe cutive 2. No it was not validly passed by Congress - A law is not passed by mere silence or non-action of Congress even if it be stated in Sec 6(a) of RA 997 It is contrary to well-settled and well-understood parliamentary law- that two h

ouses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations and the determinatio n of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determinatio n of the other. MILLER V MARDO BARRERA; July 31, 1961 FACTS - These are different cases taken together as they present only one identi cal question - 1st case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill Miller at the DoL, claiming that he is a driver of Miller and was arbitrarily dismissed wi thout separation pay - Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing Off icer Mardo of the DoL on ground that HO has no jurisdiction to hear and decide o n the case - Court rendered decision though that Reorg. Plan 2-A did not repeal Judiciary Act that conferred to CFI original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims re violations of labor standards - 2nd case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the DoL against Chin Hua Trading Co., for not being paid overtime and vacation leave pay as a driver in the company - same circumstances as 1st ca se, and court issued permanent injunction against hearing the cases by the Heari ng Officer, as Reorg. Plan 2-A is null and void. - 3RD case: Numeriana Raganas f iled with CFI a complaint against Sen Bee Trading Company for being underpaid, n ot being paid overtime, without sick leave and vacation leave pay, as a seamstre ss - Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insisted that CFI does not have jurisd iction as money claims must be filed with Regional Office of DoL under Reorg. Pl an 2-A - 4th case: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at the DoL Sia Len g did noy\t file an answer and a decision was rendered in favor of Romero. But L abor Administrator Hernando refused to issue the writ of execution of the ecisio n as he believed that Sia Seng deserved to be heard they insist as well that Reo rg. Plan is not validly passed as a statute and unconstitutional - 5th case: Mar iano Pabillare filed at the DoL a complaint against Fred Wilson and Co., as he w as summarily dismissed wihout cause, without separation pay, and without suffici ent notice. - They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative body, with n o power to adjudicate money claims - Certiorari, prohibition and injuction was f iled as well that Reorg Plan is null and void insofar as it vest original exclus ive jurisdiction over money claims TANADA V TUVERA ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985 FACTS - Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the Presid ent. - Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, lette r of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this c ase dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition conce rns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show a ny specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themse lves provide for their own effectivity dates. ISSUE

WON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves pr ovide for their own effectivity dates HELD Yes. It is the peoples right to be inf ormed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to official records, & t o documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, sh all be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by la w (Sec. 6, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the O G as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due proc ess. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed o f its contents. Decision Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless so publish ed shall have no binding force and effect. Important Point It illustrates how de crees & issuances issued by one man Marcos are in fact laws of general applicati on and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers. - The generality of law (CC Art. 14) will never work w/o con structive notice. The ruling of this case provides that publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. - Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime. 4. Where is the publication to be made? 5. When is the publication to be made? H ELD 1 & 2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of gen eral application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. We hold therefore tha t all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days a fter publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature . Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are va lidly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Con stitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegat ion. 3. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention o f the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabou ts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a m ere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requiremen t. This is not even substantial compliance.33 4. We have no choice but to pronou nce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectiv ity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provide d by the legislature. 5. We also hold that the publication must be made forthwit h, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the sa id Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by th e parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the ex ecutive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a ma tter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time. - KNP has chose Fernando Poe as its Standard Bearer for the President of the Phi ls in the May 2004 elections - LDP filed with COMELEC a petition to certify nomi nation of candidates for the upcoming elections - on Dec. 8, 2003, LDP filed a M anifestation informing the COMELEC a) that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edga rdo Angara or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candi dacy of the partys official candidates b) that LDP had placed its Secretary Gener al, Representative Agapito Aquino, on indefinite forced leave and Ambassador Enriq ue Zaldivar was the Acting Sec-Gen - Rep. Aquino contended that the Party Chairm an does not have authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Sec-Gen and a sked COMELEC to disregard the Manifestation - pending resolution, a Certificate

of Nomination was filed with COMELEC, naming Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDPs Standard Bearer for president; the certificate was signed by Rep. Aquino - the COMELEC, noting that the conflict was an internal party matter and that the period for fi ling for the Certificate of Nomination was about to end, granted the petition fo r both Petitioner (Angara) and Oppositor (Aquino) in that it recognized all the candidates nominated by both parties as the official candidates of the LDP ident ifying each set of candidates as the Angara Wing and the Aquino Wing - Angara filed the present petition assailing the COMELEC Resolution for having been issued wit h grave abuse of discretion ISSUE WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it applied equity and divided LDP into wings HELD YES there was grave abuse of di scretion. The only issue to be resolved by the Commission was who as between the Chairman and the Secretary General had the authority to sign the certificates o f candidacy. To resolve the issue, the COMELEC need only to refer to the Party C onstitution. Equity is applied only if there absence of law that can be applied to resolve the issue which is not the case here. - as provided in the 1987 Const itution the COMELEC has the authority to ascertain the identity of the political parties and its legitimate officers; consequently it has the power to settle an y controversy regarding leadership of the party as an incident to its power to r egister political parties. This matter is important in determining as to who bet ween Aquino and Angara had the authority to certify LDPs candidates - According t o the Party Constitution, it is the Chairman who has the power to sign documents in TANADA V TUVERA CRUZ; December 29, 1986 FACTS - In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the n ecessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the disposit ive portion as follows: "WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publi sh to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of g eneral application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force an d effect." - This is a motion for reconsideration/clarification of the first dec ision, specifically, on the following questions: ISSUES 1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"? 2. Must a distinction be made bet ween laws of general applicability and laws which are not? 3. What is meant by " publication"? LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TINGA; February 24, 20 04 FACTS - LDP together with other political parties formed a coalition called Koal isyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) 33 This was the manner in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presi dential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than d isclose information on this vital law.

behalf of the party; the Sec-Gen has power to sign documents only when authorize d by the Chairman. That Aquino had been given authority in the past, as found by the COMELEC during the 2001 elections, it does not follow that said authority i s still existing since it can be gathered in Angaras Manifestation that Aquinos au thority had been revoked, which the Chairman may do so in his discretion as impl ied in his authority to grant such power - However, the lack of authority of Aqu ino to certify candidates does not cancel the certificates he signed. The candid ates named will only be treated as independent candidates following COMELEC Reso lution No. 6453, section 7 - The COMELEC, by allowing two wings to nominate thei r own candidates, confused the electorate as to which set of candidates truly re present the ideologies that the LDP represents - The constitutional policy towar ds a free and open party system envisions a system that shall evolve according to the free choice of the people and not one molded by the COMELEC BRILLANTES V COMELEC CALLEJO; June 15, 2004 FACTS - On 12/22/97, Congress enacted RA 8436, authorizing COMELEC to use an aut omated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and ca nvassing/consolidating results of the national and local elections for May 11 98. Also allowed the acquisition of automated counting machines (ACM) and other dev ices to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. However, the failure o f the machines to read ballots correctly deferred implementation of modernizatio n plan. - 10/29/02, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 02-0170, a three-phase moderni zation program for the 2004 elections. o Phase 1 computerized registration and v alidation Encountered problems in implementation because machine was reverting t o old listing of voters o Phase 2 computerized voting and counting Scrapped beca use COMELEC had to maintain manual voting and counting system due to the problem s encountered with validation o Phase 3 Electronic transmission of unofficial re sults (which is challenged in this case) - Despite failure of the first 2 phases , COMELEC through its commissioners still decided to implement Phase 3 - GMA iss ued EO 172 which allocated P250,000,000 to fund the AES for the May 10 04 electio ns. Also issued EO 175, giving an additional P500M budget for the AES project. Senate President Drilon had misgivings about the proposed electronic transmissi on of results because according to the Constitution (Art VII, Sec 4), Congress has the sole authority to canvass votes for President and VP. Implementing Phase 3 would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress and would also lack constitutional authority - Asi de from Drilons apprehension, there were budget problems for implementation becau se the money allocated by GMA had already been used for phases 1 and 2. COMELEC, however, still conducted a field test of the electronic transmission of results (phase 3) on 04/27/04 (Separate opinions of COMELEC officials found on p. 277. Read just in case.) - COMELEC, 2 weeks before the national and local elections, approved RESOLUTION 6712 stating the implementation of phase 3 and declared that results of each city/municipality shall be electronically transmitted in advanc e to COMELEC, Manila. They established a National Consolidation Center (NCC), El ectronic Transmission Centers (ETC) for each city/municipality and a special ETC at COMELEC for the absentee voters. (procedure p. 278). Note that the results g arnered in the procedure are of unofficial character. - Hence, petitioner and pe titioners-in-intervention brought their misgivings to SC. ISSUES 1. WON petition ers have locus standi 2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounti ng to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing RA 6712 HELD 1. Petitioners clai m their standing as taxpayers and since the Resolution obviously involves the ex penditure of funds, they do have the requisite standing to question its validity . Most of the petitioners-in-intervention are also part of NAMFREL, the citizens authorized arm to conduct an unofficial quick count during elections. Lastly, Dr ilon and De Venecia are heads of Congress, the sole authority for canvassing vot es for President and VP. 2. The resolution usurps the tabulation of election res ults based on a copy of the election returns the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass votes for President and VP. COMELECs claim that it is not pr ohibited because it is an unofficial vote is unacceptable. - the resolution goes

against the constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out of the tre asury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec 29, Art VI). Beca use the tabulation in the resolution is unofficial in character, it is not an ap propriation made by law. In fact, it may be considered a felony under Art 217 un der the Penal Code (malversation of public funds/property). - it disregards exis ting laws that any unofficial counting of votes is done by NAMFREL by using a co py of the election returns. Not even COMELEC is authorized to use a copy of elec tion returns for counting. - COMELEC failed to notify authorized representatives of accredited political pa rties and all candidates of the proposed use of technology for the elections und er Sec 52 of the Omnibus Election Code. There are 2 conditions that COMELEC must comply with before undertaking technology for electoral purposes: take into acc ount the situation prevailing and the funds available, and notify authorized rep resentatives. These conditions give the affected people an opportunity to object if need be. Details on p 302-303. - resolution has no constitutional and statut ory basis for COMELEC to undertake a separate and unofficial tabulation of resul ts. It also doesnt make sense that Phase 3 of the program should go on when the f irst two phases have been scrapped. They should be taken as a whole and not inde pendent of each other. In the first place, there is a great possibility that the unofficial results will differ greatly from the official count so what is the u se of spending all that money for something uncertain, something that the NAMFRE L had always undertaken? It is an unnecessary waste of government funds and effo rt. - COMELEC uses the problem of dagdag-bawas as a reason for the resolution. A ccdg to them, modernization of the election will decrease the possibility of dag dag bawas but it doesnt make sense because dagdag-bawas is a result of human inte rvention. No matter how modern the technology for electoral purposes is, there w ill always be the need for human intervention so the problem will not be eradica ted. Decision PETITION GRANTED. Resolution No. 6712 is NULL AND VOID. PLDT V PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION MAKALINTAL; August 29, 1975 FACTS - September, 1964 the Public Service Commission assessed several public ut ilities for supposed supervision and regulation fees for that year - PLDT (P214, 353.60); Manila Electric Company P727,526.00; Bolinao Electronics Corporation P1 1,610.40; Philippine Stearn Navigation Company P23.921.60; and General Shipping Company P33,146.80 - The assessed fees were based upon the value of the respecti ve properties or equipment pursuant to Section 40(e) of the Public Service Act a s amended by Republic Act 3792 - After paying the demanded amounts, the said cor porations sent Separate letters to the Commission, (except the Philippine Steam Navigation Company which filed a formal petition instead) requesting for reconsi their ground: under the said Section 40(e), such ass deration of the assessments essments should be based not on the value of the properties

but upon the subscribed and paid up capital stocks of the corporations. - 28 Sep tember 1966Public Service Commission denied request for reconsideration. Their re ason: o the clause "or of the property and equipment, whichever is higher" in se ction 40(e) of the Public Service Act as an alternative base for supervision fee s collectible, applies to both stock and non-stock corporations. o to use the va lue of property and equipment as an alternative base for fixing the rates only i n case of public services not issuing shares would result in unreasonable discri mination against the latter o a comma after the words "capital subscribed or pai d" and another after the words "Capital invested," immediately preceding the cla use "property and equipment, whichever is higher," indicates the intention of th e legislature to constitute the latter as an alternative of both stock and non-s tock corp. ISSUES 1. WON the law itself draws a distinction between public utili ties issuing shares and those that do not as the capital invested is difficult t o ascertain where no shares have been issued. Thus, the value of their property or equipment should provide as an alternative rate base for this class of operat ors 2. WON reliance on the use of comma/punctuation should have bearing 3. WON t here is alleged disproportion of the total amount to be collected as supervisory fees HELD 1. NO. No showing of difficulty in ascertaining actual capital invest ment of public service operators that do not issue stocks. These companies are r equired to submit annual reports of finances and operations 2. reliance on punct uation is too risky a method of statutory construction - the punctuation of the provision in question has undergone no alteration at all - the consideranda on p unctuation was merely employed to reinforce its main argument that nothing in th e law justifies a discriminatory application of the value of the property or equ ipment (as alternative rate base) solely to operators not issuing shares of capi tal stock. 3. the very statute indicates that such fees as are therein fixed wer e designed to raise revenue for the general expenses of the Commission, and were not limited to reimbursement of actual expenditures in supervision. - we are in accord with petitioner operators that the Commission was in error in collecting the fees in question on die basis of the original cost of their property and eq uipment without due allowance for depreciation. Decision judgment MODIED in the sense that the supervision fees payable under Re public Act No. 3792 should be computed upon present values of properly and equip ment in use; the appealed resolution of the Public Serviice Commission is AFFIRM ED ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS V PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY MEN DOZA; February 10, 1998 FACTS - Nov. 5, 1992 APCD brought suit to enjoin PCA from issuing permits to app licants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants issuanc e would violate PCAs Admin. Order No.02 series of 1991 as applicants were seeking to operate in congested areas - Nov.6 trial court issued TRO enjoining PCA from ussiung licenses - Pending the case, PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No .018-93 providing for the withdrawal of the PCA from all regulation of coconut p roduct processing industry; registration would be limited to the monitoring of t heir volumes of production and admin of quality standards - PCA then issued cert ificates of registration to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processi ng plants ISSUE - Whether or not the PCA can renounce the power to regulate impl icit in the law creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is. HELD - The power given to the PCA to formulate and adopt a general program o f devt for the coconut and other palms oil industry is not a roving commission to adopt any program deemed necessary to promote the devt of the coconut and other p alm oils industry, but one to be exercised in the context of the regulatory stru cture. Reasoning - PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30, 1973 to take over the powers and functions of the Coconut Coordinating Council, the Phil. Coc o Admin, and the Phil. Coco Research Institute - By PD1468 on June 11, 1978, it was made an independent public corp...charged with carrying out States policy to promote the rapid integrated devt and growth of the coco and other palm oil indus try and to ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and beneficia

ries through a regulatory scheme set up by law - Aug.28, 1982 by EO826 govt tempo rarily prohibited the opening of new coco processing plants and on Dec.6 phased out some of the existing ones--- because of overproduction in the industry resulting, ultimately, in the decline of the expo rt performance of coco-based products - Oct.23, 1987 PCA adopted Resolution No.0 58-87 authorizing establishment and operation of additional DCN plants because o f increased demand in world market - The above measures were adopted within the framework of regulation as established by law to promote rapid integrated devt and growth of coco and other palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and beneficiaries - the questioned resolution allows not only indiscriminate opening of new plants, but the virtual dismantling of th e regulatory infrastructure - PD1468 Art.II Revised Coco Codethe role of the PCA is to formulate and adopt a general program of devt for the coco and other palm oi l industry in all its aspects o By limiting the purpose of reg. to merely monitor ing volumes of production and admin. Of quality standards, PCA in effect abdicat es its role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the industry wi ll develop - Constitution Art.XII o Sec.6 ...duty of the State to promote distri butive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands o Sec.19 State s hall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires o Any chan ge in policy must be made by the legislative dept of the govt. The regulatory sys tem has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency t o dismantle it. Decision Petition GRANTED; resolution NULL and VOID SEPARATE OPINION ROMERO [dissent] - The resolution deregulating the coco industry is a valid exercise of delegated legislation. Such resolution is in harmony with the objectives sough to be achi eved by the laws regarding the coco industry, particularly to promote accelerated growth and devt of the coco industry and the rapid integrated devt and growth of th e coconut industry - The time has come for admin policies and regulations to adap t to ever-changing business needs rather than to accommodate traditional acts of the legislature - Trimming down an admin agencys functions of registration is no t an abdication of the power to regulate but is regulation itself SANTIAGO V GUINGONA PANGANIBAN; November 18, 1998

FACTS - On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first r egular session of the eleventh Congress. Elections for the officers of the Senat e were held on the same day with Fernan and Tatad nominated to the position of S enate President. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. T he following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and S en. Drilon as majority leader. - Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming t he position of minority leader, with the agreement of Senator Santiago. He expla ined that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority ." - On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in rece ipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Sena te President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. - On July 31, 1998, Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted an original p etition for quo warranto to seek the ouster of Senator Guingona as minority lead er of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority l eader. They allege that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding a nd exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. ISSUES 1. WON the Court have jur isdiction over the petition 2. WON there is an actual violation of the Constitut ion 3. WON Guingona is usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader 4. WON Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona as the minority leader HELD 1. Yes, the court has jurisdict ion. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whethe r indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution o r gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives - The petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, ha s not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also in voke the Courts "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there ha s been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents. - Avelino v. Cuenco tackled the scope of the Courts power of judicial review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or app lication of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of e ither house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court o ver questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal "finds con stitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bod ies or previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority o f the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of t he political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, vi z.: - "Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, an d to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounti ng to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentalit y of the Government." 2. No, there was no actual violation of the Constitution. - While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elect ed by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it do es not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto const itute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no la w or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become th e minority leader. - While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electin g a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the man ner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the C harter says is that "each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a d erivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional pro vision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by t his Court. - Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such o

fficers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and disc retion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Co urt has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive r ealm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to pro tect and uphold - the very duty that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch preven ts this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. 3. No, Respo ndent Guingona was not usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader. - Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitra ry assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the pe rson suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners did not present sufficient proof of a clea r and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. 4. No, Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Resp ondent Guingona as the minority leader. - By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of ju risdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. - Respondent F ernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Re spondent Guingona as the minority leader.The latter belongs to one of the minori ty parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the me mbers of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only af ter at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. - Under these circumstances, we believ e that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exerci se of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules o f the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlo oked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts d one within their competence and authority. JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V LIM CARPIO-MORALES; October 24, 2003 FACTS - Petitioners: John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, Mateo Carino Founda tion Inc., Center for Alternative Systems Foundation, Inc., Regina Victoria Bena fin represented and joined by her mother Elisa Benafin, Izabel Luyk represented and joined by her mother Rebecca Luyk, Katherine Pe represented and joined by he r mother Rosemarie Pe, Soledad Camilo, Alicia Pacalso alias Kevab, Betty Strasser, Ruby Giron, Ursula Perez alias Ba-yay, Edilberto Claravall, Carmen Caromina, Lili a Yaranon, Diane Mondoc - Respondents: Victor Lim, President Bases Conversion an d Development Authority; John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, City of Ba guio, TUNTEX, ASIAWORLD, DENR - Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declarato ry relief with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of injun ction assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 420, Seri es of 1994,

Creating and Designating a Portion of the Area Covered by the Former Camp John Ha y as the John Hay Special Economic Zone Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227 - RA 72 27: An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into other Produ ctive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Pur pose, Providing Funds therefor and for Other Purposes OR Bases Conversion and Dev elopment Act of 1992 > setting out policy to accelerate sound and balanced conver sion into alternative productive uses of former military bases under the 1947 Ph ilippine-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely Clark and Sub ic military reservations including extension Camp John Hay Station in Baguio > c reated Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), Subic Special Economic (and free port) Zone (Sebuc SEZ) > granted Subic SEZ incentives such tax and du ty-free importations, exemption of businesses from local and national taxes > ga ve authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Specia l Economic Zones (SEZ) in Clark (Pampanga), Wallace Air Station (La Union), and Camp John Hay (Baguio) - Aug 16, 1993 BCDA entered MoA and Escrow Agreement with TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD, private corporations under laws of British Virgin Islands , in preparing for a joint venture for development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as a premier tourist destinations and recreation centers - Dec 16 , 1993 BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) bindi ng themselves to put up a joint venture company called Baguio International Deve lopment and Management Corporation leasing areas within Camp John Hay and Poro P oint for tourism and recreation Sangguaniang Panglungsod of Baguio Citys Resoluti ons to BCDA > Sept 29, 1993 to exclude all the barangays partly and totally locat ed within Camp John Hay from the reach and coverage of any plan or program for d evelopment > Jan 19, 1994 abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over homelots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding CJH > Feb 21, 19 94 15-point concept of the development of CJH which includes protection of the e nvironment, making of a family-oriented tourist destination, priority in employm ent of Baguio residents, free access to base area, guaranteed participation of t he city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously mentioned 9 bgys, liability for local taxes of businesses BCDA-TUNTE X-ASIAWORLD response > modified the proposal stressing the need to declare CJH a SEZ as a condition t o its full development according to RA 7227 - May 11, 1994 sanggunian passed res olution asking mayor to order determination of realty taxes which may be collect ed from real properties of CJH checking if CJH real properties exempt from taxes and economic activity from local and national taxes - June 1994 sanggunian pass ed Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) seeking and supporting subject to its con currence, the issuance of Pres. Ramos of presidential proclamation declaring are a of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance to RA 7227 - July 5, 1994 Ramos issued Proc No. 420 establishing a SEZ on Camp John Hay which reads Pursu ant to powers vested in me by the law and the resolution of concurrence by the C ity Council of Baguio create and designate former Camp John Hay as John Hay Special Economic Zone Sec 1. Coverage of John Hay SEZ: 288.1 hectares out of 677 hectar es surveyed and verified by DENR Sec 2. Governing Body: pursuant to Sec 15 of RA 7227, the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) is established to g overn JHSEZ, authorized to determine utilization and disposition of lands subjec t to private rights and in consultation and coordination with the City Governmen t of Baguio after consultation with its inhabitants, and to promulgate necessary policies, rules, and regulations to govern and regulate the zone thru the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation (JHPPDC), the implementing arm for its ec onomic development and optimum utilization Sec 3. Investment Climate in JHSEZ: p ursuant to Sec 5(m) and Section 15 of RA 7227, the JH Poro Point Development Cor poration shall implement necessary policies, rules and regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in consultation with pertinent governmen t departments. The zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the SEZ unde r Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Proces sing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1

991, and new investment laws that will be enacted. Sec 4. Role of Departments, B ureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities: All heads of departments, etc o f the government are directed to give full support to BCDA and/or implementing s ubsidiary or joint venture to facilitate necessary approvals to expedite program s. Sec 5. Local Authority: The affected local government units shall retain basi c autonomy and identity. - April 25, 1995 petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief challenging Proc. No. 420s constitutionality or validity as w ell as the legality of MoA and JVA between BCDA and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD - Petit ioners Allege: 1. Proc. No. 420 grants tax exemptions is invalid and illegal as it is an uncons titutional exercise by the President of a power granted only to the Legislature 2. Proc. No. 420 limits the powers and interferes with the autonomy of the City of Baguio is invalid, illegal and unconstitutional 3. Proc. No. 420 is unconstit utional that it violates the rule that all taxes should be uniform and equitable 4. MoA having been entered into only by direct negotiation is illegal 5. terms and conditions of the MoA is illegal 6. the conceptual development plan of respo ndents not having undergone environmental impact assessment is being illegally c onsidered without a valid environmental impact assessment - a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction prayed to enjoin BCDA, JHPPDC and the city government fr om implementing Proc. No. 420 and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from proceeding with thei r plan respecting CJHs development pursuant to the JVA Public respondents (BCDA, JHPPDC, City of Baguio) Allege 1. issues are moot and academic because in Novemb er 21, 1995 BCDA formally notified TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD of the revocation of the MoA and JVA 2. in maintaining the validity of Proc. No. 420, extending to the J HSEZ economic incentives to those enjoyed by Subic SEZ (established in RA 7227), the proclamation merely implements the legislative intent of said law to turn t he US military bases into hubs of business activity or investment 3. denying Pro c. No. 420 derogates the local autonomy of Baguio City or violative of the equal protection clause 4. petitioners have no standing to being suit even as taxpaye rs in the absence of an actual controversy 5. disregarded hierarchy of courts an d the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies - Petitioners Reply 1. d octrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply since they are i nvoking the exclusive authority of SC under Section 21 of RA 7227 to enjoin or r estrain implementation of projects for conversion of the base areas 2. they poss ess standing to bring petition as taxpayers ISSUES Procedural 1. WON petitioners violated doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 2. WON issues regard ing TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD is moot and academic 3. WON present petition complies w ith the requirements of SCs exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issues S ubstantive

4. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax e xemption within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ 5. WO N Proc. No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with local autonom y of Baguio City HELD 1. Although judicial policy of SC entails not entertaining declaratory relief or direct resort to it except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts, or when exceptional and compelling circumstan ces warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of SCs prim ary jurisdiction, under Sec 21 of RA 7227, only SC has the power to enjoin imple mentation of projects for the development of the former US military reservations therefore SC will take cognizance of this petition. Reasoning - Also SC retains full discretionary power to take cognizance of such petition. Besides, remandin g this case to the lower courts may unduly prolong adjudication of the issues transformation of an area in CJH into a SEZ is not a simple re-classification of an area TF a crucial issue. Conversion involves > focal point for investments b y local and foreign entities > site for vigorous business activity spurring coun trys economic growth > like Sub SEZ, turning into self-sustaining, industrial, co mmercial, financial and investment center > critical links to a host of environm ental and social concerns affecting communities are located and nation in genera l > challenges in providing an ecologically sustainable, environmentally sound, equitable transition for city in CJH reversion to government property e.g. probl em of scarcity of water supply in Baguio City 2. Revocation of the agreements wi th private respondents made issues regarding them as moot and academic. 3. Yes, present petition complies with requirements for judicial review. Reasoning - Req uisites of exercise of power of judicial review 1. existence of an actual or an appropriate case > not conjectural or anticipatory; definite and concrete; parti es pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests > in present c ase, there is a real clash of interests and rights between petitioners and respo ndents arising from issuance of Proc. No. 420 converting a portion of CJH into a SEZ where petitioners insist Proc. No. 420 has unconstitutional provisions and the respondents claiming otherwise > Pimentel, Jr. v Aguirre: By the mere enactm ent of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is deemed to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without an overt act. Indeed, even a si ngular violation of the Constitution and/or law is enough to awaken judicial dut y 2. personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional q uestion > RA 7227 requires concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs and this grant by law on LGUs of the right to concurrence is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on LGUs (recognition of real interests of communities in the utilization of such base areas) > as INHABITANTS OF BAGUI O, assailing Proc No. 420, is personal and substantial that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged ; material interest for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proc. No. 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City > Garcia v B oard of Investments: residents of Limay, Bataan where SC characterized their int erest in the establishment of a petrochemical plant in their place as actual, re al, vital and legal for it would affect not only their economic life but even th e air they breathe > Petitioners Edilberto Claravall and Lilia Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time; duties included deciding for and on b ehalf of their constituents on the question of concurrence to Proc. No. 420; the y opposed Res. No. 255 which supported Proc. No. 420 3. pleaded in the earliest opportunity 4. constitutional question is the lis mota of the case - 3 and 4 no question since action filed purposely to bring forth constitutionality issues 4. Unless limited by a provision in the Constitution, if there is no express exten sion of tax exemption and other economic incentives granted by law, any presiden tial proclamation granting such extension through implication is unconstitutiona l because it violates Art VI Sec 28(4) which gives the legislature, not the exec utive, the full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property f rom taxation and its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. Reasoni ng - Art VI Sec 28(4): No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without

the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. - Sec 3 Proc. No. 420: Investment Climate in JH SEZ: the zone shall have all the applicable incen tives of the SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreig n Investment Act of 1991 and new investment laws that may be hereinafter enacted > Sec 12 RA 7227: Subic SEZ (b & c) exemption from tariff or custom duties, national and local taxes of busi ness entities (d) free market and trade of specified goods or properties (f) lib eralized banking and finance (g) relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors - deliberations of Senate confirm exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and inves tment privileges (discussing Sec 12 RA 7227) Angara: we must confine these polic ies to Subic and provide that THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE OF SUBIC SHALL BE ESTABLI SHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES it is very clear that these princip les and policies are applicable only to Subic as a free port so we agreed that w e will simply limit the definition of pweors and description of the zone to Subi c but that does not exclude the possibility of creating other economic zones wit hin the baselands the provision now will be confined only to Subic > RA 7916: Th e Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 - privilege of export processing zone-based businesses of importing capital equipment and raw materials free from taxes, dut ies and other restrictions > Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 - tax and duty exem ptions, tax holiday, tax credit, and other incentives > RA 7042: Foreign Investm ents Act of 1991 - applicability to the subject zone of rules governing foreign investments in the Philippines - It is clear that under Sec 12 RA 7227 ONLY the SUBIC SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment incentive s and the like and no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time via presidential proclamation ; also grant of pr ivileges to JH SEZ finds no support in the other laws specified under Sec 3 Proc . No. 420 which are already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or th e enactment of RA 7227 - SC can void an act or policy of the political departmen ts of the govt on two grounds infringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion and clearly, Proc. No. 420 infringes upon the Constitution 5. NO bec ause when the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or function s is has been granted. Reasoning - under RA 7227, BCDA is entrusted with the fol lowing (a) to own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station, ODonnell Transmitter Station which may be transf erred to it by the President - such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over CJH, BCDA virtually has control over it subject to certain limitations of law

Decision Sec 3 of Proc. NO.420 is null and void and declared no legal force and effect. Proc. No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effect ive SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC V NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION YNARES-SANTIA GO; August 12, 2003 FACTS - June 16, 2000 NTC, pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, is sued Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 13-6-2000. It promulgated rules and regulation s on the billing of telecommunications services: 1. Billing statements shall be received by the service subscriber (SS) not later than 30 days from the end of e ach billing cycle. In case it is received beyond 30 days, SS shall have a grace period within which to pay the bill. During such period, SS shall not be disconn ected from service by the public telecommunications entity (PTE). 2. There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox, voice prompt, reco rded message or similar facility excluding the customers own equipment. 3. PTEs s hall verify identification and address of each purchaser of prepaid SIM cards. P repaid call cards and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from the dat e of first use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given 45 days from the dat e it is fully consumed but not beyond 2yrs 45 days from date of first use to rep lenish SIM card. The validity of an invalid SIM card shall be installed upon req uest of the SS at no addtl charge except the presentation of a valid prepaid cal l card. 4. SS shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards before the start of every call using the cards. 5. The unit of billing for (Cellular Mobile Telephone) CMT service whether postpaid or prepaid shall be reduced from 1min/p ulse to 6sec/pulse. The authorized rates per minute shall be divided by 10. - Th e MC provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newsp aper of general circulation and three certified copies furnished at the UP Law C enter. - June 22, 2000 MC was published in the Philippine Star; MC provisions re garding sale and use of prepaid cards & unit of billing took effect 90 days from effectivity of MC - August 30, 2000 NTC issued a Memorandum to all CMT service operators (SO) which contained measures to minimize incidence of stealing of cel l phone units. It directed CMT SO to: 1. Strictly comply with MC requiring the p resentation and verification of the identity and addresses of prepaid SIM card customers 2. Require all respective prepaid SIM card dealers to comply with MC 3. Deny accept ance to the networks those customers using stolen cell phone units or cell phone units registered to somebody else when properly informed of all information rel ative to the stolen cell phone units 4. Share all necessary info of stolen cell phone units to all other CMT SO in order to prevent their use 5. Require all exi sting prepaid SIM card customers to register and present valid identification ca rds. - October 6, 2000 NTC issued another Memorandum addressed to all PTEs, whic h was for strict compliance. 1. All prepaid cards and all SIM packs used by subscr ibers of prepaid cards sold on Oct. 7, 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at lea st 2 years from date of first use. 2. The billing unit shall be on a 6sec pulse effective October 7, 2000. - Procedure HELD Obiter Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making pow ers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative power is the power to make rules and regulations, which should be within the sco pe of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to such administrative agency. The regulations must be germane to the purposes of the law, and not in c ontradiction to the standards prescribed by law. power is exercised by an admini strative agency when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentiall y of an executive nature, where the power to act in such a manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the administrative duty entrus ted to it.

 Quasi-judicial October 20, 2000 ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against the NTC an action for Declaration of N ullity of MC (the Billing Circular) and of the Oct. 6 Memorandum, with prayer fo r injunction and TRO in the RTC-QC on the grounds thata. NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods since such jurisdiction belongs to the D TI under the Consumer Act of the Phils b. MC is oppressive and violative of the Due Process Clause (deprivation of property) c. MC will result in the impairment of the viability of prepaid service by unduly prolonging the expiration of prep aid SIM and call cards d. Requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable GLOBE and SMART filed a joint Mot ion to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention October 27, 2000 RTC issued TRO enjoining NTC from implementing MC November 20, 2000 RTC denied NTCs m otion to dismiss for lack of merit. Injunction is granted, pending finality of t he decision of the case. October 9, 2001 CA granted NTCs petition for certiorari and prohibition. January 10, 2002 Motions for Reconsideration were denied by CA ISSUES 1. WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case 2. WON the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Ad ministrative Remedies is applicable 1. Yes. Ratio In cases assailing the validity of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency in the performance of its QUASI-LEGISLATIVE function, t he regular courts have jurisdiction. The power of JUDICIAL REVIEW is vested in t he courts by the Constitution. The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction is only appl icable when the administrative agency is exercising its QUASIJUDICIAL function. - Art.VIII Sec.1 1987 Consti: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion o n the part of any branch or instrumentality of the govt. - Doctrine of Primary Ju risdiction: The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question whi ch is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolu tion of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge , experience and services of the admin. tribunal to determine technical matters of fact. 2. No. Ratio In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule issued by an administrative agency, in exercise of its QUASI-LEGISLATIVE powers , a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. Only j udicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of t heir quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine (Assoc. of Ph il. Coconut Desiccators v. PHILCOA). - Even if the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Adm inistrative Remedies is applicable, records show that petitioners have complied with such requirement: - During deliberation stages of MC, petitioners registere d their protests and submitted proposed schemes for the Billing Circular.

- After issuance of MC, petitioners wrote successive letters asking for the susp ension and reconsideration of the MC. - Such letters were not acted upon and ins tead, NTC issued 10/06/00 Memorandum. This was taken by petitioners as a clear d enial of their requests. Decision Consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The decisi on of CA and its Resolution are reversed. The case is REMANDED to the RTC-QC for continuation of the proceedings. 1. WON the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses fr om returning to the Philippines. 2. WON the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she d etermined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious thr eat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return. HELD 1. Ye s. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specifi c powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President c annot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Consti tution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of the specific pow ers so enumerated. - The request/demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in light solely of the constitutional pr ovision guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certai n exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even re motely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is approp riately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are i mplicit and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safegua rd and protect general welfare. 2. No. The President did not act arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses pos es a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting thei r return. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their follow ers to destabilize the country and the precarious state of the economy were the factual bases for the President to conclude that the return of the Marcoses duri ng that time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against t he State and instigate more chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. T he preservation of the State the fruition of the peoples sovereignty is an obliga tion in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Const itution and to see the faithful execution of the laws, cannot shirk from that re sponsibility.

History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded to the E xecutive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and imperative nation al emergency. Many terms are applied to these powers: residual, inherent, moral, impli d, aggregate, emergency. Whatever they may be called, the fact is that these powers e xist, as they must if the governance function of the Executive Branch is to be c arried out effectively and efficiently. GUTIERREZ [dissent] The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by la w may be impaired only upon lawful order of the court, not of an executive offic er, not even the President. I do not think that we should differentiate the righ t to return home from the right to go abroad or to move around in the Philippine s. If at all, the right to come home must be more preferred than any other aspec t of the right to travel. ART VII: EXECUTIVE GONZALES V MARCOS FERNANDO; July 31, 1975 (SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIU M) MARCOS V MANGLAPUS CORTES; September 15, 1989 FACTS Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family filed a petition for ma ndamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to them and to enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to

bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners state that the right of the Ma rcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under Sections 1 and 6 of the Bill of Rights, arguing that before the right to travel may be impaired by any a uthority/agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect. The y also invoke generally accepted principles of international law: (1) Art. 13, p ar. 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his own country, and (2) Art. 12, par. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Pol itical Rights, which states that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the righ t to enter his own country. Respondents contend that the issue of whether the two rights claimed by the Marcoses collide with the more primordial and transcenden tal right of the state to security and safety of its nationals involves a politi cal question and is non-justiciable. In support thereof, they cite Sections 4 an d 5 of the Constitution. They also point out that the decision to bar Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and p ublic safety has international precedents. CRUZ [dissent] Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and liberty of abode that Aquino then invoked. PARAS [dissent] The former President, as a Filipino citizen, has the right to return to his own country, except only if prevented by the demands of national safety and national security. PADILLA [dissent] With or without restricting legislation, the right to travel may be impaired or restricted in the interest of national security, public safety, and public healt h. Power of the state to restrict the right to travel finds abundant support in police power. The government failed to present convincing evidence to defeat Mar cos right to return to this country. SARMIENTO [dissent] The right to return to ones own country cannot be distinguished from the right to travel and freedom of abode. While the President may exercise powers not expres sly granted by the Constitution but may necessarily implied therefrom, the latte r must yield to the paramountcy of the Bill of Rights. Under the new Constitutio n, the right to travel may be impaired only within the limits provided by law. T he President has been divested of the implied power to impair the right to trave l. The determination of whether the Marcos return poses a threat to national secu rity should not be left solely to the Chief Executive; the Court itself must be SEPARATE OPINION ISSUES FERNAN [concur]

satisfied that the threat is not only clear but also present. ESTRADA V DESIERTO PUNO; (SEE DIGEST UNDER REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION) VILLENA V SECRETARY OF INTERIOR LAUREL; April 21, 1939 FACTS - Jose D. Villena, then Mayor of Makati, sought to restrain the Secretary of the Interior (SI) and his agents from proceeding with the investigation again st him until this case was settled by the SC. - Upon the request of the SI, the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice conducted an inquiry into the conduct of Villena. He was found to have committed bribery, extortion, mali cious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the law profession. - Feb. 8, 1939 ~ SI recommended to the President that Villena be suspended so as to pr event the coercion of witnesses. The President verbally granted the recommendati on on the same day. - Feb. 9,1939~ SI suspended Villena from office and instruct ed the Provincial Governor of Rizal to advise Villena of his suspension. - Feb. 13,1939~SI wrote Villena specifying the charges against him and notifying him th at Emiliano Anonas was the special investigator of the case. - Feb. 17, 1939~ th e date set by Anonas when the formal investigation would begin. But eventually p ostponed to March 28,1939 due to several incidents and postponements. - Hence, t his petition for Prelim Injunction. Villena contends that: > SI has no jurisdict ion or authority to suspend him, to file administrative charges against him, and to decide the merits of the charges because the power to suspend, to try and pu nish municipal elective officials is lodged in some other agencies of the govern ment. > SIs acts are null and void because: + SI usurped the power given by the C onstitution to the President when SI suspended him (Villena). + SI must exercise the power to supervise in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisi ons of law governing the trials and charges of against elective municipal offici als are those contained in sec. 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. + SI is exercising an arbitrary power by converting himself into a complainant and a t the same time the judge of the charges he filed against him. + SIs action didnt follow the procedure under Sec. 2188 of the AC, which requires that a complaint be based on a private persons or citizens sworn statement. - Villena prays that a wri t of Preliminary Injunction be issued to stop the SI and his agents from proceed ing further with the investigation until this case is heard; that SI be declared as without authority to suspend him and order his reinstatement in office; that SI be declared as without authority to file charges against him and to investig ate such charges. - His petition for the writ of preliminary injunction was deni ed. - The Solicitor General contends that: > Sec. 79 (C) in relation with sec. 8 6 of the Revised AC expressly empowers the SI to order the investigation of any a ct or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his dep artment and in connection therewith to designate an official or person who shall c onduct such investigation. > Sec. 2188 of the Revised AC, invoked by Villena, doe snt preclude SI from exercising the powers stated in Sec. 79 in connection to Sec . 86. Also, that invoked section, must be read in relation to sec. 37 of the Reo rganization Law of 1932. > Villena didnt question the jurisdiction of the SI at t he start of the investigation but merely contended that such charges were not in accordance with law for the reason that they didnt bear the oaths of the complai nts. > The authority of a department head to order the investigation of a subord inate necessarily carries with it by implication the authority to take such meas ures as he may deem necessary to accomplish the purpose of the investigation, in cluding suspending the officer; plus, the President authorized the suspension. > Courts of Equity have no power to restrain public officials by injunction from performing any official act, which they are required by law to perform, or acts, which are not in excess of the authority, and discretion reposed in them. ISSUE S 1. WON the SI has the legal authority to order an investigation, by a special investigator appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and irregularity aga inst Villena. 2. WON the SI has the legal authority to suspend Villena pending t he investigation of the charges. HELD 1. The SI is invested with authority to or der the investigation of the charges against the petitioner, Villena, and to app

oint a special investigator for that purpose. - Sec. 79 of the Revised AC speaks of direct control, direction and supervision over bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the SI but it should be interpreted in relation to sec. 86 of t he same Code which grants to the Dept of Interior executive supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities and other local po litical subdivisions. - Citing Planas v. Gil: Supervision is not a meaningless th ing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at le ast implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render th e power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation. 2. There is no cl ear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipa lity who is under investigation. - NOTE: There was an argument regarding the ver bal approval or acquiescence of the President to the suspension. It was said tha t if the justices were to accept that the President had the authority to suspend the petitioner, then the suspension made by the SI, since the President approve d it, should be sustained. Then this was followed by the discussion regarding ce rtain acts of the President that could not be validated by subsequent approval o r ratification. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive that should be exercised in person (i.e. suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and proclamation of martial law and the exercise of pardon.) Bu t there were doubts regarding the verbal approval by the President of the suspen sion if such could be considered as ratification in law (with law giving the pow er to suspend being the Chief Exec.) Hence, the ratio. Ratio xxxunder the presiden tial type of government which we have adopted and considering the departmental o rganization established and continued in force by par. 1, sec. 12, Art.VII of ou r (1935) Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjunc ts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments a re assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act personally, th e multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secreta ries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of bus iness, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptive ly the acts of the Chief Executive. Obiter With reference to the Executive Dept o f the Govt, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible wi thout the projection of judicial searchlight, and that it is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. - The First Section of Article VII of the Co nstitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation o f the principle that The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Ph ilippines.

- Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, the ir personality is reality but the projection of that of the President. - Citing Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. US~ each head of a department is, and must be, the Presidents alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is re quired by law to exercise authority. - As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere conce ssion of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular fi eld. - The President should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive Department before his own conscience Note Read this case in rel ation to Sec. 1 and 17 of Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution. WON the assailed memorandum orders establishing the DOTC Regional Office as an L TFRB Regional Office is unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of legislat ive power. HELD - The President may, through his/her duly constituted political agent and alter ego, legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Nation al Government in exercise of authority granted by law. - A public office may be created through any of the following modes: (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law (statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by authority of law . The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode. - The President, through Administrative Order No. 36 directed the various departments and agencies of government to immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their regional offices in CAR. - It is as if the President himself carried out the creation and establishment of the LTFRB-CAR Re gional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary directly and merely sought to im plement the Chief Executives Administrative Order. - The Presidents control over a ll executive departments come from Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitut ion, while the continuing authority to reorganize the national government is ves ted by Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416 ( as ruled in Larin Vs. Executive Secretary). - Villena vs Secretary of the Interi or: without minimizing the importance of the heads of various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Thus, thei r acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. - The designation and subsequent establishment of DOTC-CAR as th e Regional Office of the LTFRB in CAR and the concomitant exercise and performan ce of functions by the former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office fall within the s cope of the continuing authority of the President to effectively reorganize the DOTC (and other departments). - In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. A reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more ef ficient. The reorganization in this case was decreed in the interest of service an d for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions i n CAR. - The assailed orders are also not in violation of Sections 7 and 8 of Art icle IX-B of the Constitution since the organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR are, i n effect, merely designated to perform the additional duties and functions of an LTFRB Regional Office subject to the direct supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office, pending the creation of a regular LTFRB Regional Office. BENGUET EXPLORATION V DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES FERNANDO; February 28, 1977 FACTS - Sofia Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse claim against a do mestic Mining corporations (Benguet Exploration, Inc.) Lode Lease Agreement cover ing three mining claims in Benguet, Mountain Province. - Bureau of Mines dismiss ed the adverse claim - Reyes appealed to the Department of Agriculture and Natur al Resource maintaining the sufficiency of her adverse claim - At first the Depa rtment dismissed the appeal but on a second motion for reconsideration and order ed a formal hearing of the case - Benguet Exploration, Inc. filed petition for r eview ISSUES 1. WON the decision rendered by the Director of Lands approved by t

he Secretary, upon a question of fact, is justiciable 2. WON the Secretary of Ag riculture and Natural Resources can be precluded from conducting his own inquiry 3. WON Secretary Pascual, in calling for a hearing, failed to abide by the requ irements of the law HELD 1. A decision rendered by the Director of Lands and app roved by the Secretary of Agriculture and commerce, upon a question of fact is c onclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts unless there is a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence, reg ardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of evidence, s o long as there is some evidence upon which the finding in question could be mad e Reasoning Acts of a department head, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumably the acts of the Chief Executive 2. The State acting through the legi slature through its power of imperium acting as a sovereign regulating property to come up with rules with which to exercise its power of dominium as owner of t he property cannot act arbitrarily but in accordance with law Reasoning SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS V MABALOT BUENA ; February 27, 2002 FACTS - On February 19, 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. issued Me morandum Order No. 96-735 addressed to Land Transportation Franchising Regulator y Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin directing him to effect the transfer of reg ional functions of that office to the DOTC-CAR Regional Office - On March 13, 1996 , Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer fo r preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against DOTC Secretary and LTF RB chair, praying among others that Memorandum Order No. 96-735 be declared illeg al and without effect. - On March 20, the lower court issued a temporary restrain ing order enjoining DOTC Secretary from implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735 . The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on April 8, 1996. - On January 29, 1997, then DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo issued Department Order No . 97-1025 establishing the DOTC-CAR Regional Office as the Regional Office of the LTFRB-CAR and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR - On March 31, 1999, the lower court rendered a decision declaring Memorandum Order N os. 96-735 and 97-1025 null and void and without any legal effect as being violat ive of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the powers of t he legislative department and also of the provision enjoining appointive officia ls from holding any other office or employment in the Government. ISSUE

Indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an invest igation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired 3. The M ining Act speaks of findings of facts of the Director of Mines when affirmed by t he Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources being final and conclusive, in which case the aggrieved party may file a petition for review with this Court wh ere only questions of law may be raised Reasoning No such affirmance by the secr etary thats why he ordered a hearing. It is but a right and proper in the interes t of justice that a formal hearing on the merits of this case be conducted Decis ion: petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Unanimous 1. WON the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the f actual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ 2. WON the Proclamation was valid/ constitutional. WON it complied wit h ART III Section 1 par 1434 and ART VII Section 10 par 235 of the Constitution? 3. WON the President act arbitrarily in issuing PN 889 4. WON the Petitioners a re covered by PN 889. WON petitioners detained should be released HELD 1. YES. U pon deliberation, the Court abandoned the doctrine in Barcelon v Baker and Monte negro v Castaeda (determination by the President of existence of any of the groun ds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpu s should be conclusive upon the courts. The President, with all the intelligence sources was in a better position than the SC to ascertain the real state of pea ce and order). The grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute n o unqualified. The authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is circumcised , confined, restricted (more so because it is stated in the negative shall not be except), and like the limitations and restrictions imposed upon the legislative d epartment, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. - The Executive is vested with the power to suspend the privilege of the writ, and the Executive is supreme within its o wn sphere, however, the separation of powers goes hand in hand with the system o f checks and balances. The authority to determine whether or not the Executive a cted within the sphere allotted to him is vested in the Judiciary. 2. YES. a. Pr oclamation 889, as amended by Proclamation 889A, declared the existence of an up rising -- lawless elements xxx joined and banded their forces together for the av owed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an arme d insurrection and rebellion xxx b. The 2 conditions for a valid suspension a) th ere must be invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof and b) pu blic safety must require the aforementioned suspension are PRESENT. c. The 1st co ndition can be attested through jurisprudence (there were a lot of cases already 34 LANSANG V GARCIA CONCEPCION; December 11, 1971 FACTS: - 8 consolidated petitions of writ of habeas corpus. Other petitions: L-3 3965 Arienda vs Sec of National Defense L-33973 David vs Garcia L-33982 Prudente v Yan, Garcia L-34004 Tomas vs Garcia L-34013 Rimando vs Garcia L-34039 De Cast ro vs Rabago L-34265 Oreta vs Garcia L-34339 Olivar vs Garcia - August 21, 1971 Plaza Miranda bombing. 8 persons died, several injured - August 23, 1971- Presid ent Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889 suspending the privilege of the writ of h abeas corpus, by virtue of the powers vested upon the President by ART VII Secti on 10 of the 1935 Constitution. His reason was that lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State and that public safety requires immediate and effective action - Several people were apprehended and detained including the petitioners on reasonable beli ef that they had participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion. - August 3 0, 1971 Proclamation 889-A amended Proclamation 889. - September 18 and 25, Octo ber 4, 1971 -Proclamations 889-B, 889-C and 889-D lifted the suspension of the p rivilege of the writ of habeas corpus in some provinces, sub-provinces, cities, EXCEPT in Bataan, Benguet, Bulacan, Camarines Sur, Ifugao, Isabela, Laguna, Lana o, North and South Cotabato, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Viscaya, Pampanga, Quezon, Rizal , Tarlac, Zambales, Aurora, Quirino, and 18 cities including Manila. ISSUES

HUKBALAHAP, etc). The emergence and establishment of CPP NPA is proof of the exi stence of a rebellion. d. The 2nd condition is justified through the reports of the acts of the NPA (its infiltration of several mass-based organizations, vario us killings and bombings, encounters with the military, etc) and the threat it p oses to the public safety. According to intelligence reports, the CPP and its fr ont organizations are capable of preparing powerful explosive, and that there wa s a plan of a series of assassinations, kidnappings, mass destruction of propert y, etc. 3. NO. The President did not act arbitrarily. He had possession of intel ligence reports, he consulted his advisers, and had reason to feel that the situ ation was critical. The suspension of the privilege of the writ in the entire Ph ilippines was justified as he could not have ascertained the places to be exclud ed at the time of the proclamation, and he gradually lifted the suspension. 4. S ome petitioners were already released and with respect to them, the issue is moo t and academic. As to petitioners David, Felipe, Olivar, de los Reyes, del Rosar io and Sison, still under detention, they have been charged with violation of th e Anti-Subversion Act/ accused of overt acts covered by the PN 889. The PN 889 b eing valid, their release may not be ordered by the SC, but the CFI is directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary investigation of the c harges and to issue corresponding warrants of arrest if probable cause is found or otherwise , to order their release. Decision President did not act arbitraril y. PN 889 not unconstitutional. Petitions L33964, L33965, L33982, L34004, L34013 , L34039, L34265 dismissed. CFI to conduct investigation and issue warrants of a rrest or order of release as to petitioners still under detention. All concur. F ernando dissents only as to the fourth issue. SEPARATE OPINION FERNANDO [dissent] - I find it difficult to accept the conclusion that the six petitioners still un der detention should be set free. - The petitioners ought not to be further depr ived of their liberty in the absence of a warrant of arrest for whatever offense they may be held to answer, to be issued by a judge after a finding of probable cause. That is to comply with the constitutional requirement against unreasonab le search and seizure. - To keep them in confinement after ordinary processes of the law are to be availed of is to ignore the safeguard of the Bill of Rights t hat no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period t he necessity for such suspension shall exist. 35 The President shall be commanderin-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necess ary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebe llion, or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires it, he may sus pend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or an y part thereof under martial law. AQUINO V PONCE ENRILE MAKALINTAL; September 17, 1974

FACTS - September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed Proclamation No . 1081, proclaiming a state of Martial Law in the Philippines - September 22, 19 72, General Order No. 2 was signed by the President which provided an order to t he Secretary of National Defense to arrest and take into custody the individuals named in the list for being participants in the conspiracy to seize political a nd state power in the country and to take over the government by force - Secreta ry of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, immediately effected the arrest of th e herein petitioners - Petitioners sought relief from Court, filing petitions fo r habeas corpus - Respondents filed their Return to Writ and Answer to the Petiti on and prayed that the petition be dismissed - Pending resolution of these Petiti ons, petitioners, except for two (Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Sen. Jose Diokno) , were released from custody on different dates under a Conditional Release - Dece mber 28, 1973, Diokno filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition, imputing delay in the disposition of his case, and asseverating that because of the decision of the C ourt in the Ratification Cases and the action of the Members of the Court in tak ing an oath to support the New Constitution, he cannot reasonably expect to get j ustice in this case - The respondents opposed the motion on the grounds that ther e is a public interest in the decision of these cases and that the reasons given for the motion to withdraw are untrue, unfair and contemptuous. - The Court den ied Dioknos motion with a vote of 5 to 7 - Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehan kee, Muoz-Palma, Aquino and Barredo voted to grant Dioknos motion to withdraw peti tion ISSUES 1. WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial law 2. WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the circumstances required by the Constitution for the proclama tion of a state of martial law 3. WON petitioners were illegally detained entitl ing them the relief of habeas corpus HELD All petitions dismissed except those w hich have been previously withdrawn by the respective petitioners with the appro val of this Court. Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., con cur. Castro, J., in a separate opinion, explains his reasons for his concurrence in the dismissal of all the petitions. Fernando, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion. Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion. Barredo, J., concurs in the dismissals in a separate opinion. Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion. his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or the determine the w isdom of his act. TEEHANKEE [justiciable] "it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases [state d in the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or p lacing the country under martial law as the case may be, since the requirements for the exercise of these powers are the same and are provided in the very same clause] in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof."32 The Cou rt stressed therein that "indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred upon by the Constitut ion, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limite d and conditional. The precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that (t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended x x x. It is only by way o f exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege in cases of invasio n, insurrection, or rebellionor under Art. VII of the Constitution, imminent d anger thereof-when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the sa me may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspensio n shall exist. Far from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the pr ivilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but also, a s regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors a nd the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the exten

t, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. An d, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by the courts of justice. Otherwise, the explici t constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the frames of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise i n futility." SEPARATE OPINION WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial law (justiciability of the martial law proclamation ) CASTRO [justiciable] - cited Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court asserted the power to inquire into th e existence of the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in order to determine the sufficiency thereof. - The judicial de partment can determine the existence of conditions for the exercise of the Presi dents powers and is not bound by the recitals of his proclamation. But whether in the circumstances obtaining public safety requires the suspension of the privil ege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law is initially for the President to decide. The Presidents findings as to necessity is persuasi ve upon the courts. FERNANDO [justiciable] - The action taken by any or both the political branches whether in the form of a legislative act or an executive order could be tested in court. Where private rights are affected, the judiciary has the duty to look into its validity. A sho wing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an d obstacle to judicial inquiry. Its improvident exercise or the abuse thereof ma y give rise to a justiciable controversy. Necessarily then, it becomes the respo nsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have ad hered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. - The range of permissible inquiry to be conducted by th e Court is necessarily limited to the ascertainment of whether or not such a sus pension, in the light of the credible information furnished by the President, wa s arbitrary. The question before the judiciary is not the correctness but the re asonableness of the action taken. - Referred to Lansang vs. Garcia where the Cou rt sustained the presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as there was no showing of arbitrariness in the exercise of a p rerogative belonging to the executive, the judiciary merely acting as a check on the exercise of such authority. Chief Justice Concepcion in his opinion: In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check, not t o supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of BARREDO [qualified vote: justiciable] - The inquiry which the Constitution contemplates for the determination of the c onstitutional sufficiency of a proclamation of martial law by the President shou ld not go beyond facts of judicial notice and those that may be stated in the pr oclamation,, if these are by their very nature capable of unquestionable demonst ration. - While a declaration of martial law is not absolutely conclusive, the C ourts inquiry into its constitutional sufficiency may not, contrary to what is im plied in

Lansang, involve the reception of evidence to be weighed against those on which the President has acted, nor may it extend to the investigation of what evidence the President had before him. Such inquiry must be limited to what is undispute d in the record and to what accords or does not accord with facts of judicial no tice. - It is entirely up to the Court to determine and define its own constitut ional prerogatives vis--vis the proclamation and the existing martial law situati on, given the reasons for the declaration and its avowed objectives. 1. The Cons titution is the supreme law of the land. This means among other things that all the powers of the government and of all its officials from the President down to the lowest emanate from it. 2. The Judiciary provisions of the Constitution poi nt to the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of all conflicts as to what the Constitution or any part thereof means. 3. In the same way the Supreme Court is the designated guardian of the Constitution, the President is the specifically a ssigned protector of the safety, tranquility and territorial integrity of the na tion. This responsibility of the President is his alone and may not be shared by any other Department. 4. The Constitution expressly provides that in case of inv asion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public saf ety requires it, the Executive may place the Philippines or any part thereof und er martial law 5. In the same manner that the Executive power conferred upon the Executive by the Constitution is complete, total and unlimited, so also, the jud icial power vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior courts, is the very who le of that power, without any limitation or qualification. 6. Even the basic gua rantee of protection of life, liberty, or property without due process of law re adily reveals that the Constitutions concern for individual rights and liberties is not entirely above that for the national interests, since the deprivation it enjoins is only that which is without due process of law and laws are always ena cted in the national interest or to promote and safeguard the general welfare. 7 . Whereas the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution explicitly enjoins that th e privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, there is no sim ilar injunction whether expressed or implied against the declaration of martial law. - Political questions are not per se beyond the Courts jurisdictionbut that a s a matter of policy, implicit in the Constitution itself, the Court should abst ain from interfering with the Executives Proclamation. - The right of a government to maintain its existence is the most pervasive aspe ct of sovereignty. To protect the nations continued existence, from external as well as internal threats, the government "is invested with all those inherent a nd implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were generall y considered to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to th e exercise of its functions" - These powers which are to be exercised for the na tions protection and security have been lodged by the Constitution under Articl e VII, Section 10 (2) thereof, on the President of the Philippines, who is cloth ed with exclusive authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called forth. - Cited Barcelon vs. Baker : The existing doctrine at the time of the framing and adoption of the 1935 Constitution was that of Barcelon v. Bak er. It enunciated the principle that when the Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine Commission, under Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, declares that a state of rebellion, insurrection or invasion exists, and by reason thereof the public safety requires the suspension of the privileges of habeas corpus, this declaration is held conclusive upon the judicial department of the government. And when the Chief Executive has decided that conditions exi st justifying the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, cour ts will presume that such conditions continue to exist until the same authority has decided that such conditions no longer exist. These doctrines are rooted on pragmatic considerations and sound reasons of public policy. The "doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to any person , such person is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts" has been recognized by all courts and "has never been disputed b y any respectable authority." The political department according to Chief Justic e Taney in Martin v. Mott, is the sole judge of the existence of war or insurrec

tion, and when it declares either of these emergencies to exist, its action is n ot subject to review or liable to be controlled by the judicial department of th e State. MAKASIAR [political question] AQUINO [political question] habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law." The power to proclaim martial law is exclusively vested in the President. The p roclamation and its attendant circumstances therefore form a political question. - Unless this Court decides that every act of the executive and of the legislat ure is justiciable there can be no clearer example of a political question than Proclamation No. 1081. It is the exercise by the highest elective official of th e land of a supreme political duty exclusively entrusted to him by the Constitut ion. Our people have entrusted to the President through a specific provision of the fundamental law the awesome responsibility to wield a powerful weapon. The p eople have entrusted to him the estimation that the perils are so ominous and th reatening that this ultimate weapon of our duly constituted government must be u sed. - The Supreme Court was not given the jurisdiction to share the determinati on of the occasions for its exercise. It is not given the authority by the Const itution to expand or limit the scope of its use depending on the allegations of litigants. It is not authorized by the Constitution to say that martial law may be proclaimed in Isabela and Sulu but not in Greater Manila. Much less does it h ave the power nor should it even exercise the power, assuming its existence, to nullify a proclamation of the President on a matter exclusively vested in him by the Constitution and on issues so politically and emotionally charged. The Cour ts function in such cases is to assume jurisdiction for the purpose of finding out whether the issues constitute a political question or not. Its function is t o determine whether or not a question is indeed justiciable. - Granted that Proc lamation No. 1081 is not political but justiciable, it is still valid because th e president has not acted arbitrarily in issuing it. ESGUERRA [political question] - I maintain that Proclamation No. 1081 is constitutional, valid and binding; th at the veracity or sufficiency of its factual bases cannot be inquired into by t he Courts and that the question presented by the petitions is political in natur e and not justiciable. Whether or not there is constitutional basis for the Pres idents action is for him to decide alone. - Ruled Barcelon vs. Baker over Lansang vs. Garcia FERNANDEZ [political question] - The Constitution is sufficiently explicit in locating the power to proclaim ma rtial law. It is similarly explicit in specifying the occasions for its exercise . "In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public Safety requires it, he (the President as Commander-in-Chief of a ll armed forces of the Philippines) may suspend the privileges of the writ of MUNOZ-PALMA [justiciable] With Lansang, the highest Court of the land takes upon itself the grave responsi bility of checking executive action and saving the nation from an arbitrary and despotic exercise of the presidential power granted under the Constitution to su spend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or proclaim martial law; th at responsibility and duty of the Court must be preserved ANTONIO [political question]

and fulfilled at all costs if We want to maintain its role as the last bulwark o f democracy in this country. WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the c ircumstances required by the Constitution for the proclamation of a state of mar tial law actors will. Such is not the case with the act of the President, because the pr oclamation of martial law was the result of conditions and events, not of his ow n making, which undoubtedly endangered the public safety and led him to conclude that the situation was critical enough to warrant the exercise of his power und er the Constitution to proclaim martial law WON petitioners were illegally detai ned entitling them the relief of habeas corpus This is self-evident. The arrest and detention of those contributing to the diso rder and especially of those helping or otherwise giving aid and comfort to the enemy are indispensable, if martial law is to mean anything at all. ANTONIO [legal] - The Court is precluded from inquiring into the legality of arrest and detentio n of petitioners. Having concluded that the Proclamation of Martial Law on Septe mber 21, 1972 by the President of the Philippines and its continuance are valid and constitutional, the arrest and detention of petitioners, pursuant to General Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 of the President, as amended by General Or der No. 2-A, dated September 26, 1972, may not now be assailed as unconstitution al and arbitrary. - It should be important to note that as a consequence of the proclamation of martial law, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been impliedly suspended. Authoritative writers on the subject view the suspension o f the writ of habeas corpus as an incident, but an important incident of a decla ration of martial law. FERNANDEZ [the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is ipso facto suspended upon a proclamation of martial law] CASTRO [valid] - Our Constitution authorizes the proclamation of martial law in cases not only of actual invasion, insurrection or rebellion but also of imminent danger thereof. - The so called open court theory does not apply to the Philippine situation beca use our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly authorize the declaration of marti al law even where the danger to public safety arises merely from the imminence o f invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. Moreover, the theory is too simplistic f or our day, what with the universally recognized insidious nature of Communist s ubversion and its overt operations CASTRO [legal] - Given the validity of the proclamation of martial law, the arrest and detentio n of those reasonably believed to be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it is well nigh beyond questioning. - In the cases at bar, the respondents have jus tified the arrest and detention of the petitioners on the ground of reasonable b elief in their complicity in the rebellion and insurrection. Except Diokno and A quino, all the petitioners have been released from custody, although subject to defined restrictions regarding personal movement and expression of views. As the danger to public safety has not abated, I cannot say that the continued detenti on of Diokno and Aquino and the restrictions on the personal freedoms of the oth er petitioners are arbitrary, just as I am not prepared to say that the continue d imposition of martial rule is unjustified. FERNANDO [valid] While it is beyond question that the 1973 Constitution stipulates, in a transito ry provision, that: All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts p romulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after li fting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instruction

s, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly. TEEHANKEE [no pronounceme nt] FERNANDO [proclamation of martial law does not automatically carry the suspensio n of the writ of habeas corpus] It is not to be denied that where such a state of affairs could be traced to the wishes of the President himself, it carries with it a presumption of validity. The test is again arbitrariness as defined in Lansang. While the detention of pe titioners could have been validly ordered, as dictated by the very proclamation itself, if it continued for an unreasonable length of time, then his release may be sought in a habeas corpus proceeding. MUNOZ-PALMA [not legal, the proclamation of martial law did not carry with it th e automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus] - First, from the very nature of the writ of habeas corpus which as stressed in the early portion of this Opinion is a "writ of liberty" and the "most important and most immediately available safeguard of that liberty", the privilege of the writ cannot be suspended by mere implication. The Bill of Rights (Art. III, Sec . 1(14), 1935 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 15, 1973 Constitution) categorically s tates that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended exc ept for causes therein specified, and the proclamation of martial law is not one of those enumerated. - Second, the so-called Commander-in-Chief clause, either under Art. VII, Sec. 10(2), 1935 Constitution, or Art. IX, Sec. 12, 1973 Constit ution, provides specifically for three different modes of executive action in ti mes of emergency, and one mode does not necessarily encompass the other, viz, (a ) calling out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawlessness, etc., (b) sus pension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (c) placing the count ry or a part thereof under martial law. In the latter two instances even if the causes BARREDO [valid] The proclamation had merely put the Constitution in a state of anesthesia, since a major surgery is needed to save the nations life. MUNOZ-PALMA [valid] The extreme measure taken by the President to place the entire country under mar tial law was necessary. The Presidents action was neither capricious nor arbitr ary. An arbitrary act is one that arises from an unrestrained exercise of the wi ll, caprice, or personal preference of the actor, one which is not founded on a fair or substantial reason, is without adequate determining principle, nonration al, and solely dependent on the BARREDO [legal] - The imposition of martial law automatically carries with it the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any event, the Presidential order of arrest and detention cannot be assailed as deprivation of liberty without due process. - The primary and fundamental purpose of martial law is to maintain or der and to insure the success of the battle against the enemy by the most expedi tious and efficient means without loss of time and with the minimum effort.

for the executive action are the same, still the exigencies of the situation may warrant the suspension of the privilege of the writ but not a proclamation of m artial law and vice versa. - Third, there can be an automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ when, with the declaration of martial law, there is a tota l collapse of the civil authorities, the civil courts are closed, and a military government takes over, in which event the privilege of the writ is necessarily suspended for the simple reason that there is no court to issue the writ; that, however, is not the case with us at present because the martial law proclaimed b y the President upholds the supremacy of the civil over the military authority,a nd the courts are open to issue the writ. b. Principle of integration of efforts: work cohesively and unify efforts to ens ure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing crime prevention. A provisional Task Force Tulungan shall be organized to provide the mechanism, st ructure and procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing the security situation. d. Areas for deployment: Monumento Circle, SM City North Edsa, Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Comme rcial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport. - On January 1 7, 2000, the IBP filed petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployme nt of the Marines, null and void and unconstitutional because no emergency situa tion obtains in Metro Manila as would justify the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work (violates Art 2, Sec. 3), deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in a civilian function of government (violates Art. 16 , Sec. 5), and deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military t o perform civilian functions of the government. It also makes the military more powerful than what it should really be under the Constitution. - The President c onfirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum , dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief. The President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through more effective crime prevention program including increased poli ce patrols. He further stated that to heighten police visibility in the Metropol is, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AF P Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper depl oyment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppres sing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the serv ices of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature an d for a reasonable period only. ISSUES 1. WON the Presidents factual determinatio n of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review a. WON petitioner has legal standing 2. WON the calling of the armed forces to assi st the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy, over the military and the civilian character of the PNP HEL D 1. On Judicial Review c. IBP V ZAMORA KAPUNAN; August 15, 2000 FACTS - In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, Pres ident Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of Staff of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tas ked to execute and implement the said order. - The PNP Chief, through Police Sup erintendent Edgar Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000, which conta ins the ff: > Purpose: for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national security > Situation: Criminal incidents in Metro Manila ha ve been perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndica tes whose members include active and former police/military personnel. The polic e visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel. > Mission: sus

tained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crim es especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members incl ude those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP /military personnel > Concept in Joint Visibility Patrol Operations: a. Conducte d jointly by the National Capital Region Police Office and the Philippine Marine s to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the internal security of t he state against insurgents and other serious threat to national security, altho ugh the primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rest upon the AFP. Ratio 1: When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are comp lied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a pe rsonal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question ; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; an d (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. Ratio 2: When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush as ide technicalities of procedure. a. The IBP has not sufficiently complied with t he requisites of standing in this case. > Definition of locus standi + a persona l and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challen ged + interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the dec ree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere inc idental interest + gist: whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the ou tcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens t he presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of diffi cult constitutional questions > The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to pr eserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficie nt to clothe it with standing in this case > IBP has failed to present a specifi c and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. It has not shown any s pecific injury, which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned government act. 2. The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in cal ling out the Marines Definition of political question - concerned with issues de pendent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed - (Tanada v. Cuenco) questions which are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority ha s been delegated to the legislative or executive department; if an issue is clea rly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary acti on by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is h eld to be a political question - (Baker v. Carr) prominent on the surface of any case held to be a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitu tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack o f judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impo ssibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts

undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due co ordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from mu ltifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question Ratio 3: Wh en the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the i ssue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciablethe problem being one of legality or validi ty. Ratio 4: When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amou nting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. - grave abuse of discretion: capricious or whimsical exerc ise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despo tic manner by reason of passion or hostility - There is no evidence to support t he assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. Likewise, there is no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. There is a clear textual commitment under Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 1 of the Constitution t o bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power The full discretio nary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of t he calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of the s aid provision. - Congress may revoke proclamation of martial law or suspension o f the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the fact ual basis thereof. There is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revoca tion or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces - Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain ma tters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matte rs. - Fr. Bernas: graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief; when h e exercises this lesser power of calling on the armed forces, when he says it is necessary, his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody - Besides the absence of textual standards that the Court may use to judge necessity, information necessa ry to arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. On t he other hand, the President has a vast intelligence network to gather information. The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infrin ge the civilian character of the police force Constitutes permissible use of mil itary assets for civilian law enforcement - limited participation by the Marines - real authority belongs to the PNP Deployment of the Marines does not unmake t he civilian character of the police force - the real authority in these operatio ns is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military - since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to speak of - the Ma rines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols; th ere can be no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can ther e be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution Military a ssistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisd iction - Military assistance in: elections, administration of the Phil. Red Cros s, relief and rescue operations, conduct of licensure exams, sanitary inspection s, conduct of census work, etc. - Systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned - Mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not dero gation of civilian supremacy Decision Petition dismissed - 10 concur (Kapunan, D avide, Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon) 5 concur in the result (Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing) - 1 on off icial leave (Bellosillo)

SEPARATE OPINION PUNO - Political questions are defined as those questions which under the Constitutio n, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or exec utive branch of government They have two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity and (2) matters w hich have been specifically delegated to some other department or particular off ice of the government, with discretionary power to act. - (Barcelon v. Baker) Under our form of government, one department has no author ity to inquire into the acts of another, which acts are performed within the dis cretion of the other department. Whenever a statute gives discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, the s tatute constitutes him the sole judge of the existence of those facts. The exerc ise of this discretion is conclusive upon the courts. Once a determination is ma de by the executive and legislative departments that the conditions justifying t he assailed acts exist, it will presume that the conditions continue until the s ame authority decide that they no longer exist. The executive branch, thru its c ivil and military branches, are better situated to obtain information about peac e and order from every corner of the nation, in contrast with the judicial depar tment, with its very limited machinery - (Alejandrino v. Quezon) Under the Jones Law, the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the exercise of his offic e. The Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippi ne Senate take any particular action. The Philippine Legislature or any branch t hereof cannot be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process - (Vera v. Avelino) Legislature has the inherent right to determine who shall be admitted to its membership - (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito) A proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity - (Arnault v. Balagtas) The proce ss by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature is a necessa ry concomitant of the legislative process and the legislatures exercise of its di scretionary authority is not subject to judicial interference - (Osmena v. Penda tun) The Court did not interfere with Congresspower to discipline its members - ( Avelino v. Cuenco) The Court could assume jurisdiction over the controversy in l ight of the subsequent events justifying intervention among which was the existe nce of a quorum - (Tanada v. Cuenco) The Senate is not clothed with full discreti onary authority in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations, which a re mandatory in nature. - (Cunanan v Tan, Jr.) The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution and its power does not come from Congress but fr om the Constitution - (Gonzales v. Comelec) The question of whether or not Congr ess, acting as a constituent assembly in proposing amendments to the Constitutio n violates the Constitution was held to be justiciable and not a political issue . The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not in cluded in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. As a constituent assembly, the members of Congress derive

their authority from the fundamental law and they do not have the final say on w hether their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits - (Tolentino v. Com elec) Acts of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing am endments to the Constitution are at par with acts of Congress acting as a consti tuent assembly - In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question doctrin e and assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of powers conferred upon the Legislature - The Court hewed to the s ame line as regards the exercise of Executive Power - (Severino v. Governor-Gene ral) When the Legislature conferred upon the Governor-General powers and duties, it did so for the reason that he was in a better position to know the needs of the country than any other member of the executive department, and with full con fidence that he will perform such duties as his judgment dictates - (Abueva v. W ood) Under the principle of separation of powers, it ruled that it was not inten ded by the Constitution that one branch of government could encroach upon the fi eld of duty of the other. Each department has an exclusive field within which it can perform its part within certain discretionary limits. - (Forbes v. Tiaco) T he Presidents inherent power to deport undesirable aliens is universally denomina ted as political, and this power continues to exist for the preservation of peac e and domestic tranquility of the nation - (Manalang v. Quitoriano) The appointi ng power is the exclusive prerogative of the President upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress except those resulting from the need of securing con currence of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative power to prescribe qualifications to the given appointive office - ( Untal v. Chief of Staff, AFP) As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Pre sident has the power to determine whether war, in the legal sense, still continu es or has terminated. It is within the province of the political department and not the judicial department of government to determine when war is at the end (Montenegro v. Castaneda) The authority to decide whether the exigency has arise n requiring the suspension of the privilege belongs to the President and his dec ision is final and conclusive on the courts. - (Lansang v. Garcia) The suspensio n of the writ of habeas corpus was not a political question. The power to suspen d the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is neither absolute nor unqualified because the Constitution sets limits on the exercise of executive discretion on the matter. These limits are: (1) that the privilege must not be suspended exce pt only in cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger there of; and (2) when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during su ch period the necessity for the suspension shall exist. The extent of the power, which may be inquired into by courts is defined by these limitations. The funct ion of the Court is not to supplant but merely to check the Executive; to ascert ain whether the President has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his juris diction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of h is act. - (Javellana v. Executive Secretary) While a majority of the Court held that the issue of whether or not the 1973 Constitution was justiciable, a majori ty also ruled that the decisive issue of whether the 1973 Constitution had come into force and effect, with or without constitutional ratification, was a politi cal question - (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile) The Court upheld the Presidents declaratio n of martial law. On whether the validity of the imposition of martial law was a political or justiciable question, the Court was almost evenly divided. - (Garc ia-Padilla v. Enrile) The issuance of the Presidential Commitment Order by the P resident was not subject to judicial inquiry. In times of war or national emerge ncy, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the natio n and government is in peril - (Morales, Jr. v. Enrile) By the power of judicial review, the Court must inquire into every phase and aspect of a persons detentio n from the moment he was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes up on the merits of the petition - The language of Art. VIII, Sec. 1 clearly gives the Court the power to strike down acts amounting to grave abuse of discretion o f both the legislative and executive branches of government - It is clear that t he President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Philippines, may

call out the armed forces subject to two conditions: (1) whenever it becomes nec essary; and (2) to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably, these conditions lay down the sine qua requirement for the exercise of the power and the objective sought to be attained by the exercise of the powe r. They define the constitutional parameters of the calling out power. Whether o r not there is compliance with these parameters is a justiciable issue and is no t a political question. - On the use of Bernas opinion: The Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from the people who r atified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people. - When private ju sticiable rights are involved in a suit, the Court must not refuse to assume jur isdiction even though questions of extreme political importance are necessarily involved. VITUG The act of the President in simply calling on the armed forces of the Philippine s, an executive prerogative, to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols in th e metropolis, does not constitute grave abuse of discretion that would now warra nt an exercise by the Supreme Court of its extraordinary power as so envisioned by the fundamental law. MENDOZA [concur and dissent] - The judgment on the substantive constitutional issues raised by petitioner mus t await an actual case involving real parties with injuries to show as a result of the operation of the challenged executive action - A citizens suit challenging the constituti0onality of governmental action requires that (1) the petitioner must have suffered an injury in fact of an actual or imminent nature; (2) there mu st be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action by this Court - O nly a party injured by the operation of the governmental action challenged is in the best position to aid the Court in determining the precise nature of the pro blem presented. - Because of the absence of parties with real and substantial in terest to protect, we do not have evidence on the effect of military presence in malls and commercial centers - Dismiss suit on the ground of lack of standing o f petitioner and the consequent lack of an actual case or controversy SANLAKAS V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TINGA; February 3, 2004 FACTS - July 27, 2003 Some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, armed wi th ammunitions and explosives, stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati. They d emanded the resignation of GMA, Defense Secretary and the PNP Chief. - Later tha t day, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 both de claring a state of rebellion and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion. Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after negotiations. - August 1, 2003 Pre sident lifted the declaration. - PARTIES > Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (P D) o Sec 18, Art 7 does not require declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces

o There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite period since Oakwood oc cupation had ceased. > Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens, taxpay ers, law professors and bar reviewers o Declaration is constitutional anomaly th at confuses because overzealous public officers acting pursuant to the proclamat ion are liable to violate the constitutional rights of citizens o Circumvention of the report requirement in Sec 18, Art 7, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from proclamation of martial law o President ial issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President > Rep. Suplico et al as citiz ens and members of House of Representatives o Their rights, powers, and function s were allegedly affected o Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an exer cise of emergency powers and therefore is a usurpation of the power of the Congr ess in Art 6, Sec 23 par 2 > Sen. Pimentel o Issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no constitutional basis > Solicitor-General o Case has become moot because of the lifting of the declarati on ISSUES 1. WON issue is justiciable given mootness of the issue and legal stan ding of the parties b. WON petitioners have legal standing 2. WON issuances of t he President are valid HELD 1. The President, in declaring state of rebellion an d in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vest ed on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article 7 as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article 6. - Justiciable even if moot - Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of re petition yet evading review - Lacson v. Perez mootness preclude the Court from a ddressing its Constitutionality - Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have l egal standing because when an act of the Executive injures the institution of th e Congress and causes a derivative but substantial injury, then any member can f ile suit (Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez) - Sanlakas, PM, and SJS have no legal standing because they did not obtain any d irect injury from the governmental act that is being challenged. Peoples organiza tion status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the v alidity of the presidential issuances (Kilosbayan v. Morato) - SJS as taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing because there was no illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation 2. Presidential issuances are valid - Art 7, Sec 18 Sequence of graduated powers: 1.calling out power, 2.power to suspend wr it of habeas corpus, 3.power to declare martial law. - 2 and 3 require concurren ce of actual invasion or rebellion AND that public safety requires the exercise of such power. These are not required in calling-out power (IBP v. Zamora) - It does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. T he Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but with first and foremost, Executive powers - US Constitutional history: commander -in-chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken togethe r with the provision on executive power and presidential oath of office - Presid ents authority to declare state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and at the same time draws strength from her commander-in-chi ef powers - The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to the natio n that such a state exists and the armed forces may be called to prevent or supp ress it. - Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality protected ri ghts (Lacson) - President has full discretionary power to call out the armed for ces and to determine the necessity of the exercise of such power. There is no pr oof that the President acted without factual basis. - Declaration of state of re bellion does not amount to declaration of martial law. DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; May 3, 2006 FACTS - On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of na tional emergency, thus: NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of t he Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7

of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby comman d the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any ac t of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to a ll decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direc tion; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby de clare a State of National Emergency. - The declaration is premised military and police intelligence containing concerted efforts of Left and Right wing factions to bring down the Arroyo Government. - On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017 (hence, the same premise as PP1017), thus: NOW, T HEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under t he Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-i n-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 101 7 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippin es (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country; I hereby direct the Chief of S taff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. - On M arch 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emer gency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017 . ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1 017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the execu tive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgen ts of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.[4] They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a c lear and present danger. During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the So licitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. SIGNIFICANTLY, THERE WAS NO REFUTATION FROM PETITIONERS COUNSELS. On Janua ry 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, La wrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny,

escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public stateme nt, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called u pon the people to show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us de monstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms. [5] On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled Oplan Hackle I which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City . The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members an d President Arroyo herself.[6] Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground. On Februa ry 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas pr ovince. Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of t he meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the National Peoples Army (N PA), a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subver sive documents.[7] Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I. On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that memb ers of the PNP- Special Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediate ly ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to disavow any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integ rity and unquestionable loyalty. On the same day, at the house of former Congress man Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinos brother, businessmen and mid-level g overnment officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his groups plans if President Arroyo is o usted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen . Danilo Lim, Commander of the Armys elite Scout Ranger. Lim said it was all syste ms go for the planned movement against Arroyo.[8] B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade C ommander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arro yo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers , there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Qu erubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio. Earli er, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work w ithin the military and the police establishments in order to forge alliances wit h its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio Ka Roger Rosal declared: Th e Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bri nging down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to end it.[9] On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spok esman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicl y announced: Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidl y, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officer s and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the fiel d. He claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the antiArroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have bee n reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the Presidents ouster is neari ng its concluding stage in the first half of 2006. Respondents further claimed t hat the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Phi lippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals an

d 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.[10] By midnight of February 2 3, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet member s to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directe d both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chai n of command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region. PETITIONERS ARGUMEN TS In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it i s a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of ma rtial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the p ress, of speech and of assembly. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez CachoOliv ares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDGs act of raiding the Dai ly Tribune offices as a clear case of censorship or prior restraint. They also claim ed that the term emergency refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is absolutely n o emergency that warrants the issuance of PP 1017. In G.R. No. 171485, petitioner s herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) othe r members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocamp o, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted tha t PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute usurpation of legislative powers; violation of freedom of expression and a declaration of martial law. They alleged that President Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without cle ar and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a sho wing that there is necessity to do so. In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decr ees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances. In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a ) Section 4[15] of Article II, (b) Sections 1,[16] 2,[17] and 4[18] of Article I II, (c) Section 23[19] of Article VI, and (d) Section 17[20] of Article XII of t he Constitution. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., a lleged that PP 1017 is an arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers. And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Mar tial Law, petitioners argued that it amounts to an exercise by the President of e mergency powers without congressional approval. In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined un der the Revised Administrative Code. And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner L oren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional for b eing violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such a s freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of publ ic concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution . In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosec uting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first , the petitions should be dismissed for being moot; second, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et a l.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and

legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the peoples right to free expres sion and redress of grievances. ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the moot and academic p rinciple precludes the Court from taking cognizance of the cases 2. WON petition ers in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 1 71489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing Substantive 3. WO N Supreme Court can review the factual basis of PP 1017 4. WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional a. Facial Challenge b. Constitutional Basis c. As App lied Challenge HELD Procedural 1. NO. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot a nd academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;[31] seco nd, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; [32] third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;[33] and f ourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[34] Reasoning - Cou rts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;[31] second, the exceptional character of the situ ation and the paramount public interest is involved;[32] third, when constitutio nal issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the ben ch, the bar, and the public;[33] and fourth, the case is capable of repetition y et evading review.[34] - All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justi fy this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, in volving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and con trolling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic functi on of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the militar y and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guaran tees.[35] And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Ce rtainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. P anganibans Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.[36] However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justices very statement that an otherwise moot case ma y still be decided provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance. The pr esent case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice. 2. YES. The requirement of Locus standi which is the right o f appearance in a court of justice on a given question shall be set aside by the Court whenever it is shown that the case is of transcendental importance. Reaso ning - Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.[37] In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-i n interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Proc edure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended i n the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest i s the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.[38] Succinctly put, the plaintiffs s tanding is based on his own right to the relief sought. - By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, pro vided that the following requirements are met: 1. the cases involve constitution al issues; 2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of pu blic funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 3. for voters, there mus t be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in questi on; 4. or concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and 5. or legislators , there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon th eir prerogatives as legislators. - Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions. - The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitio

ners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They all eged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search committed by poli ce operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not qu estion their legal standing. - In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen al leged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming po wers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights. - In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Cou rt applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,[60] Kapatiran Ng Mga Na glilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, [61] Association of Small La ndowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[62] Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[63] and Taada v. Tuvera,[64] that wh en the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. - In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembl y may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be grant ed standing to assert the rights of their members.[65] We take judicial notice o f the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and cancel ing all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. - In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national office rs of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G .O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[66] the Court held th at the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and no thing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups a nd the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi. - In G.R. No. 171 424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact t hat she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a leg islator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not l ikewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issua nces prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pen ding electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proce edings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental impor tance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules. - It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to th e bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying l egal tenet of the liberality doctrine on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and

G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipi no people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now wai ts with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the transcendental importance doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the PP 1017 cas es. - This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. - Incid entally, IT IS NOT PROPER TO IMPLEAD PRESIDENT ARROYO AS RESPONDENT. SETTLED IS THE DOCTRINE THAT THE PRESIDENT, DURING HIS TENURE OF OFFICE OR ACTUAL INCUMBENC Y,[67] MAY NOT BE SUED IN ANY CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASE, AND THERE IS NO NEED TO PR OVIDE FOR IT IN THE CONSTITUTION OR LAW. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court lit igations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed fr om any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully atten d to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislativ e and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything wh ich impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duti es imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable t o anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people[68] but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by im peachment.[69] Substantive 3. The Presidents calling-out power is a discretionary p ower solely vested in his wisdom. However, this does not prevent an examination o f whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or w hether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. This ruling is based on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity o f the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial po wer, the courts are authorized not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess o f jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Th e latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enab le the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit , the discretion of the political departments of the government.[81] It speaks o f judicial prerogative not only in terms of power [82] but also of duty. - Howev er, judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Pre sidents decision is correct, but that the President did not act arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid do wn is not correctness, but arbitrariness.[83] It is incumbent upon the petitione r to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then this Court cannot u ndertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. - Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Con solidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leadin g to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the record s. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrar y allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuin g PP 1017 calling for military aid. 4. YES. Notwithstanding the discretionary na ture of the constitutional exercise of the President of his/her calling out of p ower, the Courts shall have authority to inquire into the factual basis of such exercise to determine whether it was within the constitutionally permissible lim its or whether grave abuse of discretion attended its exercise. (This interpreta tion was based on Article VIII, section 1 a. Facial Challenge. Facial invalidati on of laws (overbreadth doctrine) shall not be resorted to in the absence of cle ar showing that (1) the law involves the exercise of free speech; (2) that there can be no instance that the assailed law may be valid; and that (3) the Court h as no other alternative remedies available. - Under the void-for-vagueness doctr ine, a law shall be facially invalid only if men of common intelligence must nec

essarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Reasoning Petiti oners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its overbreadth. They cl aim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights und er Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a chilling effect to the ci tizens. - A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalle d for. First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool develo ped for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. A plain reading of P P 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno, [104] the US Supreme Court held t hat we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of t he First Amendment (freedom of speech). Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state intere st in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotect ed conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. - Sec ond, facial invalidation of laws is considered as manifestly strong medicine, to b e used sparingly and only as a last resort, and is generally disfavored;[107] The re ason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constituti onal adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied wi ll not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be appl ied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court .[108] - And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish t hat there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitione rs did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists. - Related to the o verbreadth doctrine is the void for vagueness doctrine which holds that a law is fac ially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meanin g and differ as to its application.[110] It is subject to the same principles gov erning overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing o n their faces statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said tha t a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1 017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of c ommon intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017. b. Constitutional Basis. The authority of the President to exercise his calling out power to suppress lawless violence shall not be deemed to include the power to authorize: (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, as these powers can be exercised by the Pr esident as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. - The take care power of the Pr esident, which includes the power to enforce obedience of laws shall not be deem ed to include calling the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. - The ordinance power of the President shall not in clude the power to make decrees with the same force and effect as those issued by President Marcos. - In the absence of delegated authority from Congress, the aut hority of the President to declare a state of emergency shall not be deemed to i nclude the power to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any private ly owned public utility or business affected with public interest. - Acts of ter rorism no matter how repulsive shall not be

deemed to be punishable in the absence of legislation clearly defining said acts and providing specific punishments therefor. Reasoning Calling-out Power - The Constitution grants the President, as Commanderin-Chief, a sequence of graduated p owers. These are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of t he writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criteri on for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessar y, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence , invasion or rebellion. Considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Offices vast intelligen ce network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. - Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forc es to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This invo lves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the Presidents callin g-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President m ust be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power w hen he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitu tion, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations. - It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the Presidents authority t o declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyos authority to declare a state of re bellion emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cite d in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Co de of 1987, which provides: SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to dep end, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an exec utive order. - President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases , PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, Preside nt Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a pr ovision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business aff ected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harm less, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas. Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declarati on of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wo rdings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power. - In his Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006 , Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe th reat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to se cure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their indi vidual freedoms. - Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify a cts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done cont rary to its command is ultra vires. Specifically, (a) arrests and seizures witho ut judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. - Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a de

claration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-o ut power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. Take Care Power - The second provision of PP 1017 pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads: SEC. 17. The President shall have contro l of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that t he laws be faithfully executed. - As the Executive in whom the executive power i s vested,[115] the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as w ell as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect tha t as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, execute its laws.[116] I n the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chie f of all the armed forces of the country,[117] including the Philippine National Police[118] under the Department of Interior and Local Government. [119] Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees? - PP 1017 state s in part: to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. - The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 19 87), which allows her to issue executive orders, administrative orders, proclama tions, memorandum orders/circulars, general or special orders. President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential D ecrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes bec ause they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.[121] - The assaile d PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authorit y to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of th e Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a st ate of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? - As this Court stated earlier, Pr esident Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws g overning family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and th e like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinen t to its duty to suppress lawless violence. Power to Take Over The pertinent pro vision of PP 1017 states: x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my dir ection; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national

emergency. - The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the s tate of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enfo rce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees x x x but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads: Sec. 17. In times of nati onal emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking t he above provision when she issued PP 1017? - During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any auth ority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any p rivately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. - This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect at the time o f its approval was President Marcos Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 2 2, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over the management , control and operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Dist ance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Phil ippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas O rient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effo rt to contain, solve and end the present national emergency. - Petitioners, parti cularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyos inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legis latures emergency powers. - A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents aut hority to declare a state of national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise. - Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads: SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of twothirds of both Houses in joint sessi on assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existe nce of a state of war. (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Cong ress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to s uch restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. - It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to other nation al emergency. If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a state of national emergency pursuan t to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a state of national emergency. Therefore, Pres ident Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergenc y even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. - But the exercise of emerge ncy powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or busines s affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegati on from Congress. - Constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construe d together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a c onstitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together a nd considered in the light of each other.[123] Considering that Section 17 of Ar ticle XII and Section 23 of Article VI relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency power s. - Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such power s to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon i t. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or pra cticable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Consti tution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the Preside nt, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emerge

ncy. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation mu st be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emerge ncy powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress .[124] - Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergenc y powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public intere st is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress . Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and u nder reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the oper ation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public int erest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the Presiden t may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. - Emergency, as a ge neric term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degre e of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as norm al. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and per ception. Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sat es since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic, b) natural disaster,[129] and c) n ational security. - Emergency, as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typ hoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. [ 131] This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission. - Followin g our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any pri vately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without au thority from Congress. - Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privatelyowned public utility or business affected with publi c interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances h ave ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point o ut the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken ov er. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency power s act passed by Congress. c. Applied Challenge. The Court shall not declare laws as invalid solely on the basis of their misapplication or abuse or susceptibili ty to abuse by the people tasked to implement them. - The arrest of Randy David and other acts done by the authorities pursuant to the parts of the laws herein considered unconstitutional are also deemed unconstitutional without prejudice t o the filing of necessary administrative, criminal or civil actions against spec ific abuses committed by authorities. Reasoning Can this Court adjudge as uncons titutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional? - Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to

declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused[135] and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.[136] The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its e fficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular ca se.[137] PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence , invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted Pres ident Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the poli ce, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the cit izens constitutional rights. - Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unc onstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The ans wer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere in cidental result arising from its exertion.[138] This is logical. - President Arr oyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General or ders are acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They are internal rules issued by the ex ecutive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient admin istration of law. Such rules and regulations create no relation except between t he official who issues them and the official who receives them.[139] They are ba sed on and are the product of, a relationship in which power is their source, an d obedience, their object.[140] For these reasons, one requirement for these rul es to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious. - G .O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. - Unlike the term lawless violence, the phrase acts of terrorism is still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism. - The absence of a law defining acts of terroris m may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military. - So far, the word terrorism appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law r egime. - P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. T hese two (2) laws, however, do not define acts of terrorism. Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who h as the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, the re can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and resi dences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all asse mblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effecte d in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of t he President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution . Thus, this Court declares that the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is un constitutional. VALIDITY OF SPECIFIC ACTS CONDUCTED BY AUTHORITIES PURSUANT TO P P 1017 AND G.O. NO. 5 - In the Brief Account[144] submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought a t Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth, he was treated brusquely by policemen who held his head and tried to push him inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa No. 880[145] and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he wa s detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh, he was eventually released for insu fficiency of evidence. - The Constitution enunciates the general rule that no pe rson shall be arrested without warrant. The recognized exceptions are in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. ( b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe

based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arre sted has committed it; and - Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above j ustifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officer s could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts w ith the invective Oust Gloria Now and their erroneous assumption that petitioner D avid was the leader of the rally.[146] Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor orde red his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted t hat petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wear ing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Furth er, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violati on of BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rall y.[147] - But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble. - Assembly under Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respe ct to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institutio n and complements the right of speech. This right is not to be limited, much les s denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evi l that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validl y required. - The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arres ted while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not c ommitting any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger t hat warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances , the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere aftertho ught. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify th e arresting officers conduct. - On the basis of the above principles, the Court l ikewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al. (G.R. No . 171483) unwarranted. Their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacaangs directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. Thi s is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much le ss denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive ev il that the State has a right to prevent.[149] Tolerance is the rule and limitati on is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and p resent danger that the State may deny the citizens right to exercise it.With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated. - Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing o n the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitione rs were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits. The firs t time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of noti ce is a fatal defect.

When a persons right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure. - G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another face t of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press. Petitioners narration of f acts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: f irst, the Daily Tribunes offices were searched without warrant; second, the polic e operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the search was con ducted at about 1:00 o clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the sea rch was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at th e vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices. - Thereafter, a wave of warning came fr om government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was meant to show a strong presence, to tell media outlet s not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government. Director General Lomibao further stated that if they do not follow th e standards and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Pr oc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover. National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to cooperate with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the national security is thr eatened. - The search is illegal. Rule 126, Section 4 of The Revised Rules on Cr iminal Procedure requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge a fter examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any othe r premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member o f his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witness es of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless th e property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which cas e a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives. - Not only that, the sear ch violated petitioners freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and democr atic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff[152] this Court held that -As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Met ropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denia l of petitioners freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even mil itant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citiz enry. - While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like th e Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be deni ed that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and se izure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officia ls to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repre ssive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do s o, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishmen t should he be so rash as to disobey. [153] Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune w as subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its antigovernment sentime nts. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on publ ic affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the

duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obst a principiis. [154] - In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans concurring opinion, at tached hereto, is considered an integral part of this ponencia. Decision - WHERE FORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITU TIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1 017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addit ion, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Art icle VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not au thorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business af fected with public interest without prior legislation. - G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUT IONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to supp ress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O . No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. - The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. Dav id and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLUKMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and v iolating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restr aint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are decla red UNCONSTITUTIONAL. BAUTISTA V SALONGA PADILLA; April 13, 1989 FACTS - Petition for certiorari to review decision of Commission on Appointments - Pres designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chair of CHR, w ho took oath of office before CJ Fernan. She discharged functions/duties of Chai r of CHR. Bautista rcvd letter fr Sec of Commission on Appointments requesting h er to submit info and docs in connection w/ her confirmation as Chair of CHR. Secretary again wrote to Bautista to request her presence at a meeting to delibe rate on her appointment. Bautista wrote to Chair of Commission on Appointments, saying why she considered Comm on Appointments as having no jurisdiction to revi ew her appointment. - Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that t he search of the Tribunes offices and the seizure of its materials for publicatio n and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible for any purpos e, - The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of t he military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the po lice committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, thi s Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

As conveyed in a letter to the Exec Secretary, Commission on Appointments disapp roved Bautistas ad interim appointment as Chair. - Bautistas motion for reconsiderat ion was denied. - A Manila Standard news item reported that Pres designated Mall illin as Acting Chair of CHR pending resolution of Bautistas case. - Bautista fil ed this petition w/ prayer for issuance of restraining order to enjoin Commissio n of Appointments not to proceed w/ deliberation on her appointment. - Bautista filed amended petition for restraining order impleading Mallillin as respondent. She also filed exparte motion to stop Mallillin fr exercising fcns of Chair and fr demanding courtesy resignations fr officers. - Court issued TRO regarding Ma llillin but not regarding Commission on Appointments, being instrumentality of c oequal branch. Bautista was extended by Pres to permanent appointment as Chair o n Dec 17, 1988. This appointment was for Pres solely to make. ISSUES 1. WON appo intment by Pres of Chair of Commission on Human Rights is to be w/ or w/o confir mation of Commission on Appointments 2. WON Pres could extend another appointmen t to petitioner on Jan 14, 1989 an ad interin appointment or any other kind of a ppointment to same office of Chair of CHR that called for confirmation by Commis sion on Appointments. 3. WON in appointments solely for Pres to make, the Pres c an voluntarily submit such appointment to Commission on Appointment for confirma tion. 4. WON the petition has become moot and academic. HELD 1. NO - CHR Chair p osition is not among positions mentioned in Sec 16 Art 12 of Consti. Therefore, appointment must be w/o review of Commission on Appointments. - Unlike Chair/Mem bers of CSC, COMELEC and CoA, the position of CHR Chair does not have express pr ovision that appointment should be with consent of Commission on Appointments. Sec 2(c) of EO 163 says CHR Chair is among those w/c Pres is authorized by law to appoint. 2. NO - Bautistas appointment on Dec 17, 1988 as Chair was a complete d act on the part of the Pres. No new appointment could be made to position alre ady filled by a previously completed appointment, accepted by appointee through qualification and assumption of duties. Even if Pres could submit to Commission on Appointments an appointment that belongs solely to her, still, there was no v acancy on Jan 14 1989. Nor can respondents contend that the new appointment on J an 14 was an ad interim appointment bec it does not apply to appointments solely for Pres to make. It extends only to those where review of Comm on Appointments is needed. T hat is why those types of appointments remain valid until disapproval by Commiss ion on Appointments or until next adjournment of Congress. 3. NO - To say otherw ise is to say that Pres w/ Congress can from time to time move power boundaries in Consti. - Neither Exec nor Legislative can create power where Consti confers none. If Consti made appointment exclusive for Pres, Pres cant grant power of par ticipation in Commission on Appointments. Nor can Commission on Appointments cre ate power to confirm appointments that Consti has reserved to Pres alone. 4. NO - Respondent contends that w/ or w/o confirmation, Bautista can be removed fr of fice anytime at pleasure of Pres. And w/ disapproval of appointment/nomination b y Commission on Appointments, there was greater reason for her removal. Thus, is sue is moot and academic. SC disagrees and says petitioner came in timely manner and didnt show intention of abandoning her petition. EO 163 speaks of term of of fice (7 yrs without reappointment) while EO 163-A speaks of tenure in office (at pleasure of Pres). The diff bet term and tenure is impt. Consistent w/ CHRs need ed independence, tenure in office cant be later made dependent on pleasure of Pre s. Obiter - Sarmiento III V. Mison - Issue: Which appointments under 1987 Consti are to be w/ and w/o review of Commission on Appointments? - Ratio: Only appoin tments mentioned in 1 st sentence of Sec 16 Art VII are to be reviewed by Commis sion. Other appointments by President are to be made w/o participation of Commis sion. - Held: Appointment of Mison as Bureau of Customs head is valid. - Marbury V. Madison - Ratio: Once appointment is made, Pres power over the office is term inated in all cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him. Decision Petition is granted; TRO is made permanent against Mallillin; Petitioner Bautist a is lawful Chair of CHR, she may be removed only for cause. Gutierrez Jr., Diss enting Opinion Cruz, Dissenting Grio-Aquino, Dissenting

enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions as Commissioner of the Burea u of Customs. In addition, they would want to enjoin Budget Secretary Guillermo Carague from disbursing Misons salary and emoluments. The grounds for the petitio n was that Misons stay in Office is unconstitutional as there was no confirmation coming from the Commission on Appointments that is required by the Constitution. The Commission on Appointments was allowed to intervene in the court proceeding. - The case was considered justiciable given that there is great public interest such as the need for stability in public service. This disposed the question of whether this is the proper remedy to question respondents right to the Office o f the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and also that of the legal standing of the petitioners. - The Constitutional Provision under careful examination is Article VII Section 16, which states that: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executi ve departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whos e appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress m ay, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the Presiden t alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commission s, or boards. ISSUE WON Misons stay in Office was Constitutional HELD - Yes it is constitutional. - Reading Article VII Section 16 there are 4 groups of officers who the President is able to appoint. The first group would be the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or offic ers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other off icers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. The second grou p is composed of those officers of the Government whose appointments are not oth erwise provided for by law. The third group are those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Lastly, the fourth group, are those officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. - To interpret the law the Justices went back in history to look at the previou s constitutions, the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In the 1935 Constitution all a ppointments is subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments while t his was removed in the 1973 Constitution wherein the President is able to appoin t SARMIENTO V MISON PADILLA; December 17, 1987 FACTS - Petitioners Sarmiento and Arcilla who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and Constitutional Law professors seeks to

without the need for the approval of the Commission on Appointments. Both were p roblematic as the 1935 provision became a venue of horse-trading (used for politic al leverage) while the 1973 provision gave too much power to the President. The court held that the 1987 provision on appointment was the middle ground that was sought by the 1986 Constitutional Commission. - Looking through the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission they said that the clear and positive intent of the framers were to make those officers in the first sentence the individuals that are subject to the approval and confirmation of the Commission on Appointm ents while those on the second and third sentence need not seek such confirmatio n. Given that the position as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is not u nder those specified in the first sentence but the second, therefore petitioner Mison is not in need of the approval of the Commission on Appointments and thus should be able to exercise full authority and functions and be entitled to his s alary and emoluments. Decision Petition DISMISSED. Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Sarmientoconcur ring (11) Gutierrez, Cruz- dissenting (2) SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [dissent] There is a need to look at the provision in its entirety. The focus of the recor ds was merely on the first sentence of the provision and the not on the followin g sentences. Those are crucial given that the position in question falls under t he latter. Also, the records of the Constitutional Commission are merely extrins ic aids and are at best persuasive only and not necessarily conclusive. In addit ion, strictly interpreting the third sentence may create an absurdity for it giv es Congress the discretion of not creating a law that would give the President t he power to appoint those who are lower in rank. An irony arises when those in a lower position require the approval of the Commission on Appointments while tho se who are higher in position would not. Arthur Yap (DOA), Alberto Romulo (DFA), Raul Gonzales (DOJ), Florencio Abad (DOE ) Avelino Cruz (DND), Rene Villa (DAR), Joseph Durano (DOT), Mike Defensor (DENR ) + the aforementioned respondents took their oaths of office and assumed their duties as acting secretaries - 9/8/2004: a group of senators, headed by Sen. Pim entel, filed this present petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to declare these appointments by GMA unconstitut ional - 9/23/2004: GMA issued ad interim (temporary) appointments, replacing res pondents acting capacity - Sol Gen argues + petition is moot because GMA had issu ed the ad interim appointments after the recess of Congress; prohibition may not enjoin acts already done. + the power to appoint is executive in naturethe Commi ssion of Appointments, though it be composed of members of Congress, is a body i ndependent of Congress, and its executive power emanates from the Consti. + only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, EjercitoEstrada and Osmena, as members of the Commission, possess standing in the present petition. - Petitioners Argument + pe titioners assert that GMA cannot issue such appointments because no law grants s uch a power S10 Ch2 B4, EO 292: in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary + while Co ngress is in session, no appointments can be made w/o the consent of the Commiss ion Respondents Argument: -respondents assert that GMA can issue such appointment s for the reason that no law prohibits it S16 Ch5 T1 B3, EO 292: The Pres. shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided bythe law S17 Ch5 T1 B3, EO 292: the Pres. may appoint an officer already in service or any other compete nt person ISSUE WON GMAs appointment of respondents as acting secretaries w/o the consent of the Commission of Appointments while Congress is in session is uncon stitutional - EO 292 applies to appointments vested in the President by lawCongress is not th e only source of law S17(3) of the previous provision states: In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year. Petitioners fail to consider that this provision acts as a safeguard against the abuse of such appointments - a depart ment secretary is considered an alter ego of the President, that is, it holds a

position of great trust and confidence. Hence, Congress cannot impose that the u ndersecretary automatically be appointedthe Pres. must appoint an alter ego of he r choice. J. Bernas, SJ.: acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy; ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress and require submission to the Commission of Appointments for approval or rejecti on. - notwithstanding Bernas textbook definition, the court finds no abuse of appo intments in the present case as such were issued immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. Decision Petition DISMISSED MATIBAG V BENIPAYO CARPIO; April 2, 2002 FACTS - The Case: Petition for Prohibition w/ prayer for a writ of prelim injunc tion and TRO. Petitioner questions the appointment and the right of respondents to remain in office as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC - On Feb.2, 199 9, Petitioner Ma. Angelina Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as Acting Director IV of the Education and Information Dept. (EID), her appointment was re newed on Feb 15, 2000 in a Temporary capacity and renewed yet again on Feb 15, 200 1 in the same Temporary capacity. - On March 22, 2001 PGMA appointed ad interim, r espondents Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Resurreccion Borra, and Flor entino Tuason as COMELEC commissioners respectively, for a term of 7 years, expi ring on Feb. 2, 2008. They took their oaths and assumed their positions with the President submitting their ad interim appointments to the Commission on Appoint ments on May 22, 2001 for confirmation. The Commission on Appointments, however, did not act on their appointments. - On June 1, 2001, PGMA renewed their ad int erim appointments with the term and the expiration remaining the same (for 7 yea rs and expiring on Feb 2, 2008). The new appointees took oath a 2nd time and the same was transmitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation on June 5, 2001. The Congress adjourned before the Commission could act on the appointm ents resulting in the renewal of their ad interim appointments by the President for the 3rd time on June 8, 2001. PIMENTEL V ERMITA CARPIO; October 13, 2005 FACTS - 7/26/2004: Congress commenced their regular session - 8/25/2004: The Com mission on Appointments (composed of members of Congress) was constituted + mean while, GMA issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their res pective departments: HELD - the court held that the President may make such appo intments, as the law expressly provides it S17 Ch5 Title 1 Book 3, EO 292: the Pr esident may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service o r any other competent person to perform the function of an office in the executi ve branch

- Benipayo, acting as COMELEC chairman, assigned a Velma Cinco as officer-in-cha rge of EID and reassigned petitioner to the Law Dept, a move which she requested reconsideration for, citing Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular no. 7 (transfer of employees prohibited during election period: Jan.2-June 13, 2001). Benipayo denied the request and citing COMELEC Resolution no. 3300. Petitioner a ppealed to the COMELEC, filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Dept against Benipayo and while the complaint was pending, she also filed th is action. She claims that ad interim appointments violate the constitutional pr ovisions on the independence of the COMELEC, and on temporary appointments and r eappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails her reassignm ent to the Law Dept, the appointment of Cinco as well as the disbursements made by the COMELEC Finance Services Dept officer by way of salaries and emoluments i n favor of respondents. - PGMA, on Sept. 6, 2001 renewed once again the ad inter im appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for a term of 7 years expiring on Feb. 2, 2008. ISSUE 1. WON Benipayos ad interim appointment and assumption of off ice as COMELEC chairman is constitutional 2. WON issue is justiciable 3. If Beni payo, Borra and Tuason were indeed appointed lawfully, WON the renewal of their appointments and subsequent assumption of office was constitutional 4. WON petit ioners removal and reassignment is illegal (done w/o approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body) 5. WON the Officer-in-charge of COMELEC Finance Services Dept, in making disbursements in favor of the new appointees, acted in excess of juris diction. HELD 1. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment made by th e Pres. in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It is not an appointment in a temporary or acting capacity. It takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the Pres. once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact t hat it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alt er its permanent character. Reasoning - Although the last sentence of Art IX-C S ec 1(2) of the Constitution says, In no case shall any Member be appointed or des ignated in a temporary or acting capacity, an ad interim appointment is not a tem porary appointment. A distinction was made between the two in Pamantasan ng Lung sod ng Maynila v IAC, where it was held that an ad interim appointment as define d in Blacks Law Dictionary is one that is appointed to fill a vacancy, or to disc harge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent. But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Ph il. law. Ad interim is used to denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is, done by the President, in the meantime, while the body, which is originally vested with the power or appointment, is unable to act. - Although t he 1935 Consti did not have the provision prohibiting temporary or acting appoin tments, this Court then decided such an appointment in Nacionalista Party v Baut ista as unconstitutional declaring that, It would be more in keeping with the int ent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a permanent C ommissioner than to designate one to act temporarily. Likewise, In Brillantes v Yorac, decided under the present Constitution, this Court struck down as unconst itutional the designation by then Pres. Aquino of Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairpe rson of the COMELEC. - Art. IX-A 1 should be harmonized with Art. VII 16. for to h old that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointments before the appointees can assume offic e will negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments. - The origina l draft of Art. VII 16 did not provide for ad interim appointments, however, it w as reinstated to avoid interruptions in vital govt services that would result fr om prolonged vacancies in govt offices. The ad interim appointment has since bee n practiced by Presidents Aquino, Ramos and Estrada. 2. Justiciability of the ca se: The Court determined the justiciability of the case by tackling the requisit es of judicial review raised by the respondents which they claimed to be lacking (actual case/controversy was not raised) > personal and substantial interest of the party Petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the case. If Benipayos appointment is unlawful, petitioners reassignment is without l egal basis; if it is lawful, then she has no cause to complain provided that it

was done in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Because of her personal and m aterial stake in the resolution of the constitutionality of respondents assumptio n of office, she has locus standi to raise it as a constitutional issue > exerci se of judicial review must be pleaded at the earliest opportunity It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a cons titutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that c an resolve the same, such that, if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot b e considered at the trial, and if not considered at the trial, it cannot be cons idered on appeal. Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim a ppointments when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constituti onal issue before a competent body. > the constitutional issue must be the lis m ota of the case The Respondents claim that the legality of petitioners reassignme nt from the EID to the Law Dept. is the issue. The Court, however, held that unl ess the constitutionality of Benipayos appointment is determined, the legality of petitioners assignment cannot be determined, therefore the lis mota of this case is clearly the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. 3. The phrase without reappointment in Art. IX-C 1(2) applies only to appointments by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, regardless of WoN such person appoi nted completes the term of office. Reasoning The phrase without reappointment does not apply to the renewal of appointments to Benipayo, Tuason and Borra because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on App ointments. - The renewal of their appointments was by-passed by the Commission o n Appointments. It was not acted upon on the merits at the close of the session of Congress. There was no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to gi ve or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. I t is therefore neither fixed nor an unexpired term. Absent such decision, the Pr esident is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee as recognized in Sec.17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover, t heir appointments were all for a fixed term expiring on Feb. 2, 2008, clearly no t in breach of the 7 year term limit. 4. The COMELEC Chairman is the official ex pressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel and the pers on holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. He has full authorit y to exercise all the powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appoin tment remains effective. Moreover, in COMELEC Resolution no. 3300, the COMELEC e n banc, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the el ection period. 5. Because Benipayo is held to be the lawful COMELEC chairman, th e Officer-in-Charge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction, in the disburseme nt of their salaries. Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Concurre d with by JJs: Davide, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbin g, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, and Sandoval-Gutierrez. Puno and Vitug, JJs, were o n official leave. Consti Provisions cited: Art. IX-A 1 The Consti Commissions COME LEC shall be independent

Art. IX-C 1(2) Nature and term of appointment of Comelec chairman and commissione r: (7 years w/o reappointment). In no case shall there be appointment in a tempo rary or acting capacity. Art. VII 16 power of Pres. to make appointments during r ecess of Congress effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointme nts or until the next adjournment of Congress. 4. WON the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitutio n in the person of the President and may not be delegated 5. WON there has been grave abuse of discretion and violation of constitutional policies HELD 1. The C ourts cognizance of this petition will not only determine the validity or invalid ity of the subject pretermination (buyback) and bond-conversion of foreign debts but also create a precedent for other debts or debt-related contract executed o r to be executed in behalf of the President by the Secretary of Finance. Seen in this light, the transcendental importance of the issues herein cannot be doubte d. - Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of alleged f acts, procedural questions acquire a relatively minor significance. By the very nature of the power wielded by the President, the effect of using this power on the economy, and the well-being in general of the Filipino nation, the Court mus t set aside the procedural barrier of standing and rule on the justiciable issue s presented by the parties. 2. The Court holds that some issues are not ripe for adjudication. One such issue raised by petitioners is the allegation that respo ndents waived the Philippines right to repudiate void and fraudulently contracted loans is not justiciable. - Records do not show whether the so-called behest lo ans were subject of the debt-relief contracts. - Moreover, asserting a right to repudiate void or fraudulently contracted loans begs the question of whether ind eed particular loans are void or fraudulently contracted. Petitioners theory depe nds on a prior annulment or declaration of nullity of the pre-existing loans, wh ich thus far have not been submitted to this Court. - As a final point, petition ers have no real basis to fret over a possible waiver of the right to repudiate void contracts. Respondents unequivocally assert that the Republic did not waive any such right, it having incorporated a no-waiver clause in the agreements. - Ob iter Many advocates that the Republic should renege on obligations that are cons idered as illegitimate. However, such course of action would have adverse repercus sions. Among the consequences is that the standard cross-default provisions in P hilippine foreign loans may come into effect, in which case, default even in one loan would be ground for other creditors to declare default on other loans. - I n any event, the discretion on the matter lies not with the Courts but with the executive. CONSTANTINO V CUISA TINGA; October 13, 2005 FACTS - This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assails said cont racts which were entered into pursuant to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992. It seeks to enjoin respondents from executing additional debt -relief contracts pursuant thereto. - The Financing Program was devised under Pr esident Corazon Aquino to manage the countrys external debt problem through a neg otiation-oriented debt strategy by means of two debt-relief options: 1) cash buy back of portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount, or 2) allowed cre ditors to convert existing Philippine debt instruments into bonds/securities. Petitioners challenge the Program as follows: 1. That it is beyond the powers gr anted to the President under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution: The Pr esident may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines That buyback and securitization/bond conversion schemes are neither l oans nor guarantees, and hence, beyond the power of the President. 2. That assuming the above as constitutionally permissible, it is only the President who may exe rcise the power to enter into these contract and such power may not be delegated . 3. That the Program was made available for debts fraudulently contracted or vo id. Petitioners rely on 1992 Commission on Audit report identifying several behes t loans contracted or guaranteed fraudulently during the Marcos regime. That sinc e these were eligible for buyback or conversion, they would be void for being wa ivers of the Republics right to repudiate the void or fraudulently contracted loa

ns. - For their part, respondents dispute the points raised by petitioners. They also question the standing of petitioners and the justiciability of the issues presented. ISSUES Procedural 1. WON the petitioners have locus standi. 2. WON th e case is ripe for adjudication Substantive 3. WON the scope of section 20, Arti cle VII includes bond-conversion and buyback 3. On Bond-Conversion - An investor who purchases a bond is lending money to the issuer, and the bond represents the issuers contractual promise to pay interest and repay principal ac cording to specific terms. The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctio ns as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others. - The onl y restriction that the Constitution provides aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the loans must be subject to limitations provided b y law. In this regard, it is noted RA 245 as amended by PD 142 entitled An Act A uthorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures Author ized by Law, and for Other Purposes, allows foreign loans to be contracted in th e form of bonds thus: the Secretary of Finance, with the approval of the Preside nt after consultation with the Monetary board, is authorized to borrow and to issu e therefore evidences of indebtedness may be of the following types: Treasury bon ds - Also under the foregoing provision, sovereign bonds may also be provided for the purchase, redemption, or refunding of nay obligation, either direct or guar anteed, of the Philippine Government. On the Buyback Scheme - It is true that in the separation of powers, it is Congress that manages the countrys coffers by vi rtue of its taxing and spending powers. However, the law-making authority has pr omulgated a law ordaining an automatic appropriations provision for debt servici ng. The Court in Guingona v. Carague, held: Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization therefore already exists under RA 4860 and 245, as amended, and PD 1967. In the light of this subsisting authoriz ation, Congress does not concern itself with details for implementation by the E xecutive. Upon such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have del egated its wisdom to the Executive. - Specific legal authority for the buyback e ven without further action from Congress is established under Section 2 of RA 24 0 thus: the Secretary of Finance shall cause to be paid out of any moneys in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated any interest falling due, or accrui ng on any portion of the public debt authorized by law. He shall also cause to b e paid out the principal amount of any obligations which have matured or, if redee med prior to maturity, such portion of the face value as is prescribed by the te rms and conditions under which such obligations were originally issued. - Buybac k is a necessary power which springs from the grant of the foreign borrowing pow er. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions

as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose. - Also, the Constituti on, as a rule, does not enumerate let alone enumerate all the acts which the Pre sident (or any other public officer) may not do, and the fact that the Constitut ion does not explicitly bar the President from exercising a power does not mean that he or she does not have that power. 4. The evident exigency of having the S ecretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debtrelief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing a nd executing strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance. If the President were to personal ly exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, this would negate the v ery existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holder s thereof are accorded, and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in run ning the government. - Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified po litical agency. Though the President is the Executive of the Government and no o ther, the heads of the executive department occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity and should be of the Presidents bosom confidence a nd alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required b y law to exercise authority subject to the direction of the President. And it is upon the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President to deal with ma tters regarding the sound and efficient management of the financial resources of Government. - And although there are powers vested in the President that may no t be delegated are only those that call for the supersedence of executive prerog atives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government, e.g. power to su spend the write of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (Par. 3 Sec 11, Art VI I) and the benign prerogative of mercy (Par. 6 Sec 11, Art VII), the power to co ntract or guarantee foreign debts does not fall within the same exceptional clas s. - Another important qualification is that the Secretary of Finance or any des ignated alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latters prior consent t o or subsequent ratification of his acts. A lack of showing that President Aquin o countermanded the acts of respondents leads us to conclude that the said acts carried presidential approval. 5. Petitioners cite an article by Jude Esguerra t hat under the Program a best case scenario would give a yield significantly lowe r than estimated by the Program and a worst case scenario where what can be gain ed in the best case is lesser than what can be lost in this worst case. In addit ion, petitioners postulate a more simple rescheduling agreement in place of the debt-relief package. Petitioners allege therefore that the Program violates constitutional state policies to promote a social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty, f oster social justice in all phases of national development, and develop a self-re liant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. - The Court held that the policies set by the Constitution as litanized are not a pan acea that can annul every governmental act sought to be struck down. Insofar as the case at bar, the court can make no conclusion other than that respondents eff orts were geared towards debt-relief with marked positive results and towards ac hieving the aforementioned constitutional policies. SEPARATE OPINION PANGANIBAN - Indubitably, former President Aquinos decision to honor outstanding debts of th e Republic was purely an executive call; hence, beyond judicial scrutiny. For th is reason, neither can respondents be faulted for implementing the Program execu ted pursuant to that constitutional executive policy. - Also, that petitioners q uestion the legality of several foreign loans necessitates a review of the assai led contracts. Because the petitioners failed to substantiate the charges, the a rgument cannot be addressed. A determination of the validity of such allegations requires a review of factual matters. The Supreme Court is not a trier or facts . The proper action for petitioners is to file their petition in the lower court s, which had concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and which are bette r equipped to conduct a firsthand examination of factual evidence in support of their allegations. This notwithstanding, there is nothing in this decision to pr

eclude the Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman from initiating an investigation of the alleged fraudulent loans. Suppletorily, probable cause m ust be shown in order that prosecution may be brought to bear. Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor and Employment the power and disc retion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining. Petitioner contends that [a] BP 30 is an undue d elegation of legislative powers [b] such conferment of authority may also run co ntrary to the assurance of the State to the workers right to selforganization a nd collective bargaining. - Procedure + Sept. 14, 1981 notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices stating the following grounds: 1) Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct; 2) Illegal termina tions and suspensions of officers and members as a result of the implementation of said Code of Conduct; and 3) Automatic treatment as of sick leaves as AWOL wi th suspensions, in violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement + Sept. 15, 1981 , notification to the Ministry of compliance with the 2/3 strike vote and other formal requirements of the law and Implementing Rules. Conciliation meetings cal led by the Minister followed. + Sept. 25, 1981, respondent certified the labor d ispute to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitrat ion and enjoined any strike at the private respondents establishment. + Hearing at NLRC was set on Sept. 28. Petitioner filed petition to SC the next day. Cour t issued resolution for respondents to file answer. After parties were duly hear d y SC on Oct. 8, case was ripe for decision. ISSUES 1. WON BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causi ng or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national inter est and thereafter decide it or certify the same to the NLRC is unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power 2. W ON there is unconstitutional application of BP 130 HELD 1. The delegation to the Minister of Labor of the power to assume jurisdiction in a labor dispute likely to affect the national interest or to certify the same to the NLRC for arbitrat ion does not constitute undue delegation of legislative powers. Reasoning: First . It lays down the premise. The power which would be denied the Minister of Labo r by virtue of such has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employers shal l immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the a ssistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision a s well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same." FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS V MINISTER FERNANDO; October 30, 1981 - Free Telephone Workers Union, herein petitioner, attacks the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 13036 (BP 130) in so far as it amends Art. 264 of the 36 "In labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affe cting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public util ities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hos pitals, and those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Empl oyment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the sam e to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending stri ke or lockout. If one

principle is within the competence of the President, who in its opinion can best determine national interests, but only when a strike is in progress. Such admis sion is qualified by the assumption that the President "can make law." But what possesses significance for the purpose of this litigation is that it is the Pres ident who "shall have control of the ministries." It points that the adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character.37 Then it cites the expanse of the powers of the President by the provisions in the Constitutions both of 1935 and 1973. (Note: My reading here is that the power by the Minister of Labor to assu me jurisdiction in a labor dispute is an executive function) Second. The ponenci a cited precedence to develop its argument. Villena v. Secretary of Interior say s that "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Execu tive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants a nd agents of the Chief Executive. In other words, without minimizing the importan ce of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. (Note: It used this doctrine in a later case Phil. American Management Co. v. Phil. American Management Employees Assoc iation) Third. Even on the assumption that the authority conferred to the Minist er of Labor partakes of a legislative character, still no case of an unlawful de legation of such power may be discerned. It cites Edu v. Ericta: To determine wh ether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislatu re does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. [a] Distinction between del egation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of auth ority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance o f the law, to which no valid objection can be made; [b] To avoid unlawful delega tion, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legisla ture itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy; [ c] Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuanc e of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. In Peop le v Exconde: regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the la w; that the regulation be 37 not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescrib es. BP 130 did not violate these guidelines. Fourth. The ponencia stressed the r uling in People v. Vera, saying that though scholarly and erudite, it aroused ap prehension for being to rigid. The liberal approach in the ruling in Edu v. Eric ta as reinforced in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices recognized th at: It would be self-defeating in the extreme if the legislation intended to cope with the grave social and economic problems of the present and foreseeable futu re would founder on the rock of an unduly restrictive and decidedly unrealistic meaning to be affixed to the doctrine of non-delegation. - Also quoting Professor Jaffe: The occasions for delegating power to administrative offices [could be] c ompassed by a single generalization. Thus: Power should be delegated where there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be effectively perform ed by the legislature without the assistance of a delegate or without an expendi ture of time so great as to lead to the neglect of equally important business. D elegation is most commonly indicated where the relations to be regulated are hig hly technical or where their regulation requires a course of continuous decision . 2. In the absence of factual determinations (by the Ministry of Labor and the N LRC), this Court is not in a position to rule on whether or not there is unconst itutional application. Decision [1] No. BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minist er of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to caus e strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter d ecide it or certify the same to the NLRC is NOT on its face unconstitutional sin ce there was no undue delegation of legislative power. [2] There is no ruling on

the question of whether or not BP 130 has been unconstitutionally applied in th is case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization and free collect ive bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by private respondent, the mat ter is not ripe for judicial determination Dispositive Petition Dismissed. Votin g 11 concur, no dissent. - December 29, 1961 Pres. Carlos P. Garcia appointed Aytona as ad interim Govern or of the Central Bank. Aytona took his oath of office on that day. - December 3 0, 1961 President-elect Diosdado Macapagal took his oath of office - December 31 , 1961 Macapagal issued Administrative Order # 2 recalling, withdrawing and canc elling all ad interim appointments made by Garcia after December 13, 1961 (the d ate Macapagal was proclaimed as the elected president by Congress) - January 1, 1962 Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim governor of the Central B ank - January 2, 1962 Both Aytona and Castillo exercised the powers of their off ice but Castillo informed Aytona of his appointment. The next day, Aytona was pr evented from holding office - Aytona instituted a quo warranto which challenged Castillos right to exercise the powers of Governor of Central bank. Aytona clai ms he was: 1. validly appointed 2. qualified for the post 3. and that the subseq uent appointment and qualification of Castillo was void because the occupation w as occupied by him - Castillo argued that the appointment of Aytona had been rev oked by AO 2. ISSUE WON the new President (Macapagal) had the power to issue the order of the cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by the past Presi dent (Garcia) even after the appointees had already qualified. HELD Castillo is the rightful governor of the Central Bank. - December 29, 1961 Garcia sent to th e Commission on Appointments (not yet in session) a communication submitting for confirmation ad interim appointments of several officials including the Central Bank Governor in the person of Aytona. There were three other communications re garding the same matter submitted on the same day. - All in all there were 350 m idnight appointments by Garcia. - In revoking the appointments, Macapagal acted based on the following reasons: 1)outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give the new President the opportunity to consider names in the light of new plicies 2)Scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fal l within the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision authorizing the i ssuance of ad interim appointments 3)Appointments were irregular, immoral and un just because they were issued only upon the condition that the appointee would i mmediately qualify obviously to prevent a recall by the incoming Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: "The President shall b e the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines." Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation that it is a presidential sys tem that obtains in our government. Thus: "All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are h ereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise." AYTONA V CASTILLO BENGZON; January 19, 1962 FACTS

President which would result to those deserving the appointment of the new Presi dent to be declined and by-passed 4)Abnormal conditions surrounding the appointm ent and qualifications evinced a desire on the part of the outgoing President to merely subvert the policies of the incoming administration - Many of the person s mentioned in the December 29 communication did not qualify. - It is Malacanang s practice to submit ad interim appointments only when the Committee on Appoint ments is in session so that only those who have accepted the appointment and qua lified are submitted for confirmation. - It is common sense to believe that afte r the proclamation of the election of Macapagal, Garcias administration was no more than a caretaker administration. He was supposed to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The appointment of 350 people in one night could be regarded as abuse of Preside ntial prerogatives. - When the President makes appointments with the consent of the Commission of Appointments, he has the benefit of their advice. When he make s ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either by previous consultation wit h the members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason f or such selection. - But in this case Garcia should have been doubly careful bec ause: the Commission that would consider the appointments is different from the one existing during the time the appointments were made the names are to be subm itted by his successor who may not fully approve of the appointments - The Court chose not to disregard Administrative Order 2 and cancelled the midnight appoin tments. There are precedents that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be reconsidered. But none of the precedents have involved mass ad interim appoi ntments. - May 16, 1962- Quimsings, as well as other peoples appointments were confirmed May 17, 1962- at the session of the Commission on Appointments, a motion for rec onsideration of all the confirmed appointments was approved, and the Commission was adjourned with no future date fixed for its next meeting - June 11, 1962- Pr esident Macapagal designated Eduardo Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of Police of I loilo. - Hence this -Petition for prohibition to restrain Eduardo Tajanglangit f rom occupying the position of Chief of Police to which petitioner Quimsing had p reviously been appointed and duly qualified and the functions of which he was ac tually discharging. ISSUE WON Quimsings appointment was not lawfully confirmed, b ecause of the motion for reconsideration of his confirmation, which has, to the present, remained unacted upon HELD The appointment of Tajanglangit to the posit ion of Chief of Police of Iloilo City was null and void, because said position w as not vacant. - The revised rules of the Commission on Appointments provide: SEC . 21: Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the tab le, and this shall be a final disposit on such a motion SEC. 22: Notice of confir mation or disapproval of an appointment shall not be sent to the President of th e Philippines before the expiration of the period for its reconsideration, or wh ile a motion for reconsideration is pending. - The Commission had not disapproved of Quimsings appointment, it was merely under reconsideration. It has been estab lished that on July 19, 1962, Quimsings appointment was delivered to Malacanang. This, as well as the provisions above, supports the conclusion that the laying o f a motion for reconsideration on the table does not have the effect of withhold ing the effectivity of the confirmation, nor is it synonymous with disapproval o f the appointment. In fact, it is recognition that the appointment was confirmed . QUIMSING V TAJANGLANGIT BARRERA; February 29, 1964 FACTS - May 20, 1960- Quimsing designated Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo City - Dec. 20, 1961- Pres. Garcia extended an ad-interim appointment to Quimsing to the same position - Dec. 28, 1961- Quimsing took his oath of office, continued d ischarging functions of Chief of Police PEOPLE V VERA LAUREL; November 16, 1937

FACTS - 15 October 1931: information for criminal case People v. Mariano Cu Unjie ng, et al. filed in CFI Manila. In the said case, HSBC, being the offended party, intervened as private prosecutor. - 8 January 1934: after a protracted trial, C FI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing MCU to imprisonment. - 26 March 1935: SC upholds sentence of conviction w/ a slight modification of t he duration of imprisonment. - 17 December 1935: MFR and 4 motions for new trial by MCU denied by Phil SC. - 18 December 1935: final judgment was entered by Phi l SC. MCU seeks to elevate the case to US SC. - November 1936: US SC denies peti tion for certiorari. - 24 November 1936: Phil Sc denies MCUs petition for leave t o file a 2nd alternative MFR or new trial; & remands the case to CFI Manila for execution of the judgment. - 27 November 1936: MCU files application for probati on under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the Phil Legislature. CFI Manila, Jud ge Pedro Tuason presiding, refers the application to the Insular Probation Offic e (IPO) - 18 June 1937: IPO recommends denial of MCUs application for probation 5 April 1937: hearing of the petition before CFI Manila, 7th branch with Judge Jose O. Vera presiding. HSBC & the Fiscal of the City of Manila file separate op positions to the granting of probation. HSBC attacks constitutionality of Act No . 4221 on the following grounds: equal protection of the laws (its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands); undue delegation of legislative power ( section 11 of the said Act endows provl boards w/ power to make said law effectiv e or otherwise in their respective provinces). - 28 June 1937: Judge Jose O. Ver a of CFI Mnla promulgates resolution with a finding that MCU is innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted but denying the latters petition for probati on. - 3 July 1937: counsel for MCU files exception to the resolution denying pro bation & notice of intention to file MFR. This was followed by a series of alter native motions for new reconsideration or new trial. A motion for leave to inter vene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys was also filed. (At torney Eulalio Chaves, 1 of the 34, subsequently filed a petition for leave to w ithdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the motion was circul ated at a banquet given by counsel for MCU & that he signed the same "without ma ture deliberation & purely as a matter of courtesy.) HSBC files opposition to mot ion for intervention. - 6 August 1937: the Fiscal of the City of Mnla files moti on w/ TC for issuance of an order to execute judgment of Phil SC in said case & to commit MCU to jail in obedience to said judgment. - 19 August 1937 is the dat e set for hearing on the various motions for CFIs consideration. On this same dat e, this instant case was field before Phil SC to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in CFI Mnla. - Note Probation implies guilt by f inal judgment. While a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the finding s and conclusive of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially wheref rom

its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. If each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no en d to litigation, and judicial chaos would result. <emphasis on the hierarchy in the Philippine judicial system> ISSUES 1. WON the constitutionality of Act No. 4 221 has been properly raised in these proceedings 2. if YES, WON said Act is con stitutional a. WON Act No. 4221 encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Execu tive b. WON section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitute an undue delegation of legisla tive power c. WON the Probation Act violates Bill of Rights provisions on equal protection of the laws 3. WON the entire Act should be avoided HELD 1. The const itutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts u nless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case. <lis mota> The question of the consti tutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary action s BUT resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. <e.g. in mandamus proceedings, in an action of quo warranto, in h abeas corpus proceedings, on an application for injunction to restrain action un der the challenged statute, & even on an application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decisio n of the case, or through petitions for prohibition and certiorari. - Code of Ci vil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516: Philippine SC is granted c oncurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over inferio r tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their jurisdi ction. - General rule: the question of the validity of the criminal statute must be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. BUT in cases where a new act seriously affected numerous p ersons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue of the ac ts validity promptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly admini stration of justice. - The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior cou rt, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdic tion with which it is not legally vested. General rule: the merit of prohibition will not lie where the inferior court has jurisdiction independent o f the statute the constitutionality of which is questioned. BUT where the inferi or court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitution al statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that s tatute. A CFI sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdictio n. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature. It is unquestionable that the constitutional iss ue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by the private prosecution. - The power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. The authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of executing the s tatute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of j udicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by l aw and ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs to the execut ive department. - Cooley on Constitutional Limitations: A court will not conside r any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no intere st in defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The pow er to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case w here he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath declin e the responsibility. - General rule: only those who are parties to a suit may q uestion the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it h as been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is

void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statut e in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its bein g brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to b e given the statute. - General rule: the question of constitutionality must be r aised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordin arily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, i t will not considered on appeal. BUT courts, in the exercise of sounds discretio n, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a s tatute should be presented. In criminal cases, the question may be raised for th e first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on ap peal. Same is true in civil cases if it appears that a determination of the ques tion is necessary to a decision of the case. Also, a constitutional question wil l be considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdi ction of the court below - General rule: the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a re sult of its enforcement. The People of the Philippines, in whose name the presen t action is brought, has a substantial interest in having Act No. 4221 set aside . Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the wellsettled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its be hests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow. The state is always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or statutes is involved. - A judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the questio n of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be decided i n order to determine the right of a party litigant. An officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the gro und that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the s tatute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. Exec utive officers (e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer) should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional. - The mere fact that the Probatio n Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not been at tacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has bee n impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts w ill pass upon a constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona f ide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fi scal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper cases. - Is the determinati on of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to resolve the instant case? While the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision i s indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on other points. - General rule: the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case, as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacke d. There is no doubt that Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely fro m Act No. 4221 now being assailed. - Moreover, the Probation Act is a new additi on to our statute books and its validity has never before been passed upon by th e courts; many persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; some of them are already on probation; more

people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and the re spondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years s ince his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constituti onal question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy d emand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. - Also, in Phi l SCs ruling in an analogous situation in Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, the Court sai d: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merch ants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new la w not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare and f or the advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." P hil SCs ruling on this point was sustained by the US SC. A more binding authority in support of the view we have taken can not be found. 2. <the essence of judicia l duty> It is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It wi ll not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear case s, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting aside a sta tute in conflict therewith. - Fundamental criteria: all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legis lature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limita tions. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not in tend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the governments. The judiciary ought to reflect the wisdom of the people as e xpressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive. - The President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against the const itutionality of the Probation Act. In a message dated September 1, 1937, he reco mmended to the NA its immediate repeal, resulting in the approval of Bill No. 24 17 of the NA repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish. In vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determina tion of actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whatever opinion i s expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper c ourse of action to take in a given case. We are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative department of our government independent in the per formance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of ou r sworn duty as we see it and as we understand it. - The constitutionality of Ac t No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroache s upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an undue d elegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of th e laws. a. Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221 vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardon s and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in th e President of the Philippines (A7, s11(6)). Our Constitution also makes specifi c mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the p ardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may dee m proper; and to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the NA. But the pardoning power has remained essentially the same. - Jones Law vests the pardoning power

exclusively in the Chief Executive. The exercise of the power may not, therefore , be vested in anyone else. Where the pardoning power is conferred on the execut ive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legi slature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor in terfere with or control the proper exercise thereof. - Killitts decision involvi ng an embezzlement case: US SC ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspendi ng sentenced was void. Under the common law the power of the court was limited t o temporary suspension and the right to suspend sentence absolutely and permanen tly was vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciar y. But, the right of Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded. US v Murray: when a person sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has beg un to serve his sentence, that court has no power under the Probation Act of Mar ch 4, 1925 to grant him probation even though the term at which sentence was imp osed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of the p robation Act was not considered but was assumed. US SC denied the right of the d istrict courts to suspend sentence. The court pointed out the necessity for acti on by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the future. - Rig gs v US: the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit held that the consti tutionality of Probation Act of March 4, 1925 have been sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the same was held i n no manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the President. - 1916: US SC , in plain and unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requi site power to enact probation laws. A federal probation law was actually enacted in 1925. The constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the US SC in 1928 and consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlie r cases. The Philippine Legislature, like the US Congress, may legally enact a p robation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal of fenses. Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts -- particularly the trial courts -- large discretio n in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, th ey being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convi ct, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. <Revised Penal Code, Indeterminate Sentence Law, Parole Act, Juvenile Delinquency Law, (Adult) Probation Law, etc s how the intention of the legislature to humanize the penal laws.> - Some US cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encro ach upon the pardoning power of the executive. Other cases, however, hold contra . Phil SC elects to follow the long catena of authorities holding that the court s may be legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by the establ ishment of a system of probation however characterized. - Probation and pardon a re not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and differ ent from each other, both in origin and in nature. Probation, the power to suspe nd sentence, was always a part of the judicial power. It simply postpones the ju dgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liabilit y following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and become operative when jud gment is rendered. The power to grant reprieves and pardons, on the other hand, was always a part of the executive power. A pardon reaches both the punishment p rescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishm ent, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the of fender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It removes the p enalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes hi m, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.

- Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of t he sentence. Snodgrass vs. State: the power to suspend the sentence does not con flict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves. A reprieve postpones th e execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for an ind efinite time. A commutation is but to change the punishment assessed to a less p unishment. - State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court: A "pardon" is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law infli cts for a crime he has committed. It is a remission of guilt, a forgiveness of t he offense. "Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a substitu tion of a less penalty for the one originally imposed. "Reprieve" or "respite" i s the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time, a postponement of exe cution, a temporary suspension of execution. - The Probation Act does not confli ct with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the proba tioner and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment. b. Under the Consti, govt powers are distributed among 3 coordinat e and substantially independent organs: legislative, executive and judicial. Eac h department derives its authority from the Constitution, the highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisd iction, supreme within its own sphere. - The power to make laws (the legislative power) is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution (A6,s1). The Philippine Legisl ature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate t he power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata n on delegare potest, an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powe rs. - The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is no t absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions like: (1) delegation of legis lative powers to local authorities; (2) to such agencies in US territories as Co ngress may select; (3) to the people at large; and (4) to those whom the Constit ution itself delegates such legislative powers (e.g., the President). The case b efore us does not fall under any of these exceptions. - Test of Undue Delegation : to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions wh en it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. BUT to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be ado pted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay dow n any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. - In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine fo r themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to ap propriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain lan guage of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. - The true dist inction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily in volves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discr etion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Th e first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. - It is tr ue that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community. The le gislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully ex ercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. The re is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental pro

cess common to all branches of the government. - The efficiency of an Act as a d eclaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the asce rtainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate. The legislature, then may provide that a con tingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. In the case at bar, the various provincial b oards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operati on of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. - While the legislature m ay suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspe nded as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. Th e suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for par ticular localities. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to them according to th e constitution. It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liber ty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all othe rs under like circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damage s, suits, or actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted. - True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those appli cable to other localities. But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects pure ly local in character which should receive different treatment in different loca lities placed under different circumstances. While we do not deny the right of l ocal self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concer n in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pa ss upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of prob ation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as p rovided in Act No. 4221. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been do ne but by what may be done under its provisions. - A great deal of latitude shou ld be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what may be terme d legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." The mass of power s of government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these re presentatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express lan guage of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions whic h by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara case) - We conclude that sectio n 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislat ive authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. c. This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a res traint on all the tree grand departments of our government and on the subordinat e instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, l ike the police power, taxation and eminent domain. BUT what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question not always easily dete rmined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. - Class legislatio n discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classificat ion on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitte d. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial di stinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of th e law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equall y to each member of the class. - In the case at bar, however, the resultant ineq uality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. While inequa lity may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benef its therein provided, inequality is

not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimina tion and inequality are permitted or allowed. - There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permi ts of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibi tions. Statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in oper ation. If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it i s unconstitutional. 3. In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is aga inst any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise val id, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the constitu tional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process. - Where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while a nother part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. What remains must express the legislative will, independently o f the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. - In the case at bar , section 11 (which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those provinces i n which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers) is so inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the sy stem, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be des erving of the intended beneficial result of that system. - Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for us to pas s upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been sai d regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to am end the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions wh ich are not there. Not for any purpose not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity. The clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insu lar Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act app ly thereto. - Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable s ystem. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of the punishment", the ad justment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the circumstances o f his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilita tion of a penitent offender. It takes advantage of an opportunity for reformatio n and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of reform. Decis ion WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regardi ng costs. So ordered. violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment . Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be heard befo re he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution. ISSUE WON conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the p etitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms o f his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original se ntence. HELD - Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons. - It was held that the determinat ion if the parole had been breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the GovGen and that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As T esoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the powe r that had granted it, the Court held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was o rdered." Tesoro had in effect agreed that the GovGens determination (rather tha

n that of the regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his parole by committing adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him. - Sales vs. Director of Prisons - The executive clemency is extended upon the conditions named in it, and it is accepted upon t hose conditions. The governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, a nd the governor shall himself determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself in the premises, had exp ressly contracted and agreed that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest an d remandment to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him. - Espue las vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol - The Court reaffirmed the Tesoro and Sales r ulings. "Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence and confinement in the penitentiary. Whe n he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executiv e of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or pr isoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine wh ether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated To no ot her department of the Government [has] such power been entrusted." TORRES V GONZALES FELICIANO; July 23, 1987 FACTS - an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wil fredo S. Torres, presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. - Sometime before 1979, Torres was convicted by the CFI of Manila of the crime o f estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from (11) yrs, (10) mos and (22) days to (38) yrs, (9) mos. and (1) day, and to pay an in demnity of P127,728.75. These convictions were affirmed by the CA. The maximum s entence would expire on 2 Nov 2000. - On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. - On 21 M ay 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its recommendation, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons and Espuelas us. Provincial Warden of Bohol. The petitio ner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, which were then pending trial bef ore the RTC, and convicted by the RTC of the crime of sedition, which was then p ending appeal before the IAC. Many other charges have been brought against the p etitioner, although some have been identified as dismissed. - On 4 June 1986, th e respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President informing her of the Res olution of the Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon previou sly granted to petitioner. - On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the co nditional pardon of the petitioner. - On 10 October 1986, the respondent Ministe r of Justice issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recom mitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. - Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims that he did not

The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the following propositions: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which ar e not subject to judicial scrutiny. 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, m ay be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Sec 64 of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Art 159 RPC . Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) RAC, no judicial pron ouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction ther efore by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended f or the violation of his conditional pardon. 3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the o ffense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Sec 64 (i) RAC is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. - A convict granted conditional pardon, like the pet itioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before t he criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) ran be imposed upon him. Sinc e Art 159 RPC defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict wh o is regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecu ted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Art 159. - In proceeding against a convict who has been conditiona lly pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, t he Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Sec 64 (i) RAC; or (ii) to proceed against him under Art 159 RPC, upon a convict who " having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed ag ainst the petitioner under Sec 64 (i) RAC. Decision Petition dismissed - Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59). A prima facie case only justifies the filing of the corresponding information, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is still necessary for conviction. - The execu tive can only allege the commission of crime and thereafter try to prove it thro ugh indubitable evidence. If the prosecution succeeds, the court will then affir m the allegation of commission in a judgment of conviction. The current doctrine holds that, by virtue of Sec 64(i) RAC, the President may in his judgment deter mine whether the condition of the pardon has been violated. - I agree that the a uthority is validly conferred as long as the condition does not involve the comm ission of a crime but, say, merely requires good behavior from the pardonee. BARRIOQUINTO V FERNANDEZ FERIA; January 21, 1949 FACTS Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. Jimenez was sentenced t o life imprisonment, while Barrioquintos trial was delayed because he was arreste d later than Jimenez. Both submitted their cases to the Guerilla Amnesty Commiss ion pursuant to Proclamation No. 838 which the said commission remanded to the C FI of Zamboanga without deciding if they were entitled to amnesty or not on the ground that neither of them has admitted to the commission of the offense. ISSUE WON confession to the crime is necessary to be entitled to the benefits of Proc lamation No. 8 (grant of amnesty) HELD - In order to entitle a person to the ben efits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is c harged, and allege the amnesty as a defense. For whether or not he admits or con fesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions sh ould conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistanc e to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war 38 efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnes

ty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable service s to the nation. - Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts and Amnesty Commissions should apply the benefits granted to cases coming within th eir province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged w ith such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is en titled to said benefits. - If the courts have to proceed to the trial or hearing of a case and decide whether the offense committed by the defendant comes withi n the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has pleaded not g uilty, there is no reason why the Amnesty Commissions can not do so. - (This cas e is under Executive of our outline, and the following, although really obiter, is most relevant to this section) Difference of Amnesty from Pardon Pardon Amnesty -granted by the Chief -by proclamation of the Executive, thus a private preside nt with the act which must be pleaded concurrence of the and proved by the perso n Congress, and is a public pardoned and which the act of which the courts court s may not take notice may take judicial notice. of. Granted to one after Granted to classes of conviction persons or communities who may be guilty, generally be fore or after institution of prosecution and sometimes after conviction -looks f orward and relieves -looks backward and offender of consequences abolishes and p uts into of crime; abolishes and oblivion the offense itself, forgives punishmen t, but as though he had doesnt abolish civil liability committed no offense Doesnt restore rights to Rights not affected as the hold public office, suffrage, offe nder is treated as if he unless expressly restored committed no crime at all by pardon Decision respondents ordered to hear and decide the applications for amne sty of petitioners unless courts have already decided WoN they are entitled to b enefits of amnesty. SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [dissent] - As many as such charges may be, none of them so far has resulted in a final co nviction, without which he cannot be recommitted under the condition of his pard on. Proclamation No. 8 (dispositive): I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, in accordance with the provisions of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of th e Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an amnesty in favor of all person s who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941 to the date when ea ch particular area of the Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy cont rol and occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to crimes against chastity or t o acts committed from purely personal motives. SEPARATE OPINION PERFECTO [concur]

To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided by a Guerrilla Amnesty Co mmission only the following elements are essential: 1. that he is charged or may be charged with an offense penalized under the RPC, except those against chasti ty or for purely personal motives; 2. that he committed the offense in furtheran ce of the resistance to the enemy; 3. that it was committed during the period fr om December 8, 1941, to the date when the area where the offense was committed w as actually liberated from enemy control and occupation. If these three elements are present in a case brought before a Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, the latter cannot refuse to hear and decide it under the proclamation. There is nothing in the proclamation to even hint that the applicant for amnesty must first admit h aving executed the acts constituting the offense with which he is charged or may be charged. avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegations against him before he is a llowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action. It is a rank inconsistency for one to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act of which , according to him, he is not responsible. MONSANTO V FACTORAN FERNAN; February 9, 1989 FACTS In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted peti tioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and thr ee other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public do cuments and sentenced them to imprisonment and payment of fine. Petitioner appea led her conviction to the SC which affirmed the same. She filed a motion for rec onsideration, but while the motion was pending, she was extended absolute pardon on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos, which she accepted on December 2 1, 1984. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote Calbayog City Treasurer requ esting that she be reinstated to her former post. The Finance Ministry ruled tha t petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new ap pointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon, but sh e still has to pay. Seeking reconsideration, petitioner wrote the Ministry stres sing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted, and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspe nsion which is August 1, 1982. Petitioner contended that: she is entitled to bac kpay for the entire period of her suspension. she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50. ISSUES 1. WON a public offic er, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment. 2. WO N petitioner is still liable to pay civil indemnities notwithstanding pardon. HE LD 1. Ratio Pardon is defined as an act of grace, proceeding from the power entru sted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate xxx and not com municated officially to the Court. This was governed by the 1973 Constitution. TUASON [dissent] - As to the determination of the pretended right of the defendants, to the benef its of amnesty, the two orders of the Commission are decisions on the merits, de finite and final as far as the Commission is concerned. The fact that the defend ants denied having committed the crime imputed to them was cited by the Commissi on as ground for its decision to turn down their application. That circumstance was not given as ground for refusal to act. The Commission has thus amply perfor med the duties required of it by the Amnesty Proclamation in both the matters of investigating and deciding. The Amnesty Commissions are executive instrumentali ties acting for and in behalf of the President. They are not courts; they are no t performing judicial functions, and this Court has no appellate jurisdiction ov er their actuations, orders or decisions. - Mandamus is ordinarily a remedy for official inaction. (Guanio vs. Fernandez) - The Court can order the Commission t o act but it can not tell the Commission how to act. How or for whom a case shou

ld be decided is a matter of judgment which courts have no jurisdiction to contr ol or review. The writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exerc ise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon a public office r the right and the duty to exercise judgment. In reference to any matter in whi ch he is required to act, it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not tha t of the court. (Blanco vs. Board of Medical Examiners) - Amnesty presupposes th e commission of a crime. When an accused says that he has not committed a crime he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is also selfevident that where the Amnest y Proclamation imposes certain conditions, it is incumbent upon the accused to p rove the existence of those conditions. A petition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and Reasoning - People v. Lising xxx acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former publ ic officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entit lement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendent elite. In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former p osition. xxx - The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of t emporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from t he right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal penalty. Temp orary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or employmen t, such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence. - In the prese nt case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or afte r the conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the pa rdon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed convi ction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality. Pardon implies gui lt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof, as opposed to the Ex Parte Garland, Pelobello, and Cristobal cases. It involves forgiveness, and not forgetfulness. - While the Court is prepared to c oncede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give a meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prero gative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe t o the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and tha t once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. Pardon canno t mask the acts constituting the crime. - Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They canno t be compromised to favor private interests. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character. 2. As for the exemption from the payment of the civil in demnity, the Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability is governed by RPC, and su bsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is no t served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Decision The assailed re solution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. is affi rmed. 1. Petitioner is not automatically reinstated, and must apply for appointm ent to her former position. 2. Petitioner is not entitled to any backpay, and mu st pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.

MACAGA-AN V PEOPLE FELICIANO; July 39, 1987 FACTS - The 22 petitioners include municipal treasurers of various municipalitie s of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, and the Officer-in-Charge of the Provinc ial Treasurers Office of Lanao del Sur, as well as the Provincial Auditor and t he Assistant Provincial Auditor of Lanao del Sur. Petitioners were charged and c onvicted in 33 cases for estafa through falsification of public and commercial d ocuments (Article 315, in relation to Article 17 1, Revised Penal Code) in a dec ision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on 15 July 1981. The total amount of Gove rnment funds (treasury warrants) involved was somewhat over P2.7 million. - The petitioners state that they applied for amnesty through the 3rd and 11th Amnesty Commission (sic) of Lanao del Sur and Marawi City and that on 2 February 1985, they were granted conditional amnesty by the said Commission, subject to the app roval or final action of the President of the Philippines pursuant to P.D. No. 1 082, dated 2 February 1977. The Amnesty Commission, the petitioners continue, en dorsed the amnesty applications of the petitioners to the President, recommendin g approval thereof or grant of executive clemency to the petitioners. The petiti oners amnesty applications are said to have been submitted to the Office of the President by the then Presidential Assistant Victor Nituda. Former Governor Moh ammed Ali Dimaporo, the petitioners further state, made written representations dated 27 January 1986 with former President Marcos concerning the petitioners a pplications during a political rally of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan on 22 Januar y 1986. Mr. Marcos apparently wrote on the upper righthand corner of former Gove rnor Dimaporos letter the following: "Approved" and signed the same with a part ly illegible date. The petitioners state, finally, that the original copies of t he amnesty papers were in the possession of then Presidential Adviser Joaquin Ve nus and were lost or destroyed at Malacaang "during the February 1986 bloodless m ilitary revolution" and could not now be located. - The respondent court held th at the benefits of amnesty were never available to the petitioners under P.D. No . 1182 as amended by PD 1429. They further contend that the applicable law to th em is PD 1082, which granted amnesty to those resisting the duly constituted aut horities in several parts of Mindanao. ISSUE WON President Marcos grant of amnest y petitioners is in accordance with law. HELD to the NO. Acts of the President in contravention with the laws, which he himself promu lgated in the exercise of his concurrent legislative powers, are void and of no effect. Reasoning The benefits of amnesty were never available to the petitioner s under PD 1182. - Under said law, the crimes to be amnestied must have been for violations of subversion laws or for crimes against public order under the RPC. Among those disqualified from amnesty under PD 1182 are those who, while holding public office or employment diverted public funds from the lawful purpose for wh ich they had been appropriated. In the instant case, petitioners were charged wit h and convicted of Art. 315 viz Art 171, RPC. Art. 315 is under Crimes Against P roperty, while Art. 171 is under Crimes Against Public Interest. Clearly, petiti oners are among those expressly disqualified under PD 1182. Neither were petitio ners able to avail of amnesty under PD 1082. - The offenses for which amnesty ma y be granted under PD 1082 are acts penalized by existing laws in the furtherance of resistance to the duly constituted authorities of the Republic by members and s upporters of MNLF, Bangsa Moro Army and other anti-government groups with similar motivations and aims. The resistance referred to is typified by the offenses of re bellion, insurrection, sedition, or conspiracy to commit rebellion or sedition, all offenses with a political character and all of which are embraced in the RPC under Crimes Against Public Order. On the other hand, the acts of which petitio ners were convicted were ordinary crimes without any political complexion and co nsisting simply of diversion of public funds to private profit. - We do not disc ount the possibility that the former President did in fact act in contravention of PDs 1082 and 1182 by granting the amnesty claimed by petitioners, and that by such act, he may indeed have aroused expectations (however unjustified under th e terms of existing law) in the minds of the petitioners. If such be the case, t hen the appropriate recourse of petitioners is not to this Court, nor to any oth er court, but rather to the Executive Department. Decision Petition denied.

violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippi nes. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Admi nistrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit th e exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both officials refuse to issue the req uired export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philip pines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic uf the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-p ayer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing money under this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 2 26, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the holding of the national elections to be held in November, 19 49. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks thi s Court to prevent the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise dispos ing of that amount or any part of it. - Petitioners rest their case chiefly on t he proposition that the C.A. No. 671 ( An Act Declaring a State of Total Emergen cy as a Result of War involving the Philippines and Authorizing the President to Promulgate Rules and Regulations to Meet such Emergency) has ceased to have any force and effect, thereby rendering the assailed Executive Orders null and void . ISSUE WON the emergency powers delegated to the President had ceased when Cong ress held its regular session HELD YES. Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperat ive when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Ord ers Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. - Commonweal th Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The inten tion of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be published, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. - Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides: "In time of war or other national em ergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period a nd subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and reg ulations to carry out a declared national policy." - The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in ARANETA V DINGLASAN TUASON; August 26, 1949 FACTS - The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the Presiden t avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses a nd lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for

duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "mu st be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opp osite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary t o the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the con stitutional scope of its powers. - The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for th e delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law; for Congres s might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet wi th the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them exc ept by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to dele gate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. - Section 4 of Act No. 671 stipulates that "the rules and re gulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Con gress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regard ing the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear mani festation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessit y to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about the tim e the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assembly failed to m ake a provision for its termination in the same way that it did for the terminat ion of the effects, and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annull ed by the legislature. - More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functio ns by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authori ty is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the sam e field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each o thers actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, t he anomaly would not be eliminated. Congress by a 2/3 vote could repeal executiv e orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the Presi dent in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure. - Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the National Assembly res tricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legisl ature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes br ought on by the war. Section 3 provides: "The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines re port thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers h erein granted." - The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his tr usteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have s aid if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report mentioned in section 3 was to be the first and last and did not think that upon the convening of the first Congress Act No. 671 would lapse, what rea son could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected t o continue making laws in the form of rules, regulations and executive orders, w

ere as important, or as unimportant, as the initial one. - As a contemporary con struction, President Quezons statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law. Pres. Quezon, who called the National Assemb ly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers A ct, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrus ted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenact ed." These phrases connote automatic extinction of the law upon the conclusion o f a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They si gnify that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant sh ould be prolonged. - Pres. Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography fur nished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of t he National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless ag ainst air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It can eas ily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon t he President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the deleg ation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly o f its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the f oundations of democratic institutions could not have been conceived under any ci rcumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation of the normal processe s of government. The period that best comports with the constitutional requireme nts and limitations, with the general context of the law and with what we believ e to be the main if not the sole raison detre for its enactment, was a period c oextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the convening of that body. - In setting the first regular session of Congress inste ad of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the purpose and intention of the National Assembly is given effect. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such s ubjects as the President may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitut ion.) In a regular session, the power of Congress to legislate is not circumscri bed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law. - After all the critic isms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of govern ment, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentar y government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-lovi ng peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, unde r this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the ti me, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve th e Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in ti mes of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances the various branches, ex ecutive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called upon to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respect ively. Decision Petitions GRANTED. QUA CHEE GAN V DEPORTATION BOARD BARRERA; September 30, 1963 FACTS - Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila denying the petition for wri t of habeas corpus and/or prohibition,

certiorari, and mandamus filed by the petitionerappellants - The petitioners wer e charged before the Deportation Board (DB) with having purchased $130,000.00 US dollars without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines and having remitted the same to HK; and three of the petitioner-appellants with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and US Governments in order to evade prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of US dollars. - After fili ng of deportation charges, presiding member of the DB issued a warrant of arrest for the said aliens but upon filing of a surety bond and cash bond, the petitio ner-appelants were provisionally set free. - The petitioner-appellants then file d a joint motion to dismiss the charges on the grounds that (1) deportation char ges do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens and (2) the DB has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges, but was denied by the DB. The petitio nerappellants then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition which w as remanded to the CFI of Manila. The CFI issued a writ of preliminary injunctio n, restraining DB from hearing the deportation charges against the petitioners, pending final termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings. D B filed its answer to the original petition, maintaining that the DB, as an agen t of the Prexi, has jurisdiction over the charges and the authority to order the ir arrest. CFI dismissed the petition, hence this appeal. ISSUES 1. WON the depo rtation charges constitute legal ground form deportation of the petitioner-appel lants 2. WON, conceding without deciding that the President can personally order the arrest of the alien complained of, such power can be delegated by him to th e DB HELD 1. Yes. The act of profiteering, hoarding, or blackmarketing of US dol lars violate Central Bank regulations and could be treated as ECONOMIC SABOTAGE, which is a ground for deportation under RA 503 amending Sec 37 of CA 613. 2. No . Official functions requiring the exercise of discretion such as the power to a rrest cannot be delegated to an agent of the President. Obiter 2 ways to deport an undesirable alien: Commissioner, as seen in Sec 52 [which is the repealing clause of the Immigratio n Act, which expressly exempted Sec 69 of Act 2711 (Act No. 2711): only indicate s that the Executive or his authorized agent could only deport/expel/exclude fro m RP aliens upon conducting a prior investigation of the ground of such action a nd the rest of it indicates the procedure concerning the protection of the said alien during the deportation proceedings. [indication of the recognition of the existence of power of the executive to deport aliens] Presidents power under Sec. 69, Act 2711 may be delegated: proofs through history Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code Decision EO 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the DB to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fi x bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. Order of arrest null and void, bonds filed decreed cancelled. Decision appealed from affirmed with modification. ART VIII: JUDICIARY DEMETRIA V ALBA FERNAN; February 27, 1987 FACTS - Petitioners, in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 on the ff. grounds: o it infringes upon the fundamental law by aut horizing the illegal transfer of public moneys o it is repugnant to the constitu tion as it fails to specify the objectives and purposes for which the proposed t ransfer of funds are to be made o it allows the President to override the safegu ards, form and procedure prescribed by the Constitution in approving appropriati ons o it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers o the transfer of fun ds by the President and the implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and th e Treasurer are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction - Solic itor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petit

ioners. He further contended that: o The provision under consideration was enact ed pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution o Prohibition wi ll not lie form one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin th e performance of duties within the latters sphere of responsibility - On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment - Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance - The Solicitor General fil ed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss setting forth as ground therefore, abrog ation of Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constit ution, rendering the petition moot and academic EO EO No. 494 (first EO of Gov-Gen Murphy, 1934): constitute a board to take actions o n complaints against foreigners, conduct investigations and make recommendations No. 33 (Quezon, 1936): creation of DB to receive complaints against aliens, to c onduct investigations (under Sec 69, Act 2711) and make recommendations authoriz ed by President ***TAKE NOTE: Power to INVESTIGATE, not POWER TO ORDER ARREST OF THE ALIEN EO 69 (Roxas, 1947): orders respondents in deportation proceedings to file a bond w ith the Commissioner of Immigration to ensure their appearance and facilitate ex ecution of deportation order whenever the President decides the case against the respondent ***TAKE NOTE: Filing of BOND, NOT AUTHORIZE ARREST OF THE RESPONDENT 398 (Quirino, 1951): reorganized the DB and authorized the DB, upn filing of fo rmal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue warrant for the ar rest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the inves tigation unless he files a bond (so here, PRESIDENT ALREADY AUTHORIZED ARREST OF RESPONDENT ALIENS) On rights of the accused: Sec 1, ART III of 1935 CONSTI = Se c 2, ART III, 1987 CONSTI This provision specifies that the probable cause must be determined by the judge after examination under oath of the complainant and t he witness produced unlike that of the 4th Amendment, Philippine Bill, or Jones Act which does not determine who exactly would determine the probable cause for the order of arrest. The Consti is silent on whether a warrant of arrest may be issued upon determination of the probable cause by other authority besides the J udge. *DURING INVESTIGATION, IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE ALIEN BE ARRESTED. IT IS ENOUGH THAT A BOND BE REQUIRED TO INSURE THE APPEARANCE OF THE ALIEN DuriNG T HE INVESTIGATION. EO Section 37, CA No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940): Commissioner of Immigration empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefore BUT d id not concentrate exercise power to deport to the

ISSUES 1. WON the case is justiciable 2. WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Pr esidential Decree No. 1177 is unconstitutional HELD 1. YES - The court cited Ece lio Javier v. COMELEC where it said that: This Court will not disregard and in ef fect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has beco me moot and academic. - As regards taxpayers suit, this Court enjoys that open dis cretion to entertain the same or not - Where the legislature or the executive br anch acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed t o do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constituti on in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 2. YES. Paragraph 1of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, being repugnant t o Section 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, is null and void. - Parag raph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agen cies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriatio ns Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment. - Se ction 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Spe aker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional co mmissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriat ions law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respe ctive appropriations. - Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical - Fo r flexibility, the Constitution provided a leeway - The purpose and condition fo r which funds may be transferred were specified - Paragraph 1 of Section 44 undu ly over-extends the privilege granted under Section 16(5), and empowers the Pres ident to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriat ions Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or offi ce included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, w ithout regard to WON the funds to be transferred are savings, or WON the transfe r is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made - It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting t o an undue delegation of legislative power DE AGBAYANI V PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK FERNANDO; April 29, 1971 FACTS - Francisca De Agbayani obtained a P450.00loan from PNB dated July 19, 193 9 maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage - As of November 27 , 1959 the loan balance was P1,294.00 - July 13 1959, PNB instituted extra-judic ial foreclosure proceedings in the office of Pangasinan Provincial Sherriff for the recovery of the unpaid loan balance - August 10, 1959 Plaintiff filed suit a gainst PNB and Sheriff alleging that 15 years having elapsed from the date of ma turity the mortgage have prescribed. - PNB prayed for the dismissal since the de fense of prescription would not be available in the period of March 10, 1945 , w hen EO 32 providing for a moratorium on debts was issued, to July 26, 1948 when RA 342 which extended the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the time during which PNB took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan - Lower court ruled in favor of De Agbayani ISSUES 1. WON a statute sub sequently adjudged as invalid should be deemed to have force and effect before t he declaration of its nullity. 2. (if yes) WON prescription ran during the eight year period that EO 32 and RA 342 was in force. HELD 1. YES Prior to the declar ation of nullity a challenged legislative or executive act must have been in for ce and effect. - The actual existence of a statute, prior to the determination o f unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which canno t be justly ignored. 2. NOBecause of the judicial recognition that moratorium wa s a valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were war suffer er the SC has made clear its view in a series of cases that during the eight yea r period that EO 32 and RA 342 was in force, prescription did not run. (cases de cided: Day v. CFI, Republic vs. Hernaez. - Orthodox view on an unconstitutional act: An unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal

ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any le gal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. - SC s aid, in Agbayani vs. PNB that orthodox view is unrealistic and that until after the judiciary declares its invalidity it is entitled to obedience and respect. DE LA LLANA V ALBA FERNANDO; March 12, 1982 FACTS - The National Assembly enacted the Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other Purpo ses". BP 129 mandates that Justices and Judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and t he Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the Judiciary. The intent of this A ct is to attain (1) more efficiency in the disposal of cases, (2) improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the court, (3) democratization of social an d economic opportunities and the substantiation of the true meaning of social ju stice. - Procedure De La Llana,a judge, together with other petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or Prohibition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and res pondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129. ISSUES 1 .WON the petitioners have legal standing. 2.On Constitutionality of BP 129 a. WO N there was lack of good faith on the part of Legislature in its enactment. b. W ON the abolition of an office by the Legislature is valid. c. WON the provision of BP 129 (regarding fixing of compensation and allowances of members of Judicia ry by the Executive) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. d. WO N BP 129 is violative of the security of tenure (Art. X Sec 7 of 1973 Constituti on) enjoyed by incumbent justices and judges and the Supreme Courts power to di scipline and remove judges. HELD 1.YES. The petitioners, being members of the ba r and officers of the court and taxpayers, have a personal and substantial inter est in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 2.a. NO. The Legislature, after careful study and eva luation of the judicial system in the country, found out that institutional refo rms is both pressing and urgent. b. YES. The abolition of an office,if within th e competence of a legitimate body and if done in good faith suffers from no infi rmity. Reasoning 0 adherence to precedent (in Bendanillo Sr. v. Provincial

Gov and in Zandueta v. De La Costa, the Court also held that the abolition of an office is valid) - Interpretation of the Consti provision - Article VII Sec 2 o f 1973 Consti "vests in the NA the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitation in the case of SC." In short, the NA has the power to abolish an office that it created. c. NO . There is no undue delegation of legislative power if the law is complete and p rovides for a standard. Reasoning - In this case, the Act provides a clear stand ard. The President may be authorized to fix the allowances and compensation but guided by the Letter of Implementation No. 93 and pursuant to PD 985. d. NO. Rem oval from office is different from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would there by lose his position. In the case of abolition, there is in law no occupant. The re can be no tenure to a nonexistent office. Reasoning - Conflicting constitutio nal provisions, the power of the NA to abolish an office on one hand and the sec urity of tenure, on the other, must be reconciled and harmonized. Reconciliation and balancing is well high unavoidable under the fundamental principle of separ ation of powers. - Political theory (Holmes and Tuazon): There is more truism an d actuality of interdependence among different branches of government than in in dependence and separation of powers. Decision: Dismissed. The unconstitutionalit y of BP 129 has not been shown. in the judiciary calls for its reorganization. He believes that the Constitution is a living instrument which translates and adapts itself to the demands of obt aining circumstances (realist approach in interpreting the Consti) No law is irrepealable. The power to create an office includes the power to abol ish them. "Salus populi est suprema lex" - The welfare of the people is the supr eme law. AQUINO [concur in the result] For him the suit is premature, but affirming expressly that the abolition was in good faith. CONCEPCION (concurs in the result) PLANA [concurs and dissent] Actual and not merely presumptive good faith attended its enactment. His qualifi cation being that the "President is under no obligation to consult with the SC a nd the SC as such is not called upon to give legal advice to the President." GUERRERO [concur] Social justification and the functional utility of the law to uphold its constit utionality is the ratio decidendi of this case. For him, inquiring into the wisd om of the law is a political question. Public office is a privilege in the gift of the State and not a right. Dura lex sed lex, even though it is harsh. PEOPLE V CUARESMA NARVASA; April 18, 1989 FACTS - On the basis of affidavits of Luz Lumacao and her witness, Soledad Tanil on, both dated August 21,1978 which were sworn to before the First Assistant Cit y Fiscal of Dumaguete City, said Assistant Fiscal filed on the same day an infor mation with the City Court Judge of Dumaguete City charging Rosie Cuaresma with oral defamation. The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case Number 7238. - Rosi e Cuaresma moved to quash the case contending that the case had been commenced b y an information by the fiscal instead of a complaint of the offended party as r equired by Article 360 of the revised Penal Code. The said article provides that criminal action for defamation cannot be prosecuted de oficio except at the ins tance of and upon the complaint expressly filed by the offended party. - The Jud ge, on August 4, 1980, denied the motion on the basis of the Supreme Court rulin g in Fernandez v. Lantin, 74 SCRA 338 (1976), which stated that the error can be corrected by the filing of the sworn statement of the complainant, assuming it contains all the information required under the Rules, with the Court to comply with Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. Alternatively, the fiscal can file w

ith the court a verified complaint of the offended party. In the order denying t he quashal, the judge, however, required the fiscal to file the verified complai nt within ten days. The fiscal complied with the order by filing the needed docu ment on the same day. - Cuaresma filed another motion to quash three months late r alleging that the offense had prescribed since the filing of the original info rmation o August 2, 1978 did not interrupt the running of the period of prescrip tion of the crime ( two months from discovery) and that said prescriptive period had long lapsed prior to the submission of the corrective complaint on august 4 , 1980. Judge granted her the motion stating that it was the filing of the verifi ed that conferred jurisdiction upon the Court and this was on August 4, 1980. ABAD SANTOS [concur and dissent] Concurs but dissented on the ground that the statute being free from any constit utional infirmity, the "Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional pow er to fill the newly created judicial positions without any obligation to consul t with the Supreme Court and to accord its views the fullest consideration. DE CASTRO [concur except as qualified] The power of the Legislature to create courts also includes the power to abolish them. When there is a conflict between public welfare(the duty of the legislatu re to provide a society with a fair and effective judicial system) and personal benefit (security of tenure), the latter must of necessity to yield to the forme r. The abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into which no j udicial inquiry is proper. Petition is premature. No actual controversy yet. Not until the abolition of courts is not done, can there be possibly a violation of the security of tenure. "Salus populi est suprema lex" - The welfare of the peo ple is the supreme law. SEPARATE OPINION TEEHANKEE [dissent] The express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of judges must prevail over the implied constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust judges. Such subjection of a judge to public "harassment and humiliation ....can dimini sh public confidence in the courts." The ills the judiciary suffers from were ca used by impairing its independence: they will not be cured by totally destroying their independence. It would be ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due process cannot count it on themselves. MELENCIO-HERRERA [concur] Tenure of Judges is different from tenure of Courts. A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to courts. The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges applies only as their Courts exist. BARREDO [concur] Inferior courts are mere creatures of law (of the Legislature) . It follows that it is within the legislature s power to abolish or reorganize them no matter w hat the cost is. He personally believes that the present situation ERICTA [concur]

- The fiscal belatedly filed a motion for consideration on Jube 26, 1981 which w as denied for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time. - Hence this action for certiorari with the Supreme Court as filed by the Second Assistant Ci ty Fiscal on May 31, 1984 or three years after the dismissal of the motion to re consider. ISSUE WON the Supreme Court should give due course to the application for certiorari HELD 1. The order of dismissal dated April 4, 1980 is a final ord er having been disposed of by the Court. The appeal, if taken in a timely fashio n, could have succeeded as the order of the Court was tainted by an error of law . The filing of the complaint in the form of an affidavit, the investigation by the fiscal, and the subsequent filing of the information with the Court did inde ed toll the period of prescription. 2. The filing of the writ for certiorari was also improper in several counts: a. The filing should have been done by the Sol icitor General instead of the Second Assistant City Fiscal and was dismissible o n this account [Republic v Partisala , 118 SCRA 870 (1982)]. b. Remedy of certio rari is limited to acts of any agency or officer exercising judicial functions o r of any judge which are claimed to be without or in excess of its or his jurisd iction, or with grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the correct proce dure is the filing of an appeal as the judgment rendered is an error in law and not grave abuse of discretion. c. The Supreme Courts jurisdiction to issue extrao rdinary writs (e.g. certiorari, mandamus, etc.) is not exclusive and granted to lower courts. There is also a hierarchy that should be followed in matters of th is nature. Direct action to the Supreme Court will be allowed only when there ar e special and important reasons therefore. And these reasons should be clearly s et out in the petition. Decision Petition dismissed. of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, t he court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no lon ger be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined t o rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raised by the petitio ner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authoriz es outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across pro vincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is impos ed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impart ial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challe nge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President un der Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. ISSUES 1. WON the SC impliedly aff irmed the constitutionality of EO No. 626-A 2. WON lower courts have authority t o rule on constitutionality of statute 3. WON EO No. 626-A violates due process 4. WON EO No. 626-A is an invalid exercise of police power 5. WON EO No. 626-A i s an invalid delegation of legislative power HELD 1. NO. While also involving th e same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles is not applicable here. T he question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the me asure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We impo sed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, howeve r, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm t he constitutionality of EO No. 626-A. 2. YES. While lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless n ot prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among othe rs, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply m eans that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by thes e lower courts. 3. YES. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and h earing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are int ended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. In the instant case, the ca rabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the

YNOT V INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT CRUZ; March 20, 1987 FACTS The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station co mmander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of EO No. 626-A. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had file d a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by th e trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petiti oner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The c onferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militat es against the doctrine of separation of powers. 4. YES. The police power is sim ply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. To justify the State in thus interposi ng its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the intere sts of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary f or the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals . The carabao, as the poor mans tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of EO No. 626-A. But while the am endatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, t hat there be a lawful method. To strengthen the original measure, EO No. 626-A i mposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movemen t, providing that "no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or pur pose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." T he object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the m eans employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. 5. YES. Section 1 of EO No. 626-A reads: The carabao or carabeef transp orted in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confis cation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institu tions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspec tion Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers t hrough dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers me ntioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from ov erflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of l egislative powers. BENGZON V DRILON

GUTIERREZ; April 15, 1992 FACTS - Petition to review the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Fiscal Year 1992 - Petitioners are retired justices of the SC and the CA who were receiving monthly pensions under RA No.910 as amended by RA No. 1797 - Respondents Drilon et al are sued in their official capacities of the Executive, involved in the im plementation of the release of funds under the GAA - RA910 was enacted in 1953 t o provide retirement pensions to Justices of the SC and the CA who have rendered service at least 2o years either in the judiciary or in any branch of govt, or in, both, or having attained the age of 70, or who resign by reason of incapacit y to discharge the duties of the office; he shall receive until his death the sa lary which he has received at the time of his retirement - RA910 was amended by RA1797. Identical retirement benefits were given to Consti Commissions and the A FP, under RA1568, as amended by RA3595, and PD578, respectively - Marcos issued successive decrees which automatically readjusted the retirement pensions of mil itary officers and enlisted men. But those in the judiciary and the Consti Commi ssions were not included in this automatic readjustment, as Marcos repealed the automatic readjustment provisions (Section 3-a of RA1797 and RA3595) for the jud iciary and the Consti Commissions - Realizing this unfairness, Congress in 1990 sought to reenact the repealed provisions by approving a bill on the matter (HB1 6297 and SB740) - Pres. Aquino vetoed the HB on the ground that it would erode t he foundation of the policy on standardization of compensation under the Salary Standardization Law, RA6758 - On the other hand, retired CA justices Barcelona a nd Enriquez filed a petition for readjustment of their pensions in accordance wi th RA1797 by reasoning out that PD644 repealing RA1797 did not take effect as th ere was no valid publication pursuant to Tanada v Tuvera, supposedly promulgated in 1975 but published only in the OG in 1983; Court authorized it as a result As a result of the resolution by the Court, Congress included in the GAA approp riations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of adjusted pensions rates f or the retired justices - In Jan 1992, President vetoed portions of Section 1, a nd the entire Section 4 of the Special Provision for the SC and the Lower Courts on the ground that the President vetoed the HB on the matter already, and such appropriation would erode the policy of salary standardization ISSUE WON the veto by the president of certain provisions in the General Appropriation s Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pension o f the retired Justices of the SC and the CA HELD - The President did not veto it ems but provisions of the law in the GAA. - While veto power is generally all or nothing, vetoing the entire bill or none at all, it does not hold when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills. o The Constitution has a item veto p ower to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriatio n or revenue measure; only a particular item or items may be vetoed o Item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts; i t is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill o The President did not veto the g eneral fund adjustment of 500M, to meet certain obligations WHICH is an ITEM. o What she vetoed were provisions methods and systems placed by Congress to insure that obligations would be paid when they fell due o Thus, augmentation of speci fic appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement benefits is a provision an d not an item o Actually, what she really vetoed were RA1797 and the Resolution of the SC dated Nov 1991. WHICH SHE CANNOT VETO. - The repealing decrees (PD644) of Marcos re taking away the automatic readjustment for the judiciary never bec ame valid law because it was never published, pursuant to the Tanada v Tuvera do ctrine; RA 1797 was never repealed and there was no need for an HB in 1990 to re store it so even the presidents veto of the HB does not even have any effect in t he continuing implementation of the law - The Veto by the president trenches upo n the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary o Guaranty of ful l flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispat ch that their needs require o Power to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding highest rates authorized by law o Veto is tantamou

nt to dictating to the judiciary how its funds should be utilized - The Justices have a right to their pensions pursuant to RA1797 o The purpose retirement laws like such is to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and retire with relative security GARCIA V MACARAEG BARREDO; May 31, 1971 FACTS - Administrative complaint filed by Paz M. Garcia against Hon. Catalino Ma caraig, Jr., Judge of the CFI of Laguna Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice , in his former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oat h of office as judge ... gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or th e Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereo f. - Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo Ci ty with station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 new ly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. After consultations w ith the officials of the province of Laguna, the municipality of Calamba and the Department of Justice, he decided to accept the offer of the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of the court, to ut ilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials and to rely on the national government for the equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the Revi sed Administrative Code, all these items must be furnished by the provincial gov ernment The provincial officials of Laguna, however, informed him that the provi nce was not in a position to do so). - As to the space requirements of the court , the Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured him that the court could be accommodate d in the west wing of the Calamba municipal building as soon as the office of th e municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another location. Whe n the projected transfer of the municipal treasurers office was about to be eff ected, the treasurer and several municipal councilors objected. The municipal ma yor then requested Macaraig to look over some of the office spaces for rent in C alamba, with the commitment that the municipal government will shoulder the paym ent of the rentals. Respondents first choice was the second floor of the Republ ic Bank branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when the owner of the bui lding refused to reduce the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable space select ed by Macaraig was the second floor of the Laguna Development Bank. After a mont hs negotiations, the municipality finally signed a lease agreement with the own er on October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the municipal government cou ld release the amount necessary for the improvements to convert the space that w as rented, which was a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom

and offices for the personnel of the court and for the assistant provincial fisc al. Thereafter, upon Macaraigs representations, the provincial government appro priated the amount of P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies and materials need ed by the court. Early in December, 1970 respondent also placed his order for th e necessary equipment with the Property Officer of the DOJ but, unfortunately, t he appropriation for the equipment of the CFI was released only on December 23, 1970 and the procurement of the equipment chargeable against this allotment is s till under way. - When Macaraig realized that it would be sometime before he cou ld actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the DOJ, Macaraig had, due to pressure of duties, nev er gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon him to forego his leave and instead to assist h im, without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy attending t o the needs of his court. - Complainant Garcia alleged: > That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, respondent has not submitted his monthly rep orts containing the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or resolved, the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to over three m onths, together with the title, number, number of hours of court session held a day. > That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New Judicial Form N o. 86, Revised 1966) from July to December, 1970 and from January to February, 1 971 inclusive. > That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, CFI of Laguna and San Pab lo and knowing fully well that he has never performed his official duties or dis charged the duties appertaining to his office, he has collected and was paid his salaries from July 1970 to February 1971 in flagrant violation of Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. > That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly r eports on the accomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear violation of Sect ions 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended. ISSUE WON respondent is guilty of dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge, gross incompete nce and violation of Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the Department of Justice and RA 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948 particularly Sections 5, 55 and 58 HELD - Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 of the Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging hi s judicial duties. Respondents inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances do es not constitute incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his f irst appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himse lf of the stigma of being a judge without a sala, but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties. Responde nts collection of salaries as judge does not constitute dishonesty because asid e from the time, effort and money he spent in Organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department of Justice. - None of these is to be taken as meaning t hat this Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line b etween what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working wi th other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separat ion of powers on which our government tests by mandate of the people thru the Co nstitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intent ions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the n ecessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and am ong them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grav e importance to the Judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of governm ent that no Judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or re solution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversa

l, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of A ppeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feel s very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued. Decision Com plaint dismissed. (8 votes to dismiss, Castro & Teehankee took no part.) impugned. What was done by him was likewise in accordance with what previous sec retaries of justice were accustomed to do. The root of the evil then is the stat utory authority of the Department of Justice over courts of first instance and o ther inferior courts. While a distinction could be made between the performance of judicial functions which in no way could be interfered with by the Department and the task of administration which is executive in character, still the confe rment of such competence to a department head, an alter ego of the President, is to my mind, not only unwise but of doubtful constitutionality. For in issuing a dministrative rules and regulations over matters deemed non-judicial, they may t rench upon the discretion of judges which should be exercised according to their conscience alone. What is more, the influence that the Secretary has over them is magnified. It is already unavoidable under our scheme of government that they court his goodwill; their promotion may at times depend on it. With this grant of authority, the assertion of independence becomes even more difficult. it is t hus objectionable in principle and pernicious in operation. That certainly is no t the way to reduce to the minimum any participation of the executive in judicia l affairs arising from the power to appoint. As it is, even when the government as the adverse party in criminal cases, tax suits, and other litigations is in t he right, a favorable decision from the lower courts could be looked upon with s uspicion. The judiciary must not only be independent; it must appear to be so. The presence in the statute books of such power of administrative oversight the n, is, to my mind, anomalous. More specifically, were it not for such power gran ted the department head, respondent Judge in this case could not have been calle d upon to assist the Secretary of Justice. Considering that the Constitutional C onvention is about to meet, it is to be hoped that it be made clear that the jud iciary is to be totally freed from any supervisory authority of an executive dep artment. (Take note guys that this case was decided just a day before the Manila Hotel inaugural session of the con-con that created the 1973 Consti. And remember that the supervision o f the CFI and other inferior courts (under the DOJ in the 1935 Consti) was trans ferred to the SC under the new Consti which provision was copied in the 1987 Con sti. I guess this case was influential in making that change possible. By the wa y, Macaraig was a former UP law prof.) SEPARATE OPINION FERNANDO [concur] - Respondent Judge Macaraig should not be held in any wise accountable. No taint of bad faith can be attached to his conduct. What he was required to do was in accordance with the practice heretofore followed by the Department of Justice. H e is, under the statute in force, under the administrative supervision of its he ad. Nor can the good faith of Secretary of Justice Abad Santos be BADUA V CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION GRINO-AQUINO; February 14, 1991 FACTS Respondent David Quema alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of land wh ich he mortgaged to Dra. Valera. He was able to redeem the property but only aft er 22 years. On the other hand, petitioner spouses claim the property was sold t o them by Dra. Valera. Quema filed a case before the Barangay Council but when i t failed to settle,

he filed a complaint in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. (The disputed land is located in Villaviciosa, Abra) The tribal court decided in favor of Quema. Bu t as the spouses did not immediately vacate the land, they received a warning or der from the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA). Petitioners filed this ac tion alleging that respondent Cordillera Bodong Administrations decision is void for lack of judicial power or jurisdiction. Respondent contends the Supreme Cour t has no jurisdiction over tribal courts because they are not part of the judici al system. ISSUE WON a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and executory decision HELD NO. Decision of tribal court is annul led for lack of jurisdiction. The creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region w as rejected in a plebiscite by the provinces and cities of the Cordillera Region hence the Cordillera Bodong Administration, the indigenous and special courts f or the indigenous cultural communities and the CPLA as a regional command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines do not legally exist. The Maeng Tribal Court no t being constituted into an indigenous court, it is but an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community. Such tribal courts are not part of the Philippine Judicial System which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law. T hey do not possess judicial power. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY V COURT OF APPEALS ROMERO; February 5, 1996 FACTS - Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) entered into three contracts regarding various services at the South Harbor: > With Ocean Terminals Services, Inc. (OTS I). OTSI was granted exclusive right to manage and operate stevedoring services at the South Harbor > With Marina Port Services Inc. (MPSI). MPSI was granted ex clusive management and operation of arrastre and container handling services at the South Harbor > With 7-R Ports Services. 7-R was granted warehousing services - On November 28, 1991, the contract with MPSI was renewed. Part of the contrac t required the MPSI to cause integration of storage, arrastre and stevedoring se rvices at the South Harbor. Consequently, OTSI and 7-R assigned their respective stevedoring and warehousing services to MPSI. In effect MPSI had the duty and responsibility to manage, operate and render the following services: - Arrastrereceiving, handling, checking as well as custody and delivery of cargo services . These are services done on land. - Stevedoring- all work performed on board ve ssel, that is, the process of loading and unloading cargo, stowing inside hatche s, compartments and on deck or open cargo spaces on board vessels. - Container T erminal Handling- the services of handling container discharged or loaded unto v essels. - Storage- storing of containers, bulk and break bulk cargoes in all sto rage areas at the South Harbor. - April 2, 1992, PPA entered into a contract wit h petitioner Manila Floating Silo Corporation (MAFSICOR) whereby the latter was granted right, privilege, responsibility and authority to provide, operate a flo ating bulk terminal facilities for bulk cargoes bound for the South Harbor with a proviso that use of such facility shall not be compulsory to bulk shippers or importers. Contract would be enforced for 5 years and shall be on an interim bas is until an actual land based bulk terminal plant for the Port of Manila. - Sept . 8, 1192, PPA and MAFSICOR entered a supplemental agreement stating that manpow er needed for stevedoring services shall be hired from OTSI. - MPSI filed a peti tion against PPA and MAFSICOR for declaratory relief, final injunction with praye r for temporary restraining order and preliminary prohibitory injunction claimin g that said contract was in complete derogation of their rights under their cont ract with PPA. - RTC of Manila through judge Veridiano II, issued TRO directing PPA to maintain status quo and enjoining MAFSICOR from bringing in the floating terminal and set a hearing on the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. - PPA filed an opposition to the issuance of said writ stating PPA-MAFSICOR cont ract actually supports PPAMPSI contract as stevedoring manpower would be hired f rom MPSI. And that on a 2-day public hearing, most of the registrants agreed to the operation of the floating terminal. - MAFSICOR also filed an urgent motion f or the lifting of the TRO and a denial of the the preliminary injunction on the ground that an injunctive relief is not available in an action for declaratory r

elief. They filed another motion to dismiss complaint stating that declaratory r elief was not available to MPSI because MAFSICOR was not a party in the PPA-MPSI contract therefore they were not a partyin-interest. - AUGUST 25, 1993, trial c ourt denied writ of preliminary injunction and lifted TRO stating that first, th e right to operate a floating terminal was not on the PPA-MPSI contract and ther e would be no conflict between contracts with MPSI and MAFSICOR since MPSI is no t the sole entity authorized to render stevedoring services in the South Harbor and besides, stevedoring services for MAFSICOR shall be provided by OTSI. Second , contract with MAFSICOR was noon-exclusive meaning MPSI could also operate a floating term inal. Third, injunctive relief may not be granted for an action for declaratory relief. Further, MPSI could not question PPA-MAFSICOR contract they being not a party thereto. - MPSI filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court on Sept. 15, 1993. - Meanwhile on Sept. 3 1993, Katipunan ng mga Manggaga wa sa Daungan (KAMADA) the bargaining agent or the 4000 stevedores employed by M PSI, filed a complaint against MPSI, PPA and MAFSICOR for the annulment of PPA-M AFSICOR contract alleging that the operation of the floating bulk would duplicat e their function of stevedoring in the South Harbor. They also alleged that MAFS ICOR had not contacted them on the matter regarding the hiring of their services in the supplemental contract. Also, KAMADA said that the requirement of MAFSICO R of trained and qualified stevedores (since services in the floating terminal w ould be done by machine), certainly some of their member employees would be depr ived. - Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Mabunay. Court granted TRO st ating great and irreparable injuries upon the applicant would result before the matter can be heard on notice. - MAFSICOR filed a motion to dismiss civil case a nd for the lifting of the TRO (complete reasons in p.224-25). Reasons included C ourt Circular No. 13-93 which prohibits the issuance of injunction against certa in government agencies including public utilities. Motion was denied. - Sept. 10 , 1993, MAFSICOR filed a supplement to its motion to dismiss and to lift TRO, ra ising as an additional reason, Section 1 of P.D. no. 1818 which states that: no c ourt in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project including among others public utilities for the transport of goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre c ontracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government office from pr oceeding with the operation of such public utility - MPSI opposed stating MAFSICOR is not a public utility nor is performing a public function and thus non public interest may be affected. - Judge Mabunay denied MAFSICORs motion. - Sept. 28,199 3, KAMADA case was resolved by Judge Mabunay in which writ was denied due to fai lure of KAMADA to present clear and convincing evidence of any damages it will s uffer. - Another case was filed by yet another party. This was a case for injunct ion with provisional remedy of preliminary injunction involving the same PPA-MAF SICOR contract. This was filed by the Chamber of Customs Brokers Inc., the only accredited association for customs brokers in the country, stating that they wer e never informed of the proposal to put up a floating grains

terminal and that operation of such would adversely affect and prejudice its mem bers (reason in p.226-227). - Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Bayhon. Court issued a restraining order. In due course, on October 1, 1993, lower cour t issued a preliminary injunction upon the filing of MPSI of an injunction bond. - PPA and MAFSICOR filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibitio n with a prayer for an issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. Petition impleaded Judge Verdiano as a public respondent. Petition also prayed Judges Ma bunay and Bayhon be administratively dealt with for disregarding Circular No. 13 -93. - Pursuant to Sec. 9(1) of B.P. 29, SC referred case to Court of Appeals. October 13, 1993, CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction finding that MPSI has exclusive stevedoring rights at the South Harbor and that the operation of a floating grains terminal by MAFSICOR would overlap on the rights of MPSI. On th e applicability of PD 1818 and Circular No. 13-93, court stated that what is bei ng stopped temporarily is private respondents operation of the floating bulk term inal facility that would lessen MPSIs stevedoring services as it infringes on the latters contractual right. - MAFSICOR filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. - On June 8, 1994, CA decided that writ of preliminary injunction is ma de permanent and that Judge Bayhon be permanently enjoined from issuing injuncti ve orders during the trial of the case in the court. - Thus, CA affirmed the exc lusivity of the stevedoring contract in favor of MPSI. That being so, it preclud ed infringement of the PPA-MPSI contract by the PPAMAFSICOR contract. CA explain ed that the floating grains terminal is simply a mechanized unloading of grains cargo from the vessel to the barge or other transport facilities. And also that what is solely done by stevedores is substituted by machines complemented by nee ded stevedores. With respect to the supplemental agreement which states that ste vedores would be hired by MAFSICOR from OTSI, court stated that it was just an a djustment in order not to violate PPA-MPSI contract. And that MAFSICOR can legal ly excuse themselves from the contract because OTSI already assigned its stevedo ring services to MPSI. As regards to forum shopping allegation of MAFSICOR (fili ng of separate petitions by MPSI, KAMADA and Chamber), court said that there was no forum shopping because petitioners had separate and distinct legal personali ties. There also was no proof that they confabulated to forum-shop. On the appli cability of PD 1818, CA affirmed its Oct.13 ruling. - PPA and MAFSICOR filed a m otion for review on certiorari alleging that Court of Appeals decision: a) viola tes PD 1818 and Circular No. 13-93, the constitutional principle of separation o f judicial and executive powers and prescription against forum shopping, b) supp lants the discretion of the trial court to pass upon the propriety of a preliminary injunction and c) is contrary to the ev idence on record. ISSUE WON PD 1818 applicable to the case HELD YES Ratio no cour t in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, pre liminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure project including among others public ut ilities for the transport of goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre cont racts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government office from proce eding with the operation of such public utility - Clearly, the prohibition in PD 18 18 does not cover infrastructure alone. It includes among others stevedoring ser vices. The law being clear, there is no room for interpretation or construction. A verbis legis non est recendum (from the words of a statute there should be no departure). - PD 1818 applies in controversies involving facts or the exercise o f discretion in technical cases. It is founded on the principle that to allow cou rts to determine such matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the admini strative machinery. - In Republic v. Capulong discretion was defined as a power o r right conferred upon them by law of acting officially under certain circumstan ces, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. - Entering into a con tract for the operation af a floating grains terminal notwithstanding the existe nce of other stevedoring contracts pertaining to the South Harbor is undoubtedly an exercise of the discretion on the part of the PPA. No other persons or agenc ies are in a better position to gauge the need for the floating terminal than th e PPA; certainly not the courts. Courts have no brooding of such administrative

agencies (Hon. Reinerio Reyes et al v. Hon Doroteo Caneba et al). courts will in tervene only to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the Government has transgressed its constitutional boundaries (Bureau Veritas v. Office of the President). Under the separation of powers, the courts may not tread into matter s requiring the exercise of discretion of a functionary or office in the executi ve and legislative branches, unless it is clearly shown that the government offi cial or office abused his or its discretion. In this case there is no showing th at the PPA abused its discretion in entering into the contract with MAFSICOR. Ju dge Veridiano correctly concluded that there is no provision for the putting up of a floating grains terminal in the PPAMPSA contract. All it covers are the gen eral services of stevedoring. While the operation of a floating grains terminal may be considered as part and parcel of stevedoring as such operation merely entails the mechanization of stevedoring, it was considered by the PPA, i n the exercise of its discretion, as necessary to improve the services rendered in the South Harbor in the meantime that no land-based bulk terminal is yet oper ational. - There are actually instances when PD 1818 should not find application . These are a) where there is clear and grave abuse of discretion b) where the e ffect of the nonissuance of an injunction or a restraining order would be to stav e off implementation of a government project. In this case the operation of a flo ating bulk terminal would augment and improve the over-all operations at the por t of Manila and/or stevedoring services awarded to MPSI. - Another contention ag ainst the applicability of PD 1818 is that MAFSICOR is a private entity. Such co ntention betrays a failure to comprehend the functions of the PPA. One of the du ties of the PPA is to provide services (whether on its own, by contract or other wise) within the Port Districts to make or enter contracts of any kind or nature to enable it to discharge its functions under its decree. - Section 1 of PD 181 8 clearly states that an injunction may not be issued to prevent any person or p ersons, entity or government official from undertaking the protected activities enumerated. The prohibition therefore applies regardless of whether or not the e ntity or person being enjoined is a public or private person or entity, provided that the purpose of the law to protect essential government projects in pursuit of economic development is attained. - court did not resolve main issues offere d (such as the exclusivity of the PPA-MPSI contract) for resolution therein whic h necessitates trial on merits. However court took note of the allegations again st two judges Decision Petition on certiorari granted decision of the CA is reve rsed and set aside. IN RE: VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA NARVASA; November 9, 1998 FACTS - The Resolution of the Court En Banc, handed down on May 14, 1998, sets o ut the relevant facts. - Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments signed by the President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Ma teo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial C ourt of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. received at the Chief Justices chambers on May 12, 1998 - view by Senior Associ ate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Consultant of the Council, who had been a membe r of the Committee of the Executive Department and of the Committee on the Judic ial Department of the 1986

Constitutional Commission: that on the basis of the Commissions records, the el ection ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. Without a ny extended discussion or any prior research and study on the part of the other Members of the JBC, this hypothesis was accepted, and was then submitted to the President for consideration, together with the Councils nominations for eight ( 8) vacancies in the Court of Appeals - April 6, 1998: Chief Justice received an official communication from the Executive Secretary transmitting the appointment s of eight (8) Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals all of which had been duly signed on March 11, 1998 by the President - In view of the fact that all th e appointments had been signed on March 11, 1998 - the day immediately before th e commencement of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution which impliedly indicated that the Presidents Office did not a gree with the hypothesis that appointments to the Judiciary were not covered by said ban, the Chief Justice resolved to defer consideration of nominations for t he vacancy in the Supreme Court created by the retirement of Associate Justice R icardo J. Francisco - May 4, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from the Pres ident, addressed to the JBC, requesting transmission of the "list of final nomin ees" for the vacancy" no later than Wednesday, May 6, 1998," in view of the duty imposed on him by the Constitution "to fill up the vacancy . . . within ninety (90) days from February 13, 1998, the date the present vacancy occurred." - May 5, 1998: Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III requested the Chief Justice fo r "guidance" respecting the expressed desire of the "regular members" of the JBC to hold a meeting immediately to fill up the vacancy in the Court in line with the Presidents letter . The Chief Justice advised Secretary Bello to await the reply that he was drafting - May 6, 1998: the Chief Justice sent his reply to th e President-- stating that no sessions had been scheduled for the Council until after the May elections because of the "need to undertake further study of the m atter," prescinding from "the desire to avoid any constitutional issue regarding the appointment to the mentioned vacancy"; delivered to Malacaang May 6, 1998, a nd a copy given to the Office of Justice Secretary Bello - Justice Secretary and the regular members of the Council had already taken action on May 6, 1998 they came to an agreement on a resolution: they drew attention to Section 4 (1), Arti cle VIII of the Constitution (omitting any mention of Section 15, Article VII) a s well as to the Presidents letter of May 4, with an appeal that the Chief Just ice convene the Council for the purpose "on May 7, 1998 - CJ convoked the Counci l to a meeting at 3 oclock in the afternoon of May 7, 1998 - May 7, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from President: "the election-ban provision applies o nly to executive appointments or appointments in the executive branch of government," t he whole article being "entitled EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.", "firmly and respectfu lly reiterate(d) . . . (his) request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmi t . . . the final list of nominees for the lone Supreme Court vacancy." - May 8, 1998: Chief Justice replied: --Section 15 of Article VII imposes a direct prohi bition on the President which is the general rule, the only exception being only as regards "executive positions"(judicial positions are covered by the general rule) - Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, unlike Section 15, Article VII, the duty of filling the vacancy is not specifically imposed on the President - normally, when there are no presidential elections Section 4 (1), Article VIII shall apply but when (as now) there are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the President shall not make any appointments requesting the regular Members of the Judicial and Bar Council to defer action on the matter until further advice by the Court - May 8, 1998: another meeting w as held; closed with a resolution that "the constitutional provisions be referre d to the Supreme Court En Banc for appropriate action - May 12, 1998: Chief Just ice received from Malacaang the appointments of two (2) Judges of the Regional Tr ial Court mentioned above; places on the Chief Justice the obligation of transmi tting the appointments to the appointees so that they might take their oaths and assume the duties of their office (trouble is that in doing so, the Chief Justi ce runs the risk of acting in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution) - the

Court Resolved that pending the foregoing proceedings and the deliberation by t he court on the matter, and until further orders, no action be taken on the appo intments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta which in the meantime shall be hel d in abeyance and not given any effect and said appointees shall refrain from ta king their oath of office and the Judicial and Bar Council is INSTRUCTED to defe r all action on the matter of nominations - Valenzuela took his oath on May 14, 1998 -- In his "Explanation" he stated that he did so because on May 7, 1998 he "received from Malacaang copy of his appointment . . ." which contained the follo wing direction: "By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performanc e of the duties of the office" - The Relevant Constitutional Provisions Section 15, Article VII: "Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make ap pointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein prejudice public service or endanger public safety." Section 4 (1), Article VIII: "The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate J ustices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurr ence thereof ." Section 9, Article VIII: "The Members of the Supreme Court and j udges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at leas t three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Suc h appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall i ssue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list." ISSUE WON during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancie s in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII HELD The appo intments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 were unquestionabl y made during the period of the ban. Such appointments come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be fo r the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. Reasoning - While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest the re is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, there is a str ong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the perio d of the ban. - Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the Preside nt is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided t herein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. - journal of the commissi on which drew up the present Constitution discloses: desire to make certain that the size of the Court would not be decreased for any substantial period as a re sult of vacancies, the insertion in the provision of the same mandate that "IN C ASE OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE T HEREOF." was proposed - Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan c onsiderations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments - the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions whi ch have to be

made even after the proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so lon g as they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate actio n and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointees qualifications," can be made by the outgoing President - The exception allows on ly the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued va cancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the perio d of the ban. - Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filli ng vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the Presidents power of appoi ntment, it is this Courts view that, as a general proposition, in case of confl ict, the former should yield to the latter - the Constitution must be construed in its entirety as one, single instrument; instances may be conceived of the imp erative need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not only in the e xecutive but also in the Supreme Court. - concerning Valenzuelas oath-taking an d "reporting for duty"-Standing practice is for the originals of all appointment s to the Judiciary to be sent by the Office of the President to the Office of th e Chief Justice, the appointments being addressed to the appointees "Thru: the C hief Justice, Supreme Court, Manila." It is the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Co urt, in the Chief Justices behalf, who thereafter advises the individual appoin tees of their appointments and also of the date of commencement of the pre-requi site orientation seminar to be conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy for new Judges. the ship owner and respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not reac h its point of destination - so they just agreed that the private respondent wil l replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class "G" cement cost free. However, upon inspection, the Class "G" cement did not conform to the petitioners specifications. - The petitioner then informed the private respond ent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of th eir contract - July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator (Shri N.N. Malhotra) resolve d the dispute in petitioners favor - Respondent- to pay $ 899,603.77 + 6% inter est - To enable the petitioner to execute the award, it filed a Petition before the Court in India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India which the said court granted - The plaintiff shall also be e ntitled to get from defendant US$899,603.77 with 9% interest per annum till the last date of realization - However, respondent refused to pay - Petitioner filed a complaint to RTC of Surigao - RTC and CA dismissed the complaint ISSUES 1. WO N the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and th e private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract; phrased differently, WON t he non-delivery of the said cargo is a proper subject for arbitration under the above-quoted Clause 16 2. WON the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable i n this jurisdiction HELD 1. YES. the correct interpretation to give effect to bo th stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all claims or disputes arising from or relating to the design, drawing, instructions, specifi cations or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract, and for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes. - For the sake of argument, granted t hat the nondelivery of the oil well cement is not a proper subject for arbitrati on, the failure of the replacement cement to conform to the specifications of th e contract is a matter clearly falling within the ambit of Clause 16. 2. YES. This Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. 32 Thus, if under the procedural rules o f the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopt ing the arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded respect - if the pr ocedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final a nd executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in t his jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise - the private respondent herein, as the party attacking a foreign judgment, has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity which it failed to do i

n the instant case. Decision Petition GRANTED ART X: LOCAL GOVERNMENT ABBAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CORTES; November 10, 1989 FACTS - Petitioner Abbas, a representative of other taxpayers in Mindanao, filed this petition to(1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conductin g the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereo f, unconstitutional - The 1987 Constitution provides for regional autonomy throu gh Article X, section 15 which provides that "there shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, citie s, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive histori cal and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant ch aracteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national soverei gnty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." - To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides: Sec. 16. The Preside nt shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilit ies not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall b e vested in the National Government. Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organi c act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the re gional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the Pres ident from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall d efine the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executi ve and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION V OCURT OF APPEALS MARTINEZ; July 23, 1998 FACTS - Oil & Natural Gas Commission (petitioner)- a foreign corporation owned a nd controlled by the Government of India - Pacific Cement Company (respondent) a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippi nes. - The two parties entered into a contract on Feb 26, 1983, where respondent undertook to supply the petitioner (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement; peti tioner to pay ($477,300.00) - The oil well cement was loaded on the ship MV SURU TANA NAVA in Surigao City, for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India. - respond ent had already received payment but failed to deliver the oil well cement due t o a dispute between

and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitutio n and national laws. The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective wh en approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebisci te called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and geograp hic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomou s region. Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, with in eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organi c acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Sec. 2 0. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Con stitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of s ources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, fa mily, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social and tourism development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Pre servation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters a s may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the peopl e of the region. Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organiz ed, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted an d signed into law on August 1, 1989.The present controversy relates to the plebi scite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, sc heduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entit led "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Min danao." ISSUES 1. WON certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement. 2 .WON R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution. HELD 1. No, RA 67 43 does not conflict with the Tripoli Agreement. SC finds it neither necessary n or determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public internation al or internal Philippine law. The Constitution itself provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into t he validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the Const itution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the prov isions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implem entation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitu te part of the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter. 2. No, R.A. No. 6734 does not violate 1987 C onstitution. a. Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creat es an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of t he Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite. The reference to the constitutiona l provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional r equirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requ irements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus: SEC. 13. T he creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when a pproved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in par agraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be he ld not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, Tha t only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be inc luded in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities whic h in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall rem

ain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions. Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the cons tituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a major ity vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be i ncluded in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned i n Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The sing le plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mi ndanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 67 34, shall compromise it. b. Equal protection of the law Petitioner insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, T awi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Maraw i and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities i ncluded in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas which do not str ictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congre ss has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited. Petitioners argument is not tenable. The Constit ution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas shou ld constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, th e ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislatures discretion. Any review of this

ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. SC cannot do this wit hout doing violence to the separation of governmental powers Moreover, equal pro tection permits of reasonable classification. The guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been made by Congr ess on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution it self. c. Free exercise of religion Petitioner questions the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exerci se of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the O rganic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim C ode [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and t he national law on the other hand, the Shariah courts created under the same Ac t should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shariah ) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this obje ction by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Mu slim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offe nsive to a Muslims religious convictions. Judicial power includes the duty to s ettle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enf orceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be exer cised, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflict ing claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged vio lation of religious freedom. The Court in this case may not be called upon to re solve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the M uslim Code and national law. TANO V SOCRATES DAVIDE; August 21, 1997 FACTS - special civil action for certiorari and prohibition praying to: 1. declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa (b) Office Order No. 23, Serie s of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 199 3, dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; 2. enjoin the enforcement thereof; and 3. restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosec utors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of the Regional Trial Court s and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office O rder. - Ordinance No. 15-92 - took effect on January 1, 1993 - entitled: "AN ORD INANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIE S AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF," - Purpose: to effectively free our water from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance - unlawful for any person, business enter prise, company to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish (all alive, breathing not nece ssarily moving, used for foor and for aquarium purposes) and lobster except SEA BASS (apahap), CATFISH (hitohito), MUDFISH (dalag), AND MILKFISH FRIES. - Penalt y: fine of not more than P5,000.00, imprisonment of not more than 12 mos and/or cancellation of their permit to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa - Off ice Order No. 23, Series of 1993 - pursuant to City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74 (r equirement of mayors permit) and Ordinance No. 15-92 (banning of shipment of live fish and lobster), authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspec tions on cargoes containing live fish and lobster to ascertain whether the shipp er possessed the required Mayors Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of F isheries and Aquatic Resources - Resolution No. 33 - prohibits catching, gatheri ng, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aqua tic organisms coming from Palawan waters (mameng, suno, panther/senorita, taklob o, mother of pearl, giant clams, tiger prawn, loba/green grouper, tropical aquar ium fishes) for a period of five years - WHEREAS - studies disclose only 5% of t

he corals of Palawan remain to be in excellent condition - cannot be gainsaid that destruction and devastation of the corals of our provi nce were principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite fishing, so dium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances - need to protect and pr eserve the existence of the remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to regenerate within 5 years - RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) empo wers the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the environment and impose appropri ate penalties e.g. to dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing Ordinance No. 2 - prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, an d shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms coming from Palawan w aters (mameng, suno, panther/senorita, taklobo, mother of pearl, giant clams, ti ger prawn, loba/green grouper, tropical aquarium fishes) for a period of five ye ars - Policy Considerations: - Sec. 2-A (RA 7160: policy of the state that subdi visions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to be sel f-reliant communities, more responsive and accountable local government structur e through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be g iven more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. - Sec. 5-A (RA 7160 ): Any fair and reasonable doubts as to the existence of the power shall be inte rpreted in favor of the Local Government Unit concerned - Sec. 5-C (RA 7160). Th e general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to LGU in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quali ty of life for the people in the community. - Sec. 16 (RA 7160). Every LGU shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effec tive governance; and those which are essential to the promotion of the general w elfare. - Policy of the Province of Palawan: to protect and conserve the marine resources of Palawan - Penalty: fine of not more P5,000.00, and/or imprisonment of 6 mos to 12 mos and confiscation and forfeiture of paraphernalia - Petitioner s Allege: - Ordinances deprived them of due process of law (no consultation), th eir livelihood (all the fishermen of Palawan), and unduly restricted them from t he practice of their trade (Airline Shippers Association of

Palawan), in violation of Art XII Sec 2 (2) (3) 40 41 39 and Art XIII Sec 2 , 7 (1987). - Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation or conditio n under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied (Mayor - absolute au thority WON to issue permit) - Ordinance No. 2 altogether prohibited the catchin g, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwel ling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered throug h lawful fishing method - fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways - me mbers of Airline Shippers Association were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering contracts essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion - if Ordinance No. 2 is null and void, TF criminal ca ses against Tano et al have to be dismissed - Interests of petitioners - Tano et al: to prevent prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until constitutionality or legality of the said Ordinances they allegedly violated sh all have been resolved - Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and 77 fisherme n: declaratory relief because Ordinances adversely affects them ISSUES 1. WON SC has jurisdiction 2. WON Ordinances 15-92, Office Order 23, Ordinance 2 of Resol ution 33 are constitutional HELD 1.NO because there is clear disregard for hiera rchy of courts and petitioners have no cause of action BUT SC opt to resolve thi s case because of the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end (199 3-1998). Reasoning Petitioners Tano, et al WRT cause of action 39 Art XII Sec 2 (2): The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archi pelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its us e and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. (3) The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fisherw orks in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons. 40 Art XIII Sec 2: The promotion of soc ial justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. 41 Art XIII Sec 7: The State shall p rotect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland a nd offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate tech nology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, a nd other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such reso urces. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fi shermen against foreign intrusion. Fisherworks shall receive a just share form t heir labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources. - no cause of action because there is no showing that the petitioners filed a Mo tion to Quash the information in their respective criminal cases that would have this remedy proper therefore the petitioners cannot allege the lower courts of having acted in excess of their jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion - If p etitioners filed motion to quash information, it should have contained that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in question ar e unconstitutional. BUT if their Motion to Quash was denied, the remedy is not c ertiorari but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special defenses a nd if an adverse decision is rendered, an appeal should have been the proper rem edy. And if there is an exceptional circumstance where special civil action for certiorari may be filed, the lower court must be accorded a Motion for Reconside ration to allow itself to correct any errors Petitioners Airline Shippers et al WRT Declaratory Relief - SC is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petit ions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved being set

tled that the SC merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions Peo ple v Cuaresma - There is after all hierarchy of courts. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifi cally set out in the petition. This is established policy strict adherence theret o in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of liti gants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary wri ts directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land... Santiago v Vas ques - judicial policy that SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exception al and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction BUT, these Ordinances were undoubt edly enacted in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protect ion and preservation of the environment and are thus novel and or paramount impo rtance. No further delay then may be allowed. 2. YES, since it is settled that l aws, including ordinances of LGUs enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and the petitioners did not present clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence to o verthrow this assumption. Reasoning Peralta v COMELEC - presumption of constitut ionality of laws including ordinances of LGUs and to overthrow this presumption, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Subsistence or Marginal Fishermen - T here is no showing that any of the petitioners qualify as subsistence or margina l fishermen > Airline Shipping Association of Palawan: a private association composed of mar ine merchants > Virginia and Robert Lim: merchants > the rest of petitioners: fi shermen without any qualification to their status - Since consti does not provid e for the definition of subsistence or marginal Marginal Fisherman - Generally, an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering f ish - Sec 13 RA7160 an individual engaged in subsistence fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produ ced by himself and his immediate family Subsistence Fishermen - Generally, one w hose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood Art XII Sec 2 aim primarily not to bestow any right of subsistence fishermen but to lay stres s on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth - provision merel y recognizes priority to subsistence fishermen Sec 149 of LGC - only provision o f law which speaks of preferential right of marginal fishermen Joint Administrat ive Order No. 3 (1996) - prescribed guidelines concerning preferential treatment of small fisherfolk relative to fishery right in Sec 149 but this case does not involve such fishery right Protection of the Environment v Right of Marginal Fi shermen Art XIII Sec 7 - speaks not only of communal marine and fishing resource s but of their protection, development, and conservation Art XII Sec 2 (Regalian Doctrine) - marine resources belong to the State and EDU shall be under full co ntrol and supervision of the State Constitutional Commission - between Rodrigo a nd Bengzon - marginal fishermen subject to rules and regulations and local laws Oposa v Factoran - even though balanced and healthful ecology is under Declarati on of Principles and State Policies it does not follow that is less important th e civil and political rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights for it concerns self -preservation and self-perpetuation this basic right need not be written in the C onstitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind Sec 16 LGC - right of people to a balanced and healthful ecology in General Welfare Cl ause

Realization of the General Welfare Clause, Decentralization and Exercise of Poli ce Power Sec 5(c) LGC - general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the LGU in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life Fishery Laws - that LGU may enforce under Sec 17 in municipal water include - PD 704 - PD 1015 closed season - PD 1219 explor ation, exploitation, utilization, conservation of coral resources - PD 5474 unla wful to catch, sell, etc. ipon during closed season - PD 6451 prohibits and puni shes electrofishing Memorandum of Agreement (1994) - between Dept of Agriculture and DILG - issuance of permits to construct fish cages, gather aquarium fishes, gather kapis shells, gather/culture shelled mollusks, establish seaweed farms, establish culture pearls, transports fish and fishery products and establishment of closed season RA 7611 Strategic Environment Plan for Palawan Act comprehensi ve framework for sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting a nd enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province wh ich shall serve to guide the local government of Palawan nd the government agenc ies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and proje cts affecting Palawan Principal Objectives of Ordinances 1) establish closed sea son for the species covered in the said ordinances for a period of five years 2) to protect the corals in the marine waters of Puerto Princesa and Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities Jurisdiction of BFAR or LG U - Bellosillo: Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa t o enact Ordinance 15 Series of 1992 because supposed to be within the jurisdicti on and respoinsibility of BFAR (Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) under PD 704 ot herwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975 TF unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of DNR (Natl Res) - Majority: BFAR jurisdiction over management, c onservation, development, etc not all-encompassing; excludes municipal waters; B FAR no longer under DNR, now under DoA TF incorrect to challenge that ordinances unenforceable because no approval of Sec of DENR but of Sec of DoA instead; BUT this can be dispensed with because of Repealing Claus of LGC insofar as those p rovisions are inconsistent and power to enact ordinances to enhance right of peo ple to a balanced ecology contained in the General Welfare Clause in the LGC Decision Petition dismissed for lack of merit and TRO lifted Voting 10 concur, 4 dissent, 1 on leave SEPARATE OPINION MENDOZA [concur] - fully concurs with the decision - two important points: uphold presumption of validity of the ordinances in view of total absence of evidence that undermine t heir factual basis AND need not allow shortcircuiting of the normal process of a djudication on the mere plea that unless we take cognizance of petitions like th is, by-passing the trial courts, alleged violations of constitutional rights wil l be left unprotected, when the matter can be very well be looked into by trial courts and in fact it should be brought there released to the LGUs subject to the IRR (Implementing Rules and Regulations) pre scribed by the Oversight Committee Internal Revenue Allotment shall be released directly by the DBM to the LGUs concerned - OCD Resolutions Oversight Committee allocated Php5B as follows: Php2B in accordance with formula sharing scheme pres cribed under LGC of 1991 Php2B allocated with a modified CODEF sharing scheme ac tion projects and other priority initiatives; proposals were to be submitted by the LGUs to the Oversight Committee subject to its approval (OC prescribed a Cri teria for Eligibility) - GAA of 2000 Also contained a proviso earmarking Php5B o f the IRA for the LGSEF (similar to GAA of 1999) Php3.5B shared by the LGUs usin g a percentagesharing formula agreed upon by the various Leagues of LGUs Php1.5B to be earmarked for projects, which are to be endorsed to and approved by the O versight Committee - GAA of 2001 GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted and OC alloca ted Php5B LGSEF as follows: Php3B according to the modified codal formula Php1.9 B is earmarked for priority projects Php100M for capability building fund subjec t to OCs approval - Procedure Province of Batangas, represented by Gov. MANDANAS filed a petition for CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, and MANDAMUS to declare as unconst

itutional the assailed provisos in GAA of 99, 00, 01 and OCD Resolutions and was i ssued against Exec. Sec. ROMULO (Chairman of Oversight Committee on Devolution), Sec. BONCODIN (Dept. of Budget and Mngmt.), and Sec. LINA (DILG) - Petitioners g rounds Violative of Sec.6 Art.10 of 1987 Consti (just share must be automaticall y released to the LGUs) Vesting the Oversight Committee with authority in determ ining distribution and release of LGSEF is contrary to the principle of local au tonomy Improper sharing scheme (provisos modified sec.285 of LGC) resulting to a n illegal amendment by the Executive branch of substantive law ISSUES Procedural 1. WON petitioner has legal standing 2. WON petition involves factual questions properly cognizable by lower courts 3. WON petition has been rendered moot and academic Substantive Php1B to be earmarked to support local affirmative BELLOSILLO [dissent] - Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact Ordina nce 15 Series of 1992 because supposed to be within the jurisdiction and respoin sibility of BFAR (Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) under PD 704 otherwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975 TF unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of DNR (Natl Res) PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V ROMULO CALLEJO; May 30, 2004 FACTS - EO 48 issued by Pres. Estrada on 12/07/98 entitled Establishing a Program for Devolution Adjustment and Equalization: Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was created DBM was directed to set aside an am ount to be determined by the Oversight Committee based on appraisal surveys by D ILG Committee (which was constituted under Local Govt Code of 1991) has been task ed to issue implementing rules and regulations governing equitable allocation an d distribution of the said fund to the LGUs - GAA of 1999 In this General Approp riations Act, the program was renamed as Local Govt Service Equalization Fund (LG SEF) Php96.78B was the allotted share of the LGUs in the IR taxes Oversight Special Provisions included that the amount of Php5B shall be earmarked for LGSEF, and it shall be

4. WON assailed provisos violate constitutional provision on local autonomy 5. W ON the assailed provisos result to a proper amendment of sharing scheme provided in LGC HELD 1. Yes. - The petitioner seeks relief in order to protect or vindic ate its own interests, which pertains to the LGUs share in the national taxes (IR A). The potential injury it stands to suffer is the diminution of its share in t he IRA, which is clearly a plain, direct and adequate interest. 2. No. - It involv es a legal question (on what is the proper legal interpretation) which is to be settled by the SC. Also, the facts necessary to resolve the issue need not be de termined by a trial court since they are not disputed. 3. No. - Even if the LGSE F for 99, 00, and 01 have already been released, there is still compelling reason f or the SC to resolve substantive issues. - Even in cases where supervening events , whether intended or accidental, had made the cases moot, the Court did not hes itate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controll ing principles to guide the bench, bar and public. Obiter - Sec.25 Art.2: The Sta te shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. - Sec.2 Art.10: The territori al and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. - Presidents power over LGUs is one of general supervision, and this excludes power of control. (Drilon v. Lim: The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he him self does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.) Autonomy is either DECENTRALIZATION of ADMINISTRATION or decentral ization of POWER. - LOCAL AUTONOMY means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. LGUs are subject to regulation, however limited, for no other purpose than to enhance sel f-government. - Local autonomy includes both ADMINISTRATIVE (autonomy in the exe rcise of its functions) and FISCAL AUTONOMY (power to create own sources of reve nue, in addition to equitable share in national taxes.) 4. Yes. - Sec.6 Art.10 m andates that o LGUs shall have a JUST SHARE in the NATIONAL TAXES o Just share sha ll be DETERMINED BY LAW o Just share shall be AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED to the LGUs - As such, the LGUs are N OT required to perform any act to receive the just share accruing to them from nat ional taxes (Sec.286 LGC: It shall be released to them without need of further a ction.) The provision is IMPERATIVE. Any retention is prohibited. - Ratio To subj ect the distribution and release of the LGSEF to implementing rules and regulati ons, including mechanisms prescribed by the OC, as sanctioned by the provisos in the GAAs of 99, 00, 01 and the OCD Resolutions makes the release NOT automatic, wh ich violates the Constitution. - OC exercising jurisdiction and control contradi cts principle of local autonomy. There is also NO STATUTORY BASIS for this power since the OC was created merely to formulate rules and regulations for efficien t implementation of the LGC (only ad hoc character) - As evident from the Con-Co m deliberations, the Automatic release provision was intended to GUARANTEE princ iple of local autonomy. 5. No. - The sharing scheme provided for in the LGC is f ixed and may not be reduced except in the event that the national government incu rs an unmanageable public sector deficit. (Sec.285 LGC: Provinces 23%, Cities 23% , Municipalities 34%, Barangays 20%) - Congress may amend LGC but should do so t hrough a separate law, and not just through an appropriations law. Decision Peti tion granted. Provisions relating to LGSEF declared unconstitutional. Respondent s are directed to rectify unlawful distribution of LGSEF. Entire IRA to be relea sed automatically without further action by LGUs. AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.) - The RA del etes the word independent and treats Santiago City just as a component city. Its t erritory and territorial jurisdiction remains unchanged. - Petitioners believe t hat this amounts to a conversion of Santiago City and must therefore be decided by the citys citizens in a plebiscite, of which the RA has no provisions provided for. Respondents, on the other hand, deem that this is a mere reclassification. ISSUES 1. WON issue is justiciable 2. WON a plebiscite must be provided HELD 1. Ratio The enumeration in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution shall i nclude any material change in the political and economic rights of the local gov ernment unit(s) directly affected. - Petitioners have standing. The change will

affect the powers of the mayor and the voting exercise of residents. - Not a pol itical question. Petitioners claim that under Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Consti tution they have a right to approve or disapprove RA 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. The Court has the duty to ensure that Congress complies wit h the Constitution in law-making. 2. Ratio The change from independent component city to component city shall amount to a conversion which therefore requires a plebiscite as contemplated in Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Imple menting Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code. - Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, or abolished, or its boundary substantially alt ered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. - Respondents emphasize that the change pr ovided in the RA is not among those enumerated in the foregoing provision. Moreo ver, the territory and boundaries of Santiago City remained unchanged. - But the ponente points out that there is a common denominator among those enumerated in the provision all of them result to a material change in the political and econ omic rights of the local government units directly affected and the people there in. The same applies to the present case. - As the petitioners mentioned, the ch ange of Santiago City from independent component city to component city will hav e the following effects: From being directly under the Office of the President, the city will be reverted to the Provincial Government of Isabela, thereby MIRANDA V AGUIRRE PUNO; September 16, 1999 FACTS - Special Civil Action in Supreme Court. of prohibition with prayer for pr eliminary injunction. - Petitioners are Miranda, mayor of Santiago City at time of filing of petition, and residents of Santiago City (located in Province of Is abela) - Respondents are executive, local government and budget secretaries, and public officials of the province of Isabela - Intervenor is winner of additiona l seat in provincial board brought about by the reallocation. - Assailed is the co nstitutionality of RA 8528 AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF RA 7720(AN ACT CO NVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO

increasing its land area and subsequently increasing its share in the internal r evenue allotment. Taxes which the city collects for its benefit will be redefine d and may be shared with the province. Allocation of operating funds will now co me from the Province which amounts to a decrease in the citys funds. Registered v oters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials Ci ty officials, especially the mayor, will now be under the control of the Provinc ial Governor Resolutions and ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will now b e subject to review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan - Clearly this amounts to a conversion if not a downgrade of Santiago City. - Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code i s in accord with the Constitution when it provides that: - (f) Plebiscite (1) no c reation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of b oundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes c ast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The pleb iscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hu ndred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. Decision Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of p rohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementi ng said law. Voting 10 concur; 4 dissent the statute could not have possibly complied with any criteria when respondent M unicipality was created. Hence, it is null and void. - The Local Government Code was enacted only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the Code w as not yet in existence. A plebiscite had also been conducted among the people o f the unit/units affected by the creation of the new Municipality, who expressed approval thereof; and that officials of the newly created Municipality had been appointed and had assumed there respective positions as such. ISSUE WON BP Blg 56 is unconstitutional. HELD - No. The absence of the Local Government Code at t he time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislat ive competence to create municipal corporations. Sec. 3, Art. 11 of the 1973 doe s not prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It contains no requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for creating a new municipali ty, in much the same way that creating a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local Government Code. What the constitutional provision means is that the once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution o f local government units should conform to the criteria thus laid down. In the i nterregnum, before the enactment of such code, the legislative power remains ple nary except that the creation of the new local government unit should be approve d by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose. - The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite wa s conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. Further, it is a long-recognized prin ciple that the power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislativ e in nature. Absent any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may creat e any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient administration of go vernment. The creation of the new municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise o f the legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Bata sang Pambansa. - The petitioners, residents of the province of Negros Occidental, challenge the constitutionality of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the act which created Negros del Norte. The said law provides that some cities from the island of Negros woul d be separated in order to create the new province, subject to a concurrence of the majority in a plebiscite. - The petitioners contend that the act is not in a ccord with the Local Government Code as in Article 11, Section 3 of the Constitu tion. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite be held in the unit or units af fected. The petitioners said that Negros Occidental is a unit affected by the cre ation of the new province, thus, they should be allowed to vote. Also, they cont

end that the minimum requirement of 3500 square kilometers for the creation of a new province (as provided by the Local Government Code) has not been complied s ince the Negros del Norte is only comprised of 2856.56 square kilometers. They p ray that the plebiscite be declared null and void, and that the Court order the COMELEC to conduct another plebiscite which includes Negros Occidental. - The re spondents, meanwhile, argue that the term unit or units affected does not include Negros Occidental. As such, they cited a Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, where the court ruled that only the members of the newly created barangay are allowed to vote in the plebiscite. Also, they contend that Negros del Norte actually is comprised of 4,019.95 square kilometers, thus, it has met the requirement of the LGC. Lastly, they argue that since the plebiscite has already happened, the cas e is moot and academic. ISSUES 1. WON the case is moot and academic 2. WON the a ct complied with the constitutional requirements HELD 1. No. The case cannot be truly viewed as moot and academic. The legality of the plebiscite itself is bein g challenged by the petitioners. The Court has the duty to repudiate acts which run counter to the Constitution, done by whatever branch of government. 2. No. P lebiscite - The province of the Negros Occidental should be allowed to vote in t he plebiscite. It is clear that they are part of the units affected by the creatio n of the new province, it being the parent province. - The case cited by the petit ioners, Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, is different with the case at bar. It m erely includes the division of a barangay, the smallest political unit. This cas e refers to a division of the largest political unit, a barangay, thus there wil l be more problems involved. The Court also looked at the dissent of Justice Vic ente Abad Santos in that case, which mimics they decision of the Court in this c ase. TORRALBA V MUNICIPALITY MELENCIO-HERRERA; January 29, 1987 FACTS - Residents and taxpayers of Butuan City with Torralba, a member of the Sa ngguniang Panglungsod of the same city contend that Batas Pambansa (BP) 56, crea ting the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur, violated Sec. 3, A rt. 11 of the 1973 Constitution: No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, e xcept in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in t he unit or units affected. Petitioners argue that under the said provision, the Local Government Code must first be enacted to determine the criteria of the cre ation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, TAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ALAMPAY; July 11, 1986 FACTS - A plebiscite was held on January 3, 1986 which divided the province of N egros Occidental into two Negros del Norte and Negros Occidental.

- Looking at Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, the bill wherein BP Blg. 885 originate d, it clearly said that a plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected. BP Blg. 885, on the other hand, says that a plebiscite shall be conducted in the pro posed new province which are the areas affected. The Court found no legal basis f or the change. - The Court also declared the pronouncement in Paredes vs Executi ve Secretary is abandoned. - However, the act being unconstitutional, the Court cannot direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, there being no legal basis to do so. Minimum area requirement Upon examining the certification issued by the Prov incial Treasurer, the new province, at most, has a land area of only 2765.4 squa re kilometers. Respondents contention that the term land area is meant to include n ot only land, but water also cannot be appreciated. The Court looked at the last sentence of the first paragraph of Sec 197 of the LGC which states that the terr itory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. It is clear tha t the use of the word territory has reference only to land mass since it speaks of territory not needing to be contiguous or adjacent to each other. Decision Pe tition granted. BP Blg. 885 declared unconstitutional. The plebiscite is void as well as the proclamation of Negros del Norte as a new province and the appointm ent of its new officials. SEPARATE OPINION TEEHANKEE - congratulated the Court in its unanimity in the decision. - Additional facts: Act was approved in deep secrecy and inordinate haste in the last day of session, Dec 3, 1985. Though the act provided that a plebiscite be conducted 120 days its approval, but the plebiscite was held in Jan 3, 1986. The petitioners filed the case in Dec 23, 1985, even as no printed copies of the Act were available, sinc e its has not been published. Since it was Christmas break at that time, the pet ition was only acted upon by the Court only on January 7, 1986, after the plebis cite has been held. CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V COMMISSION ON AUDIT CORTES; January 29, 1990 FACTS - Note Read first sec. 15-21, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution for this cas e. - The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15,1987, which created the Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground that it preempts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress (see sec. 18, Art. X) and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the appr oval of the act through a plebiscite. - Executive Order No. 220, issued by the P resident in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of t he 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Provi nce and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. - It was created to accelerate econo mic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. - Its main function is to coordin ate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the region, part icularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the exec utive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region [sec. 5)]. - It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongo ing national and local government projects in the region. - The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy formulating body and a Cordillera Exec utive Board as an implementing arm (secs. 7, 8 and 10]. - The CAR and the Assemb ly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional go vernment is established and organized [sec. 17]. - Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last "Whereas" clause provides: WHEREAS, pendi ng the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent need, in the interest of nati onal security and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the existing administrative structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and the Governments legitimate concerns in the area

s, without attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous region on a permanent basis. - During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed in to law. The Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E. O. No. 220 and its transitory nature. ISSUE 1. WON EO No. 220 is unconstitutiona l because it preempts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the cr eation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval o f the said organic act through a plebiscite 2. WON EO No. 220 created a new terr itorial and political subdivision with CAR 3. WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the l ocal autonomy for the provinces HELD 1. EO. No. 220 is constitutional. - Petitio ners assertions that the President has preempted Congress from its mandated task of enacting said organic act. - EO No. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomo us region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. - The President is act ing on a contingency. The complex procedure in Art. X of the Constitution will t ake time. o The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the f irst Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to a ddress the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. - The transitory natu re of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Bro ad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras." o EO N o. 220 created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of progr ams and services [secs. 2 and 5]. o The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not su pplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous govern ment agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that bring s together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Governme nt, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras. - The Congress was c onvened. It enacted Republic Act No. 6658, which created the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. (per Sec. 18, Art. X). The President then appointed it s members. o The commission prepared a draft organic act, which became the basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The resul t was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous regio n, which was signed into law on October 23, 1989. o A plebiscite for the approva l of the organic act, to be conducted shortly, shall complete the process outlin ed in the Constitution, in the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effe ct for more

than two years and despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the Cordillera s is still to be created. Events have shown that petitioners fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordiller as was totally unfounded. 2. It did not create a new territorial and political s ubdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. - The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. o Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corpor ations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of prope rty, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. o As stated earlier, t he CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of pr ograms and services in the covered areas. - Considering the control and supervis ion exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. N o. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line depa rtments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to t he regional development councils which the President may create under the Consti tution (Art. X, see. 14). o These councils are "composed of local government off icials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and represen tatives from non-governmental organizations within the region for purposes of ad ministrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein an d to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in t he region." 3. The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cor dilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a b asic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each o It f the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18]. - The concept of local autonomy: must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Con stitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local govern ment units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of governme nt authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 11.] The CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage fo r political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the p rocess of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivision s already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region ve sted with political autonomy. Decision Petition to declare EO No. 220 as unconst itutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Voting All 15 justices concurred with J. Gutierrez, Jr. concurring in the result since for him the issue has become mo ot and academic because Republic Acts No. 6658 and No. 6766 superseded the assai led EO already. a. declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secr etary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and pr ohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing the same and spending publ ic funds for the purpose b. declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cor dillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices t o be still in force and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Regi on shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the vote rs in the constituent units. ISSUE WON the province of Ifugao, being the only pr ovince which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Regio n can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region. HELD - The sole provin ce of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. a. The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution provinces, cities, mu nicipalities and geographical areas connote that region is to be made up of more t han one constituent unit. The term region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. - rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the langu age of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense i

t has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. b. Th e entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constitu ting the Region. - It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. - If this were so, we would be fa ced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a set of provinci al officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive an d legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the sma llest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V , sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766) - Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Re gional Government for its initial organizational requirements can not be constru ed as funding only a lone and small province [Art XXI sec 13(B) (c)] - Certain p rovisions of the Act call for officials coming from different provinces and citie s in ORDILLO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GUTIERREZ; December 4, 1990 FACTS - January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act Provi ding for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region, the people of the p rovinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite. - Results of plebiscite: approv ed by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the rest provinc es and city. The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population, and a s such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the abovementioned area s. - February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Orga nic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of votes ca st only in the province of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the President reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that Ifugao being the o nly province which voted favorably then. Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR. - March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991. - Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5, 1990 a memorandum granting authority to w ind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Ass embly created under Executive Order No. 220. - March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executiv e Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under Executive Order N o. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of Organic Act. - Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit. - Petitioners therefore pray that the court:

the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a common regional la nguage. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766) - Thus, to contemp late the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate the letter a nd intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and illogical. Decision Petition (both a and b) granted. BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT GAMING CORPORATION PARAS; May 14, 1991 FACTS - Petitioners are taxpayers and practicing lawyers. Petitioner Basco is th e Chairperson of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila. On July 19 81 PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and c entralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by l aw - Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of PD 1869 and they pray fo r its annulment based on the ff. grounds: "A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person willing right recognized bylaw. It waived the Man ila City governments right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognize d by law. "B. The law has intruded into the local governments right to impose l ocal taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally ensh rined principle of local autonomy. "C. It violates the equal protection clause o f the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR - conducted gambling. while most other forms of gambling are outlawed. together with prostitution, drug traffick ing and other vices; "C. It violates the avowed trend of the government away fro m monopolistic and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization. I SSUES 1. WON petitioners have standing to question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 2. WON PD 1869 violates the principle of local autonomy of Manila 3. WON PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause HELD 1. Yes, petitioners have standin g to question and seek the annulment of PD 1869. - Considering the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or riot the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and tha t they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this p etition. With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before the Supreme Court, it holds that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger o f sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of." And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutiona l questions raised. 2. No, PD 1869 does not violate the local autonomy of Manila with regard to its exemption clause. a. The City of Manila, being a mere Munici pal corporation hits no inherent right to impose taxes. Its "power to tax" must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by t he state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" b. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. The City of Manilas power to impo se license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 197.5, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise. license s or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the Na tional Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issu e "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licen ses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila. 3. No, PD 1869 does n ot violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution - The "equal protecti on clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of indivi duals or objects upon which different rules shall. The mere fact that some gambl ing activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse racing (R -A. 306 as amended b y RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions. while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one. unconstitutional.

JUDGE LEYNES V COMMISSION ON AUDIT CORONA; December 11, 2003 FACTS - Petitioner is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, was formerly assigned in the Municipality of Naujan, Or iental Mindoro as the sole presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court. - His s alary and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) were drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court. In addition, he received a monthly allowance from the local funds of the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984. - Ma rch 15, 1993- the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, through Resolution No. 057, sough t the opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer regard ing any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the municipa lity to petitioner judge. - May 7, 1993- the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously appro ved Resolution 101, increasing petitioner judges monthly allowance starting May 1 993. - February, 17, 1994- Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to st op the payment of the monthly allowance and to require the immediate refund of t he amounts previously paid. Her directive was based on the following: 1. Section 36, RA No.7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993 2. National Compensation Cir cular No. 67 of the Department of Budget and Management - Petitioner Judge appea led to Commission on Audit, Regional Director upheld opinion of Provincial Audit or Dalisay and added that Resolution No. 101 Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang B ayan of Naujan failed to comply with Section 3 of the Local Budge Circular No. 5 3 outlining the conditions for the grant of the allowances to judges and other n ational officials or employees by the local government units. - Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the Regional Director to the Commission on Audit. - September 14, 1999- Commission on Audit issued its decision affirmin g Resolution of the Regional Director. 1. the main issue is whether or not the m unicipality can validly provide RATA to its municipal judge 2. Section 36 of RA 7645 states: - Payable from the programmed/appropriated amount and others from p ersonal services savings of the respective offices where the officials or employ ees draw their salaries; - Not exceeding the rates prescribed by the Annual Gene ral Appropriations Act; - Officials/amployees on detail with other offices or as signed to serve other offices or agencies shall be paid from their parent agenci es - No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source. 2. The m unicipal government may provide additional allowances and other benefits to judg es and other national government officials or employees assigned or stationed in the municipality, provided, that the finances of the municipality allow the gra nt thereof pursuant to Section 447, Par. 1 RA 7160, and provided further that si milar allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the national governm ent to the official/employee assigned to the local

government unit as provided under Section 3(e) of local Budget Circular No. 53. 3. Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 101 is null and void. The Honorable Judge To mas C. Leynes, being a national government official is prohibited to receive add itional RATA from the local government fund pursuant to Section 36 of the Genera l Appropriations Act and National Compensation Circular No. 67. - Position of Co mmission on Audit > The municipality could not grant RATA to judges in addition to the RATA already received from the Supreme Court 1. National Compensation Cir cular No. 67 - the RATA of national officials and employees shall be payable fro m the programmed appropriations or personal services savings of the agency where such officials or employees draw their salary and - no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source 2. General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA 7645) - the RATA of national officials shall be payable from the programmed app ropriations of their respective offices 3. Local Budget Circular No. 53 - prohib its local government units from granting allowances to national government offic ials or employees stationed in their localities when such allowances are also gr anted by the national government or are similar to the allowances granted by the national government to such officials or employees - Position of Petitioner > M unicipality is expressly and unequivocally empowered by RA 7160 (the Local Gover nment Code of 1991) to enact appropriation ordinances granting allowances and ot her benefits to judges stationed in its territory. > DBM cannot amend or modify a substantive law like the Local Government Code 1991 through mere budget circul ars. ISSUE WON Judge Leynes can validly receive allowance from municipality HELD - Ratio When a national official is on detail with another national agency, he should get his RATA only from his parent national agency and not from the other national agency he is detailed to. -Respondent COA erred in opposing the grant o f the monthly allowance by the Municipality of Naujan to petitioner Judge Leynes - Reasoning RA 7645 is amended by NCC No. 67. No, administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify, or nullify a statute. The Constitution guarantees the principl e of local autonomy - Article 10, Section 2 An ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of evidence showing that it is not in accordance with the law. ART XI: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS FRANCISCO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PER CURIAM; September 27, 2005 FACTS Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. vs. The House Committee on Justice, represented by Its Chairman, Rep. Simeon Datumanong, The House of Representatives, represent ed by Its Speaker, Rep. Jose de Venecia and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo MI NUTE RESOLUTION - Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 September 2005: DEN IED WITH FINALITY as no substantial arguments were presented to warrant the reve rsal of the questioned resolution - Urgent Motion for Consolidation dated 24 Sep tember 2005 DENIED for lack of merit - Letter dated 26 September 2005 NOTED WITH OUT ACTION FRANCISCO V NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC. CARPIO-MORALES; November 10, 2003 FACTS - Art 11, Sec 8 Constitution Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeac hment to effectively carry out the purpose of this Section. - November 2001 - 12 th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Pr ocedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) superseding the Rul es approved by 11th Congress > Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initia ted. In cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachm ent or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated on the day th e Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution again st such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that th e verified complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in

substance. In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment i s filed or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Memb ers of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of th e filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secret ary General. > Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. Wi thin a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed i nitiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official. - July 2002 House of representatives adopted a Resolution directing Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Ch ief Justice of the Judiciary Development Fund - June 2003 Pres. Estrada filed th e first impeachment complaint against Davide and 7 associate justices for culpab le violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crime s; endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora, and Dilangalen House Committee on Justice d ismissed the complain because insufficient in substance - October 2003 Rep. Teod oro and Fuentebella filed second impeachment complaint founded on the alleged re sults of the legislative inquiry; resolution of endorsement/impeachment was sign ed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives ISSUES 1. WON issue is justiciable 2. WON Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings a dopted by 12th Congress is constitutional and second impeachment complaint is va lid HELD 1. Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for judicia lly discoverable standards for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion through power of judicial review. o Locus standi - Case is of transce ndental pubic importance. o Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had bee n filed and the 2001 rules had been promulgated and enforced.

o Lis mota - (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitution al for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; an d (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred u nder Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. o Judicial Restraint not an option because the Court is not legally disqualified; no other tribunal to whic h the controversy may be referred. 2. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Repr esentatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was fil ed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on Octo ber 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constit ution. o Interpretation of the term initiate takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on J ustice or, by filing by at least 1/3 of the members of the HR with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Sec 3 (5) of Art XI becomes clear. o Sec 3 (5) of Article XI once an impeachment complains has been initiated, another com plaint may not be filed against the same official within a period of one year. o Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committe e on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in subs tance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Comm ittee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General o f the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeac hment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contraven e Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term initiate a meaning dif ferent meaning from filing and referral. habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism before the Civil Service Commissio n. Accordingly, the Commission conducted a formal investigation, and thereafter, promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charg e of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Commission found responde nt guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his two so ns, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the pen alty of dismissal from the service. - The Commission denied respondents motion for reconsideration. - Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a special civi l action for certiorari with preliminary injunction to set aside the Civil Servi ce Commissions resolutions. The Court of Appeals then reversed and set aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission, ruling that respondent did not appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism. The Court of Appeals further held that it is "the person who recommends or appo ints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act." It likewise declared null and void the Civil Service Commissions resolution dismissi ng him from the service. - The Commission then filed an appeal via ceriorari bef ore the Supreme Court. ISSUES 1. WON respondent is guilty of nepotism 2. WON the Commission is the "party adversely affected by the decision" of the Court of Ap peals who may file an appeal therefrom HELD 1. YES - Under the definition of nep otism (Section 59 of Executive Order 292), one is guilty of nepotism if an appoi ntment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consang uinity or affinity of any of the following: a) appointing authority; b) recommen ding authority; c) chief of the bureau or office, and d) person exercising immed iate supervision over the appointee. - the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a viol ation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision o

ver the appointee. - Respondent is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuat ro College of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. He did not appoint or reco mmend his two sons to CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V DACOYCOY PARDO; April 29, 1999 FACTS - Respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was charged with the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. It was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito. Mr. Daclags authority to recommend th e appointment of first level positions such as watchmen, security guards, driver s, utility workers, and casuals and emergency laborers for short durations of th ree to six months was recommended by respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Re gional Director Eladio C. Dioko, with the provision that such positions shall be under Mr. Daclags immediate supervision. Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director I II, DECS Regional Office VIII, Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of th e school. Mr. Daclag also appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. Howev er, it was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that funds are available for the pro posed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy and even rated his performance as very satisfac tory. On the other hand, his son Ped stated in his position description form that his father was his next higher supervisor. The circumvention of the ban on nepoti sm is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervis ion. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondents two sons and plac ed them under respondents immediate supervision serving as driver and utility wor ker of the school. Both positions are career positions. - To our mind, the unsee n but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or recommend ing authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepot ism. - Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the effici ency of its personnel. The basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comp rehensive one. The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the pr ohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive. If not within the exc eptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or bated when ever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the outstanding civil ser vants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in order to abate an y occasion for graft or circumvention of the law." 2. YES - There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision o f the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official me ted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of App eals, the court required the petitioner therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to im plead the Civil Service Commission as

public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the c onstitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service. - Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has becom e the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the ci vil service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly aban don and overrule extant jurisprudence that "the phrase party adversely affected b y the decision refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from offi ce" and not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary " or "when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Ser vice Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or emp loyees from administrative charges." - The Court of Appeals reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission, to support its ruling is misplaced. The issues in Debulgado are whether a promotional appointment is covered by the prohibition a gainst nepotism or the prohibition applies only to original appointments to the civil service, and whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in r ecalling and disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner after the Commission had earlier approved that appointment. Debulgado never even impli edly limited the coverage of the ban on nepotism to only the appointing or recom mending authority for appointing a relative. Precisely, in Debulgado, the Court emphasized that Section 59 "means exactly what it says in plain and ordinary lan guage: x x x The public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in importance, and the Court had neither authority nor inclination to dilute that i mportant public policy by introducing a qualification here or a distinction ther e." Decision Petition granted. The Court of Appeals decision is reversed and th e resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are revived and affirmed. SEPARATE OPINION MELO [dissent and concur] - Although I completely agree with the result and likewise with the wisdom in wh ich the issues relating to nepotism are threshed out in the majority opinion, I do not agree with the majority opinion stating that the Civil Service Commission may appeal a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case involving nepoti sm. And Mr. Justice Puno would go further by allowing even a private complainant and by implication, a complainant office, to appeal a decision exonerating or a bsolving a civil service employee of charges against, or even imposing a penalty upon him. This totally contravenes our well-settled ruling in several cases. The Court of Appeals exonerated respondent Dacoycoy of the charge of nepotism. F rom such adverse decision, the Civil Service Commission, through its Office for Le gal Affairs, interposed the present appeal by way of a petition for review on ce rtiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under existing laws and jurisprude nce this is not allowed, so this Court ruled in the above-cited cases. If this p oint is not stressed by the Court, the present decision might be misconstrued as a watering down of the settled doctrine. - It is axiomatic that the right to ap peal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law. - A cursory reading of P.D. 807, other wise known as The Philippine Civil Service Law shows that said law does not contem plate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrativ e charges. - Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides: - "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the impositi on of a penalty of suspension for more that thirty days, or fine in an amount ex ceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or di

smissal from office." - Said provision must be read together with Section 39 par agraph (a) of P.D. 805 (should be 807) which contemplates: "Appeals, where allow able, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision." - The phra se "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary ac tion which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer , removal or dismissal from office. The remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges against him. But w hen the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in the case, there is no oc casion for appeal. - Based on the above provision of law, appeal to the Civil Se rvice Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely af fected by the decision, that is, the person or the respondent employee who has b een meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demoti on in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Ser vice Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more th an thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. Appeal in c ases allowed by law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the decisi on. - It is my submission that the prerogative to now determine whether this pra ctice of disallowing appeals in cases of exoneration should still continue or no t, exclusively belongs to Legislature. The Court cannot and should not arrogate this policy-making power of Congress unto itself, not even in the guise of the e xercise of its expanded power of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution. On ly Congress has authority to remedy inadequacies in the wisdom of a law, should it find any, especially when the definite intention of the existing law was to d isallow the State to appeal from judgments of exoneration. Any attempt by the Co urt to transgress this most basic principle in the separation of powers between these two branches of government would to my mind, result in the abhorrent act o f judicial legislation. - Effective June 1, 1995, Revised Administrative Circula r No. 1-95 ordained that, appeals from awards, judgments or final orders or reso lutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency (which includes the Civil Service Commission) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be tak en by filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Although in general, appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals may be filed via a verified petition for review on certior ari with this Court (where pure questions of law, distinctly set forth therein, may be duly raised), an appeal involving a judgment or final order of the Court of Appeals exonerating a government employee in an administrative case, in parti cular, falls within the ambit of the provisions of Section 39, paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree No. 807. It is elementary that a special law such as Preside ntial Decree No. 807 takes precedence over general rules of procedure such as Ru le 45 of the Rules of Court. No appeal may, therefore, be taken under Rule 45. Moreover, it is recognized in our jurisdiction that an administrative case whic h could result in the revocation of license, or similar sanctions like dismissal from office, constitutes a proceeding which partakes of a criminal nature. Bein g such, provisions of law pertaining thereto must perforce be construed strictly against the State, just as penal laws are strictly construed strictly against t he State. Any ambiguity, should there be any, must be resolved in favor of the r espondent in the administrative case. The term "party adversely affected" should not be construed as to include the State in administrative charges involving ne potism. - To allow appeals from decisions, be they exonerative or

otherwise, against civil service employees would, to my mind, be stocking the st akes too much against our civil servants. It should be noted in this regard that the greater bulk of our government workers are ordinary people, working under s upervision and, more often than not, exposed to political pressure and the influ ence of peddlers of power. Their simple status notwithstanding, they are not eas ily cowed and intimidated. Many, though, are threatened with complaints, transfe r of station, or demotion, if they refuse to do the bidding of some unscrupulous superiors or politicians. I can, therefore, understand why the law and our juri sprudence disallow appeal by the complainant from decisions in administrative ca ses, be they exonerative or otherwise. Verily, an employee may be hounded into s pending up to his last resources and losing his self-respect and honor by succes sive appeals. - What will happen, if for instance, the respondent government emp loyee is initially exonerated or given a light penalty, and the complainant may appeal, insisting that the employee is guilty or that he deserves a heavier pena lty? And, if the Civil Service Commission thereafter metes out a penalty not to the liking of the complainant, the matter may still be elevated to the Court of Appeals or even this Court? Where else will all this end, if not in the physical and financial exhaustion of the respondent civil servant? Again, I wish to stre ss that I speak here of the ordinary employees. The big shots in government who commit wrongs may somehow hereby benefit, but then we shall be content in conclu ding that we decided in favor of the many, that the good of the majority prevail ed. - A judgment of exoneration by the Court of Appeals, as in the case of a jud gment of exoneration by the Civil Service Commission or the now defunct Merit Sy stem Protection Board, may indeed prove to be truly adverse to the government ag ency concerned and eventually to the State as a whole. This is especially so whe n there had been lapses in the interpretation and/or application of the law as i n the present case. This notwithstanding, the right to appeal, which is merely s tatutory may not be invoked, much less exercised, when the law does not provide any. Again, until and unless Congress exercises its prerogative to amend such la w, this Court is bound by it and has no other recourse except to apply the same. Fortunately for petitioner but not so for respondent, the latter failed to invo ke the foregoing general rule. In a similar case, we held that the party favored by such law who fails to interpose any objection to an appeal may be deemed to have waived this right. - Premises considered and with the above observations, I vote to grant the petition as stated in the dispositive thereof. PUNO [concur] Appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person of the respondent employee who has been meted out the penal ty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirt y days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appeal able to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspe nsion for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty da ys salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the decision. - It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance w ith the provision of law. - By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal ma y be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charg es filed against him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal. - The phrase party adversely affec ted by the decision refers to the government employee against whom the administra tive case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the for m of suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. - With humility, I make the submission that is time to strike down the doctrine disallowing appeals to the Civil Service Commission when the decision e xonerates a government official or employee from an administrative charge. The d octrine is principally based on a constricted interpretation of Section 39 of P.

D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law) which states: Sec. 39. (a) Appeals, where allowabl e, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seaso nably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days. x x x - Accordi ng to Paredes, Mendez and Magpale, the phrase party adversely affected by the dec ision refers alone to the respondent government official or employee against whom the administrative case is filed. They excluded from its compass the party comp lainant whose charge is dismissed. Hence, when the respondent government officia l or employee is exonerated, the decision is deemed final as the party complaina nt is precluded from appealing. - I find it difficult to agree with the above in terpretation which is not only too narrow but is subversive of the essence of ou r civil service law. In the case at bar, private respondent is the Vocational Ad ministrator of the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. His charged with the o ffense of nepotism for the appointment of two sons as driver and utility worker under his immediate control and supervision. It is beyond argument that nepotism is prohibited by our civil service law for it breeds inefficiency, if not corruption, in government service. The critical question, t herefore, is: who has the standing to prevent the violation of this law and prot ect public interest? I submit that a taxpayer has the standing to bring suit to void nepotic acts for he has an interest that appointments in the civil service s hall be made only according to merit and fitness x x x. A taxpayer has a right to good government and good government cannot result from appointments determined by bloodlines. The Civil Service Law itself recognizes that there are offenses w hich can be the subject of a complaint by any private citizen. Thus, Section 37 of the law allows any private citizen to file a complaint against a government o fficial or employee directly with the Commission. Section 38 also recognizes tha t administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or em ployee by the head of the department or office of equivalent rank, or head of lo cal government or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors or upon sworn writte n complaint of any other persons. The general rule is that one who has a right to be heard has standing to seek review of any ruling adverse to him. Hence, if a private citizen has the right to file an administrative complaint, he must also have the right to appeal a dismissal of his complaint, unless the law clearly pr ecludes his right of appeal for indubitable policy reasons. A contrary rule will diminish the value of the right to complain. The cases of Paredes, Mendez and M agpale do not give any policy reasons why the dismissal of a charge of nepotism cannot be appealed. They merely resort to doubtful inferences in justifying the bar to appeals. Such an approach goes against the rule that preclusions of judici al review of administrative action . . . is not lightly to be inferred. - In tru th, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Ser vice Law. For what the law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencie s involving suspension for not more than 30 days or fine in an amount not exceed ing 30 days salary. But there is a clear policy reasons for declaring these deci sions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasi-judicial machin ery of our administrative system and defeat the expectation of fast and efficien t action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty o ffense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be overemphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erro neous decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from review, especial ly judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo, eve n a decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.

- Similarly, the doctrine barring appeal cannot be justified by the provision li miting the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission to review decisions invo lving: (1) suspension for more than thirty (30) days; (2) fine in an amount exce eding thirty (30) days salary; (3) demotion in rank or salary; and (4) transfer, removal or dismissal from office. Again, there is nothing in this provision ind icating legislative intent to bar appeal from decisions exonerating a government official or employee from nepotism. Statutory preclusion of appeals is the exce ption rather than the rule, for as stressed by Mr. Justice Douglas, "tolerance o f judicial review has been more and more the rule against the claim of administr ative finality." Yet the cases of Paredes, Mendez and Magpale precisely barred a ll appeals despite lack of an explicit, positive provision in the Civil Service Law. - Moreover, the case at bar involves the right of a party adversely affecte d to resort to judicial review. This case does not involve the appellate jurisdi ction of the Civil Service Commission, i.e., whether or not it has the power to review a decision exonerating a government official from a charge of nepotism. T he facts show that it was the Civil Service Commission that at the first instanc e found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism. It was Dacoycoy who appealed the decision o f the Civil Service Commission to our regular court, more exactly, the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of Court. As Dacoycoy only impleaded Suan as respo ndent, the Court of Appeals ordered that the Civil Service Commission should als o be impleaded as party respondent. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Commi ssion as it cleared Dacoycoy from the charge of nepotism. The question therefore is whether or not this Court is precluded from reviewing the decision of the Co urt of Appeals on a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Again, I submit that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this review. Indeed, under the Constitu tion, the jurisdiction of this Court has even been expanded "to determine whethe r or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government." The question is not our lack of jurisdiction but the prudential exercise of power. In certiorari cases alleging grave abuse of discretion, our given task is to det ermine how much is too much of an abuse. - To my mind, it is also of de minimis importance that the petition of thus Court was filed by the Civil Service Commis sion. The records will reveal that Suan, the original complainant, wrote to the Civil Service Commission urging it to make the appeal ostensibly for lack of mea ns. But even without Suan, I submit that the nature of the issue in the case at bar and its impact on the effectiveness of government give the Civil Service Com mission the standing to pursue this appeal. The issue in the case at bar is basi cally a legal one, i.e., the proper interpretation of who can be convicted of nepotism, and undoubtedly, this Court has the authoritat ive say on how to interpret laws. Administrative agencies have always conceded t hat the final interpretation of laws belongs to regular courts. And the issue ha s broad implications on the merit and fitness philosophy of our civil service sy stem. Under Sec. 3, Article IX (B) of our Constitution, it is the Civil Service Commission that has oversight of our civil service system. It is thus the party better equipped to argue the diverse dimensions of the issue. It is also the mos t affected, for it has the duty not to stand still when nepotic practices threat en the principle of meritrocacy in our government. It seems to me self evident t hat this type of injury to public interest can best be vindicated by the Commiss ion and not by a private person. - There are other disturbing implication if we do not junk the doctrine of non-reviewability of decisions exonerating governmen t officials from charges of nepotism. For one, the doctrine unduly favors offici als charged with nepotism, for while we allow further review of their conviction , we disallow review of their exoneration, regardless of the errors. This distor ted rule contravenes our distaste against nepotism, a practice whose continuance can fatally erode faith in government. For another, perpetuating a nepotic act, an evil that should be extirpated wherever found, can never be the intent of ou r legislators who crafted our Civil Service Law. For still another, completely c utting off access to judicial review goes against the spirit of the 1987 Constit ution expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. Putting up borders of non-review

ability weakens the judiciarys checking power. Indeed, shielding abusive administ rative actions and decisions from judicial oversight will ultimately erode the r ule of law. As Justice Brandeis opined, "supremacy of law demands that there sha ll be an opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied and whether the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was condu cted regularly." - I join the majority opinion. ROMERO [dissent] - Does the Civil Service Commission have the legal personality to appeal a decis ion of the Court of Appeals exonerating an employee charged in an administrative case, which decision, in effect, reversed and nullified the Commissions finding that the respondent employee is guilty as charged? - After an exhaustive and car eful scrutiny of P.D. No. 807 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Law), Execut ive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987) a s well as the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, I fi nd no legal basis to support the contention of the majority that the Commission has that legal personality. - The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government . Corollarily, it is equipped with the power and function to hear and decide adm inistrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, incl uding contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices and the agencies attached to it. This is in consonance with its authority to pas s upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in t he civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and ef ficiency of such officers and employees except as otherwise provided by the Cons titution or by law. It is thus clear that the Civil Service Commission has been constituted as a disciplining authority. - Section 34, Rule XIV of the Omnibus R ules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides the answer as to wh o may appear before the Commission, thus: "Administrative proceedings may be com menced against a subordinate officer or employee by the following officials and employees: (a) Secretary of department; (b) Head of Office of Equivalent rank; ( c) Head of Local Government Unit; (d) Chief of Agency; (e) Regional Director; or (f) Upon Sworn, Written complaint of Any other Person." - Consequently, the com plaint can either be the Secretary of department, head of office of equivalent r ank, head of a local government unit, chief of agency, regional director or any other person or party. The phrase any other party has been understood to be a comp lainant other than the head of department or office of equivalent rank or head o f local government or chiefs of agencies or regional directors. - The respondent , on the other hand, is any subordinate officer or employee. Nowhere can be foun d, expressly or impliedly, in Section 34 of Rule XIV of Omnibus Rules Implementi ng Book V of E.O. No. 292, the Commission as one of the parties, either as compl ainant or respondent in an administrative case. Logically and by necessary impli cation, it cannot considered either a complaint or a respondent. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Based on the foregoing, there is no other c onclusion but that the Civil Service Commission is not a party to an administrat ive proceeding brought before it. As provided by Supreme Court Administrative Ci rcular 1-95, decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission may be brought to th e Supreme Court, now to the Court of Appeals, on certiorari by the aggrieved par ty. By inference, an aggrieved party is either the one who initiated the complai nt before the Commission or the respondent, the person subject of the complaint. In fact, the question as to who is an aggrieved party has long been settled in a litany of cases. An aggrieved party in an administrative

case is the government employee against whom an administrative complaint is file d. The Civil Service Commission is definitely not a government employee. Neither is it an agency against whom an administrative charge is filed. While it may be argued that, in a sense, the government is an "aggrieved party" in administrati ve proceedings before the Commission, it nevertheless is not the "aggrieved part y" contemplated under P.D. No. 807 or the Civil Service Law. - Having establishe d that the Civil Service Commission is not a party, much less an aggrieved party , then indubitably, it has no legal personality to elevate the case to the appel late authority. The Commission, therefore, has no legal standing to file the ins tant petition. - While admittedly, the Civil Service Commission is considered a nominal party when its decision is brought before the Court of Appeals, such is only a procedural formality. As with appellate processes, a nominal party is not the aggrieved party. Its inclusion as a party is based primarily on the fact th at the decision, order or ruling it issued is being contested or assailed and se condarily, for purposes of enforcement. By analogy, the Commission in the perfor mance of its quasi-judicial functions is just like a judge who should "detach hi mself from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. Th e raison detre for such doctrine is that a judge is not an active combatant in su ch proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual po sitions and for the appellate court to decide the issues without his active part icipation. By filing this case, petitioner in a way ceased to be judicial and ha s become adversarial instead." - I dissent from the ponencias conclusion that the Commission may appeal a judgement of exoneration in an administrative case invo lving nepotism in light of the foregoing disquisition. AWOL. When De Torres wrote that he will continue with CIRDAP, Chancellor warned that UPLB would be forced to drop him fr rolls of personnel. - After almost 5 yr s of absence w/o leave, De Torres wrote that he was reporting back to duty at UP LB. Chancellor Villareal said he should have come fr an approved leave. ACCI Dir ector said De Torres was considered AWOL and advised him to reapply. But Chancel lor Villareal reversed his stand and said De Torres may report bec records do no t show that he had been officially dropped. ACCI requested ruling from Civil Ser vice Commission. - CSC ruled that De Torres have been dropped fr service. Petiti oners sought recourse before the CA but the petition was dismissed. ISSUE WON De Torres automatic separation from civil service was valid HELD NO. Automatic dism issal was invalid. - Section 33, Rule XVI of Revised Civil Service Rules speaks of automatic separation even w/o prior notice and hearing. Quezon v. Borromeo: c hief nurse of Iligan City Hospital requested for two extensions of leave. Both g ranted. She sought third extension. It was not acted upon. It was ruled that she violated Sec 33. She was dropped. - Isberto v. Raquiza: Employee, absent w/o of ficial leave ought to have known that he was deemed automatically separated. - R amo v. Elefao: Petitioner was dropped fr service for her failure to return to dut y after expiration of leave of absence. - There is sufficient notice when Chance llor advised petitioner and warned of possibility of being considered AWOL. But in those three cases, the petitioners were actually dropped. Here, De Torres was never actually dropped. He remained in the rolls. His salary was even increased several times during his absence. His appointment was also reclassified. These are acts inconsistent w/ separation. UP has chosen not to exercise its prerogati ve to dismiss petitioner. - Here, UP exercised academic freedom. It has power to determine who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, who may be admitted to study. CSC has no authority to dictate UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. - This case is a petition for certiorari of a previous ruling of the Court of Ap peals regarding the legality of the appointment and transfer of Josefina Bacal t o the Office of the Regional Director of the Public Attorneys Office. Josefina Ba cal is a Career Executive Officer III which she alleges entitled her to the posi tion of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorneys Office. - Bacal passed the Career Executive Services Examinations in 1989 and on 1994 was conferred CES eli gibility and was appointed as Regional Director of the PAO. On January 5, 1995 s

he was appointed to the rank of CESO III and on November 5, 1997 the Secretary o f Justice appointed her as Chief Public Attorney that was confirmed by President Ramos on February 5, 1998, wherein she took her oath and assumed office. - On J uly 1, 1998 Carina Demaisip was appointed Chief Public Defender by Pres. Estrada while Bacal was appointed Regional Director without her consent. Demaisip took her oath of office on the 7th of July. Bacal filed a petition quo warranto that questioned her replacement to the Supreme Court that was dismissed without preju dice for it to refiled in the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals ruled in Bacals favor. ISSUES 1. WON the case should be dismissed for its failure to exhaust adm inistrative remedies through an appeal to the Office of the President 2. WON Bac als removal amounted to a removal without cause (which is illegal) 3. WON by the mere fact of being appointed would enable the individual to acquire security of tenure 4. WON a Career Executive Service personnel can be shifted from one offic e to another without violation of their right to security of tenure as their sta tus and salaries is based on their ranks and not on their jobs 5. WON Demaisip h as a security of tenure HELD 1. No, because the administrative decision sought t o be reviewed is that of the President himself. No appeal need be taken to the O ffice of the President from the decision of a department head because the latter is in theory the alter ego of the former. In addition, exhaustion of administra tive remedies does not apply when the question raised is purely legal. 2. No, he r appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney requires her to be appoin ted to a CES Rank Level I which never materialized. If the rank of an individual is not appropriate to the position her appointment is deemed to be temporary an d she cannot claim security of tenure. The right to tenure is conferred upon the individual filling the position based on the possession of required qualificati ons. The general rule would be that those who were qualified would be appointed, but as an exception, those with insufficient qualifications may be appointed bu t merely in an acting capacity. ART IX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS CIVIL SERVICE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PANGANIBAN; April 3, 20 01 FACTS - Dr. Alfredo De Torres is UPLB Assoc Prof., who went on vacation LOA w/o pay, during which he served as official rep to the Centre on Integrated Rural De vt for Asia and the Pacific (CIRDAP). CIRDAP requested UPLB for extension of LOA but was denied by Director of ACCI of UPLB. The Director advised De Torres to r eport for duty. Also. UPLB Chancellor de Guzman apprised him on rules of Civil S ervice and possibility of being considered CUEVAS V BACAL MENDOZA; December 6, 2000 FACTS - Justice Cuevas, Executive Secretary Zamora, and Atty. Demaisip v Atty. B acal

3. No, security of tenure is acquired with respect to the rank and not to the po sition. In addition, the guaranty of security of tenure is applicable only to th ose in the first and second level in the civil service. 4. No, reading through P D No. 1 that created the Integrated Reorganization Plan, the Career Executive Se rvice provides that reassignments or transfers are allowed provided that it is m ade in the interest of public service and involves no reduction in the rank or s alary of the individual and that this should not be done more oftener than two y ears. If the individual deems it as unjustified s/he may appeal to the President . The rule that an employee can claim security of tenure is applicable only to E lection Registrars, Election Officers, also in the Commission on Elections, and Revenue District Officers in thew Bureau of Internal Revenues. Bacal was just CE SO III therefore, she is meant to qualify in the position where she was subseque ntly appointed to which is Regional Director. 5. No, she does not. The security of tenure is also not permanent following the same logic that was used for Bacal , Demaisip having not acquired the qualification of CES Rank Level I implies tha t her stay in the position is temporary. of funds or the interests of the economy; abolition must be made in good faith, not personal or political reasons ISSUES 1. WON there was a bona fide reorganiza tion of NAPOLCOM 2. WON there was a valid abolition of the petitioners offices HE LD 1. NO. Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as a collegial body w/in the DILG, and under RA 8551 it was defined as an agency attached to the Department for policy and program coordination. This increase in the agencys autonomy does not r esult in the creation of an entirely new office. S4 of RA 8551amends the NAPOLCO Ms composition by adding the PNP Chief as an ex-officio member, requiring the mem bership of 3 civilian commissioners, a fourth commissioner from the law enforcem ent sector and at least one female commissioner. Such changes are trivial and do not affect the nature of the NAPOLCOM; in fact, the powers and duties of NAPOLC OM remain unchanged. Reorganization only takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of the office including lines of control and authorit y and may involve a reduction of personnel or abolition of offices if done in go od faith (economic purposes, bureaucratic efficiency, etc.) Despite the new law, NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative, superviso ry, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions. 2. NO. Respondents stress that S8 of RA 8551 discloses legislative intent to abolish NAPOLCOM pursuant to a bona fide reorganization. As held in UP Board of Regents v. Rasul, the removal of an incumbent is not justified if the functions of the old and new positions are the same, that is, if there is no true reorganization. The court finds that RA 8551 does not expressly abolish the petitioners positions upon examination of the changes introduced by the new law. In the event of a reorganization done in good faith, no dismissal actually occurs because the office itself ceases to exi st. If the abolition merely seeks to enact a change of nomenclature or attempt t o circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service personnel, t hen the abolition is void ab initio. In the case at bar, no bona fide reorganiza tion had been mandated by congress; hence, petitioners were removed from office with no legal cause, making S8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional, and entitling them t o immediate reinstatement. Decision -Petition GRANTED, but only to the extent of declaring S8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional for violating the petitioners rights to security of tenure. Petitioners are entitled to reinstatement. CANONIZADO V AGUIRRE GONZAGA-REYES; January 25, 2000 FACTS - PETITITON to declare RA 8851 (RA 8551) unconstitutional - the National P olice Commission (NAPOLCOM) was originally created under RA 6975 entitled An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized Department Of Th e Interior And Local Government, And For other Purposes. - under RA 6975, petitio ners Alexis Canonizado, Edgar Torres, Rogelio Pureza, and respondents Jose Adion g and Dula Torres were appointed as NAPOLCOM commissioners on Jan. 1991 for six year terms - 3/6/1998: RA 8551, aka the Philippine National Police Reform and Reo rganization Act of 1998 took effect, declaring the terms of the current commissio ners expired - the petitioners question the constitutionality of S4 of RA 8551 w

hich amends S13 of RA 6975, altering the composition of NAPOLCOM as well as S8, which removes them from office and allegedly violates their security of tenure. - as members of the civil service, the petitioners cannot be removed from office except for causes provided by law, that is, with legal cause and not merely for r easons deemed fit by the appointing power - the creation or abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function; Congress may abolish any office w/o impairing the officers right to continue in his position. This power may be exer cised for reasons such as a lack FACTS - The Case: Special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set as ide two decisions of the Commission on Audit (COA) - On June 11, 1993, Petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde was appointed as ad interim Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) by then Pres. Ramos for a term expiring Feb. 2, 1999. She assum ed office after taking her oath and her appointment was confirmed by Congress. Before the end of her term, or on Feb. 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarificatio n from the Office of the Pres. as to the expiry date of her term of office. In r eply, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (now Associate Justice) Corona, in a letter, opined that petitioners term would expire on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2, 1999. She thus remained in office after Feb. 02, 1999, relying on the said advis ory opinion. - On Feb. 04, 1999, CSC Chairman Alma De Leon, requested opinion fr om the COA on whether petitioner and her co-terminous staff should continue to b e paid their salaries notwithstanding the fact that their appointment had alread y expired. COA General Counsel issued an opinion that the petitioners appointment had indeed expired. - CSC Resident Auditor issued a notice disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her staff, a decision which petitioner appealed to the COA en banc. The appeal was dismissed, COA affi rmed the disallowance, and held that the issue of petitioners term of office may be addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which had Feb. 02, 1999 as expiration date. COA also stated that the Commission is bereft of power to re cognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, she was again den ied; hence this petition. ISSUE WON petitioner Atty. Gamindes term of office, as CSCommissioner, expired on Feb. 2, 1999 or on Feb. 2, 2000 HELD It expired on Fe b. 2, 1999. For Commissioners (5 year term) the count is: Feb.02, 1987--- Feb.02, 1992--- Feb.02, 1999-- Feb.02, 2006 Ratio The appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1 987 Constitution must be on Feb. 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution in order to maintain the regular interval of vacancy every 2 years consistent in the previous appointment intervals. GAMINDE V COMMISSION ON AUDIT PARDO; December 13, 2000

Reasoning - The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Art IX-B Sec. 1(2). The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system of a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the CSC (Art. XII Sec. 1(1), 1973 Consti). It was a copy of th e Constitutional prescription in the amended 1935 Constitution of a rotational s ystem for the appointment of the Chairman and members of the Commission on Elect ions (Art. X Sec. 1, 1935 Consti, as amended). - In Republic v Imperial, it was said that the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions: (1) that the terms of the first (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term. - C onsequently, the terms of the first Chairman and Commissioners of the Constituti onal Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irresp ective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expirations of the firs terms of 7, 5 and 3 years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2-year interval between the expirat ion of the terms. - In the law of public officers, term of office is distinguished from tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer ma y claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the sever al incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during w hich the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. - Although Art. XVIII Sec. 15 provides that incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner re moved for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term, what it contemplates is tenure not term. The term unless i mports an exception to the general rule. Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members of the Consti Commissions shall continue for 1 year a fter ratification of the Consti under their existing appointments at the discret ion of the appointing power who may cut short their tenure by reasons the reason s stated therein. However, they do not affect the term of office fixed in Art. IX, providing for a 7-5-3 yr rotational interval for the 1st appointees. Decision T erm of office expired on Feb. 2, 1999. However, petitioner served as de facto of ficer in good faith until Feb. 2, 2000 and thus entitled to receive her salary a nd other emoluments for actual service rendered. COA decision disallowing salari es/emoluments is reversed. Voting 10 Concur, Bellosillo No part., Related to one of the parties, Puno, conc ur (In the result), De Leon, Jr., Concurring and Dissenting opinion Mendoza, Joi ns De Leons dissent SEPARATE OPINION DE LEON [concur and dissent] Dissents: -the term of petitioner expired on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2, 1999 as explained in ponencia. -the term of the first set of CSCommissioners appointed under the 1987 Constitution commenced on the Feb. 2, 1988 not on the date of its ratification on Feb. 2, 1987. Concurs: -that the salaries and emoluments which petitioner as CSCommissioner received after Feb. 2, 1999 should not be disallowe d by COA. productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992 pursuant to RA 6971, otherwi se known as the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the ground that it was prohibited under AO 29. The disallowance of the bonus in question was finally brought on appeal t o the Commission on Audit (COA) which denied the appeal. ISSUES 1. WON with rega rd to G.R. No. 119597, Incentives under RA 6971 are applicable to ADEPT employee s 2. WON AO 29 and 268 (being Presidential pronouncements) are violative of the provisions of EO 292 (being a law passed by the legislature), and hence null and void, and WON AO 29 and 268 unlawfully usurp the Constitutional authority grant ed solely to the Civil Service Commission 3. WON the forced refund of incentive

pay is an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation 4. WON assumin g arguendo that the grant of incentives was invalid, the same should be the pers onal liability of officials directly responsible therefore in accordance with se ction 9 of AO 268 HELD 1. There are generally two types of GOCCs: 1. Those incor porated under the general corporation law. Employees of this type have the right to bargain (collectively), strike, and other such remedies available to workers of private corporations. Functions are mainly proprietary. 2. Those with specia l charter (a.k.a. original charter), which are subject to Civil Service Laws, ha ve no right to bargain (collectively). Incorporated in pursuance of a State Poli cy. - Only GOCCs incorporated under the general corporation law, and thus perfor ming proprietary functions, are included under the coverage of RA 6791. GOCCs cr eated in pursuance of a policy of the state and those whose officers and employe es are covered by the Civil Service are expressly excluded. - The legislative in tent to place only GOCCs performing proprietary functions under the coverage of RA 6971 is also gleanable from the other provisions of the law making reference to remedies available only to laborers akin to the private sector. - Also, pursu ant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the establi shment of Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and Incentives Award Systems for GOCCs with original charters, it is thus evident that the PTA is already wi thin the scope of an incentives award system. 2. In accordance with EO 292, the functions of the Civil Service Commission have been decentralized to the offices and agencies where such functions can be effectively performed; specifically, the implementation BLAQUERA V ALCALA PURISIMA; September 11, 1998 FACTS - G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are cases for certiorari an d prohibition, challenging the constitutionality and validity of AO 29 and 268 Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and a gencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to EO 292 o therwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules Impleme nting Book V of EO 292. - In 1993, then President Ramos issued AO 29 authorized the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum am ount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Section 7 of AO 268 (iss ued by President Aquino), enjoining said grants without prior approval of the Pr esident. Section 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amou nt authorized under Section 1 hereof to immediately cause the return/refund of t he excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of t he government concerned, who are the herein Respondents, caused the deduction fr om petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. - To prevent the Respondents from making further deductions from t heir salaries or allowances, the Petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief. - In G.R. No. 119597, the facts are different but the petition poses a common issue with the other consolidated cases. The Petitioner, Association of D edicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority (ADEPT), is an association of employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) who were granted

of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System ahs been decentralized to the President or to the head of each department or agency (as his/her alter ego ). - The President is the head of government. His/her power includes control ove r executive departments. Control means the power to alter what a subordinate offi cer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. In issuing AO 29 limiting the amount of benefi ts, enjoining heads of departments from granting benefits without prior approval from him/her, and directing the refund of any excess over the prescribed amount , the President was just exercising his power of control over executive departme nts. Specifically, seeing that the incentives program was producing demoralizati on instead of the original goal of encouragement, owing to the fact that employe es not receiving the incentives felt slighted and underappreciated, the Presiden t merely exercised his power of control by modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits without appropriate clearance from the Office of the President. - Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the Civil Service Commission to grant benefits to government employ ees. AO 29 and 268 did not revoke, but rather only regulated, the grant and amou nt of incentives. 3. Not all contracts entered into by the government will opera te as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovere ign and proprietary acts. The acts involved in this case are governmental. Besid es, incentive pay is in the nature of a bonus, which is not a demandable or enfo rceable obligation. 4. Absent a showing of bad faith, public officers are not pe rsonally liable for damages resulting form the performance of official duties. D ecision In upholding the Constitutionality of AO 268 and 29, the Court reiterate s the doctrine that in interpreting statutes, that which will avoid a finding of unconstitutionality is to be preferred. Considering, however, that all the part ies here acted in good faith, the Court cannot countenance the refund of the inc entives which amount the petitioners have already received, as a corollary, furt her deductions from salaries are thus enjoined. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS PADILLA; May 5, 1994 FACTS - Nature Petitions for prohibition to stop the threatened illegal transfer , disbursement, and use of public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution and the law - 18 April 1994: Petitioner Liga Ng Mga Barangay, an organization of barangays, represented by petitioner Alex David (as taxpayer and as president and secretary general of the organization) filed this petition for prohibition, with prayer fo r a temporary restraining order. - 22 April 1994: Another petition raising the s ame issues were filed. - Petitioners question what they perceive as the threatene d illegal transfer, disbursement, and use of public funds in a manner contrary t o the Constitution and the law relative to the conduct of the forthcoming baranga y elections. They claim that in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1994, on ly P137,878,000.00 were appropriated by the Congress for the holding of the said elections. The petitioners claim that by early 1994, Congress itself has made t he assessment that the money is insufficient to defray cost of holding the elect ions. Petitioners allege that in order to augment said amount, respondents have threatened and are about to transfer/re-allocate certain moneys to be sourced fr om the executive and legislative branches of government to COMELEC, which in tur n will use it to fund the elections: [a] P180M from the appropriation of the DIL G, [b] P160M from the Countryside Development Fund; P70M from the Senate; P30M f rom the HReps; and [c] P43M from the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) of Provin ces, Cities and Municipalities (Note: This is the scheme that is being assailed in the issue of this case) - 21 April 1994: Court resolved to require respondent s to submit comment on the petition within the nonexistentiable period of 5 days - 26 April 1994: Respondents through the Solicitor General filed their comment. They claim that petitioners acted solely on the basis of reports made in the ne wspaper (Barangay Poll Funds Found article from the Manila Bulletin) and did not b other to confirm the veracity of article. They also claim that said reports were

mere unofficial proposals/suggestions made in the process of searching for fund s. COMELEC further alleges that that it intends to fund the barangay elections f rom the money allotted by Congress for the purpose and from its own savings resu lting from unused funds. The Solicitor General supports the stand of the respond ents, as it is according to Sec. 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution and Sect oons 17 (Use of Savings) and 19 (Meaning of Savings and Appropriations) of the G AA for Fiscal Year 1994. - Respondents also maintain that funds from LGUs may al so be used to help defray the cost of the forthcoming barangay elections. They c ite Opinion No. 51 of the Secretary of Justice, dated 19 April 1994, which says that under Sec. 50 of the Omnibus Election Code, LGUs are required to appropriat e funds for barangay elections ISSUE WON the existence or lack of factual basis on WON the impleaded public respondents are attempting, or intending to effect the transfer of funds which would be in direct contravention of Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution 42 HELD Any threat or attempt to pursue a transfer of funds scheme that exists only in newspaper reports is not sufficient factual basis to render such scheme by t he COMELEC unconstitutional. Reasoning 1. [a] The threat to pursue the scheme, i f ever there was one, existed only in newspaper reports which could have misled the general public, including the petitioners, into believing that the same eman ated from impeccable sources. [b] Court acknowledges petitioners have displayed vigilance and acted with the best of intentions, but they should have first obta ined an official statement or at least confirmation from respondents as to the v eracity of the report instead of relying on the newspaper article. 2. The court went further in saying actually, in affirming the arguments of the respondents t hat consistent with Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution, the following may b e availed by the COMELEC to defray the cost of the forthcoming barangay election s: [a] Article IV of the Omnibus Election Code provides that LGUs should appropr iate funds for the barangay elections. COMELEC may make arranges with local gove rnments to comply with this article pursuant to its constitutional authority to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elect ions. COMELEC may also issue an appropriate directive for the province city, or municipality to advance election expenses that are chargeable to it. Since the P resident exercises general supervision of all local governments, the COMELEC may course its directives to local governments through the Office of the President and to be implemented by DILG. (Note: This is based on the Opinion No. 51, s. 19 94 of Sec. of Justice which was cited as authority) [b] Sections 17 and 19 of GA A for FY 1994 where it was stated that the Heads of Constitutional Commissions u nder Article IX of the Constitutionare hereby authorized to augment any item in t his Act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respec tive appropriations. Decision Petitions DISMISSED for lack of merit. Voting 14 c oncur, no dissent. LOONG V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS PUNO; April 14, 1999 42 No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representati ves, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Com missions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropria tions law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their resp ective appropriations.

FACTS - RA 8436 prescribed the adoption of an automated election system > Was us ed in the May 11, 1998 regular elections in the ARMM which includes Sulu > Atty. Jose Tolentino was the head of the COMELEC Task Force in Sulu - Sulu voting rea dily peaceful except that there was a problem with the automated counting of vot es > Discrepancies were reported (May 12, 1998) between the election returns and the votes cast for mayor in the muncipality of Pata (later on confirmed when ch ecked by Atty. Tolentino) > The automated counting of ballots in Pata were suspe nded and the problem was immediately communicated to the COMELEC technical exper ts > The problem was caused by the misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots but nothing was wrong with the machines. - Em ergency meeting called by Atty. Tolentino participated in by military police off icials and local candidates. Petitioner Loong was among those who attended along with private respondent Tan. > Discussed how ballots should be counted. > Shift to manual count recommended by Brig. Gen. Espinosa and Subala, PNP Director Ale jandrino, gubernatorial canddidates Tan and Tulawie and congressinal candidate T ulawie > Automated count insisted by gubernatorial candidates Loong and Jikiri. Written position papers were required to be submitted. > Local ballots in five m unicipalities were rejected by automated machines (Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapu l and Jolo). Ballots rejected because of the wrong sequence code. > COMELEC issu ed Minute Resolution 98-1747 ordering manual recount in Pata. By 12 midnight of May 12, Atty. Tolentino had sent an en banc report to the COMELEC reommending ma nual recount in the whole province of Sulu because it is possible that the same problem would extend to other provinces in Sulu. > The COMELEC approved of Atty. Tolentinos recommendation with the following implementation procedures: + Coun ting machines from Jolo be transported to Manila in the PICC to keep COMELEC awa y from bloodshed between AFP and MNLF + Authorize the official travel of the boa rd of canvassers concerned for the conduct of the automated and manual operation s of the counting of votes at PICC + To authorize the presence of only the duly authorized representative of the political parties concerned and the candidate w atchers both outside and inside the perimeters of the PICC > May 15, 1998 COMELE C laid down rules for manual count through Minute Resoln 98-1796 > May 18, 1998 Loong filed objection to Minu te Resolution 98-1796 + Violates provisions of RA 8436 providing for automated c ounting of ballots in ARMM. Automated count is mandatory and could not be substi tuted by manual counting. + Ballots were rejected because ballots were tampered with and/or the texture was different from the official ballot + Counting machin es designed in such a way as only genuine official ballots could be read by the machine + Other counting machines in other municipalities were in order. > COMEL EC still began with the manual count on May 18. > Loong filed petition for certi orari with Supreme Court: + COMELEC issued Minute Resolutions without prior noti ce and hearing to him + Order for manual counting violated RA 8346 + Manual coun ting gave opportunity to election cheating: < Counting by human hands of fake, t ampered and counterfeit ballots which machines were programmed to reject < Oppor tunity to substite ballots in PICC < 22 Board of Election Inspectors for 1,194 p recincts gives sufficient time to change and tamper ballots < Opportunity to del ay the proclamation of winning candidates through dilatory moves in pre-proclama tion controversy because the returns and certificates are already made by man > Tan proclaimed winner in Sulu. Loong garnered 3rd highest votes. ISSUES 1. WON p etition for certiorari was appropriate remedy to invalidate COMELEC resolutions 2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdis ction in order manual count a. Is there legal basis for manual count? b. Are its factual bases reasonable? c. Was there denial of due process when COMELEC order ed manual count? 3. Won it is proper to call for special election for the positi on of Sulu governor assuming the manual count is illegal and result is unreliabl e. HELD 1. Certiorari is the proper remedy according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of the Co nstitution - Interpretation of RA 8436 must be made in relation the COMELECs br oad power in Art. 9, Section 2(1) to enforce and administer all laws and regulati ons relative

to the conduct of an election. - Adjudicatory for the petitioner, private respond ent and intervenor so there are enough considerations for the certiorari jurisdi ction. 2. No grave abuse of discrection amounting to lack of jurisdiction becaus e the post election realities show that the order for the manual count was not a rbitrary, capricious or whimsical. a. There was legal basis for the manual count . - RA 8436 cannot be insisted upon after the machines rejected the local ballot s in five municipalities of Sulu. The errors were not machine related by were be cause of the ballots. - Congress failed to provide for remedy when the error in counting is not machine-related. The vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELE C from levitating the problem. Article 9, Section 2(1) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations r elative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and re call. b. There was reasonable factual basis. - Automated machines failed to read the ballots correctly in Pata. Local ballots in Jolo, Siasi, Tapal, Indanan and Talipao were rejected. > Flaws were carefully analyzed by COMELEC experts and fo und nothing wrong with the machines but with the ballots. > To continue with the automated count would result in a grossly erroneous result. - COMELEC had to ac t derisively in order to restore peace and order, especially since past election tensions have been created by failures in automated counting. Military and auth orities recommended manual counting to preserve peace and order. c. There was no denial of due process when COMELEC ordered the manual count. - They were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of local ballots in Sulu. > Orally heard > Written position papers > Representatives escorted transfer of ballots a nd automated machines to Manila > Watchers observed manual count - The integrity of the local ballots was safeguarded when they were transferred from Sulu to Ma nila and when they were manually counted. - Manual count is reliable because whe n the COMELEC ordered manual count, it issued corresponding rules and regulation s to govern the counting and the ballots were not difficult to understand. 3. A special election for Sulu governor is improper. - A special election only govern s exceptional circumstances. The plea can only be grounded on a failure of elect ion. > A failure of election applies when on account

of force majeure, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes, the election in an y polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended befor e the hour fixed by law for the dosing of the voting, or after the voting and du ring the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the cust ody of canvass thereof. > A plea for special election must also be addressed to t he COMELEC not to the SC (Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code should be read in relation to RA 7166). > Grounds for failure of election involve questins afte r the fact. They can only be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice and hearing to the parties. Loong did not do this in the present case. His plea for special election was an afterthought. - To hold a specal election would be d iscriminatory. > All elected officials in Sulu now discharging functions.; > Tan s election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be treated unalik es. In addition - COMELEC was organied under Comm. Act 607 in August 1940. The p ower to enforce election laws was originally vested in the President and exercis ed through the Dept. of Interior. - 1940 amendments to 1935 Constitution transfo rmed the COMELEC to a constitutional body. COMELEC was granted power to have excl usive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the c onduct of elections. - 1973 Constitution broadened powers of the COMELEC by makin g it the sole judge of all election contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the national legislature and elective provincia l and city officials. It was given judicial power asde from the traditional admi nistrative and executive functions. - 1987 Constitution added powers to the COME LEC by allowing it to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative t o the conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiative, referenda and recalls. It a lso includes contets involving elective municipal and barangay officals. - Sanchez filed with COMELEC a Petition to declare null and void the local elect ions due to alleged large scale terrorism - Ultimately, the COMELEC found that a fter the voting was over in the local elections, terrorism and irregularities we re committed- counters were threatened by armed goons and policemen into making spurious election returns in favor of Biliwang. - Thus, COMELEC issued a resolut ion ordering: 1. The annulment the Jan. 30, 1980 election and the setting aside of the proclamation of Biliwang 2. To certify to the President/Prime Minister an d the Batasang Pambansa the failure of election, so that remedial legislation ma y be enacted, and pending such enactment, the President/PM may appoint municipal officials in San Fernando - Sanchez sought reconsideration of the COMELEC Resol ution certifying the failure of election, and praying instead that COMELEC call a special election in San Fernando - COMELEC denied reconsideration - Both Biliw ang and Sanchez filed petitions with the SC, which were consolidated into the fo llowing issues: ISSUES 1. WON the COMELEC has the power to annul an entire munic ipal election on the ground of post-election terrorism 2. WON the COMELEC has th e authority to call for a special election HELD 1. Biliwang asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to annul elections of municipal officials because, under Sectio n 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the power to try election contests relative to elective municipal officials is vested in the CFI - SC: It may be true there is no specific provision vesting COMELEC with authority to annul an election. Under the 1935 Constitution, the SC said that COMELEC did not have this power, and th at instead the power lay with the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electo ral Tribunal. Now, however, it is the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa a nd elective provincial and city officials. The COMELEC must be deemed possessed o f the authority, in line with its plenitude of powers and its function to protec t the integrity of elections. 2. COMELEC opined that it had no powers to order t he holding of a new or special election, because the actual election itself took place, and in a proper, orderly fashion. According to COMELEC, the Batas Pamban sa Blg. 52 grants COMELEC authority to call for a new or special election only i n a failure of election, but in this case, there was a failure to gauge the true and genuine will of the electorate, as opposed to a failure of election (tainted casting of ballots (failure of election) vs. tainted counting of ballot

s (failure to gauge the will)) - SC: to state that this is not the failure of el ection contemplated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 because elections did take place i s too tenuous a distinction. In practical effect, no election has been held; the re has been in truth and in fact, a failure to elect. This interpretation only h ampers the effectiveness of the COMELEC and delays the opportunity to the voters to cast their votes. Decision The SC upholds the power and prerogative of the C OMELEC to annul an election and to call for a special election. UNIDO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS BARREDO; April 3, 1981 FACTS - Appeal by the UNIDO (a political org campaigning for "NO" votes to amend ments to the 1973 Consti proposed by the Batasang Pambansa), from the resolution s of COMELEC dated March 18 and March 22, 1981. - 5 March 1981: COMELEC issued 3 Resolutions providing for Rules and Regulations concerning the plebiscite campa ign: (1) Resolution No. 1467 providing for equal opportunity on free public disc ussions and debates; (2) Resolution No.1468 providing for equal time on the use of the broadcast media (radio & TV) <equal as to duration and qualityat the same rates or given free of charge>; & (3) Resolution No.1469 providing for equal spa ce on the use of the print media; but COMELEC recognizes the principle of selfre gulation & shall practice only minimal supervision. - 10 March 1981: UNIDO write s to COMELEC re: news that Pres. Marcos will lead the campaign for "Yes" votes i n his 2-hr nationwide "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" radio-TV program on March 12, w hich will be carried live by 26 television and 248 radio stations throughout the country. Citing the said COMELEC resolutions, they demand exactly the same numb er of TV and radio stations all over the country to campaign for No votes. - 1 7 March 1981: UNIDO writes a follow-up letter to COMELEC, stating that on March 21, they will hold a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, & requ esting that it covered by radio and television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M. They SANCHEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS MELENCIO-HERRERA; June 19, 1982 FACTS - Jan. 30, 1980 local elections- Sanchez and Biliwang ran for Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga - Biliwang was proclaimed winner

expect COMELEC to direct the radio & TV facilities to comply with their request. - 18 March 1981: COMELEC issued Resolution saying UNIDOs request "cannot be gran ted and is hereby denied" & that (1) Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo is not a politic al or partisan vehicle but an innovative system of participatory democracy where the President as leader of the nation enunciates certain programs or policies. I ts format is intended to result in effective multi-way consultation between the leader of the nation and the people; and that (2) UNIDO, not having the same con stitutional prerogatives vested in the President/Prime Minister, has no right to demand equal coverage by media accorded President Marcos but is free to enter into appropriate contracts with the TV or radio stations concerned. COMEMEC can not direct these media to grant free use of their facilities. - 20 March 1981: U NIDO writes another letter as MFR. Denied by COMELEC for lack of merit. Hence, t his appeal before SC. Petitioner raises the following grounds: (1) COMELEC resol utions in question are contrary to the Constitution and the law, for being unjus t, unfair & inequitable. They violate the basic principles of equality, good fai th and fair play, & are not conducive to insure free, orderly and honest electio ns; (2) UNIDOs request/demand for equal broadcast media of its public meeting/ral ly at Plaza Miranda was arbitrarily denied. The campaign for NO votes should be granted the same right & equal use of facilities granted Marcos campaign for YES. ISSUE WON COMELEC discretion acted with grave abuse of HELD for being beyond what the charter, the laws and pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate, for being more than what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or privilege inherent in the head of state to directly dialogue with the sovereign people when the occasion demands, for being impract ical under prevailing circumstances, and for its failure to join in the instant petition indispensable parties, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction to act, and for these alone among other reasons which there is h ardly time to state herein, the prayer in the instant petition cannot be granted . - The proposed changes of the Charter are of deep and transcendental importanc e and the more the people are adequately informed about the proposed amendments, their exact meaning, implications and nuances, the better. - Denial of due proc ess is considered generally as the first and the most valued right of everyone u nder the Bill of Rights. UNIDO should have made the television and radio station s (who will be directly affected by any injunction of the Comelec upon SCs orders ) parties to this case. Said parties are indispensable without which the Court c annot proceed properly. - In fact, petitioner has not shown, for apparently they have not done so, that they have requested any TV or radio station to give them the same time and style of "pulong-pulong" as that which they afforded the Pres ident. Also, there are other groups and aggrupations not to speak of individuals who are similarly situated as petitioner who would also want to be heard. - The "free orderly and honest elections" clause of the Constitution is applicable al so to plebiscites, particularly one relative to constitutional amendments. It is indispensable that they be properly characterized to be fair submission: the vo ters must of necessity have had adequate opportunity, in the light of convention al wisdom, to cast their votes with sufficient understanding of what they are vo ting on. - Nothing can be of more transcendental importance than to vote in a co nstitutional plebiscite. It is the duty of the Comelec to see to it that the sal e of air time by TV and radio stations insures that time equal as to duration an d quality is available to all contending views. - Curtailment of the freedom of speech and the press of television and radio stations is permissible for electio n purposes. - The head of state of every country in the world must from the very nature of his position, be accorded certain privileges not equally available to those who are opposed to him. When the head of state wants to communicate on ma tters of public concern, no government office or entity is obliged to give the opposition the same facilities. They have to avail themselve s of their own resources. - In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in power, it does not necessar

ily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed. W hen the President spoke in "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" he spoke as PresidentPrime Minister and not as head of the KBL, the political party now in power. - The pe titioner had not adequately shown that COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discret ion. The Comelec has indeed the power to supervise and regulate the mass media w ith respect to the equal opportunity provisions, but such authority arises only when there is a showing that any sector or member of the media has denied to any party or person the right to which it or he is entitled. Comelec is not suppose d to dictate to the media. - There are other political parties similarly situated as petitioner. To grant t o petitioner what it wants, it must necessarily follow that such other parties s hould also be granted. That would be too much to expect from the media that has also its own right to which it or he is entitled. Comelec is not supposed to dic tate to the media. Decision Appeal dismissed. CHAVEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS BIDIN; July 3, 1992 FACTS - Petition for the issuance of a TRO enjoining COMELEC from proclaiming th e 24th highest senatorial candidate. - May 5, 1992 - Court issued a Resolution o f the case "Francisco Chavez v. Comelec, et al.," disqualifying Melchor Chavez f rom running for Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. The petitioner then filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate to all its ag ents and the general public the resolution; and (2) order said election official s to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candi dates, tally sheets, election returns and "to count all votes cast for the disqu alified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez . . . ." - May 8, 1992 Comelec issued a resolution which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the creditin g of all "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Me lchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates. On Election Day, Melchor Chavez remained undeleted in the list of qualified

candidates. Commissioner Rama issued a directive over the radio and TV ordering that all Chavez votes be credited to the petitioner however it did not reach all t he precincts - Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to perform its mandator y function under Sec. 7, RA 7166 which states that if a candidate has been disqu alified, it shall be the duty of the Commission to instruct without delay the de letion of the name of said candidate. - Confusion arose as the "Chavez" votes we re either declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BE Is).As a result, "Chavez" votes were not credited in favor of petitioner. - May 12, 1992 - Comelec issued another Resolution directing all municipal and city el ection registrars throughout the country to examine the minutes of voting submit ted by the BEIs and to credit all the "Chavez" votes, which have been declared s tray or invalidated by the BEIs, in favor of petitioner. - Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved futile because it did not reach all the various BEIs throughout the country on time for implementation and that the minutes of v oting did not indicate the number of "Chavez" votes which were declared stray or invalidated. - May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the res pondent Comelec praying the latter to (1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes to scan for the "Chavez" votes for purposes of crediting the same in his favor; (3) make the appropriate entries in the election returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates. - Dissatisfied with the failure of re spondent Comelec to act on his petition, petitioner filed this urgent petition f or prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO, enjoining th e Comelec from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate, without first implementing Comelecs resolution of May 12, 1992 and acting upon petitioners l etter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992. Petit ioner alleges that respondent Comelec acted capriciously and whimsically and wit h grave abuse of discretion. - June 8, 1992, Sen Agapito Aquino prayed for the d ismissal of the instant petition on the ground that the law does not allow pre-p roclamation controversy involving the election of members of the Senate. ISSUE 1 . WON SC has jurisdiction over the case HELD 1. Jurisdiction - The alleged inact ion of Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor Chavezs name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the Courts function of j udicial review. The Court can review the decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise o f its administrative functions. - Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left undone. Comelec has ordered the deletion of Melchor Chavez s name not only on the official list of candidates, but also on the election re turns, tally sheet and certificate of canvass. Hence, petitioners allegation th at respondent Comelec failed to implement the resolutions does not hold water. Petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy being in the nature of a pre -proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over preproclamat ion controversies involving local elective officials, such are not allowed in el ections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Repres entatives. - Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: "Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation C ases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no preprocl amation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmiss ion, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificat e of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an i nterested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or ele ction returns before it. xxx xxx xxx "Any objection on the election returns befo re the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal certificates o f canvass before the provincial boards of canvassers or district board of canvas sers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically noted in the minutes of their r espective proceedings." What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in

the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the errors mus t appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought t o be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceeding s. - The petitioners prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest error s in the certificates of canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but fo r the reopening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained th erein. He has not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the certificates of ca nvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, the prop er recourse is to file a regular election protest which exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. - The word "sole" underscores the exclusivity of the Tribunals jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective Members is therefore the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribu nal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner invol ving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a member of the Senate. Pe titioners proper recourse is to file a regular election protest before the Sena te Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial candidates have been proclaim ed. - Petitioner argues that a recount before the Senate Electoral Tribunal woul d force him to shell out the expenses imposes not only a property requirement fo r the enjoyment of the right to be voted upon but also a price on the right of s uffrage which would ultimately stifle the sovereign will. - The law is very clea r on the matter and it is not right for petitioner to ask this Court to abandon settled jurisprudence, engage in judicial legislation, amend the Constitution an d alter the Omnibus Election Code. The mandatory procedures laid down by the exi sting law in cases like the one at bar must be faithfully followed. The proper r ecourse is for petitioner to ask not this Court but the Legislature to enact rem edial measures. - Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: " (1) Errors in the appreci ation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper subject for election prot est and not for recount or reappreciation of ballots. (2) The appreciation of ba llots is not part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The function of ballots appreciation is performed by the board election inspectors at the preci nct level. (3) The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issue s enumerated under Sec. 243 OEC. The complete election returns whose authenticit y is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of ca nvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates. "The ground for re count relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of "Sanchez" vot es intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256)." - Petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest er ror in the certificates of canvass or election returns before the Comelec which would warrant their correction. Decision Premises considered, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit. Narvasa, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, J r., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur. Notes Pre-proclamation controvers y is defined as "any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered po litical party or coalition

of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any ma tter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns." [Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code). BUAC AND BAUTISTA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND CAYETANO PUNO; January 26, 2004 FACTS - Buac and Bautista filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel the COMELEC to take cognizance of contests involving the conduct of a plebiscit e and the annulment of its result. - In April 1988, a plebiscite was held to rat ify the cityhood of Taguig (converting Tagiug into a highly urbanized city). The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixtyfour (64) other election returns, declared that the No votes won, indicating that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig into a city. However, upon order of the COMELEC, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the plebiscite re turns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed. - Allegin g that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes, Buac and Bautista filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the ann ounced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the b allots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest. - Cayetano inte rvened in the case. He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He all eged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest, and such mu st be within the jurisdiction of the RTC. - COMELEC initially gave due course to the petition and ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case, but this was ove rturned completely upon the MFR of Cayetano. ISSUE WON COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide cases regarding plebiscite contests. HELD YES Ratio COMELEC has jurisd iction over plebiscite contest contests as power to decide such cases is part of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC under Art. IX(C) Sec. 2(1) . Reasoning: there are 7 reasons given. 43 Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and func tions: (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the condu ct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. 1. Part of judicial power is the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred b y law. Under the present case, there is no involvement of the violation of any l egally demandable right, for it merely involves the ascertainment of the vote of the electorate of Taguig. 2. Jurisdiction of RTC is only on civil actions. A Pl ebiscite is NOT a civil action but a determination of public will. - Jurisdiction is settled upon determining WoN there is involvement of a judicia l controversy or a purely administrative function. In this case, it is clearly j udicial. COMMISSION ON AUDIT ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS V MINISTER OF LABOR GUTIERREZ; August 3, 1983 FACTS - Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor fe deration while the other petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from among the employees of the following offices, schools, or government-owned or co ntrolled corporations: PNB, MWSS, GSIS, SSS, PVTA, PNC, PUP. The workers in the respondent institutions have not directly petitioned the heads of their respecti ve offices or their representatives in the Batasang Pambansa. They have acted th rough a labor federation and its affiliated unions. The workers and employees ar e taking collective action through a labor federation which uses the bargaining power of organized labor to secure increased compensation for its members. - The petitioners contend that they should be included as recipients of the P.D. 851 Christmas bonus which states: SECTION 1. All employers are hereby required to pa y all their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P 1000 a month, regardless of the nature of their employment, a 13th-month pay not later than De cember 24 of every year. SECTION 2. Employers already paying their employees a 1

3th-month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree. - Section 3 of t he Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 851 provides: Section 3. Employees cover ed. The Decree shall apply to all employers except to: b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions, including government-owned and controlled corpor ations, except those corporations operating essentially as private subsidiaries of the Government; - The petitioners argue that regulations adopted under legisla tive authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and for the sol e purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. A legislative act cann ot be amended by a rule and an administrative officer (Minister of Labor) cannot change the law. ISSUE 1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case; 3. To grant jurisdiction to RTC would result to jumbled justice. There would be con fusion if plebiscite contest cases were given to the RTC for what if the plebisc ite was a national one. Every RTC in the Philippines would have jurisdiction ove r nationwide plebiscite, which runs contrary to the principle that jurisdiction of an RTC is limited to their region. 4. The Consti gives jurisdiction of contes ts involving only election of officers to the courts (part of judicial function) or to administrative tribunals (exercising quasi-judicial power). As such, juri sdiction over plebiscite contests is not vested on the courts. 5. The Constituti onal mandate to COMELEC to enforce and administer laws and regulations relative to conduct of plebiscites (among others) includes the power to ascertain the tru e results of such plebiscite. It includes the power to do all that is necessary to achieve honest and credible plebiscites. *The provision granting COMELEC juri sdiction over contests re: elected officials is not limiting in the sense that i t only limits quasi-judicial power of COMELEC to such cases. The power to ascert ain true results is implicit in its power to enforce all laws relative to the co nduct of plebiscite. 6. COMELEC is best suited to have jurisdiction over such ca ses because of their indisputable expertise in election and related laws. 7. MFR of Cayetano filed out of time (filed 10 days, not the prescribed 5 days, after receipt of the Order or Resolution of COMELEC). Decision COMELEC directed to rei nstate the petition to annul the results and decide it without delay. SEPARATE OPINION CARPIO-MORALES [dissent] - Quasi-judicial function of COMELEC is limited to contests involving election o f regional, provincial, and city officials (limited to what the provision in the Consti said). As such, jurisdiction must be granted to the RTC, since no other court or agency has jurisdiction over it. - Present contest is based on allegati ons of fraud and irregularities, which involves a legal question that is determi nable by a judicial or quasi-judicial body. - There is also the involvement of a demandable right (right to a canvass free from fraud, anomalies, and irregulari ties) which arose from their right to to vote in a plebiscite. 43

2. WON branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the Government included among the employers under PD 851 are required to pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of less than P1000 13th-month pay; 3. Whether or not b ranches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the Government are all owed to collectively bargain for wages and benefits. HELD 1. The Court does not have jurisdiction over the petition. Reasoning The petitioners are faced with a procedural barrier. The petition is one for declaratory relief, an action not em braced within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. There is no statut ory or jurisprudential basis for petitioners statement that the SC has original a nd exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief suits where only questions of law are concerned. HOWEVER, the petition has far reaching implications and raise s questions that should be resolved. 2. Government employees are not entitled to 13thmonth pay as provided in PD 851. Ratio Unless so specified, the government does not fall within the terms of any legislation or decree (STATCON). Reasoning The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, cannot be covered by a general t erm like employer unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to tha t effect. In fact, it has been expressly stated in Section 3 of the Rules and Re gulations Implementing PD 851 that Government subdivisions, etc. are not covered by the Decree. The benefit is extended only to employees of private companies/ corporations. In addition, Sec. 2 of PD 851 bars the petitioners from receiving the bonus, since government offices have instituted an across the board wage inc rease. 3. Public officers and employees may not join associations which impose t he obligation to engage in concerted activities in order to get salaries, fringe benefits, and other emoluments higher than or different from that provided by l aw and regulation. Reasoning Since the terms and conditions of government employ ment are fixed by law government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The pr inciple behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace canno t be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. In government employment , it is the legislature and the administrative heads (when properly delegated th e power) of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. - Under the present Constitution, government-owned or controlled corporations are speci fically mentioned as embraced by the civil service (Section 1, Article XII-B). This was to correct th e situation where more favored employees of the government could enjoy the benef its of two worlds. Salaries and fringe benefits of those embraced by the civil s ervice are fixed by law. As such petitioners have no standing to bargain collect ively (or to bargain at all) for wages. was dismissed from NASECO in 1983. In the same year Credo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was eventually decided by the NLRC in 1984 in her favor . - NASECO contends, among others, that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to order Cr edos reinstatement. NASECO claims that, as a GOCC [by virtue of its being a sub sidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidi ary of the PNB, which in turn is a GOCC], the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. In support of this argument, NASECO cites National Housing Corporation vs. Juco [134 SCRA 172 (1985)], where SC held that "employees of GOCCs are governed by th e civil service law. ISSUE For the purpose of determining whether the case falls under the NLRC or CSC, WON NASECO (without original charter) covered by the civi l service as defined in the 1987 Constitution HELD - GOCCs without legislative c harter shall not be deemed to be embraced by the term civil service under the Co nstitution. By implication, labor disputes in said GOCCs shall fall within the j urisdiction of the NLRC. By further implication, the auditing power of COA shall not apply to them. Reasoning In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCCs, the 1987 Constitution starkly varies from the 1973 Constitution, upon whi ch NHC is based. Under the 1973 Const, it was provided that "[t]he civil service embraces every instrumentality of the Government, including every government-own

ed or controlled corporation." - On the other hand, the 1987 Const provides that [Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(1)] [t]he civil service embraces all instrumentalities of the G overnment, including government owned or controlled corporations with original c harters." - Thus, the situation sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution an d the NHC case regarding subsidiary corporations created under the Corporation C ode, whose "officials and employees would be free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Au dit, appear relegated to relative insignificance by the above 1987 Constitutional provision. By clear implication [of Art. IXB, Sec. 2(1)], the Civil Service doe s not include GOCCs 44 44 SEPARATE OPINION FERNANDO [concur pro hac vice] - This is in conformity to the prevailing doctrine of statutory construction tha t unless so specified, the government does not fall within the terms of any legi slation or decree. - ART. XIII Sec. 1: Public office is a public trust. Public of ficers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility xxx > Under the Constitution there can be no right to strike by them nor to take a mas s leave which is a way of doing indirectly what is not legally allowable. - Gove rnment workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private se ctor to secure concessions from employers (terms are fixed by law). MAKASIAR [dissent] - All the whereases are the premises of the decree requiring all employers to pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1000 a month. All working masses, without exception whether private sector or public, are also su ffering from ravages of inflation, and are entitled to properly celebrate Christ mas every year. - Both the employees of the respondents and the employees of the private sector are similarly situated and have collective bargaining agreements with their respective employers. NATIONAL SERVICE CO. V NLRC PADILLA; November 29, 1988 FACTS - Nature: Special civil actions for certiorari to review the decision of t he NLRC. - Summary: In NASECO, the Court explained that the civil service under the 1987 Const does not cover employees from GOCCs organized as subsidiaries und er the general corporation law. Accordingly, employees in such GOCCs are under N LRCs jurisdiction. By further implication, the auditing power of COA does not app ly over said GOCCs. - Eugenia Credo was an employee of NASECO, a corporation tha t provides manpower services to PNB and its agencies. Because of certain adminis trative charges against her such as discourtesy and insubordination, she BRYAN_SJ: NLRC does not have jurisdiction over those covered by the CSC. It had jurisdiction on labor issues of private corporations or broadly speaking, privat e businesses.

which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCCs under the general corporation law. - On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of [SCs] decision thereof, th e NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidia ry of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a GOCC without or iginal charter. 46 45 NLRC decision affirmed. CRISTOBAL V MELCHOR MUNOZ-PALMA; July 29, 1977 FACTS - Jose Cristobal was formerly employed as a private secretary in the Presi dents Private Office in Malacaan, having been appointed to that position on July 1, 1961 with a salary of P4,188.00 per annum. On the second week of January, 19 62, the then Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc, thru a letter, informed the plai ntiff that his services as private secretary in the Presidents Private Office w ere terminated effective January 1, 1962. A similar letter was addressed by Sec. Mutuc to some other employees in the Office of the President (OP). The dismisse d employees appealed to the President by means of letters dated January 3, 1962 and January 26, 1962 for a reconsideration of their separation from the service. In a letter dated February 21, 1962, their request for reconsideration was deni ed by Secretary Mutuc, acting by authority of the President. - On March 24, 19 62, five of the employees who were separated (excluding Cristobal) filed a civil action before the CFI of Manila against Secretary Mutuc and the Cash Disbursing Officer of the OP praying for reinstatement and the payment of their salaries e ffective as of January 1, 1962. From a judgment dismissing their complaint, the said employees appealed to the Supreme Court which rendered a decision promulgat ed on November 29, 1968 reversing the dismissal of their complaint and declaring their removal from office as illegal and contrary to law, and ordering their re instatement and the payment of their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to the dat e of their actual reinstatement. - Sometime in May, 1962, when the civil action filed by Raul Ingles, et al was still pending in the CFI of Manila, the dismisse d employees who filed said action were recalled to their positions in the OP, wi thout prejudice to 45 BRYAN_SJ: A corporation can be created generally in two ways: by incorporation u nder the Corporation Code, or by special law. Corporations created by special la w are also called corporations with special/original charters. 46 BRYAN_SJ: What the Court seems to mean is that although PNB has an original char ter, and hence covered by civil service law, NASECO (as PNBs sub-subsidiary) was organized under the Corporation Code. Hence, NASECO is under NLRCs jurisdiction. the continuation of their civil action. With respect to the other employees who were not reinstated Cristobal included, efforts were exerted by Sec. Mutuc to lo ok for placements outside of Malacaan so that they may be reemployed. Cristobal w aited for Sec. Mutuc to make good his assurance that he would be recalled to the service, until the latter was replaced by other executive secretaries who likew ise assured the plaintiff of assistance to be reemployed at the opportune time. - After the decision of the SC promulgated on November 29, 1968, the plaintiff a ddressed a letter to the OP dated January 19, 1969, requesting reinstatement to his former position and the payment of salary from January 1, 1962 up to the tim e of actual reinstatement, supposedly in accordance with said decision. This req uest was denied repeatedly by the OP in successive letters addressed to the plai ntiff dated September 1, 1969, January 19, 1970, April 23, 1970, May 23, 1970, a nd May 19, 1971, the last of which declared the matter definitely closed, - Co nsequently, Cristobal filed on August 10, 1971, with the CFI of Manila a complai nt against then Exec. Sec. Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala, Cash Disbursin

g Officer of the OP, and praying for the following: 1. Declaring his dismissal a s illegal and contrary to law; 2. Ordering Sec. Melchor to certify his name in t he payroll of the OP, to be retroactive as of January 1, 1962, the effective dat e that he was illegally dismissed from the service; 3. Ordering Arcala to pay al l the emoluments and/or salary to which the plaintiff is entitled effective as o f January 1, 1962; and 4. Ordering them to allow him to continue with the perfor mance of his duties in the Secretary Office Staff, Office of the President of th e Philippines. - The defendants, represented by the Solicitor General alleged th at Cristobal had no cause of action as he is deemed to have abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper proceedings to assert his right within one year from the date of separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Co urt, he having come to court only after the lapse of more than nine years, there by in effect acquiescing to his separation, and therefore he is not entitled to any salary from termination of his employment. - On May 18, 1972, the trial cour t rendered its decision dismissing the complaint reasoning that: Section 16 of R ule 66 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that an action against a public office or employee may not be filed for the plaintiffs ouster from office unless the same is commenced within one year after the cause of the ouster, or the righ t of the plaintiff to hold much office or position arose. This period of one yea r is a condition precedent for the existence of the cause of action for quo warr anto. The rationale of this doctrine is that the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or position in the civil service, as against another actually holdingit, so that the Govern ment may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one fo r the person actually holding the office although illegally, and another for one not a ctually rendering service although entitled to do so. The fact that the petition er sought to pursue administrative remedies to secure his reinstatement does not excuse the failure to file the action within the one year period. ISSUE WON Cri stobal has abandoned his right to seek judicial relief for not having filed his complaint within the oneyear period provided for in Section 16, Rule 66 of the R ules of Court HELD NO. The Court agrees that in actions of quo warranto involvin g right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one yea r from the time the cause of action arose; Persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recov er said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they s hall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. However, t his doctrine of laches (laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and un explained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could o r should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to as sert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it) which is invoked to de feat Cristobals suit, is not applicable in this case. There are certain excepti onal circumstances attending which take this case out of the rule. Reasoning 1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office. > Upon receipt of the l etter or January 1, 1962 advising him of his separation from the service, Cristo bal, with the other dismissed employees, sought reconsideration in a letter date d January 3, 1962, calling inter alia the attention of then Sec. Mutuc that he w as a civil eligible employee with eight years of service in the government and c onsequently entitled to security of tenure under the Constitution. This was foll owed by another letter of January 26, 1962. Reconsideration having been denied, a complaint was filed on March 24, 1962, with the CFI of Manila entitled Ingles vs. Mutuc, which prayed for reinstatement and payment of salaries as of January 1, 1962, wherein the SC held that the removal of the plaintiff-employees was ill egal and contrary to law and that they were entitled to be reinstated with payme nt of their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to the date of their actual reinsta tement. > Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but his non-participation is not fatal to his cause of action. During the pende

ncy of the civil case, Cristobal continued to press his request for

reinstatement together with the other employees who had filed the complaint and was in fact promised reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later. More i mportantly, Cristobal could be expected - without necessarily spending time and money by going to court to relic upon the outcome of the case filed by his coemp loyees to protect his interests considering the similarity of his situation to t hat of the plaintiffs therein and the identifical relief being sought. 2. It was an act of the government through its responsible officials more particularly th en Sec. Mutuc and his successors which contributed to the alleged delay in the f iling of Cristobals present complaint for reinstatement. > After the Ingles sui t was filed in court, the dismissed employees, Cristobal included, continued to seek reconsideration of their dismissal. It was then that Sec. Mutuc assured the employees that without prejudice to the continuation of the civil action, he wo uld work for their reinstatement. Accordingly, some of the dismissed employees w ere recalled to their respective positions in the OP among whom were the plainti ffs in the civil case and several others who were not parties therein. Sec. Mutu c even tried to place the others outside of the Malacaan Office. In the meantime, however, Sec. Mutuc was replaced by other Exec. Secretaries to whom Cristobal o ver and over again presented his request for reinstatement and who gave the same assurance that Cristobal would be recalled and re-employed at "the opportune ti me". > It was this continued promise of the government officials concerned which led Cristobal to bide his time and wait for the Office of the President to comp ly with its commitment. Furthermore, he had behind him the decision of the Supre me Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc which he believed should be applied in his favor. B ut when Cristobal, in answer to his various letters, received the letter of May 19, 1971 from the Office of the President denying his reinstatement and declarin g the matter "definitely closed" because of his failure to file an action in cou rt within one year from his separation, it was only then that he saw the necessi ty of seeking redress from the courts. > Surely, it would now be the height of i nequity and injustice, if after Cristobal relied and reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the former Executive Secretaries who dealt with him and who preceded the herein respondent Sec. Melchor, that the court hold that h e lost his right to seek relief because of lapse of time. 3. The dismissal of ap pellant Cristobal was contrary to law on the strength of the Supreme Courts dec ision in Ingles vs. Mutuc. > In Ingles, the defendants maintained that the princ ipal issue in the case was whether or not the employees were occupying positions primarily confidential in nature and therefore subject to removal at the pleasu re of the appointing power, and that this issue was to be resolved in the affirmative. The Court held: that one holding in the government a primari ly confidential position is "in the Civil Service" and that "officers or employe es in the unclassified" as well as "those in the classified service" are protect ed by the provision in the organic law that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Sec tion 4, Article XII, 1935 Constitution); that while the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power and such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "di smissed" but that his term merely "expires"; that there was no evidence to indic ate that the respective positions of the dismissed employees were "primarily con fidential" in nature and on the contrary the compensation attached and the desig nation given thereto suggest the purely or at least mainly clerical nature of th eir work; and consequently, considering that the dismissed employees were admitt edly civil service eligibles with several years of service in the Government, th eir removal from office was "illegal and contrary to law". > No evidence was add uced by the government to show that Cristobals position was "primarily confiden tial". On the contrary as stated by this Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc, the compensa tion attached to his item and the designation of the position indicate the purel y clerical nature of his functions. In fact, none of the letters sent to him fro m the OP ever indicated that he was holding his position at the pleasure of the appointing power or that his services were terminated because his term of office had "expired". The only reason given - and this appears in the letter of Septem

ber 1, 1969 from the OP - was that he failed to institute the proper proceeding to assert his right, if any, to the position within the period of one year from the date of termination and under settled jurisprudence he is deemed to have aba ndoned his right to said office or acquiesced in his removal. > In granting reli ef to the Cristobal on the matter of back salaries, however, there is no proof t o show that from January 1, 1962 up to the promulgation of this decision, Cristo bal at no time worked or was employed at some other office. The court cannot ign ore the probability of Cristobals having sought employment elsewhere during tha t period to support himself and his family. Considering the lapse of almost nine years before he filed this suit, the resolved to grant back salaries at the rat e last received by him only for a period of five (5) years without qualification and deduction. > The Public Officials concerned are directed to reinstate Jose Cristobal, either in the OP or in some other government office, to any position for which he is qualified by reason of his civil service eligibility, subject to present requirements of age and physical fitness; and to pay him back salaries for a period of 5 years at the rate of P4,188.00 per annum without qualification and deduction. Decision Decision set aside. ACOLOLA V TANTUICO SANTOS; June 27, 1978 FACTS - Nature ORIGINAL PETITION for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injun ction. - Petitioner Arturo A. Acolola was assigned as Provincial Auditor of Capi z on April 16, 1972. Sometime before December 12, 1972, an administrative compla int was filed against him charging him with various irregularities in connection with the discharge of his duties. The complaint was subsequently dismissed. - O n December 27, 1974 he was again administratively charged with offenses ranging from "misconduct, neglect of duty to incompetence in the performance of official duties," which charges were likewise dismissed. - On December 3, 1976, while pe titioner was assigned as Acting Highway Engineering District Auditor of Romblon, private respondent Horacio A. Martinez, a contractor of Public Works Project in the province of Romblon, filed another complaint against petitioner charging hi m, this time, with (1) Delaying action on payment of vouchers. (2) Delaying acti on on request for inspection of accomplished work: (3) Refusal to assign an audi tors representative to check deliveries of materials at job sites at the time o f deliveries; (4) Piecemeal suspension of vouchers: (5) Demanding free transport ation and meals when on inspection of materials delivered or work accomplished, and (6) Demanding P24,000 cost of plane fare for his twin daughters trip to the United States. - Upon the recommendation of the Civil Security Office of the Co mmission on Audit, an entrapment scheme was devised and executed on December 15, 1976. Petitioner was apprehended by the PC Provincial Command in the act of rec eiving from complainant Horacio A. Martinez, the amount of P2,000.00 in marked P 20 bills as bribe money, while he was about to enter his room at the Seaside Hot el. - On January 12, 1977, a formal administrative charge was preferred against him. At the same time the preventive suspension of petitioner was ordered by the respondent pursuant to Section 41, Presidential Decree No. 807. Respondent, now petitioner, answered the charge. - On May 12, 1977, petitioner was summarily di smissed from the service, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 807, dated October 6, 1975. Petitioners motion for reconsideration praying for a formal investiga tion denied, appeals to Court, seeking: (1) the review and reversal of the order of May 27, 1977

of the Acting Chairman Cormnission on Audit, (Hon. Francisco S. Tantuico Jr.) su mmarily dismissing him from the service, on the grounds that respondent acted wi thout or in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and th e said order is violative of his constitutional rights; and (2) his reinstatemen t to his former position. Petition was given due course, respondents required to file their comments, TRO issued. - On March 18, 1978, the Solicitor General for and in behalf of respondent Tantuico, Chairman of COA, filed the required comme nt and prayed that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner filed his rejoinder (should be reply) to the said comment on April 20, 1978. ISSUE WO N the respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, could summarily dismiss pe titioner pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 807. HELD Ratio Yes, the respondent Chairman of COA could summarily dismiss petitioner Pursuant to PD 807. Section 40 of Presidential Decree No. 807 specifically provides: "SEC. 40. Summary Proce edings.-No formal investigation is necessary and the respondent may be immediate ly removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) Wh en the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong. (b) When the respo ndent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable gro und to believe that he is guilty of the present charge. (c) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable. - Resort to summary proceedings by disciplining auth ority shall be done with utmost objectivity and impartiality to the end that no injustice is committed: Provided, That removal or dismissal except those by the President, himself, or upon his order, may be appealed to the Commission." - Pet itioner was caught red-handed by agents of the Philippine Constabulary in the en trapment operations, and the evidence against him was over whelming which warran ted his summary dismissal from the service under PD 807. The seriousness of the offense charged, the circumstances surrounding its commission and the evidence o f guilt, being overwhelming and indubitably strong, the interest of the public s ervice demanded the drastic remedy of summary dismissal, which respondent Chairm an of the Commission -on Audit judiciously took against petitioner. Decision Pet ition DISMISSEd for lack of merit. TRO LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Voting 4 concur: Fe rnando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, and Aquino 1 on official leave: Concepcion Jr. SANDIGANBAYAN NUNEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN FERNANDO; January 30, 1982 FACTS - Petitioner Rufino Nuez was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa thr ough falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance wi th his other co-accused, all public officials - Informations were filed on Febru ary 21 and March 26, 1979 - On May 15, petitioner filed a motion to quash on con stitutional and jurisdictional grounds - Respondent court denied the motion, as well as the MFR - Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition wit h the SC, assailing the validity of PD 1486, as amended by PD 1606, creating the Sandiganbayan ISSUE WON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitut ion HELD Petition dismissed. Petitioner has been unable to make a case calling f or the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as am ended by Presidential Decree No. 1606. Ratio On the equal protection clause of t he Constitution - Petitioners premise is that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violat es petitioners right to equal protection because: > Appeal, as a matter of right, became minimized into a matter of discretion > Appeal was limited to questions of law, excluding a review of facts and trial evidence > There is only one chanc e to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of r ight covering questions of law and of facts, and to two appellate courts (CA and SC) - Classification satisfies the test announced by this court in People v. Ve ra > Must be based on substantial distinction > Must be germane to the purposes of the law > Must not be limited to existing conditions only and must apply equa lly to each member of the class - The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, in response to problem, namely, the dishonesty in the public service. - Petitioners, should therefore have anticipated that a

different procedure that would be prescribed for that tribunal would not be violative of the equal protection clause - The general gua rantees of the Bill of Rights must give way to specific provisions of the Consti tution, for the promotion of the general welfare, which is the end of the law On the ex post facto provision of the Constitution - Petitioners contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto law is premised on the allegation that petitioners right of appeal is being diluted or eroded eff icacy wise. - Justice Makasiar, in the Kay Villegas Kami decision, defined an ex post facto law as one which: > makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act > aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed > changes the punishmen t and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when commi tted > alters the legal rules on evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less o r different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense > assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect impose s penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful > d eprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has be come entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty - the lawful protection to which an accused has become enti tled is qualified, not given a broad scope - the mode of procedure provided for i n the statutory right to appeal can hardly be argued to be embraced therein - th e test to whether the ex post facto law is disregarded, in the language of Justi ce Harlan in Thompson v. Utah, is taking from an accused any right that was regar ded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him - the omission of the CA as an intermediate tribunal does not deprive the petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his libert y - his innocence or guilt is passed upon by a three-judge court, where a unanim ous vote is required - if convicted, the SC has the duty to see whether any erro r of law was committed - the SC in determining whether to give due course to the petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of in nocence has been overcome - SC carefully scrutinizes whether the quantum of evid ence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied

- It is farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that the omission of the C A as a reviewing authority results in the loss of vital protection of liberty. On the due process clause of the Constitution - Petitioner alleges lack of fairness - In Arnault v. Pecson, the court declared that what is required for compliance with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings is a fair and impartial tria l and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense - In criminal procee dings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is informed as to why he is p roceeded against and what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law. If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly process of law, and only punished after inquiry and i nvestigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgmen t awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due proc ess of law. - The Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution, has been transformed into the Off ice of the Special Prosecutor which shall continue to function and exercise its powers provided by law, EXCEPT those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman cr eated under the sam Constitution (1987). - The 1987 Constitution provides that t he Ombudsman as distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan has the duty to inve stigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any pu blic official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. - The Special Prosecutor (Raul Gon zales) is thus a subordinate of the Tanodbayan(Ombudsman) and can investigate an d prosecute cases only upon the latters authority or orders. Obiter Raul Gonzales does not remain as Ombudsman in as much as he has not been replaced because he has never been the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman is a new creation unde r Article XI of the 1987 constitution different from the Office of the Tanodbaya n created under PD 1607. terrorism and harassment until further orders from the CHR and to appear before the Commission for a dialogue. - However, the same group again bulldozed the are a and allegedly handcuffed private respondent Valles, pointed their firearms at others and fired a shot in the air. - The CHR issued another injunction Order re iterating the same order. - Procedure 1. EPZA filed in CHR a motion to lift the Order of injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporar y restraining orders but this was denied. 2. EPZA filed a special civil action o f certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for issuance of restraining order and /or preliminary injunction. It was granted by the Court. 3. CHR filed a Motion t o lift the restraining order contending that CHR has the power not only to inves tigate but also to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection (Art. 13 Sec. 18, 1987 Consti) ISSUE WON the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of HELD NO. Not being a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, for it may only be is sued by the judge of any court in which the action is pending (within his distri ct), or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court or by the judge of the Regional Trial Court. Reasoning 1. adherence to precedent - In Hon. Isidro Carino vs. CHR the Court held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. Fact-finding function is different from adjudicatio n and cannot be likened to a judicial function. 2, textual interpretation of the text - plain meaning - The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose hu man rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer j urisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by la. It is never derived

by implication. - preventive measures and legal aid services refer ti extrajudicia l and judicial remedies which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims. Decision The petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Orders of injunction of CHR are ANNULLED COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EXPORT PROCESING ZONE AUTHORITY V COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS GRINO-AQUINO; April 14, 1992 FACTS - Nature Special Civil Action for certiorari and prohibition to review the orders of the Commission on Human Rights - P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and d esignating certain parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the C avite Export Processing Zone (CEPZ). The area was divided into four four Phases a nd Phase IV was bought by Filoil and was later sold to EPZA. - Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals, had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or Filoil. To convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA paid a P10K-financial assista nce to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresi ta Valles and Alfredo Aledia, the father of the respondent Loreto Aledia. - Ten years later, the private respondents filed in CHR a joint complaint praying for j ustice and other reliefs and remedies. The CHR conducted an investigation. - Acco rding to CHR, EPZA, together with help of PNP, bulldozed and level the area, des pite the fact that the occupants presented a letter from the Office of the Presi dent of the Phil ordering postponement of bulldozing. - Because of this, the CHR issued an Order of injunction to desist from committing further acts of demolit ion, ZALDIVAR V SANDIGANBAYAN PER CURIAM; May 19, 1988 FACTS GR Nos. 79690-707 - Petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar (Antique Governor) soug ht to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from proceeding wi th the prosecution and hearing of Criminal cases Nos. 12159 12161 and 12163-1217 7 - Petitioner alleged that said cases were filed by Tanodbayan without legal an d constitutional authority since the 1987 Constitution conferred upon the Ombuds man (not the present Tanodbayan) the authority to file cases with the Sandiganba yan GR No. 80578 - Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar, on substantially the same ground s as first petition, sought to restrain Tanodbayan Gonzales from conducting prel iminary investigations and filing similar cases with the Sandiganbayan ISSUES 1, WON the Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution, have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations and direct the filing of cases with the Sandiganbayan HELD NO. The incumbent Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution is without autho rity to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan

and SET ASIDE. TRO which the Court issued is made PERMANENT. ART XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY KRIVENKO V DIRECTOR OF LANDS MORAN; November 15, 1947 (SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM) MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS BELLOSILLO; February 3, 1997 FACTS - Respondent GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell thr ough public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of responden t MHC which owns the historic Manila Hotel. In a closed bidding held on 18 Septe mber 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corp oration, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51 % of the MHC or 15,300, 000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT Sh eraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. - Pending the declaration o f Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the necessary contra cts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched t he bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent lett er dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust B ank for Thirtythree Million Pesos (P33-000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to accept. - On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has d isregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC ma y be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court iss ued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and cons ummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. On 10 September 1996 the instant case w as accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Divisi on. - The petitioner argues the following: 1. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second Par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Phil ippines heritage and culture. To all intents and purpose, it has become a part o f the national patrimony. 2. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Cons titution, applies. 3. It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hote l is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bi d offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any rea son, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer th is to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. - Respondents maintain that: 1. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of th e 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is no t a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s). Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditi ons under which business may be done." 2. Granting that this provision is self-e xecuting, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which onl y refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and ot her mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and excl usive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XI I, 1987 Constitution. While petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in th e hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel histori c, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. Wha t is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to res

pondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State. 3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporatio n, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly , 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimo ny. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it h ad lost in the bidding. 4. The reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. I., of the bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualifie d Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not y et arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. 5. The prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its disc retion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretio n it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty o r a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition f or mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demand s and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner. ISSUES 1. WON Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Const itution is non-self-executing 2. WON the Manila Hotel falls under the term natio nal patrimony 3. WON 51% of the equity of MHC can be considered part of national patrimony 4. WON petitioner should be allowed to match the highest bid 5. WON G SIS committed grave abuse of discretion HELD 1. NO. A provision which is complet e in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling l egislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right i t grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-e xecuting, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. The argument of respondents that the non-self-exe cuting nature of Sec. 10, second par. of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of t he first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self -executing is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing b ecause Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operat ion of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign

investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions coveri ng the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-ex ecuting in one part and non-self-executing in another. Sec. 10, second par., Art . XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complet e in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legi slation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. 2. YES. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When th e Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural r esources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the t erm natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Manil a Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. Its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated wit h our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hote l has become part of our national economy and patrimony. 3. YES. 51% of the equi ty of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comp rises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns th e 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51 % of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the ho tel edifice stands. Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a se parate and distinct personality. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of pe rsons distinct from the government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public function"; (2) whe n the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has appr oved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third cate gories of "state action." Therefore the transaction, although entered into by re spondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to th e constitutional command. 4. YES. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bi dder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured t he requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constit ution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultant ly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligati on to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respon dents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisi ons of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested pa rties. Paragraph V. J. I of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qu alified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share . The constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of s hares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a high er, or even the highest, bid. Where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions coveri ng the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meani ng to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Ren

ong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner c ould participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreign ers alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale on ly if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the hig hest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constituti onal mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. O nly after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause of a ction. 5. YES. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Re nong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alter native but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only wit h the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The r efusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Ma laysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Voting Regalado, Dav ide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur with the main opinion. Narvasa, C.J, joins Justice Puno in his dissent. SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA [concur] Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimo ny" consists of the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article 1) consisting of land, sea, and air. The concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not only to our rich natural resources b ut also to the cultural heritage of our race. The Manila Hotel is very much a pa rt of our national patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This institution has played an important role in our nations history, having been the venue of many a hist orical event, and serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest Hou se for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others. "Preference to qualified Filipinos," to be meaningful, must refer not only to th ings that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect th e very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acqu isition of things that pertain to the national patrimony, preference to qualifie d Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the quali fied Filipino and the nonFilipino are equal in which case, the award should undi sputedly be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all. VITUG [separate] - The provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(i)n the grant of ri ghts, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, t he State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is selfexecutory. The pro vision does not need, although it can obviously be amplified or regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules. - The term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the countrys natural resources but also to its cultural heritage. A "historica l landmark, Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of Philippine heritage. - The act of the GSIS, a government entity which derives its authority from the State , in selling 51% of its share in MHC should be considered an act of the State su bject to the Constitutional mandate. - On the pivotal issue of the degree of "pr eference to qualified Filipinos," the only meaningful preference would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match

the foreign bid. The magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly possib le for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the dissen ting view, could trigger the right of preference. MENDOZA judgment] [separate opinion in the - The only way to enforce the constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant of rig hts, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is to allow petitioner Philippine corpor ation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of t he controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel Corporation. - We are dealin g here not with common trades or common means of livelihood which are open to al iens in our midst, but with the sale of government property, which is like the g rant of government largess or benefits. Therefore no one should begrudge us if w e give preferential treatment to our citizens. - Nor is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to match the highest bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all the Filipino entity would then do would b e not to make a bid or make only a token one and, after it is known that a forei gn bidder has submitted the highest bid, make an offer matching that of the fore ign firm. This is not possible under the rules on public bidding of the GSIS. Un der these rules there is a minimum bid required. If the Filipino entity, after p assing the prequalification process, does not submit a bid, he will not be allow ed to match the highest bid of the foreign firm because this is a privilege allo wed only to those who have "validly submitted bids." TORRES [separate] - History, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and is the produc t of events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth a nd acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people. The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. The Manil a Hotel is witness to historic events which shaped our history for almost 84 yea rs. The history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction, where profit subverts the cherished historical v alues of our people. PUNO [dissent] - The vital issues can be summed up as follows: 1. Whether Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Ar t. XII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need imple menting legislation to carry it into effect; Assuming Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII is self executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation; 3 . Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence, mandated to implement Sec . 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution; 4. Assuming GSIS is part of the St ate, whether it failed to give preference to petitioner, a qualified Filipino co rporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of t he controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation; 5. Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the sale of the shares to Renong Berhad, a foreign cor poration. - 1st issue: courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitut ion as self executing, rather than as requiring future legislation for their enf orcement. If they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamen tal law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by

Congress. Case law also lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is no t self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers th e Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into e ffect. The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express t ext, there is a categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting forei gn ownership in certain areas of investments in the country and to encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises. The second and th ird paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed to the State and n ot to Congress alone which is but one of the three great branches of our governm ent. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy and pat rimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national jurisdiction" and not mer ely "certain areas of investments." Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to implement is uncondition al and it is now. - The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the st ocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the disposition of part of our nat ional patrimony. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that the Comm issioners entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. The unique value of the Manila Hotel to our h istory and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel go es beyond pesos and centavos. The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a na tional cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not exc lude it from our national patrimony. 2. - The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes th e respondent GSIS. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to ser ve a public purpose. As a state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bou nd to adhere to the policies spelled out in the Constitution especially those de signed to promote the general welfare of the people. One of these policies is th e Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a constitutional command. To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequently, we must turn to the rules and regulations of respondents C ommittee on Privatization and GSIS to determine the degree of preference that pe titioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A look at t he rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of prefere ntial right to be accorded a qualified Filipino bidder. However, they cannot be read to mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for P ar. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules and re gulations. I submit that the right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal, and pe titioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder should be preferred. Under the rules, t he right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bi dder cannot be awarded the block of shares" No reason has arisen that will preve nt the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as a bidder. It complied with the pr ocedure of bidding. It was declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS and the ru les say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right for t he rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified Filipino the priv ilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did not grant, peti tioner cannot demand. - Petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. It knew that the rules and regulations do not provide that quali fied Filipino bidder can match the winning bid after submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and disregard them when it loses. PANGANIBAN [dissent]

- The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, aft er a bidding process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given th e right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win. No statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreig ner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majoritys strained interpretati on, I respectfully submit, constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes bidding a

ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win. - Asi de from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial legislation is short -sighted and, viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino interes ts. It encourages other countries - in the guise of reverse comity or worse, una bashed retaliation - to discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions by au thorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the higher bids of F ilipino enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing similar bids of ot her foreigners to remain unchallenged by their nationals. - In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First" policy of the Consti tution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allow ed only where all the bids are equal. The Constitution mandates a victory for th e qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied. But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest score. MINERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V SECRETARY ROMERO; January 16, 1995 FACTS - Controversy is due to the change introduced by Art XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural resources. Utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed in the present Consti . - With the state in full control and supervision, the only options for mineral exploration development and utilization is only through direct undertaking or b y entering into co-production, joint venture, or productionsharing agreements, o r by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exp loration, development and utilization. - The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either technical or financial assistan ce for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petrole um and other mineral oils - In view of these provisions, the President issued Exe cutive Order No. 211 and No. 279. The former prescribes interim procedures in th e processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and u tilization of minerals pursuant to the 1987 Consti. The latter authorizes the DE NR secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production or productio n-sharing agreements, and prescribed guidelines for these agreements and those w ith foreignowned corporations - To implement the legislative acts, the DENR Secr etary promulgated AO Nos 57 and 82. The former converts all existing mining leas es or agreements prior to the 1987 Consti into production-sharing agreements except smallscale mining leases and th ose pertaining to sand, gravel and quarry resources cover an area of 20 hectares or less. The latter laid down the Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement Through Negotiation (MPSA). - It is for these AOs that the MAP, Inc. filed the petition - They contend that: o The issuance of the AOs was in excess of his rulemaking power under EO279 o The AOs violate the non -impairment of contract provision under Art 3, Sec 10 of the 1987 Consti as AO57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other mining agreements and co nverts it into productionsharing agreements within a year of its effectivity and AO82 declares that failure to submit Letter of Intent and MPSA within 2 years o f effecitivity of guidelines shall cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and gravel permits o AOs have the effect of repealing or abrogating existing mi ning laws which are not inconsistent with the provisions of EO279 as the Eos mer ely reiterated the acceptance and registration of declarations of location and a ll other kinds of mining applications by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences un der PD 463, as amended, until Congress opts to modify the same - A TRO was given enjoining the implementation of the AOs. The Continental Marble Corp. also inte rvened as its DENR refused to renew its mining permit ISSUES 1. WON DENR Sec com mitted grave abuse of discretion in promulgating AOs 57 and 82 2. WON PD 463 con tinues to subsist insofar as it allows licenses, concessions and leases for the exploration, utilization and development of mineral resources 3. WON AO 57 and 8 2 impairs vested frights as to violate the non-impairment of contract doctrine a s guaranteed by Art 3, Section 10 of the Consti 4. WON AO 57 and 82 authorizes a utomatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivit

y of the 1987 Consti into production sharing agreements HELD - There is no clear showing that the DENR Sec has transcended the bounds demarcated by EO279 for th e exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to grave abuse of discretion o Th e power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the i mplementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment o By such regulations, the law cannot be extended. So long as the relate solely to ca rrying into effect the provision of law, they are valid o The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted o In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails as rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law o Sec 6 of EO269 specifically authorized the said official to promulgate such supplementar y rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the provisi ons of the law. More so, the subject sought to be governed and regulated is germ ane to the objects and purposes of EO279, specifically issued to carry out the m andate of the 1987 Consti - PD 463 is not the governing law anymore as it pertai ned to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural res ources through license, concession or lease which has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 the 1987 Consti., except those provision in PD463 that are not i nconsistent with the provisions of EO279 o To continue the licenses, concessions or lease would be inconsistent witht raison detre of EO279 and contravening the express mandate of the Article XII, Section 2 the 1987 Consti. o The Consti only orders that the State have full control and supervision of the mineral resource s and the only mode for its exploration, utilization and development is through a direct act, or may enter into co-production, joint venture, production sharing agreements or into agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving technica l or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilizati on of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic gro wth and general welfare of the country. - The AOs do not unduly preterminate exi sting mining leases in general as it does not apply retroactively to license, co ncession of lease granted by government under the 1973 Consti or before the effe ctivity of the 1987 Consti but to those granted after the effectivity of the 198 7 Consti and shall be subject to modifications and alterations which Congress ma y adopt o As such, by issuing EO279, the President validly modified or altered t he privileges granted as well as the terms and conditions of mining leases under EO211

o Moreover, even if there were contracts, leases or agreements granted by the St ate such as those granted by EO211, these are still subject to alterations throu gh a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State and even the court rec ognizes the superiority of police power over the sanctity of the contract especi ally when such power is exercised to preserve the security of the state and the means adopted are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are, therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive. o The State may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifyin g and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under PD 463 or EO211 o T he object of this police power is clear the exploration, development and utiliza tion of mineral resources are matters vital to the public interest and the gener al welfare of the people - There is not provision in AO57 that leads to the conc lusion of an authorization of automatic conversion of mining leases and agreemen ts granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Consti pursuant to EO211, into prod uction-sharing agreements o The use of the term production-sharing agreement imp lies negotiation and cannot be presumed as a unilateral declaration on the part of government o The MPSA requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after ne gotiations are arrived at in good faith and in accordance with procedure as laid out in AO 82 Decision AO 57 and 82 are valid and constitutional the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. Atok alleged th at a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930 and record ed on January 2, 1931 in the Office of the mining recorder of Baguio. The locati ons of the mineral claims were made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philipp ine Bill of 1902. - The Bureau of Forestry Development argued that the land soug ht to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under P roclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. By reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. ISSUE WON the B enguet and Atok Mining Companies have exclusive rights to the property in questi on. HELD YES. Though the property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, this did not impair the rights already veste d in Benguet and Atok at that time. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property into mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land became th e private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok. - There was insufficient evidence of open, contin uous, adverse and exclusive possession submitted by the applicants to support th eir claim of ownership. They acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965. - This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule reserve s to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land. T hus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which mineral is discovere d, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals bel ong. - Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by vir tue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Con stitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain ex cept agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its ad option. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private resp ondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use could be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral pu rposes. Voting Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Gancayco and GrioAquino, concur. ATOK BIG WEDGE MINING V COURT OF APPEALS PARAS; January 18, 1991 FACTS - Fredia Mineral claim was located in Itogon, Benguet by A. I. Reynolds in

1930. The mineral claim was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder. In 1931, the mineral claim was sold by A.I. Reynolds to petitioner. Since then petitioner has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim. - In 1964, respondent Liwan Consi constructed a house in the land where the claim was located. It was only in 1984 when he was told that said lot belong ed to Atok. Respondent contends that he had been paying taxes on said land which his father had occupied before him. Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry. The MTC dismissed the case. The RTC decided in favor of Atok. Upon appeal by Con si, the CA dismissed the forcible entry action ruling that both Consi and Atok a re holders of possessory titles, the former through long term occupancy, and the latter by virtue of its being the claim locator. ISSUE WON an individuals long t erm occupation of land of the public domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim HELD NO. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws th en in force removed it from the public domain. As the land had become private pr operty of the locators (A.I.) they had the right to sell it to Atok. Where there is a valid location of mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the publi c and the property of the locator. (Note however that the sale in the case took place in 1931) Atok then have exclusive rights to the property in question by vi rtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the 19 35 Constitution prohibited alienation of all lands of the public domain except a gricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption . - Neither could Consi argue long term possession. His possession was not in th e concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land. Since the subject lot is a mineral land, private respondents possession did not confer upon him possessory rights, REPUBLIC V COURT OF APPEALS AND DELA ROSA CRUZ; April 15, 1988 FACTS - Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land divided into 9 lots in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province on February 11, 1965 on his own behalf and on behalf of his children. According to the application, Lot s 1-5 were sold to Jose dela Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbali o and Jaime Alberto, respectively in 1964. Balbalio and Alberto testified that t hey had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription. - It was opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation as to por tions of Lots 15 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic through the Bureau of Forestry Development as to Lots 1-9. Benguet opposed on the ground that June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934 by the suc cessors-in-interest of James Kelly who located DIRECTOR OF LANDS V KALAHI INVESTMENTS

MADIALDEA; January 31, 1989 FACTS - On December 12, 1963, Kalahi Investment Inc., moved for an advanced hear ing of Lot No. 1851-B, Floridablanca Cadastre. Evidence was presented and Kalahis title was to be registered under the provisions of Act 496. - It was later on f ound out that this lot was a vast land of mountain ranges covering an area no le ss than 886,021,588 square meters. This lot contains the alleged 123 mineral cla ims of Kalahi. It was also found out that the said lot was labeled as timber lan d under RA 3092. in the land classification of the province of Pampanga and Zamb ales, these lands were also considered part of the Project No. 11, Timber Land. - The Bureau of Forestrys opposition on the registration of the lot is based on t he ground that these lands are part of the vast public forest known as TIMBER LA ND. These lots are not yet released as alienable agricultural lands and were eve n declared by the President of the Philippines under Proclamation No. 82 as part of the Mt. Dorst Forest Reserve. - Kalahi thus abandoned its former claim over Lot No. 1851-B. it limited its claim to two land which when combined, cover an a rea of 1,730 hectares. This land contained the 123 mining claims of Kalahi and w here the alleged 500,000 coffee plants were planted. Kalahi claimed and presente d evidence that it had located in 1934 and prior thereto 123 mineral claims in F loridablanca Mountains; made annual assessments work thereto; made declaration o f location and paid annual assessment work from 1965-1966; constructed roads tra versing the mountains and hills and planted 500,00 coffee trees. These however w ere not considered by the court as basis sufficient in law and in fact for the r egistration of title under act 496. - Kalahi thus contended that these mineral l ands were now segregated from government lands and its mining claims thereon dee med property rights. These were based on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated August 31, 1956 which stated that the legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to g rant the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefore upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law the ar ea is segregated and becomes the property of the locator. - Citing the San Mauric io doctrine Under the Act of Congress of 1902 (Philippine Bill), a right or right s acquired by a holder of unpatented but valid and existing claim located and re gistered under its provisions becomes the property of the locator the right of th e locator to enjoy the surface ground and the minerals within the limits of his claim becomes exclusive as against the whole world, limited only by extralateral rights of adjoining locators. He is not required to purchase the claim or secur e a patent and as long as he could comply with the mining laws, his possessory rights of ownership are as goo d as though secured by patent. - It also claims registration of title based on it s actual, open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years or confirmation of imperfect title under Sec. 48 (b) CA141 as amended by RA No. 1942. - In its decision, the court a quo deni ed the claim for registration ruling that a) the 123 mining claims are governed by mining law; hence under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines which is the proper agency to enforce the claims and to adjudicate the rights of the claimant s, which in fact Kalahi recognized when it filed an application for lease with s aid Bureau, and b) that the claim for confirmation of imperfect title based on t he evidence of Public Land Law provisions: - The lands in the public domain are classified under three main categories: Mineral, Forest and Agricultural lands i n the public domain that title could be issued the Public Law never governs priva te lands. - The Public Land Law is not applicable to forest lands nor to mineral lands. The confirmation of imperfect land title can not be basis for registrati on of titles over forest and/or mineral lands. - On appeal Kalahi assigned as er rors the following: 1)the lower court erred in not considering the basis for the registration of land in question sufficient in law and in fact. 2)the lower cou rt erred in declaring that the doctrine of the Supreme Court and the opinion of the Secretary of Justice never contemplate of a procedure that will entitle the claimants to the registration of the lands in question. 3)the lower court erred in denying the claim for registration of the claimants title over the land in que

stion at last a portion thereof covered by the mining claims and their gaps. - O n the other hand the Director of Lands contended: Kalahi admitted that the land i n question is a mining property consisting of mining claims located and register ed under the provisions of the Act of the US Congress of July 1, 1902. and as su ch, said Act requires Kalahi as holder of mining claims to do no other act excep t to proceed with the acquisition of mining patent in the Bureau of Mines. The A ct prescribes an explicit and definite procedure by which mining patents are to be secured administratively - CA thus certified the following questions (issues) f or SC resolution: ISSUES 1. WON mining claims acquired, registered perfected and patentable under the Old Mining Law matured to private ownership would entitle claimant-appellant to the ownership thereof 2. who has the authority to examine process and find out WON the requirements of the Act of Congress of 1902 have been complied by applicant- the Court or the Bureau of Mines HELD 1. NO. In the recent case of Santa Rosa Mining Co. v Hon Minister of Natural Resources Jo se Leido jr. and Director of Mines Juanito Fernandez the SC ruled that while it recognized that the right of a locator of a mining claim is a property right, th is right is not absolute. It is merely a possessory right more so when petitione rs claims are still unpatented. Mere location does not mean absolute ownership ove r the located claim. It merely segregates the located land or area from the publ ic domain by barring other would-be locators from locating the same and appropri ating for themselves the minerals found therein the intention of the lawmaker is that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining claims. This case modifie s the San Mauricio doctrine in that while a perfected location of a mining claim has the effect of segregating said land from the body of public domain, the are a covered does not thereby become the private property of the locator. - Concurr ing opinion of Justice Laurel in Gold Creek Mining Corp. v Rodriguez and Abadill a: my opinion is that while the locator, under the circumstances, secures the ben eficial ownership or the dominum utile, the government retains the bare ownershi p or the dominium directum, until the locators claim ripens into full ownership u pon full compliance with all requirements of the law for the issuance of a paten t. - Dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. case : To give a broader meaning and give a greater effect to the location of a mining claim is to contend that location is all that is necessary to acquire absolute ownership over a located mining claim. This is not the law. Location without mor e,confers only the right of possession I maintain that in prohibiting the alienat ion of natural resources, save any existing right, the Constitution does not ref er to the right of location or the inherent right of possession, or any inchoate or contingent right which are only means to bring about another right; it refer s only to the right to obtain a patent. - It is not clear if Kalahi has fully com plied with the requirements of Act of Congress of 1902. this is a factual issue which is beyond the issue of the Court. Nonetheless, even assuming claimant to b e a holder of a subsisting and valid patentable mining clai8m, we hold that it c an no longer proceed with the acquisition of a mining patent in view of PD No. 1 214 issued in October 14, 1977, directing holders of subsisting an valid patentab le mining claims located under the provisions of the Act of Congress of 1902 to file a mining lease application within one year of the approval of the Decree non -filing of the application within the period

prescribed shall cause the forfeiture of all his rights to the claim. - Records show that claimant has already filed a mining lease application. 2. Having filed a mining lease application, its mining claims therefore, are deemed covered by PD 1214 and the Bureau of Mines may accordingly process the same as a lease appl ication, in accordance with PD 463, pursuant to PD 1214. As to whether or not th e Bureau of Mines is qualified to rule on whether there has been full and faithf ul compliance with the requirements of Philippine Bill of 1902, SC ruled that th e Bureau is empowered as a corollary function in the processing of mining lease applications. Decision The decision of the CFI of Pampanga is affirmed, with the modification that Kalahis mining claims may be processed as a mining lease appli cation by the Bureau of Mines. TAN V DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY MAKASIAR; October 27,1983 FACTS - Petitioner-appellant: Wenceslao Vinzons Tan - Respondents-appellees: Sec . of Agri. And Nat. Resources (DANR) Jose Feliciano, Director of Bureau of Fores try (BOF) Apolonio Rivera - Intervenors: Ravago Commercial Co., Jorge Lao Happic k, Atanacio Mallari - April 1961 the Bureau of Forestry issued a notice advertis ing for public bidding a tract of public forest land (6,420 hectares) in Olongap o, Zambales. It was located within the former US Naval Reservation. - May 5, 196 2 petitioner Wenceslao Tan submitted his application plus nine other applicants - Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the are declared as a f orest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder - Jun e 7, 1961 then Pres. Carlos Garcia issued a directive to the Dir. Of Bureau of F orestry to prepare a draft proclaiming the said land as a watershed forest reser ve for Olongapo and to reject the bids they have received Sec. Fortich (DANR) ho wever sustained the recommendations of the director of BOF who concluded that it would be beneficial to the public interest of the are is made available for exp loitation. The Director said that to the declare the forest are as a forest rese rve rather than to open it for timber exploitation under license and regulation would do more harm than good to the public interest since it might just become a Free Zone and Logging Paradise to the problem loggers of Dinalupihan, Bataan an o pen target for timber smugglers and kaingineros; also, rejecting the received bi ds would cause the department huge embarrassment - The area was then awarded to Wenceslao Tan by the BOF against the other bidder s, Rovago Commercial Company and Jorge :Lao Happick - May 30, 1963 DANR Sec. Goz on (who succeeded then Sec. Fortich) issued a memorandum authorizing the grant o f new ordinary timber license for areas not more than 3,000 hectares each and th e extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 5000 hectares Dec. 19, 1963- Gozon was then replaced by acting Sec. Jose Feliciano, who upon a ssumption of office he revoked the memorandum. - But that same day, the license of Wenceslao Tan was signed by acting Director of (BOF), Estanislao Bernal, with out the approval of the Secretary of DANR - Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick then wrote a letter to the Sec. of DANR praying that the license iss ued to Tan be cancelled on the ground that it was irregular, anomalous and contr ary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations - The license was declared void ab initio - Petitioner Tan claims that respondents unlawfully, illegally, w himsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted w/o or in excess of its jurisdict ion and with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber l icense without just cause, by denying petitioner Tan of the equal protection of the laws and by depriving him of his constitutional right to property w/o due pr ocess of law by impairing the obligation of contracts - His petition was dismiss ed because it did not state a sufficient cause of action ISSUE WON the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action HELD cause of action 3 esse ntial elements 1. legal right of the plaintiff 2. correlative obligation of the defendants 3. the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right NO . - the petition was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim u pon which relief could be granted; the timber license relied upon by the petitio ner was void ab initio - also, court takes judicial notive that the are has been declared a forest reserve on April 39, 1964 - what is important for the validit

y of a timber gning. Before s signed Dec. f Forestry no

license is the date of release of the license and n the sate of si the release, not tight is acquired by the licensee. Tans license wa 9, 1963 and was released Jan. 6, 1964 by January 6, the Director o longer had any authority to release the license

- the petitioner had not acquired any legal right under such void license - the petitioner also failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. He should have ap pealed the order of the DANR Secretary to the President, who has the power to re view on appeal the orders/acts of the said secretary where administrative appeal is available, special civil action of certiorari cannot be availed - moreover, not only did the petitioner fail to exhaust his administrative remedies, he also failed to note that his action is a suit against the state which under the doct rine of immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the state gives it consent to be dued - Next, granting that the license granted to him was valid, still the re spondents can validly revoke this license REPUBLIC V QUASHA REYES; August 17, 1972 FACTS - The case involves a judicial determination of the scope and duration of the rights acquired by American citizens and corporations controlled by them und er the Parity Amendment appended to the Constitution as of Sept. 18, 1946 - Will iam Quasha is an American citizen who purchased a land in Forbes Park on Nov.26, 1954. He filed a petition on March 1968 where he averred the acquisition of the said land; that the RP claimed that upon expiration of the Parity Amendment (PA) on July 3, 1974, rights acquired by US citizens shall cease; that this claim af fects his right and interest and that the uncertainty as to the status of his pr operty after the PA ends reduces the propertys value and precludes him from havin g improvements made on it; and so he contends that the ownership of properties d uring the effectivity of the PA continues despite its termination - Sol.Gen. Ant onio Barredo: land acquired by Quasha is private agri. land and that the acquisi tion violated Sec.5 Art.XIII of the Constitution which prohibits the transfer of private agricultural land to non-Filipinos except by hereditary succession; and assuming validity of acquisition, his rights acquired through the PA will expir e on July 3, 1974 - CFI: rendered decision in favor of plaintiff, holding that a cquisition was valid and he has a right to continue in ownership of property eve n beyond July 1974. Thus, this appeal. ISSUES 1. WON by virtue of the so-called PA to the Philippine Constitution Quasha could validly acquire ownership of the private residential land which is concededly classified private agricultural lan d

2. On the assumption that Quashas purchase of the private agricultural land is va lid and constitutional, WON his rights will expire on July 3, 1974 HELD 1. NO. T he Parity Amendment gives Americans no right to validly acquire ownership of pri vate agricultural land in the Philippines. -examination of the PA reveals that i t only establishes an express exception to 2 provisionsSection 1 Article XIII (di sposition, exploitation, etc. of public lands) and Section 8 Article XIV (operat ion of public utilities) > no other provision was referred to, not Sections 2 & 5 of Art.XIII -Quasha argues that since PA permitted US citizens/entities to acq uire agricultural lands of the public domain, then such citizens/entities became entitled to acquire private agricultural land in the Phils., even without hered itary succession > this argument does not rest upon the text of the PA but upon a mere inference; if it was ever intended to create an exception to Sec.5, it wo uld have bee mentioned just as Sec.1 and 8 were mentioned -whether from the Phil . Or the American side, the intention was to secure parity for US citizens only in: 1)exploitation, development and utilization of public lands and other natura l resources, and 2) the operation of public utilities -Quasha further contends t hat when the Constitution was adopted in 1935, US citizens were already qualifie d to acquire public agri land, so even without hereditary succession transfer of private agri lands to Americans is permitted > such capacity could exist only d uring the American sovereignty over the Islands (before the RP is established) 2 . His rights will expire. All the exceptional rights conferred upon US citizens and business entities owned or controlled by them, under the Parity Amendment, a re to last during the effectivity of the agreement entered into on July 4, 1946, but in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974. -text of PA: in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974in conformity with Article X, Section 2 this agreement shall hav e no effect after July 3, 1974. It may be terminated be either the US or the Phi ls at any time... -Quasha argues that the limitative period should not be applica ble because under Art.428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law > th is limitation already existed when he purchased the land > The cant complain of deprivation of due process because PA is part of Consti, t he highest law of the land > if the Philippine Government can not dispose of its alienable public agricultural lands beyond that date under PA, then, logically, the Constitution, as modified by PA, only authorizes either of two things: a) a lienation or transfer of rights less than ownership or b) a resoluble ownership that will be extinguished not later than the specified period. Discussion Histor ical Background Article XIII Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources S ec.1 All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain...belong t o the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization sh all be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corps. At least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens... Sec.2 No private corporation...may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.. . Sec.5 Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land sha ll be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associatio ns qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. A rticle XIV General Provisions Sec.8 No franchise...for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporatio ns organized under the laws of the Philippines, 60% of the capital of which is o wned by citizens of the Philippines... nationalistic spirit are self-evident in these provisions 1945 Report of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs : when the Philippines do become independent next July, they will start on the r oad to independence with a country whose commerce, trade and political instituti ons have been very damaged; internal revenue have been greatly diminished by war . in 1946, US enacted Philippine Trade Act authorizing the President of the US t o enter into an Exec. Agreement with the President of the Philippines, which sho uld contain a provision thatthe disposition, exploitation, development, or utiliza tion...be open to citizens of the US and to all forms of business enterprise own ed or controlled, directly or indirectly, by US citizens.; and that the govt of the Phil. Will take such steps as are necessary to secure the amendment of the Cons

titution so as to permit the taking effect as laws of the Phils. Of such part of the provisions Commonwealth Act No.733- authorized the President of the Phils. To enter into the Executive Agreement proposed amendment was submitted to a plebi scite and was ratified in Nov. 1946 Parity Amendment: Notwithstanding the provisi on of section 1, Article 13, and section 8, Article 14, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive Agreement en tered into...on July 4, 1946...but in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974, the disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization...be open to citizens of the US and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by US citizens in the same manner as to, and under the same conditi ons imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations ow ned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines. Laurel-Langley Agreement (revis ion of PA enacted in June 1955): establishes some sort of reciprocity rights bet ween US and Phils. --no direct application to the case at bar, since the purchas e by Quasha of the property in question was made in 1954, prior to the effectivi ty of this agreement LAUREL V GARCIA GUTIERREZ; July 25, 1990 FACTS - The subject property in this case (Roppongi) is one of the four (4) prop erties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agre ement entered into with Japan in 1956, the other lots being: Nampeidai Property , Kobe Commercial Property, and Kobe Residential Property. The properties are pa rt of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and pr operty and their suffering during World War II. - The Reparations Agreement prov ides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in twenty (20) yea rs in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philip pine and Japanese governments. Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribe s the national policy on procurement and utilization of reparations and developm ent loans. The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule. - On August 1986, President Aquino created a committe e to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in To kyo and Kobe, Japan. - On July 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 29 6 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations capital g oods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive has been pushing its decision to sell the repa rations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. Petitioners have filed two pe titions to stop the sale of the Roppongi property. ISSUES 1. WON the Roppongi pr operty and others of its kind can be alienated by the Philippine Government 2. W ON Executive Order No. 296, which entitles nonFilipino citizens or entities to a vail of reparations capital

goods and services, is constitutional. WON EO 296 violate the following constitu tional provisions: a. constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the nationa l patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution b. reservation of th e ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens c. there is preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, pr ivileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony d. WON ther e is protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and tra de practices e. WON there is guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of public concern f. WON there is declaration of the state polic y of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest HELD 1 . NO, the Roponggi property is public domain. As property of public dominion, th e Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its owner ship is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an applica tion to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. 2 . The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is neces sary for the determination of the case. The Court will not pass upon a constitut ional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disp osed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law . Decision Petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Jap an. - vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez - Mar ia Luisa Palacios - administratix - Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widows usufruct and in favor of Juan P ablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wandas usufruct is INVALID because fir st heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator b. fideicommissary substitut ions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second heirs or substitu tes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC c. grant of usufruct of re al property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5 d. proposed par tition of the testators interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow and appe llants violates testators express will to give this property to them - LC: appro ved partition ISSUE WON the partition is valid insofar as a. widows legitime b. s ubstitutions c. usufruct of Wanda HELD a. YES, appellants do not question becaus e Marcelle is the widow and over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, c ondition or substitution of any kind whatsoever - the proposed creation by the a dmininstratix in favor of the testators widow of a usufruct over 1/3 of the free portion of the testators estate cannot be made where it will run counter to the t estators express will. The Court erred for Marcelle who is entitled to of the est ate en pleno dominio as her legitime and which is more than what she is given unde r the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give M arcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testators intention for as stated above his disposition even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wan da. b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not t he only case where a vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is VALID. BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankows ki and Horace Ramirez are not related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it v alidates a fideicommissary substitution provided that such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the 47 48 47 heir originally instituted. Another is that there is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the apellee a grees that the testator contradicts the establishment of the fideicommissary sub stitution when he permits the properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and naked owners. c. YES, usufruct of Wan da is VALID - Art XIII Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals

, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of the public domain in the Philippines. The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamenta ry succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this provision does not apply to tes tamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meanin gless. Any alien would circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippin e landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land BUT an alien may be best owed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore, th e usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does n ot vest title to the land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of t itle to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution. Decisio n: Marcelle (as legitime), Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in naked own ership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez 50 49 RAMIREZ V VDA. DE RAMIREZ ABAD-SANTOS; February 15, 1982 FACTS - APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal benefici aries: Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez - widow - French who lives in Paris - receive d (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion Roberto and J orge Ramirez - two grandnephews - lives in Malate - received the (free portion) Wanda de Wrobleski - companion - Austrian who lives in Spain - received usufruct uary rights of 2/3 of the free portion CRUZ V NCIP PER CURIAM; December 20, 2000 (SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIU M) LA BUGAL TRIBAL ASSOCIATION V WESTERN MINING CORPORATION PHILIPPINES CARPIO-M ORALES; January 29, 2004 FACTS - Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners - SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus and Prohibition. - Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 7942, otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along 49 Art XIII (1935): Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources Art 900 CC: If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be ent itled to of the hereditary estate 48 Art 904 (2) CC 50 Art XII Sec 7 (1987): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private [remove d agricultural] lands shall be transferred or conveyed [1935: assigned] except t o individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain [removed in the Philippines].

with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of t he Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining Corporation (Philipp ines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws. - July 25, 19 87 President Aquino issued EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to accept, consi der and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance f or large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upo n appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with th e foreign proponent. In entering into such proposals, the President shall consid er the real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the coun try that will be realized, as well as the development and use of local scientifi c and technical resources that will be promoted by the proposed contract or agre ement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall mean those proposals for contracts or agreements for min eral resources exploration, development, and utilization involving a committed c apital in a single mining unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in Unit ed States currency (US $50,000,000.00). - March 3, 1995 President Ramos approved 7942 to govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all m ineral resources. RA 7942 defines modes of mineral agreements for mining operati ons, outlines the procedure for filing and approval, assignment/transfer, and wi thdrawal, and fixes their terms. These also apply to FTAAs. - The law also presc ribes the contractors qualifications, grants certain rights such as timber, water , easement rights and right to possess explosives. Surface owners or occupants a re forbidden from preventing holders of mining rights from entering private land s and concession areas. A procedure for settlement of conflicts is also provided for. - The Act restricts conditions for exploration, quarry and other permits. It regulates the transport, sale and processing of minerals, and promotes the de velopment of mining communities, science and mining technology, and safety and e nvironmental protection. - The governments share in the agreements is spelled out and allocated, taxes and fees are imposed, incentives granted. Aside from penal izing certain acts, the law likewise specifies grounds for the cancellation, rev ocation and termination of agreements and permits. - April 9, 1995 RA 7942 took e ffect. - March 30, 1995 Shortly before RA 7942 took effect, the President entered into and FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sul tan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. - August 15, 1995 DENR Secretary Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) 9523, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 794 2. This was later repealed by DAO 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 2 0, 1996. - January 10, 1997 Counsels for petitioners sent letter to DENR Secretar y demanding that they stop the implementation of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, giving t hem 15 days from receipt to act thereon. DENR has yet to respond or act on petit ioners letter. - Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. - Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary without or in excess of jurisdiction: 1)In signing and promulgating DAO 9640 imp lementing RA 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that: It allows fully fo reign owned corporations to explore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral resour ces in a manner contrary to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 4, 1987 Constitution It allow s the taking of private property without the determination of public use and for just compensation It violates Art. III, sec. 1 It allows enjoyment by foreign c itizens as well as fully foreign owned corporations of the nations marine wealth contrary to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 2 It allows priority to foreign and fully for eign owned corporations in the exploration, development and utilization of miner al resources contrary to Art. XII 2)In recommending approval of and implementing the FTAA between the President and WMCP because the same is illegal and constit utional - They pray that the Court issue an order permanently enjoining the resp ondents from acting on any application for an FTAA; declaring RA 7942, DAO 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and

void; and, canceling the FTAA issued to WMCP as unconstitutional, illegal and n ull and void. - Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners contentions, argue th at the requisites for judicial inquiry have not been met, the petition does not comply with the criteria for prohibition and mandamus, and there has been a viol ation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. - WMCP subsequently filed a Manifestat ion dated September 25, 2002 alleging that on January 23, 2001 WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation organized under Philippine laws, 60% of the equity of which is owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations while about 40% is owned by Indophil Resources NL, a n Australian company. - Because of this, the DENR Secretary, by Order of December 18, 2001, approved t he transfer and registration of the subject FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius. Said Order, however, was appealed by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. (Lepanto). Becau se there is no final judgment yet, the case cannot be considered moot. ISSUES 1. WON case is justiciable 2. WON EO 279 took effect 3. WON the WMCP FTAA is const itutional 4. WON RA 7942 is constitutional HELD 1. Case is justiciable. Ratio In cases involving constitutional questions, the Court is not concerned with wheth er petitioners are real parties in interest, but with whether they have legal st anding. - Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La Bugal BLaan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and indigenous peoples cooperative organ ized under Philippine laws representing a community actually affected by the min ing activities of WMCP, members of said cooperative, as well as other residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of WMCP. Even if they are not th e actual parties in the contract, they claim that they will suffer irremediable d isplacement as a result of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining activities in their area of residence. - And although RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 were not in force when the subject FTAA was entered into, the question as to their validity is ri pe for adjudication. RA 7942 explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-ex isting arrangements. The WMCP FTAA also provides that any term and condition fav orable to FTAA contractors resulting from a law or regulation shall be considere d part of the agreement. - The petition for prohibition and mandamus is also the appropriate remedy. Public respondents, in behalf of the Government, have oblig ations to fulfill under said contract. Petitioners seek to prevent them from ful filling such obligations on the theory that the contract is unconstitutional and , therefore, void. - The contention that the filing of the petition violates the rule on hierarchy of courts does not likewise lie. The repercussions of the iss ues in this case on the Philippine mining industry, if not the national economy, as well as the novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling circumsta nces to justify resort to this Court in the first instance. Indeed, when the iss ues raised are of paramount importance to the public, this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. 2. YES. Ratio When the issues raised are of paramo unt importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of proced ure.

- Petitioners contend that EO 279 did not take effect because its supposed date of effectivity came after President Aquino had already lost her legislative powe rs under the Provisional Constitution. But it was explained that the convening o f the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by the President it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted. 3. NO. Ratio The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise o f legislative powers by the President and did not prevent the effectivity of law s she had previously enacted. In accordance with Art. XII, sec. 2 of the constit ution, FTAAs should be limited to technical or financial assistance only. However, contrary to the language of the Constitution, the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a full y foreign-owned mining corporation, to extend more than mere financial or techni cal assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and operate every asp ect of the mining activity. - WMCP nevertheless submits that the word technical en compasses a broad number of possible services, perhaps, scientific and/or techno logical in basis. It thus posits that it may well include the area of management and operations. The Court is not persuaded. Casus omisus pro omisso habendus es t a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. Moreover, the management or operation of mining activiti es by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, wa s precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradic ate. - Respondents insist that agreements involving technical or financial assist ance is just another term for service contracts. The proceedings of the CONCOM in dicate that the members used the terms interchangeably. The Court is likewise no t persuaded. While certain commissioners may have mentioned the term service cont racts, they may have been using the term loosely and not in the context of the 19 73 Constitution. Also, the phrase service contracts has been deleted in the 1987 C onstitutions Article on National Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to retain the concept of service contracts under the 1973 Constitution, it could h ave simply adapted the old terminology instead of employing new and unfamiliar t erms (agreements involving either technical or financial assistance). - The UP Law Draft and Article XII, as adopted, uses the same terminologies. And the UP Law d raft proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants o f beneficial ownership of the countrys natural resources to foreign owned corpora tions. While, in theory, the State owns these natural resources and Filipino citi zens, their beneficiaries service contracts actually vested foreigners with the r ight to dispose, explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same. This arrangement is clearly incompatible with the constitutional ideal of nationaliza tion of natural resources. But the proponents nevertheless acknowledged the need for capital and technical knowhow in the large-scale exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources. Hence, they proposed a compromise technical or financial agreements. 4. NO, insofar as said Act authorizes service contract s. Ratio Financial or technical agreements as contemplated in Art. XII, sec. 2 s hall refer to financial agreements and/or technical agreements only and not to s ervice contracts. - Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technic al agreements, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that gran t beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to fundamental law. Decis ion WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Court hereby declares unconstitution al and void: 1)The following provision of RA 7942 a) The proviso in Section 3 (a q) b) Section 23, c) Section 33 to 41, d) Section 56, e) The second and third pa ragraphs of Section 81, and f) Section 90. 2)All provisions of DAO 96-40, s. 199 6 which are not in conformity with this Decision, and 3)The FTAA between the Gov ernment of the Republic of the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc. Voting 8 co ncur including ponente, 5 dissent, 1 took no part SEPARATE OPINION VITUG - It could not have been the object of the framers of the Charter to limit the c ontracts which the President may enter into, to mere agreements for financial and technical assistance; The Constitution has not prohibited the State from itself exploring, developing, or utilizing the countrys natural resources, and, for thi

s purpose, it may, enter into the necessary agreements with individuals or entit ies in the pursuit of a feasible operation. which side wins, the FTAA would still be in the hands of a qualified Filipino co mpany. - The word involving signifies the possibility of inclusion of other activi ties. If the intention of the drafters were strictly to confine foreign corporat ions to financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have been unmistakably restrictive and stringent. - The present Constitution st ill recognizes and allows service contracts (and has not rendered them taboo), a lbeit subject to several restrictions and modifications aimed at avoiding pitfal ls of the past. - In the minds of the commissioners, the concept of technical an d financial assistance agreements did not exist at all apart from the concept of service contracts duly modified to prevent abuses technical and financial agreeme nts were understood by the delegates to include service contracts duly modified t o prevent abuses. - Current business practices often require borrowers seeking h uge loans to allow creditors access to financial records and other data, and pro bably a seat or two on the formers board of directors, or at least some participa tion in certain management decisions that may have an impact on the financial he alth or the long-term viability of the debtor, which of course will directly aff ect the latters capacity to repay its loans. - If the Supreme Court closes its doo rs to international realities and unilaterally sets up its own concepts of stric t technical and financial assistance, then it may unwittingly make the country a virtual hermit an economic isolationist in the real world of finance. - The commi ssioners fully realized that their work would have to withstand the test of time , that the Charter, though crafted with the wisdom born of past experiences and lessons painfully learned, would have to be a living document that would answer the needs of the nation well into the future. RESOLUTION PANGANIBAN; December 1, 2004 FACTS - Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners - SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus and Prohibition - Ponente: Panganiban, J. (take note: ma jor dissenter in part1) - All mineral resources are owned by the State. Their ex ploration, development and utilization (EDU) must always be subject to the full control and supervision of the State. More specifically, given the inadequacy of Filipino capital and technology in large-scale EDU activities, the State may se cure the help of foreign companies in all relevant matters especially financial a nd technical assistance provided that, at all times, the State maintains its righ t of full control. The foreign PANGANIBAN - The petition should be dismissed on the ground of mootness. The dispute claimi ng the right to purchase the foreign shares in WMCP is between two Filipino comp anies (Sagittarius and Lepanto). So regardless of

assistor or contractor assumes all financial, technical and entrepreneurial risk s in the EDU activities; hence it may be given reasonable management, operationa l, marketing, audit and other prerogatives to protect its investments and enable the business to succeed. - The Constitution should be read in broad, life-givin g strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narr ow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President a nd Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attrac t foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. - On the basis of this control standard, this Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law , its Implementing Rules and Regulations insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Ag reement (FTAA). ISSUES 1. WON the case been rendered moot by the sale of the WMC shares in WMCP to Sagittarius and by the subsequent transfer and registration o f the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius 2. Assuming that the case has been rendered moot, WON it would still be proper to resolve the constitutionality of the assai led provisions of the Mining Law, DAO 96-40 and the WMCP FTAA 3. What is the pro per interpretation of the phrase Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financ ial Assistance contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Const itution? HELD 1. YES. Ratio The courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. - The dispute claimi ng the right to purchase the foreign shares in WMCP is between two Filipino comp anies (Sagittarius and Lepanto). So regardless of which side wins, the FTAA woul d still be in the hands of a qualified Filipino company. The plea to nullify the Mining Law has become a virtual petition for declaratory relief, over which thi s Court has no original jurisdiction. - Petitioners argue that the sale of share s and transfer of the FTAA is invalid. Government cannot enter into FTAA with Fi lipinos. - It does not take deep knowledge of law and logic to understand that w hat the Constitution grants to foreigners should be equally available to Filipin os. 2. Ratio FTAAs are service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the grant thereof is subject to several safeguards. - Petitioners stress the fol lowing points. First, while a case becomes moot and academic when there is no mo re actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits, what is at issue is not only the validity of the WMCP FTAA but also the constitutionality of RA 7942 an d its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Second, the acts of private respondent cannot operate to cure the law of its alleged unconstitutionality or to divest this Court of its jurisdiction to decide. Third, the Constitution imposes upon t he Supreme Court the duty to declare invalid any law that offends the Constituti on. - But of equal if not greater significance is the cloud of uncertainty hangi ng over the mining industry, which is even now scaring away foreign investments. It is evident that strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitution ality issue be resolved now. And citing Acop v. Guingona, the courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. 3. Citing Francisco v. House of Representatives, the ponencia reiterated the well settled principles of constitutional construction: Verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Wher e there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution shoul d be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. Ut magis valeat q uam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. - Petitioners clai m that the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance sim ply means technical assistance or financial assistance agreements, nothing more and nothing else. - But if that was the intention, then what is the point of req uiring that they be based on real contributions to the economic growth and gener al welfare of the country? - It is also unclear how a verba legis approach leads to the conclusion that the management or operation of mining activities by forei gn contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely

the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate. If the framers had intended to put an end to service contracts, they would have at lea st left some transitory guidelines. - The drafters will have to be credited with enough pragmatism and savvy to know that these foreign entities will not enter into such agreements involving assistance without requiring arrangements for the p rotection of their investments, gains and benefits. - Using ratio legis est anim a, we may now examine the CONCOM deliberations. It may be observed that the memb ers use the terms financial and technical assistance agreements and service contrac ts interchangeably. From their statements, it may be concluded that FTAAs are ser vice contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the grant thereof is subje ct to several safeguards (in accordance with law, President as signatory, reporting to Congress) - With ut magis valeat quam pereat, we may notice a contradiction betw een the States full control and supervision and the safeguarded service contracts with foreign contractors. It must be pointed out that the full control and supe rvision cannot be taken literally to mean that the State controls and supervises everything involved, down to the minutest details, and makes all decisions requ ired in the mining operations. Control by State may be on the macro level establi shment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry standards, etc. - To furth er disabuse the notion of these new service contracts, the governments share in the se operations will not be limited to taxes, duties and fees to be imposed. Those only consist of the basic government share. The law provides for an additional government share to be determined using formulas presented in DAO 96-40, either of which results to at least 50% of the net benefits from the mining. Decision W HEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts January 27, 2004 Decisi on; to DISMISS the Petition; and to issue this new judgment declaring CONSTITUTI ONAL 1) RA 7942 (Phil. Mining Law), 2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations co ntained in DAO 96-40 insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in par. 4 of Section 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution; and 3) the FTAA dated March 30, 1995 executed by the government and WMCP, except Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA which are hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary to public policy and for being grossly disadvantageous to the governme nt. Voting 10 concur including ponente, 4 dissent, 1 took no part SEPARATE OPINION CARPIO Provisions of RA 7942 abdicate the States constitutional duty to control and supervise fully the exploitation of mineral resources. - The change in language in the Constitution was a clear rejection of the old system of license, concession or lease. - The State as owner of the natural resources mus t receive income from its exploitation taxes, fees and charges cannot substitute. - State must receive at least 60% of the net proceeds in FTAAs, which share is equivalent to the Filipino equity requirement.

- The majority opinion refused to accept that the State is entitled to what the entire mining industry is willing to pay the State. CARPIO-MORALES [part 1 ponente] The phrase natural resources are owned by the Sta te simultaneously vests the legal title to the nations natural resources to the Go vernment, and the beneficial ownership of these resources in the sovereign Filip ino people. - In the EDU of natural resources, Government acts as trustee. So it cannot, without violating its sacred trust, enter into any agreement or arrange ment which effectively deprives the Filipino people of their beneficial ownershi p of these resources. - Art. XII, sec. 2 in mentioning based on real contribution s to the economic growth and general welfare of the country articulates the valu e which the Constitution places on natural resources, and recognizes their poten tial benefits. - Real benefits are intergenerational benefits because the mother lands natural resources are the birthright not only of the present generation of Filipinos but of future generations as well. - Involving as the majority construes it runs counter to the restrictive spirit of the provision. - Either refers to on e of two items and any is required when more than two items are involved. - Either i s not merely descriptive but restrictive. - Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. - It is understandable, however regrettable, that a gover nment, strapped for cash and in the midst of a self proclaimed fiscal crisis, wo uld be inclined to turn a blind eye to the consequences of unconstitutional legi slation in the hope, however false or empty, of obtaining fabulous amounts of ha rd currency; As always, the one overriding the consideration of this Court shoul d be will of the sovereign Filipino people as embodied in their Constitution. The task of reclaiming Filipino control over Philippine natural resources now be longs to another generation. FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION V ERC AND MERALCO TINGA; January 15, 2004 FACTS - Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Status Quo O rder assailing the Order dated November 27, 2003 of respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), provisionally authorizing respondent Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) to increase its rates by an average amount of 12 centavos per kilowatt hour. Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) argues that the said Order of t he ERC is void for having been issued without legal basis or statutory authority . It also contends that Rule 3, Sec. 4 of the Implementing Rules of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power. FDC further asserts that the Order is void for having been issued by the ERC with grave abuse of discretion and manifest bias. In support of its prayer for the issuance of injunctive relief, FDC claims that the implementation by MERALCO of the provisional rate increase will result in ir reparable prejudice to the FDC and others similarly situated unless the court re strains such implementation. - On Dec. 29, 2003, FDC filed with the Court an Urg ent Motion to Grant Restraining or Status Quo Order. On Jan. 9, 2004, the ERC is sued an Order clarifying that the provisional rate increase granted to MERALCO i n its Nov. 27, 2003 Order should be applied beginning Jan. 1, 2004. The Court En Banc issued on Jan. 13, 2004, a Resolution ordering ERC and MERALCO to file the ir respective Comments on the Petition. The Court also enjoined ERC and MERALCO to observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of the Petition and set t he case for oral arguments on Jan. 27, 2004. On Jan. 26, 2004, ERC, MERALCO, and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective Comments on th e Petition. - In its Comment, the ERC concurred with the arguments of the OSG an d insists that it is authorized to issue provisional orders under the law. ERC a rgues that it must not have been the intention of Congress to expand the functio ns of the ERC, as the successor of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), and clip i ts powers at the same time. The ERC also asserts that it is authorized to issue provisional rate increases ex parte, and that it may base its provisional order on the verified application and supporting documents submitted by the applicatio

n, and it is not required to wait for the comments of consumers or local governm ent units (LGUs) concerned before issuing a provisional order. The ERC also deni es that the Nov. 27, 2003 Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. On th e contrary, it claims that the Order is supported by substantial evidence. Final ly, ERC contends that the filing of the instant Petition is premature because it was denied the opportunity to have a full determination of the Application afte r trial on the merits, and is violative of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. - For its part, MERALCO asserts that the Order is valid, because it was issued by the ERC pursuant to Sec. 44 of the EPIRA which allows the transfer of powers (not inconsistent with the EPIRA) of the old ERB to ERC. It also denies that the assailed Order was issued by the ERC with grave abuse of discretion, asserting that on the contrary, the issuance thereof was based on the Application, affidav its and other supporting documents which it submitted earlier. ISSUE 1. WON ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate adjustments under RA No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (E PIRA) 2. Assuming that the ERC has the authority to grant provisional orders, WO N the grant by the ERC of the provisional rate adjustment in question constitute s grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction HELD 1. Yes. The E RC is endowed with statutory authority to approve provisional rate adjustments u nder the aegis of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. The sections read, thus: Sec. 44. Transfer of Powers and Functions. The powers and functions of the Energy Re gulatory Board not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby trans ferred to the ERC. The foregoing transfer of powers and functions shall include all applicable funds and appropriations, records, equipment, property and person nel as may be necessary. Sec. 80. Applicability and Repealing Clause The applica bility provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as th e Public Services Act, Republic Act 6395, as amended, revising the charter of NPC; Presidential Decree 269, as amended, referred to as the National Electrificatio n Decree; Republic Act 7638, otherwise known as the Department of Energy Act; Exec utive Order 172, as amended, creating the ERB; Republic Act 7832 otherwise known as the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1004; shall continue to have full force and effect except insofar as they are inconsistent with this Act. The provisions with respect to electric power of Sec tion 11(c) of Republic Act 7916, as amended, and Section 5(f) of Republic Act 72 77 are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. - Presidential Decree No. 40 and all laws, decrees, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent wit h this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied) The principal powers of the ERB relative to electric public utilities transferred to the ERC are the following: 1. To regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies; 2. To issue certificates of public convenience for the o peration of electric power utilities; 3. To grant or approve provisional electri c rates. - It bears stressing that the conferment upon the ERC of the power to g rant provisional rate adjustments is not inconsistent with any provision of the EPIRA. The powers of the ERB transferred to the ERC under Section 44 are in addi tion to the new powers conferred upon the ERC under Section 43. Section 80 of th e EPIRA complements Section 44, as it mandates the continued efficacy of the app licable provisions of the laws referred to therein. The material provisions of t he Public Service Act which continue to

be in full force and effect are contained in Section 16(c), which states thus: S ection 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. The Commissio n shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: xxx xxx xxx c) To fix and determine indiv idual or joint rates, toll charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as we ll as commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public service s provisionally and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearin g thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the conc erned parties operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in ca se public service equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily fo r the promotion of a private business, the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purposes of fixing the rates. - Similarly, Sections 8 and 14 of EO No. 172 or t he ERB Charter continue to be in full force by virtue of Sections 44 and 80 of t he EPIRA. Said provisions of the ERB Charter read: SEC. 8. Authority to Grant Pr ovisional Relief. The Board may, upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter and without prior hearing, on the basis of the supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief o n motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after hearing, should the Board find that the pleadings, togethe r with such affidavits, documents and other evidence which may be submitted in s upport of the motion, substantially support of the provisional order; Provided, That the Board shall immediately schedule and conduct a hearing thereon within t hirty (30) days thereafter, upon publication and notice to all affected parties. SEC. 14. Applicability Clause The applicability (applicable) provisions of Comm onwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act; Repub lic Act No. 6173, as amended, otherwise known as the Oil Industry Commission Act; Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, revising the charter of the National Power Co rporation under CA 120; Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended, also referred t o as the National Electrification Administration Decree, and Presidential Decree N o. 1206, as amended, creating the Department of Energy, shall continue to have f ull force and effect, except insofar as inconsistent with this order. (Words in pare nthesis supplied). - Furthermore, under Sec. 80, only three specific laws were e xpressly repealed or modified. Sec. 8 of EO No. 172 and Section 16(c) of CA No. 146 which both grant the regulatory body concerned the authority to approve prov isional rate increases are not among the provisions expressly repealed or modifi ed. This clearly indicates the laws intent to transfer the power to ERC. - Be it noted that implied repeals are not favored in our jurisdiction. Thus, a statute will not be deemed to have been impliedly repealed by another enacted subsequent thereto unless there is a showing that a plain, unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy exists between the two. - Likewise, it may not be asserted with succ ess that the power to grant provisional rate adjustments runs counter to the sta tutory construction guide provided in Sec. 75 of the law. This section ordains t hat the EPIRA shall be construed in favor of market competition and people power empowerment, thereby ensuring the widest participation of the people. To the Co urt, the goals of market competition and people empowerment are not negated by t he ERCs exercise of authority to approve provisional rate adjustments. The concer ns are taken care of by Sec. 43 of the EPIRA and its IRR. Again for one, even if there is a ground to grant the provisional rate increase, the ERC may do so onl y after the publication requirement is met and the consumers affected are given the opportunity to present their side. For another, the rate increase is provisi onal in character and therefore may be modified or even recalled anytime. Finall y, the ERC is mandated to prescribe a rate-setting methodology in the public inte rest and to promote efficiency. For that matter, there is a plethora of provisions in Sec. 43 and related sections which seek to promote public interest, market co

mpetition, and consumer protection. - All the foregoing undeniably lead to the c onclusion that the ERC, under Sections 43(u), 44, and 80 of the EPIRA, in relati on to Sec. 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Sec. 8 of EO. No. 172, possesses the power to grant provisional rate adjustments subject to the procedure laid do wn in these laws as well as in the IRR. 2. Yes. It is settled that there is grav e abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily ou t of malice, ill will, or personal bias. What makes the challenged Order particu larly repugnant is that it involves a blatant and inexcusable breach of the very rule which the ERC is mandated to observe and implement. The violated provision which is Sec. 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR specifies how the ERC should exercise its power to issue provisional orders pursuant to Sec. 44 in relation to Sec. 80 of the EPIRA. First, the application for rate increase must be published in a news paper of general circulation in the locality where the applicant operates; second, ERC must consider the comments or pleadings of the customers a nd LGU concerned in its action on the application or motion for provisional rate adjustment. Since the IRR was issued pursuant to the EPIRA, Sec. 4(e) of Rule 3 as part of the IRR has the force and effect of law and thus should have been co mplied with. - In view of the infirmities which attended the November 27, 2003 O rder, particularly: 1) the failure of MERALCO to publish its Application or at l east a summary thereof; 2) the failure of ERC to resolve the Motions for Product ion of Documents filed by the oppositors to MERALCOs Application before acting on the motion for provisional rate adjustment; and 3) the failure of the ERC to co nsider the arguments raised by the oppositors in their respective pleadings prio r to the issuance of the assailed Order, the Court declares void the November 27 , 2003 Order of the ERC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PANGAN IBAN; March 30, 2004 FACTS - The petitioners, after having been granted permission to prospect for ma rble deposits in the mountains of Biakna-Bato, succeeded in discovering marble d eposits in Mount Mabio, which forms part of Biak-na-bato mountain range. The pet itioners then applied with the Bureau of Mines for the issuance of the correspon ding license to exploit said marble deposits. License No. 33 was granted to them . Shortly after respondent Ernesto Maceda was appointed Minister of the Departme nt of Energy, he cancelled the petitioners license through his letter to Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation dated Semptember 6, 1986. Because of the can cellation, the original petition was filed on August 21, 1991. - The trial court granted the petition and said that the privilege granted under the license had already ripened into a property right, thus the cancellation of the license with out notice or hearing was against the Constitutional right of the petitioners ag ainst deprivation of their property rights. It was unjustified because that coul d be covered by four separate application is 400 hectares. Finally, they ruled t hat Proclamation No. 84, which confirmed the cancellation of the license, was an ex post facto law. Thus, they were allowed to continue their operations until t he expiration of their license. - On appeal, the CA held that the grant of quary license covering 330.3062 hectares to the respondents was valid because it was covered by four separate applications, each for an area of 81 hectares. Moreover , it held that the limitation under PD 463 - that any quarry license should not cover not more than 100 hectares in

any given province was supplanted by RA 7942, which increased the mining areas a llowed under PD 463, ISSUES 1. WON the case is moot and academic 2. WON the lice nse is valid 3. WON Proclamation No. 84 is valid HELD 1. No. With the shift of c onstitutional policy (Art 12 Sec 2) toward full control and supervision of the S tate over natural resources the Court in Miners Association of the Philippines v s Factoran declared the provisions of PD 463 as contrary to the Constitution. RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies the new constitutional man date. It has repealed all laws that are inconsistent with any of its provisions. However, it does not apply retroactively to a license granted by the government under the 1973 Constitution. The Court therefore needs to determine WON the lic ense of the respondents falls within the type of licenses wherein the new law ca nnot be applied. 2. No. The license granted to the petitioners is subject to the terms and conditions of PD 463. Proclamation No. 2202, which awarded the licens e to Rosemoor, expressly states that the grant is subject to existing policies, l aws, rules and regulations. The license is thus subject to Section 69 of PD 463, which states that a license cannot cover more than 100 hectares in any one provi nce. The law does not provide any exception to the number of applications for a license. Moreover, the license was issued solely in the name of Rosemoore Mining and Development Corporation, rather than the four individual stockholders. 3. Y es. Citing Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation vs. Balite Portal Mining C ooperative, Tan vs. Director of Forestry and Ysmael vs. Executive Secretary, the Court ruled that licenses may be revoked by executive action when national inte rest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a property right pro tected by the due process clause. The license merely evidences the privilege gra nted by the state and does not vest any permanent or irrevocable right. The lice nse likewise contains a provision which says that the license may be revoked or c ancelled at any time by the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences when in his opini on, public interest so require. As to the exercise of prerogative by Maceda, suff ice to say that while the cancellation or revocation of the license is vested in the said director, the latter is subject to the department head. - Moreover, gr anting that the license is valid, it may also by revoked by the State in the exe rcise of police power. The exercise of power through Proclamation No. 84 is clea rly in accord with jura regalia, which reserves to the State ownership of all na tural resources. - Proc No. 84 is also not a bill of attainder since the declaration of the licen se as a nullity is not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation a pun ishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of a ttainder. - Proclamation No. 84 is also not an ex post facto law. It does not fa ll under the six recognized instances when a law is considered as such. Also, an ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature. D ecision Petition granted DIDIPIO EARTHSAVERS ASSOCIATION V SECRETARY CHICO-NAZARIO; March 30,2006 FACTS - Nature Prohibition and mandamus - Assails the constitutionality of Repub lic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1 996. - 25 July 1987 ~ President Aquino promulgated EO No. 279 which authorized t he DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either t echnical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and u tilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. - 3 March 1995 ~ Presiden t Ramos signed into law Rep. Act No. 7942 entitled, An Act Instituting A New Syst em of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development, Utilization and Conservation, o therwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. - 15 August 1995 ~ DENR Sec retary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series of 1995, containing the implementing guidelines of Rep. Act No. 7942. - 23 January 1997 ~ DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996, which took effect on after due publication supers

eded DAO No. 23, s.1995. - Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hect ares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya. - Subsequently, AMC consolidated wit h Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now goes under the new nam e of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholder s of which are Australian nationals. - 7 September 2001 ~ counsels for petitione rs filed a demand letter addressed to then DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason that Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Reg ulations DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional. - The Office of the Executive Secretary was also furnished a copy of the said letter. - There being no response to both letters, another letter of the same content dated 17 June 2002 was sent to Pres ident Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. - This letter was indorsed to the DENR Secretary and eventually referred to the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional Office No. 02, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for further action. - 12 November 2002 ~ counsels for petitioners received a letter from the Panel o f Arbitrators of the MGB requiring the petitioners to comply with the Rules of t he Panel of Arbitrators before the letter may be acted upon. - Yet again, counse ls for petitioners sent President Arroyo another demand letter dated 8 November 2002. Said letter was again forwarded to the DENR Secretary who referred the sam e to the MGB, Quezon City. - In a letter dated 19 February 2003, the MGB rejecte d the demand of counsels for petitioners for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA. - Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They pray that the Court issue an o rder: 1. enjoining public respondents from acting on any application for FTAA; 2 . declaring unconstitutional the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and its Implement ing Rules and Regulations; 3. canceling the FTAA issued to CAMC. ISSUES Procedur al 1. WON the petitioners eminent domain claim is a justiciable issue. Substant ive 2. WON RA 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void becausethey allow the unjust and u nlawful taking of property without payment of just compensation, in violation of Art III Sec 9 of the Constitution 3. WON the mining act and its implementing ru les and regulations are void and unconstitutional for sanctioning an unconstitut ional administrative process of determining just compensation 4. WON the state, through RA 7942 and the CAMC FTAA, abdicated its primary responsibility to the f ull control and supervision over natural resources 5. WON the respondents interp retation of the role of the wholly foreign and foreign-owned corporations in the ir involvement in mining enterprises, violates Art XII Sec 2 (4) of the Constitu tion 6. WON the 1987 Constitution prohibits service contracts HELD

1. YES. It is a justiciable issue. Based on the following considerations: a. Locus Standi~ In the case, there is a clash of legal rights as Rep. Act No. 7942 has been enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have been entered in to. Petitioners embrace various segments of the society, like DESAMA representin g a community actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as oth er residents of areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC. These petitione rs have the standing to raise the constitutionality of the questioned FTAA as th ey allege a personal and substantial injury. They are under imminent threat of b eing displaced from their landholdings as a result of the implementation of the questioned FTAA. b. Ripeness~ By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the cha llenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy eve n without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitu tion and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. c. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and the magnitude of the publ ic interest involved will have a bearing on the countrys economy, which is to a g reater extent dependent upon the mining industry. Also affected by the resolutio n of this case are the proprietary rights of numerous residents in the mining co ntract areas as well as the social existence of indigenous peoples, which are th reatened. 2. On the Validity of Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and DAO 96-40 PETITIONERS contend that Sec. 76 of RA No. 7942 and Sec. 107 of DAO 96-40 allow the "unlawful and unjust "TAKING" of private property for private purpose in con tradiction with Sec. 9, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation." - They assert that public respondent DENR, through the M ining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation. - They cited the case of Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi to illustra te the concept of taking of property for purposes of eminent domain to wit: > "ta king under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private property for mo re than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment ther eof." - Petitioners quickly add that even assuming arguendo that there is no abs olute, physical taking, at the very least, Section 76 establishes a legal easeme nt upon the surface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract a rea sufficient to deprive them of enjoyment and use of the property and that suc h burden imposed by the legal easement falls within the purview of eminent domai n. (NOTE: An easement is defined to be a liberty privilege or advantage, which o ne man may have in the lands of another, without profit; it may arise by deed or prescription) - PUBLIC RESPONDENTS argue that Section 76 is NOT A TAKING provis ion but a VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER and by virtue of which, the state m ay prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good o rder, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation invol ves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtai ls some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. - Pu blic respondents concluded that to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase. - Public respondents are in clined to believe that by entering private lands and concession areas, FTAA hold

ers do not oust the owners thereof nor deprive them of all beneficial enjoyment of their properties as the said entry merely establishes a legal easement upon s urface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract area. - Hence the distinctions below: 1. Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulatio n in Police Power no compensation shall be paid. (NOTE: noxious= harmful)

Jurisprudence shows: WHERE A PROPERTY INTEREST IS MERELY RESTRICTED BECAUSE THE CONTINUED USE THEREOF WOULD BE INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC WELFARE, OR WHERE PROPERTY IS DESTROYED BECAUSE ITS CONTINUED EXISTENCE WOULD BE INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC INTEREST , THERE IS NO COMPENSABLE TAKING. However, WHEN A PROPERTY INTEREST IS APPROPRIA TED AND APPLIED TO SOME PUBLIC PURPOSE, THERE IS COMPENSABLE TAKING. In the exer cise of its police power regulation, the state restricts the use of private prop erty, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rights, which constitu te ownership, is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public. (-Ber nas)

TAKING MAY INCLUDE TRESPASS WITHOUT ACTUAL EVICTION OF THE OWNER, MATERIAL IMPAI RMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY OR PREVENTION OF THE ORDINARY USES FOR WHICH THE PROPERTY WAS INTENDED SUCH AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EASEMENT.

The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those ent ities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private propert y to public use upon payment of just compensation.

On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welf are by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the two. Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended f or a noxious purpose; hence, In Republic v. Castellvi, the Court had the occasion to spell out the requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit: 1. the expropriator must enter a private p roperty; 2. the entry must be for more than a momentary period. 3. the entry mus t be under warrant or color of legal authority; 4.the property must be devoted t o public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; 5. th e utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust th e owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Normally, of co urse, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of titl e to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionab le that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement ri ght of way. THE ENTRY REFERRED TO IN SECTION 76 IS NOT JUST A SIMPLE RIGHT-OF-WA Y WHICH IS ORDINARILY ALLOWED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE. Here, the holders of mining rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting mining a ctivities such as exploration, extraction and processing of minerals. Mining rig

ht holders build mine infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels, pr epare tailing ponds, storage areas and vehicle depots, install their machinery, equipment

and sewer systems. On top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are accorde d to them where they may build warehouses, port facilities, electric transmissio n, railroads and other infrastructures necessary for mining operations. All thes e will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the affected areas the benefic ial ownership of their lands. WITHOUT A DOUBT, TAKING OCCURS ONCE MINING OPERATI ONS COMMENCE. 1. On Section 76 of RA No. 7942 as a Taking Provision Brief Histor y of Mining Laws: First found in Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 137 A simila r one was found in a provision of Presidential Decree No. 463, otherwise known a s The Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 Hampered by the difficulties an d delays in securing surface rights for the entry into private lands for purpose s of mining operations, Presidential Decree No. 512 dated 19 July 1974 was passe d into law in order to achieve full and accelerated mineral resources developmen t. Thus, Presidential Decree No. 512 provides for a new system of surface rights acquisition by mining prospectors and claimants. by the holder of mining rights and the surface owner, occupant or concessionaire in accordance to PD 512. Reasoning and Held/s on the Second Substantive Issue: 3. On the Power of Courts to Determine Just Compensation The question on the jud icial determination of just compensation has been settled in the case of Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay wherein the Court declared that the determina tion of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Even a s the executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination s, the same cannot prevail over the courts findings. (NOTE: I think this is the r atio already.) There is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its im plementing rules and regulations that exclude the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just compensation in expropriation proceedings involving mining op erations. There is nothing wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by the P anel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminar y matter the reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or occupants. T he jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less original and exclusi ve because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedi ngs are not a continuation of the administrative determination. 4. On the Suffic ient Control by the State Over Mining Operations Citing La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Ass ociation, Inc. v. Ramos: The Court held that RA 7942 provides for the states cont rol and supervision over mining operations. o The gamut of requirements, regulat ions, restrictions and limitations imposed upon the FTAA contractor by the statu te and regulations easily overturns petitioners contention that the setup under R A 7942 and DAO 96-40 relegates the State to the role of a passive regulator depend ent on submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the government agencies con cerned are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct and change -- the various work programs and the corresponding minimum expenditure c ommitments for each of the exploration, development and utilization phases of th e mining enterprise. - Considering the provisions of the statute and the regulat ions just discussed, the Court believes that the State definitely possesses the means by which it can have the ultimate word in t he operation of the enterprise, set directions and objectives, and detect deviat ions and noncompliance by the contractor; likewise, it has the capability to enf orce compliance and to impose sanctions, should the occasion therefore arise.

In other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and ge t away with it; on the contrary, it will have to follow the government line if i t wants to stay in the enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of mining operations. 5. On the Proper Interpretation of the Constit utional Phrase "Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance"

Citing La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos: Par. 4 of Sec. 2 Art XII allows for the possibility that matters, other than those explicitly mentioned, could be made part of the agreement. o The use of the word involving implies that these agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in sense becomes very apparent when we jux tapose agreements for technical or financial assistance against agreements includin g technical or financial assistance. This much is unalterably clear in a verba le gis approach. o The word involving as used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated thus: one, the sense of concerning, having to do with, or affecting; two, entailing, requiring, implying or necessitating; and three, inclu ining or comprising.

Whereas in Commonwealth Act No. 137 and Presidential Decree No. 463 eminent doma in may only be exercised in order that the mining claimants can build, construct or install roads, railroads, mills, warehouses and other facilities, this time, the power of eminent domain may now be invoked by mining operators for the entr y, acquisition and use of private lands. Considering that Section 1 of President ial Decree No. 512 granted the qualified mining operators the authority to exerc ise eminent domain and since this grant of authority is deemed incorporated in S ection 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter pr ovision is a taking provision. o The taking to be valid must be for public use. o Public use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the power of eminent dom ain is now synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and p ublic convenience. o It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit o r advantage. Public use as traditionally understood as actual use by the public ha s already been abandoned. Decision THEREFORE, the Mining Law and the CAMC FTAA a re not void because Sec. 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Sec. 107 of DAO 96-40 provi de for the payment of just compensation based on the agreement entered into

If the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations to fin ancial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have certa inly been so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in anyo nes mind about their true intent. o For example, they would have used the sentenc e foreign corporations are absolutely prohibited from involvement in the managem ent or operation of mining or similar ventures or words of similar import. A sea rch for such stringent wording yields negative results.

- The meaning of the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial as sistance must not be construed in an exclusionary and limiting manner since there was a conscious and deliberate decision by the drafters to avoid the use of res trictive wording. 6. On Service Contracts Not Deconstitutionalized The 1987 Cons titution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprise s, subject to the full control and supervision of the State; this time, however, safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime. Citing Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals: a. "The phrase agreements involvin g either technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in f act service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are be tween foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the oth er, the government as principal or owner of the works." b. "xxx..From the foregoin g, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements involving either techn ical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service co ntracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the govern ment as principal or owner of the works. " - "As written by the framers and ratifi ed and adopted by the people, the Constitution allows the continued use of servi ce contracts with foreign corporations -- as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supe rvision of the State -- sans the abuses of the past regime. The purpose is clear : to develop and utilize our mineral, petroleum and other resources on a large s cale for the immediate and tangible benefit of the Filipino people." (id.) Decis ion The petition for prohibition and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40; Republic Act No. 7942 and i ts Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 insofar as they rel ate to financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 3, 2002 FACTS - Diwalwal Gold Rush Area rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusa n-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. It is located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalitie s of Monkayo and Cateek in Davao Del Norte. The land has been embroiled in contr oversy since mid-80s due to the scramble over gold deposits found within its bowe ls. - March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted Exploration Permi t No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the Diwalwal area. - June 27, 1991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076 or the Peoples Smal l-Scale Mining Act which established a Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program to be i mplemented by the secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regula tory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretarys direct supervision and control. It al so authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to small-scale miner s under certain conditions. - December 21, 1991, then DENR Secretary Fulgencio F actoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66 declaring 729 hectar es of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining. This was made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by Proclamation No. 369 which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. - Petition for the c ancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing Agre ement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director (RED Mines Case) - February 16, 1994, while RED mines case was pending , Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporatio n (SEM), which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by t he permit. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered SEMs integrated MPSA application. Several small -scale miners filed their opposition (MAC cases). - March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act was enacted. Pursuant to this, the MAC cas es were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disp utes involving conflicting mining rights. RPA took cognizance of the RED Mines c ases which was consolidated with the MAC cases. - April 1, 1997 Provincial Minin

g Regulatory Board of Davao passed Resolution No. 26, Series of 1997 authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits (OTPs) to small-scale miners operating in the Diwalwal mines. - May 30, 1997, petitioner SEM filed complaint for damages against DENR Secretary and PMRB-Davao, alleging that the illegal issuance of the OTPs allowed the extraction and hauling of P60,000 worth of gold ore per truckl oad from SEMs mining claim. - Meanwhile, June 13, 1997, the RPA resolved the Consolidated Mines cases and de creed in an Omnibus Resolution that the validity of EP No. 133 is reiterated and all adverse claims against MPSAA No. 128 are dismissed. - June 24, 1997 the DEN R Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which provided among others, that: DENR shall studythe option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area b. Study shall include studying and weighing the fe asibility of entering into management agreements or operating agreements c. Such agreements shall include provisions for profitsharing including profit-sharing ar rangements with small-scale miners, as well as the payment of royalties to indig enous cultural communities - July 16, 1997 petitioner SEM filed a special civil a ction for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the CA for the nullificati on of Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the direct state utilization e spoused therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133, amo ng others - January 6, 1998, the MAB rendered a decision in the Consolidated Min es cases, setting aside the judgment of the RPA. This decision was then elevated to he Supreme Court by way of consolidated petition. - March 19, 1998, the CA d ismissed petition of SEM ruling that: a. DENR Secretary did not abuse his discre tion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since it was merely a directive to co nduct studies on the various options available to the government for solving the Diwalwal conflict. b. The assailed memorandum did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as official government policy on the matter, but was simply a m anifestation of the DENRs intent to consider it as one of its options, after dete rmining its feasibility through studies. c. Petitioners rights under EP No. 133 a re not inviolable, sacrosanct or immutable and, being in the nature of a privile ge granted by the State, the permit can be revoked, amended or modified by the C hief Executive when the national interest so requires. - Motion for reconsiderat ion was denied, thus this petition. ISSUES 1. WON CA erred in upholding the ques tioned acts of the DENR Secretary which petitioner allege as violative of mining laws and in derogation of vested rights of petitioner over the area as covered by EP No. 133. 2. WON CA erred in holding that an action on the validity of ore transport permit (OTP) is vested in the Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA). a. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING V BALITE PORTAL MINING

HELD 1. SC agreed with CA that the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adop t direct state utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The term s of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed was merely a study o f this option and nothing else. It did not grant any management/operating or pro fit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, bu t simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determi ne its feasibility. - Petition was premature. The MO did not impose any obligati on on the claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the p arties to the dispute. Petitioner can show no more than a mere apprehension that the State, through the DENR, would directly take over the mines, and until the DENR actually does so and petitioners fears turn into reality, no valid objection can be entertained against MO 97-03 on grounds which are purely speculative and anticipatory. 2. Whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diw alwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled matter, as the EPs va lidity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. - Whether or not respondent Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC) and the other mini ng entities it represents are conducting illegal mining activities is a factual matter that has yet to be finally determined in the Consolidated Mines Cases. SC also pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioners rights under EP N o. 133 be regarded as total and absolute, as EP No. 133 merely evidences a privi lege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, dev elopment and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources are matters im presses with great public interest. - Looking into Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 199 5, the SC said that the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full contr ol and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of the countr ys natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by enter ing into agreements with qualified entities. The State need be guided only by th e demands of public interest. - In the absence of any concrete evidence that the DENR Secretary violated the law or abused his discretion, he is presumed to hav e regularly issued the memorandum with a lawful intent and pursuant to his offic ial functions. - With regard to the second issue, the Court did not rule on it a s the grounds invoked by petitioner for invalidating the OTPs are inextricably l inked to the issues raised in the Consolidated Mines cases. Decision Petition wa s denied; CA ruling affirmed. CHAVEZ V PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI COASTAL BAY CARPIO; July 9, 2002 FAC TS - Nature original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary inju nction and a temporary restraining order. Petition also seeks to compel the Publ ic Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on PEAs then on-going renegotiat ions with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation to reclaim portions of M anila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such recalamtion. - 1973-The government through the Commis sion of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay - 1977-President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating the PEA. And was tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and submer ged areas and to develop, improve, acquire x x x lease and sell any and all kind s of lands. On the same date, President Marcos issued PD. 1085 transferring to P EA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) - 1981-Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum ordering PEA to amend its contract with CDCP which stated t hat CDCP shall transfer in favor of PEA the areas reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRR P - 1988-President Aquino issued Special Patent granting and transferring to PEA parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP. Subsequently she transferred in the name of PEA the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands - 1995-PE A entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation , to develop the Freedom Islands and this was done without public bidding - Pres

ident Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres approved the JVA - 1996-Sen ate President Maceda delivered a privileged speech in the Senate and denounced t he JVA as the grandmother of all scams. As a result, investigations were conducted by the Senate. Among the conclusions were: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the govern ment has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate the se lands; (2) the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thu s void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal - 1997-President Ramos created the Leg al Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of the Senate Committee report.1998-The Philippine Daily Inquirer published reports on on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI - PEA Director Nestor Kalaw and PE A Chairman Arsenio Yulo and former navy officer Sergio Cruz were members of the negotiating panel - Frank Chavez filed petition for Mandamus stating that the go vernment stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed la nds to AMARI and prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of the renegotiation s of JVA. He cited that the sale to AMARI is in violation of Article 12, Sec. 3 prohibiting sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations and Article 2 Section 28 and Article 3 Sec. 7 of the Constitution on the right to information on matters of public concern - 1999-PEA and AMARI signed Amended JVA which Pres. Estrada approved ISSUES 1. WON the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because subsequent events 2. WON the petit ion merits dismissal for failure to observe the principle governing the hierarch y of courts 3. WON the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administr ative-remedies 4. WON petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit 5. WON the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going ne gotiations before a final agreement 6. WON the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to amari of certain lands, reclaimed and sti ll to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 consitution; and 7. WON the court is the pr oper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageuos to the government. o threshold issue: whether amari, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the amended jva 367.5 hectares of reclaimed froeshore and submerged area in manila bay in view of sections 2 an d 3, article 12 of the 1987 constitution HELD (1) The prayer to enjoin the signi ng of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution and if already implemented, to annul the effects of an unco nstitutional contract (2) The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions Reasoning the instant case raises constitu tional issues of transcendental importance to the public (3) The principle of ex haustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question

(4) Petitioner has standing if petition is of transcendental public importance a nd as such, there is the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayers suit on these ma tters of transcendental public importance (5) The constitutional right to inform ation includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final cont ract and must therefore constitute definite propositions by the government and s hould not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public or der Reasoning The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involvin g public interest reinforces the peoples right to information on matters of publi c concern. PEA must prepare all the data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract. While the evaluation or review is on-going, there are no official acts, transacti ons, or decisions on the bids or proposals but once the committee makes its offic ial recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the gover nment (6) In a form of a summary: o The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands compr ising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of P EA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to priva te corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. o The 592.15 h ectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain and outside the commerce of man until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for publi c service. The government can make such classification and declaration only afte r PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources th e government can alienate. o Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such t ransfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitu tion which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable l and of the public domain o Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such tran sfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural re sources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim thes e submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands a s alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public services. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public do main to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article 12 which prohibits priv ate corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Reasoning Commonwealth Act 141 of the Philippine National Assembly empowers the president to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable se c. 6. The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Com merce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into(a) Al ienable of disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral lands.-The President must fir st officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. -Sec. 59 states that the lands disposabl e under this title shall be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the Go vernment by dredging, filling, or other means; (b) Foreshore; (c) Marshy lands ( d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes. -Sec. 61 states that the lands comprised in classes (a), (b) and (c) of section 59 shall be disposed f to private parties by lease only and not otherwise -After the effectivity of the 1 935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. These lands remained suis generic as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public d omain the government could not sell to private parties. The only way that the go vernment can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. -in case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain, a pub

lic bidding is required -1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources a re owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natur al resources shall not be alienated. Article 12, Sec. 3 states that alienable la nds of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corpora tions or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain exc ept by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not mo re than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. -rat ion behind the ban on corporations from acquiring except through lease is not we ll understood. If the purpose is to equitably diffuse lands ownership then the C onsti could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. If the intent was to encourage ownercultivatorship and the economic family-size farm and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case, then placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his he irs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next. In actual practice then, this ban strengthens the consti limitation on individuals from acquiring more than t he allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the ban, indivi duals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public dom ain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. He could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholder s of the corporation. J.G. SUMMIT HOLDINGS V COURT OF APPEALS PUNO; September 24, 2003 FACTS - January 27, 1977 The National Investment and Development Corporation (NI DC), a government corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Kawas aki Heavy Industry, Ltd of Kobe, Japan for the construction, operation, manageme nt of the Subic National Shipyard, which became the Philippine Shipyard and Engi neering Corporation (PHILSECO) with 60-40% capitalization. - One of the features of the agreement is the grant to the parties the right of first refusal should either of them decide to sell, assign or transfer its interest in the joint vent ure. - November 25, 1986-- the NIDC transferred all its rights, title and intere st in PHILSECO to the Philippine National Bank (PNB). And subsequently transferr ed to the Natl Government pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14 - December 8, 1 986-- Pres Aquino issued Proclamation No. 50 establishing the Committee on Priva tization (COP) and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to take possession of, ma nage and dispose of non*performing assets of the National Government. - APT was named trustee in the National Govt share in PHILSECO. - COP and APT decided to se ll the govt shares to private entities (87.67% equity share). - APT and KAWASAKI agreed to exhange KAWASAKIs right of first refusal for the right to top by 5% the highest bid, and be entitled to name the company which could top. KAWASAKI name d Philyard Holdings, Inc. (PHI) - JG Summit Holdings Inc submitted a bid of 2,03 0,000,000.00php with an acknowledgment of

KAWASAKI/PHIs right to top. JGSHI was declared the highest bidder. - KAWASAKI/PHI exercised the option to top and the COP approved. APT and PHI executed a Stock Purchase Agreement. - JGSHI filed a petition for mandamus to question the legali ty of the right to first refusal and right to top exercised by KAWASAKI/PHI. - C A held that petition for mandamus was not the proper remedy, and that JGSHI was estopped from questioning the validity because it participated in the public bid ding with the full knowledge of KAWASAKI/PHIs right to top. - SC held that a) the right to top granted to KAWASAKI/PHI was illegal. Because it allows foreign cor porations to own more than 40% equity in PHILSECO, which is a public utility who se capitalization should be 60% Filipino-owned. It also violates the rules of co mpetitive bidding; b) JGSHI cannot be estopped from questioning the unconstituti onal, illegal and inequitable provision; c) APT should accept the 2,030,000,000. 00 bid of JGSHI, execute Stock Purchase Agreement, return to PHI the amount of 2 ,131,500,000.00php, and cancel the stock certificates issued to PHI. - Responden ts filed MFR with the ff. issues ISSUES 1. WON PHILSECO is a public utility. 2. W ON under 1977 Joint Venture Agreement, KAWASAKI can exercise its right of first refusal only up to 40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO 3. WON the right to top granted to KAWASAKI violates the principles of competitive bidding. HELD 1. No. PHILSECO is not a public utility. A shipyard is not a public utility by n ature, and there is no law declaring it to be. clientele whom it may choose to serve as its discretion. It is not legally oblig ed to render its services to the public. Though the industry may be imbued with public interest, its public service is only incidental. f) Shipyards in the past were declared as public utilities (by Act No 2307, Commonwealth Act No 146). Th en Marcos PD No. 666 removed it from the list of public utilities to free the ind ustry from the 60% citizenship requirement under the Constitution (he wanted to accelerate the growth of the industry). Then BP Blg 391 repealed PD No. 666 , re verting back the status of shipyards as public utilities. g)Pres Aquino repealed BP Blg 391 with EO No. 226. But this did not revive PD No 666 or the other repe aled laws. The status of shipyards reverts back to non-public utility prior to t he Public Service Law. highest bid should KAWASAKI/PHI decide to exercise its right to top. f) If the p arties did not swap right to first refusal with right to top, KAWASAKI would sti ll have the right to buy the shares (for the original amount, which was lesser), so there is no basis in the submission that the right to top unfairly favored K AWASAKI. Decision: MFR granted. Decision & resolution of CA affirmed. Voting Con cur: Davide, Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Tinga (w/ sep op) SEPARATE OPINION TINGA Shipyard is not a public utility. Since the enactment of CA No. 454 shipyards ha ve never been considered public utilities. PD 666 merely removed any doubt as to their non-public utility status. 2) No. There is nothing that prevents KAWASAKI to acquire more then 40% of PHILSECOs total capitalization, under the Joint Venture Agreement. (or YES, it can own mo re than 40%). They agreed that in the event that one party sells its shares, the non-selling party have a preferential right to buy or to refuse the selling. Th e partnership is based on delectus personae. No one can become a member of the p artnership association w/o the consent of all other associates. BAGATSING V COMMITTEE ON PRIVITIZATION QUAISON; July 14, 1995 FACTS - this is a petition to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of a bl ock of shares of Petron Corporation and the award made to Aramco Overseas Compan y as the highest bidder and to stop the sale of said block of shares to Aramco PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1966 under the corporate name Esso Philippines, Inc. - In 1973, the Philippine go

vernment acquired ESSO through the PNOC and became a wholly-owned company of the government under the corporate name PETRON and as a subsidiary of PNOC. - On De cember 8, 1986, President Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50 entitled Proclai ming and Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization o f Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets thereof and creating the Com mittee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. - Implicit in the proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the government and the ideal of leaving busine ss to the private sector. - December 2, 1991, President Ramos deemed the privati zation program to be successful and beneficial. - September 9, 1992, the PNOC Bo ard of Directors approved Specific Thrust No. 6 and moved to bring the attention of the administration to the need to privatize Petron. 3) a) Public utility = a business or service engaged in regularly supplying the public with some commodity or service of public consequence such as electricity, water , transportation. The facility must be necessary for the maintenance of life and occupation of residents. b)Public utility implies public use and service to the public. Determinative characteristic: service or readiness to serve an indefini te public (not a privileged few), which has rights to demand and receive the ser vices and commodities. c) Public use is not synonymous with public interest. The fact that a business offers services and goods that promote public good and ser ve the interest of the public does not make it a public utility. d)True criterio n to judge the character of the use: whether the public may enjoy it by RIGHT or only by PERMISSION e) Shipyard = a place or enclosure where ships are built or repaired. It has a limi ted No. The right to top did not violate the rules of competitive bidding. a) biddin g = making an offer or an invitation to prospective contractors whereby the govt manifests its intention to make proposals for the purpose of supplies, materials and equipment for official business or public use. Public bidding is the accept ed method in arriving at a fair and reasonable price, and ensures that overprici ng, favoritism, and other anomalous practices are eliminated or minimized. b) Pr inciples of bidding: 1) the offer to the public; 2) an opportunity for competiti on; 3) a basis for comparison of bids. As long as the three are complied with, t he bidding is valid and legal. c) The highest bid may not be automatically accep ted. Bidding rules may specify other conditions or reservations. d) In the case, 1) all interested bidders were welcomed; 2) basis for comparing bids were laid down; 3) all bids were accepted sealed and were opened and read in the presence of the COAs official representative and before all other bidders. e) The bidders were placed in equal footing. And they were made aware of the rules that the govt reserved the right to reject the

- October 21, 1992, Sec. Del Rosario, as Chairman of the Committee on Privatizat ion, endorsed to President Ramos the proposal of PNOC. - January 4, 1993, a foll ow-up letter was sent by Secretary Del Rosario to President Ramos. - January 6, 1993, Secretary Lazaro of the Dept. of Energy endorsed for approval - January 12 , 1993, the Cabinet approved the privatization of Petron as part of the Energy S ector Action Plan. - March 25, 1993, the Government Corporate Monitoring and Coo rdinating Committee recommended a 100% privatization of Petron. - March 31, 1883 , the PNOC Board of Directors passed a resolution authorizing the company to neg otiate and conclude a contract with the consortium of Salomon Brothers of Hongko ng Limited and PCI Capital Corporation for financial advisory services to be ren dered to Petron. - April 1, 1993, President Ramos approved the privatization of Petron up to a maximum of 65% of its capital stock. - August 10, 1993, President Ramos approved the 40%40%-20% privatization strategy of Petron. - Invitation to bid was published. - The floor price bid for the 40% block was fixed at US$400 million. - The bids of Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), ARAMCO, and WESTMON T were submitted while the floor price was being dicussed. - ARAMCO was declared the winning bidder at US$502 million - December 16, 1993, Monino Jacob, Preside nt and Chief Executive Officer of PNOC, endorsed to COP the bid of ARAMCO for ap proval. And was approved on the same day. Also on the same day, WESTMONT filed a complaint questioning the award of shares to ARAMCO. - February 3, 1994, PNOC a nd ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase Agreement - March 4, 1994, the two companies signed the Shareholders Agreement ISSUES 1. WON the petitioner have locus standi 2. WON the inclusion of Petron in the privatization program contravened the dec lared policy of the State 3. WON the bidding procedure was valid 4. WON Petron w as a public utility HELD 1. YES. Taxpayers may question contracts entered into b y the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be in contravention of the law. 2. YES. The decision of PNOC to privatize Pe tron and the approval of the COP of such privatization, being made in accordance with Proclamation No. 50, cannot be reviewed by the Court. Such acts are exerci ses of the executive function as to which the Court will not pass judgment upon or inquire into their wisdom. 3. YES. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules shou ld be given more weight than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer. 4. NO. A public utility under the Constitution and the Public Service Law is one organized for hire or compensation to serve the pu blic, which is given the right to demand its service. Petron is not engaged in o il refining for hire and compensation to process the oil of other parties. Decis ion Petitions dismissed ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V COURT OF APPEALS YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 20, 2001 FACTS - Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals - Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is engaged in the business of im porting crude oil, refining the same and selling various petroleum products thro ugh a network of service stations throughout the country - Petroleum Distributor s and Service Corporation (PDSC) owns and operates a Caltex service station at t he corner of the MIA and Domestic Roads in Pasay City - June 30, 1983: Shell fil ed with the quondam Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) an application for author ity to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Paranaque to Imelda Marcos A ve, Paranaque. The application was initially rejected because the old site had b een closed for five years such that relocation of the same to a new site would a mount to a new construction of a gasoline outlet, which construction was then th e subject of a moratorium. Subsequently, BEU relaxed its position and gave due c ourse to the application. - PDSC filed opposition on the grounds that: (1) there are adequate service stations attending to the motorists requirements in the tra ding area, (2) ruinous competition will result, and (3) there is a decline not a n increase in the volume of sales in the area. Petrophil and Caltex also opposed on the ground that Shell failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements. - March 6, 1984: BEU dismissed application on jurisdictional grounds and for la ck of full title of the lessor over the proposed site - May 7, 1984: BEU reinstate

d application ision denying leum products Affairs (OEA) ard (ERB) and e BEU

and conducted a hearing thereon - June 3, 1986: BEU rendered a dec application because there was no necessity for an additional petro retail outlet on the site. Shell appealed to the Office of Energy - May 8, 1987: EO 172 was issued creating the Energy Regulatory Bo transferring to it the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of th

- May 9, 1988: OEA denied Shells appeal. Shell moved for reconsideration and pray ed for new hearing or remand of the case for further proceedings. Shell submitte d a new feasibility study to justify application. - July 11, 1988: OEA remanded case to ERB noting the updated survey conducted by Shell - September 17, 1991: E RB allowed Shell to establish the service station - PDSC filed a motion for reco nsideration but was denied by the ERB. It thus elevated the case to the CA. - No vember 8, 1993: CA reversed ERB judgment - CA denied motion for reconsideration. Shell and ERB thus elevated matters to the Supreme Court - While case was pendi ng in the CA, Caltex filed a similar application in the same area. PDSC opposed on the same grounds but ERB also approved application. PDSC again filed a petiti on with the CA. Petition was dismissed in May 14, 1993. - ERB arguments: evidenc e used as basis for ERBs decision is neither stale nor irrelevant and justifies e stablishment of retail outlet, evidence on vehicle volume and fuel demand suppor ts construction of outlet, new outlet will not lead to ruinous competition - She ll arguments: ERB findings based on substantial evidence, feasibility study has not become irrelevant even if presented two years after preparation, CA erred in passing judgment and making pronouncement of purely economic and policy issues on petroleum business, proposed outlet will not result to ruinous competition, C A should have referred the new evidence to ERB under the doctrine of prior resor t to primary jurisdiction ISSUES 1. WON the court should set aside the ERB decis ion 2. WON there is substantial evidence to support ERBs finding of public necess ity to warrant approval of Shells application 3. WON the Feasibility study has be come stale because it was submitted in evidence two years after it was prepared in 1988 4. WON the establishment of the outlet would result to ruinous competiti on HELD Ratio The courts will not interfere with actions of an administrative ag ency, except if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction o r grave abuse of discretion. General Rule: The courts will not interfere in matt ers, which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entruste d with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies - Executive officials are presumed to have famili arized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpo se of the law, and to have formed an

independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion - Exception An action by an administrative agency may be set aside if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting wi th the letter and spirit of the law. - When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a preexisting law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts t hat finally determine what the law means. 1. No cogent reason to depart from gen eral rule since ERB findings conform to the governing statutes and controlling c ase law on the matter Regulatory boards were empowered to entertain and act on a pplications for the establishment of gasoline stations in the Philippines. There is a worldwide trend towards economic deregulation. This trend is reflected in our policy considerations, statutes and jurisprudence. RA 8479 was enacted to im plement Art XII, Sec. 19 of the Constitution Government believes deregulation wi ll eventually prevent monopoly Art XII, Sec. 19 is anti-trust in history and spi rit. It espouses competition. The objective is based upon the belief that throug h competition producers will satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for goods and services and thus, matches their desires with societys oppo rtunity costs. Recent developments in the oil industry as well as legislative en actments and jurisprudential pronouncements have overtaken and rendered stale th e view espoused by the appellate court in denying Shells petition ERB Decision wa s based on hard economic data 2.

Data includes: developmental projects, residential subdivision listings, populat ion count, public conveyances, commercial establishments, traffic count, fuel de mand, growth of private cars, public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles in creased market potential which will benefit community and transient motorists ER B is in a better position to resolve Shells application being primarily the agenc y possessing the necessary expertise on the matter Substantial evidence is all t hat is needed to support an administrative finding of fact. It means such releva nt evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion 3. The pronouncement of Cou rt of Appeals Sixteenth Division affirming ERB Decision approving a similar appli cation by Caltex is more in keeping with the policy of the State and the rationa le of the statutes enacted to govern the industry CA: no gasoline station along the entire stretch; need not necessarily result in ruinous competition, absent a dequate proof to that effect; unless petitioner is able to prove by competent ev idence that significant changes have occurred sufficiently to invalidate that af ore-stated study, the presumption is that said study remains valid 4. The mere p ossibility of reduction of earnings of a business is not sufficient to prove rui nous competition In determining the allowance or disallowance of an application for the construction of a service station, the CA confined the factors thereof w ithin the rigid standards governing public utility regulation, where exclusivity , upon satisfaction of certain requirements, is allowed. However, exclusivity is more the exception rather than the rule in the gasoline service station busines s PDSC failed to show that its business would not have sufficient profit to have a fair return on investment Caltex, PDSCs principal, never filed any opposition to Shells application A climate of fear and pessimism generated by unsubstantiate d claims of ruinous competition already rejected in the past should not be made to retard free competition, consistently with legislative policy of deregulating and liberalizing the oil industry to ensure a truly competitive market under a regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous supply, environmentally clean and high quality petroleum products Decision (1) Challenged decision of the Court o f Appeals is reversed and set aside (2) ERB Order granting the amended applicati on of Pilipinas Shell Corporation to relocate its service station to Benigno Aqu

ino Jr., Ave., Pque, Metro Manila reinstated Voting 3 Justices concurred, 1 on s ick leave FACTS - Two separate motions for reconsideration seeking reversal of the SCs deci sion nullifying the win-win resolution dated November 7, 1997 issued by the Offi ce of the President (OP) - Decision struck down as void the act of the OP in reo pening the case in OP Case No. 96-C 6424 through the issuance of November 7, 199 7 win-win Resolution which substantially modified its March 29, 1996 OP Decision that had long become final and executory - The March 29, 1996 OP Decision was d eclared by the same office as final and executory after the DARs motion for recon sideration of the said decision was denied for having been filed beyond the 15-d ay reglementary period - Movants: o The win-win resolution is valid as it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling o Proper remedy for petitioner is a petition for review and not certiorari o Filing of motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before petition for certiorari may be filed o Petitioners are guilt y of forum shopping - Intervenors: o They have right to intervene o The win-win resolution is valid as it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling o Win-win resolut ion properly addresses the substantial issues of the case - Both movants ask tha t their motions be resolved en banc since the issues are novel and of transcendenta l significance Issue here according to them is WON the power of the local governm ent units (LGUs) to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the Dept of Ag rarian Reform (DAR) - Other issues raised by movants described as substantial (1) whether the subject land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility; (2) whether the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA); (3) whether the land is tenanted, and if not, whether the app licants for intervention are qualified to become beneficiaries thereof; and (4) whether the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify t he land into industrial/institutional use ISSUE WON the SCs decision nullifying t he win-win resolution dated November 7, 1997 issued by the Office of the Preside nt (OP) must be reversed. HELD - The issues presented are matters of no extraord inary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc ART XIII: AGRARIAN REFORM FORTRICH V CORONA MARTINEZ; November 17, 1998

o The issue is no longer novel as having been decided in Province of Camarines S ur, et al. v. CA wherein it was held that LGUs need not obtain the approval of th e DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non agricultural use. o Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous vote of all f ive members of the 2nd Division. - The order which denied the DARs motion for rec onsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was not an erroneous ruling and i t does not have to be corrected by the November 7, 1997 win-win resolution o In accordance with Administrative order No. 18 which mandates that decisions, order s, resolutions of the OP shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from rece ipt of copy thereof unless a motion for reconsideration is filed within such peri od. o Late filing of DAR is not excusable because DAR must not disregard the reg lementary period fixed by law in referring the decision to the departments conce rned for the preparation of the motion of consideration o Procedural rules shoul d be treated with utmost respect and due regard as they are designed to facilita te the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the res olution of rival claims in the administration of justice - There is a grave abus e of discretion in entertaining the second motion for reconsideration and on the basis thereof issued the win-win resolution was a flagrant infringement of the doctrine of res judicata. These grave breaches of the law, rules and settled jur isprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature. o When the March 29 , 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the petitioners - When the DARs order denying the petitioners first applicatio n for conversion was first brought by petitioner to the OP, the appropriate admi nistrative rules were not complied with. But movants cannot now question the sup posed procedural lapse for the first time before the SC. It should have been rai sed and resolved at the administrative level. - Intervenors do not have certain right or legal interest in the subject matter. o Being merely seasonal farmworke rs without the right to own, application for intervention must fail as they have no legal or actual and substantial interest over the subject land o even "win-w in Resolution of November 7, 1997 did not recognize the latter as proper parties to intervene in the case simply because the qualified farmer-beneficiaries have yet to be meticulously determined as ordered in the said resolution. - The March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed of the afo rementioned substantial issues o Factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court, presuming the OP is the most competent in matters falling within its domain - O ur affirmation of the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is precisely pr o-poor considering that more of the impoverised members of society will be benef ited by the agro-economic development of the disputed land which the province of Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake. o The O P Decision of March 29, 1996 was for the eventual benefit of the many, no just o f the few. This is clearly shown from the development plan on the subject land a s conceived by the petitioners - WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsidera tion of the April 24, 1998 Decision of this Court, filed by the respondents and the applicants for intervention, are hereby DENIED with FINALITY. SIGRE V COURT OF APPEALS AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; August 8, 2002 FACTS - Private respondent Lilia Y. Gonzales, as coadministratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to prohibit the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from accepti ng the leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre (predecessor of petitioner Rolando S igre), and for LBP to turn over to private respondent the rentals previously rem itted to it by Sigre. - Ernesto Sigre was private respondents tenant in an irriga ted rice land located in Barangay Naga, Pototan, Iloilo. He was previously payin g private respondent a lease rental of 16 cavans per crop or 32 cavans per agric ultural year. In the agricultural year of 1991-1992, Sigre stopped paying his re ntals to private respondent and instead, remitted it to the LBP pursuant to the Department of Agrarian Reforms Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, which s et the guidelines in the payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmerbenefi

ciaries under the land transfer program of P.D. No. 27. - The pertinent provisio n of the DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 reads: "A. Where the value of the land ha s already been established. The value of the land is established on the date the Secretary or his authorized representative has finally approved the average gro ss production data established by the BCLP or upon the signing of the LTPA by landowners and tenant farmers concerned heretofore authorized. Payment of lease rentals to landowners covered by OLT shall terminate on the date the value of th e land is established. Thereafter, the tenant-farmers shall pay their lease rent als/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized agents: provided that in case whe re the value of the land is established during the month the crop is to be harve sted, the cut-off period shall take effect on the next harvest season. With resp ect to cases where lease rentals paid may exceed the value of the land, the tena nt-farmers may no longer be bound to pay such rental, but it shall be his duty t o notify the landowner and the DAR Team Leader concerned of such fact who shall ascertain immediately the veracity of the information and thereafter resolve the matter expeditiously as possible. If the landowner shall insist after positive ascertainment that the tenant-farmer is to pay rentals to him, the amount equiva lent to the rental insisted to be paid shall de deposited by the tenant-farmer w ith the LBP or its authorized agent in his name and for his account to be withdr awn only upon proper written authorization of the DAR District Officer based on the result of ascertainment or investigation." - According to private respondent , she had no notice that the DAR had already fixed the 3-year production prior t o October 1972 at an average of 119.32 cavans per hectare, and the value of the land was pegged at P13,405.67. Thus, the petition filed before the Court of Appe als, assailing, not only the validity of MC No. 6, but also the constitutionalit y of P.D. 27. - The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and declare d MC No. 6 null and void. The LBP was directed to return to private respondent t he lease rentals paid by Sigre, while Sigre was directed to pay the rentals dire ctly to private respondent. In declaring MC No. 6 as null and void, the appellat e court ruled that there is nothing in P.D. 27 which sanctions the contested pro vision of the circular; that said circular is in conflict with P.D. 816 which pr ovides that payments of lease rentals shall be made to the landowner, and the la tter, being a statute, must prevail over the circular; that P.D. 27 is unconstit utional in laying down the formula for determining the cost of the land as it se ts limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just compensation; and that it is no longer applicable, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657. H ence, these petitions. ISSUES 1. WON MC No. 6 is valid 2. WON MC No. 6 can be re conciled with PD 816

3. WON PD 27 is unconstitutional HELD 1. YES. - PD 27, issued on October 21, 197 2 by then Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos, proclaimed the entire country as a land refo rm area and decreed the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, tra nsferring to them the ownership of the land they till. To achieve its purpose, t he decree laid down a system for the purchase by tenant-farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Owners of rice and corn lands that exceeded the minimum retention area were bound to sell their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and subject to conditions. It was p ursuant to said decree that the DAR issued MC No. 6, series of 1978. - The Court of Appeals held that P.D. No. 27 does not sanction said Circular, particularly, the provision stating that payment of lease rentals to landowners shall termina te on the date the value of the land is established, after which the tenant-farm er shall pay their lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized agen ts. - We disagree. The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bo dies to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the ob jects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to bu t in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. One such administrativ e regulation is DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zob el, emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by transferring to the tenantfarmers the ownership of the land theyre tillin g. As noted, however, in the whereas clauses of the Circular, problems have been encountered in the expeditious implementation of the land reform program, thus necessitating its promulgation. - The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, e xplicitly recognized by the appellate court when it stated that (T)he main purpos e of the circular is to make certain that the lease rental payments of the tenan t-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the land. x x x The circular was meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmers lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his favor against the determined purch ase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual obligor for said purchase pri ce. Since the assailed Circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpos e of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being the case, it has the force of la w and is entitled to great respect. 2. YES. - The Court cannot see any irreconcil able conflict between P.D. No. 816 and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner unt il the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in 1 978, mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the value of the land has been determined. - In Curso v. Court of Appeals, involvin g the same Circular and P.D. 816, it was categorically ruled that there is no in compatibility between these two. - In other words, MC No. 6 merely provides guid elines in the payment of lease rentals/amortizations in implementation of P.D. 8 16. Under both P.D. 816 and MC No. 6, payment of lease rentals shall terminate o n the date the value of the land is established. Thereafter, the tenant farmers shall pay amortizations to the Land Bank. The rentals previously paid are to be credited as partial payment of the land transferred to tenant-farmers. - Private respondent, however, splits hairs, so to speak, and contends that the Curso case is premised on the assumption that the Circular implements P.D. 816, whereas it is expressly stated in the Circular that it was issued in implementation of P.D. 27. Both MC No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but rather, in conjunction with e ach other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be made to the landowner. After the value of the land has been determined/established, then the tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No. 6. Cle arly, there is no inconsistency between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR Cir cular No. 6 supplement each other insofar as it sets the guidelines for the paym ents of lease rentals on the agricultural property. 3. NO. - P.D. 27 does not su ffer any constitutional infirmity. It is a judicial fact that has been repeatedl

y emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in De Chavez v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and upheld as part and parce l of the law of the land, viz.: "There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised Constitution itself. Eje ctment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our du ty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardin al postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is a lso because any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basi c aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuati ng the misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as well as the grave social p roblems thereby created. There can be no justification for any other decision th en whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental policy goals." - Th ereafter, in Gonzales v. Estrella, which incidentally involves private responden t and counsel in the case at bench, the Court emphatically declared that "Presid ential Decree No. 27 has survived the test of constitutionality." - Then, in 198 2, P.D. 27, once again, was stamped with judicial imprimatur in Association of R ice & Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Counci l. - Further, in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec retary of Agrarian Reform, involving the constitutionality of P.D. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. 6657, any other assault on the validity of P.D. 27 was ul timately foreclosed when it was declared therein that R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitu tional objections raised in the herein petition. - The objection that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional as it sets limitations on the judicial prerogative of determini ng just compensation is bereft of merit. P.D. 27 provides: "For the purpose of d etermining the cost of the land to be transferred to the tenantfarmer pursuant t o this Decree, the value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one half (2 ) times the average harvest of three normal crop years immediately preceding the promulgation of this Decree;" - E.O. 228 supplemented such provision, viz.: "SEC . 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by P.D. 27 shall b e based on the average gross production determined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production in accordance with Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973 and related issuances and regulation of the Department of Agrarian Refo rm. The average gross production per hectare shall be multiplied by two and a ha lf (2.5), the product of which shall be multiplied by Thirty Five Pesos (P35.00) , the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay on October 21, 1972, or Thirty One Pesos (P31.00), the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on October 21, 1972, and the

amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining its cost to the farmer and compensation to th e landowner." - The determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like i n Section 16 (d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or conclusive. This is evident from the succeeding paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228: "x x x In the event of dispute with the landowner regarding the amount of lease rental paid b y the farmer beneficiary, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Barangay Com mittee on Land Production concerned shall resolve the dispute within thirty (30) days from its submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform Memorandum C ircular No. 26, series of 1973, and other pertinent issuances. In the event a pa rty questions in court the resolution of the dispute, the landowners compensation shall still be processed for payment and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust Department of the Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of Sect ion 5 hereof, pending the resolution of the dispute before the court." - Clearly therefrom, unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the par ties may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. - Fin ally, the Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law operate s distinctly from P.D. 27. R.A. 6657 covers all public and private agricultural land including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture as prov ided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229; while, P.D. 27 cov ers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which provides for the mechani sm of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically states: (P)resident ial Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to operate with respect to rice an d corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that R. A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in any way, P.D. 27. And whatever provision s of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A. 6657 shall be suppletory to the latter, and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 are retained even with the passage of R.A. 6657. Decision Petitions GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. ROXAS AND CO. V COURT OF APPEALS PUNO; December 17, 1999 FACTS - Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA Three haciendas (Palico, Banilad, Caylaway) in Nasugbu, Bats is owned by Roxas a nd Co., a domestic corp. - President Aquino signed Proclamation No. 131 and EO 2 29 for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. - Congress passed RA 6657 (Compr ehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL). This was signed by Pres. Aquino. - Roxas and Co. filed w/ DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway. Haciendas Pali co and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordan ce w/ CARL. PALICO AND BANILAD For Haciendas Palico and Banilad, the Municipal A grarian Reform Officer (MARO) sent notices Invitation to Parties to Roxas and Co . through Mr. Jaime Pimentel, Hacienda Administrator. This was to discuss the re sults of DAR investigation of Haciendas. The reports recommended that the hacien das be subject to compulsory acquisition. DAR, through its Secretary, sent Notic es of Acquisition. - Whether they accept or reject this offer, they must inform Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution. In case of rejection or failure to reply, DAR conducts administrative proceedings to determine just compensation of the land. In case of acceptance or if compensation has already been deposited, DAR takes immediate possession of the land. - Bec petitioner rejected, DAR sent to Landbank a Request to Open Trust Account in favor of petitioner for its compe nsation. - Petitioner applied w/ DAR for conversion of Palico and Banilad fr agr icultural to non-agri lands. Despite this application, DAR proceeded w/ acquisit ion of the haciendas. - The Landbank trust accounts for compensation were replac ed by DAR with cash and Landbank bonds. - DAR registered Certificate of Land Own ership Award (CLOAs) and distributed them to farmer beneficiaries. CAYLAWAY - Th is hacienda was voluntarily offered for sale to the govt. DAR accepted the petiti oners voluntary offer and sent Notice of Acquisition. - However, Roxas and Co. Pr esident sent letter to DAR withdrawing voluntary offer for sale (VOS) bec Sanggu

niang Bayan of Nasugbu reclassified Caylaway fr agri to non-agri land. - DAR sai d reclassification would not exempt the land fr agrarian reform. It denied the w ithdrawal of the VOS. - Petitioner instituted case w/ DAR Adjudication Board (DA RAB) for cancellation of the CLOAs bec Nasugbu is a tourist zone and not suitabl e for agri production. This petition for conversion was denied by the MARO. - Pe titioner filed w/ CA, but CA dismissed the petition. Hence, the recourse to SC. ISSUES 1. WON SC can take cognizance despite failure of petitioner to exhaust ad ministrative remedies 2. WON acquisition proceedings were valid 3. WON SC can rule on reclassification of the haciendas HELD 1. Yes. - Administrative remedies must be exhausted first . But judicial action can be resorted to immediately when - question is purely l egal - the administrative body is in estoppel - act is patently illegal - theres urgent need for judicial intervention - respondent disregarded due process - the respondent is a department secretary - irreparable damage will be suffered - th eres no other speedy remedy - strong public interest is involved - subject of con troversy is private land - in quo warranto proceedings - DAR issued CLOAs w/o ju st compensation. And the law provides that deposit must be made only in cash or Landbank bonds. DARs initial action to open trust account deposits does not const itute payment. 2. No. - CARL provides for 2 modes of acquisition: compulsory and voluntary. - In compulsory acquisition, the farmer beneficiaries and the landow ners must first be identified. However, the law is silent on how identification must be made. To address this, DAR issued Admin Order 12-1989. This was amended by DAR AO 9-1990 and DAR AO 1-1993. In these amendments, Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to conference meeting were expanded. - The Notice of Covera ge notifies landowner that his property is placed under CARP, informs him that a public hearing will be conducted and a field investigation of the land will be conducted. - Notices and pleadings against a corp are served on the President, M anager, Secretary, Cashier or agent or directors. This is to ensure prompt and p roper notice. Jaime Pimentel is not one of these parties. - Petitioners principal place of business is in Makati. Pimentel is based in Nasugbu. - Assuming that P imentel was an agent of the corp, there is no showing that he was duly authorize d to attend the conference meeting. Assuming petitioner was duly notified, the a reas subject to CARP were not properly identified before they were taken over by DAR. The acquisition covers only portions, not the entire haciendas. The hacien das are not entirely agri lands. Petitioner had no idea which portion was subjec t to compulsory acquisition. This is important bec petitioner can exercise right to retention choose to retain not more than 5 hectares out of the total area su bject to CARP. - With respect to Caylaway, notices were not deemed received by t he petitioner. 3. No.

- DARs failure to observe due process in acquisition does not ipso facto give SC power to adjudicate on application for conversion from agri to non-agri land. Its DARs job. - Guiding principle in land use conversion is to preserve prime agri l ands for food production while recognizing need of other sectors for land. CARL promotes social justice, industrialization, and optimum use of land. - Land use manner of utilization of land incl. allocation, devt and mgmt. - Land use conver sion requires field investigation. - Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not w arrant SC to arrogate authority to resolve controversy jurisdiction over w/c is initially lodged w/ an administrative body. Here, DAR must be given chance to co rrect its procedural lapses. Decision Petition is remanded to DAR for proper acq uisition proceedings and determination of petitioners application for conversion. SEPARATE OPINION MELO [concur and dissent] - PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Bats as tourist zone, has force and effect of law unless repealed. It cannot be disregarded by DAR. YNARES-SANTIAGO dissent] [concurr and - If acts of DAR are patently illegal and rights of party are violated, the wron g decisions of DAR should be reversed and set aside. CLOAs do not have nature of Torrens Title and administrative cancellation of title is sufficient to invalid ate them. ART XIV: EDUCATION UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS V COURT OF APPEALS AND ARIOKASWAM Y WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE MENDOZA; August 31, 1999 FACTS - Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is an Indian citizen taking her doct oral program in Anthropology at the University of the Philippines. To complete t he doctoral program she was required to pass a dissertation and she created one entitled, Tamil influences in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Ph ilippines. She defended her dissertation although prior to it Dr. Medina noted so me lifted material in the dissertation without proper acknowledgment. She got th e nod of four of the five panelist and thus was allowed to graduate because the letter coming from Dean Paz that wanted her to be temporarily struck off the lis t of candidates for graduation to clear the problems regarding her dissertation did not reach the Board of Regents on time. - Prior to the graduation, Dean Paz told Celine through a letter that she would not be granted academic clearance wi thout Celine substantiating her accusation of Drs. Diokno and Medina maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation. Celine answered by saying that the unfavorable attitude was due to some failure to include Dr. Medina in the l ist of panel members and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment. Dr. Medina an swered back and wrote that Celines dissertation contained plagiarized materials a nd that her doctorate be withdrawn. - An ad-hoc committee was formed to investig ate the charges and that the request for the withdrawal of the doctorate degree was asked of the Board of Regents. In the investigation it was found out that in at least 90 instances the dissertation included lifted materials without proper or due acknowledgment. The College Assembly therefore unanimously approved and recommended the withdrawal of the doctorate degree and forwarded it to the Unive rsity Council. The University Council approved, endorsed, and recommended the wi thdrawal to the Board of Regents. UP Diliman Chancellor Roman summoned Celine to a meeting and that she should submit her written explanation to the charges aga inst her. The Chancellor informed Celine of the charges and showed a copy of the findings of the investigating committee. A second meeting was done as well as a third one, however Celine did not attend the third meeting alleging that the Bo ard of Regents at that time already had decided her case before she was fully he

ard. Celine asked for a re-investigation and that the jurisdiction was placed on the student disciplinary tribunal in the case of dishonesty and that the withdr awal of the doctorate degree is not an authorized penalty. - A special committee was create by Chancellor Roman that investigated the case and they came out wit h the findings through all the documents and an interview of Celine. It was esta blished that at least 22 counts of documented lifting were identified that forms the 90 instances found by the College ad-hoc committee. That Celine admits of b eing guilt of the allegation of plagiarism. The Board of Regents decided to with draw the doctorate degree. Celine requested an audience with the Board of Regent s and a reinvestigation which was denied. - Thus this case, a petition for manda mus and a prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction and damages was filed. Trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit while Court of Appea ls reversed and ordered the restoration of the degree. ISSUES 1. WON the writ of Mandamus is applicable in this situation 2. WON THE withdrawal of the doctoral degree can be done by the University 3. WON there was a denial of due process HE LD 1. No, a writ of Mandamus is not available to restrain an institution of high er learning from the exercise of its academic freedom that is a constitutional r ight 2. Yes, because Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, boar d or person to do the act required to be done when it or s/he unlawfully neglect s the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulti ng from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the us e and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there bein g no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of a law. It coul d not be invoked against the academic freedom of the school as academic freedom as a Constitutional right (Article XIV Section 5 (2)) gives a wide sphere of aut hority over the choice of students. This entails as well that it can also determ ine who would have the distinction of being a graduate of the school. If the Uni versity discovers that the honor and distinction was obtained through fraud it h as the right to revoke or withdraw such distinction. The actions of the Universi ty through the Board of Regents is to protect academic integrity by withdrawing her academic degree that she obtained through fraud. 3. No, Due process was done as there were several investigations done by the school starting from the colle ge to the Board of Regents. She was also invited in the investigation to clear u p her name. However, the actual admission and the clear plagiarism of her source s proved that indeed she committed the offense. Her demand for the Student Tribu nal to decide her case is untenable, as it is obvious that such case is useless for the penalty it gives is suspension. Celine in not in the ambit of disciplina ry powers of the UP anymore. MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION V COURT OF APPEALS KAPUNAN; December 15, 2000 FACTS -PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Vol. 41, No. 14, or the September-October 1994 issue of Miriam Colleges school pa per Chi-Rho entitled Libog at Iba Pang Tula was odiously received by the MCHS

community, calling it obscene, indecent and devoid of all moral values among other thi ngs. -an excerpt written by Mr. Gomez, who wrote the foreword (Foreplay) reads: ma y mga palangganang nakatiwangwang mga putang bikay na sa gitna di na puwedeng pagl abhan di na maaring pagbabaran -several other poems and stories are contained w/ th e theme sekswalidad at ibat ibang karanasan nito -ff the publication of the paper, Dr. Sevilla, Chair of the MC Discipline Committee wrote a letter to the editoria l board, informing them of the complaints filed against their publication by the Miriam Community, along with the alleged school regulations violated, and requi ring the board to submit a written statement in answer to the charges. -the stud ents requested to transfer the case to DECS, w/c under Rule 7 of DECS order no. 94, has jurisdiction -the students atty., Ricardo Velmonte, contends that for act ions committed w/in their capacity as campus journalists, what applies is RA 707 9 (The Campus Journalism Act) and not committee regulations -the committee proce eded w/ its investigation ex parte, suspending 5 students, expelling 3, dismissi ng 2 and withholding graduation privileges of 1 student -these students thus fil ed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order before the RTC of QC, questioning the Discipline Boards jurisdi ction -the RTC denied the prayer for a TRO and held that nothing in the DECS Ord er No. 94 excludes school Admin from exercising jurisdiction and that it cannot delimit the jurisdiction of schools over disciplinary cases -the students then f iled a Supplemental Petition and Motion for Reconsideration after w/c the RTC gran ted the writ for preliminary injunction (against expulsion and dismissal) so as not to render the issues moot -both parties moved for reconsideration after w/c the RTC recalled the issues and dismissed the case -the RTC referred the case to the CA for disposition w/c issued a resolution requiring the respondents to sho w cause why no preliminary injunction should be issued, and issued a TRO (agains t the dismissals/suspensions) -the CA granted the students petition, declaring th e RTC order and the dismissals/suspensions as void -hence this present petition by Miriam College ISSUES 1. WON the case has been rendered moot 2. WON the TC ha s jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari by the students 3. WON M iriam had jurisdiction over the complaints against the students HELD 1. NO. Peti tioner asserts that the case is moot since more than 1 year had passed since the court issued the TRO. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of a proceeding prior to t he judgment of a final order to preserve the status quo of things until the meri ts of the case can be heard and persists until issuance of a final injunction. A TRO on the other hand preserves the status quo until the hearing of the applica tion of the preliminary injunction. In the instant case, no such preliminary inj unction was issued, hence the TRO automatically expired (BP 224, TRO expires aft er 20 days if judge takes no action on application of preliminary injunction). T he CA erred in assuming its order was complied w/ by Miriam; it cant be said that the students had graduated w/in that short span of time. Miriam also allegedly refused the students readmission, and so actual controversy still existed. Since the RTC had set aside all previous orders, it allowed the dismissals and suspen sions to remain in force. 2. YES. RA 7079 includes a certain S4 which states tha t the editorial board of a school publication is free to determine its editorial policies; S7 of the same act provides that a ..a student shall not be expelled o r suspended solely on the basis of articles he/she has written orperformance of h is/her duties. S9 mandates DECS to promulgate the rules and regulations for the act , as embodied by DECS Order No. 94, series of 1992 which under Rule 12 provides that DECS regional office shall have original jurisdiction over cases as a result of the decisions, actions and policies of the editorial board of a school w/in i ts area of administrative responsibility. When the Discipline Board imposed the sanctions on the students, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition raising the ff grounds: (1) the Discipline Board had no jurisdiction over the ca se (2) the Board did not have the qualities of an impartial and neutral arbiter, w/c would deny the students their right to due process. The issues thus raised were purely legal in nature and well within the jurisdiction of the TC to determ ine. The TC had the duty to render a decision for a case w/in its jurisdiction a

nd should have settled the issues before dismissing the case. 3. YES. A14 S5(2) of the Constitution guarantees all institution of higher learning academic freed om w/c includes the right of the school to decide for itself how best to attain it: (1) who may teach (2) what may be taught (3) how it shall be taught (4) who may be admitted to study -how it shall be taught certainly encompasses the right o f the school to discipline its students. what may be taught embodies the Constitut ional obligation to instill discipline in students, stated in A14 S3(2) -who may be admitted to study clearly provides the school w/ the right to determine whom t o expel A14 S4(1) merely recognizes the States power to regulate and supervise ed ucational institutions, not deprive them of their rights -In several cases, the Court has upheld the rights of students to free speech in school premises. -As held in Tinker v. Des Moines School District: petitioners have the right to peacable assembly and free speechthey do not shed these constit utional rights at the schoolhouse gate. A students rights extend beyond class hou rs, and he/she may express even controversial subjects on school grounds -howeve r, free speech is not absolute and students lose immunity when conduct by the stu dentdisrupts class work or involvesinvasion of the rights of others. -provisions of RA 7079 should be construed alongside the provisions of the Constitution. Consi stent w/ jurisprudence, S7 of RA 7079 should be read to mean that the school cant suspend/expel a student on the sole basis of articles he/she has written, excep t when such articles materially disrupt class work orinvades the rights of others . - From the foregoing, it is evident that Miriam College has jurisdiction over the complaints against the students, as the power to investigate is an adjunct o f its power to suspend or expel students. It is a necessary corollary to its enf orcement of rules and regulations, w/c is inherently granted by the Constitution . The court therefore rules that MC has the authority to hear and decide the cas es filed against respondent students. CAMACHO V CORESIS QUISUMBING; August 22, 2002 FACTS - The Case: Special civil action for certiorari against the graft investig ator in the Office of the Ombudsman, Atty. Jovito Coresis Jr., in dismissing the administrative and criminal complaints against private respondents. - In June 1 995, Petitioner Manuel Camacho, the Dean of the College of Education of the Univ ersity of Southeastern Philippines (USP) received complaints from several doctor al students regarding a class held by respondent Dr. Daleon during the 1st sem. of SY 19941995. The complaints were that there were ghost students in Dr. Daleons c lass, namely respondents Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba and Norma Tecson, who were given grades of 1.0, 1.5, and 1.25 respectively, despite their failure to attend regular classes. - June 13, 1995, petitioner requested respondent Daleon to fur nish copies of exams, term papers, records of attendance, which respondent ignor ed. The matter was raised in a university council meeting and a committee was cr eated to investigate the complaint. Dr. Daleon admitted that he made special arr angements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding their course without petitioners approval. - Petitioner recommended to Dr. Prantilla (the University Pres) that Agulo, Alaba, and Tecson be required to attend regular classes and comply with t he course requirements. Dr. Prantilla approved the

recommendation; however, he also entertained an appeal by Agulo to validate the grades given to them. The BoR upheld the grades and consequently, petitioner fil ed an administrative complaint against Dr. Daleon, as well as criminal complaint s against Dr. Daleon, Agulo, Alaba, Tecson, and members of the USP BoR including Dr. Prantilla for violating R.A. 3019 and/or such other penal laws to the Offic e of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. Said office ordered respondents to desist from furt her proceedings to consolidate the administrative complaint with the criminal co mplaint. - On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr. , the graft investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, and approved b y Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. It dismissed both complaints upon finding insuffici ent evidence to hold Dr. Daleon liable for the administrative charges as well as finding no prima facie violation for the criminal complaint. Petitioner moved f or reconsideration and was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the case was brought before the Supreme Court. ISSUE WON public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction (in exonerating Dr. Daleon from ad ministrative as well as criminal liability arising from his giving passing grade s to Agulo, Tecson, and Alaba without requiring them to attend classes). HELD Absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the Courts power of judicial review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may not be invoked. Reasoning 1. From the records, the re is no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold respondent Office of grave abuse of discretion because the conclusions in its assailed Resolution are based on s ubstantial evidence easily verifiable. Well established is the principle that fa ctual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and eve n finality by this Court, provided such findings are supported by substantial ev idence. Daleon had the authority to modify the rule on attendance without seeking permis sion of petitioner. 3. Dr. Daleons teaching style had support of the members of t he Board of Regents (BoR), the body with the authority to formulate university p olicies, fully knowing the policy on attendance of students in the graduate scho ol. In passing its resolution, they not only validated the grades given by Daleo n, they also gave an imprimatur on the propriety, regularity and acceptability o f Dr. Daleons instructional approach. 4. Dr. Daleons teaching style, validated by the USP BoR, is bolstered by the constit utional guarantee on academic freedom. Academic freedom is two-tiered - that of the academic institution and the teachers. As was held in Miriam College v. CA, In stitutional freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for it self, its aims and objectives and the methods on how best to attain them, free f rom interference or outside coercion except when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It includes the freedom to determine for itself: who may te ach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to stud y. It was said in Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation that, Academic free dom also accords a faculty member the right to pursue his studies in his particu lar specialty. Applied to the case at bar, academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon wi th the widest latitude to innovate and experiment on the method of teaching whic h is most fitting to his students, subject only to the rules and policies of the university. Consider that the BoR, whose task is to lay down school rules and p olicies, has validated his teaching, there can be no reason for petitioner to co mplain before the Court simply because he holds a contrary opinion on the matter . Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Resolution of Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao is affirmed. Voting Concurred with by JJs: Bellosillo, Mendoz a, and Corona namely: that "her frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class," is not valid grou nd for expulsion - Respondent, on the other hand, contended that petitioner was

admitted, not to a degree program but merely to take some courses for credit, si nce admission to a degree requires acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Gradu ate School of Ateneo de Manila University (as opposed to, the Loyola School of T heology), and no such acceptance was given. - Further, that respondent, being an "institute of higher learning" has the "academic freedom" to discretion whether to admit or continue admitting any particular student considering not only acad emic or intellectual standards but also other factors. - Finally that there is n o "clear duty" to admit petitioner since the School of Theology is a seminary fo r the priesthood and petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman. ISSUES Procedural 1. WON a mand amus proceeding is proper in the case at bar Substantive 2. WON respondent is de emed possessed of a right to continued admission to the Loyola School of Theolog y. 3. WON her expulsion was based on reasonable grounds (therefore, not aribtrar y). HELD 1. Mandamus shall not lie absent a showing that there is a clear legal right on her part and a clear duty on respondents part to so admit her. - What a student possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore sat isfy the prime an indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding. 2. Autonomy recognized by the Constitution: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." - Although "academic freedom" is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to publish his findings and thoughts without fear of retribution, the reference given by the constitution of "institutions of high er learning," show that the school or college itself is possessed of such a righ t. - J. Frankfurter: "four essential freedoms" - determine for itself who may te ach, what may taught, how, and who may be admitted to study - Universities, unli ke public utitlities, have discretion as to whom to admit or reject. 3. Denied n ot only on general principle, but also in view of the character of the particula r educational institution involved. It is a seminary for the priesthood. Therefo re, at most, she can lay claim to a privilege, no duty being cast on respondent school. 5. 2. Public respondent anchored his decision on Art. 140 of the University Code which provides that the rules on attendance of students shall be enforced in all clas ses subject to the modification by the Dean in the case of graduate students and other courses. It is undisputed that Dr. Daleon had already been designated Off icer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Graduate School by the President of USP and was even entitled to emoluments inherent to the Dean of the Grad. School. Accordingly, a s OIC, performing the functions of the Dean of the Grad. School, Dr. GARCIA V LOYOLA THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL FERNANDO; November 28, 1975 FACTS - This is a mandamus proceeding to compel the Admission Committee of the L oyola School of Theology to allow petitioner to continue studying there. - Petit ioner alleged that she was admitted by respondent in the Summer of 1975 to pursu e graduate studies leading to an MA in Theology, but was denied readmission in t he following semester. She contended that the reason given by respondent for suc h denial,

- Decision for her expulsion was deemed best considering the interest of the sch ool as well as of the other students and her own welfare. There was nothing arbi trary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant. SEPARATE OPINION TEEHANKEE [concur] - Same points as Ponencia, plus: - A petition will be dismissed where petitioner has admittedly failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. - Questions of ad mission to the school are matters of technical and academic judgment that the co urts will not ordinarily interfere with. Only after exhaustion of administrative remedies and when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic judgment of the school faculty. MAKASIAR [dissent] - 1935 Constitution: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." VS. 1973 Constitution which broadened the scope into "All institution s of higher learning." Thus guaranteed, it is not limited to the members of the faculty nor to administrative authorities of the educational institution. It mus t also be deemed granted in favor of the student body because all three constitu te the educational institution, without any one of which the educational institu tion can neither exist nor operate. - An individual has a natural and inherent r ight to learn and develop his faculties. The Constitution provides for this in v arious provisions. The happiness and full development of the curious intellect o f the student are protected by the narrow guarantee of academic freedom and more so by the broader right of free expression, which includes free speech and pres s, and academic freedom. - No private person has the inherent right to establish and operate a school. Education is a sovereign state function; therefore, not d ifferent in this respect from commercial public utilities, whose right to exist and to operate depends upon state authority. Constitutional rights must be respe cted by the State and by enterprises authorized by the state to operate. - Nature Petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction an d restraining order to review the decision of the CA - Respondent-students (stud ents hereinafter) as then applicants to the University of the Philippines Colleg e, of Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percent in the National Med ical Admission Test (NMAT) which was the cut-off score prescribed for academic y ear 19861987 by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of January 17, 1986 as approved by the University Council (UC) on April 8,1986. - However, their scores were low er than the 90 percentile cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its me eting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year 1987-88. - Upon appeal of s ome concerned PreMed students, the Board of Regents (BOR) in its 996th resolutio n dated February 24, 1987 reverted to the NWAT cut-off score of 70 percentile. T he BOR reiterated its 996th resolution in its 997th resolution dated March 24, 1 987. - subsequently, the University General Counsel, pursuant to the instruction of the Chancellor, conducted an investigation on the students case and recomme nded inter alia the admission of all applicants obtaining a percentile I rating ranging from 70 to 90 "as a matter of right". - The Dean of the UPCM and the Fac ulty did not heed the BOR directive for them to admit the students. This prompte d the students to file a petition for mandamus with the RTC. On June 11, 1987, t he trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their admission. - St udents filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and attached thereto their letter to the UPCM Faculty. In an Order dated June 15, 1990, the RTC dismissed their ca se with prejudice. In view of this development, the UPCM Faculty held an emergen cy meeting on June 22, 1990 where it denied the appeal of the students on the gr ound that they were not qualified for admission to the UPCM. As a result, the st udents filed with the RTC a motion to reconsider its order of dismissal. On June 27, 1990, the RTC issued an order for the admission of the students to the coll ege. Whereupon, the petitioners moved to lift the ex-parte mandatory order. - Me anwhile, the BOR in its 1031st meeting dated June 28, 1990, invoking its plenary power under the Charter of the University over matters affecting university aff airs, resolved to approve the admission of the students in the interest of justi

ce and equity and to order the petitioners to admit them. 51 - Consequently, the UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct agai nst them and later, issued an Order for their Preventive Suspension. So, herein petitioners appealed to the CA but their appeal was dismissed. Motion for recons ideration was also denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE WON the BOR violated the petitioners academic freedom, and thus could validly direct the petitioners to ad mit the students to the college of medicine. HELD There is no violation of acade mic freedom when an order of BOR in upholding the admission requirement approved by the University Council (in 1986) is supportive of right of the University Co uncil to fix or approve admission requirements, against the UPCM Faculty and Dea n who changed the admission requirements approved by the University Council with out following the prescribed rules and procedures of the University. Reasoning T he method deployed was simply referring to the UP Charter or to the University C ode, and then applying the relevant provisions or rules to the case at bar. The ponencia cited the case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee , Loyola Sc hool of Theology, citing Justice Frankfurters concurring opinion in Sweezy v. N ew Hampshire , though as obiter dicta only, to strengthen the arguments in suppo rt of the ratio decidendi. First. Under the UP Charter, the power to fix the req uirements for admission to any college of the university is vested in the Univer sity Council (See. 9). The power to prescribe the courses of study is vested in the University Council subject to the approval of the Board of Regents (Sec. 9). The power to appoint the academic staff, fix their compensation, hours of servi ce and other conditions is vested in the Board of Regents [Sec. 6(e)]. The power to allocate the income among the different categories of expenditures is vested in the Board of Regents Second. Academic freedom may be asserted by the Univers ity Council or by the Board of Regents or both in so far (sic) as it relates to the functions vested in them 52 52 53 51 54 REYES V BOARD OF REGENTS OF UP MEDIALDEA; February 25, 1991 FACTS Students manifested that they never intended to question the Facultys right to academic freedom; that they believed the issue was simply on the question of obs ervance of the proper procedure in implementing admission requirements; that the y felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue the court action; that they would leave to the Faculty the determination of humanitarian consideration of t heir case; that they apologized for offending the Faculty and that they would li ke to appeal for a chance to remain in the college The individual faculty member has the freedom to pursue his studies in his parti cular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeav ors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that His conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whethe r in the political, economic, or academic establishments 53 In contrast, the Uni versity has the academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study 54 Art. XIV Sec.5 (2) of the 1987 Constitution sates that Academic free dom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

by law which are essential to institutional academic freedom The academic freedo m claimed by the faculty to have been violated by the Board of Regents when it i ssued the questioned order is related to the right of the University to fix admi ssion requirements. This right and power to fix admission requirements is clearl y vested by law in the University Council. The College Faculty was merely empowe red by the Board of Regents under Article 324 of the University Code to initiall y determine the admission requirements, subject to the approval of the Universit y Council and the President of the University. Third. When the Board of Regents retained the cut off score in the NMAT at 70th percentile (p, 161, Rollo) which was the cut off score approved by the University Council on 8 April 1986, it did not exercise the power to prescribe the entrance requirements. It merely upheld the power of the University Council under the law to fix the requirements for a dmission to the UPCM and rendered ineffective the action of the UPCM Faculty, wh ich attempted to exercise that power to increase the cut off score in NMAT to 90 percentile without the approval of the University Council and the President of the University in violation of Section 324 of the University Code (supra) which is very explicit on this matter.] Fourth. The BOR only exercised its power of go vernance and its duty in seeing to it that all the units abide with the law, uni versity rules and regulations. Fifth. Under the Constitution, the students have the right to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonabl e and equitable admission and academic requirements [Article XIV, Section 5(3)]. While it may be the UC could ratify the acts of the College regarding admission requirements, the same should be done within a reasonable time. It is to be rec alled that the controversy regarding the students admission started in 1987. It is surprising that despite petitioners insistence on the UCs jurisdiction ove r admission requirements, they did not seek recourse to it immediately. From the records, there appears to be no physical or legal hindrance to the calling for a UC meeting on the students case. To validate these resolutions at this point in time would not be fair and equitable to the students. In the span of three ye ars, they have proved their mettle by passing the academic requirements of the c ollege Therefore No. There was no violation of the petitioners academic freedom b y the BOR since the BOR only exercised its power of governance and its duty in s eeing to it that all the units abide with the law, university rules and regulati ons. Decision Petitions DISMISSED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals AFFI RMED. Voting 3 concur, no dissent, 2 took no part. MORALES V UP CHICO-NAZARIO; December 13, 2004 FACTS - According to Art. 410 of the UP Code, students who complete their course s with the following minimum weighted average grade shall be graduated with hono rs: Summa cum laude 1.20 Magna cum laude 1.45 Cum laude 1.75 - Provided that all the grades in all subjects prescribed in the curriculum, as well as subjects th at qualify as electives, shall be included in the computation of the weighted av erage grade; provided further that in cases where the electives taken are more t han those required in the program, the following procedure will be used in selec ting the electives to be included in the computation of the weighted average gra de: 1) For students who did not shift programs, consider the required number of electives in chronological order. 2) For students who shifted from one program t o another, the electives to be considered shall be selected according to the fol lowing order of priority: a. Electives taken in the program where the student is graduating will be selected in chronological order. b. Electives taken in the p revious program and acceptable as electives in the second program will be select ed in chronological order. c. Prescribed courses taken in the previous program, but qualify as electives in the second program will be selected in chronological order. - Nadine Morales transferred from UP Manila (majored in Speech Pathology ) to UP Diliman and enrolled in the European Languages undergraduate program in SY 1997-98. She was enrolled under the Plan A curriculum and chose French as her major and German as her minor. - Under Plan A, a student has to complete 141 un its with 27 being electives. - 1st semester of AY 1997-98 Morales enrolled in Ge rman 10 and German 11 where she obtained a grade of 1.0 in both subjects. - 2nd

semester of AY 1997-98 Morales changed minor to Spanish but maintained French as her major. - End of 1st semester of SY 1990-2000 Morales included in list of ca ndidates for graduation with probable honors based on the computation made by th e College of Arts and Letters of Morales GWA inclusive of her grades of 1.0 in Ge rman 10 and 11. Her GWA then was 1.725. - 2nd semester of SY 1999-2000 Morales GW A was 1.729 after obtaining an average of 1.708 in her final semester in UP, mak ing her eligible for cum laude honors. - During the assessment for graduation, s he was not granted cum laude honors because her grades in German 10 and 11 were excluded in the computation, bringing her GWA to 1.760. According to Prof. Bautista of the Dept. of European Languages, a Plan A student is required to major in a European language other than Spanish and minor in any other discipline allowed in the curriculum. o In Morales case, her major is Fren ch and her minor is Spanish so German does not fit into her curriculum. o Plan A curriculum also does not allow for free electives. Electives must be major lang uage electives taken from French courses in either literature or translation. Ge rman 10 and 11 are basic language courses and do not fall under electives as con templated in the Plan A curriculum. - Morales requested that her German 10 and 1 1 grades be included in the computation of her GWA. o Her letter was taken up on a no-name basis during the University Council meeting upon the endorsement of t he Registrar. By a vote of 207-4, the Council affirmed the decision of the CAL i n not awarding honors to Morales. o Issue was then elevated by Morales to the UP Board of Regents and it was resolved that the appeal be returned to the Univers ity Council for further consideration with full disclosure of petitioners identit y. o By a vote of 99 in favor-12 against-6 abstaining, the Council denied the aw ard of cum laude honors to Morales. o A subsequent appeal was made to the Board of Regents. This appeal was denied 9-2. - Morales filed a petition for certiorar i and mandamus before the RTC and assailed the decision of the UP Board of Regen ts as erroneous. The RTC ruled in her favor by saying that the UP Board of Regen ts greatly abused its discretion in the improper application of its academic dis cretion in interpreting Art. 410 of the UP Code. The RTC ordered that UP recompu ted Morales grades by including German 10 and 11 and confer upon her cum laude ho nors. - In the Court of Appeals: o In resolving the issue, the CA initially dete rmined whether only questions of law were involved and eventually decided that a n analysis of the facts of the cases was indispensable. o The CA ruled that the lower court violated UPs constitutionally protected right to academic freedom whe n it substituted its own interpretation of the internal rules and regulations of the University for that of the UP Board of Regents and applied the same to the case at bar. ISSUES

1. WON the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal of the RTC Order because the e ssential facts were never in dispute, the case involving only questions of law 2 . WON the RTCs interpretation of Art. 410 of the UP Code violated the academic fr eedom granted to UP as an institution of higher learning HELD 1. Yes, the appeal raises questions of law. - A question of law arises when the issue does not cal l for an examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. There is a question of fact when the do ubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion dr awn therefrom is correct is a question of law. - Both parties admitted to the fa cts. Any conclusion based on these facts would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence, but would be limited to an inquiry o f whether the law was properly applied given the state of facts of the case. Sin ce the appeal raises only questions of law, the proper mode of appeal is through a certiorari. The CA did not have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the ap peal. 2. Yes, the RTC violated the academic freedom granted to UP. Ratio deciden di: Unless there is a clear showing of arbitrary and capricious exercise of judg ment, courts may not interfere with the Universitys exclusive right to decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them (in this case, to wh om among its graduates it shall confer academic recognition based on its establi shed standards). - In University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, it was said that the discretion of schools of learning to formulate the rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation forms part of the academic freedom. Such discretion may not be disturbed much less controlled by the court s unless there is a grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. - Grave abuse of discretion involves capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivale nt to lack of jurisdiction. The power should be exercised in an arbitrary or des potic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to p erform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. - UP proceede d fairly in evaluating the situation of Morales and gave her and her parents amp le opportunity to present their side on different occasions. There is no showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness. o Deliberations were done in the University Council. A member asked whether German 10 and 11 could be counted as electives for Morale s and the Registrar responded the student was enrolled in Foreign Languages with a major in French and a minor in Spanish and German 10 and 11 are not required in the checklist. These can neither be considered as electives because electives should be non-language electives. German 10 and 11 are excess subjects. Even if Morales completed all the required subjects under the curriculum so that German 10 and 11 should be included, the Dean of the CAL said that the same rule had a pplied in the past to previous students. Applying the rules to Morales would be unfair to the other students. o Since the rule provides for an order of priority in the electives, there is an implication that not all electives may be include d in the GWA. o The Advising Committee allows students to change their majors an d minors but these shifts are not counted as part of the course with credit in t he curriculum. - The word program in Art. 410 must be interpreted in the context o f a particular curriculum. In computing the GWA, the grades of subjects prescrib ed in the curriculum and the grades of subjects that qualify as electives in the curriculum are included. - The interpretation of the required subjects or allow able electives in the curriculum should be taken in the context of the entire co urses. Morales decision to shift caused the exclusion of her grades in German 10 and 11. Besides, German 10 and 11 were excess subjects, her total units taken up in the University being 147, instead of the required 141. - Well-settled is the principle that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrati ve agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus their findings of fact in that regard ar e generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the Courts. Art. 14, Sec. 4 of

the Constitution proves that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all instituti on