CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 2019 CASE DIGESTS

LECTURE 2

ARTICLE VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

1) Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660

FACTS

The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty
by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the
reservation.

The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by
the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by
the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With
the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in
the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

ISSUE

Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head,
therefore making it unconstitutional?

RULING
NO.
The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be
exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.

In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can
be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official.
The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing
tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.

In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon
the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial
governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better
qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”.
As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants,
they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state.

Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

2) SEC v. Interport, 567 SCRA 354

FACTS

The Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with GHB(Ganda

Holdings Berhad). Under said memorandum of agreement, RC acquired100% of the entire
capital stock of GEHI (Ganda Energy Holdings Inc.) which would own and operate a 102
megawatt gas turbine power generating barge.In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the
expanded capital stock of IRC.

On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital of PRCI (Philippine Racing Club).- It is
alleged herein that a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent to the
Philippine Stock Exchange through facsimile and the SEC, but the facsimile machine of the
SEC could not receive it. However, the SEC received reports that the IRC failed to make timely
public disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, heavily traded IRC
shares utilizing this material insider information.

For this reason, the SEC required the directors to appear before the SEC to explain the alleged
failure to disclose material information as required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts.
Unsatisfied with the explanation, the SEC issued an order finding that the IRC violated the
Rules in connection with the then Old Securities Act when it failed to make timely disclosures of
its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the SEC found that the directors of IRC entered into
transactions involving IRC shares in violation of the Revised Securities Act.

Respondents, however, questioned the authority of the SEC to investigate on said matter since
according to PD 902-A, jurisdiction upon the matter was conferred upon the PED (Prosecution
and Enforcement Department) of the SEC – however, this issue is already moot since pending
the disposition of the case, the Securities Regulation Code was passed thereby effectively
repealing PD 902-A and abolishing the PED. They also contended that their right to due process
was violated when the SEC required them to appear before the SEC to show cause why
sanctions should not be imposed upon them since such requirement shifted the burden of proof
to respondents. The case reached the CA and said court ruled in favor of the respondents and
effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or administrative cases against
respondents. In its resolution, the CA stated that since there are no rules and regulations
implementing the rules regarding DISCLOSURE, INSIDER TRADING OR ANY OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED SECURITIES ACT, the SEC has no statutory authority to file
any suit against respondents. The CA, therefore, prohibited the SEC from taking cognizance or
initiating any action against the respondents for the alleged violations of the Revised Securities
Act.

ISSUE

Whether or not the SEC has authority to file suit against respondents for violations of the
Revised Securities Act.

RULING

YES.

Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act do not require the enactment of
implementing rules to make them binding and effective.

The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any implementing rules for Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act, no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had against
the respondents without violating their right to due process and equal protection, citing as its
basis the case Yick Wo v. Hopkins.26 This is untenable.

In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may concern Sections 30 and
36 of the Revised Securities Act, this Court upholds these provisions as legal and binding. It is
well settled that every law has in its favor the presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific
provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all
intents and purposes.27 The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate
provisions of law, where a reasonable construction that will support the law may be given. In
People v. Rosenthal,28 this Court ruled that:

In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be held
invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will
support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground
that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of
common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities
necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith." (25 R.C.L., pp.
810, 811)

In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,29 the Court underlined the importance of the presumption of
validity of laws and the careful consideration with which the judiciary strikes down as invalid acts
of the legislature:

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the
acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to
the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines,
a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally enacted.

The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and regulations is
based on the impracticability of lawmakers' providing general regulations for various and varying
details of management.30 To rule that the absence of implementing rules can render ineffective
an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the administrative
bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules. To assert that a law is
less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature
of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of
affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know.31 It is well established
that administrative authorities have the power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement
a given statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations conform to the
terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into effect its general
policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and regulations cannot assert for
themselves a more extensive prerogative or deviate from the mandate of the statute.32
Moreover, where the statute contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the
case of Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no impediment to its
implementation.

The reliance placed by the Court of Appeals in Yick Wo v. Hopkins33 shows a glaring error. In
the cited case, this Court found unconstitutional an ordinance which gave the board of
supervisors authority to refuse permission to carry on laundries located in buildings that were
not made of brick and stone, because it violated the equal protection clause and was highly
discriminatory and hostile to Chinese residents and not because the standards provided therein
were vague or ambiguous.

This Court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act, such that the acts proscribed and/or required would not be understood by a
person of ordinary intelligence.

3) Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 1

FACTS

The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974,
reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious
accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles
along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching
motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have
been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas],
the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No.
207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and
devices.

President Marcos instructed that the Land transportation Commissioner shall require every
motor vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair
of a reflectorized early warning device, of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The
Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are
appropriate to effectively implement this order.

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035,
already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and
aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies
mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229 as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission, alleged that said
Letter of Instruction No. 229 "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police
power." For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society." He
contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public.”

ISSUE

W/N Letter of Instruction No. 229 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative
Order No. 1 violates the provisions and delegation of police power.
RULING

NO.
The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is
equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to
acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the
temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta
sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard,
which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays
down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is
to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied.
If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to
be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought
to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the
recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the
Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to
adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated
is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the
hands of Congress being assumed.

4) Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328

FACTS

San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, is
considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region. Fishing
method used here is trawl which, on account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the
operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there
arose a general clamor among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the
operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay.
In response to the clamor, the President issued EO 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San
Miguel Bay, and the EO 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22.
A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for injunction
and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila,
docketed as Civil Case No. 24867, praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to
restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from
enforcing said executive order; to declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as
may be just and equitable in the premises.

CFI declared that EO 22, 66, and 80 are invalid.

ISSUE

1. Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Orders Nos.
22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay,
2. Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was
not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.

RULING

Trawl is a fishing net made in the form of a bag with the mouth kept open by a device the whole
affair being towed, dragged, trailed or trawled on the bottom of the sea to capture demersal,
ground or bottom species

1. YES.
In the Fisheries Act, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has authority to
regulate or ban the fishing by trawl which, it is claimed, obnoxious for it carries away fish eggs
and fry's which should be preserved. Can the President of the Philippines exercise that same
power and authority? Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines prescribes:
SEC. 10 (1). The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, exercises general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law,
and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:
SEC. 63. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION. — Administrative acts
and commands of the President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of
operation of the Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions, parts or
ports of the Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the general performance of
duties by public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall be made in executive
orders.
Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code also provides that:
All executive functions of the government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly
under the Executive Departments subject to the supervision and control of the President of the
Philippines in matters of general policy.
One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and Natural Resources which by law is
placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions subject to
the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines (Sec. 75, R. A. C.).
Moreover, "executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under
the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned
by law to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition
and recommendation of the respective Department" (Sec. 79-A, R.A.C.), and there can be no
doubt that the promulgation of the questioned Executive Orders was upon the proposition and
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and that is why said
Secretary, who was and is called upon to enforce said executive Orders, was made a party
defendant in one of the cases at bar (G.R. No. L-9191).

2. YES.
The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring of authority
or discretion as to the execution of law:

Delegation of the power to legislate- involves a discretion as to what the law shall be
Conferring of authority or discretion- the authority or discretion as to its execution has to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

In the case of U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, We also held, the power to delegate - the
Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto
itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and
regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of
power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not
complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of
which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and void.
Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs
in the waters of the Philippines and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources
to provide regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself
and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The President did nothing but
show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of general
concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with law.

5) Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410

FACTS

These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
(1) candidates for public office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and
employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutor’s office
of a crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.

The challenged section reads:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the
DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among
others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening
test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and
with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test
as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the
risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall
be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to
the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxx xxx xxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo
a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject
to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator
and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend
or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator?
2. Corollary, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution?

RULING
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator
2. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as unconstitutional.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. It unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified
illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for
senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator-elect.

The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing
COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under
the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as
getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the
drug-testing requirement.

Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations.
As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on
legislative power in the following wise: “Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional
governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of
each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or
the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied
from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the
waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.”
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in
the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing
the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.

6) Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.

FACTS
Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and
Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and
19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for violating the
fundamental rights protected under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the Respondents, singly
and collectively, from enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.

Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government, the Executive Director of the Information Communications Technology Office, the
Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation.

Petitioners argue that Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 8, 7, 12, 19, 26 (21 sections total) of The Cybercrime
Act violate the petitioners’ constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due
process, equal protection, privacy of communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions
against double jeopardy, and the right against unreasonable searches and seizure; and that
Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the CICC the power to formulate a national
cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow under Section
26 of the Act.

ISSUE

Whether or not Sections 8 and 26 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 are constitutional.

RULING
YES.
Section 8: Section 8 provides for the penalties for the crimes punished under the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012. The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a
legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it
regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the evil sought to be
punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded
simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of another offense or
might just have been connected with another crime.77 Judges and magistrates can only
interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by
the legislative department.

The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Section 26: In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the
Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1
The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.103

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and
implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law
gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions,
training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and organization and user’s assets.104 This definition serves as the parameters
within which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.

Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to
"prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and
prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for
fast and reliable international cooperation."105 This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of
law and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard.106 Hence, Sections 24 and
26(a) are likewise valid.

7) Quezon City PTCA v. Department of Education, G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016

FACTS

On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus,
issued Department Order No. 54, Series of 20093 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing
Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School Level. Petitioner Quezon City PTCA
Federation filed the present Petition in the belief that the provisions undermine the
independence of PTAs and PTCAs, effectively amend the constitutions and by-laws of existing
PTAs and PTCAs, and violate its constitutional rights to organize and to due process, as well as
other existing laws. Petitioner assails the Department Order as an inordinate exercise of the
Department of Education’s rule-making power. Petitioner insists that the Department Order is an
invalid exercise of the rule-making power delegated to the Secretary of Education as it
supposedly disregards PTAs’ and PTCAs’ purposes, not only as partners of the Department of
Education in the implementation of programs, but also as a watchdog against "abuses,
mismanagement, inefficiency[,] and excesses of public officials within the public school system."

ISSUE

Whether or not the Department Order is constitutional.

RULING
YES.

The three powers of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—have been generally

viewed as non-delegable. However, in recognition of the exigencies that contemporary
governance must address, our legal system has recognized the validity of "subordinate
legislation," or the rule-making power of agencies tasked with the administration of government.
Administrative agencies, however, are not given unfettered power to promulgate rules. As noted
in Gerochi v. Department of Energy, two requisites must be satisfied in order that rules issued
by administrative agencies may be considered valid: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. In addition to the substantive requisites of the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test, the Administrative Code of 1987 (Administrative Code) requires the
filing of rules adopted by administrative agencies with the University of the Philippines Law
Center.

Apart from the Education Act of 1982, Book IV, Chapter 2 of the Administrative Code provides
for the rule-making power of the secretaries heading the departments that comprise the
executive branch of government:

SECTION 7. Powers and Functions of the Secretary.—The Secretary shall:

....

(4) Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient administration of the offices
under the Secretary and for proper execution of the laws relative thereto. These issuances shall
not prescribe penalties for their violation, except when expressly authorized by law;

It was pursuant to this rule-making authority that Former Secretary of Education Jesli A. Lapus
promulgated Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009. As its title denotes, the Department
Order provided revised guidelines governing PTAs at the school-level.
The Department Order does not exist in a vacuum. As underscored by the Department of
Education, the Department Order was issued "in response to increasing reports of malpractices
by officers or members of PTAs."Among these "malpractices" are those noted in a resolution
adopted by the "Regional Education Supervisors in-charge of THE [sic] Student Government
Program (SGP), selected Teachers-Advisers and the Officers of the National Federation of
Supreme Student Governments (NFSSG)" during a conference held from February 4 to 8, 2008.
This same resolution formally sought to "review and [revise] the Guidelines Governing
PTAs/PTCAs at the School Level as contained in DepED Order No. 23, s. 2003.

8) People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 628

FACTS

Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O. Oil
Company. The main objects and purposes of the company are to mine, refine, market, buy and
sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products. Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty by
the RTC in two cases of selling their shares to individuals without first obtaining the
corresponding written permit or license from the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No. 2581, commonly known as the Blue
Sky Law.

Section 2 of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation
attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character
whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various
documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.

Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that “whatever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is
satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership,
association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and
provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership,
association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership,
association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such person,
partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities
named in said certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer shall furthermore have
authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or
permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the
period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.”

The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially depended upon a promise
of future promotion and development of the oil business, rather than on actual tangible assets.
On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on the ground that it
constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular Treasurer.
ISSUE

Whether there is undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular Treasurer

RULING

NO.

The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision
regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be
issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation
applying therefor “has complied with the provisions of this Act”, and this requirement, construed
in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by
the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act 2581 have been complied with.
Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is
expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in the public interest.” In view of
the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public against “speculative schemes which
have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock infly-by-night
concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”, the
Supreme Court held that “public interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular
Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of
certificates or permits.

Also, Act 2581 allows appeal from the decision of the Treasurer to the Sec of Finance. Hence, it
cannot be contended that the Treasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence.
The maxim “delegatus non potest delegare” has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
“subordinate legislation”, in practically all modern governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the limit
and extent of the authority. While courts have undertaken to lay down general principles, the
safest is to decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the
wholesome legislative purpose intended to be achieved.
The Supreme Court upheld the assailed decision.

9) Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533

FACTS

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum
Circular No. 2 (MC 2) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

The POEA ruled in her favor. She was awarded a substantial sum of money for the death of her
husband pursuant to MC 2 which prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign
and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment as
well as stipulations on death benefits and burial for the families of overseas workers.
The Petitioner and former employer of deceased, Eastern Shipping is questioning the validity of
Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as a violation of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. It contends that the POEA had no authority to promulgate the MC No. 2; and even with
such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under
the principle, is not subject to delegation.

ISSUE

W/N Memorandum Circular No. 2 (MC 2) violates the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power.

RULING

NO.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce
it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
In the case at bar, MC 2 actually complies with the given tests. The model contract prescribed
by MC 2 has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the
employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the
model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the
exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which,
in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights
of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

Specifically, the authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder
provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what
the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the spread of specialized activities and their respective
peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the
statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide. This is given effect by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary
regulation (i.e. implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code)
These regulations have the force and effect of law.

10) Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730

FACTS
Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought
admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they
either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission
into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary
Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical
Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985
[which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance
of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with
the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April
1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the
trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as
previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with
the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 2382 offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the
undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be
followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education.

RULING:
 No. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from
and reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the
three great departments of government, must be applied with circumspection in respect of
statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and
technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our present day world.

SC held that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act:
"the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same
Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance
with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.

Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine
first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid
exercises of governmental power.

11) Viola v. Alunan, 277 SCRA 409

FACTS

Viola, as a barangay chairman, filed a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art III,
Sec.1-2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga
ng mga Barangay Officers insofar as they provide for the election of first, second, and third vice
presidents and for auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.

He contended that the questioned positions are in excess of those provided in the LGC Sec.493
which mentions as elective positions only those of the president, vice president, and five
members of the board of directors in each chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan
political subdivision, and national levels and thus the implementing rules expand the numbers in
the LGC in violation of the principle that implementing rules and regulations cannot add or
detract from the provisions of the law they are designed to implement.

ISSUE

Whether or not Sec 1-2 of the Implementing Rules are valid.

RULING

The creation of these positions was actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng
Mga Barangay, which was adopted by the First Barangay National Assembly with the proviso in
Section 1 thereof that “The Board may create such other positions as it may deem necessary
for the management of the chapter” and Section 2 thereof specifically provides that the National
Liga shall be composed of the presidents of the provincial Liga chapters, highly urbanized and
independent component city chapters, and the metropolitan chapter who shall directly elect their
respective officers, namely, a president, executive vice president; first, second, and third vice
president, auditor, secretary general; and five (5) members to constitute the Board of Directors
of the National Liga.
Furthermore, the creation of additional positions is authorized by Sec. 493 of the LGC which in
fact requires – and not merely authorizes – the board of directors to “create such other positions
as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter”. To begin with, the creation of
these positions was actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga barangay
which was adopted by the First Barangay National Assembly.

There is no undue delegation of power by Congress in this case. SC decisions have upheld the
validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish,
or merge offices in the executive management.

While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions to provide for the
needs of the chapter, the board of directors of the National Liga must be deemed to have the
power to create additional positions not only for its management but also for that of all the
chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels.
Otherwise the National Liga would be no different from the local chapters. The fact is that Sec.
493 grants the power to create positions not only to the boards of the local chapters but to the
board of the Liga at the national level as well.

12) Abakada v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1

FACTS

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition
for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A.
No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5
imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of
services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is
o authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT
rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied.
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28(2) of the Constitution.

RULING

1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments
to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income
taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions
or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is
the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.

13) Beltran v. Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA 168

FACTS

The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people
is a primordial governmental concern. The National Blood Services Act was enacted in the
exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.

What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always
easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable
basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April
2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President
Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on
August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994.

On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department
of Health (DOH). Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks – All
commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity
of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary. ” Section 23.
Process of Phasing Out. — The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood
banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the
effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study
and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.”

Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already
been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act
Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and
Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories.”

The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by
licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a
petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality
and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF

LEGISLATIVE POWER;

RULING

As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the
contention of petitioners that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is
unconstitutional because it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power.
According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the
latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance
of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted
by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7
of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative
power.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is
usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the
hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or
any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that may be
left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers
and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board
may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear
from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of
the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the
phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite
standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the
promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary
blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of
Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. The Secretary of Health
has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said
Act. Section 11 of the Act states:
'SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. ' The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in
accordance with the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty (60)
days from the approval hereof

This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative body's
authority and expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order No.9, series of 1995 or
the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative Order. No. 9
effectively filled in the details of the law for its proper implementation.

Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for
commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 'based on
the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety. This
power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a
period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction
between the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said
phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2 thereof:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared the
policy of the state:

a) to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill
public consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act;

b) to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a
medical service and not a sale of commodity;
c) to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of blood supply
and blood products;

d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to curb the hazards
caused by the commercial sale of blood;

e) to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the existing
health subjects of the formal education system in all public and private schools as well as the
non-formal system;

f) to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms for voluntary

and non-profit collection of blood;
g) to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a National Blood
Transfusion Service Network in order to rationalize and improve the provision of adequate and
safe supply of blood;

h) to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary blood

donation and providing non-profit blood services, either through a system of reimbursement for
costs from patients who can afford to pay, or donations from governmental and non-
governmental entities;

i) to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to operate on a non-
profit basis;

j) to establish scientific and professional standards for the operation of blood

collection units and blood banks/centers in the Philippines;

k) to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the collection, storage
and banking of blood; and,

l) to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include preventive services and

education to control the spread of blood transfusion transmissible diseases.

14) Abakada v. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251

FACTS

Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of
RA 9335, which a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards
and incentives, the law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system
should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to
the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA
9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue
targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the
President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that
it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law, when legislative function should have been deemed accomplished and
completed upon the enactment of the law. Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by
asserting that the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances
rather than violates separation of powers, as it ensures the fulfilment of the legislative policy.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the
President.

2. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of
a congressional oversight committee.

RULING

1. NO.

To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority to announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue
targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and
4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards:
“public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy
and welfare.” In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.

2. YES.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 having approved the IRR formulated
by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC on May 22, 2006, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of
implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic. Nevertheless the
Court confronted the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional.

Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily

constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in
a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch. However, to forestall the
danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the Constitution
imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its
legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and
presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited
to scrutiny and investigation.

In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based
primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection
with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class. Legislative veto is a statutory provision
requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules
and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it,
retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As
such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an
inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny
and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers.
It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution‘s diagram of power as it entrusts
to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the

law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.
Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based
on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress
arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or
any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision
that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has
already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its
members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch
charged with the implementation of the law.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations
of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The
constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is upheld.

15) Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, 242 SCRA 192

FACTS

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a TRO, where
petitioners assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
and its authority to issue the same.

Petitioner Fernandez was the Director of Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit while co-
petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Relations both at the
Central Office of CSC. While in service, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by respondents Patricia
Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr. – chairman and commissioner, respectively. The resolution
merged some of the CSC departments; it renamed other departments; basically, it reorganized
the functions and personnel assigned in some departments. Such changes were justified under
Section 17 of Book V of Executive Order 292 provides that ". . . as an independent constitutional
body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need arises.
During the general assembly of officers and employees of the CSC, Sto. Tomas expressed the
implementation of the resolution unless restrained by higher authority. Hence, Petitioners filed
this petition. During the pendency of the petition, petitioners filed for issuance of a TRO alleging
that they received office orders from CSC assigning Fernandez to Region V and de Lima to
Region III. The Court granted the TRO.
Petitioners alleged that CSC has no legal authority to issue the subject resolution. They also
argued that the resolutions effected the abolition of public offices, something which may be
done only by the same legislative authority which created those public offices in the first place.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CSC has the legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710?

RULING:
YES.

The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept petitioner’s argument. The term
"public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred
by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public.

We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term is
used in the law of public officers. It is essential to note that none of the "changes in
organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the
termination of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its
officers and employees. We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative
Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant
to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the
commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization regardless of
the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative
authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the organization,"
as the need [for such changes] arises." Assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that
legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds of changes contemplated in Resolution
No. 94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is necessary), such legislative
authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The legislative
standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out
not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration of Policies
found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which
required the Civil Service Commission as the central personnel agency of the Government [to]
establish a career service, adopt measures to promote — efficiency — [and] responsiveness . . .
in the civil service . . . and that personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the
corresponding authority to the departments, offices and agencies where such functions can be
effectively performed.

16) Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253

Background

In 1968, R.A. 5435 authorized the President of the Philippines, with the help of Commission on
Reorganization, to recognize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies,
and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and
corporations owned or controlled by it.
Purpose was to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government.

FACTS
The Congress passed the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (RA
6743) pursuant to Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution. A plebiscite was called in some
provinces which resulted in 4 provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi Tawi) in
favor of creating an autonomous region and therefore became the ARMM. The RA says that
those provinces and cities who did not vote in favor of it shall remain in their existing
administrative regions provided, however, that the President may merge the existing regions
through administrative determination.

President Cory then issued the EO containing the provinces/cities that will be “merged,”
transferring provinces from their existing region to another. The petitioners who are members of
the Congress representing legislative districts protested the Executive Order, saying that there
is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within existing
regions and restructure them to new administrative regions. The transfer of one province under
its current region to another (ex: Misamis Occidental from Region X to IX) is a form of
reorganization, an alteration of the existing structures of the government.

The RA 6743 only holds authority of the president to merge existing regions and cannot be
construed as reorganizing them.

ISSUE

W/N the power to merge administrative regions is legislative (petitioner’s stand) in character or
executive as the respondents contend

ARGUMENTS

Petitioners:
It unduly delegates power to the President to merge regions through administrative
determination or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated

Respondents:
No undue delegation but only a grant of power to fill up or provide the details of legislation
because the Congress did not have the facility to provide for them

RULING

Petition is DISMISSED.

The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the
President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power
to merge the existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial
organization of administrative regions in 1972. (RA5453)
This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the
exercise of power. Standard can be gathered or implied. Standard can be found in the same
policy underlying grant of
power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department:
“to promote simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to enable it to pursue its
programs consisted with the national goals for accelerated social and economic development.”

17) Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, 677 SCRA 408

FACTS

On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12
(E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power
to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption,...
among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to
the President.

On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13
(E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-
ODESLA a complaint affidavit[2] for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities

Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees,
namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel
Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand
Three Hundred

Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order[3] signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations
under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to

Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and
charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and
docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the

Ombudsman.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the
ordinary course of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition

ISSUES

I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE

TO CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE.

II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE

TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS.

III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO

DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.

ARGUMENTS

In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not
authorized under any existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of
the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a... new,
additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only
usurped the powers of congress to create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-
judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon the... powers of the
Ombudsman.

Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that the President went beyond the authority granted by
E.O. 292 for him to reorganize the executive department since his issuance of E.O. 13 did not
merely involve the abolition of an office but the creation of one as well.

Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which is
reserved to the Judicial Department and, by way of exception through an express grant by the
legislature, to administrative agencies. He points out that the name Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division is proof itself that the IAD-ODESLA wields quasi-judicial power.

RULING

The President has Continuing Authority... to Reorganize the Executive Department...

under E.O. 292.

Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following... actions
undertaken for such purpose:
 1. Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof
or... transferring functions from one unit to another;
2. Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and
3. Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies.

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created
within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing
"delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.

Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an

office or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the
other way around. Only Section 31(1) gives the President a... virtual freehand in dealing with the
internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as
extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of
transferring functions and offices from one unit to... another.

The Reorganization Did not Entail... the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.

The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as
the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to
the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The
reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the
ODESLA through the establishment of a third division the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has... been tasked to
discharge under E.O. 13.

The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.

A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be
pursued in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for
purposes of economy and efficiency. It appears in this case... that the streamlining of functions
within the Office of the President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind. In its
Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of eradicating
corruption in the government and... promoting economy and efficiency in the bureaucracy.
Indeed, the economic effects of the reorganization is shown by the fact that while Congress had
initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the 2010 annual budget, no
separate... or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever required after the transfer
of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions
and maintain its personnel would be sourced from the following year's appropriation for the
President's Offices under the General Appropriations Act of 2011.

Petitioner asseverates, however, that since Congress did not indicate the manner by which the
appropriation for the Office of the President was to be distributed, taking therefrom the
operational funds of the IAD-ODESLA would amount to an illegal appropriation by the President.

The contention is without legal basis.

There is no usurpation of the legislative... power to appropriate public funds.

In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to
recommend the budget necessary for the operation of the Government,.which implies that he
has the necessary authority to evaluate and determine the structure that... each government
agency in the executive department would need to operate in the most economical and efficient
manner. Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President's authority to

"direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department or agency." The
aforecited provision, often and consistently included in the general appropriations laws,
recognizes the extent of the President's power to reorganize the executive offices and...
agencies under him, which is, "even to the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for
that purpose."

And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise
given constitutional authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the
savings in other items of the appropriation for his office.

In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any funds appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which is included in
the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau...
or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IADODESLA from the total
amount appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the
necessary funds for the IADODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office
budget... without committing any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the
legislature's power to appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the existing funds
previously appropriated by Congress for his office.

The IAD-ODESLA is a fact- finding... and recommendatory body not vested... with quasi-
judicial powers.
while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and
resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of...
reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA
shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."

Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report and
recommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory
body to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases.

The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD ODESLA as his fact-finding
investigator cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the
Executive Department to ensure the enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of... the
Constitution provides:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power
in the President to conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the
executive department.

18) Arroyo v. DOJ, 681 SCRA 181

NATURE:
These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo in G.R. No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the
Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their petitions
and supplemental petitions against respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec),
the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel),
Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-
Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.

FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral
fraud and manipulation cases
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the
May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and
Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos,
GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage and
manipulating the election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1. Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However,
the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election
Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the
conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of
the Comelec.
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by
the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction

RULING

1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a
provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding
probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with
the Comelec Rules of Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that we the the court cannot
consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelec’s independence
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution

2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent

jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means
equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the
petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate
bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent
initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was
immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with
another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second
office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency
that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
others.

Petition is denied

19) La Suerte v. CA, 739 SCRA 489

FACTS
These cases involve the taxability of stemmed leaf tobacco imported and locally purchased by
cigarette manufacturers for use as raw material in the manufacture of their cigarettes. Under the
Tax Code, if it is to be exported or to be used in the manufacture of cigars, cigarettes, or other
tobacco products on which the excise tax will eventually be paid on the finished product.

La Suerte was assessed by the BIR for excise tax deficiency amounting to more than 34 million
pesos. La Suerte protested invoking the Tax Code which allows the sale of stemmed leaf
tobacco as raw material by one manufacturer directly to another without payment of the excise
tax. However, the CIR insisted that stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to excise tax "unless there
is an express grant of exemption from [the] payment of tax."

La Suerte petitioned for review before the CTA which cancelled the assessment. The CIR
appealed to the CA which reversed the CTA. The CIR invoked a revenue regulation (RR) which
limits the exemption from payment of specific tax on stemmed leaf tobacco to sales transactions
between manufacturers classified as L-7 permittees.

ISSUES

[1] Is stemmed leaf tobacco subject to excise (specific) tax?

[2] Is purchase of stemmed leaf tobacco from manufacturers who are not classified as L-7
permittees subject to tax?
[3] Is the RR valid?
[4] Is the possessor or owner, or importer or exporter, of stemmed leaf tobacco liable for the
payment of specific tax if such tobacco product is removed from the place of production without
payment of said tax?
[5] Does the imposition of excise tax on stemmed leaf tobacco under Section 141 of the 1986
Tax Code constitute double taxation, considering they are paying the specific tax on the raw
material and on the finished product in which the raw material was a part?

RULING

[1] Yes, excise taxes on domestic products shall be paid by the manufacturer or producer
before[the] removal [of those products] from the place of production." "It does not matter to what
use the article[s] subject to tax is put; the excise taxes are still due, even though the articles are
removed merely for storage in some other place and are not actually sold or consumed.

When tobacco is harvested and processed either by hand or by machine, all itsproducts
become subject to specific tax. Section 141 reveals the legislative policy to tax all forms of
manufactured tobacco — in contrast to raw tobacco leaves — including tobacco refuse or all
other tobacco which has been cut, split, twisted, or pressed and is capable of being smoked
without further industrial processing.
Stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to the specific tax under Section 141(b). It is a partially
prepared tobacco. The removal of the stem or midrib from the leaf tobacco makes the resulting
stemmed leaf tobacco a prepared or partially prepared tobacco.

Despite the differing definitions for "stemmed leaf tobacco" under revenue regulations, the onus
of proving that stemmed leaf tobacco is not subject to the specific tax lies with the cigarette
manufacturers. Taxation is the rule, exemption is the exception.

[2] Stemmed leaf tobacco transferred in bulk between cigarette manufacturers are exempt from
excise tax under the Tax Code vis-a-vis RRs.

Section 137 authorizes a tax exemption subject to the following: (1) that the stemmed leaf
tobacco is sold in bulk as raw material by one manufacturer directly to another; and (2) that the
sale or transfer has complied with the conditions prescribed by the Department of Finance.

The conditions under which stemmed leaf tobacco may be transferred from one factory to
another without prepayment of specific tax are as follows: (a) The transfer shall be under an
official L-7 invoice on which shall be entered the exact weight of the tobacco at the time of its
removal; (b) Entry shall be made in the L-7 register in the place provided on the page for
removals; and (c) Corresponding debit entry shall bemade in the L-7 register book of the factory
receiving the tobacco under the heading, "Refuse, etc.,received from the other factory," showing
the date of receipt, assessment and invoice numbers, name and address of the consignor,
formin which received, and the weight of the tobacco.

[3] Yes, valid. Under Section 3(h) of RR No. 17-67, entities that were issued by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue with an L-7 permit refer to "manufacturers of tobacco products."
Hence, the transferor and transferee of the stemmed leaf tobacco must be an L-7 tobacco
manufacturer.

The reason behind the tax exemption of stemmed leaf tobacco transferred between two
L-7 manufacturers is that the same had already been previously-taxed when acquired by
the L-7 manufacturer from dealers of tobacco. There is no new product when stemmed
leaf tobacco is transferred between two L-7 permit holders. Thus, there can be no excise
tax that will attach. The regulation, therefore, is reasonable and does not create a new
statutory right.

Moreover, although delegation is not allowed as a rule, the power to fill in the details and
manner as to the enforcement and administration of a law may be delegated to various
specialized administrative agencies.

[4] Importation of stemmed leaf tobacco not included in the exemption. The transaction
contemplated in Section 137 does not include importation of stemmed leaf tobacco for the
reason that the law uses the word "sold" to describe the transaction of transferring the raw
materials from one manufacturer to another.
[5] In this case, there is no double taxation in the prohibited sense because the specific tax is
imposed by explicit provisions of the Tax Code on two different articles or products: (1) on the
stemmed leaf tobacco; and (2) on cigar or cigarette.

20) People v. Vera 65 Phil. 56

FACTS

This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may
review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled
"The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the
application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of
Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further
action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final
judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No. 41200).

The Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction
sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years
and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with
reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation. The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the
provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of
the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19,
1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution)

To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition,
herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
his jurisdiction:

I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng
under probation for the following reason:

(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only
to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered
cities like the City of Manila.
ISSUE

Whether or not Sec. 11 of Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional? (YES)

RULING:

YES. Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

RATIO: In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it
is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left
the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
delegate of the legislature. To a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules
and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative
boards. For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as
administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their
respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect.

That a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the
legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by
proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community. The
power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated.

But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the Prohibition Act
contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves,
as we have already said, the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial
board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board
need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified
contingency. The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of
suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some
jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its
authority.

True, the statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation
of the Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the
authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they
thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or
operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the
legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be
held in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the
necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be
done under its provisions.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

21) United States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 32

FACTS

In the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila the defendant was charged within a violation
of paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs, duly published
in the Official Gazette and approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice. 1 After a demurrer
to the complaint of the lighter Maude, he was moving her and directing her movement, when
heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam,
sail, or any other external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows:

No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig
River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.

Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:

For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to
a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.

In this court, counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds:
First that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of the
Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a
law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.

By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is
authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the
ports of the Islands, and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required
to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as follows:

SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered,
and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into
effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.

SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made
and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this
Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars,
United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court;
Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section
seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by both.
ISSUE

Wheher or not Act 1136 is Constitutional. (YES)

RULING

YES. So much of the judgment of the Court of First Instance as convicts the defendant of a
violation of Acts Nos. 355 and 1235 is hereby revoked and is hereby convicted of a
misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 25 dollars, with costs of both instances. So ordered.

RATIO

The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor
regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region and each a harbor requires
peculiar use more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which,
when kept within the proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue
grant of legislative power.

The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and
319 [19 and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act
Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable
regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500.

This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question.

One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature
to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any body or authority. Where the
sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the
constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The
power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted can
not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be
developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body
for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. (Cooley's
Constitutional limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.)

This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment
acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of
another. Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8
are concerned, and is sufficient to sustain this prosecution, it is unnecessary that we should
pass on the questions discussed in the briefs as to the extend and validity of the other acts. The
reference to them in the complaint is not material, as we have frequently held that where an
offense is correctly described in the complaint an additional reference to a wrong statute is
immaterial.

22) United States v. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 608

Doctrine:
The orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officer or body issued pursuant to a
statute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not an
offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.

FACTS

The defendant was notified in writing on February 22, 1913, by a duly authorized agent of the
Director of agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico,
Pampanga Province, had been exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that
said carabaos were accordingly declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral
designated by an agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by
further order of the Director of Agriculture. It appears from the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution that the defendant fully understood that, according to the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture, he was not to remove the animals, or to permit anyone else to remove them from
the quarantine in which they had been placed. In spite, however, of all this, the carabaos were
taken from the corral by the commands of the accused and driven from place to place on his
hacienda, and were used as work animals thereon in the same manner as if they had not been
quarantined.

The contention of the accused is that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial
do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof. Hence, this appeal from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga convicting the accused of a
violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous
communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of
Agriculture.

RULING

NO.

The original information against the accused charged a violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760
committed by the accused in that he ordered and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time,
were in quarantine, to be taken from quarantine and moved from one place to another on his
hacienda. An amended information was filed. It failed, however, to specify that section of Act
No. 1760 alleged to have been violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on
the trial.

The only sections of Act No. 1760, which prohibit acts and pronounce them unlawful are 3, 4
and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. Section 3 provides, in effect, that it shall be
unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the
Philippine Islands any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous
communicable disease, or any of the effects pertaining to such animal which are liable to
introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands. Section 4 declares, substantially, that it shall
be unlawful for any reason, firm, or corporation knowingly to ship, drive or otherwise take or
transport from one island, province, municipality, township, or settlement to another any
domestic animal suffering from any dangerous communicable diseases or to expose such
animal either alive or dead on any public road or highway where it may come in contact with
other domestic animals. Section 5 provides that whenever the Secretary of the Interior shall
declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any island, province,
municipality, township, or settlement and that there is danger of spreading such disease by
shipping, driving or otherwise transporting or taking out of such island, province, municipality,
township, or settlement any class of domestic animal, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or
corporation to ship, drive or otherwise remove the kind of animals so specified from such locality
except when accompanied by a certificate issued by the authority of the Director of Agriculture
stating the number and the kind of animals to be shipped, driven, taken or transported, their
destination, manner in which they are authorized to be shipped, driven, taken, or transported,
and their brands and distinguishing marks.

A simple reading of these sections demonstrates clearly that the case at bar does not fall within
any of them. There is no question here of importation and there is no charge or proof that the
animals in question were suffering from a dangerous communicable disease or that the
Secretary of the Interior had made the declaration provided for in section 5 or that the accused
had driven or taken said animals from one island, province, municipality, township or settlement
to another. It was alleged had been exposed to a dangerous communicable disease and that
they had been placed in a corral in quarantine on the premises of the accused and that he, in
violation of the quarantine, had taken them from the corral and worked them upon the lands
adjoining. They had not been in highway nor moved from one municipality or settlement to
another. They were left upon defendant's hacienda, where they were quarantined, and there
worked by the servants of the accused.

The Solicitor-General in his brief in this court admits that the sections referred to are not
applicable to the case at bar and also admits that section 7 of the said Act is not applicable. This
section provides: "Whenever the Director of Agriculture shall order any animal placed in
quarantine in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the owner of such animal, or his agent,
shall deliver it at the place designated for the quarantine and shall provide it with proper food,
water, and attendance. Should the owner or his agent fail to comply with this requirement the
Director of Agriculture may furnish supplies and attendance needed, and the reasonable cost of
such supplies and attendance shall be collectible from the owner or his agent."
We are in accord with the opinion expressed by the Solicitor-General with respect to this
section, as we are with his opinion as to sections 3, 4, and 5. the law nowhere makes it a penal
offense to refuse to comply with the provisions of section 7, nor is the section itself so phrased
as to warrant the conclusion that it was intended to be a penal section. The section provides the
means by which the refusal of the owner to comply therewith shall be overcome and the
punishment, if we may call it punishment, which he shall receive by reason of that refusal. It has
none of the aspects of a penal provision or the form or substance of such provision. It does not
prohibit any act. It does not compel an act nor does it really punish or impose a criminal penalty.
The other sections of the law under which punishments may be inflicted are so phrased as to
make the prohibited act unlawful, and section 8 provides the punishment for any act declared
unlawful by the law.

The Solicitor-General suggests, but does not argue, that section 6 is applicable to the case at
bar. Section 6 simply authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among them,
paragraph (c) "to require that animals which are suffering from dangerous communicable
diseases or have been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time
as may be deemed by him necessary to prevent the spread of the disease." Nowhere in the law,
however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful,
nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders.

Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for
not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court,
for each offense." A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by
paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provisions of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and
particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the
statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No.
1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture

However, the accused is accordingly convicted of a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the
Penal Code, and is sentenced to pay a fine of seventy pesetas (P14) and censure, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs of this appeal. So ordered.

23) People v. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450

This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries
Commission.

Doctrine:
 The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned.

FACTS

On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura and four others, were charged by a Constabulary
investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the
morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte,
Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; and electrocuting device
locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a
bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with
the use of these devices or equipments catches fish through electric current, which destroy any
aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal
Case No. 5429).

The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it
is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The
lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive
and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.

Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in
fishing.Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous
substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five
thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years. The
Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the silence of the
law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224),
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.

On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1,
amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing
to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters"
found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water
fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other
bodies of fresh water."

The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is
punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides
that any other violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall
subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more
than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court." In this appeal, the prosecution argues
that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries
Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous
substance.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Fisheries Administrative Order 84 was within the authority of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries to promulgate.

RULING

NO.
The Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a
form of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11.

The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the
Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the
Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and
regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the
development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national
policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No.
3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the
Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the
offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both, in the discretion of the court."

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that
those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The
reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is
not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking
body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law.That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of
marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind
and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of
"other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next
lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in
section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations
fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of
the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur.
965 on p. 11 32).

Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban
against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the
impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters.
That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro
fishing.

However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the
Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because
Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees
affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269),
expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas.

The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear
recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission
that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must

be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended.
(U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress
(Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-
25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December
29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules
that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93
Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs.
Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans
Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making
powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue
instructions, orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to carry
into effect the provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural
Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704. Section 4(h)
of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and
regulations consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the development of
fisheries."

Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall
have the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders,
memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate the proper working and
harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his
Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters
under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe
penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law."

Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of
law (Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique
Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rule-
making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend
the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be
improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking
body.

In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the
Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly
punish electro fishing.

24) People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90

Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use an euphemistic phrase, of an
alternative penal sanction of imprisonment imposed by law but without a specification as to the
term or duration thereof.

As a consequence of such legislative faux pas or oversight, the petition at bar seeks to set
aside the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte penned by herein
respondent judge granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction filed by herein private respondents. Subject of said decision were the issues on
jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section 32 thereof.

FACTS
A criminal case was filed against herein private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino
A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the
Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte for violation of Republic Act No. 4670 otherwise known as the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
before the former Court of First Instance of Leyteto restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial
Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case
upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense
charged.

In an amended petition, they further alleged the additional ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said law, is
unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment,
the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the
legislative department of the Government.

Respondent judge rendered the challenged decision holding in substance that Republic Act No.
4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts, and remanding the case to the former Municipal Court of Hindang,
Leyte only for preliminary investigation.

The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:

Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall willfully interfere with, restrain or coerce
any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other
manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction,
be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand
pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied).

Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging from
P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment.

It is apparent that the law has no prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of
imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is
specified, there is no equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment, although both
appear to be qualified by the phrase "in the discretion of the court.

CONTENTIONS

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS:
Sec. 32 is unconstitutional because it is an undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as
if the latter were the legislative department of the Government

PETITIONER:
The discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to determine the period of
imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue delegation of
legislative power.
The prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power is concerned only with the
delegation of power to make laws and not to interpret the same. It is also submitted that
Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the discretion, not to fix the period of
imprisonment, but to choose which of the alternative penalties shall be imposed.

RESPONDENT JUDGE:
The principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to
the length of sentence or amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing
persons convicted of crime.
In such instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by the courts is not an attempt to use
legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the administration
of justice and the application of existing laws to the facts of particular cases.

ISSUE

Whether or not Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional

RULING

YES, SECTION 32 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Section 32 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle that legislative
power cannot be delegated:
One is the doctrine of separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the three
powers of government if they can straightway remerge on their own motion?
The second is the concept of due process of laws which precludes the transfer of regulatory
functions to private persons.
Lastly, there is the maxim of agency "Delegata potestas non potest delegari.”

An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative

authority to the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It
is clear, however, that when the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it must be a
MERE LEGAL DISCRETION which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by
law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow.
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since
the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is
endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment.

It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have
been provided by the legislature.

What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the
length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific
or designated limits provided by law, the ABSENCE OF WHICH DESIGNATED LIMITS
WELL CONSTITUTE SUCH EXERCISE AS AN UNDUE DELEGATION, if not-an outright
intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of
imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the
legislative authority.

The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment,
without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may
range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused.
Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially
legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on
separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the
presumption of constitutionality has to yield.

On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of

Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should
be, as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.

25) Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS

In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that no carabao
and carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shall be subject
to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat InspectionCommission may see
fit for the carabeef and to deserving farmers through dispersal as theDirector of Animal Industry
may see fit in the case of the carabaos.
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit,
in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty.

On January 13, 1984, Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo inviolation of EO 626-
A. He issued a writ for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of saidEO. The trial court
sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the
ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC.Hence, this petition
for review filed by Petitioner.

ISSUE

(1) Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

RULING

(1) YES. EO 626-A is unconstitutional.

To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests
of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference, and; (b) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose.

In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirements—that
is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare
and so is a lawful subject of the order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably
necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the
slaughter of carabaos except those seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance
of a permit adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and
prevention of their improvident depletion.

Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second requirement.
Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their
movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It
is not clear how the interprovincial transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more that
moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there.

Even if assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty
is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike
in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared as forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are
certain occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as summary
abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated
meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem
sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the instant case, no such
pressure is present.

The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid
delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the
NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and reasonable
guidelines that said officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found;
instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to
partiality and abuse, and even corruption.

26) Philippine Coconut v. RepublicG.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

27) Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013 (See Lecture 1)

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 5: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

1. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
2. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
3. Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.

1) Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2001

Facts: Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of
government -- the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national,
regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections
may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and
proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members.4 In effect, a
voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and another
for a party-list representative.5 Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.

Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of
party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this
statute’s policy declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. The
requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law
(RA 7941) in this wise:

"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall

constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall
be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No.

2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list
representatives through the party-list system.

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously
with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties,
organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc
proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast
for the party-list system.

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided
by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of
party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two
percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this
constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52
party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8 filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the
same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA’s Petition was joined by other party-list organizations
in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998.

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed
Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38
respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional9 seats must
be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent
party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote
requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three
"elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52
seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized
sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives."
Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society."
Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.)
Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA
7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at
least one representative.

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on
the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list
system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties,
organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list
system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats,
not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two
percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as
provided by said Section 11.

In its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority --
with three commissioners concurring11 and two members12 dissenting -- affirmed the
Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the
51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction
of manifest errors."

Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for
the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed
before this Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent
of the total votes cast for the party-list system. In the suits, made respondents together
with the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been
declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of additional
representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at
least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec "to
CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13
January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the
parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15
October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this
Court."

ISSUES:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words,
should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all
the time?

2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section
11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

RULING:
1. It is merely a ceiling.

We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys
the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define
and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution
explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said

earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in
the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit
them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions
participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes."
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats
in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law
provides:

"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-
list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
"mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to
adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.17 Our task now, as
should have been the Comelec’s, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through
highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical
formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual
election process.

Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial
agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless
declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal,
a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at
all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.

2. It is constitutional
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate
discussion:

"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point

that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmeña when he said that a political party must have
obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a
seat under the party-list system.

They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes
cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will
actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by the
people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be
able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list
system, Mr. President."

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of
Representatives, as the following shows:

"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at,
arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats
among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned
after that of the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the
Bundestag of Germany."

Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement,
the specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people,
but is exercised by representatives chosen by them.21 But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be
the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation,
and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative
districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise
and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not
interpretation or circumvention.

2) Philippine Guardians v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2009

FACTS:
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13,
2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list
of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the
party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of
the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the
COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party or
organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or through its authorized
representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.

PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its
pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization under the Party-List System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted
that:

(1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to
invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition
already registered with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is
required to file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a
manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a
Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its participation in the 2007 elections
within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether
or not to participate in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed;

(2) The Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – Philippine Mines Safety
Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections –
cannot apply in the instant controversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited
case is removed from PGBI’s; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the
opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25 others similarly affected by Resolution
No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the
Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and
the 25 other party-list is a denial of the equal protection of the laws;

(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended and/or aborted
to prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in accordance
with the same Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.

The COMELEC denied PGBI’s motion/opposition for lack of merit.

First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4
of R.A. 7941.3 The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a
party or organization does not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise
and the party, organization or coalition must go through the process again and apply for
requalification; a request for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.

Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes
in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.
Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of – the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution
No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their
opposition.

As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the
motion to have been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for
accreditation provided in Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed months after
the deadline.

PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the
COMELEC when it moved to reconsider its delisting.

The Supreme Court initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines
Safety Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections
(Minero);4 we said that no grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly
applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court
disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning:

Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not
participate at all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast in the two preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty
bound to certify it.
PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other
arguments, PGBI claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the
evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA
7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of the deliberations inclusive
of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Minero Ruling may be used as legal basis for delisting PGBI.

RULING: NO.

Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it

cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of
any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to
participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. 6 The word "or" is a disjunctive
term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies,
as a disjunctive word.7 Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.

Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA

7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the
non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner
the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list
organization that does not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less
than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law,
given the law’s clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two
scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and
separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law – in
jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of
the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.8

What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association
for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC 9 (Banat) where we partly
invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows:

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds
that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting;
these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the
disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should
now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list
seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we
declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied. We do so
under our authority to state what the law is, 10 and as an exception to the application of
the principle of stare decisis.

As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it
was clearly an erroneous application of the law – an application that the principle of
stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary
violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in
general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an
erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strike it out from our ruling case
law.

3) BANAT v. COMELEC, 586 SCRA 210

Nature: Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list
which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be
entitled to one seat;

FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in
May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to
one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,
then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6%
of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a
party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of
the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the
2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed
by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is
mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be
impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also
proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this
digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of
the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUE

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

RULING

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members
of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and
50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed
Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May
2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or
the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of
Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to

allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and
those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes
cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the
votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability
of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we
increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get
two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of
occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is
present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast,
then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering
less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the
ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum
seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats
are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off
of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-
percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-
percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17
party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-
lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for
the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second,
in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast,
and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the
remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the
additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be
observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is
7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number
of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a
two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a
total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get
3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and
there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-
lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are
occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties
(the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc)from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either
from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of
the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to
participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which
represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion,
concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the
framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the
Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the
country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.

4) Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010

FACTS

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,

bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical
and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are
immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition
was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA
7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field
personnel.
ISSUE

WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;

WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds

RULING

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for
the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is
not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of
civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement
of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest.

5) Magdalo v. COMELEC, 673 SCRA 651

FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the
COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party
based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National
and Local Elections.

COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO
where it held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in
accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that
the party’s organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members
participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati
City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel were held hostage.
This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show
their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in
the process defying the laws of organized societies.

MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En
Banc for resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution
dated 23 December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to participate in the 10 May
2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group. COMELEC En Banc denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.

ISSUE
Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for
Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals
through violent or unlawful means?

RULING
No.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: election

To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of
registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:

x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election
laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our
election laws grant to qualified registered parties.

x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or

coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for
accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the
next natural step to follow.

Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be
denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which
provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be
entitled to accreditation."

Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment
of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse
of force; that force which is employed against common right, against the laws, and
against public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law
and need not be a crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to
exist.

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP
881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to
participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this
authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking
registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or
unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does not entail
any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation of
qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless
analogously applicable.
6) Dayao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193643, January 29, 2013

FACTS
LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry players in
the LPG and energy sector. It sought to register as a party-list organization for the May
10, 2010 elections and was approved by the COMELEC.
Petitioners filed a complaint and petition before the COMELEC for the cancellation of
LPGMA’s registration as a party-list organization, arguing that LPGMA does not
represent a marginalized sector of the society because its incorporators, officers and
members are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens.
In response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
does not require that party-list representatives must be members of the marginalized
and/or underrepresented sector of the society. It also averred that the ground cited by
the petitioners is not one of those mentioned in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and that
petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to oppose the petition for
registration.
The COMELEC dismissed the complaint for two reasons. First, the ground for
cancellation cited by the petitioners is not among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6
of R.A. No. 7941. Second, the complaint is actually a belated opposition to LPGMA’s
petition for registration which has long been approved with finality. Petitioners’ motions
for reconsideration were denied.

ISSUE

1) Whether or not a belated opposition to a petition for registration bars the action of
complainants.

2) Whether or not the Constitution and the Party-List System Act (RA 7941) require that
incorporators, officers and members of a party-list must be marginalized or
underrepresented citizens.

RULING
There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation.
However, in light of COMELEC Resolution dated December 13, 2012, the present
petitions ought to be dismissed.
1) An opposition to a petition for registration is not a condition precedent to the filing of a
complaint for cancellation.
Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of
party-list accreditation, viz:
Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.
The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a
party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is
afforded to the party-list group concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated grounds for
disqualification in Section 6 exists.
2) In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 36 the Court explained that the
"laws, rules or regulations relating to elections" referred to in paragraph 5 include Section
2 of R.A. No. 7941,37 which declares the underlying policy for the law that marginalized
and underrepresented Filipino citizens become members of the House of
Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this
policy must be disqualified.
The party-list system of representation was crafted for the marginalized and
underrepresented and their alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. In fact, there is no
need to categorically mention that "those who are not marginalized and
underrepresented are disqualified."
All told, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint
for cancellation of LPGMA’s party-list accreditation. In the ordinary course of procedure,
the herein complaint should be remanded to the COMELEC. However, on August 2,
2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513 which subjected to summary
evidentiary hearings all existing and registered party-list groups, including LPGMA, to
assess their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the
guidelines set in Ang Bagong Bayani. The Resolution stated, among others, that the
registration of all non-compliant groups shall be cancelled. LPGMA submitted to a factual
and evidentiary hearing before the COMELEC and was deemed to have complied with
all requirements for registration.
7) Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R.No. 203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS

The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the
party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered
and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in
the elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.

13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The
COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of
these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution
No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to
determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to
participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).

39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot
for the elections. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all
petitions.

ISSUE
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

RULING
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However,
since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system,
thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the
COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to
participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not
exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally
be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the
party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and
underrepresented."

Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only
for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly
making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional
terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or
type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not
for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and
regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral
process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-
list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their
only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from
being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
8) Abang Lingkod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013

FACTS

ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant

farmers and fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22,
2009. It failed to obtain the number of votes needed in the May 2010 elections for a seat
in the House of Representatives.

On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC August 9,
2012 resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing
compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.

In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled ABANG

LINGKOD registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to
establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented;
that it merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May
2010 elections.

ABANG LINGKOD field a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system. The said
petition was consolidated with the separate petitions filed by 51 other party-list groups
whose registration were cancelled or who were denied registration under the party-list
system. The said party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain
status quo ante orders from the court.

The Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list
groups, including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified
under the party-list system pursuant to the new parameters laid down by the Court and,
in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.

On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, which, inter alia,
affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system.
The COMELEC issued the Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary
evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the May 13, 2013 elections as the reason
therefor. ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the COMELEC's Resolution
dated May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion
for reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition
with this Court, alleging that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass
upon the merits of its motion for reconsideration considering that the election returns
were already being canvassed and consolidated by the COMELEC.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process?
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG
LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system.

RULING

ABANG LINGKOD was not denied of due process.

Administrative due process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to

administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are
satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing.

In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court
finds that the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to
present evidence establishing its qualification as a party-list group. It was notified through
Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That
ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent
documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No.
7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates, belies its
claim that it was denied due process.

There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary
hearing to assess the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum.
ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent and all the evidence adduced by it to
establish its qualification as a party-list group are already in the possession of the
COMELEC. Thus, conducting further summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose
of determining ABANG LINGKOD's qualification under the party-list system pursuant to
Atong Paglaumwould just be a superfluity.

Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD's claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not categorically
require the COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of
determining the qualifications of the petitioners therein pursuant to the new parameters
for screening party-list groups.

Cancellation of party-list registration

R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to
submit proof of their track record as a group. The track record requirement was only
imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held that national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations seeking registration under the party-list system must prove
through their, inter alia, track record that they truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented.

In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines
on who may register under the party-list system and the representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented. For purposes of registration under the party-list
system, national or regional parties or organizations need not represent any marginalized
and underrepresented sector; that representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizations that represent the sectors
stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically
marginalized and underrepresented.

Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG

LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e.
proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they
represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals
represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s,
which they represent.

9) Lico v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205505, September 20, 2015

FACTS

Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization registered under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections. It filed with the COMELEC the list of its
nominees, with petitioner Lico as first nominee
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.
Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioner Lico subsequently
took his oath of office and thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations,
Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-
sharing agreement signed by its nominees
Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the
first year of the three-year term
Ating Koop introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient
changes was the composition of the Central Committee. The amendments likewise
mandated the holding of an election of Central Committee members within six months
after the Second NationalConvention.
In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members
(referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee.
The Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group. Almost
one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee
expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and
graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-
sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under
Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.
Rimas Group filed before COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico which prayed that
petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives
COMELEC dismissed the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the
House of Representatives and to Sanction the Immediate Succession of the Second
Nominee of ATING KOOP Party List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascarina as its Party
Representative, for lack of jurisdiction

ISSUE

Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction

RULING

NO.

We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico
from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless
proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its
purview.

The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico from
the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as party-list
representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner
Lico from the House of Representatives.

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution34 endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve
questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of
office as member of the House of Representatives.35 In this case, the COMELEC
proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he
assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

10) Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106

FACTS

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, “An Act Converting the municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”.

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the Munnicipalities of Mandaluyong and
San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent
congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which
eventually became RA 767., President Ramos signed it into law.

Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved the conversion. The turnout at the
plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes”
whereas 7, 911 voted “no”. By virtue of these results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified in
effect.

Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46 thereof, is
unconstitutional. They alleged that it contravenes the “one subject – one bill” rule which
states that every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof They also alleged that the subject law embraced two
principal subjects, namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city;
and 2. the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two
separate districts.

Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the composition of the
House of Representative beyond that provided in the Constitution. Furthermore,
petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that
the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.

ISSUE
Whether or not the number of the members of the House of Representative may
increase

RULING

YES.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The present
composition of the Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a
legislative enactment.

The provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution
clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

11) Mariano v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as
taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”).
Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by
John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.

ISSUE
Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new
corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two
executive terms as allowed by the Constitution

RULING
No. Increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in
RA No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in
paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.—

Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati
provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise
fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause
contemplates of the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the
said Section which reads in full as follows: “Within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section.” In short, the clause refers to a general
reapportionment law.

12) Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700

FACTS

The 1987 Constitution apportioned two (2) Legislative Districts to the province of
Maguindanao (which is part of the ARMM).

The first legislative district is composed of Cotabato City and 8 Municipalities, however
Cotabato City is not part of ARMM but Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in
the ARMM.

On August 28, 2006, the ARMM regional assembly (ARMM’s legislature) exercised its
power under Section 19 of RA 9504 [Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA
201)] creating the province of Shari Kabunsuan.

On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution

No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the first legislative district into its own separate province of Shari
Kabunsuan.

On March 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. (RN) 07-0407 maintaining the
status quo of Cotabato City as part of the new province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

On March 29, 2007, the COMELEC promulgated RN 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s
first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of
MMA 201

On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued RN 7902 by renaming the first legislative district
as the province of Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City.

The petitioner, Sema, was a candidate in the May 14, 2007 elections for representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City. The petitioner prayed for the nullification of the
RN 7902 and exclusion of the votes casted by the inhabitants of Cotabato City in that
office.

1. Sema contended that Shari Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in the

congress under Article 6, Section 5, paragraph 3 of the Constitution and section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The petitioner claimed that in issuing RN 7902,
the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts.

The COMELEC through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contended:

1. The Petitioner wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify RN 7902

because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its
administrative, not quasi-judicial, power

2. The writ of prohibition became moot with the proclamation of respondent

Didagen Dilangalen as representative of the legislative district of Shariff
Kabunsuan province with Cotabato City.

2.
3. The respondent (Dilangalen) countered that the petitioner is estopped from
 questioning RN 7902, since in the petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, Sema
indicated that she was seeking election as representative of the province of
Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City. The respondent added that the RN 7902 is
constitutional because it only renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district. The
respondent further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion
Maguindanao’s first legislative district to solely Cotabato City since the power of
reapportion lies exclusively with congress. Not to mention that Cotabato City does
not meet the population requirements under Article 6, Section 5, paragraph 3 of
the Constitution (at least 250,000 inhabitants).

ISSUE
Issues relating to Article VI, Section 5:

1. If the new province of Shariff Kabunsuan (created under MMA 201) is entitled to
one representative in the House of Representatives (HOR) without the need of a national
law creating a legislative district for such new province.
2. If the COMELEC resolution no. 7902 is constitutional, can the COMELEC
reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative district to solely Cotabato City.

RULING

1. As mentioned earlier, Article X, Section 20, the ARMM Regional assembly may not
create a representative district nor may it create a province, because under Article VI,
Section 5, paragraph 3 provinces automatically gets one representative district.

Each city with a population of at least two hundred and fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least have one representative in the House of Representatives. There is no
provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative
bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided section 10, Article
X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another
matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereafter be created, or
any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”

A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000
or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city
with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district
because once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes
entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a
province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

2. The court ordered the consolidation of GR 177597 and GR 178628 (If the COMELEC
act in Ultra Vires in issuing RN 7902). The petition in the latter echoed Sema’s contention
that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing RA 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato
City a representative in the HOR.

The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create
legislative districts out of existing ones.—Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution vests
in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to
create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through
a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative
bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be
increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a
national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995), we
held that the “power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of
Congress) to make laws,” and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a

legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in
Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district.

Court Ruling:
The court declared Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, the court
declared VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shari
Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

13) Herrera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 131499, November 17, 1999

FACTS

In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the
COMELEC to have the province subdivided into two provincial districts. Acting upon the
request, the Provincial Election Supervisor conducted two consultative meetings with the
provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads,
representatives of all political parties, and other interested parties. A consensus was
reached in favor of the division.
The PES then issued a memo recommending the division of the province.
Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under the Memo
Circular No. 97-1 issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department
of Finance.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan
seats to Guimaras—1st district (Buenavista and San Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district
(Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats.

The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:

1.the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.
2.the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the
province.
3.the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable.
4.there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.
ISSUE

Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing

Resolution No. 2950?

RULING

COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.

1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent.
Contiguous and adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border,
connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable distances. On its
face, the map of Guimaras shows that the municipalities grouped together are
contiguous or adjacent.
2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor. As required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested parties were
duly notified and represented.
3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang
Panlalawigan members. Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative
district shall be divided into 2 districts for purposes of electing the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras, being a 4th class province and
having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2
districts.
4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division
shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned not the number of listed or
registered voters. The districting of the Province of Guimaras was based on the official
1995 Census of Population as certified by the National Statistics Office.
14) Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53

FACTS

RA 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of
Quezon City. Petitioner Moises Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of
Quezon City, challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535 and sought to
enjoin its implementation, the holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City of
Novaliches, and the disbursement of funds for said plebiscite, on the following grounds:

a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by Sections 7, 11(a) and
450(a) of the Local Government Code, as to the requirements of income, population and
land area; seat of government; and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City,
respectively, and its Implementing Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and (2), as to
furnishing a copy of the Quezon City Council of barangay resolution; an

b) The said law will in effect amend the Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether or not the proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will result in a prohibited
amendment of the Constitution.

RULING

Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the
law passed by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the
requisites therefor.

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, we had occasion to stress that:

All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a
law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis
may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must
negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in
favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.

Every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed through regular
congressional processes. A person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his
allegations clearly and unmistakably. Having this in mind, we now proceed to examine
whether or not petitioner was able to successfully overcome the presumption of validity
accorded R.A. No. 8535.
The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited
amendment of the Constitution, contrary to petitioner’s contention. The ordinance
appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it
provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and municipalities
as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or appendix of the
Constitution will only result in its erroneous interpretation.

Clearly, from the foregoing considerations, petitioner has failed to present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality being enjoyed by R.A. No.
8535. Nor did he succeed to convince the Court with substantial and persuasive legal
reasons for us to grant the reliefs he seeks.

15) Aldaba v. COMELEC G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Facts:
May 1, 2009, RA 9591 passed into a law, amending the Malolos Charter by creating a
separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos is a contested fact
given that the house bill for this law relied on the undated certification issued by NSO
that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by year 2010 due its current population
growth rate.
Petitioners, taxpayers and registered residents of Malolos filed this petition contending
that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of
250k for a city to merit representation in Congress.
OSG contended that Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it
involves a determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to
determine compliance with constitutional requirement.

Issue: Is RA 9591 unconstitutional as the population of Malolos has not met the
population requirements set forth by the Constitution?

Ruling:
RA 9591 is unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a
legislative district, the city must have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.
[5] The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least
250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for
the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a
legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic

projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and
no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because
based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than
250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be
made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000
is entitled to have a legislative district only in the immediately following election after the
attainment of the 250,000 population.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic
projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this
case do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on
demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states
that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the requirement
that intercensal demographic projections shall be as of the middle of every year. In
addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the
NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the
absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can
be given credence by this Court.

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must
be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order
No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.

Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides:

Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase
to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on
the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in
paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

16) Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order
to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates
the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first
district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province.

HELD:
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is
entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population.
Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province

17) Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

FACTS: On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). On December 3,
2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for
the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC).
The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the
approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the
Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).

On November 10, 2006, herein petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed
the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355
for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the
people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue
Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law
was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population
of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of
Section 461 of the LGC.

On May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the
above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of
Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial
contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the
exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the
Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.

The Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after
the resolution of this case.

Movant-intervenors then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the
rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal
interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010
elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case.

On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the
decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence the above
motion. At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant
Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second
motions for reconsideration of the original parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, which states that the
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands", is valid, for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC

RULING: Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become
a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land
area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as
an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers,
Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR
and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of
Dinagat.

The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is
not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its
average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the
Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic
services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than
looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait
accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a
province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.
Ratio legisest anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute, although it
is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not
within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as
much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the
statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts
ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent
of the law and its legislators.

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a

co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in
mind: the presumption of constitutionality of statutes. This presumption finds its roots in
the tri-partite system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which
enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy
for each other’s acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its
official functions. Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of
statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the
theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to
ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed. Consequently, before a
law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such
a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.

18) Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179670, December 8, 2008

FACTS: In 2006, Cagayan de Oro Congressman Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two
legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative
districts were created. COMELEC promulgated Recolution No. 7837 implementing RA
9371. Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the
Supreme Court. Petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371
without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite
which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit. He
prayed for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from
implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead
to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district for
Cagayan de Oro. The Court didn’t grant the petitioner’s prayer for TRO thus the May 14
National and Local Elections proceeded according to RA 9371.

Respondent averred that R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan
de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; that the criteria established under Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality,
or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of a local government unit took place; and that R.A. No. 9371 did not bring
about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and income classification;
hence, no plebiscite is required.

Petitioner countered that Cagayan de Oro City's reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371
falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; that the creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator - the material change in the political and economic
rights of the local government units directly affected, as well as of the people therein; that
a voter's sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the entire city's
Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law
and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by the
COMELEC; and that a voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the
Congressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district.

ISSUE: Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government
unit?

RULING: No, Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the

determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other
subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative
body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize
population and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand,
is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules
on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides: xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact,
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section.xxx

Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment

speaks of, are the local government units (historically and generically referred to as
"municipal corporations") that the Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays. The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government (Article X).

Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the
authority to act has been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the
apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise acts on local
government units by setting the standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition
and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local
government units and altering their boundaries through legislation.

Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and the means to make a legislative district
sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively heard. As above stated, the
aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting power among
districts." Hence, emphasis is given to the number of people represented; the uniform
and progressive ratio to be observed among the representative districts. To ensure
continued adherence to the required standards of apportionment, Section 5(4)
specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as the given standards are met.

In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X,
Section 10 expressly speaks of how local government units may be "created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered." Its concern is the
commencement, the termination, and the modification of local government units'
corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that
must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in the
local government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on

the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code
expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement
exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.

The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a
political unit because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of
Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It is not, however, a political
subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. It can more
appropriately be described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the
whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a
corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the
district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a
representative in their national affairs. The role of the congressman that it elects is to
ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the
affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no
legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence,
there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action
on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are
the territorial and political subdivisions of the state. They possess legal personality on the
authority of the Constitution and by action of the Legislature. As a political subdivision, a
local government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions of
government." As a corporate entity with a distinct and separate juridical personality from
the State, it exercises special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents.

Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and
does not even imply, a division of a local government unit where the apportionment takes
place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city,
municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be a
requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.

Section 6: No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he

is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election.

1) Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

FACTS
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipinoparents. On November 5, 1985,
respondent Cruz enlisted in the UnitedStates Marine Corps and took an oath of
allegiance to the UnitedStates. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippinecitizenship through

repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He was elected as the Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was
then running for reelection.

Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the Houseof Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondentCruz was not qualified to become a
member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly electedRepresentative of the Second District of
Pangasinan. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino whobecame an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-bornFilipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship

RULING
YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand,
naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses
all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As

a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under
this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of
C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of
the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at
any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic
necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists

of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said
oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in
the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered
the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as
a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It
bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

2) Aquino v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 400

FACTS
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second
Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he
was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm
Village, Makati) for 10 months.

Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman
which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less
than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.

Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in
his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed
a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the
election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910
votes.

Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15,
the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino
ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of
residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

ISSUE
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to
warrant disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just
residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in

RULING
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with
“domicile” not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle
was applied.

Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was
domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical
and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of
domicile.

The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in
that community for electoral gain.

While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area
for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which
is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for
him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he
established a domicile of choice and not just residence. The Constitution requires a
person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the
district in which he seeks election to .

Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he
was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52
years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace
and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his
domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in
Conception, Tarlac.

Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease
agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent
home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one.
The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated
domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his
sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or
domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City.

Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of
one year residence in the district.
Decision

3) Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300

FACTS
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her
residence in the place was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for
cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did
not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the
Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven

months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s

proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself
and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issue:
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to
satisfy the one year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative.

Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the
concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the
purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House
of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by
Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that
an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was
ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications

to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are
set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

4) Perez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133944, October 28, 1999

FACTS
On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy
for Representative of the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Four days later, on March 30, 1998, petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed in the
COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent as a candidate
on the ground that he had not been a resident of the district for at least one (1)
year immediately before the day of the elections as required by Art. VI, §6 of the
Constitution.
On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous
resolution,[11] dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding private respondent
Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third District of Cagayan.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition for
certiorari and eventually pass upon private respondent’s eligibility for the office of
Representative of the Third District of Cagayan?

RULING:
…the following provision of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6 Effect of Disqualification Case. ¾ Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC)
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
“As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private respondent
was decided by the First Division of the COMELEC on May 10, 1998. The following
day, May 11, 1998, the elections were held. Notwithstanding the fact that private
respondent had already been proclaimed on May 16, 1998 and had taken his oath
of office on May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration on May
22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June 11, 1998. Clearly, this
could not be done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of
proceedings for disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not
been proclaimed. The COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the
motion because the proclamation of private respondent barred further
consideration of petitioner’s action. In the same vein, considering that at the time
of the filing of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a
member of the House of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the
same. Pursuant to Art. VI, §17 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the
declaration of private respondent’s ineligibility. As this Court held in Lazatin v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:[14]”
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
When does section 6 of R.A. 6646 apply to petitions for disqualifying a candidate
and when does it not apply?

In the case supra, R.A 6646, section 6 cannot be applied since there was
already a decision made by COMELEC based on substantial evidence, dismissing
the petition for disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to
run as representative for the Third District of Cagayan.Accordingly he was
proclaimed elected and, on May 17, 1998, he was sworn in office. It thereforebarred
further consideration of petitioner’s action.
“Petitioner’s remedies should have been:
1) to reiterate her prayer in the petition for disqualification, and move for the
issuance of an order by the COMELEC suspending the proclamation of private
respondent pending the hearing of the said petition and, in the event the motion
was denied before the proclamation of private respondent, file a petition for
certiorari in this Court with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin the
proclamation of private respondent;

2) to file a petition for quo warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal within ten (10) days after the proclamation of private respondent as
Representative-elect on May 16, 1998.”

“In the case of Lonzanida where this court held that the clear legislative intent
is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification
case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of
the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained
unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will
unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delayin g
tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.”
“…In Aguam v. COMELEC this Court held- ‘Time and again this Court has given its
imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass
and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate proclaimed
has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power. It of
course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since
private respondent’s petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the
annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this
issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC xxx
Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the
validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder,
baneful effects may easily supervene.”
“It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to
prevent the candidate from running or, if elected. From serving, or to prosecute
him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has
been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed
condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.”

5) Fernandez v. HRET, 608 SCRA 733

FACTS: This petition for certiorari and prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court stems from the Decision[1] in HRET CASE No. 07-034 for quo warranto entitled
Jesus L. Vicente v. Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez promulgated by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) on December 16, 2008 as well as Minute
Resolution No. 09-080 promulgated on April 30, 2009, likewise issued by the HRET,
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the questioned
Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DECLARES respondent Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez

ineligible for the Office of Representative of [the] First District of Laguna for lack of
residence in the district and [ORDERS] him to vacate his office.

Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the
Province of Laguna in the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC),
he indicated his complete/exact address as “No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo
Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna” (alleged Sta. Rosa residence).

Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a “Petition to Deny Due
Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification” before
the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046 (PES).
Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioner’s COC and the latter’s
disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material misrepresentation in
his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past elections, he had
declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth
Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that
petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the
First District. The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Laguna on June 27, 2007, having garnered a total of 95,927 votes, winning by a margin
of 35,000 votes over the nearest candidate.

On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET,
docketed as HRET CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to
hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing the First
Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void.

Since the HRET ruled in favor of private respondent, this petition was filed before us.

ISSUE: whether petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement
to be a Member of the House of Representatives, as provided in the 1987 Constitution.
(YES)

RULING: YES. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

The decision of the HRET in HRET CASE No. 07-034 promulgated on December 16,
2008, and its Minute Resolution No. 09-080 promulgated on April 30, 2009 in the same
case, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
RATIO: Anent the second issue pertaining to petitioner’s compliance with the residency
requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, after studying the evidence
submitted by the parties, we find for petitioner, taking into account our ruling in Frivaldo
v. COMELEC, which reads in part:

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our
country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt,
political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot
stand in the way of the sovereign will. xxx Emphasis supplied)

The qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives are found in Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution, which provides: Section 6. No person shall be a Member of
the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write,
and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election. Emphasis supplied)

We find the interpretation of the HRET of the residency requirement under the
Constitution to be overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual circumstances of
this case. The evidence presented by private respondent before the HRET hardly
suffices to prove that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement
under the Constitution. Private respondent’s documentary evidence to disqualify
petitioner mainly consisted of (a) petitioner’s certificates of candidacy (COCs) for various
positions in 1998, 2001 and 2004, which all indicated his residence as Pagsanjan,
Laguna within the Fourth District of said province; (b) his application for a driver’s license
in August 2005 that indicated Pagsanjan, Laguna as his residence; and (c) the statement
in his COCs including his 2007 COC for Congressman for the First District of Laguna that
his place of birth was Pagsanjan, Laguna.

The only thing these pieces of documentary evidence prove is that petitioner’s domicile
of origin was Pagsanjan, Laguna and it remained his domicile up to 2005, at the latest.
On the other hand, what petitioner asserted in his 2007 COC is that he had been a
resident of Sta. Rosa, Laguna in the First District of Laguna as of February 2006 and
respondent’s evidence failed contradict that claim. If it is true that petitioner and his
family had been living in Sta. Rosa, Laguna as of February 2006 with the intent to reside
therein permanently, that would more than fulfill the requirement that petitioner be a
resident of the district where he was a candidate for at least one year before election
day, which in this case was May 14, 2007.

In order to buttress his claim that he and his family actually resided in Sta. Rosa, Laguna
beginning at least in February 2006, petitioner’s evidence included, among others: (a)
original and extended lease contracts for a townhouse in Villa de Toledo, Barangay
Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna; (b) certification issued by the President of the Villa de
Toledo Homeowners Association, Inc, that petitioner has been a resident of said
Subdivision since February 2006; (c) affidavits of petitioner’s neighbors in Villa de
Toledo attesting that petitioner has been a resident of said subdivision since February
2006; (d) certification of the barangay chairman of Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa,
Laguna that petitioner is a resident of Villa de Toledo within the said barangay; (e)
certificates of attendance of petitioner’s children in schools located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna
since 2005; and (f) DTI certificates of business issued in the name of petitioner and his
wife to show that they own and operate businesses in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2003.

The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not
domiciled in another district. Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino, this Court held that the
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to
consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be

decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not necessarily the domicile of choice
of a candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which require a
congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy a new
one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that
other district. Neither do we see the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in
Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district. Certainly,
the Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the
district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year
prior to election day. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative
indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can
establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect,
imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property
requirement would be unconstitutional.

To summarize, private respondent’s own evidence did not categorically establish where
petitioner’s domicile is nor did said evidence conclusively prove that for the year prior to
the May 14, 2007 petitioner had a domicile other than where he actually resided, i.e. Sta.
Rosa, Laguna.

6) Tagolino v. HRET, G.R.No. 195540, March 19, 2013

FACTS: Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is the March 22, 2012 Decision 1 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) which declared the validity of private
respondent Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez’s substitution as the Liberal Party’s replacement
candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in lieu of
Richard Gomez.

November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy 2 (CoC)
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as
Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal
Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates,
Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, 3 alleging that Richard, who was
actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila,
misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City.
In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency
requirement under Section 6, Article VI 4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
(Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office.
In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.
On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution qualification.

Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the
COMELEC En Banc through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010. 7 Thereafter, in a
Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted the said resolution with finality "in order to
enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution."

On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC 9 together
with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as
the party’s official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same
congressional post. In response to various letter-requests submitted to the COMELEC’s
Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its
administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 8890 on May 8, 2010, approving, among
others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the substitution of private
respondent.

The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution (May 9,
2010 Pending resolution of Juntilla’s May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections
were conducted as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richards, whose
name remained on the ballots, garnered 101, 250 votes while his opponents, namely,
Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493
votes, respectively. In view of the aforementioned substitution, Richard’s votes were
credited in favor of private respondent and as a result, she was proclaimed the duly-
elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET in order to
oust private respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to
comply with the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution considering that the transfer of her voter registration from San Rafael
Bulacan to the Fourth District of Leyte was only applied for on July 23, 2009; (2) she did
not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio; and (3) private respondent’s
CoC was void due to her non-compliance with the prescribed notarial requirements i.e.,
she failed to present valid and competent proof of her identity before the notarizing
officer. After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision
which dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a
qualified candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District).

ISSUE: whether or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that Richard
was validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative
(Fourth Legislative District) in view of the former’s failure to meet the one (1) year
residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. (YES)

RULING: YES. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22,
2012 Decision rendered by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET
Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

RATIO: The petition is meritorious. A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification

and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a certificate of candidacy.

The Omnibus Election Code 23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a
candidate’s bid for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this
case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny
due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions
between the two are well-perceived.

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically
considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because
of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In
other words, while the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as
prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she
is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought
by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses. On the other hand, a
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the
OEC is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications
required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the
relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same
in the CoC.

Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have

been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC
had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not
been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab
initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes.

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010
elections due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement. The
confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17,
2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC
En Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and even further perpetuated
by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard was
merely disqualified – and not that his CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled –
would mean that he could have been validly substitute by private respondent, thereby
legitimizing her candidacy.

Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution did not
explicitly decree the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC should
not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private
respondent’s substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for
Richard’s "disqualification" is his failure to comply with the residency requirement under
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course to
and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, misrepresentation contemplated
under a Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one’s qualifications for elective
office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino
status.

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the
COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law
Department’s finding that Richard was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not
denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval of private
respondent’s substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s ruling
encompassed the cancellation of Richard’s CoC and in consequence, disallowed the
substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of
the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondent’s substitution.
Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Banc’s error as above-discussed, the
HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion, warranting the grant of the instant petition.

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not
a bona fide candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte
when she ran for office, which means that she could not have been elected. Considering
this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues
respecting private respondent’s own qualification to office.

7) Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

FACTS

Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of
the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended
petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations,
specifically:
(1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of
Batangas;
(2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of
Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when
she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the
Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;2
(3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is
either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;
(4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent
resident or an immigrant4 of the United States of America;
And
(5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.

In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife of
Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid and
binding marriage between them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with
Congressman Mandanas was solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain
formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it void ab initio.
Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to live with Congressman
Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to her. As to her date of birth, the
Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3
July 1964. Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent resident
and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not supported by evidence.

Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8,
2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last
exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the
petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of
her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013
the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and
on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives.
She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the
May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her case.

2. Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency requirement for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives.
3. Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of a
Member of the House of Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

RULING

1.) Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her case.

Yes. The COMELEC has jurisdiction and not the HRET.

According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications” of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the
following reasons:First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a
petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such
action Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered
a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.

The court has consistently held that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives

because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been
said, the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.”28 Thus, until such time, the
COMELEC retains jurisdiction

2.) Whether or not Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency requirement for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives.

NO. COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives

For respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office,
the law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid
requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner’s lack of
proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner’s burden to
present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a
permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.

Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence however, establishing the

fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use until
June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts
to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent
utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely
misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until
she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual
Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible
to run for and hold any elective public office in the Philippines.
As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her
natural-born status, we quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division
that petitioner cannot be considered a resident of Marinduque:
“Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his
domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he
must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive
acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his
domicile of choice.

In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that [petitioner] had already re-acquired her
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained her
domicile in the Philippines. There being no proof that [petitioner] had renounced her
American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the
USA.

The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has met the one-year residency
requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque
is her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18,
2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year
residency. For, [petitioner] has never regained her domicile in Marinduque as she
remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can
substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

3.) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the
qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives as enumerated in
Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

NO. The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House
of Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the
qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the
candidate must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year
residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the case, the COMELEC did not err
when it inquired into the compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to
determine if she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply applied
the constitutional provision and nothing more.

8) Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, supra.

FACTS

In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, is challenged insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for public office whether appointed or elected
both in the national or local government; (2) students of secondary and tertiary schools;
(3) officers and employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons charged before
the prosecutor’s office of a crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less
than 6 years and 1 day.

The drug testing shall employ, two testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in
the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo
mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories
monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices,
the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two
(2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who
complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the
campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The
first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test
while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug
test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No
person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2
hereof the drug test certificate herein required.

Petitioner Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the
May 10, 2004 elections,1filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it,
he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution;
and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to
read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than
two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)

qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate.
He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and
Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator
must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.

ISSUE
Whether or not Congress can enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

RULING
No.Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as unconstitutional. The
unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the
constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one
aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in

the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. It unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to
be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and,
if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect.

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out
that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs
only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these
stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate.
The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify the qualification standards for
senators as written in the Constitution, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force
of a constitutional mandate,or alter or enlarge the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
should be declared as unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect.
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly
found in the Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution
prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering
election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen
in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions
of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC

resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to
the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine
qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The
COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test." Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC
Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum,
requires for membership in the Senate.

The Court declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Section 7: The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a

term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon
on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House
of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Dimaporo v. Mitra, 202 SCRA 779

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO v. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of

Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L.
SABIO Secretary, House of representatives

FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative
District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections.

He took his oath of office and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and
privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao.

Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents

Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX
of the Omnibus Election Code.

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

According to the speaker, by the very act of filing his certificate of candidacy, Ali
Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner wrote to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected
Member of Congress."

Petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for
such relief was subsequently.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

He did not lose his seat as congressman when he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao because Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and
therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.

The term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds
by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the
Constitution. On the other hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may
be summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment
in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an
election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

Under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of
a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it
were the intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 as among the means by which the term of a Congressman may be shortened, it
would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution. They
did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the
grounds previously found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted
the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.

He cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds
another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is
not equivalent to holding another office or employment.

RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION:

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as
the voluntary act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term
"voluntary renunciation" of office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution.

The ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the Constitution does not affect its
validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive.

There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of
Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a
penalty of disqualification to hold public office.
Petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him
from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws.
ISSUE:

WON SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 IS OPERATIVE UNDER THE
PRESENT CONSTITUTION (AND THEREFORE PETITIONER IS CONSIDERED IPSO
FACTO RESIGNED)

RULING:

YES.

1. Only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the
enumeration of elective public officials who are to be considered resigned from
office from the moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another
office. The advocates elucidated on the rationale of this inclusion, thus:

MR. PEREZ (L.):

I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The
purpose is that the people must be given the right to choose any official who belongs to,
let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However, because of the
practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not
assume the office, because of that spectacle the impression is that these officials were
just trifling with the mandate of the people…
xxxx
MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
…officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered
resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but
primarily because under our Constitution, we have this new chapter on accountability of
public officers.
…Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers?
This only means that all elective public officials should honor the mandate they have
gotten from the people…we have precisely included this as part of the Omnibus Election
Code because a Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself out with the people and seek
(sic) their support and mandate should not be allowed to deviate or allow himself to run
for any other position unless he relinquishes or abandons his office. Because his
mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a Batasan or a governor
or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one
he was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic) intention to service the
mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be
considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than anything that is the accountability that
the Constitution requires of elective public officials…
Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it
for? If a Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not
want to serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one he was
elected to? The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt
act of abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he should
therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he could be of better
service.
…primarily because under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the
elective public officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal
ambition…
XXX

Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is

no longer operative does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut
short the term of office of elective public officials, the statutory provision seeks to
ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging
them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure
by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to
their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public
officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate
which they have received from their constituents.
2. In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of
office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure"
of office.
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by
the legislature, but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure)
may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure
may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change
the duration of the term of office.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a
certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut
short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is
allowed to serve its unexpired portion.

3. The ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of
members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of
Congress.

Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the

Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found
in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be
shortened are not exclusive.

As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the constitution
of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all
others. Neither does it preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so
enumerated in the constitution or statutes are merely conditions the occurrence of any
one of which the office shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal
effect of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a
congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds
provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended
such absurdity.

4. Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under

Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough to include the situation
envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. The act, contemplated in
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of candidacy for another
office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective
office.

As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces
automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently
held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually
held.

The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from
the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode
of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Section 9: In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a

special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by
law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall
serve only for the unexpired term.

1) Lucero v. COMELEC, 234 SCRA 280

WILMAR P. LUCERO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE L. ONG, JR.

FACTS:

The petitioners were two of the five candidates for the Second Legislative District of
Northern Samar in the synchronized national and local elections held on 11 May 1992.

The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar credited
Jose L. Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068 votes, or a lead by
Ong of 204 votes. However, this tally did not include the results of Precinct No. 7 of the
municipality of Silvino Lobos, where the submitted election returns had not been
canvassed because they were illegible; of Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the
ballot boxes were snatched and no election was held.

The COMELEC, acting on Lucero's urgent manifestation, directed the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to desist from reconvening until further orders.

On 7 January 1994, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution calling for a

special election in the last remaining Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the
Municipality of Silvino Lobos if justified by the result of the canvass by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar, and to notify the parties of the schedule of
election activities for that precinct.

Both Lucero and Ong filed with SC special civil actions for certiorari to challenge the
Resolution.

In G. R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1) the count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7
of Silvino Lobos must be unconditional because the election returns therefrom are
invalid; and (2) his chances in the special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos
would be spoiled if the returns for Precinct No. 7 were to be included beforehand in the
canvass.

In G. R. No. 113509, Ong questions the authority of the COMELEC to call for a special
election in Precinct No. 13 almost two years after the regular election.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in calling for a special
election in Precinct No. 13 after almost two (2) years, or more specifically after one (1)
year and ten (10) months, following the day of the synchronized elections

RULING:

YES.

On the authority of the COMELEC to order the holding of a special election,

Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and if in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of
the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to
the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.
The first paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 likewise provides:
Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. — The postponement,
declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in
Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission
sitting en banc by a majority votes of its members. The causes for the declaration of a
failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the
election.

1. There are, therefore, two requisites for the holding of special elections
under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., (1) that there is a failure of
election, and (2) that such failure would affect the results of the election.

The parties admit that the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 was due to
ballot-box snatching and do not dispute the finding of the COMELEC as to the
necessity and inevitability of the holding of a special election in said precinct,
even if the result of Precinct No. 7 should be based on the questionable "Comelec
Copy" of its election returns.

The COMELEC held:

Based on the adjudged correction of the votes in favor of petitioner Lucero in the
Municipality of Las Navas, the results of the recount of votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 16
(Silvino Lobos), and the votes reflected in the available copy of the election returns for
Precinct No. 7 (Silvino Lobos), it is safe to predict that when the special Provincial
Board of Canvassers will reconvene to sum up the votes of the contending parties,
the original lead of private respondent Ong of two hundred four (204) votes against
petitioner Lucero — 24,272 as against 24,068 — will be reduced to either 175 or
173 depending on whether Lucero will be credited a low of 29 or a high of 31 votes
as reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 7.
Without preempting the exact figures which only the special Provincial Board of
Canvassers can correctly determine, undoubtedly it is inevitable that a special election
will have to be held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino
Lobos.
xxxxxxx
Given the established lead of private respondent Ong over petitioner Lucero, We answer
in the affirmative. According to Comelec records, the number of registered voters in
Precinct No. 13 is two hundred thirteen (213). Since the lead of respondent Ong is
less than the number of registered voters, the votes in that precinct could affect
the existing result because of the possibility that petitioner Lucero might get a
majority over Ong in that precinct and that majority might be more than the
present lead of Ong.

On the basis of the additional votes credited so far to the parties, the following
computation is in order: to Ong's 24,272 votes will be added 2 more from Precinct No.
16, to make a total of 24,274, while to Lucero's 24,068 votes will be added 20 more from
Las Navas and 43 from Precinct No. 16, for a total of 24,131. Ong's earlier lead will
thus be reduced to 143, which is admittedly less than the 213 registered voters in
Precinct No. 13.

The two requirements then for a special election under Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code have indeed been met.

2. In the course of the deliberations on these cases, the Court considered

the possible application, by analogy, of Section 10, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution providing that no special election in the event of a vacancy in the
Offices of the President and Vice President "shall be called if the vacancy occurs
within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election," and of
the second paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 which provides:

In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of

Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the
Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier
than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the
vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election
shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.

A view was expressed that we should not hold the special election because the
underlying philosophy for the prohibition to hold the special election if the
vacancy occurred within a certain period before the next presidential election or
the next regular election, as the case may be, is obviously the avoidance of the
expense to be incurred in the holding of a special election when a regular election
is, after all, less than a year away.

The Court ultimately resolved that the aforesaid constitutional and statutory
proscriptions are inapplicable to special elections which may be called under
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.
First, the special election in the former is to fill permanent vacancies in the Office
of the President, Vice President, and Members of Congress occurring after the
election, while the special election under the latter is due to or by reason of a
failure of election.

Second, a special election under Section 6 would entail minimal costs because it
is limited to only the precincts involved and to the candidates who, by the result of
the election in a particular constituency, would be affected by the failure of
election. On the other hand, the special election for the Offices of the President,
Vice President, and Senators would be nation-wide, and that of a Representative,
district-wide.

Third, Section 6, when specifically applied to the instant case, presupposes that
no candidate had been proclaimed and therefore the people of the Second
Legislative District of Northern Samar would be unrepresented in the House of
Representatives until the special election shall ultimately determine the winning
candidate, such that if none is held, they would have no representation until the
end of the term. Under the aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions, the
elected officials have already served their constituencies for more than one-half of
their terms of office.

Fourth, if the law had found it fit to provide a specific and determinate time-frame
for the holding of a special election under Section 6, then it could have easily done
so in Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166.

3. Another serious obstacle to Ong's proposition is that, considering the

COMELEC's disposition of Precinct No. 7 in the challenged Resolution, he would
then be declared and proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the Second
Legislative District of Northern Samar despite the fact that as earlier observed,
there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, and the results of the district
elections for Representative would be affected by the failure of the election in
Precinct No. 13. To accept the proposition is to allow a proclamation based on an
incomplete canvass where the final result would have been affected by the
uncanvassed result of Precinct No. 7 and by the failure of the election in Precinct
No. 13 and to impose upon the people of the Second Legislative District of
Northern Samar a Representative whose mandate is, at the very least, uncertain,
and at the most, inexistent.

2) Ocampo v. HRET, 432 SCRA 114

FACTS

ISSUE
RULING

Section 11: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all

offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.

1) People v. Jalosjos, 432 SCRA 689

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) Trillanes v. Pimentel, 556 SCRA 471

FACTS:On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood
Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the
President and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers
surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood
Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention
and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an
Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and
Related Requests. Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and
fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed
Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow
him to work and serve his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of
detention prisoners who are held without bail

RULING: No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in
Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état
cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the
class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved
in the crime charged. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s
application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination
that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction, justifies
the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such
cases is “regardless of the stage of the criminal action.”
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-
defense applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted
prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all
prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office,
elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of
arrest and detention.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior
term” to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the
doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more
precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the
Senate, “they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action
with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he
could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering mis impression that the call of duty
conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints
articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord
may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields
to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the
rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties
imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The accused-appellant
asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives,
not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or
a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner
into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this
discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court
previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his
certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be
proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a
seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of
taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to
him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

3) Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876

FACTS: This is an ordinary civil action for the recovery, by plaintiffs

Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of
money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of
defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. At the time of said publication, defendant was
a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense.

ISSUE: whether the publication in question is a privileged communication;

whether the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase
“speech or debate therein” of Article VI, Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which
provides that “[t]he Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall
in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place”

RULING: No. The phrase “speech or debate therein” refers to utterances

made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while
the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same
is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress
or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties
as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in
question.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category.
According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the
Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in
session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers
of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in
thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee
thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

4) Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1

FACTS
In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
delivered the following remarks:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal.

I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be
living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would
rather be in a different environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x x

Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
declaring that only sitting members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the
impending vacancy of the CJ post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent
members of the Court, including Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically
disqualified.

Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court,
contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards
then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment
proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-Santiago.

ISSUE
Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or
subjected to disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech.

RULING

No, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be
afforded parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution, which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x x shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof." Although there was no express
admission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed say those words,
there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as
an implied admission.
Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the
lady senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In
fact, her excuse that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial
legislation on the JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light of
the controversy her utterances had managed to stir.

Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without
it, the parliament or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and
ineffective forum." However, it should be noted that "[l]egislators are immune
from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for
their private indulgence, but for the public good."

Section 13: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.

1) Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2001

FACTS
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners)
filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat
in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC **see boxed def’n below) Board of Governors.

During respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was

elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board
of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board
of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:

SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for
which he was elected.

Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-
owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the
position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically
forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which held that incumbent
national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another
government office.

Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled

corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does
not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor
an employment.

ISSUE
Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section
13, Article VI of the Constitution.

RULING

NO! The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

* The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as amended,
only six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the
President of the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members, or four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC
Board of Governors are not appointed by the President --- an overwhelming majority of
four-fifths of the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the private sector members of the
PNRC.

The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of
any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the
PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his
appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the
PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads
us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of
the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC
Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

* The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled
by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable
by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the
PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the
PNRC Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions
or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC
Chairman is a private office, not a government office.

* Although the PNRC is created by a special charter (which deviated to the rule that
private corporations must be created by/under a general law i.e. Corporation Code), it
cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of
the essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the
PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation.

Section 14: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may

personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

1) Puyat v. De Guzman, 112 SCRA 31

FACTS

On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries
(IPI), a private corporation, was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners
that may be called the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the
Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the
management of IPI.

On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings
questioning the election.
Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on
Constitutional grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member
of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article
VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as
counsel before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an administrative body. The
prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance.

When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez
had purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of
sale was notarized only on 30 May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion
for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in
the matter in litigation, which motion was granted by the SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in

effect appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in
contravention of the Constitutional provision.

RULING

The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention,
Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance
could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman

Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them
"after the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the
quo warranto suit had been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case
before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his
intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was objected to by
petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided,
instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel
before an administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition.
The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective.
All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to
acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the
proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by
indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or impliedly prohibited.

Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit
of the prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order
granting Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and
set aside.

2) Baguilat v. Alvraez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017

FACTS

The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17 th Congress on July 25, 2016,
several news articles surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the
adoption or anointment of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the
"Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative minority" in the House of Representatives.

Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the House - where the candidate
who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically
becomes the Minority Leader - Rep. Baguilat would be declared and recognized as the
Minority Leader. However, despite numerous follow-ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat
was never recognized as such.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat
should be recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition" in
the House where the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes
for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities
attending Rep. Suarez's election to said Minority Leader position.

For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of Minority Leader is an internal
matter to the House of Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot interfere with such internal
matters of a coequal branch of the govemment.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to

recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the only legitimate members of the House
Minority.

RULING

The petition is without merit.

In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda,11 the Court explained that the peremptory
writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity,
and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy
relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.12

The deviation by the Lower House from the aforesaid rules is not averse to the
Constitution.
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a
majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the
method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole
control.

Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and
authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion
brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality
or department of the government."

However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had
conducted the questioned proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional
rules, the Court is hard-pressed to find any attending grave abuse of discretion which
would warrant its intrusion in this case. By and large, this case concerns an internal
matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent any showing of grave
abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only
embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the
separation of powers doctrine.

Verily, "[i]t would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department

for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that]
the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself."

3) Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17

(can’t find topic related to Sec. 14 in this case huhu)

FACTS
On February 21, 1949, Sen. Tanada filed with the Senate Secretary charges
against Senate President Avelino. Sen. Tanada requested to give a privilege speech
during the session. Sen. Tanada’s motions were continuously denied of the common
courtesy and ruling Sen. Sanidad and Tanada “out of order!”. Senator Avelino along with
other Senators, walked-out of the session hall. Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz
issued Resolution No. 67 and 68 declaring the vacancy of the position of Senate
President and installing Hon. Cuenco as Acting Senate President. These resolutions
were voted and unanimously approved.
Thus, Avelino filed a petition before the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme
Court with a vote of 6 out of the 10 Justices present, decided to deny the petition stating
that the Court has no jurisdiction on the case. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The SC with a majority vote of seven, granted the motion and took
cognizance over the case.

ISSUE
WON the 12 Senators who installed Cuenco as the Acting President of the Senate
constituted a quorum?

RULING
YES. Supreme Court held that there is a quorum that the 12 senators being the majority
of 23 Senators. Resolution Nos. 67 and 68 are valid. Sen. Cuenco has been legally
elected as Senate President. PETITION DISMISSED.

If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly
constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the
transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say
there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such
session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez,
and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor
twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute aquorum, "the
House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute
"the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference
between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23),
constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice
Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they
could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been
so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have
been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against
and one abstained.

NOTE:
Quorum has been defined as that number of person of the body, which legally
assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its lawful business,
or, in other words, that number that makes the lawful body and gives it power to pass
 a valid act. Unless otherwise validly provided, it ordinarily refers to one-half plus one
of the entire membership of the body. (Agpalo, 2005.)
Although the Supreme Court’s initial findings that there was no quorum originally
constituted, the Supreme Court finds light in the dissenting opinions of the Justices that
even if a new quorum were to be established, Sen. Cuenco would still be elected Senate
President because of the 12 Senators supporting him and only 11 Senators supporting
Sen. Avelino.

4) Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Phils., G.R. No. 169271. Oct. 18, 2011
(can’t find also Sec. 14 topic here huhuhu)

FACTS
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress
acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces were
Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular
elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor
later than 90 days after its ratification.

Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under
R.A. 6734. Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional

elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a
plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.But
onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May
2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.With the
enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the
ARMM elections.
Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different parties
arose as a consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153
questioning the validity of said laws.

OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM
to continue to perform their functions should these cases not be decided by the end of
their term onSeptember 30, 2011.

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these
laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and
plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094
in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the
people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the "elective and representative"
character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the
petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the
May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that
the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM,
in complete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE
Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections?
Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING
Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto. The
Court agreed with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that
the Constitution mandates synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution. While the Constitution does not
expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII)
of the Constitution,which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections.
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done
among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the
least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections whether
national or local to once every three years.This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. Furthermore, to achieve
synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs
regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333)
with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be
held in May 2013).

In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office
of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President
and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year
noon of June 30, 1992.

It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of
synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is
the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion.This
common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years
(Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).

That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local
officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for
President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x
xrecords of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission.

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure
of the Constitution. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-
governor and regional assembly representatives fall within the classification of "local"
elections, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited
region of ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article Xof the
Constitution entitled "Local Government."Autonomous regions are established and
discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local
Government.

Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional
mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with
marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization
demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of
a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason to accord merit to the petitioners claims
of grave abuse of discretion.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and
local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being
as compelling as the other.If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their
coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional
autonomy as the term suggests directly carries a narrower regional effect although its
national effect cannot be discounted.

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way
arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or
objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the Constitution and to
reasonably accepted norms.Under these limitations, the choice of measures was a
question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.

However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in
executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option
that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly
and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the
fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court.
Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by
the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No.
9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only does
is to"appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office."This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to
office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be therefore emphasized
that the law must be interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize elections and
must not be interpreted otherwise.

5) Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268

FACTS
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin
taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there
is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The
bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations,
Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But
after a roll call, the Chair, Deputy Speaker Daza, declared the presence of a
quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of
the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On
the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it
was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the
"constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, Section 16(3) that "each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules
is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of
Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.

ISSUE
Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House

RULING

No. Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a
particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to
be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to the Court.The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim
is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier
motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of
delaying the business of the House.

6) Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863

FACTS

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before
the House making serious imputations of bribery against the President Carlos Garcia.
Because of this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House
Committee to investigate the truth of the charges made against the President, to
summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to
require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by the House.

Osmeña then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the
ground that it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in the House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding,
and after giving petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously
disorderly behavior. A House resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from
office for 15 months.

Thereafter, Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to
discipline its members.

ISSUE
Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?

RULING
No. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be
questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of
Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always
been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their
words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned
in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” than
Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked
(Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for
words spoken in debate.”

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege

cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English
Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

7) Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636

FACTS

The instant case arose from the complaints filed by a group of employees of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID
Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Thus, petitioner was indicted as a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in the exercise of her official functions, have unlawfully and criminally approved
the application for legalization of the stay of several aliens.
ISSUE
Whether the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive
suspension of Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines,
from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the
Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order was valid.

RULING
YES. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of
an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support.
Section 13 of the statute provides:
"SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. - any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

In Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled:

"The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid
information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent
or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service."

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of

suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an
order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about
it."

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to

the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the
Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension
of public officials and employees indicted before it.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power
of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
"x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty
days."
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure
that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as
the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino
Paredes, Jr., vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., the Court affirmed the order of suspension of
Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the
encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The Court ruled:
"x x x. Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution - which
deals with the power of each House of Congress inter alia to `punish its Members for
disorderly behavior,' and `suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days - is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The
maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate,
branches of the government - the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary - has
exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively
prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
8) United States v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729

FACTS
Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were charged with the crime of illegal
importation of opium. The defense counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day
of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of
February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not
passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that,
therefore, the same is null and void

ISSUE
Whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals.

RULING
YES. While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question
whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in
the United States that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the
question whether a particular bill became a law or not. The result is that the law and the
adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of the
special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not ambiguous
or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They show, with absolute
certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28,
1914.

As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal
Government and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that country
in the matter now before us. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12
midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in
declining to go behind these journals.

9) Casco Philippines Commercial Co. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347

FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It bought

foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw
materials in the production of synthetic resin glues. Petitioner asked for a refund of its
payment of margin fee on foreign exchange transactions under RA 2609. Sec 2 of RA
2609 exempts the payment of margin fee on the sale of foreign exchange for the
importation of Urea formaldehyde.Respondent, however, refused on the ground that the
exemption from margin fee refers to “Urea formaldehyde” and not “Urea and
Formaldehyde”. Petitioner contends that “Urea formaldehyde” in Sec 2 of RA 2609
should be construed as “Urea and Formaldehyde” based on the intention of the Senate
during the consideration of the bill.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioner’s contention is correct

RULING: No. "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct
and different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde".
It is well settled that the enrolled bill, which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of
"urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any
mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree.

10) Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131

FACTS: The Petitioner is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police
Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. Upon the resignation of the chief of
police, Petitioner was designated acting chief of police and, at the same time, given a
provisional appointment to the same position by the Mayor of Manila. The respondent
Commissioner of Civil Service rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position”due to lack of a
bachelor’s degree based on section 10 of the Police Act of 1966.
Petitioner asserted that he is not required to be a bachelor’s degree holder. He posits
that what was approved by the Senate in the third reading of House Bill 6951 is different
in what now appears in Sec. 10 of the Police Act of 1966. It would thus appear that the
Bill was change during the course of its engrossment and such change was not made by
Congress but by a mere employee in rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences. Hence,
the petitioner would like the SC to look into the matter.

ISSUE: Whether the Judiciary can assail the validity of an enrolled bill by investigating
the legislative process

RULING: No. under the Enrolled Bill Doctrine, the signing of the bill by the Speaker of
the House and the Senate President and the certification of the secretaries of both
Houses that it was passed are conclusive as to its due enactment. The enrolled bill
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. With respect to matters not
expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in case of
discrepancy.
The court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The
respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith
and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their
respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted
role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-
making with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The
investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in
Congress.

11) Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the House of
Representatives, was passed on third reading without amendments. But when the bill
was discussed in the Senate, substantial amendments were introduced by Senator
Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. There was also an
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas but this does not appear in the journal of
the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. The House of Representatives
thereafter signified its approval of H.B.9266 containing the amendments recommended
by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually
approved by the Senate. The printed copies of the bill were then certified and attested by
the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. Then the
President affixed his signature thereto by way of approval. The bill became RA 4065.

Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B. 9266 signed
into law by the President was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the
Senate floor. As a consequence, the Senate President invalidated his signature on the
bill. Thereafter, the President withdrew his signature on H.B. 9266.

ISSUE: Whether or not the bill has become a law

RULING: No.

In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding
officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated
enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment.7 Another case
however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive
evidence.8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark,9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is
conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not
unanimous on this point.

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as
follows:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it
is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass
Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has
no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of
the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance,
and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to
coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it
has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion
reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they are silent as to whether the journals
may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a
bill. It does not require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said
Constitution does contain the following provisions:

Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal."

Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed
and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days
prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be
allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is

conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-
equal department of the government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had
never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even
greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification

made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking
process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification
does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its
passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill
passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President. 12
In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar
provision in the State Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted
as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has "passed both
houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
12) Abakada v. Ermita, supra.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 17: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered

1) Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 134

FACTS
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of
the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the
National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not
been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election

protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly.
The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own
resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on
or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought
the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his
motion.

ISSUE
Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding
the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?

RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution
of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election
protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to
be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure
to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power
to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also
in the Electoral Commission.
2) Reyes v. COMELEC, supra.

FACTS
Facts:

Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of
the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended
petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations
regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship.
Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8,
2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last
exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the
petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of
her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013
the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and
on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives.
She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the
May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

ISSUE

1 Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of
member of the House of Representative.
2 Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for
office

RULING
The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC.

1 Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative
Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of
Representative.
2 In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for
public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the
Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the
case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements.
Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of
allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved
the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere
effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he
must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive
acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his
domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced
her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in
the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of
Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-
year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains
to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the
fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

3) Vera v. Aquino, 77 Phil. 192 (per checking title should be Vera v. Avelino)

FACTS
After The elections, Comelec submitted its report to Congress & the President. The
Report state that there was terrorism and violence in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac,
which prevented the expression of the
popular will. That there was coercion and intimidation, that most of the residents left their
homes in order not to be subjected to oppression (many of them voted for Roxas as
president and that there was terrorism to ensure the election of the members of the
Nationalista party)

A protest against the election of VERA DIOKNO & ROMERO was filed with the SET. The
Senate convened and THE PENDATUN RESOLUTION was approved. Under the
Resolution, pending the termination of the protest against their election, VERA, DIOKNO,
ROMERO (who had been included among the 16 senators who won, and proclaimed by
Comelec), SHALL NOT BE SWORN IN, NOR SEATED AS SENATORS.’

The 3 filed this case for the annulment of the Pendatun Resolution, and for them to be
able to occupy their seats and exercise their senatorial prerogatives.

ISSUE
1. Whether the SC has jurisdiction?
2. Does prohibition lie?
3. Assuming that the SC had jurisdiction, did Senate exceed its powers in adopting
the Pendatun Resolution?

RULING
1. No.

Petitioners further invoke the ANGARA DOCTRINE which they claim grants SC
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission.

The Court provides that previously, under the ALEJANDRINO DOCTRINE, mandamus
will not lie against the legislative body, and its officers, to compel the performance of
duties purely legislative in character. The courts cannot dictate their legislative functions,
over which they have exclusive control. When there is a member who has been expelled
by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion
was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the
most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, taken in pursuance of a
power committed exclusively to that department by the constitution.

HOWEVER: The Organic Act had some innovations which established additional
exceptions to the well known doctrine of SEPARATION OF POWERS, for instance the
CREATION OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS, wherein the Justices of the SC participate in
the decision of congressional election protests. Under Marbury vs. Madison, the court
may annul any legislative enactment that fails to observe the constitutional limitations. A
legislative enactment is the act of an agency of sovereign authority. If it conflicts with the
Constitution, then it must fall. Invalidating it is a plain exercise of judicial power, that
power vested in the courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. THIS IS
NOT THE EXERCISE OF SUBSTANTIVE POWER to review and nullify the acts of
Congress. It is simply a NECESSARY CONCOMITANT OF THE POWER TO HEAR
AND DISPOSE OF A CASE and to determine its validity against the law.

The Angara Doctrine is not applicable. In Angara, the Court took jurisdiction because
there was a conflict of
jurisdiction between 2 constitutional bodies, hence the SC was compelled to determine
the character, scope and
extent of their respective spheres of action. IN THIS CASE, there is actually no
antagonism between the Senate and the SET. Consequently, the SC cannot intervene.
Following the ALEJANDRINO DOCTRINE, the court cannot entertain this petition and
order the branch of legislature to reinstate a member. To do so would be to establish
judicial predominance and to UPSET THE CLASSIC PATTERN OF CHECKS AND
BALANCES WISELY WOVEN INTO OUR INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. There are
undoubtedly many wrongs that the judiciary may not correct, for instance, those involving
political questions.

2. NO. prohibition refers only to proceedings of tribunals exercising judicial or

ministerial functions, NOT
LEGISLATIVE functions.

3. No.

The discussions of the Con-Con showed that instead of transferring to the Electoral
Tribunal all the powers of the
House or Senate as the “sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications” of its
members, it was GIVEN ONLY JURISDICTION OVER “ALL CONTESTS” relation to
election, etc.
According to the deliberations, a compromise plan / amendment was submitted limiting
the power of the ET to judging all cases contesting the election, returns and qualifications
of members. In rejecting the Labrador Amendment (which seemed to give to the ET the
power to determine also the election of members who have not been protested), the
Con-Con thus did NOT INTEND TO GIVE IT ALL THE FUNCTION OF THE ASSEMBLY
on the subject of election and qualification of members.
An ELECTION CONTEST relates only to statutory contests in which the contestant
seeks not only to out the intruder, but also to have himself inducted into the office.
Thus, since the power to defer-oath taking, until the contest is adjudged, does not belong
to the ET, then it must be held that the Senate or the House still retains such authority,
for it has not been transferred to, nor assumed by the ET. This can be interpreted in 2
ways:
•that such power to delay oath taking stemmed from the former privilege of either House
to be
the judge of election returns and qualifications of members, OR
•that it is an inherent power to every legislative body as a measure of self-preservation.
3 points:
1. the authority of the ET is only over all contests relating to E,R,Q of its members, it
does not extend to all matters and functions of legislative on the subject.
2. Congress still retains the authority to defer oath taking of members, pending an
election contest
3. Congress, under parliamentary practice, has the power to inquire into the credentials
of any of its
members. But the power of the ET is a limited power.

4) Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 59 SCRA 434

FACTS
Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first district of Negros Oriental.
Her rival Olivia Paras, and some other concerned citizens filed a disqualification case
against Limkaichong before the COMELEC. The latter allegedly not a natural born citizen
of the Philippines because when she was born, her father was still a Chinese and that
her mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s
dad. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy,
her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects. Hence, she
lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. During
the pendency of the case, election day came, and votes were cast. Results came in and
Limkaichong won over Paras. Comelec after due hearing, declared Limkaichong as
disqualified. Notwithstanding their proclamation of disqualification, Comelec issued a
proclamation declaring Limkaichong as the winner. This is in compliance with Resolution
no. 8062 adopting the disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the
continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the
proclamation, filed a petition before the Comelec

ISSUE

1. Whether the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election

case
2. Who has jurisdiction over the disqualification case
3. Whether the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules apply to
disqualification based on citizenship

RULING
1. No. In assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in
accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in

the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the
proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization
certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:
1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said
naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and
establish his permanent residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person
naturalized remaining more than one year in his native country or the country of his
former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as prima
facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:

3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a
public or private high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau
of Private Schools] of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are
taught as part of the school curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by
neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A
certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by
the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the President] and the
Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];

5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in
violation of the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a
requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives
designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of
naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter
that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized
citizen’s descendant.

Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office
requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal
or government institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper
officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on account of her
citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so,
she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of
Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in whom they
have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing
ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment
during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any intention to
misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to
be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.
2. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken
her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the. Accordingly, the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) should now assume jurisdiction over the
disqualification cases.

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his
qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the
House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications.
The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section
2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to
have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.

3. No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to
disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the
1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House of Representatives must be
natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure.
Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may
still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.

5) ChaveZ v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 315

FACTS
Petition for the issuance of a TRO enjoining COMELEC from proclaiming the 24th
highest senatorial candidate.

May 5, 1992 - Court issued a Resolution of the case “Francisco Chavez v. Comelec , et
al.,” disqualifying Melchor Chavez from running for Senator in the May 11, 1992
elections. The petitioner then filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1)
disseminate to all its agents and the general public the resolution; and (2) order said
election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of
candidates, tally sheets, election returns and “to count all votes cast for the disqualified
Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez . . . .”

May 8, 1992 - Comelec issued a resolution which resolved to delete the name of Melchor
Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all
“Chavez” votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name
in the list of qualified candidates. On Election Day, Melchor Chavez remained undeleted
in the list of qualified candidates. Commissioner Rama issued a directive over the radio
and TV ordering that all “Chavez” votes be credited to the petitioner however it did not
reach all the precincts.

Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to perform its mandatory function under Sec. 7,
RA 7166 which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be the duty of the
Commission to instruct without delay the deletion of the name of said candidate.

Confusion arose as the “Chavez” votes were either declared stray or invalidated by the
Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs).As a result, “Chavez” votes were not credited in
favor of petitioner.

May 12, 1992 - Comelec issued another Resolution directing all municipal and city
election registrars throughout the country to examine the minutes of voting submitted by
the BEIs and to credit all the “Chavez” votes, which have been declared stray or
invalidated by the BEIs, in favor of petitioner.

Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved futile because it did not reach all the
various BEIs throughout the country on time for implementation and that the minutes of
voting did not indicate the number of “Chavez” votes which were declared stray or
invalidated.

May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelec praying
the latter to (1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de officio; (2) to re-open
the ballot boxes to scan for the “Chavez” votes for purposes of crediting the same in his
favor; (3) make the appropriate entries in the election returns/certificates of canvass; and
(4) to suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.

Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on his petition, petitioner filed
this urgent petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO,
enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate, without
first implementing Comelec’s resolution of May 12, 1992 and acting upon petitioner 􀀀s
letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992. Petitioner
alleges that respondent Comelec acted capriciously and whimsically and with grave
abuse of discretion.

June 8, 1992, Sen. Agapito Aquino prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition on the
ground that the law does not allow pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of
members of the Senate.

ISSUE

Whether or not SC has jurisdiction over the case

RULING

Jurisdiction - The alleged inaction of Comelec in ordering the deletion of

Melchor Chavez’s name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of
the Court’s function of judicial review. The Court can review the decisions or orders of
the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge
of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of its administrative
functions.

Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left undone.

Comelec has ordered the deletion of Melchor Chavez’s name not only on the official list
of candidates, but also on the election returns, tally sheet and certificate of canvass.
Hence, petitioner 􀀀s allegation that respondent Comelec failed to implement the
resolutions does not hold water.

Petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy being in the nature of a pre-
proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation
controversies involving local elective officials, such are not allowed in elections for
President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:

Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President,
Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections
for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no
pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of
canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the
appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested
person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.

xxx xxx xxx

Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or
on the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial boards of canvassers or
district board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically noted in the
minutes of their respective proceedings.
What is allowed is the correction of “manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns.” To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of
canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have
been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their
respective proceedings.

The petitioner’s prayer does not call for the correction of “manifest errors in the
certificates of canvass or election returns” before the Comelec but for the reopening of
the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein. He has not even
pointed to any “manifest error” in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires
to be rectified. There being none, the proper recourse is to file a regular

- Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: “… (1) Errors in the appreciation of ballots by the

board of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for recount or re-
appreciation of ballots. (2) The appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of
the board of canvassers. The function of ballots appreciation is performed by the board
election inspectors at the precinct level. (3) The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is
limited to the issues enumerated under Sec. 243 OEC. The complete election returns
whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the
purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.

“The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may
be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of “Sanchez”
votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election
returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the Comelec or the
board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face
thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256).”

Petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in the certificates of canvas s or
election returns before the Comelec which would warrant their correction.

Note:

Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as “any question pertaining to or

affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the
board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234,
235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns.” [Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code).

6) Guerrero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000

FACTS

Guillermo Ruiz file a petition to disqualify respondent Rodolfo Fariñas as a candidate for
the position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that Fariñas
had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls,
despite his failure to file a certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998 or 3
days before the election, Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy substituting candidate
Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998, the COMELEC
dismissed the petition of Ruiz.

After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that Farinas could not validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas,
since the latter was not the official candidate of LAMMP, but was an independent
candidate. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his oath of office as a member of the House of
Representatives. Comelec dismissed the MR on the ground that the matter is now within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal.

ISSUE
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of
the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Fariñas is already within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives?

RULING
There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its
jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Farinas
as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is vested with the
power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that
power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is a
recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET.
Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s
decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to
the HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions.

In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who
has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressmanis raised, that issue is
best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids
duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with
due regard to the people’s mandate.
7) Barbers v. COMELEC, 460 SCRA 569

FACTS

Robert Barbers and Rodolfo Biazon were candidates in the 2004 Senatorial elections.
After a partial canvass of the votes, the first eleven senators were duly proclaimed by the
Comelec. Barbers and Biazaon battled for the 12th and final spot.

After canvassing the remaining Certificates of Canvass (COCs), Comelec proclaimed

Biazon as the 12th Senator. Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. While
there were certain precincts where there was failure of elections, the COMELEC stated
that this difference will not materially be affected by the votes in said precincts.

Barbers assailed the proclamation of Biazon arguing that it was illegal and premature
being based on an incomplete canvass. Barbers asserted that the remaining
uncanvassed COCs and votes and the results of the special elections, which were still to
be conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results of the elections.

Comelec denied Barbers’ petition and declared Biazon to be the winner for the 12th and
final slot in the Senate. Barbers sought the review of the Comelec’s Resolution before
the SC by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.

ISSUE

Can the Supreme Court take cognizance over Barbers’ petition?

RULING

NO.

The alleged invalidity of Biazon’s proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to

the election returns of members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such
dispute falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET. For this Court to take cognizance of
the electoral protest against Biazon would usurp the constitutional functions of the SET.

Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Sec. 17. The Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Xxx”

Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal provides: The Senate
Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the Senate.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. The word sole in Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) underscores the exclusivity of the SETs jurisdiction over election
contests relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is
categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that the SC has no jurisdiction to entertain
Barbers’ petition. Since Barbers contests Biazons proclamation as the 12th winning
senatorial candidate, it is the SET, which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers
complaint.

EXISTENCE OF OTHER REMEDY PRECLUDES DIRECT RESORT TO THE

SUPREME COURT VIA CERTIORARI. Where the candidate has already been
proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an
electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal. In like manner, where as in the present case,
Barbers assails Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th duly elected Senator, Barbers’ proper
recourse is to file a regular election protest with the SET.

Certiorari and prohibition will not lie in this case considering that there is an available and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul the COMELECs assailed
proceedings.
8) Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010

FACTS

G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo
party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007
elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against
petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in
the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative.

It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not
Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee,
said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.

G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list
group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the
House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims
of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former
rebels, and security guards.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it
was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership
in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee.
Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal
concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group,
not before the HRET.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan

RULING

YES.

Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected
members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are,
the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the
cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee
has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as
member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-
list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon
and Palparan.

9) Abbas v. SET, 166 SCRA 651

FACTS
On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election contest

against 22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators-elect. With the

exemption of Senator Estrada, the senators filed for motion for disqualification or

inhibition from the hearing and resolution on the ground that all of them are interested

parties to said case.

ISSUE
Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are sitting in
the tribunal?

RULING

NO.

Composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; The Constitutional provision clearly

mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a representative or
representatives of the Supreme Court.

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both
Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended
that both those “Judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it
held that said provision “x x x is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests x x
x shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators’) peers in that
Chamber are represented.” The other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision
just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a
representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.

The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
—

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What
we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators
and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members
alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

10) Pimentel v. HRET, G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002

FACTS

On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance
with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first
time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose
nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list
representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q.
Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from
party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang
Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and
Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2
representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative
each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its
representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the
nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on
Appointments (CA). From available records, it does not appear that after the 11 May
1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives
to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to the
HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the
different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote
two letters addressed to the Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and
to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of
the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the
restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives
to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its meeting of 20
January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator
Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same
day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the
letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2
February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order)
against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and
Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act,
party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in
the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February
2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On
11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their petitions to
implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his capacity as
Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted both
motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions
on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his
capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list
representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-
petitioners.

ISSUES
1. Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no
party-list representatives in the HRET.

2. Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to

include party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

RULING
1. NO.

The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the

prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and
party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the
HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the
Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would
fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on
Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who
among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective
electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of
the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the
House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to
the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.[26] However, under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the
House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise,
‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone
to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action
the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in
the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents
prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in the election of members
of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the
House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the
CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at
that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list
representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the
petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list
representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-
list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the
issues presented by petitioners at this time.

2. There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in
response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power
to reconstitute themselves.

11) Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792

FACTS

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc
of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of
Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of
whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of
Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP).
Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.
Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman
Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura

received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly
helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting
LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the
promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura
to the HRET.

ISSUE

Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political
party therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending
therein.

RULING

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence
from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of
party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In
expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in
favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the
ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its
resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives
is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the
HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution.
Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such
as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not
be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he
has formally affiliated with another.

12) Lerias v. HRET, 202 SCRA 808

FACTS

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. wrote a letter to Senate President and Chairman of HRET
requesting them to restructure the CA and HRET to include party-list representatives to
conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.

Thereafter, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court their Petitions for Prohibitions,
Mandamus, and Preliminary Injunction against HRET, and its corresponding Chairman
and Members contending that party-list representatives should have at least 1.2 or 1 seat
in the HRET and 2.4 setas in the CA contending that respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel.

ISSUE:

Whether the present composition of the HRET violates the constitutional requirement of
proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET.

The court cannot pass upon the petition because it finds no violation of the constitution.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the court may not interfere with the exercise
by the House of the constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list
groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the
CA. Neither does it appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections, the House barred the
party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it
appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply
refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did not
designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions, with the
predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for
election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives
lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented
by petitioners at this time.

Section 18: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the

President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from
their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.

1) Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496

FACTS:
Daza was chosen to be part of the Commission of Appointments and was listed as
representative of the Liberal Party. LDP was reorganized and 24 members from the
Liberal Party transferred to LDP. Because of this, the House of Representatives revised
its representation by withdrawing the seat given to Daza and giving it to the newly-
formed LDP. Singson was chosen to replace Daza, in accordance to proportional
representation.

Issues

1. Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a stable political party

2. Whether it is necessary for the party to be registered to be entitled to proportional
representation in the CA

RULING and Ratio

Both petitioner and respondent invoke the case of Cunanan v. Tan. In the said case, 25
Members of the Nacionalista Party reorganized themselves and formed the Allied
Majority. 3 Nacionalista Congressmen, originally chosen, were deprived of their seats by
colleagues who joined the Allied Majority. Carlos Cunanan’s ad interim appointment was
rejected by the CA. Jorge Tan was designated in his place. Cunanan contended the
validity of the rejection. The Court agreed that Allied Majority was merely a temporary
combination; officially, they were still part of the Nacionalista Party. Thus, the
reorganization of the CA at that time was not based on proportional representation. The
Court held that mere shift of votes should not affect the organization of the CA, or else, it
would forever be at the mercy of the House of Representatives.
The petitioner argues that LDP is not a permanent party and has not yet achieved
stability. However, the LDP has already been in existence for a year. They command the
biggest following. They not only survived but prevailed.
Regarding being a duly registered party, the LDP was granted its registration as a
political party by the COMELEC. Thus, shattering the argument of the petitioner that
registration is required.

2) Coseteng v. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377

Facts:
Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives
under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the
Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a request backed by nine
congressmen.

Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12
congressmen to the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member,
representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also
organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA
due to political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson
(LDP).

Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary
Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the
Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members
null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats
and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that
she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from the
Minority.

The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question,
hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional
representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the
Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.

Issue:

W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.

Held:

Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political
question but because revision in House representation in CA was based on proportional
representation.

The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in
the House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up
10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties.
KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices.
Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than
1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House
seats in CA.

Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not
members of her party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong.
Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been

nominated and elected by their parties because of members were nominated by their
floor leaders and elected by the House.

Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the
Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by
the other government branches.
3) Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 316

FACTS: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in

the Senate for the Commission on Appointments (COA) is as follows: LDP—7.5; LP-
PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC—2.5; LAKAS-NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one Senator by
adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing,
one other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s
representation in the COA to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.
Respondents filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration, alleging, among others, that
decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and
spirit of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions; It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the
Commission on Appointments; The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion
when it elected respondent Tañada to the Commission on Appointments; and that the
election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system which
contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of any
party in the Commission.

The court denied the MR, stating that the respondent's claim to membership in the
Commission on Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the
Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that
twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties represented therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of Article VI, Sec. 18

RULING: The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada in the Commission on
Appointments for the year alluded to by respondents is not disputed. The questioned
decision however refers to the former Senator's Membership in the Commission during
his first election as Senator in 1953-1954. In the following years the composition of the
Commission on Appointments showed varying membership from the Nacionalista Party
and Liberal Party, not discounting the various coalitions of the rival groups within their
own ranks.

His membership in the Commission was never contested nor disputed by any party nor
member of the Senate so that the question of whether his sitting as member of the
Commission was constitutionality valid or not never reached the Court. The older
Tañada's membership in the Commission on Appointments cannot thus be considered
by respondent Senator Tañada as a precedent sufficient to overrule the clear mandate of
Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.

His election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party
with the Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the strength of his
being the lone representative of the Citizens' Party. The Senate recognized the rule on
proportional representation in the Commission by resorting to a coalition of political
parties in order to resolve and avoid fractional membership in the Commission.

The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada to the Commission on Appointments
does not reflect any practice or tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a
precedent in the interpretation of the constitutional provision on proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments. No practice or tradition, established
by a mere tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a doctrine of practical
construction of the fundamental law. In the absence of judicial confirmation of the
constitutionality of the challenged legislative practice the repeated erroneous legislative
interpretation of a constitutional provision, does not vest power on the legislature.

This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a
multi-party system, entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments requires a minimum membership in each house. The mere presence of
one Senator belonging to a political party does not ipso facto entitle such a party to
membership in the Commission on Appointments.

We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12
Senators be elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it
can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the
Commission. The overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a
proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the Commission
on Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership
is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution.
The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of
proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in
unusual situations like the case at bar.

Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its
functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum, which is less
than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly
perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected
thereto. Even if respondent Senator Tañada is excluded from the Commission on
Appointments for violation of the rule on proportional representation, the party he
represents still has representation in the Commission in the presence of house members
from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile.
4) Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1

FACTS: In 2005, the anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project(NRP) as well
as the Graci tapes surfaced, which prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing and
investigate the said scandals, particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The Senate
committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak
before them as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department
heads cannot attend due to pressing matters. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a
similar letter. Drilon, the Senate President, excepted the letters.

Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. It prohibited the
Department Heads, Senior Officials of Exec. Dept, flag officers of AFP, PNP with rank of
chief superintendent and others as may be determined by the President, from appearing
in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the President’s approval.
Those department heads and military officers invited by the Senate invoked EO 464 to
except themselves. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it allegedly infringes on
the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and
conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional

RULING: EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of

the subject EO, SC distinguished Sec. 21 and 22 of Art 6 of the Constitution. The
Congress’ power of inquiry is expressed in Sec. 21. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House with power to make investigations and
exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.
Stated differently, the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence
of information; and where the body does not itself possess the requisite information,
recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

Sec. 22 provides for the Question Hour which is closely related to legislative power and it
is precisely a complement to or a supplement of the legislative inquiry. The appearance
of the members of the Cabinet is essential not only to the application of check and
balance but also in aid of legislation.

A distinction was thus made between Sec. 21 and 22. One specifically relates to conduct
of inquiries in aid of legislation – the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used
for legislation; while the other aims to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. While attendance is discretionary in Question Hour, it is mandatory in Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation. The power of Congress to compel appearance under Sec. 21 but
the lack of it under Sec. 22 is based in the principle of Separation of Powers. While Exec.
Branch is a co-equal branch, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power
to inquiry, the only way to be exempted is by a valid claim of privilege. Only one Exec.
Official may be excused – the President.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent as per EO 464, limited as it is only
to appearances in the Question Hour, is valid on its face. However, this shall not be
applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is
not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department heads to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim is subsequently made by either the President of the
Exec. Secretary.

5) Gudani v. Senga, 498 SCRA 671

FACTS
Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani
and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan
were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not
testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen.
Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the
Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following
day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service.
After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of
Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo
be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen.
Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or
orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of
their having testified before the Senate.

ISSUE
1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry?

2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even
if the President desires otherwise?

3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4
October 2005?

RULING
1. Yes. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Philippines. Outside the limitations of
provisions such as Sec. 5, Art. XVI, the President has absolute authority over members
of the armed forces, and can restrict their mobility and speech. Both restrictions are
necessary to insulate the military from partisan politics and to ensure that they are ready
to be called in times of emergency. The military must follow the President’s authority
pursuant to the principles of discipline and obedience to the chain of command, with
violation of the latter punishable under Art. 65 of the Articles of War.

The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as

commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general
rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before
Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the
prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control
over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of
higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as
commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position.
Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the
President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and
obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose
the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to
appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes
as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation.
Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as
commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with
Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in
this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the
Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to
require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or
actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which
members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s
prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the
legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before
Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and
executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various
constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only
as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of
behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a
similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness
inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation,
such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to
compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.

3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to
be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were
initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been
acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has
fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation
of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October
2005.
6) NOEC II v. Sangguniang Panlungsod, G.R. No. 72492, Nov. 5, 1987

FACTS
Assailed is the validity of a subpoena sent by the respondent Committee to the
petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the
General Manager, respectively, of petitioner NegrosOriental II Electric Cooperative
(NORECO II), requiring their attendance and testimony at the Committee's investigation.
The investigation to be conducted by respondent Committee was "in connection with
pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities" in the City of Dumaguete
where petitioner NORECO II, an electric cooperative, had its principal place of business.
Specifically, the inquiry was to focus on the alleged installation and use by the petitioner
NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that city. Respondent Antonio S. Ramas
Uypitching, as Chairman of the Committee on Public Utilities and Franchises and Co-
Chairman of the respondent Ad Hoc Committee, signed both the subpoena and the
Order complained of.
Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena on the following grounds:
a. The power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient
power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification
Administration; and

b. Neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the Local Government Code
grants (the Sangguniang Panlungsod) any specific power to investigate alleged
inefficient power lines of NORECO II.

Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft

of the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to
order the arrest of witnesses who fail to obey the subpoena. It is further argued that
assuming the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in
said body, it cannot be exercised in the investigation of matters affecting the terms and
conditions of the franchise granted to NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the
SangguniangPanlungsod.
Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by
the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in aid of
legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its
jurisdiction. It is also the position of the respondents that the contempt power, if not
expressly granted, is necessarily implied from the powers granted the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Furthermore, the respondents assert that an inquiry into the installation or
use of inefficient power lines and its effect on the power consumption cost on the part of
Dumagueteresidents is well-within the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and its
committees.

ISSUE
Whether the Sanguniang Panlungsod has the power to mandate the testimony of
witnesses and order arrests who fail to observe the subpoena?
RULING:
NO
1. A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the
legislative power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the
legislative bodies of local government units, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative power. While
the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress with the power to punish non-
members for legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the
legislative body as a means of preserving its authority and dignity, in the same way that
courts wield an inherent power to "enforce their authority, preserve their integrity,
maintain their dignity, and ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice.
The Court proceeded to delve deeper into the essence of the contempt power of the
Philippine Congress in a subsequent decision arising from the same factual antecedents:
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power. When the framers of the Constitution
adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the
realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be
full and complete, independently of the other's authority or power. And how could the
authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance,
every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal
therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity. . .

Whether or not the reasons for upholding the existence of said power in Congress may
be applied mutatis mutandis to a questioned exercise of the power of contempt by the
respondent committee of a city council is the threshold issue in the present controversy.

3. The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation

as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the
judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt
power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot
correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The
power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of
the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.
The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law.
4. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only
possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-
members for contumacious behaviour would be for said power to be deemed implied in
the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the
subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of
legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to
exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power in
any government body inevitably poses a potential derogation of individual rights, i.e.
compulsion of testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally
construed to have impliedly granted such powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot be
lightly presumed that the sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government
powers, have reposed these powers in all government agencies. The intention of the
sovereign people, through their representatives in the legislature, to share these unique
and awesome powers with the local legislative bodies must therefore clearly appear in
pertinent legislation.
There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local
legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for
contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the
petitionersTorres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative
body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers.
5. Even assuming that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent
Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of,
such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power if actually
possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within
the jurisdiction of the legislative body. As admitted by the respondents in their Comment,
the investigation to be conducted by the Ad-Hoc Committee was to look into the use by
NORECO II of inefficient power lines "of pre-war vintage" which the latter had acquired
from the Visayan Electric Company, and "to hear the side of the petitioners". It becomes
evident that the inquiry would touch upon the efficiency of the electric service of
NORECO II and, necessarily, its compliance with the franchise. Such inquiry is beyond
the jurisdiction of the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent
committee.
There is no doubt that a city government has the power to enact ordinances regulating
the installation and maintenance of electric power lines or wires within its territorial
jurisdiction. The power subsists notwithstanding the creation of the National
Electrification Administration (NEA), to which body the franchise powers of local
government units were transferred by Presidential Decree No. 269.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete may, therefore, enact ordinances to
regulate the installation and maintenance of electric power lines, e.g. prohibit the use of
inefficient power lines, in order to protect the city residents from the hazards these may
pose. In aid of this ordinance-making power, said body or any of its committees may
conduct investigations similar to, but not the same as, the legislative investigations
conducted by the national legislature. As already discussed, the difference lies in the
lack of subpoena power and of the power to punish for contempt on the part of the local
legislative bodies. They may only invite resource persons who are willing to supply
information which may be relevant to the proposed ordinance. The type of investigation
which may be conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod does not include within its
ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by an electric cooperative of the conditions
of its electric franchise.
In the exercise of this power, the NEA may conduct hearings and investigations, issue
subpoenas and invoke the aid of the courts in case of disobedience to its subpoenas
(Sec. 47 & Sec. 54, P.D. 269). Clearly, then, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dumaguete cannot look into any suspected failure of NORECO II to comply with the
standards of electric service prescribed by law and in its franchise. The proper recourse
is to file a complaint with the NEA against NORECO II if there be sufficient basis therefor.
The legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared null and
void for being ultravires. The respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent
Ad-Hoc Committee are without power to punish non-members for contempt.

7) Standard v. Senate, 541 SCRA 456

FACTS

SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro
Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation
Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately
conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent
in the future. The respondent Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid
of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly involving the same
issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of
respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon
the judicial powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing
cases.

RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution,
as initiated in the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to
denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered
foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a
similar fraudulent in the future."

The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-

judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise
of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an
essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation.

The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may

or may not be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish
for contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives
cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal
culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation,
respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy
whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may
include in its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who
may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence,
contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the
prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.

8) Dela Paz v. Senate, 579 SCRA 521

FACTS

Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended at the Moscow airport departure area for his
failure to declare in written form the 150, 000 euros found in his possession. As a
result, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations conducted an inquiry and
issued warrants of arrest in connection with the “Euro-General’s” detention in
Moscow. However, Dela Paz contended that the said Senate Committee chaired by
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, was devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the
Moscow incident as it does not involve state to state relations as provided in par.
12, sec. 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure. He added that the arrest
warrants issued by the Senate against him were invalid as these lacked the
required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent committee. Are
the contentions of the Dela Paz tenable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. In a nine-page unanimous resolution penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B.

Nachura, the Court enumerated six reasons why the petition of the spouses Dela
Paz “must inevitably fail.”

The Court cited sec. 16(3), Art. VI of the Constitution, which states that each House
shall determine the rules of its proceedings. “The challenge to the jurisdiction of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee…in effect, asks this Court to inquire into
a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate….[I]t is not for this Court to
intervene in what is clearly a question of policy, an issue depended upon the
wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate’s action,” the Court said.

Second, the Court said that even if it is within the Court’s power to inquire into the
validity of the exercise of assailed jurisdiction, it is convinced that respondent
Committee has acted within the proper sphere of its authority. Citing the same
provision raised by dela Paz, the Court said that the Senate provision
“unmistakably shows that the investigation of the Moscow incident is well within
its committee’s jurisdiction.” visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court cautioned that
the Moscow incident could create ripples in the relations between the Philippines
and Russia, noting that country is a state-party to the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption and the United Nations Convetion Against Transnational
Organized Crime. The two conventions contain provisions dealing with the
movement of considerable foreign currency across borders. The Moscow incident
would reflect on our country’s compliance with the obligations required of state-
parties under these conventions, noted the Court.

Third, the Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be jointly conducted
by the respondent Committee and the Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee). Pursuant to par. 36,
sec. 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee may conduct
investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the government.

Fourth, the Philippine Senate has issued a formal written order of arrest signed by
10 senators, with the Senate President himself approving it, in accordance with the
Senate Rules.

Fifth, the Philippine Senate has already published its Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in two newspapers of general Circulation.

Lastly, the arrest order issued against the Dela Paz coupled has been rendered
ineffectual when Gen. Dela Paz voluntarily submitted himself during the Senate
inquiry held on November 15, 2008. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
initially scheduled the hearing on the Moscow incident on October 23, 2008. (GR
No. 184849, Spouses Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
February 13, 2009

OR

FACTS
Petitioner Gen. dela Paz was detained by the local authorities at the Moscow
departure area for the failure of declaration and the discovery of 105, 000 Euros in
his luggage. Waiting upon his arrival in Manila is a subpoena from the Senate
Committee for an investigation with regards to the incident in Moscow.
ISSUE
Whether the Senate Committee has jurisdiction over a matter involving state to
state relations?
HELD
YES. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that is to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. The Senate has the capacity to set its own rules of proceedings as
the provision of the Philippine Constitution. The exercise of its power is exempted
from any interference and supervision from the Judiciary.
The Senate Rules provide that the Senate Committee shall cover in its jurisdiction
all matters relating to the relations of the Philippines with other nations generally;
diplomatic and consular services; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the
United Nations Organization and its agencies; multi-lateral organizations, all
international agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas Filipinos.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being moot and
academic.

9) Romero v. Estrada, 583 SCRA 396

FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the
invitations and other compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee on Labor,
Employment, and Human Resources Development (Committee) in connection with its
investigation on the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)
funds in the Smokey Mountain project. On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II,
as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an invitation, 1 signed by
the Legislative Committee Secretary, which pertinently reads as follows:

Dear Mr. Romero:

Pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 537, entitled: "RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE LABOR
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE LIABILITY FOR
PLUNDER OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT RAMOS AND OTHERS, FOR THE ILLEGAL
INVESTMENT OF OWWA FUNDS IN THE SMOKEY MOUNTAIN PROJECT, CAUSING
A LOSS TO OWWA OF P550.86 MILLION".

The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and
possible amendments to the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act"
and to craft a much needed legislation relative to the stated subject matter and purpose
of the aforementioned Resolutions.
On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed the instant petition, docketed as G.R. No. 174105,
seeking to bar the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from
compelling petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus issued.

Failing to secure the desired TRO sought in the petition, petitioner Romero II appeared at
the September 4, 2006 Committee investigation.

Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO.

ISSUE: Whether or not the senate committee hearing was constitutional. (YES)

RULING: YES. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

RATIO: The Court petition. resolves to dismiss the instant petition. A legislative
investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one
hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the
application of a law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving
demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia,
undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus,
legislate wisely and effectively; 17 and to determine whether there is a need to improve
existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, 18 albeit the inquiry need not result in
any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional
hearings in aid of legislation.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court need not belabor the other issues raised in this
recourse. Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to
petitioners to appear before it in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned
investments, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was quoted at the
outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring
persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. 21 Sabio emphasizes the
importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if
incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked:

Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that ["this right may be]
invoked by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat x x x only when the incriminating
question is being asked, since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or
effect of the questions to be asked of them. That this right may possibly be violated or
abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their power of inquiry.
The consolation is that when this power is abused, such issue may be presented before
the courts.

Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses x x x
will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it [is] their duty to cooperate with
them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The
unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity
of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the
realm of proper investigation. 22 (Emphasis supplied.)

As a matter of long and sound practice, the Court refrains from touching on the issue of
constitutionality except when it is unavoidable and is the very lis mota 23 of the
controversy. So it must be here. Indeed, the matter of the constitutionality of the assailed
Committee invitations and subpoenas issued vis - à-vis the investigation conducted
pursuant to PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 has ceased to be a justiciable controversy,
having been rendered moot and academic by supervening events heretofore indicated.
In short, there is no more investigation to be continued by virtue of said resolutions; there
is no more investigation the constitutionality of which is subject to a challenge.

10) Garcillano v. House, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008

FACTS

ISSUE
RULING

11) Neri v. Senate, 564 SCRA 152

FACTS
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to
be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18,
2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power
brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE

Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive

privilege.

RULING

YES. The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide
by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of
Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does
not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept
has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the
area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of
the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely
contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege
on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary
in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did
not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the
September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with
the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of
Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

12) Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 25

FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known
as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to
resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a
non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in
the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited
anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who
benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions,
was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the
investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to
whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million
proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody
of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He
thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning
the validity of his detention.

ISSUES
 1. Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00
2. Whether or not the Senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for
a term beyond its period of legislative session.
3. Whether or not the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination

RULING

1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House
of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry –
with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
– which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and
also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and
cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by
the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the
parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious
that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said
deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be
determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the
inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have
already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every
question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation;
what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

xxx xxx xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that
subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt
to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the
existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without
impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed
during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing
investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such
committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very
purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-
preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
[P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal
instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of
that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable
rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the
Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him
as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear
reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as
well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus
developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a
question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to
show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of
the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable
to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege
by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to
secure immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of
the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved
from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but
rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.

13) Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704

SABIO v. GORDON (related to Art. VI, Section 21 not Section 18)

FACTS:

Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President Corazon C. Aquino installed
her regime by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1, creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon this Commission the
herculean task of recovering the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.
Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance."
Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG's unhampered performance of its task.

Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that
it tramples upon the Senate's power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI,
Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate
Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on
the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT),
and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors." According to said Resolution, the
Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of
Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a
relative of an executive committee member; to date there have been no payments given,
subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004.

On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard
J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners,
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No.
455.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time,
he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.

Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, approved by Senate President

Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede,
Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing
scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters
specified in Senate Res. No. 455. Similar subpoenae were issued against the directors
and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.

Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August
18, 2006, he reiterated his earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the
other hand, the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation relied on the
position paper they previously filed, which raised issues on the propriety of legislative
inquiry.

This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order requiring Chairman Sabio and
Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should
not be cited in contempt of the Senate.

They submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation, which partly
reads:

Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the subject inquiry in aid of legislation.
But the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the
parameters of the Constitution and the law. On this score, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1
should not be ignored as it explicitly provides:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce

evidence in any judicial legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.

With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the
power of legislative inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to provide
protection to the PCGG in order to ensure the unhampered performance of its
duties under its charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section 4(b) of which had not been
amended, repealed or revised in any way.

XxxxxxX

Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on

Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public
Services issued an Order directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest
for contempt of the Senate.

The Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the
Committees' members.

Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No.
82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he
was detained.

Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against
the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and
Joker P. Arroyo and Members.

Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the PCGG's
nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni,
likewise filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the same
respondents, and also against Senate President Manuel Villar, Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the entire Senate. The case was docketed as
G.R. No. 174318.

Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution granting respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative
inquiry.

It reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees

may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.

On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of
legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce

evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.

To determine whether there exists a clear and unequivocal repugnancy between the two
quoted provisions that warrants a declaration that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the
1987 Constitution, a brief consideration of the Congress' power of inquiry is imperative.

Chairman Sabio also argues that respondent Senate Committees have no power to
punish him and his Commissioners for contempt of the Senate.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution

This issue hinges the merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners that their refusal to appear before respondent Senate Committees
is justified

2. Whether respondent Senate Committees have power to punish petitioner Sabio

and his Commissioners for contempt of the Senate

RULING:

1. YES.

The Congress' power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it
reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty, cited in Arnault v. Nazareno. In those
earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power
to legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs v. MacKellar explains the breath and basis of the
power, thus:

Where no constitutional limitation or restriction exists, it is competent for either of the two
bodies composing the legislature to do, in their separate capacity, whatever may be
essential to enable them to legislate….It is well-established principle of this parliamentary
law, that either house may institute any investigation having reference to its own
organization, the conduct or qualification of its members, its proceedings, rights, or
privileges or any matter affecting the public interest upon which it may be important
that it should have exact information, and in respect to which it would be
competent for it to legislate. The right to pass laws, necessarily implies the right to
obtain information upon any matter which may become the subject of a law. It is
essential to the full and intelligent exercise of the legislative function….In
American legislatures the investigation of public matters before committees,
preliminary to legislation, or with the view of advising the house appointing the
committee is, as a parliamentary usage, well established as it is in England, and
the right of either house to compel witnesses to appear and testify before its committee,
and to punish for disobedience has been frequently enforced….The right of inquiry, I
think, extends to other matters, in respect to which it may be necessary, or may be
deemed advisable to apply for legislative aid.

XXXXXXX

Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it

recognized that the power of inquiry is "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function," thus:

Although there is no provision in the "Constitution expressly investing either House of

Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental
to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite
information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who
possess it."

XXXXXXXXX

Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress' power of inquiry, provisions on such
power made their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution.
Then came the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What
was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American
jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of
Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a
direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the
mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative
function are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in
Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is
co-extensive with the power to legislate."

CONSIDERING THESE JURISPRUDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS, WE FIND SECTION

4(B) DIRECTLY REPUGNANT WITH ARTICLE VI, SECTION 21.

Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. NOWHERE IN THE CONSTITUTION IS ANY
PROVISION GRANTING SUCH EXEMPTION. The Congress' power of inquiry, being
broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws
as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends "to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power
of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class.

CERTAINLY, A MERE PROVISION OF LAW CANNOT POSE A LIMITATION TO THE

BROAD POWER OF CONGRESS, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL
BASIS.

Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the
Constitution stating that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives."

Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle
of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach
of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging
public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and
non-accountability.

2. YES

Article VI, Section 21 provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees

may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.

It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for "contempt of Senate Committees
and the Philippine Senate" was approved by Senate President Villar and signed by
fifteen (15) Senators. From this, it can be concluded that the Order is under the
authority, not only of the respondent Senate Committees, but of the entire Senate.

At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees.

Clearly, there is a direct conferral of power to the committees.

Father Bernas, in his Commentary on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed out its
significance:

It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of
investigation not just of Congress but also of "any of its committees." This is significant
because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the
committees and it means that the means which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the Committees.

XXXX

This is a reasonable conclusion.

The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress
must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.
Otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 will be meaningless.
The indispensability and usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative
inquiry is underscored in a catena of cases, foreign and local.

In Arnault v. Balagtas, the Court further explained that the contempt power of Congress
is founded upon reason and policy and that the power of inquiry will not be complete if for
every contumacious act, Congress has to resort to judicial interference, thus:

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot
require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information if it is
impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the
Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch
supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each
department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's
authority or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for
every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the
legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy,
because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts
committed against its authority or dignity.43

In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Dumaguete, the Court characterized contempt power as a matter of self-preservation,
thus:

The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation

as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the
judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt
power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis x x x.

14) Balag v. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018

ARVIN R. BALAGv.SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

CASE: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to
annul, set aside and enjoin the implementation of Senate P.S. Resolution (SR) No.
504 and the Order (Contempt Order)of the Senate Committee on Public Order and
Dangerous Drugs citing Arvin Balag (petitioner) in contempt.

FACTS:

On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio Ill), a first year law
student of the University of Sto. Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing
conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity (AJ Fraternity) of the same university.

SR No. 504, was filed by Senator Juan Miguel Zubiri condemning the death of
Horacio III and directing the appropriate Senate Committee to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, to hold those responsible accountable.

· The Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs chaired by

Senator PanfiloLacson together with the Committees on Justice and Human
Rights and Constitutional Amendment and Revision of Codes, invited petitioner
and several other persons to the Joint Public Hearing.

· Petitioner, however, did not attend the hearing scheduled.

· On October 11, 2017, Senator Lacson as Chairman of Senate Committee on

Public Order and Dangerous Drugs, and as approved by Senate President Aquilino
Pimentel III, issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum addressed to petitioner directing him
to appear before the committee and to testify as to the subject matter under inquiry.
Another Subpoena Ad Testificandum was issued on October 17, 2017, which was
received by petitioner on the same day, requiring him to attend the legislative hearing on
October 18, 2017.

· On said date, petitioner attended the senate hearing.

· In the course of the proceedings, Senator Grace Poe (Senator Poe) asked
petitioner if he was the president of AJ Fraternity but he refused to answer the
question and invoked his right against self-incrimination.

· Senator Poe repeated the question but he still refused to answer. Senator
Lacson then reminded him to answer the question because it was a very simple
question, otherwise, he could be cited in contempt.

· Senator Poe retorted that petitioner might still be clinging to the supposed
"Code of Silence" in his alleged text messages to his fraternity. She manifested
that petitioner's signature appeared on the application for recognition of the AJ
Fraternity and on the organizational sheet, indicating that he was the president.

· Petitioner, again, invoked his right against self-incrimination.

· Senator Poe then moved to cite him in contempt, which was seconded by
Senators Joel Villanueva (Senator Villanueva) and Zubiri. Senator Lacson ruled
that the motion was properly seconded, hence, the Senate Sergeant-at-arms was
ordered to place petitioner in detention after the committee hearing.

· Thus, petitioner was placed under the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-
arms by virtue of a Contempt Order.

· Hence, this petition.

PETITIONER:

· The legislative inquiry conducted by respondent committees was not in aid of

legislation; rather, it was in aid of prosecution.
· He properly invoked his right against self-incrimination as the questions
propounded by Senator Poe regarding the officers, particularly the presidency of the AJ
Fraternity, were incriminating because the answer thereto involves an element of the
crime of hazing.
· The Senate illegally enforced and executed SR No. 504 and the Contempt Order,
which caused him grave and irreparable injury as he was deprived of his liberty without
due process of law. Respondents did not exercise their power of contempt judiciously
and with restraint.

SUPREME COURT:

· Petition is moot and academic. Respondent committees have terminated

their legislative inquiry. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention
of petitioner likewise ends.Accordingly, there is no more justiciable controversy
regarding respondents' exercise of their constitutional power to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation, their power of contempt, and the validity of petitioner's
detention.

· Nevertheless, there were occasions in the past when the Court passed upon
issues although supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and academic. In
this case, the petition presents a critical and decisive issue that must be
addressed by Court: what is the duration of the detention for a contempt ordered
by the Senate?This issue must be threshed out as the Senate's exercise of its power of
contempt without a definite period is capable of repetition. Moreover, the indefinite
detention of persons cited in contempt impairs their constitutional right to liberty. Thus,
paramount public interest requires the Court to determine such issue to ensure
that the constitutional rights of the persons appearing before a legislative inquiry
of the Senate are protected.

ISSUE:
WHAT IS THE DURATION OF THE DETENTION FOR A CONTEMPT ORDERED BY
THE SENATE?(To know the answer right away, skip the discussion below and go
directly to “SUPREME COURT RULING”)

JURISPRUDENCE RE: CONTEMPT POWER

In Arnault v. Nazareno (Arnault), where the Senate's power of contempt was

discussed, the Court held that the Senate "is a continuing body and which does
not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as to time [with] the Senate's power to punish
for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted xxx" It
was ruled therein that had contempt been exercised by the House of
Representatives, the contempt could be enforced until the final adjournment of the
last session of the said Congress.

Notably, Arnault gave a distinction between the Senate and the House of
Representatives' power of contempt. In the former, since it is a continuing body,
there is no time limit in the exercise of its power to punish for contempt; on the
other hand, the House of Representatives, as it is not a continuing body, has a
limit in the exercise of its power to punish for contempt, which is on the final
adjournment of its last session.

Later, in Neri v. Senate (Neri), the Court clarified the nature of the Senate as
continuing body:

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court sees fit to issue a
clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is
"continuing'', as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or
change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-
day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of
the Senate of the Congress before it.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills
and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered
terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate
of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status,
but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily
apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically
have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by
the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a
continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters
will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of
course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

Based on the above-pronouncement, the Senate is a continuing institution.

However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Congress
acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. Due to
the termination of the business of the Senate during the expiration of one (1)
Congress, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the
succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status,
but as if presented for the first time.

WHY IS THERE A NEED TO LIMIT THE PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT?

SC:There is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of

imprisonment that may be imposed by the Senate pursuant to its inherent power
of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation. Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of legislation,
must respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein.

Under Arnault, however, a witness or resource speaker cited in contempt by the

Senate may be detained indefinitely due to its characteristic as a continuing body.
The said witness may be detained for a day, a month, a year, or even for a lifetime
depending on the desire of the perpetual Senate.Certainly, in that case, the rights
of persons appearing before or affected by the legislative inquiry are in jeopardy.
The constitutional right to liberty that every citizen enjoys certainly cannot be
respected when they are detained for an indefinite period of time without due
process of law.

As discussed in Lopez, Congress' power of contempt rests solely upon the right of self-
preservation and does not extend to the infliction of punishment as such. It is a means to
an end and not the end itself. 48 Even arguendo that detention under the legislative's
inherent power of contempt is not entirely punitive in character because it may be used
by Congress only to secure information from a recalcitrant witness or to remove an
obstruction, it is still a restriction to the liberty of the said witness. It is when the
restrictions during detention are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to
punish. Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related
rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that
purpose. An indefinite and unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive
restriction and will certainly violate any person's right to liberty.
It is recognized that the Senate's inherent power of contempt is of utmost
importance. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence
of information respecting the conditions which the legislations are intended to
affect or change. Mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also
that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed through the power of
contempt during legislative inquiry.

While there is a presumption of regularity that the Senate will not gravely abuse its
power of contempt, there is still a lingering and unavoidable possibility of
indefinite imprisonment of witnesses as long as there is no specific period of
detention, which is certainly not contemplated and envisioned by the Constitution.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

WHAT IS THE DURATION OF THE DETENTION FOR A CONTEMPT ORDERED BY

THE SENATE?

1. The Court finds that THE PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT UNDER THE

INHERENT POWER OF CONTEMPT BY THE SENATE DURING INQUIRIES IN AID
OF LEGISLATION SHOULD ONLY LAST UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY UNDER WHICH THE SAID POWER IS INVOKED.

In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its process may be enforced by the
Senate Committee if the subject of investigation before it was within the range of
legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called relates to that
subject. Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the
inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely,
once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of
contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained
witness.

2. The Court further rules that THE LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY OF THE SENATE
TERMINATES ON TWO INSTANCES:

First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report.

Sections 22 and 23 of Senate Rules state:

Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the
inquiry, the Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report…

The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed
with the Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next Order of
Business.

Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be
referred to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar. (emphases supplied)

As gleaned above, the Senate Committee is required to issue a Committee Report after
the conduct of the legislative inquiry. The importance of the Committee Report is
highlighted in the Senate Rules because it mandates that the committee begin the
consideration of its Report within fifteen (15) days from the conclusion of the inquiry. The
said Committee Report shall then be approved by a majority vote of all its members;
otherwise, it is disapproved. The said Report shall be the subject matter of the next order
of business, and it shall be acted upon by the Senate. Evidently, the Committee Report
is the culmination of the legislative inquiry. Its approval or disapproval signifies
the end of such legislative inquiry and it is now up to the Senate whether or not to
act upon the said Committee Report in the succeeding order of business. At that
point, the power of contempt simultaneously ceases and the detained witness
should be released. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of
the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.

Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of
one (1) Congress.

As stated in Neri, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of
that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to
take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first
time. Again, while the Senate is a continuing institution, its proceedings are
terminated upon the expiration of that Congress at the final adjournment of its last
session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon that expiration, the
imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends.

3. In Arnault, there have been fears that placing a limitation on the period of
imprisonment pursuant to the Senate's power of contempt would "deny to it an
essential and appropriate means for its performance." Also, in view of the limited
period of imprisonment, "the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the
next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the
witness until the investigation is completed xxx."

The Court is of the view that these fears are insufficient to permit an indefinite or an
unspecified period of imprisonment under the Senate's inherent power of contempt. If
Congress believes that there is a necessity to supplement its power of contempt
by extending the period of imprisonment beyond the conduct of its legislative
inquiry or beyond its final adjournment of the last session, then it can enact a law
or amend the existing law that penalizes the refusal of a witness to testify or
produce papers during inquiries in aid of legislation. The charge of contempt by
Congress shall be tried before the courts, where the contumacious witness will be
heard. More importantly, it shall indicate the exact penalty of the offense, which
may include a fine and/or imprisonment, and the period of imprisonment shall be
specified therein. This constitutes as the statutory power of contempt, which is
different from the inherent power of contempt.

Notably, there is an existing statutory provision under Article 150 of the Revised
Penal Code, which penalizes the refusal of a witness to answer any legal inquiry
before Congress, to wit:

Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the National Assembly, its committees or
subcommittees, by the Constitutional Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or
divisions. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from two hundred to one
thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person
who, having been duly summoned to attend as a witness before the National Assembly,
(Congress), its special or standing committees and subcommittees, the Constitutional
Commissions and its committees, subcommittees, or divisions, or before any
commission or committee chairman or member authorized to summon witnesses,
refuses, without legal excuse, to obey such summons, or being present before any such
legislative or constitutional body or official, refuses to be sworn or placed under
affirmation or to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers,
documents, or records in his possession, when required by them to do so in the
exercise of their functions. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who
shall restrain another from attending as a witness, or who shall induce disobedience to a
summon or refusal to be sworn by any such body or official. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Verily, the said law may be another recourse for the Senate to exercise its statutory
power of contempt. The period of detention provided therein is definite and is not
limited by the period of the legislative inquiry. Of course, the enactment of a new law or
the amendment of the existing law to augment its power of contempt and to extend the
period of imprisonment shall be in the sole discretion of Congress.

Moreover, the apprehension in Arnault - that the Senate will be prevented from
effectively conducting legislative hearings during recess - shall be duly addressed
because it is expressly provided herein that the Senate may still exercise its power
of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that the period of
imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry,
specifically, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Thus, the
Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and compelling even during its
recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons appearing are respected
because their detention shall not be indefinite.
Sec. 22

Senate v. Ermita,supra.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 23: 1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint

session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.

2. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,

authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

1) SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017)
and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was issued
declaring a state of national emergency and aimed to suppress lawlessness and
the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same
time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)
head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by
the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later
still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On
the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however
grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of
PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national
emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that
PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly
declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such
declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an
overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the
lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that
PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over
power.

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery
of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to
be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was issued declaring
a state of national emergency and aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same
time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)
head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by
the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later
still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On
the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however
grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of
PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national
emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that
PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly
declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such
declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural
calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an
overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The
Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the
lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that
PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over
power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

RULING: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of
the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected
due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the
case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same
time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following
way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP
1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of
PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the
growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing
to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military
aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to
simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or
duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at
bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017
shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct.
It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity
of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive
control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally
unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and
again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The
SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it
becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been
met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it
arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress.
They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The
SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President
Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed
PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate
‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction;
the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of
emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs
authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the
following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to
it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

WHEREFORE, the Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it

constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the
AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the
provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the
President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and
the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.
Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

3) Ampatuan v. DILG Secretary Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011

FACTS: On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then
Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao
and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She
directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by
the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence” in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273
“transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the
DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term
“transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the supervision
of the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy,

petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-
Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They
alleged that the President’s proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s
autonomy as these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s
operations and to seize the regional government’s powers. They also claimed that
the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in
the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent
incidents occurred and that the deployment of troops and the taking over of the
ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers.
Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be
declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE: 1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle
of local autonomy under the Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when
she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions

RULING:1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did
not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents
took the respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the
Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the
vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12
Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the
ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-
Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over the administration or the
operations of the ARMM.

2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood

under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry
out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in
the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by
Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a
power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.

3. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless

violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s
exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the
matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon.
Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the
determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress
lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by
grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s
judgment. Thus, the Court said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President
acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed
forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since
matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors
which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to
arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain
pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the
courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide
that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting
technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence

network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly
confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to
call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations
to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the
decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be
done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the
Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the
President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual basis. They simply
alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of
emergency, it follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary
had no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued
Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further
bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also
indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms
and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears
and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called
out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle
the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the
affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of
emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must
respect the President’s actions
4) Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017 -See MR Feb. 6, 2018

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.

1) Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630

FACTS

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the
tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality
of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact
the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is
also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the
Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

RULING

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives
as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it
is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only
the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law
must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power
not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the
Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must
come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local
needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by
the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on
separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings
were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No.
1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a
bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.
3) Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331

FACTS

Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with
injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works
particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some
of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the
petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed
within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at
Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any government property
or any important premises to the main highway. The respondents' contention is that there
is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from
the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the
land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government.

ISSUE

Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the
purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government?

RULING

No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue
for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of
the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion.
Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interest
and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use
public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether
the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of
the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally
serve the public.
Section 25: 1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended
by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget.
The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by
law.

2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill

unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates.

3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow
the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended,
and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.

5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the

President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.

6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only

for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law.

7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the
general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations
law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in
force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

1) Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517

FACTS
Petitioner Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
When RA 1600 took effect, petitioner had an accumulated active commissioned
service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the
provisions of RA 2334, and such reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor
after court-martial proceedings;
From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status
and as such, he has neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, nor was he ever employed in the Government in any capacity;
Garcia brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money" in the
court a quo to compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to reinstate him in the active commissioned
service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the
emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status.
He contended that his reversion was contrary to Par. 11 of RA 1600 which prohibits
the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers on active duty w/ at least 10 years of
accumulated active commissioned service.
However, the respondents contend that the paragraph 11 “Special Provisions for
the Armed Forces of the Philippines” has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the
budget in question or to any appropriation item contained law since RA 1600 is about
appropriation of money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-
1957, while the said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental government policy matters
of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the
AFP. and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2 4 of the 1935 Constitution of
the Philippines, which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation.

ISSUE
WON paragraph 11 RA 1600 is unconstitutional. Does it contain rider in an appropriation
bill?

RULING
YES.
The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to
disclose the relevance to any appropriation item.
RA 1600 is , is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation of the government
while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and
the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.
… That reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned
service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be
reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or
upon their request;…

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION

MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general
appropriation act. It was a completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be
expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not
embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void,
inoperative and without effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

2) Farinas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003

FACTS
The petition seeks to declare Section 14 of RA no. 9006 (The Fair Elections Act)
unconstitutional as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Blg. 881 (The Omnibus
Election Code )which provides:

Sec. 67 Candidates holding elective office-Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity,
except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Reason for the petition: The unconstitutionality rose upon the violation of Section 26 of
article 6 of the constitution requiring every law to have only one subject, which should be
expressed in its title.

RA No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while section 67 of the
Omnibus election code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office
rather than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity

Petitioners also asserted that Sec 14 violates equal protection clause because it repeals
Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving Section 66 intact which imposes
similar limitation to appointive individuals.

Sec. 66 Candidates holding appointive office or position- Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including members of the AFP, and officers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing his certificate of candidacy.

Respondents’ defense:

Section 14 of RA No. 9006 as it repeals Section 67 of Omnibus Election Code is

not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The title “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices” is broad and could encompass entire election
exercise including the filing of candidacy of elective officials.

The effectivity clause of RA No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due process
clause of the Constituion as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and
property.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 be rendered unconstitutional because it as it
expressly repealed Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and violated the “one-
subject-one title” rule?

Whether Section 14 of RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider?

*rider- additional provision added to a bill or other measure under the consideration by a
legislature having little connection with the subject matter of the bill.

RULING
NO and NO

Sec 26(1), Article IV provides:

“Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.”
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be
so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It is sufficient if
the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object.
The title of RA no. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible elections through Fair Election Practices.”
Section 2 provides the principles and objectives thereof: The State shall, during the
election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of media of communication or information to guarantee or
ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media time and space,
and the equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and for among
candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination.
The Court is convinced that the title and objectives of RA no. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Sec. 67 within its contemplation.
RA no. 9006 does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. An act having a single
general subject , indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions as long as
they are not inconsistent or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.
3) Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.

FACTS

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers
who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus,
Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five
(5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs
-of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation
of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before
the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – Social Justice Society President Alcantara filed a Petition for
Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional,
and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently.

G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided
for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional
and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they
pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE

Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once.
The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government,
Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and
Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to approve realignment
from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund,
subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is within the
same implementing unit and same project category as the original project; (ii)
allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original project/scope of
work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The
DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days
from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund shall be
limited within the same classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed
under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of
realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs,
the LGU concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the
funds have been deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee
on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as
the case may be.

PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was
created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-
President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate
government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social
Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD
1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special
funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff
through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and
projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the
principles of/constitutional provisions on accountability.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the
Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional.

RULING:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the
amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these
intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed
and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation
would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within
a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point
out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79
Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators,
which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.

Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF
Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79
Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of
spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents,
preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This
setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes
of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item
veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
“limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would
aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she
recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or amount per proposed
program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.”

Article VI, Section 25 (2) provides that “No provision or enactment shall be
embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited
in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.”
Moreover, Article VI, Section 25 (5) provides that “No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”

2. YES.

Regarding the Malampaya Fund:

The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase
gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public
funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined
only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied
by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and
general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific
things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited;
second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department
has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to
“energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government.”

Regarding the Presidential Fund:

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential
Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities
due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines.” The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the
authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for
restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose,
however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not
supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence,
leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the
delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification
since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as
unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable,
all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains
legally effective and subsisting.

Article VI, Section 25 (4) provides “A special appropriations bill shall specify the
purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding
revenue proposed therein.”
4) Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208

FACTS
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget
Reform Decree of 1977) as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly,
parties with general interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayer.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 provides:
“The president shall have authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are
included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved
after its enactment”.

In particular, petitioners claim that the provision violates the following constitutional
provision:
Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution — No law shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions
may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
The petition additionally argues that:

● The provision infringes upon fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of

public funds
● It is repugnant to the Constitution as it fails to specify objectives and purposes for
which proposed transfer of funds are to be made
● It allows the President to override safeguards, form and procedure prescribed by
the Constitution in approving appropriations
● It amounts to an undue delegation of legislative powers to the executive
● The threatened, continuing transfer of funds by the President and the
implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the Treasurer of the
Philippines are without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction.

The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the
petitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another,
coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also
alleged that the petition has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec
16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where
the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that
“No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President…may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.”
ISSUE
Whether Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 constitutional?

RULING
No. In the 1973 Constitution, it is explicitly stated that one cannot transfer an
appropriation for one item to another. However, it allowed enactment of a law which
authorized transfer of funds in order to augment an item from savings in another item in
the appropriation of the govt. branch or constitutional body concerned. This leeway is
limited, and was only granted to allow heads of govt. branches some flexibility in the use
of public funds and resources. This limitation stems from the fact that the PURPOSE and
CONDITION for fund transferring was required. Paragraph 1 of The Budget Reform
Decree of 1977 unduly overextends the privilege granted in sec. 16(5) because the
President can indiscriminately transfer funds from the Executive Dept.’s branches to any
branch in the General Appropriations Act without regard as to whether or not 1) the funds
are actually savings in the item from which it is taken, 2) the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which the said transfer is made. Although there is no complete
disregard of the standards in the fundamental law, it goes beyond the tenor thereof. It
puts the bypasses the safeguards in Sec. 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution on the release of money from the Treasury.

5) Liga v. COMELEC 232 SCRA 219

FACTS
Petitioner Liga Ng Mga Barangay, an organization of barangays, represented by
petitioner Alex L. David, its president and secretary general as well as a taxpayer filed
the instant action to question what they perceive as "the threatened illegal transfer,
disbursement and use of public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution and the
law" relative to the conduct of the forthcoming barangay elections (scheduled for 9 May
1994).

Petitioners claim that in the General Apropriation Act of 1994, only One Hundred Thirty
Seven Million Eight Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Pesos (P137,878,000.00) were
appropriated by Congress for the holding of the 1994 barangay elections.
In order to augment the said appropriated amount, petitioners allege that the
respondents have threatened and are about to effect a transfer or re-allocation of funds
to be sourced from the executive and legislative branches of Government to respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

The said information was culled by petitioners from a news item entitled "Barangay Poll
Funds Found" appearing in the 18 March 1994 issue of the Manila Bulletin. Based on the
said news report, petitioners claim that respondents will effect the transfer of said public
funds from the executive and legislative branches of the Government to respondent
COMELEC, which in turn would use the said funds for the purpose of holding the
barangay elections scheduled on 9 May 1994.

When required to file their comment, the respondents through the Solicitor General
averred that:

Petitioners acted solely on the basis of reports made in a newspaper, not bothering to
confirm the veracity of the said reports either from the COMELEC, the DILG, and/or any
of the respondents, particularly on whether respondents are indeed officially initiating the
alleged transfer of funds for the barangay elections;
The said reports were mere unofficial proposals or suggestions made in the process of
searching for funds for the said elections but which were later discarded by the
proponents themselves;
The COMELEC never had planned to secure any funding from the DILG, CDFs or IRAs,
as alleged by petitioners, or from any other source for that matter which would be
contrary to the Constitution and the election laws;
Respondent COMELEC particularly alleges that it intends to fund the forthcoming
barangay elections from the P137,878,000 appropriated by Congress for the said
elections and from its (COMELEC's) own savings resulting from unused funds originally
intended for the conduct and supervision of elections and other political exercises such
as funds for the sectoral elections which did not take place and possibly from a portion of
its (COMELEC's) modernization program for which the amount of more than five hundred
million pesos (P500,000,000) had been appropriated by Congress;
The Solicitor General defends the above COMELEC scheme as allowed by Sec. 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution and Sections 17 and 19 of the General Appropriations Act
for Fiscal Year 1994, viz:
(5). No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may,
by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
the Heads of Constitutional Commission under Article IX of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman and the Commission on Human Rights are hereby authorized to augment
any item in this Act from their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 19. Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings refers to portions of balances
of any programmed appropriation free of any obligation or encumbrance still available
after the satisfactory completion or unavoidable discontinuance or abandonment of the
work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized, or arising from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence
without pay.
Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of an item, project, activity or purpose with
an appropriation which upon implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed
resources is determined to be deficient. In no case, therefore, shall non-existent item,
project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure be funded by augmentation from
savings or by the use of appropriations authorized otherwise in this Act. (emphasis
supplied)

Respondents maintain that funds of local government units may also be used to help
defray the cost of the forthcoming barangay elections. For authority, they cite Opinion
No. 51, s. 1994 of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, dated 19 April 1994, issued
upon request from the COMELEC, wherein the former takes the view that under Section
50 of the Omnibus Election Code, local government units are required to appropriate
funds for barangay elections:

Sec. 50. Funding. — Local governments shall appropriate such funds to defray such
necessary and reasonable expenses of the members of the board of election tellers,
board of canvassers and the printing of election forms and procurement of other election
paraphernalia, and the installation of polling booths.
Pursuant to said opinion of the Secretary of Justice, the COMELEC issued Comelec
Resolution No. 2713, dated 21 April 1994, promulgating the guidelines for the sharing by
local government units in the expenses of the barangay elections.

ISSUE
Whether the impleaded public respondents are attempting, or intending to effect the
transfer of funds which would be in direct contravention of Sec. 25(5), Art. VI, of the
Constitution.

RULING
NO. The threat to pursue the scheme, if ever there was one, existed only in newspaper
reports which could have misled the general public, including the petitioners, into
believing that the same emanated from unimpeccable sources.

The Court acknowledges that petitioners have displayed vigilance and acted with the
best of intentions when they filed the present petitions. Yet, it would have been more
prudent for them to have first obtained an official statement or at least confirmation from
respondents as to the veracity of the reports contained in the said news item — which
could itself have been quoted out of context by the reporter concerned or simply
abbreviated to meet the day's deadline.

6) Sanchez v. COA, 552 SCRA 471

FACTS
In 1991, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7180 (R.A. 7180) otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act of 1992. This law provided an appropriation for the DILG
under Title XIII and set aside the amount of P75,000,000.00 for the DILG's Capability
Building Program.

The usage of the Capability Building Program Fund (Fund) is provided under the Special
Provisions of the law as follows:
Special Provisions
1.Capability Building Program for Local Personnel. The amount herein appropriated for
the Capability Building Program for local personnel shall be used for local government
and community capability building programs, such as training and technical assistance,
with the necessary support for training materials, supplies and facilities: PROVIDED,
That savings from the appropriation may be used to acquire equipment, except motor
vehicles, in further support of the programs.

The Capability Building Program shall be implemented nationwide by the Department of

the Interior and Local Government through the Local Government Academy and shall
involve local officials and employees, including barangay officials, elected and appointed.

The appropriations authorized herein shall be administered by the Department of the

Interior and Local Government and shall be released upon submission of a work and
financial plan supported by a detailed breakdown of the projects, activities and objects of
expenditures proposed to be funded.

Savings generated over and above the requirements prescribed in Section 18 of the
General Provisions of this Act shall be made available for the Capability Building
Program of the Department of the Interior and Local Government for local officials and
employees, subject to Section 40 of P.D. 1177.

On 11 November 1991, Atty. Hiram C. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Project Director of the
Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy,
informed then Deputy Executive Secretary Dionisio de la Serna of the proposal to
constitute and implement a "shamrock" type task force to implement local autonomy
institutionalized under the Local Government Code of 1991.

The stated purpose for the creation of the task force was to design programs, strategize
and prepare modules for an effective program for local autonomy. The estimated
expenses for its operation was P2,388,000.00 for a period of six months beginning on 1
December 1991 up to 31 May 1992 unless the above ceiling is sooner expended and/or
the project is earlier pre-terminated.

The proposal was accepted by the Deputy Executive Secretary and attested by then
DILG Secretary Cesar N. Sarino, one of the petitioners herein, who consequently issued
a memorandum for the transfer and remittance to the Office of the President of the sum
of P300,000.00 for the operational expenses of the task force. An additional cash
advance of P300,000.00 was requested. These amounts were taken from the Fund.

Upon post-audit conducted by Department auditor Iluminada M.V. Fabroa, however, the
amounts were disallowed for the reason that the transfer of fund from DILG to the Office
of the President to defray salaries of personnel, office supplies, office rentals, foods and
meals, etc. of an Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local
Autonomy taken from the Capability Building Program Fund is violative of the Special
Provisions of R.A. 7180.

The Commission on Audit affirmed the findings of the Department Auditor.

Petitioners’ Argument:

The transfer of the questioned amount from the Fund of the DILG to the Office of the
President was legal and that the disallowance was without basis. They explain that the
Capability Building Program which was financed by the Fund was administered by the
DILG and was intended as a complementary resource to aid the DILG in its task of
pursuing an intensified program of enhancing local government autonomy capabilities. It
was pursuant to this goal that a task force was created to design programs, strategize
and prepare modules for an effective program for local autonomy with the expenses
therefor to be charged against the Fund;
The purpose of the task force was actually within the framework of the Special Provisions
of R.A. No. 7180, and the transfer of funds to effectuate this purpose was not violative of
the said law contrary to the Department Auditor's conclusion;
The law did not prohibit the DILG from directly coordinating with the Office of the
President in attaining the objectives of local autonomy.

Respondent’s Argument:

There is no legal basis for the transfers in question because the Fund was meant to be
implemented by the Local Government Academy;
Transfer of funds under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution may be made only by the
persons mentioned in the section and may not be re-delegated being already a
delegated authority;
The funds transferred must come only from savings of the office in other items of its
appropriation and must be used for other items in the appropriation of the same office. In
this case, there were no savings from which augmentation can be taken because the
releases of funds to the Office of the President were made at the beginning of the budget
year 1992;
While the Fund is a regular appropriation, it partakes the nature of a trust fund because it
was allocated for a specific purpose. Thus, it may be used only for the specific purpose
for which it was created or the fund received.

ISSUE
Whether the disallowed transfer satisfies the standard laid down for the augmentation
from savings under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING
NO.

The General Provisions of R.A. No. 7180 provides that "[E]xcept by act of the Congress
of the Philippines, no change or modification shall be made in the expenditure items
authorized in this Act and other appropriations laws unless in cases of augmentations
from savings in appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5) of Article VI of the
Constitution."
Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, in turn, provides:
Sec. 25(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; However,
the President, the President of the Senate, The Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
It is important to underscore the fact that the power to transfer savings under Sec. 25(5),
Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution pertains exclusively to the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions and no other.
Thus, the submission that there was a valid transfer of funds within the Executive
Department should be rejected as it overlooks the fact that the power and authority to
transfer in this case was exercised not by the President but only at the instance of the
Deputy Executive Secretary, not the Executive Secretary himself. Even if the DILG
Secretary had corroborated the initiative of the Deputy Executive Secretary, it does not
even appear that the matter was authorized by the President.

More fundamentally, even the President himself could not have validly authorized the
transfer under the Constitution. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission are
instructive as regards the extent of the President's power to augment:
MR. SARMENTO: I have one last question. Section 25, paragraph (5) authorizes the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
President, the President of the Senate to augment any item in the General
Appropriations Law. Do we have a limit in terms of percentage as to how much they
should augment any item in the General Appropriations Law?

MR. AZCUNA: The limit is not in percentage but "from savings." So it is only to the extent
of their savings.

Therefore, the President cannot indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity
of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard to whether the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made.

R.A. 7180 contains a similar provision on the President's power to augment and provides
the meaning of "savings" and "augmentation," thus:
Sec. 17. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
the Heads of Constitutional Commissions under Article IX of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman and the Commission on Human Rights are hereby authorized to augment
any item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.

xxx

Sec. 19. Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings refer to portions or balances of
any programmed appropriation free of any obligation or encumbrance still available after
the satisfactory completion or unavoidable discontinuance or abandonment of the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized, or arising from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence
without pay. Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of an item, project, activity or
purpose with an appropriation which upon implementation or subsequent evaluation of
needed resources is determined to be deficient. In no case, therefore, shall a non-
existent item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure be funded by
augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations authorized otherwise in this
act.

Clearly, there are two essential requisites in order that a transfer of appropriation with the
corresponding funds may legally be effected. First, there must be savings in the
programmed appropriation of the transferring agency. Second, there must be an existing
item, project or activity with an appropriation in the receiving agency to which the savings
will be transferred.

Actual savings is a sine qua non to a valid transfer of funds from one government agency
to another. The word "actual" denotes that something is real or substantial, or exists
presently in fact as opposed to something which is merely theoretical, possible, potential
or hypothetical.

In the case at bar, the amount transferred from the Fund did not constitute savings as
there were no such savings at the time of the transfer. It is preposterous to pronounce
that savings already existed as early as 31 January 1992. It is even more ridiculous to
claim that savings may be presumed from the mere transfer of funds. There was neither
allegation nor proof that the amount transferred was savings or that the transfer was for
the purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer was made.

7) Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014. -See MR, Feb. 3, 2015

FACTS: On September 25, 2013, Sen. JinggoyEjercito Estrada delivered a privilege

speech to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional
₱50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice
Corona.The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM
brought the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) to the consciousness of the
Nation for the first time, and made this present controversy inevitable.The DAP was a
government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated
spending.
The petitioners contend in unison that based on how it was developed and implemented
the DAP violated the mandate of Section 29(1) and Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether DAP violated the Constitution

RULING: Yes. The adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of the President as
the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed. Although no law was
necessary for the adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a
fund nor an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing
spending, anytransfer of appropriated fundsshould conform to Section 25(5), Article VI of
the Constitution.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), must be made upon
a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) The
funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective
offices; and(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices.
Section 25(5), not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an
implementing law for it to be operative. That law, generally, is the General Appropriations
Acts (GAA) of a given fiscal year. To comply with the requisite, the GAAs should
expressly authorize the transfer of funds. However, the 2011 and 2012 GAA contravened
with the Constitution. It did not contain the phrase “for their respective offices” allowing
transfer of funds from one branch to another branch of the government which is not
allowed under Sec. 25 of Art. 6 of the Constitution. The transfer should only be within
their respective offices.To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5),
refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate, with respect to
the Senate President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the
Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with respect
to their respective Chairpersons.
There was also no savings from appropriation. The fact alone that the appropriations are
unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as unalloted or
unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can
be generated. Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has already been
an allotment or authorization to incur obligations and disbursement authority.The
Executive could not circumvent the law by declaring unreleased appropriations and
unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year. Further, no funds
from savings could be transferred under the DAP to augment deficient items which are
not provided in the GAA. An appropriation for any program, activity or project (PAP) must
first be determined to be deficient before it could be augmented from savings. However,
there were certain PAP that was supported by DAP that had not been covered with
appropriations in the respective GAAs. The Executive was authorized to spend in line
with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws, but such authority did not translate to
unfettered discretion that allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of
Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given
that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from
Congress.
Section 26: 1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall
be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

1) Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418

FACTS: Tenancy Counsel Unit of the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy
Commission of the Department of Justice, thru its Trial Attorney the herein petitioner
Manuel A. Cordero as counsel for indigent petitioner tenant Vicente Salazar, filed with
the Second Regional District of the Court of Agrarian Relationsagainst private
respondent landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana. Upon a motion by the private respondent,
the respondent Judge issued an order disqualifying petitioner from appearing as counsel
for the tenant on the ground that a tenant who cannot afford to pay should be
represented by the public defendant of the Department of Labor and the circular issued
by the Agricultural Tenancy Commission creating the Tenancy Unit Counsel is ultra vires
and has no legal force. Subsequently, RA 2263 "AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN
SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF
THE PHILIPPINE” was enacted which provides that in case a tenant cannot afford to be
represented by counsel, it shall be the duty of the trial attorney of the tenancy mediation
commission to represent him. Petitioner manifested that the issue is now moot and
academic since petitioner, on the basis of RA 2263 section 19 and 20,is now allowed to
represent the tenant. Respondent, in his comment, contends that before the enactment
of RA 2263, there was no Tenancy Mediation Division in existence nor was there any law
creating the same and defining its functions, and that its only basis for existence,
therefore, are sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 which are null and void
because the Constitution under Article VI Section 1 provides that "no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill." He contended further that nowhere in the titles of Republic Act No. 1199
and Republic Act No. 2263 is the creation of the Tenancy Mediation Division ever
mentioned, thereby indicating that section 19, Republic Act No. 2263 falls under the first
class of prohibited bills.

ISSUE: Whether the contention of the respondent is correct

RULING: No. The constitutional requirement under Article VI section 1, is complied with
as long the law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject which is the
Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may
be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, will be
regarded as valid. The provisions of sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 are
certainly germane to, and are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the one
general subject, agricultural tenancy.

2) Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING
3) Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172

FACTS
Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company, both re-suppliers of
power produced by NAPOCOR, assails the power vested in NAPOCOR that "in any
contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of
its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder
"shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus
two-month operating expenses." Also it could “renew all existing contracts with franchise
holders for the supply of electric power and energy,". This is all in pursuant to RA 3043
and the amendments it offered to RA 2641. This statutory provision was assailed on the
ground that, being a rider, it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill,
which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be
expressed in its title and is only meant to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR. The
lower court sustained its validity.

ISSUE
Whether or not RA 3043 is constitutional.

RULING

Yes. No bill "which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in [its] title . . ." This provision is similar to those found in many
American State Constitutions. It is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills
as log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments. Where the
subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people
should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional
provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not
germane to the subject matter of the bill. Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to
is such a rider.

To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to

cripple or impede proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and
not unduly technical, it must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without
expressing each and every end and means necessary for its accomplishment. Thus,
mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the
act a complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act
relating to its subject finding expression in its title. More specifically, if the law amends a
section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be
amended, there being no need to state the precise nature of the amendment. "Of course,
the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and
the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators."

4) Insular Lumber Co. v. CTA, 104 SCRA 710

FACTS
These two (2) cases are appeals by way of certiorari from the decision dated July 31,
1969 of the Court of Tax Appeals ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
refund to the Insular Lumber Company the amount of P10,560.20 instead of P19,921.37,
representing 25% of the specific tax paid on manufactured oil and motor fuel utilized by
said company in the operation of its forest concession in the year 1963.

Insular Lumber Company (Company for short). a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of New York. U.S.A., and duly authorized to do business in the
Philippines is a licensed forest concessionaire. The Company purchase manufactured oil
and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession on which specific
tax was paid.
The commissioner denied the Company's claim for refund on the ground that the
privilege of partial tax refund granted by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 to those
using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions is limited to a period of five (5)
years from June 14, 1956, the date effectivity of said Act.
Respondent court, however, did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08
because the Company's right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those
paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed.
Hence, the Company was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only.

ISSUE
Did the Court of Tax Appeals err in its previous decisions (denying the tax exemption to
Insular Lumber Company)?

RULING
The Commissioner contends that the first proviso in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435
is unconstitutional. In claiming the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid section, the
Commissioner anchored its argument on Article VI, Section 21(l) of the 1935 Constitution
which provides:
No bill which may be enacted into a law shall embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill
The title of R.A. No. 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway
Special Fund." The Commissioner contends that the subject of R.A. No. 1435 was to
increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of, the Act deals with another
subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers.
Partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not
expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a
decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.
The Court finds NO MERIT in the arguments.
Republic Act No. 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy - the
necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an
increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Section 5 of the law is in
effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has
reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is nor, a deviation from the general subject of the
law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit
duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or
the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation.
Furthermore, in deciding the constitutionality of a statute alleged to be defectively titled,
every presumption favors the validity of the Act. As is true republic in cases presenting
other constitutional issues, the courts avoid declaring an Act unconstitutional whenever
possible. Where there is any doubt as to the insufficiency of either the title, or the Art, the
legislation should be sustained.

5) Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208

FACTS Valentin Tio is a videogram establishment operator adversely affected by

Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board".

P.D. No. 1987 provides for the levy of a tax over each cassette sold (Sec. 134) and a
30% tax on the gross receipts of a videogram establishment, payable to the local
government (Sec. 10).

ISSUE

The petioner, among others, raised the following issues:

1. Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider and the same is not
germane to the subject matter of the law.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority; and

RULING
1. No, the tax is not a rider and is germane to the purpose and subject of the law.

The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive
enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not
necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to
accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are
germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing provision is
allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the
general object of the law, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.

Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the purpose of
regulating an activity. At the same time, the videogram industry is also an untapped
source of revenue which the government may validly tax. All of this is evident from
preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6 and 8, quoted in part above.

The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer
the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy,
the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic
video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the law to protect the movie industry,
the tax remains a valid imposition.

2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.

Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the videogram
board (Board) has authority to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of
the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of
such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is an undue
delegation of legislative power.

This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or
discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no
valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority
of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the
deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the Board."

The petition was DISMISSED.

6) Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1)
its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it
did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies
of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its
passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.

RULING:
No. SC held that Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held
that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies
is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354,
which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our
ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have
to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the
repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207,
PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720
or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference
Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill,
is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges
that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.

3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the

Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of
laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-
controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the
benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the
government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the
services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices
of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own
public functions.

Section 27: 1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he
shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to
the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The
President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law
as if he had signed it.

2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object.

1) Abakada v. Ermita, supra.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) CIR v. CTA, 185 SCRA 329

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

3) Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452

FACTS
Congress passed the General Appropriations Bill 1989. It eliminated or decreased
certain items included in the proposed budget as submitted by the president.
When presented to the President for her signature, it was signed but 7 SPECIAL
PROVISIONS and Sec 55 (General Provision) were VETOED.
The senate then passed a resolution saying that the President’s Veto was
unconstitutional.
Sec 55 provided:
“Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations /
Disapproved or Reduced by Congress” – No item of appropriation recommended by the
President in the Budget which has been disapproved or reduced shall be restored or
increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation.
An item for appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President shall be
deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the
specific purpose is provided in the GAB”
The reason why the President vetoed the provision was that it violates Section 25(5) –
nullifying the power of the President to augment any item from savings in other items.
Gonzales et al claim that the President’s Line-Veto in appropriation bills is limited to
items and does not cover provisions.
They claim that Cory exceeded her authority when she vetoed Sec 55 which are
PROVISIONS, such that when the President objects to a PROVISION of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the ITEMVETO POWER but should veto the entire
bill.
They further claim that the Item-Veto Power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation.
Lastly they claim that Sec 25(5) of the Constitution (which provides for the President’s
Augmentation Powers) – has to be provided for by law thus Congress has the
prerogative to limit the exercise of the same.
On the other hand the Solgen claims that Sec 55 is actually a rider because it is
extraneous to an appropriation act, therefore the President validly vetoed it. Solgen
further claims that the constitution empowers the President to veto PROVISIONS or
other distinct and severable parts of an Appropriations Bill

ISSUE
Did the President exceeded the item-veto power?

RULING
No. In Article VI Sec 27 of the Constitution:
Paragraph 1 = refers to the general veto power of the President. If exercised, it
would result to the veto of the ENTIRE BILL.
Paragraph 2 = refers to the ITEM VETO power or LINE VETO. It allows the exercise of
veto over particular items in an APPROPRIATION, REVENUE OR TARIFF BILL. The
power given to the President to disapprove any item in an Appropriations Bill does not
grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the
same item.
The terms ITEM and PROVISION are different. An ITEM refers to the particulars, details,
the distinct and severable parts of the bill. It is the indivisible sum of money dedicated to
a stated purpose. It obviously means an item which in itself is a SPECIFIC
APPROPRIATION of money, not some general provision of law, which just happens to
be put in an appropriation bill.
The claim of the petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing
the entire bill not
only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be
subject of a separate veto,
but also overlooks the constitutional mandate that any PROVISION in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular provision therein, and that
any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
In short, A PROVISION in an appropriation bill is limited in its operation to some
particular appropriation, and DOES NOT RELATE TO THE ENTIRE BILL. (The
President may veto provisions.)
Even assuming that provisions are beyond veto powers,
Sec 55 may still be vetoed following the DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE
PROVISIONS.

As to the claim that Congress should be allowed to impose restrictions or conditions in

an appropriations bill (which they claim is beyond veto-powers), it cannot be denied that
Legislature has the power to provide qualifications and conditions in Appropriation Bills
as to limit how the money shall be spend, etc. Also, it cannot be denied that the
Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or qualification but allowing the appropriation
itself to stand. HOWEVER, for these to apply, THE RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE SUCH
IN THE REAL SENSE OF THE TERM, not some matters which are more properly dealt
with in a separate legislation. Restrictions or Conditions must exhibit a CONNECTION
WITH MONEY ITEMS IN A BUDGETARY SENSE IN THE SCHEDULE
OF EXPENDITURES. Thus the test is one of APPROPRIATENESS. Sec 55 appears to
be a condition but actually they are GENERAL LAW MEASURES MORE
APPROPRIATE FOR a substantive, separate legislation.
4) Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra.

FACTS

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994),
was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As
passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the
proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of
Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to
realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and
approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to
have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR
THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY
ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which
he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot
be validly done through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public
debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the
Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,
Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation
and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and
Colleges (SUC’s),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the
Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the
modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which
requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific
Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not be used for payment
of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored
personnel carriers”
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment
pension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and
CHR, the Congress.
ISSUE

Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the
GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c)
Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are
constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for
debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional

RULING

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative
process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a
veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a
violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt
payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be
done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the
President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other
government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income
and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as
exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D.
No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the
Department of Budget and Management’s Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision
which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended —
70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should
strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health is an “appropriate” provision. Being directly related to and
inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the
special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP
modernization program that the President must submit all purchases of military
equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or legislative
veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the
validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the
issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being “inappropriate”
provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for
payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been
contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of
laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered
into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in
the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the
President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000
CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation
law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-
Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to
appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the
DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures
shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution
Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into
execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

5) Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.

FACTS
(same as previously discussed)

ISSUE
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on.. checks and balances.

RULING

YES. It is unconstitutional for violation of the Consitutional provision on checks and

balances.

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power
to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by
Congress for approval through a process known as “bill presentment.” The President’s
item–veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

Petitioners claim that “[i]n the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump–sum
appropriation, the legislator’s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA
denies the President the chance to veto that item later on.”212 Accordingly, they submit
that the “item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line–
item budgeting” and that “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting [which]
effectively renders the constitutionally–given power of the President useless.The fact that
the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does
not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203

The Court agrees.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump–sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed
and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump–sum/post–enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above– described
system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion
PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or
may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the
detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.

Moreover, even without its post–enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013
PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a
prohibited form of lump–sum appropriation as above–characterized. In particular, the
lump–sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted
for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc.
This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes
of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.

Section 28: 1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.

3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant

thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.

1) Commissioner of Internal Reveue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power, 164 SCRA 27

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING
2) Abra Valley College v. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106

FACTS

Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated

with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and
declare void the “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located
at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to
P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial
Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in
its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second
floor of the building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the
ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial
establishment, and thus the property is not being used exclusively for educational
purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for
review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by
filing said petition on 17 August 1974.

ISSUE

Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.

RULING

Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly
grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used
exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes.ﾝ Reasonable emphasis has
always been made that the exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the
school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern
Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental
to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the
property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
3) John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775, Oct. 24, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioners filed their Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief assailing

(1) the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420 and

(2) the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement
previously entered into between public respondent BCDA and private respondents.

Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly
declared of no legal force and effect.

Intervener Camp John Hay Development Corp. (CJHDC) filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene alleging that it, together with its consortium partners, entered into a Lease
Agreement with respondent BCDA for the development of the John Hay SEZ; and that it
“stands to be most affected” by this Court’s Decision “invalidating the grant of tax
exemption and other financial incentives” in the John Hay Special Economic Zone (SEZ)
since “[i]ts financial obligations and development and investment commitments under the
Lease Agreement were entered into upon the premise that these incentives are valid and
subsisting.”

CJHDC, proffering grounds parallel to those of public respondents, prays that: (1) it be
granted leave to intervene in this case; (2) its attached Motion for Reconsideration in
Intervention be admitted; and (3) this Court’s Decision of October 24, 2003 be
reconsidered and petitioners’ petition dismissed.

CJHDC’s Motion for leave to Intervene was granted and noted its Motion for
Reconsideration in Intervention.

ISSUE:
Whether the tax exemptions and other financial incentives granted to the Subic SEZ
under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992),
are applicable to the John Hay SEZ.

RULING:
CJHDC’s argument that the President’s “power to create Special Economic Zones
carries with it the power to provide for tax and financial incentives,” does not lie. It is the
legislative branch which has the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation
but to grant exemptions.

Paragraph 4, Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution is crystal clear: “[n]o law granting
any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.”

Hence, it is only the legislature, as limited by the provisions of the Constitution, which
has full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation.
The Constitution itself may provide for specific tax exemptions or local governments may
pass ordinances providing for exemption from local taxes, but, otherwise, it is only the
legislative branch which has the power to grant tax exemptions, its power to exempt
being as broad as its power to tax.

There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7227 which can be considered a grant of tax
exemption in favor of public respondent BCDA. Rather, the beneficiaries of the tax
exemptions and other incentives in Section 12 (the only provision in R.A. No. 7227 which
expressly grants tax exemptions) are clearly the business enterprises located within the
Subic SEZ.

Contrary to public respondents’ interpretation, the Decision of October 24, 2003 does not
“tie the hands” of executive or administrative agencies from implementing any present or
future legislation which affords tax or other financial incentives to qualified persons doing
business in the John Hay SEZ or elsewhere. The second sentence of Section 3 of
Proclamation No. 420 was declared null and void only insofar as it purported to grant tax
exemptions and other financial incentives to business enterprises located in John Hay
SEZ. However, where there is statutory basis for exemptions or incentives, there is
nothing to prevent qualified persons from applying for and availing thereof.
4) Lung Center v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

5) CIR v. De La Salle University, G.R. No. 196596, November 9, 2016

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 29: 1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.

2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,

directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any
penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special
fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the Government.
1) Guingona v. Carague, supra.

FACTS
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the
General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the
DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred
Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New
Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for
debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section
5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary
priority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being
higher than the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby
follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond
to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or
objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide
an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter
of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very
survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an
amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and
so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
2) Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

3) Philippine Coconut v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 30: No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.

1) First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA, 237 SCRA 519

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA

MANUFACTURING, INC.

CASE: Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application
for preliminary injunction is the novel question of where and in what manner
appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI) should be filed.

A thorough scrutiny of the conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,

otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," Executive Order
No. 226, also known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 and Supreme
Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus, called for.
FACTS:

· BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend

its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product
from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles."
· Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
BOI decision which was denied. So,Mariwasa filed a petition for review with
respondent Court of Appeals pursuant to SC Circular 1-91.
· Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition on the ground that the Court of
Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over the BOI case, the same being
exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of E.O. 226 or the
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

PETITIONER:

The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and
Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals
from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because
the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226,
which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed
directly with this Court.

Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the
former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be
modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making
powers is not entirely defensible as it seems.

(NOTE: During the transitional period after the country emerged from the Marcos
regime, the lawmaking power was lodged on the Executive Department.According
to SC in its decision in the herein case, the obvious lack of deliberation in the
drafting of our laws could perhaps explain the deviation of some of our laws from
the goal of uniform procedure which B.P. 129 sought to promote. In exempli gratia,
Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 provides that
all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the order or decision.)

PRIVATE RESPONDENT:

Whatever "obvious inconsistency" or "irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have

been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for
appeal has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which
was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was
enacted.Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on
the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

WHICH COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE

BOARD OF INVESTMENTS (BOI)?

RULING:

COURT OF APPEALS

1. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of
appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also
provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter
portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to
regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.

The case of Bustos v. Lucero distinguished between rights created by a

substantive law and those arising from procedural law:

Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights is a term which

includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations (60 C.J., 980). Substantive law is that part of the
law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action, as opposed to adjective or remedial
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress for their
invasion.

Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the
BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the
substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal
from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to
be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions
of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of
appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the
substantive right to appeal.

Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as

the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI
are concerned.

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE BOI, WHICH BY STATUTE WAS

PREVIOUSLY ALLOWED TO BE FILED DIRECTLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT,
SHOULD NOW BE BROUGHT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.

2) Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 32: The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition
therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum
of the registered voters thereof.

1) Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, 262 SCRA 492

FACTS: · On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic
Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of
converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.

·
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military
reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the
implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport,
buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.

·
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang
Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence,
as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone
and submitted such to the Office of the President.

·
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.
·
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg.
10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone, b) to allow Morong to join
provided conditions are met.

·
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the
Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.

·
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of
1991.

·
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the
ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

·
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the
metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval
base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

·
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 and 2848,
adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules
and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum

·
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the
validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on
proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law

ISSUE: 1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating

Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to
annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of
the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment
of a national law."

RULING:1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but
respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the
word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned
at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes
was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called
"referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and
the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was
the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this
exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to
enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the
other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any
act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most
cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and
supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent
Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still
in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved
law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to
adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an
approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or
implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or
prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions
or cases.
In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec
Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion.
However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative
since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or
instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself
has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the
pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned
Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a
branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and
acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

2) Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106

FACTS:
December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative.
Upon the filing of the Petition, the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an
Order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the
attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution including the proposal,
proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form, and the notice of
hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense
and setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
December 12, 1996, Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and
Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising that R.A.
No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative,
which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution
was left to some future law.
December 19, 1996, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition
and issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with
the Petition, and private respondents conducting a signature drive for people's
initiative to amend the Constitution.
January 2, 1997, private respondents filed their Comment on the petition. They
argue therein that R.A No. 6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of
people initiative to propose amendments to the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative
and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or
cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as
worded, adequately covers such initiative.

HELD:
No, Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned,
R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate
legislation.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the
Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The
inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word
is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to
initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and
resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As
pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact,
approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of
initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Second. It is true that Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that
Section 5 restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the
registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the
other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition
for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the
contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended,
in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy
of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on
national and local laws.

3) Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174299, October 25, 2006

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the
Commission on Elections COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to
amend the 1987 Constitution. On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153,
namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups
1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b)
and (c) 2 and Section 7 3 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act
("RA 6735").

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) 4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department) 5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." 6
These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to
amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v.
Commission on Elections 8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari
and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel
the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course
to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino
Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition
deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."

ISSUE: Whether or not the initiative petition of the Lambino group complied with the
Constitution. (NO)

RULING: NO. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

RATIO: The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of
the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit
Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino
Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution.

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign
such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft
shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature.

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in
a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must
set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the
framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant
American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the
people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic
Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as
valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories

Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional

requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that
they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a
copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet. There is not a single word, phrase, or
sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet.
Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached
to it. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes
before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the
"petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the
initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all
or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they
signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group
failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever,
not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature
sheets.

In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the
proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an
indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted
this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is
also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The
failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the
initiative void for noncompliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment
must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The
signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.