I.

(a) No with regard to Romeo, Samuel, Teresita, and Jose. The breach of contract of
carriage filed by them against CTC will not prosper. However, with regard to Uriel
and Pedro, Yes. The breach of contract of carriage filed by them against CTC will
prosper.

In the case of Darines vs Quinones & Quitan (2017), “in an action based on a breach
of contract of carriage, it is necessary to show the existence of the contract between
the parties, and the failure of the common carrier to transport its passenger safely to
his or her destination.” And in the case of Baliwag Transit Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals (1989), in a suit for breach of contract of carriage, the real party in interest is
the injured passenger. The case of Vda. De Nueca vs. Manila Railroad Co (1968)
defined a passenger as one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of express
or implied contract with the carrier as to the payment of fare or that which is
accepted as an equivalent thereof. Lastly, the case of Muller vs. Muller (2006)
pronounced that the time–honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely
stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may
be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.

Here, Romeo being stow away cannot be said to be a passenger, and thus cannot sue
CTC for breach of contract of carriage for one who boarded by fraud, stealth, or
deceit cannot be considered a passenger. Samuel cannot find relief in court as he was
committing a crime or inequitable act while inside the bus. Teresita and Jose failed to
fall into the definition of a passenger as there is no express or implied contract with
the carrier to travel in public conveyance. Therefore, the breach of contract of
carriage filed by Romeo, Samuel, Teresita, and Jose against CTC will not prosper.

Lastly, Article 1758 of the New Civil Code states that a passenger being carried
gratuitously or under a reduced fare is still considered a passenger. Here, both Uriel
 and Pedro is still a passenger even though they are being transported gratuitously.
Hence, the breach of contract of carriage filed by them against CTC will prosper.

(b) Yes, Romeo, Samuel, Teresita, Uriel, Jose and Pedro have a cause of action for
damages against UTI. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is so pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter. Here, Romeo, Samuel, Teresita, Uriel, Jose and Pedro
sustained injuries because the public utility vehicle they were riding collided with
UTI bus. Hence, Romeo, Samuel, Teresita, Uriel, Jose and Pedro have a cause of
action for damages against UTI.

(c) With regard to CTC, as the action is predicated on breach of contract of carriage,

II.
Yes with regard to TMBI. The breach of contract filed by Sony against TMBI will
prosper. In Weatwind Shipping Corporation v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., as
long as an entity holds itself to the public for the transport of goods as a business, it is
considered a common carrier regardless of whether it owns the vehicle used or has to
actually hire one. Further, Article 1734 of the New Civil Code states that common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the
same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; &
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

The same Code provides that in all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of
the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733. In this case, the TMBI failed to
overcome the burden of proof. Hence, TMBI is liable to Sony.

However, with regard to BM, the answer is No. The breach of Contract filed by Sony against
BM will not prosper. In the case of Torres–Madrid Brokerage, Inc. vs. FEB Mitsu Marine
Insurance Co., Inc, the Supreme Court distinguished culpa contractual to culpa aquiline, thus:

In culpa contractual, the plaintiff only needs to establish the existence of the contract and the
obligor's failure to perform his obligation. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove or even
allege that the obligor's non- compliance was due to fault or negligence because Article 1735
already presumes that the common carrier is negligent. The common carrier can only free itself
from liability by proving that it observed extraordinary diligence. It cannot discharge this
liability by shifting the blame on its agents or servants. On the other hand, the plaintiff in culpa
aquiliana must clearly establish the defendant's fault or negligence because this is the very basis
of the action. Moreover, if the injury to the plaintiff resulted from the act or omission of the
defendant's employee or servant, the defendant may absolve himself by proving that he
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Here, Sony’s action is
predicated on breach of contract. Accordingly, there is no basis to directly hold BM liable to
Sony for quasi-delict.

III.