Estrada v. Desierto, GR No.146740-15 and GR No.

146738, March 2, 2001

Case Summary: https://lawiqlegal.wordpress.com/2021/01/10/estrada-vs-desierto/
Facts: During the 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
Sometime in the year 2000, the following sequence of events occurred which built up the
irresistible pressure for the petitioner to resign, and these are:

 In October 2000, then Gov. Chavit Singson went on air and accused the petitioner, his
family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords;
 Sen. Teofisto Guingona delivered a privilege speech accusing the petitioner of receiving
jueteng money;
 The privilege speech was referred to the Blue Ribbon Committee for joint investigation.
House Committee on Public Order and Security decided to investigate the exposẻ of
Gov. Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Alvarez, Herrera and Defensor
spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
 Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air but petitioner strenuously held on to
his office and refused to resign. Former Presidents Aquino and Ramos called for
Estrada’s resignation. Some senior advisers of Estrada as well as a number of his
cabinet resigned from their positions.
 In December 2001, the impeachment trial started. The dramatic point of the December
hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI
Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed
the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment
agreement with their bank.
 Then Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu also took the witness stand and alleged that
petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing
charges of insider trading.
 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges
ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence
showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose
Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling and
tendered their collective resignation.
 The impeachment proceedings was postponed for an indefinite time until the House of
Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors.
 On January 18, 2000, EDSA II happened where a 10km line of people holding lighted
candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue to
the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's
resignation.
 On January 19, the petitioner informed Exec. Sec. Edgardo Angara that AFP had
defected. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he
would not be a candidate.
 On the same day, AFP and PNP announced that they are withdrawing their support to
the government. Likewise, some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant
secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts. To stem the tide of
 rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the
highly controversial second envelope.
 On January 20, negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at
Malacañang and consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice
Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA
Shrine.
 At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left
Malacañang Palace.
 Following petitioner’s exit from Malacañang, he issued the following press statement:
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of
our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the
restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of
this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me
for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead
in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
 It also appears that on the same day, the petitioner sent a letter to the House Speaker
and Senate President stating that “By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of
the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise
the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President.”
 On January 22, after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the
powers the duties of the Presidency.
 The Supreme Court issued Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC confirm the authority
given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on
January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.
 The House then passed Resolution Nos. 175 and 176 expressing their full support to the
Arroyo administration.
 On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Sen. Teofisto Guingona as her Vice-
President which was approved by the Senate and Congress.
 On February 7, Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court
is functus officio and has been terminated.
After Petitioner’s fall from pedestal power, several cases for plunder, malversation and graft and
corruption were filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Petitioner filed two petitions before this court:

1. GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term
of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted; and
2. GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable
to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as
and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.

The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed
submitted for decision.
Issues and Ruling:
1. Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question. – No.

Private respondents raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and
hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They stress that respondent Arroyo
ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th
President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has
been recognized by foreign governments.

The Court held that the cases at bar do not involve a political question and therefore falls within
the ambit of judicial scrutiny pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers of coordinate
branches of government.

Political question refers to those questions which, under our Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. It is concerned with the issues
dependent on the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.

Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A.
Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. and related cases to support their thesis that
since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo,
they present a political question. In rejecting the private respondents’ submission, the court
made a legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA
I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the
office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new
government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of
the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political
question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of
the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are
the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.

2. Whether or not the petitioner Resigned as President. – Yes.

Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.

Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took
her oath as President.

The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution
which provides:

"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the
President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In
case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the
President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President
or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.

x x x."

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered
resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14 th President of
the Public. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and
its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-
taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by
the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacañang as narrated in the Angara Diary published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. In
the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due
to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them.
Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in
the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying
the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him
in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense.

3. Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President. – No,

Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the
inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant
submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine
whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in
section 11 of article VII."

The Court ruled that the act of both houses of the Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as the
President through the resolutions passed, implicitly shows that the premise of Petitioner’s inability is
no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.

4. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. – No.

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the
respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the
impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit,
whether criminal or civil.

We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was
aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
"Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since, the Impeachment Court is
now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached
and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a
better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot
due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed
against him.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery
and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.
Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in
the same footing as any trespasser.

ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

For resolution are petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and Omnibus
Motion in G.R. No. 146738 of the Court’s Decision of March 2, 2001.

Petitioner’s arguments/ Issues:

1. He is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the Decision for adverting to
newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has
resigned.
2. His resignation was due to duress and an involuntary resignation is no resignation at all.
3. the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution in that
Congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of opinion between
a majority of the Cabinet and the President. It is also urged that the President’s judgment
that he is unable to govern temporarily which is thereafter communicated to the Speaker of
the House and the President of the Senate is the political question which this Court cannot
review.
4. He fault Congress for its various acts expressed thru resolutions which brushed off his
temporary inability to govern and President-on-leave argument. He asserts that these acts of
Congress should not be accorded any legal significance because: (1) they are post facto and
(2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied.
5. Petitioner reiterates the argument that he must be first convicted in the impeachment
proceedings before he could be criminally prosecuted.

Ruling: We find the contentions of petitioner bereft of merit.

1. In our Decision, we used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has
resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and
posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president.

All these prior events are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was
no need to cite their news accounts. The reference by the Court to certain newspapers
reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible evidence for being
hearsay. The news account only buttressed these facts as facts. For all his loud
protestations, petitioner has not singled out any of these facts as false.

Regarding the use of Angara Diary

We used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the petitioner.
Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a person’s subjective intent
from the evidence before them. The use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the
 hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by the Court
from the facts narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as
evidence.

2. We also reject the contention that petitioner’s resignation was due to duress and an
involuntary resignation is no resignation at all. [I]t has been said that, in determining
whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the element of voluntariness is
vitiated only when the resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government
action. The three-part test for such duress has been stated as involving the following
elements: (1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the other’s terms; (2) whether
circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were
the result of coercive acts of the opposite side.

In the cases at bar, petitioner had several options available to him other than
resignation. He proposed to the holding of snap elections. He transmitted to the
Congress a written declaration of temporary inability. He could not claim he was forced
to resign because immediately before he left Malacañang, he asked Secretary Angara:
"Ed, aalis na ba ako?" which implies that he still has a choice of whether or not to leave.

3. We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made the
submission in G.R. No. 146738 that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the
Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions
in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII." We sustained this submission and
held that by its many acts, Congress has already determined and dismissed the claim of
alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner. If petitioner now feels
aggrieved by the manner Congress exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to
seek redress from Congress itself. The power is conceded by the petitioner to be with
Congress and its alleged erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by this Court. The
recognition of respondent Arroyo as our de jure president made by Congress is
unquestionably a political judgment.

4. We disagree. There is nothing in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states
that the declaration by Congress of the President’s inability must always be a priori or
before the Vice-President assumes the presidency. In the cases at bar, special
consideration should be given to the fact that the events which led to the resignation of
the petitioner happened at express speed and culminated on a Saturday. Congress was
then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on petitioner’s letter
claiming inability to govern.

5. A plain reading of the provision will not yield this conclusion. The provision conveys two
uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us that judgment in impeachment cases has a limited
reach . . . i.e., it cannot extend further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, and second, it tells us the
consequence of the limited reach of a judgment in impeachment proceedings
considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted shall still be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law. No amount of manipulation will justify
petitioner’s non sequitur submission that the provision requires that his conviction in the
impeachment proceedings is a condition sine qua non to his prosecution, trial and
punishment for the offenses he is now facing before the respondent Ombudsman.

Likewise, Petitioner failed to show that the postponement of the impeachment

proceedings was unjustified, much less that it was for an unreasonable length of time.
Recalling the facts, on January 17, 2001, the impeachment proceeding was suspended
until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue on the resignation of
the public prosecutors. This was justified and understandable for an impeachment
proceeding without a panel of prosecutors is a mockery of the impeachment process.
However, three (3) days from the suspension or January 20, 2001, petitioner’s
resignation supervened. With the sudden turn of events, the impeachment court became
functus officio and the proceedings were therefore terminated. By no stretch of the
imagination can the four-day period from the time the impeachment proceeding was
suspended to the day petitioner resigned, constitute an unreasonable period of delay
violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial.

Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or termination of the
case without the express consent of the accused. We reiterate that the impeachment
proceeding was closed only after the petitioner had resigned from the presidency,
thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio. By resigning from the
presidency, petitioner more than consented to the termination of the impeachment case
against him, for he brought about the termination of the impeachment proceedings. We
have consistently ruled that when the dismissal or termination of the case is made at the
instance of the accused, there is no double jeopardy.