Procedural law provides the process that a case will go through (whether it goes to trial or not).

The procedural law determines how a proceeding concerning the enforcement of substantive
law will occur. (https://criminal-law.freeadvice.com)

Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive rights in a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under
the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J. 980.)

Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which
courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes
the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions (36 C.J. 27; 52 C.J.S. 1026).
(Bustos vs. Lucero,* (46 Off. Gaz., January Supp., pp. 445, 448),

Case Digest

Primicias vs Ocampo, G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953

Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory offenses,
namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, which was docketed as criminal
case No. 18374, in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien without
the approval of the President of the Philippines and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation
to section 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
18375, in that he failed to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and certain
authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance
from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.
Petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering
the questions of fact involved in said cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409,
otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that "the aid of
assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of First
Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure."
The Court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that with the promulgation of the
Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines previously existing
were not only superseded but expressly repealed, that the Supreme Court, having been vested
with the rule-making power, expressly omitted the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure
regarding assessors in said Rules of Court, and that the reference to said statute by section 49
of Republic Act No. 409 on the provisions regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere
surplusage. Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to this court imputing
abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.

Issue/s:
 1) The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive
right, and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.

Held:
If we are to be guided merely by the provisions contended by the petitioner, the right to trial with
the aid of assessor would seem to be beyond dispute. These provisions are simple and clear
and appear to be mandatory. But where the difficulty arises is in their relation or bearing on the
directive of the Constitution which provides that "the existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared rules of courts subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same." Pursuant to this rule-making power,
the Supreme Court promulgated the present Rules of Court, which became effective on July 1,
1940, but because it failed to incorporate therein the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
on assessors, respondents now contend that the right to trial with the aid of assessors, with all
its concomitant provisions, cannot now be invoked because, being procedural in nature, the
same must be deemed to have been impliedly eliminated.
This claim would be correct if we were to hold that the right to trial with the aid of assessors is
not substantive but procedural or adjective in nature. If it were merely procedural, not having
been incorporated in the Rules of Court, the logical conclusion is that the rule- making power
has deemed wise to eliminate it. But no such presumption, nor conclusion, can be drawn for the
reason that the right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense that it must created and
defined by express enactment as opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or
obtain redress therefor. "Rules of procedure should be distinguished from substantive law. A
substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the
powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs, whereas rules of
procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be enforced in
courts of justice."

Thus, it was there said that these provisions "necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
intervention of the assessors is not an empty formality which may be disregarded without
violating either the letter or the spirit of the law. It is another security given by the law to the
litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of which they cannot be deprived without vitiating
all the proceedings.

Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs Cobato- Cortes, G.R. No. 165922
March 20, 2003
Facts:
In 2004, petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City (trial court) a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage under Act 3135, as
amended. Under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended, petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure
are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagees claim. Invoking Article 62 (6) of
RA 6938, petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees.
Executive Judge of the trial court, denied the request for exemption, citing Section 22 of Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, as amended, exempting from the Rules coverage only the Republic
of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and certain suits of local government units.
The OSG joined causes with the petitioner and submits that as the substantive rule, Article
62(6) of RA 6938 prevails over Section 22 of Rule 141, a judicial rule of procedure. The OSG
also takes issue with respondents finding that the legal fees collected under Rule 141 are not
fees payable to the Philippine Government as the judiciary forms part of the Philippine
government, as defined under the Revised Administrative Code.

Issue/s:
1) Whether or not Congress has a power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and
procedure

Held:
Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law. However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to repeal,
alter or supplement such rules.

The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by
deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress subsidiary and corrective power. This glaring and
fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice that this
Courts power to promulgate judicial rules is no longer shared by this Court with Congress:

Reaffirming Echegarays construction of Section 5(5), the Court described its exclusive power to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure as one of the safeguards of this Courts
institutional independence:

The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional
independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now
the Courts exclusive domain.

Wherefore the Court AFFIRM the Orders of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs De Leon, G.R. No. 143275 March 20, 2003
Facts:
Respondent spouses Arlene and Bernardo de Leon filed a petition to fix the just compensation
of a parcel of land before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch 63, acting as a Special
Agrarian Court. LBP interposed an ordinary appeal by filing a notice of appeal. Appellate courts
Fourth Division dismissed LBPs ordinary appeal primarily holding that LBP availed of the wrong
mode of appeal. LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Issue/s:
1) Whether or not Section 60 of RA 6657 infringes on the exclusive rule-making power of
this Court in violation of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Held:
Section 60 of RA 6657 is constitutional and does not violate this Courts power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings, practice
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. We ruled that the Rules of Court does not categorically
prescribe ordinary appeal as the exclusive mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts. The reference by Section 61 to the Rules of Court in fact even supports the mode of a
petition for review as the appropriate way to appeal decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts.
Furthermore, the same Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution quoted by
LBP states that rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. Since Section 60 is a special procedure
and this Court has not yet provided for a particular process for appeals from decisions of
agrarian courts, the said section does not encroach on our rule-making power.
In the light of the aforementioned circumstances, we find it proper to emphasize the prospective
application of our Decision dated September 10, 2002. A prospective application of our Decision
is not only grounded on equity and fair play but also based on the constitutional tenet that rules
of procedure shall not impair substantive rights.
In accordance with our constitutional power to review rules of procedure of special courts,] our
Decision in the instant case actually lays down a rule of procedure, specifically, a rule on the
proper mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Under Section 5 (5), Article VIII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, rules of procedure shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. In determining whether a rule of procedure affects substantive rights, the test
is laid down in Fabian vs. Desierto, which provides that:

[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure
of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the
rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard
or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates
a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates
as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

We hold that our Decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from
judgments of Special Agrarian Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights. If
our ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice LBPs right to appeal because pending
appeals in the Court of Appeals will be dismissed outright on mere technicality thereby
sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending
case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon
prior to the issuance of said doctrine.
Asia United Bank vs Goodland Company, Inc. G.R. No. 188051, November 22, 2010
Facts:
An Ex-Parte Application/Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession was filed by Asia United
Bank (AUB) over a 5,801-square- meter lot located in Makati City and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 223120 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati in AUBs name. The
property was previously registered in the name of GOODLAND under TCT No. 192674 (114645).

The petition alleged that, on February 20, 2000, GOODLAND executed a Third Party Real Estate
Mortgage on the property in favor of AUB to secure the P202 million credit accommodation
extended by the latter to Radiomarine Network (Smartnet) Inc. (Radiomarine).

When Radiomarine defaulted in the payment of its obligation, AUB instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings against the real estate mortgage. At the public auction sale held on
December 4, 2006, AUB was declared the highest bidder. On the same date, a Certificate of Sale
was issued in its name and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

With the expiration of the redemption period, AUB proceeded to execute an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, through its First Vice-President, Florante del Mundo. AUB thereafter
secured a Certificate Authorizing Registration from the Bureau of Internal Revenue to facilitate
the transfer of the title.

GOODLAND, through its counsel, Atty. Antonio Bautista (Atty. Bautista), opposed the petition,
denying that it executed the real estate mortgage. RTC issued the writ of possession sought by
AUB. GOODLAND, through its counsel on record, Atty. Bautista, filed a motion for
reconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration, but both were denied.
GOODLAND sought recourse with the CA by initially filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC,
through a certain Atty. Lito Mondragon (Atty. Mondragon) of the Mondragon & Montoya Law
Offices. RTC issued an Order] denying due course to GOODLANDs notice of appeal for being
legally inutile due to Atty. Mondragons failure to properly effect the substitution of former
counsel on record, Atty. Bautista. GOODLAND moved for reconsideration, but the same was
denied. GOODLAND elevated the incident to the CA by way of a special civil acton for certiorari.

Issue/s:
1) Whether or not invocation of the interest of substantial justice will suffice to override a
stringent implementation of the rules.
Held:
Under Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, for a substitution of attorney to be effectual,
the following essential requisites must concur: (1) there must be a written application for
substitution; (2) it must be filed with the written consent of the client; (3) it must be with the written
consent of the attorney substituted; and (4) in case the consent of the attorney to be substituted
cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof of notice that the motion for substitution was
served on him in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court. The courts a quo were uniform
and correct in finding that Atty. Mondragon failed to observe the prescribed procedure and, thus,
no valid substitution of counsel was actualized. However, they took divergent postures as to the
repercussion of such non-compliance, thereby igniting the herein controversy.
The RTC strictly imposed the rule on substitution of counsel and held that the notice of appeal
filed by Atty. Mondragon was a mere scrap of paper.

However, relying on our pronouncement in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan

Development Co. the CA brushed aside the procedural lapse and took a liberal stance on
considerations of substantial justice, viz.:

It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse
a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the
ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave
injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. Thus, substantial
justice would be better served by giving due course to petitioners notice of appeal.

The emerging trend of jurisprudence is more inclined to the liberal and flexible application of the
Rules of Court. However, we have not been remiss in reminding the bench and the bar that
zealous compliance with the rules is still the general course of action. Rules of procedure are in
place to ensure the orderly, just, and speedy dispensation of cases;]to this end, inflexibility or
liberality must be weighed. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules or the exemption of
a case from their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of
justice requires it. Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and
due regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed in the Constitution which
guarantees that all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. The adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a
case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that a litigation is not a game
of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Under Rule 1,
Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the controlling
principle to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided
on their merits and not on technicalities. This does not mean, however, that procedural rules are
to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own
rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of
substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or
whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law
and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights
of the litigants.
Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful observance of the Rules of Court, and their relaxation
or suspension should only be for persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. Further, a bare invocation of the interest of substantial
justice will not suffice to override a stringent implementation of the rules.
Given the foregoing, we are bound to deny a liberal application of the rules on substitution of
counsel and resolve definitively that GOODLANDs notice of appeal merits a denial, for the
failure of Atty. Mondragon to effect a valid substitution of the counsel on record. Substantial
justice would be better served if the notice of appeal is disallowed. In the same way that the
appellant in Pioneer was not permitted to profit from its own manipulation of the rules on
substitution of counsel, so too can GOODLAND be not tolerated to foster vexatious delay by
allowing its notice of appeal to carry on.