Marcelo v.

Sandiganbayan 531 SCRA 385 (2007)

MARCELO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 156605 | August 28, 2007
Garcia, J.
DOCTRINE:
 If the plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the interrogatories, it may be a good basis for the
dismissal of his complaint for non-suit unless he can justify such failure or refusal. The ROC
prescribes the procedures and defines all the consequence/s for refusing to comply with the
different modes of discovery.
 Even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues, summary judgment may still ensue as
a matter of law if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not
genuine. 

FACTS:
 The PCGG (on behalf of Republic) issued a writ of sequestration against Marcelo Fiberglass
Corporation (MFC). PCGG agents proceeded to occupy MFC premises.
 PCGG, filed a Complaint with the Sandiganbayan against Edward Marcelo, Fabian Ver, and
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos for recovery of ill-gotten or unexplained wealth. Marcelo and Ver,
in taking advantage of their relationship with the Marcoses, were alleged to have (a) obtained
from the Republic, thru the PN, a favored contract for the construction of high-speed fiberglass
boats at the cost of millions of pesos;
(b) collected from the Republic advances representing 79% of the contract price; and
(c) secured a loan from foreign banks which, upon the behest of then Pres. Marcos, was covered by  what
amounts to a sovereign guarantee.
 Marcelo filed his Answer attaching thereto a copy of the PN-MFC boat-building contract, the
alleged favored contract adverted to.
 The Republic served a Request for Admission on Marcelo. In his August 15, 1991 Response to
PCGGs Request for Admission, Marcelo included his own counter-request for admission on
matters stated in his response.
 The Republic impleaded sixteen (16) corporations which are alleged to be beneficially owned
and are dummies of the individual defendants. The latter answered that they are not owned,
controlled or were acquired by Marcelo who is merely an officer/stockholder; and that their
assets were acquired legally.
 Marcelo, MFC and the other corporations (herein petitioners) separately filed their Pre-Trial
Brief With Written Interrogatories and Request for Admission. The Republic filed an Answer to
Marcelo.
 Petitioners filed three separate Motion for Summary Judgment.
o Marcelo’s motion was based on two major arguments: (1) no genuine finding of fact
against him; and (2) In his Pre-Trial Brief, he requested the Republic to admit the truth
of the matter of fact related in his 15 August 1991 Response (to PCGG Request for
Admission) and Request on Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines for Admission but the
Republic did not reply to the request. Thus, pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court, each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted.
 o MFC’s points: (1) Lack of a genuine issue/cause of action against it; and, (2) the
Republics failure and continued refusal to answer the written interrogatories and reply
to the request for admission of certain facts set forth in its pre-trial brief.
o Other corps: That the matters set forth in their written interrogatories are deemed
established, they: a) are not parties or signatories to, and were not involved in obtaining
the PN-MFC contract in question; b) were not involved in and did not do any act in
securing the approval of direct payment for the subject boats, in violation of the
stipulation in the contract that payment should be made by Confirmed Irrevocable and
Divisible Letter of Credit (L/C); c) did not receive/collect anything from the Republic and
there is no document showing they ever received anything; and d) were not involved in
the procurement of the alleged aforementioned foreign loan.
 The Republic filed separate Opposition only to Marcelo’s and MFC’s respective motions
for summary judgment. Marcelo and MFC filed their respective Replies to the
opposition.
 The Sandiganbayan denied the separate motions of summary judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for
summary judgment of Marcelo, MFC and the other petitioner corporations.
RULING: YES. Sandiganbayan erred in not granting the Motion for Summary Judgment.
1. Summary judgment is in order. Under Section 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, summary
judgment may be allowed where, save for the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. There’s really no
more genuine issues to be tried in this case, the Republic having failed or refused to answer the
requests for admission and the written interrogatories of the petitioners. As it were, the Republic
only answered petitioner Marcelo’s request for admission or interrogatories. But then the Republics
answer serves only to highlight and confirm the fact that petitioner Marcelo’s participation in all the
transactions subject of this case is as President of MFC.

2. The Republic has veritably acknowledged the regularity of the boat-construction contract by its
failure to answer written interrogatories and the request for admission propounded by
petitioner MFC. To be precise, the Republic did not answer the written interrogatories of MFC.

3. The Republic cannot plausibly evade the consequences of its failure to answer written
interrogatories and requests for admission. If the plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the
interrogatories, it may be a good basis for the dismissal of his complaint for non-suit unless he
can justify such failure or refusal. To be sure, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedures and
defines all the consequence/s for refusing to comply with the different modes of discovery.

4. It is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue--fully and fairly.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters” may be inquired into and learned by the parties before
the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties - before the trial if not
indeed even before the pre-trial - should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant
to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to their
adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the
dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery
mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.
 5. ROC explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of the modes of discovery
provided in Rule 24-26 after an answer to the complaint has been served. On the other hand,
leave of court is required as regards discovery in accordance with Rule 27/28, which may be
granted upon due application and a showing of due cause.

6. To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious,
the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as:
 dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof;
 taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking
discovery;
 refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses

7. Under Rule 25, All that is entailed to activate or put in motion the process of discovery by
interrogatories to parties is simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter setting forth a list of
questions with the request that they be answered individually.

Discovery under Rule 26 is begun by nothing more complex than the service on a party of a letter or other
written communication containing a request that specific facts therein set forth be admitted in writing.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 662 SCRA 152 (2011)

Santamaria vs. Cleary, 793 SCRA 459, (2016)

Santamaria v. Cleary
G.R. No. 197122. 15 June 2016
Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE: Depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by
the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes.

FACTS:
    Thomas Cleary, an American citizen and resident of Los Angeles, filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against herein petitioners, Ingrid Sala Santamaria, Astrid Sala Boza, and
Kathryn Go-Perez before the RTC of Cebu. The petitioners filed their respective Answers with
Compulsory Counterclaims. Then the Court issued a notice of pre-trial. In Cleary’s pretrial brief, he
stipulated that he would testify “in support of the allegations of his complaint, either on the witness
stand or by oral deposition.” Cleary then moved for court authorization to take desposition before the
Consulate-General of the Philippines in LA and that such be used as his direct testimony. 
    Santamaria and Boza opposed the Motion and argued that the right to take desposition is nit
absolute. They claimed that Cleary chose the Philippine system to file his suit, and yet he deprived the
court and the parties the opportunity to observe his demeanor and directly propound questions on him.
 Go-Perez filed a separate opposition arguing that since Cleary elected to file suit in the Philippines, he
should submit himself to the procedures and testify before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The Court
denied Cleary’s Motion on the ground that depositions are not meant to be a substitute for actual
testimony in open court. As a rule, a deponent must be presented for oral examination at trial as
required under Rule 132, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. 
    Upon appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s decision and held that and that it is immaterial that
Cleary is the plaintiff himself. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Cleary is allowed to take desposition abroad for his direct testimony on the
ground that he is residing abroad, pursuant to Rule 23, Section 4 (c) (2) of the ROC. 

HELD: YES. Depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by
the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional cases are
enumerated in Rule 23, Section 4(c). In this case, Rule 23, Section 4 (c) (2) applies; it states that the
witness resides at distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or
is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition. 
    It should also be noted that Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rules of Court no longer requires leave of court
for the taking of deposition after an answer has been served. According to respondent, he only sought a
court order when the Department of Foreign Affairs required one so that the deposition may be taken
before the Philippine Embassy or Consulate. That neither the presiding judge nor the parties will be able
to personally examine and observe the conduct of a deponent does not justify denial of the right to take
deposition. This objection is common to all depositions. Allowing this reason will render nugatory the
provisions in the Rules of Court that allow the taking of depositions. As suggested by the Court of
Appeals, the parties may also well agree to take deposition by written interrogatories to afford
petitioners the opportunity to cross-examine without the need to fly to the United States. 

Go v. People of the Philippines, 677 SCRA 213, (2012)

Go v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 185527. July 18, 2012.
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE: Rule 23 does not apply to criminal cases. Rule 119 Sec 15 applies instead.
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution.—When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence
after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the
same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination
after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against
the accused.
 FACTS: Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
docketed as Criminal Case No. 396447.

The prosecution’s complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia,
traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on
September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.

On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li
Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos,
Cambodia and that, upon doctor’s advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason
of ill health.

The MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical
Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied,9 prompting
petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.

On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The
RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply
suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking
of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the
constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.

The CA reversed because no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal
cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity to cross-examine the
complaining witness and make timely objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through
counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness.

ISSUE: Whether taking the deposition of the witness is allowed in this criminal case

RULING: NO. 

For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who
would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court,
or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:

“SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution.—When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence
after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the
same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination
after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against
the accused.”

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same
court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness’
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness’
testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case against the accused.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the
court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC’s orders granting the motion to
take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia.

Georg vs. Holy Trinity College, Inc., 797 SCRA 550, (2016)
Georg vs. Holy Trinity College, Inc., 797 SCRA 550, (2016)

Georg v Holy Trinity College Inc.

G.R. No. 190408. July 20, 2016.
Perez, J.

DOCTRINE: Considering that the trial court has the discretion to decide whether a deposition may or
may not be taken, it follows that it also has the discretion to disregard a deposition for noncompliance
with the rules.

FACTS: The Holy Trinity College Grand Chorale and Dance Company (the Group) was organized in 1987
by Sister Teresita Medalle (Sr. Medalle), the President of respondent Holy Trinity College in Puerto
Princesa City. In 2001, the Group was slated to perform in Europe. Edward Enriquez (Enriquez), who
allegedly represented Sr. Medalle, contacted petitioner Benjie B. Georg to seek assistance for payment
of the Group’s international airplane tickets. 

A Memorandum of Agreement with Deed of Assignment was executed between petitioner, the group,
and the SC Roque Foundation where petitioner agreed to advance the payment of airplane tickets
amounting to 4M. The group assigned said amount in favor of petitioner. Petitioner paid for the Group’s
domestic and international airplane tickets.

In an Amended Complaint dated 15 August 2001 for a Sum of Money with Damages filed before the RTC,
Branch 18, Tabaco City, petitioner claimed that the second party assignor/respondent and the
foundation-grantor have not paid and refused to pay their obligation under the MOA. 
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. On 5 January 2007, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending
appeal. Said motion was granted and a corresponding writ was issued by the trial court. On 9 January
2007, respondent filed a notice of appeal. In a Decision dated 17 November 2009, the Court of Appeals
relieved respondent of any liability for petitioner’s monetary claims.

ISSUE: whether respondent is liable under the MOA

RULING: Yes.

Between the two parties, we are inclined to give credence to petitioner. The trial court did not give
probative weight to the deposition of Sr. Medalle basically stating that respondent’s counsel failed to
conform to Section 20, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court which provides that:

Section 20. Certification, and filing by officer.—The officer shall certify on the deposition that the witness
was duly sworn to by him and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony given by the witness.
He shall then securely seal the deposition in an envelope indorsed with the title of the action and
marked “Deposition of (here insert the name of witness)” and shall promptly file it with the court in
which the action is pending or send it by registered mail to the clerk thereof for filing.

Indeed, there is no record of any certification from Notary Public Romeo Juayno stating that the witness,
Sr. Medalle in this case, was sworn to by him and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony
given by Sr. Medalle. Furthermore, petitioner correctly noted that respondent’s counsel did not seek a
leave of court to conduct a deposition in violation of Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken.— By leave of court after jurisdiction has
been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such
leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be
taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The
attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions
shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be
taken by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.

In Republic of the Phils. v. Sandiganbayan,16 we held that:

Depositions pending action may be conducted by oral examination or written interrogatories, and may
be taken at the instance of any party, with or without leave of court. Leave of court is not necessary to
take a deposition after an answer to the complaint has been served. It is only when an answer has not
yet been filed (but jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property subject of the
action) that prior leave of court is required. The reason for this is that before filing of the answer, the
issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear. In this case, respondent’s counsel filed a
Notice of Deposition for the Taking of Deposition on 28 October 2002. The Answer with Counterclaim
was only filed on 21 February 2005.
In this instance, respondent should have asked for leave of court. Considering that the trial court has the
discretion to decide whether a deposition may or may not be taken, it follows that it also has the
discretion to disregard a deposition for noncompliance with the rule

Martinez vs. Ongsiako, 820 SCRA 508, (2017)

Ogayon vs. People, 768 SCRA 670, (2015)

Honesto Oga Yon y Diaz vs. People of the Philippines
[GR 188794] [September 2, 2015]
Legal Doctrine: The purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining
magistrate as to the existence of probable cause. The Bill of Rights does not make it an imperative
necessity that depositions be attached to the records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said
omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record showing what testimony
was presented. (People vs. Tee)
Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the depositions and the
transcript. In their absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if there is evidence in the records
that the requisite examination was made and probable cause was based thereon. There must be, in the
records, particular facts and circumstances that were considered by the judge as sufficient to make an
independent evaluation of the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.
Facts: In October 2003, Police Chief Inspector Ferrera together with other police officers proceeded to
Ogayon’s house in Albay to enforce Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003. The warrant was for the seizure of
shabu and drug paraphernalia allegedly kept and concealed in the premises of Ogayon’s house. Drug
paraphernalia and platic of shabu were found in the possession of Oga Yon. Two informations were filed
against him for violation of RA 9165. Relying on presumption of regularity, the RTC rejected Oga Yon’s
frame–up defense, thereby convicting him of said crime. Oga Yon appealed to CA impugning the validity
of the search warrant but it was rejected by CA albeit that the latter did not find evidence complying
with the requirements, but because of Oga Yon’s failure to make a timely objection against the warrant
during the trial. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether search warrant was defective for there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings in which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the required searching questions and
answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause.
Ruling of the Court: No, the search warrant was not defective even if there was no transcript of
stenographic notes of the proceedings in which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the required
searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause.
The purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining
magistrate as to the existence of probable cause. The Bill of Rights does not make it an imperative
necessity that depositions be attached to the records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said
omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record showing what testimony
was presented. (People vs. Tee)
 Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the depositions and the
transcript. In their absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if there is evidence in the records
that the requisite examination was made and probable cause was based thereon. There must be, in the
records, particular facts and circumstances that were considered by the judge as sufficient to make an
independent evaluation of the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.
Hence, the search warrant was not defective even if there was no transcript of stenographic
notes of the proceedings in which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the required searching
questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause since the Bill of Rights
does not make it an imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the records of an application
for a search warrant.

Zepeda v. China Banking Corp. 504 SCRA 126 (2006)

295. Zepeda vs. China Banking Corporation

G.R. No. 172175, 9 October 2006

Ynares-Santiago, J. 

DOCTRINE: The consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the party
upon whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a particular question in the set of
written interrogatories and despite an order compelling him to answer the particular question, still
refuses to obey the order. 

FACTS:

 Petitioners, spouses Expedito and Alice Zepeda (Spouses Zepeda) filed a complaint for
nullification of foreclosure proceedings and loan documents with damages against respondent
Chinabank before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, 
 Spouses Zepeda alleged that they obtained a loan of P5,800,000.00 from Chinabank secured by
a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land. Spouses Zepeda subsequently subsequently
encountered difficulties in paying their loan obligations hence they requested for restructuring
which was allegedly granted by Chinabank. Hence, they were surprised when China bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the subject property where it emerged as the highest bidder.
Chinabank was issued a Provisional Certificate of Sale and upon the failure of Spouses Zepeda to
redeem the property, ownership was consolidated in its favor. According to Spouses Zepeda, the
foreclosure proceedings should be annulled for failure to comply with the posting and
publication requirements. 
 Chinabank, on its end, filed a motion to dismiss but this was denied. Hence, it filed an answer
with special affirmative defenses and counterclaim and it also filed a set of written
interrogatories with 20 questions. 
  The RTC, in its order, denied Chinabank’s affirmative defenses for lack of merit and it directed
the Clerk of Court to set the pre-trial conference for the marking of the parties’ documentary
evidence. 
 Chinabank then filed a petition for certiorari which was granted by the Court of Appeals. The CA
held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the two assailed Orders. It ruled
that compelling reasons warrant the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint because they failed to
answer Chinabank’s written interrogatories and the complaint states no cause of action, among
other reasons.  
 Spouses Zepeda filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. 
ISSUE: 

Whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to answer respondent’s written
interrogatories as provided for in Section 3(c), Rule 29 of the Rules of Court. 

RULING:

No. Chinabank filed a motion to expunge the complaint based on Section 3( c) of Rule 29 which states: 

“SEC. 3. Other consequences.—If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an
order made under section 1 of this Rule requiring him to answer designated questions, or an order under
Rule 27 to produce any document or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it
to be done, or to permit entry upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 28 requiring
him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in regard to the
refusal as are just, and among others the following: 

x x x (c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is
obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party x x x”

In Arellano v. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, the consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule
29 would only apply where the party upon whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to
answer a particular question in the set of written interrogatories and despite an order compelling him to
answer the particular question, still refuses to obey the order. 

However, in this case, Spouses Zepeda refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not
just a particular question. According to the Court, Chinabank should have filed a motion based on
Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29. Section 5 of Rule 29 reads: 

“SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers.—If a party or an officer or managing agent of a
party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a
proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of
such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of
that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default
against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other,
including attorney’s fees.” 
Therefore, due to Chinabank’s filing of an erroneous motion, the RTC cannot be faulted for ruling that
the motion to expunge was premature for for lack of a prior application to compel compliance based on
Section 3. 

Afulugencia vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., 715 SCRA 399, (2014)
296. Sps. Afugulencia vs. Metrobank and Ortega

G.R. No. 185145, Feb. 5, 2014

Del Castillo

Facts:

 Petitioner sps. Filed a complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale,
certificate of sale, and other documents with damages against respondents Metrobank and
Emmanuel Ortega before RTC of Malolos City.

 Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation while Ortega is the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of the Malolos RTC.

 After the filing of pleadings, petitioners filed a motion for issuance of subpoena to require
metrobank’s officers to testify as petitioner’s initial witnesses during the hearing on August 31,
2006. 

 Metrobank opposed the motion, arguing that for lack of proper notice of hearing, the motion
must be denied. Pursuant to Sec. 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules of Court, Metrobank argues
that metrobank’s officer’s considered adverse parties, may not be compelled to testify for
petitioners since they were not initialy served with interrogatories. Furthermore, the documents
sought by petitioners from respondent’s officers were irrelevant to the case.

 Petitioners submitted a reply, stating that the lack of proper notice was cured by Metrobank’s
opposition; that applying the rule of liberality, the defect may be ignored by the trial court.
Furthermore, the documents sought by petitioners is relevant as it will prove that their
obligations to metrobank were paid in full and that the Rules do not prohibit a party from
presenting the adverse party as its own witness.

 RTC ruled in favor of metrobank, denying motion for issuance of subpoena. The Court held that
the requirements of valid notice and hearing as specified in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15, Rules of
Court were not complied with. Moreover, the defendant bank and its officers are adverse
parties who cannot be summoned to testify unless written interrogatories are first served upon
them, as provided in Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court.

 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied as the RTC held that no laxity could
be accorded to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25, Rules of Court. 
  On appeal to the CA, petitioner asserted liberality on the rules was insisted, and the disposition
of the case on its merits and not technicalities. The CA added that Rule 21 of the Rules of Court
requires prior notice and hearing only with respect to the taking of depositions; since their
Motion sought to require Metrobank’s officers to appear and testify in court and not to obtain
their depositions, the requirement of notice and hearing may be dispensed with.

 CA denies appeal and affirms the lower court. The CA held that Rule 25 is quite clear in providing
that the consequence of a party’s failure to serve written interrogatories upon the opposing
party is that the latter may not be compelled by the former to testify in court or to render a
deposition pending appeal. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in holding that the petitioners must first serve written interrogatories to
respondent banks officers before they can be subpoenaed.

Ruling: No. The Court did not err in strictly applying Rule 25 of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 6, Rule 25, Rules of Court provides that unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause
shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not be
compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
The purpose of this rule is to prevent fishing for evidence and needless delays in the conduct of trial. In
this case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers, who are adverse parties, to the witness stand as
their main witnesses. The CA court did not err in holding that this is improper. Petitioners are attempting
to build a case on the evidence of the adverse party, which should not be the case as the burden of
proof in Civil Cases, lies with the complainant. Lastly, no good cause was shown to compel the testimony
of adverse parties who have not been served written interrogatories.

Sec. 6, Rule 25 cannot be ignored in this case and the Lower Courts did not err in denying petitioner’s
motion for subpoena. Petition denied.

Villuga vs. Kelly Hardware and Construction Supply, Inc., 677 SCRA
131, (2012)
Villuga vs. Kelly Hardware and Construction Supply, Inc.
G.R. No. 176570, 18 July 2012
Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:
This Court has ruled that if the factual allegations in the complaint are the very same allegations set
forth in the request for admission and have already been specifically denied, the required party cannot
be compelled to deny them anew. 

FACTS:
On March 3, 1995 Plaintiff filed with the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite a Complaint for a Sum of Money and
Damages against defendants alleging that the latter failed and refused to pay for the construction
materials despite of several oral and written demands. 

Defendants, in their answer, admitted having made purchases from plaintiff, but alleged that they do
not remember the exact amount thereof as no copy of the documents evidencing the purchases were
attached to the complaint. Defendants, nonetheless, claimed that they have made payments to the
plaintiff in the amounts of P110,301.80 and P20,000.00, respectively, and they are willing to pay the
balance of their indebtedness after deducting the payments made and after verification of their account.

Plaintiff, in its counter manifestation, signified that it was amenable to defendants’ offer to pay the
principal amount of P259,809.50. However, plaintiff insisted that defendants should also pay interests,
as well as litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and all incidental expenses.

Subsequently, plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings contending that defendants
were deemed to have admitted in their Answer that they owed plaintiff the amount of P259,809.50
when they claimed that they made partial payments amounting to P130,301.80. Based on this premise,
plaintiff prayed that it be awarded the remaining balance of P129,507.70. 

In their Answer to Amended Complaint, defendants reiterated their allegations in their Answer to

Complaint. Plaintiff filed a Request for Admission asking that defendants admit the genuineness of
various documents, such as statements of accounts, delivery receipts, invoices and demand letter
attached thereto as well as the truth of the allegations. Defendants filed their Comments on the Request
for Admission stating their objections to the admission of the documents attached to the Request.
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary Judgment which was thereafter granted by
the trial court. The CA affirmed the Orders of the RTC and defendants Motion for Reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether there was an implied admission by the defendant.

RULING:

None. A careful examination of the said Request for Admission shows that the matters of fact set forth
therein are simply a reiteration of plaintiff’s main allegation in its Amended Complaint and that
defendants had already set up the affirmative defense of partial payment with respect to the above
allegation in their previous pleadings. This Court has ruled that if the factual allegations in the complaint
are the very same allegations set forth in the request for admission and have already been specifically
denied, the required party cannot be compelled to deny them anew. In this case, it is difficult to believe
that defendants do not know how their payment was applied. Instead of denying knowledge,
defendants could have easily asserted that their payments of P110,301.80 and P20,000.00 were applied
to, and should have been deducted from, the sum sought to be recovered by plaintiff, but they did not,
leading the court to no other conclusion than that these payments were indeed applied to their other
debts to plaintiff leaving an outstanding obligation of P259,809.50. Defendant’s defense of partial
payment in their Answer to Second Amended Complaint, in effect, no longer raised genuine issues of
fact that require presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Hence, the summary judgment of the RTC
in favor of plaintiff is proper.

Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos vs. Republic, 814 SCRA 600, (2017)

298. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos

G.R. No. 213027, January 18 2017

Sereno,C J

DOCTRINE: Section 2 of R.A. 13 79 provides that "[w]henever any public officer or employee has
acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed primafacie  to have been unlawfully
acquired."

FACTS 

 Civil Case No. 0141 is a forfeiture case entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, filed by the Republic through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant to Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 13797 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. 

 The present consolidated petitions emanated from the same Civil Case No. 0141, when the
Republic filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 19 dated 24 June 2009 with respect to
another property listed in the 1991 Petition. . By way of that motion, the Republic asked the
Sandiganbayan to render judgment declaring the pieces of jewelry, known as the Malacañang
Collection and specifically mentioned under paragraph 9 (6) of the 1991 Petition, as ill-gotten;
and to subsequently cause this collection of jewelry to be declared forfeited in favor of the
Republic:

o Hawaiian Collection

o the Roumeliotes Collection x x x referred to as "MIA Jewelry" x x x seized from

Roumeliotes at the Manila International Airport on March 1, 1986. 

o the Malacañang Collection x x x seized from Malacañang after February 25, 1986 and
transferred to the Central Bank on March 1, 1986

 On 3 July 2009, the Republic also filed a Request for Admission 38 addressed to the Estate
of Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, and Irene Marcos
Araneta. It requested the admission under oath of the truth of the following:
o the set of jewelry described as the "Malacañang Collection" subject of this petition and
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated June 24, 2009 had been acquired during
the incumbency of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos as public
officials of the Republic of the Philippines, particularly between 1966-1986.

o "Malacañang Collection'' had been acquired from abroad, particularly during

respondents' travels to Asia, Europe and the United States.

o acquisition costs of the "Malacañang Collection'' more or less corresponds to the values
appraised by Christie's in 1998

o That at the time of the recovery of the Collection in Malacañang, the pieces of jewelry
were in mint condition, and most of which has never been used by respondents

 The Republic also submitted a Supplement to Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment dated 14 July 2009

 Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta

o  Filed their Manifestation and Preliminary Comments dated 21 July 2009. They

manifested therein that Imelda Marcos had indeed demanded the return of the jewelry
to her through a letter dated 25 May 2009 and that the PCGG had been unlawfully
possessing the prope1iies in view of its failure to initiate the proper proceeding or to
issue a sequestration or freeze order. 

o Then stated that the Republic's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was filed to
justify the possession by the PCGG of the pieces of jewelry, even if these were not part
of the forfeiture case - Civil Case No. 0141. They based their allegations on the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution omitting the said collection

o In their Manifestation and Motion to Expunge they claimed that the filing of the Request
for Admission was tantamount to an abdication of the earlier position of the Republic
that the case was ripe for summary judgment.

 Meanwhile Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. :

o filed a Manifestation that he was adopting the Manifestation and Motion to Expunge

filed by Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta. Which the republic filed its opposition in
which it said that the Manifestation and Motion to Expunge of Imelda Marcos and Irene
Marcos Araneta argued on trivial matters, raised puerile arguments, and failed to refute
the contention that the collection was ill-gotten and subject to forfeiture.

 In Response to Marcoses’ Manifestations and Preliminary Comments, It insisted that

while the Decision dated 2 April 2009 focused on the Arelma assets, it had reservations
regarding "other reliefs and remedies as may be just and equitable under the premises. 
  Rejoinder filed by the Marcoses alleged that the demand could not have meant that the
collection was part of the case, because the jewelry collection was "trivially mentioned"
in the statement of facts of the 1991 petition

 Sandigangbayan Resolution. SB ruled that (1) the proceedings in this case had not been
terminated; (2) in filing their objection, respondents were not deemed to have admitted
the matters in the Request for Admission; and (3) the Republic's Request for Admission
was not inconsistent with the Motion for Summary Judgment. To which the marcoses
opposed but the MR was subsequently denied.

 Meanwhile, the Estate of Marcos filed a Motion for Extension of Time on 09 July 2014
and a Manifestation on 8 August 2014, saying that its other executor in solidum  was no
longer filing a separate petition for review, but was adopting that which was filed by
Imelda Marcos

 Hence the Petitions for Review on Certiorari2assailing the Partial Summary

Judgment3 dated 13 January 2014 and the Resolution 4 dated 11 June 2014 rendered by
the Sandiganbayan, Special Division, 5 in Civil Case No. 0141. In the assailed Judgment
and Resolution, the pieces of jewelry, known as the Malacañang Collection, were
labeled as ill-gotten and were consequently forfeited in favor of the Republic

ISSUE:

1. Whether the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the properties

2. whether the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was
not inconsistent with the Request for Admission

HELD

1. YES. The Sandiganbayan correctly noted the Annexes, which were mentioned in subparagraph 6
and made an integral part of the 1991 Petition, itemizing and enumerating the pieces of jewelry
with their estimated values. It ultimately found that the 1991 Petition had categorically alleged
that the Malacañang Collection was included in the assets, monies and properties sought to be
recovered.

With respect to the manner of making allegations in pleadings, the Rules of Court simply provides as
follows:

Section 1. In general. - Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the
case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.

If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their applicability to him shall
be clearly and concisely stated.
In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting
the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer? To
be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and
circumstances or other matters aliunde  are not considered. The court may consider -- in addition to the
complaint -- the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the
records. 129

The 1991 Petition is compliant with the requirements stated in law and jurisprudence. The sufficiency of
its allegations is thus established with respect to the pieces of jewelry

2. YES. The Sandiganbayan also properly ruled that there was no inconsistency or incongruity
between Republic's Request for Admission and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Indeed,
we have held that a request for admission can be the basis for the grant of summary judgment.
The request can be the basis therefor when its subject is deemed to have been admitted by the
party and is requested as a result of that party's failure to respond to the court's directive to
state what specifically happened in the case.  The resort to such a request as a mode of
discovery rendered all the matters contained therein as matters that have been deemed
admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

A careful scrutiny of the three bases used by the Sandiganbayan in justifying the absence of a genuine
issue and eventually granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment leads us to no other course of
action but to affirm the ruling of the Sandiganbayan. The prima facie  presumption on unlawfully
acquired property indeed finds application on the first basis. Section 2 of R.A. 13 79 provides that
"[w]henever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be
presumed primafacie  to have been unlawfully acquired." And in this regard, the Sandiganbayan had
taken judicial notice of the legitimate income of the Marcoses during their incumbency as public officers
for the period 1966-1986 which was pegged at USD 304,372.43. 

Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. vs. Toledo, 697 SCRA 425,
(2013)
Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. et al. v. Toledo

G.R. No. 190818, June 5, 2013 

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

DOCTRINE: Under Section 2, Rule 26, once a party serves a request for admission regarding the truth of
any material and relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served is given a period of
fifteen (15) days within which to file a sworn statement answering the same. Should the latter fail to file
and serve such answer, each of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted.
An exception to this rule is if the matters in a request for admission have already been admitted or
denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny
them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and
thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26. 

FACTS: Petitioners were assessed to pay their 4th quarter local business taxes pursuant to Section 21 of
the City Ordinance No. 7794, by respondent Toledo who was treasurer of the City of Manila. Petitioners
paid their taxes but with protest, assailing the constitutionality of Section 21 of the ordinance. The
protest was denied, so petitioners filed a case with the RTC of Manila against respondents reiterating
their claim that Section 21 of the ordinance is null and void. They also sought refund of the taxes they
paid plus interest. Subsequently, they filed an Amended Complaint that reprised their previous claims.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss. The RTC did not address the arguments raised in the Motion to
Dismiss and only admitted petitioner’s amended complaint. Respondents filed an answer where they
restated their contention in the Motion to Dismiss that the petitioners failed to file any written claim for
tax refund with the City of Manila. Petitioners then sent respondents a Request for Admissions and
Interrogatories, where among which it requested the admission of the fact that they filed a written
protest with the City of Manila. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the issuance of a tax
refund. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Respondents filed two (2)
Motions for Extension to File Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals, and filed a Petition for
Review. The CTA reversed RTC ruling and denied petitioners of a tax refund. CTA held that petitioners
failed to contest the denial of their protest before a court of competent jurisdiction within the period
prescribed by law. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the case was brought
before the CTA en banc. The CTA en banc upheld the CTA Division’s ruling and so the case at bar. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the implied admission rule under Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court shall
apply in the case.

RULING: NO. Under Section 2, Rule 26, once a party serves a request for admission regarding the truth
of any material and relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served is given a period of
fifteen (15) days within which to file a sworn statement answering the same. Should the latter fail to file
and serve such answer, each of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted.
An exception to this rule is if the matters in a request for admission have already been admitted or
denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny
them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and
thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26. 

In the case, records show that petitioners filed their Request for Admission with the RTC and
also served the same on respondents, requesting that the fact that they filed a written claim for refund
with the City Treasurer of Manila be admitted. Respondents, however, did not and in fact, need not
reply to the same considering that they have already stated in their Motion to Dismiss and Answer that
petitioners failed to file any written claim for tax refund or credit. In this regard, respondents are not
deemed to have admitted the truth and veracity of petitioners’ requested fact. Therefore, the implied
admission rule does not apply in the case at bar. 

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. San Miguel Corporation, 815

SCRA 563, (2017)
300. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. San Miguel Corporation
G.R. No. 205045, January 25, 2017

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE: A motion for production of documents may be availed of even beyond the pretrial stage,
upon showing of good cause as required under Rule 27. But the petitioner should show “good cause”
and relevance of the documents sought to be produced, and the trial court had not yet rendered its
judgment.

FACTS: 

Bureau of Internal Revenue Deputy Commissioner Estelita C. Aguirre issued two (2) Formal Letters of
Demand to San Miguel Corporation with the accompanying Final Assessment Notice (FAN) to pay
deficiency excise taxes. The taxes were assessed by classifying “San Mig Light” as a “variant” which is
subject to a higher excise tax rate than a “new brand”. San Miguel filed a Protest/Request for
Reconsideration against each FAN but it was denied.

San Miguel Corporation filed before the Court of Tax Appeals (First Division) Petitions for Review,
docketed as CTA Case Nos. 7052 and 7053, assailing the denials of its Protest/Request for
Reconsiderations of the deficiency excise tax assessments. The CTA promulgated judgment granting the
petitions and cancelling the assessments. 

The Commissioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Production of Documents praying
that San Miguel Corporation be compelled to produce the following: (a) “Kaunlaran” publication for the
months of October 1999 and January 2000; (b) 1999 Annual Report to stockholders; and (c) copies of the
video footage of two (2) San Mig Light commercials as seen in its website. The Commissioner claimed
“that the admission of said documents would lead to a better illumination of the outcome of the case.” 

The CTA First Division denied the motion. The CTA En Banc affirmed the denial. Thus, CIR filed a petition
for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner argues that this motion for production of documents may be filed after pretrial or during the
pendency of the action since Rule 27, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure does not explicitly
provide that it must be availed of before trial or pretrial. Petitioner contends that all requisites for filing
the motion were satisfied. 

ISSUE: 

 Whether a motion for production of documents and objects may be availed of after the court
has rendered judgment

RULING: 

NO. It must be availed of before judgment.

Rule 27, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.—Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefore, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other
property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall
specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and
may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.

Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court does not provide when the motion may be used. Hence, the
allowance of a motion for production of document rests on the sound discretion of the court where the
case is pending, with due regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of equity and justice.

Eagleridge Development Corporation v. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc., held that a motion
for production of documents may be availed of even beyond the pretrial stage, upon showing of good
cause as required under Rule 27. The production of documents was allowed because the petitioner was
able to show “good cause” and relevance of the documents sought to be produced, and the trial court
had not yet rendered its judgment.

In this case, petitioner filed its Motion for Production of Documents after the Court of Tax Appeals
Division had rendered its judgment. The production of those documents after judgment defeats the
purpose of modes of discovery in expediting case preparation and shortening trials.

Therefore, denial of the motion was proper.

Eagleridge Development Corporation vs. Cameron Gran-ville 3 Asset

Management, Inc., 741 SCRA 557, (2014)

268. Eagleridge Development Corp. v Cameron Granville Asset Management

G.R. No. 204700. April 10, 2013.

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE: The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of the modes of discovery
sanctioned by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only the parties, but also the court to discover all
the relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending before it. Generally, the scope of
discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with information essential to the fair
and amicable settlement or expeditious trial of the case. All the parties are required to lay their cards on
the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case.

FACTS: Petitioners EDC and Oben are defendants in a collection suit initiated by Export Industry Bank
(EIB), currently pending proceedings before the RTC. By virtue of a deed of assignment, EIB transferred
EDC’s outstanding loan obligations to respondent Cameron. Thereafter, Cameron filed its Motion to
Substitute/Join EIB dated November 24, 2006, which was granted by the trial court.

On February 22, 2012, petitioners filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of the Loan Sale and
Purchase Agreement (LSPA) dated April 7, 2006 referred to in the Deed of Assignment. Respondent
Cameron filed its Comment dated March 14, 2012 alleging that petitioners have not shown “good
cause” for the production of the LSPA and that the same is allegedly irrelevant to the case a quo. In
response, petitioners filed on March 26, 2012 their Reply. Petitioners explained that the production of
the LSPA was for “good cause”. They pointed out that the claim of Cameron is based on an obligation
purchased after litigation had already been instituted in relation to it. As petitioners’ alleged loan
obligations may be reimbursed up to the extent of the amount paid by Cameron in the acquisition
thereof, it becomes necessary to verify the amount of the consideration from the LSPA, considering that
the Deed of Assignment was silent on this matter. The trial court denied petitioners’ motion for
production for being utterly devoid of merit. It ruled that there was failure to show “good cause” for the
production of the LSPA which the trial court denied. On certiorari filed with the CA, the CA dismissed the
petition.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying the production and/or inspection of the
LSPA

RULING: YES. 

Section 1, Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Court, states: Section 1. Motion for production or inspection;
order.—Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending
may a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on
behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; xxx

The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of the modes of discovery sanctioned
by the Rules of Court in order to enable not only the parties, but also the court to discover all the
relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending before it. Generally, the scope of
discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with information essential to the fair
and amicable settlement or expeditious trial of the case. All the parties are required to lay their cards on
the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case. Although the grant of a motion for
production of document is admittedly discretionary on the part of the trial court judge, nevertheless, it
cannot be arbitrarily or unreasonably denied because to do so would bar access to relevant evidence
that may be used by a party-litigant and hence, impair his fundamental right to due process. 

The question was whether respondent had acquired a valid title to the credit, i.e., EDC’s outstanding
loan obligation, and whether it had a right to claim from petitioners. In fact, petitioners had maintained
in their motions before the trial court the nullity or non-existence of the assignment of credit
purportedly made between respondent and EIB (the original creditor). As respondent Cameron’s claim
against the petitioners relies entirely on the validity of the Deed of Assignment, it is incumbent upon
respondent Cameron to allow petitioners to inspect all documents relevant to the Deed, especially those
documents which, by express terms, were referred to and identified in the Deed itself. The LSPA, which
pertains to the same subject matter—the transfer of the credit to respondent is manifestly useful to
petitioners’ defense.

Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is
given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and
when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its
understanding may also be given in evidence. Since the Deed of Assignment was produced in court by
respondent and marked as one of its documentary exhibits, the LSPA which was made a part thereof by
explicit reference and which is necessary for its understanding may also be inevitably inquired into by
petitioners. In this light, the relevance of the LSPA sought by petitioners is readily apparent. Fair play
demands that petitioners must be given the chance to examine the LSPA.

Respondent's contention that the LSPA is privileged and confidential is likewise untenable.

Indeed, Rule 27 contains the proviso that the documents sought to be produced and inspected must not
be privileged against disclosure. Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types of privileged communication. 
These are communication between or involving the following: (a) between husband and wife; (b)
between attorney and client; (c) between physician and patient; (d) between priest and penitent; and
(e) public officers and public interest.

Privileged communications under the rules of evidence is premised on an accepted need to protect a
trust relationship.  It has not been shown that the parties to the deed of assignment fall under any of the
foregoing categories

Chan v. Chan, 702 SCRA 76 (2013)

301. Chan v Chan

G.R. No. 179786. July 24, 2013.

Abad, J.

DOCTRINE: Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces
tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced for
examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more
so to their disclosure. Sec 24c, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is about non-disclosure of privileged
matters.

FACTS: Petitioner Josielene Chan filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
to respondent Johnny Chan, the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of
custody of their children to her. She averred that he failed on his marital duties because of his excessive
drinking and drug use. During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1
that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a
hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from “methamphetamine
and alcohol abuse.” Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the RTC a request
for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical
records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to “be allowed to
submit in evidence” the records sought by subpoena duces tecum. Johnny opposed the motion, arguing
that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC
sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. On certiorari, the CA denied Joseliene’s
petition.

ISSUE: whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by
physician-patient privileged communication

RULING: NO.

The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as
the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the
physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that
concern the patient’s health problems. Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be
made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus: SEC. 36. Objection.—Objection to
evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. Objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds
therefor shall become reasonably apparent. An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within
three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court. In any case, the
grounds for the objections must be specified.

Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced for
examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more
so to their disclosure. Sec 24c, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is about non-disclosure of privileged
matters.

It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a
litigant prior to trial pursuant to Sec 1, Rule 27 of the RoC. But the right to compel the production of
documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are not privileged. To allow, the disclosure
during discovery procedure of the hospital records — the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him — would be to allow access to
evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent.

Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Sanchez, 717 SCRA 294,
(2014)
302. Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Sanchez
G.R. No. 182738. February 24, 2014
PERALTA, J.
DOCTRINE:
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision

FACTS:

1. Respondent Manuel O. Sanchez, a stockholder of petitioner Capitol Hills Golf & Country
Club, Inc. filed a petition for the nullification of the annual meeting of stockholders of May
21, 2002 and the special meeting of stockholders of April 23, 2002. Petitioners, along
with their co-defendants, filed an Answer with Counterclaims and, thereafter, a Motion
for Preliminary Hearing of Defendants' Affirmative Defenses, which was denied on
August 9, 2002 by Hon. Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., then Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 93, now a member of the Court of Appeals.
2. Respondent filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents, which the court
granted in an Order ordered to produce and make available for inspection and
photocopying by the plaintiff the stockholder information documents.
3. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) of the August 9, 2002 Order, which
denied their motion for preliminary hearing. Subsequently, they filed a Supplement to
Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, attaching therewith an alleged certification
issued by the National Printing Office to support their contention of lack of cause of
action on the grounds, among others, that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1996, as amended, has not been duly
published in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Pending resolution of the MR,
petitioners filed on January 21, 2003 a Motion for Deferment of Implementation of the
September 10, 2002 Order.
4. Respondent, on October 7, 2002, filed an Omnibus Motion to immediately allow him to
inspect and photocopy the documents and to compel petitioners to deposit with the court
the documents subject of the September 10, 2002 Order.
5. Presiding Judge Bruselas issued an Order 12 denying petitioners' MR of the Order dated
August 9, 2002 and considered respondent's omnibus motion as a reiteration of his
earlier motion for inspection and production of documents; thus, the immediate
implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order was simultaneously ordered.
6. During the January 11, 2007 inspection, the only document produced by the Acting
Corporate Secretary, Atty. Antonio V. Meriz, and one of the staff, Malou Santos, was the
Stock and Transfer Book of the Corporation. They alleged that they could not find from
the corporate records the copies of the proxies submitted by the stockholders, including
the tape recordings taken during the stockholders’ meetings, and that they needed more
 time to locate and find the list of stockholders as of March 2002, which was in the
bodega of the Corporation.
7. In order to give both the plaintiff and defendants one last chance to comply with the
order dated September 10, 2002, the SC reiterated the said order:
The SC ordered the defendants to strictly comply with this order. Failure of the
defendants to comply with all the requirements of the order dated September 10, 2002
will result into the citing all the defendants in contempt of court. This Court shall order
defendants solidarily to pay a fine of P10,000.00 for every day of delay to comply with
the order of September 10, 2002 until the defendants shall have fully and completely
complied with the said order.
8. Anent the argument against the threatened imposition of sanction for contempt of court
and the possible payment of a hefty fine, the CA opined that the case of Dee v.
Securities and Exchange Commission cited by petitioners is inapplicable, Before the SC,
petitioners contend that the "threatened imminent action" by the RTC to penalize them or
without regard to the guideline laid down by the Court in Engr. Torcende v. Judge
Sardido is not proper and calls for the exercise of the SC’s power of supervision over the
lower courts.

ISSUE: Whether the imposition of contempt as “threatened imminent action” is proper?

RULING: YES

1. If adjudged guilty of indirect contempt, the respondent who committed it against a

Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank may be punished with a fine
not exceeding thirty thousand pesos, or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or
both. 43 In this case, the threatened sanction of possibly ordering petitioners to solidarily
pay a fine of P10,000.00 for every day of delay in complying with the September 10,
2002 Order is well within the allowable range of penalty.
2. In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or
are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall
allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless
the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision.
3. Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of court, courts have
the duty to ensure that all the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings have been
complied with. It behooves them too to docket the petition, and to hear and decide it
separately from the main case, unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of the
contempt proceedings and the main action.
4. But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court, the above rules,
as clarified in Regalado, do not necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu
proprio initiates the proceedings, there can be no verified petition to speak of. Instead,
 the court has the duty to inform the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her
right to due process. This formal charge is done by the court in the form of an Order
requiring the respondent to explain why he or she should not be cited in contempt of
court.
5. In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Court's
mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the
September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of
indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only
serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-
observance of the long-overdue order to produce and make available for inspection and
photocopying of the requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal
to comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect
contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing
jurisprudence.
6. The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person
adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the
Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these
were not done in this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making the September 3,
2007 Resolution final and executory

Limos v. Odones, 628 SCRA 288, (2010)

303. Socorro Limos vs. Spouses Francisco & Arwenia Odones
[GR 186979] [August 11, 2010]
Nachura, J.

Legal Doctrine: A party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be deemed to have
impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized, however, that the
application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court.

Facts:

 Private respondents Sps Odones filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title and Damages
against petitioners Limos, Rosa delos Reyes and Sps Delos Reyes before Tarlac RTC. The
complaint alleged that they are the owners of a 940 sq m land by virtue of an Extrajudicial
Succession of Estate and Sale dated Jan 29, 2004, executed by the surviving heirs of Donata
Lardizabal, in whom the original title was vested.

 After registering the document of conveyance, they found out that the OCT was cancelled and
replaced by a TCT in the petitioners’ name. Petitioners were able to secure TCT by virtue of a
Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Donata and husband on April 18, 1972. Respondents sought
the cancellation of said TCTs on the ground that the Sps Lardizabal’s signatures were forgeries.

 In response, petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars, which was denied, and in their
answer pleaded affirmative defenses: (a) failure to state a cause of action inasmuch as the
 respondents’ alleged title is void & are not real parties-in-interest (b) non-joinder of the other
heirs of Donata as indispensable parties (c) respondents’ claim is barred by laches. In reply,
respondents maintained their standing and appended a sworn statement of heir Amadeo
Razalan.

 Petitioners also served upon respondents a Request for Admission, which respondents failed to
respond to, prompting petitioners to file a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing on the Special
and Affirmative Defenses. RTC & CA denied said motion because respondents had already
replied*, hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether respondents’ failure to respond to the Request for Admission amounted to an implied
admission & a preliminary hearing should therefore be conducted.

Ruling of the Court: No, respondents’ failure to respond to the Request for Admission did not amount to
an implied admission. Under these rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall
be deemed to have impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must be emphasized,
however, that the application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the
court. Matters set forth in the petitioners’ Request for Admission were the same affirmative defenses in
their answer which respondents already traversed in their Reply.

Santiago Land Dev., Co. v. CA, 258 SCRA 535 (1996)

304. Santiago Land Development Company vs CA

G.R. No. 103922, July 9, 1996

Torres, Jr., J.

DOCTRINE: If plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the interrogatories, it may be a good basis for the
dismissal of his complaint for non-suit unless he can justify such failure or refusal, but it should be noted
that it is discretionary on the court to order the dismissal of the action.

FACTS: The Philippine National Bank (PNB) initiated the foreclosure proceedings of a mortgaged
property owned by respondent Komatsu Industries when respondent failed to pay its indebtedness. As
such, respondent filed an action with the RTC Makati seeking to prevent the foreclosure of the subject
property. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order but the property was, extrajudicially
foreclosed by the PNB. Thereafter, respondent Komatsu Industries filed an amended petition for the
declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

During the pendency of the case filed by respondent Komatsu, petitioner Santiago Land Development
Corporation (SLDC) purchased the subject property. Consequently, petitioner SLDC filed a motion for
intervention which was allowed by the Court.

Petitioner SLDC served written interrogatories on respondent Komatsu Industries’

counsel. The interrogatories were not, however, answered by the respondent by reason of which
petitioner SLDC filed a motion to dismiss the action with prejudice based on Sec. 5, Rule 29 of the Rules
of Court. 

An opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by respondent Komatsu Industries alleging that

there was no valid service of the written interrogatories inasmuch as the service was made on the
respondent’s counsel and not directly upon any of the respondent’s officers who were competent to
testify in its behalf, pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss so petitioner SLDC filed a petition for review before the
Supreme Court. Such petition was remanded to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that
there was a valid service and the failure of the respondent to answer the interrogatories would warrant
the dismissal of the case. However, certiorari does not lie in the case at bar because it is not intended to
correct defects of jurisdiction solely and not to correct errors of procedure or matters in the court a
quo’s findings or conclusions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the interrogatories were improperly served.

RULING: NO. 

Petitioner SLDC argues that the civil action should have been ordered dismissed with prejudice because
of private respondent’s deliberate, knowing, and continued refusal to answer the written
interrogatories. The respondent court, therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion and/or
disregarded the usual course of judicial proceedings when it refused to order the dismissal of the civil
case.

Section 5, Rule 29 of the Rules of Court warrants the dismissal of the complaint when the plaintiff fails or
refuses to answer the written interrogatories. If plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the interrogatories, it
may be a good basis for the dismissal of his complaint for non-suit unless he can justify such failure or
refusal. It should be noted that it is discretionary on the court to order the dismissal of the action.

Although there was an error of judgment in denying the motion to dismiss, nevertheless, such cannot be
considered as grave abuse of discretion and therefore, correctable by certiorari. Certiorari is not
available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge’s findings and conclusions and that
certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law and
fact. Furthermore, the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory, cannot be
questioned by certiorari, it cannot be subject of appeal, until final judgment or order is rendered.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 722 SCRA 211, (2014)

Republic vs Sandiganbayan
GR 188881

 The Republic, through PCGG, commenced a complaint for "reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages against Bienvenido Tantoco Jr., et al.
 Pre-trial commenced and the temporary markings of Exhibites "A" to "LLL" of the Republic,
together with their sub-markings, were adopted. However, over the objections of the respondents
Tantoco and Santiago, the PCGG produced and caused the pre-marking of additional documents,
Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAAA."
 Tantoco and Santiago filed a "Motion under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court," claiming that the
additional documents were never produced at the discovery proceedings and praying that petitioner
be sanctioned for contempt. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion.
 Republic filed its formal offer of evidence and the Sandiganbayan initially excluded the said
documents but later partly relented and admitted Exhibits "MMM" to "AAAAAA." Respondents filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was granted.

ISSUE + RULING: Should evidence not produced at the discovery proceedings be admitted

NO. It is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties, before the trial if not indeed even before the
pre-trial, should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known
to them individually, but also those known to adversaries as set forth in Rules 24 to 29.

The Sandiganbayan clarified in its First Resolution that the defendants' "Motion Filed under Rule 29" was
but in pursuance of their continuing objection to the marking of evidence not produced at discovery. The
Second Resolution, while issued after petitioner had submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence, noted that all
the documents contained therein were photocopies. It stated that a mere certification from the Clerk of
Court that they "appear to be the original copy" would not suffice. 

The Sandiganbayan still admitted them as evidence, yet the only reason  cited for doing so was liberality.
The general rule is that secondary evidence is still not admissible until the non-production of the primary
evidence has been sufficiently accounted for. Nothin on records shows. and petitioner itself makes no
claim, that the Exhibits fall under any of the exceptions to the Best Evidence rule.

After failing to submit the documentary evidence during discovery, when it was clearly ordered by both the
Sandiganbayan and the SC to do so, petitioner also repeatedly failed to prove the due execution and
authenticity of the documents. Thus, said documents are not admissible as evidence.