Define Common Carrier

Art. 1732 provides that a common carrier is a person, corporation, firm, or association engaged
in the business of transporting or carrying passengers or goods or both by land, air, or water for
compensation offering its services to the public.

In the case of Pedro de Guzman vs. CA, the SC held that the definition of common carrier
according to the law does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both and anyone who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity. The law also avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled trips and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Lastly, the law refrains from making a distinction
between a carrier offering its services to the general public and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

A stipulation, exempting the company from liability from loss or damage arising from the
negligence of its agents, in the charter party is valid, provided that the charter is a demise or a
bareboat charter.

A bareboat or a demise charter must be distinguished from a contract of affreightment. In the

former, the charterer becomes the owner of the voyage or service stipulated, and such charter
party may transform a common carrier into a private carrier (Caltex [Phils.] v. Sulpicio Lines,
G.R. No. 131166, September 30, 1999). On the other hand, in a contract of affreightment, the
common carrier is not transformed into a private carrier (Coastwise Lighterage Corp. v. CA, G.R.
No. 114167, July 12, 1995).

The Court in the case of Planters Product, Inc. v. CA (G.R. No. 105090, September 15, 1993)
explained that the distinction between a common carrier and a private carrier lies in the
character of the business, such that if the undertaking is a single transaction, not a part of a
general business or occupation, although involving the carriage of the goods for a fee, the
person or corporation offering such service is a private carrier. Moreover, as opposed to a
common carrier, a private carrier may validly enter into a stipulation that it is exempt from
liability for the negligence of its agents or employees.

C-D-S-P
The Court in Eastern Shipping Lines provides that the law of the country to which the goods are
to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction
or deterioration.

Under Article 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all circumstances.

Under the Art. 1735 of the Civil Code, in case of loss of effects of passengers or death or injuries
to passengers, the common carrier is presumed to be at fault or have acted negligently unless it
can prove that it has observed extraordinary diligence. Consequently, the carrier may be held
liable for breach of obligation.

In case of such breach, the carrier is liable for actual and compensatory damages that may be
established including damages for loss of earning capacity; attorney’s fees and exemplary
damages may also be available. In the case of moral damages, the general rule is that moral
damages are not recoverable in an action based on breach of contract. However, the
exceptions are (1) if the passenger died and (2) if there is fraud, bad faith, or gross negligence.
(Sps. Dionisio Estrada and Jovita R. Estrada v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 203902,
July 19, 2017).

Article 1733 of the New Civil Code provides that “common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods -xxx- according to all circumstances of the case”. The fact that the
maleta was not declared nor the charges paid thereon is of no consequence as long as it was
received by the carrier for transportation. In this case, the carrier is presumed negligent for the
loss of X‟s baggage.

No. X is not a passenger. In the case of Vda de. Nueca v. Manila Railroad Co., (C.A. No. 31731-R,
January 30, 1968), it is held that a passenger is one who travels by virtue of a contract, express
or implied, with the carrier as to the payment of the fare, or that which is accepted as an
equivalent. The relation of passenger and carrier commences when one puts himself in the
care of the carrier, or directly under its control, with the bona fide intention of becoming a
passenger, and is accepted as such by the carrier – as where he makes a contract for
transportation and presents himself at the proper place and in a proper manner to be
transported. Given such circumstances, X is not considered as a passenger as there was no
evidence that he bought a ticket or paid his fare.
According to the case of Ramos v. China Southern Airlines Co. (G.R. No. 213418, September 21,
2016), when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a
certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he
would fly on that flight and on that date. If that does not happen, then the carrier opens itself
to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Moreover, in an action based on a breach of
contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not need to prove that the common carrier was
at fault or negligent. All she has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-
performance due to the carrier’s fault.

According to Art. 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary
diligence for the safety of passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case. A passenger is one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of contract,
express or implied, with the carrier as to the payment of fare or that which is accepted as an
equivalent thereof.

Furthermore, in the same case, the following were held to be not considered as passengers and
are entitled to ordinary diligence only:
1. One who has not yet boarded any part of a vehicle regardless of whether or not he has
purchased a ticket;
2. One who remains on a carrier for an unreasonable length of time after he has been
afforded every safe opportunity to alight;
3. One who has boarded by fraud, stealth, or deceit;
4. One who attempts to board a moving vehicle, although he has a ticket, unless the
attempt be with the knowledge and consent of the carrier;
5. One who has boarded a wrong vehicle, has been properly informed of such fact, and on
alighting, is injured by the carrier; or
6. One who rides any part of the vehicle which is unsuitable or dangerous or which he
knows is not designed or intended for passengers. (Vda de. Nueca v. Manila Railroad
Co., C.A. No. 31731-R, January 30, 1968)

Ny-R-Bf; A-Bw-R
According to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code, common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries
to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of
the common carriers. This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.

Art. 1758 of the Civil Code states that when a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation
limiting the common carrier‟s liability for negligence is valid, but not for willful acts or gross
negligence.

The Supreme Court ruled in the case of GV Florida Transport v. Heirs of Romeo Battung, Jr, (G.R.
No. 208802, October 14, 2015), that a common carrier is responsible for death or injuries
caused by wilful acts of other passengers or strangers, only if the common carrier‟s employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented the act.
Here, since the assailant was another paying passenger who boarded the bus and deliberately
stabbed Ysidro to death without any showing that the employees of Yatco prevented the act
makes the Yatco liable

Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for the injuries suffered by a passenger on account
of the willful acts or negligence of other passenger or of strangers, if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.

Article 1734 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the causes listed,
one of which is the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers.
However, this rule does not apply, if the fact of improper packing is known to the carrier or his
servants, or apparent upon ordinary observation, but it accepts the goods notwithstanding,
such condition, it is not relieved of liability for loss or injury resulting therefrom (Southern Lines,
Inc. v. Court Of Appeals And City Of Iloilo, G.R. No. L-16629, January 31, 1962).

Art. 1734 – FAATO

The hijacking made by three (3) armed men can be considered as a fortuitous event as it was
attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence or force which exempts the carrier from
liability.

The following are requisites of a fortuitous event:

(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will;
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a normal manner; and
(4) The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in or the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.

U-I-O-D

In this case, the hijacking is not an unexpected occurrence and is not independent of human
will. Moreover, hijacking of the carrier does not fall among the other exempting causes under
Article 1734 of the New Civil Code. The presumption of fault or negligence provided under
Article 1735 was not overcome by the carrier as there was no proof of extraordinary diligence
on its part, particularly in the selection of its four male employees who are of greater number
and strength as opposed to the hijackers who are only two and only one is armed with a bladed
weapon. Therefore, the hijacking is not a force majeure.

Under the law, hijacking may be set up as a defense if it was attended by the use of grave or
irresistible threat, violence, or force. In this case, it would appear that the truck was left
unattended by its driver and was taken while he was visiting his girlfriend. (Pedro de Guzman v.
CA, G.R. 47822, December 22, 1988)

Article 1757 of Civil Code provides that the responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of
passengers as required in Articles 1733 and 1755 cannot be dispensed with or lessened by
stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise

The following are defenses which would limit the common carrier’s liability:

○ Fortuitous event provided that the disaster is the proximate and only cause of the loss, that
the common carrier exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before during, or
after the occurrence of the disaster, and that the common carrier has not negligently incurred
in delay in the transport of the goods (Arts. 1739 and 1740 of the Civil Code);

○ Acts of public enemy provided that the same is the proximate and only cause of the loss, that
there exists an actual state of war, and that the common carrier exercised due diligence to
prevent or minimize the loss before during, or after the act causing the loss, deterioration, or
destruction of the goods (Art. 1739 of the Civil Code);

○ Negligence of the shipper or owner provided that if it is the proximate and only cause, the
same shall be an absolute defense but if the negligence was contributory only, then, it shall
only be a partial defense (Art. 1741 of the Civil Code);

○ Character of the goods or defects in the packaging or container provided that the common
carrier exercised due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss even if the damage was caused by
the inherent defect or character of the goods (Art. 1742 of the Civil Code);

○ Order or act of public authority provided that the public authority had the power to issue the
order and that the order or act was lawful (Art. 1743 of the Civil Code); and

○ Exercise of extraordinary diligence.

As in tort actions, the proper defense is due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee by the employer.

Generally, as provided in Article 1759 of the New Civil Code (NCC), the liability of the common
carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees. However, it was decided by the
court that if the source of obligation is under Article 2176 of NCC or the cause of action based
on quasi-delict or tort, the exercise of due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of
employee is available as a defense. (Del Prado v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. 29462, March
7,1929)

Article 1736 of the New Civil Code (NCC) provides that in carriage of goods, the extraordinary
responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in
the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered,
actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to
receive them, without prejudice to the provision of Article 1738. It is also provided that the
carrier shall deliver the goods within the time specified and agreed upon; however, in case
there is no stipulation, the carrier is bound to deliver the goods within a reasonable time.
Otherwise, it will incur delay and will be held liable for the breach of contract of carriage

Under Art. 1744 the stipulation absolutely exempting the common carrier for loss of the goods
is contrary to public policy and is therefore void.

The legal relationship between the consignee and the arrastre operator is akin to that of a
depositor and warehouseman (Lua Kian v. Manila Railroad Co., 19 SCRA 5 [1967]). The
relationship between the consignee and the common carrier is similar to that of the consignee
and the arrastre operator (Northern Motors, Inc. v. Prince Line, et al., 107 Phil. 253 [1960]).
Since it is the duty of the arrastre to take good care of the goods that are in its custody and to
deliver them in good condition to the consignee, such responsibility also devolves upon the
carrier.

Both the arrastre and the carrier are therefore charged with and obligated to deliver the goods
in good condition to the consignee (Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Metro Port Service, Inc.
(Formerly E. Razon, Inc.), G.R. No. 83613, February 21, 1990).

Before consignee C received the goods the obligation of the common carrier to observe
extraordinary diligence remains.

Under the law, a common carrier, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to
passengers. In this case, a public utility bus is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders.
It is the duty of common carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances for a reasonable
length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are
liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or
jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so. It was the duty of the driver, when he
stopped the bus, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger
such as Santiago while he was attempting to board the same. When a busis not in motion there
is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board.
Santiago, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a
passenger and is entitled to all the rights and protection pertaining to a contract of carriage.
(Dangwa Trans Co. v. CA, G.R. 95582, 7 Oct. 1991)
Articles 1736-1738 of the New Civil Code provides that in case of contract of carriage of goods,
the duty to exercise extraordinary diligence starts from the time the goods are unconditionally
placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to the person, who has
the right to receive them. It remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily
unloaded or stored in transit unless the shipper or owner had made use of the right of stoppage
in transitu. Hence, it continues to be inoperative even during the time the goods are stored in a
warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination until the consignee has been advised of the
arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or
otherwise dispose of them.

In the case of Jesusa Vda de Nueca, et al. v. The Manila Railroad Co. (CA-No. 31731, January
30,1968), the court ruled that such person must have a bona fide intention to use the facilities
of the carrier, possess sufficient fare with which to pay for his passage, and present himself to
the carrier for transportation in the place and manner provided. If he does not do so, he will not
be considered a passenger and the carrier does not owe him extraordinary diligence.

Under the rule on Hand-Carried Baggage, baggage in transit which is in the personal custody of
the passenger or his employee will be considered as necessary deposits. The common carrier
shall be responsible for the baggage as depositaries, provided that notice was given to them or
its employees, and the passenger too the necessary precaution, which the carrier has advised
them to the relative care and vigilance of their baggage. The law requires the common carrier
to observe the same diligence as the hotel keepers in case the baggage remains with the
passenger; otherwise, extraordinary diligence must be exercised (Art 1754, NCC).

The act of a thief or robber, who entered the common carrier‟s vehicle, is deemed force majure
if it is done with the use of arms or through irresistible force (Art 1754, NCC). The use of arms in
staging a hold-up is force majure under the rule on necessary deposits. The liability of the
common carrier for the loss of the belongings does not attach when the loss is due to a force
majure.

Under Art. 1763, a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common
carrier‟s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission.’

According to the case of Paguio Transport Corp vs. NLRC (GR No. 119500, August 28, 1999),
Boundary System is when the driver is engaged to drive the owner‟s/ operator‟s unit and pays
the latter a fee commonly called “boundary” for the use of the unit. Whatever the driver earns
in excess of that amount is his income. The relationship between jeepney owners/operators
and jeepney drivers and the like is employer-employee and not as lessor-lessee.

Article 1750 of the New Civil Code provides that a contract fixing the sum that may be
recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods is
valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been fairly and freely agreed
upon. And in the case of Shewaran vs. Philippine Airlines, G.R. No. L-20099. July 7, 1966, it was
provided that the liability of a common carrier may by contract be limited to a fixed amount,
but said agreement must be in writing and signed by the shipper or owner of the goods, besides
the other requirements of the law.

According to Article 1749 of the New Civil Code, a stipulation limiting a common carrier‟s
liability to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading unless the shipper or owner
declares a greater value, is binding. Moreover, Article 1754 of the same Code provides that
provisions of Articles 1733 to 1753 shall apply to the passenger‟s baggage which is not in his
personal custody or that of his employees.

Arts. 1759 and 1760 of the New Civil Code provides that common carriers are liable for the
death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former‟s
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers. The common carrier‟s responsibility cannot be
eliminated or limited by stipulation, by posting of notices, by statements on the tickets or
otherwise.

The rule is different with respect to a stipulation limiting the carrier‟s liability for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of goods shipped. Under Article 1750, Civil Code, a contract fixing
the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances and has
been fairly and freely agreed upon.

Article 1749 of the NCC provides that a stipulation that the common carrier‟s liability is limited
to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading is binding, unless the owner declares a
greater value.

As held in the case of Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Lucita Suyon, et al., (G.R. No. 143360,
September 5,2002), the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for any damages caused by the
negligent operation of the vehicle although the same was already sold or conveyed to another
person at the time of the accident. The registered owner is liable to the injured party subject to
his right of recourse against the transferee or the buyer. Furthermore, as provided in article
2180 of the New Civil Code, the employer shall be liable for damages caused by his employee
acting within the scope of his assigned task.

The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving
breach of contract

Common Carriers; Air Transportation; Where a passenger, despite his protestations and valid
travel documents, was unceremoniously bumped off by the airlines, damage was already done
when he was offered to fly the next day, which offer did not cure the airline’s default

Airline passengers have every right to decline an upgrade and insist on the accommodation they
had booked, and if an airline insists on the upgrade, it breaches its contract of carriage with the
passengers