ESTRELLITA M. BASCOS vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and

RODOLFO A. CIPRIANO, G.R. No. 101089 April 7, 1993

1. TEST TO DETERMINE COMMON CARRIER. — Article 1732 of

the Civil Code defines a common carrier as "(a) person, corporation
or firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public." The test to
determine a common carrier is "whether the given undertaking is a
part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to
the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent
of the business transacted." . . . The holding of the Court in De
Guzman vs. Court of Appeals is instructive. In referring to Article
1732 of the Civil Code, it held thus: "The above article makes no
distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a "sideline"). Article
1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person
or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguished between a
carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We
think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such
distinctions."

2. Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the

vigilance over the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they are
 presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the
goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few instances
when the presumption of negligence does not attach and these
instances are enumerated in Article 1734. In those cases where the
presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it
exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the
presumption . . . The presumption of negligence was raised against
petitioner. It was petitioner's burden to overcome it. Thus, contrary to
her assertion, private respondent need not introduce any evidence to
prove her negligence. Her own failure to adduce sufficient proof of
extraordinary diligence made the presumption conclusive against her.

3. In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that hijacking, not
being included in the provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with
under the provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the common carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier
from liability arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers
or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or
force. This is in accordance with Article 1745 of the Civil Code
which provides: "Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar
stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to
public policy . . . (6) That the common carrier's liability for acts
committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or
irresistible threat, violences or force, is dispensed with or diminished";
In the same case, the Supreme Court also held that: "Under Article
1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible — and will not
be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility — even for
acts of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where such thieves or
robbers in fact acted "with grave of irresistible threat, violence of
 force," We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are
reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is
attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."

4. JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS CONCLUSIVE. — In this case, petitioner

herself has made the admission that she was in the trucking business,
offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions
are conclusive and no evidence is required to prove the same.

5. WHO ALLEGES A FACT. — Petitioner presented no other proof of

the existence of the contract of lease. He who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it.

6. While the affidavit of Juanito Morden, the truck helper in the hijacked
truck, was presented as evidence in court, he himself was a witness as
could be gleaned from the contents of the petition. Affidavits are not
considered the best evidence if the affiants are available as witnesses.

7. Granting that the said evidence were not self-serving, the same were
not sufficient to prove that the contract was one of lease. It must be
understood that a contract is what the law defines it to be and not
what it is called by the contracting parties.
JOSE PILAPIL vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., GR. No.
52159 December 22, 1989

1. No, the company is not liable for the incident. While the law requires
the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence
against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the
absolute safety of its passengers.

2. Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care,
vigilance and precaution in the carriage of passengers by common
carriers to only such as human careand foresight can provide. What
constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all
the circumstances.

3. In the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no

way due to any defect in the means of transport or to the negligent or
willful acts of private respondents employees.

4. Involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and

suitable cars as well as competent employees, the presumption is rebutted
and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise
would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its
passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers.

5. Also, the rule that common carriers are bound to exercise

extraordinary diligence in safe transport of their passengers, is not the
standard by which liability is to be determined when intervening acts
of strangers is directly the cause of the injury. Article1763 governs:
 Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suf ered by
a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a goodfather of a f amily could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.

6. Although the suggested precaution (mesh-work grills cover for the

windows of the bus) could have prevented the injury complained of,
the rule of ordinary care and prudence not so exacting as to require one
charged with its exercise to take doubtful or unreasonable precautions
to guard against unlawful acts of strangers.

7. The carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or maintaining

vehicles as to absolutely prevent any and all injuries to passengers.
Where the carrier uses cars of the most approved type, in general use
by others engaged in the same occupation, and exercises a high degree
of care in maintaining them in suitable condition, the carrier cannot be
charged with negligence in this respect
PHIL. AMERICAN GEN. INSURANCE V. MGG MARINE, G.R.
NO. 135645, 2002

1. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported
by them. Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them,
common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or
negligent if the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed or if the
same deteriorated.

2. However, this presumption of fault or negligence does not arise in the

cases enumerated under Article 1734 of the Civil Code:

Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or

deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of
the following causes only:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or

calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

In order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability where

the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods is due to a natural
disaster or calamity, it must further be shown that the such natural
disaster or calamity was the proximate and only cause of the loss; there
must be "an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause ofthe
injury of the loss.

3. Moreover, even in cases where a natural disaster is the proximate and

only cause of the loss, a common carrier is still required to exercise due
diligence to prevent or minimize loss before, during and after the
occurrence of the natural disaster, for it to be exempt from liability
under the law for the loss of the goods. If a common carrier fails to
exercise due diligence--or that ordinary care which the circumstances of
the particular case demand -- to preserve and protect the goods carried by
it on the occasion of a natural disaster, it will be deemed to have been
negligent, and the loss will not be considered as having been due to a
natural disaster under Article 1734 (1).

4. Since the presence of strong winds and enormous waves at Cortes,

Surigao del Sur on March 3, 1987 was shown to be the proximate and
only cause of the sinking of the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G and the loss of
the cargo belonging to San Miguel Corporation, private respondents
cannot be held liable for the said loss.
MAURO GANZON v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. L-48757
May 30, 1998

1. Yes, Ganzon is liable. In the case at bar, the contract of carriage was
deemed perfected by the delivery of the scraps which was unconditionally
placed in the possession and control of the common carrier
and subsequently upon receipt by the carrier for transportation.
Consequently, the petitioner-carrier's extraordinary responsibility for the
loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced.

2. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease

only upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the
consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. The fact that
part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not
impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the
custody and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded.

3. The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to
any of the following causes enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil
Code, namely: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural
disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war,
whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or
owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the
packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of competent
public authority. Hence, the petitioner is presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently.
SOUTHERN LINES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
CITYOFILOILO, G.R. No. L-16629, January 31, 1962

1. Yes, herein petitioner is liable for the loss or shortage. Article 361 of
the Code of Commerce provides:

ART. 361. — The merchandise shall be transported at the risk and

venture of theshipper, if the contrary has not been expressly
stipulated.

2. As a consequence, all the losses and deteriorations which the goods

may suf erduring the transportation by reason of fortuitous event, force
majeure, or theinherent nature and defect of the goods, shall be for the
account and risk of theshipper.

3. Proof of these accidents is incumbent upon the carrier. Under the

provisions of Article 361,The defendant-carrier in order to free itself
from liability was only obliged to prove that the damages suffered by the
goodswere "by virtue of the nature or defect of the articles."

4. Article 362 of the same Code provides:

ART. 362. — Nevertheless, the carrier shall be liable for the losses
and damages resulting from the causes mentioned in the preceding
article if it is proved, as against him, that they arose through his
negligence or by reason of his having failed to take the precautions
which usage his established among careful persons, unless the
shipper has committed fraud in the bill of lading, representing the
 goods to be of a kind or quality different from what they really
were.

If, notwithstanding the precautions referred to in this article, the

goods transported run the risk of being lost, on account of their nature
or by reason of unavoidable accident, there being no time for their
owners to dispose of them, the carrier may proceed to sell them,
placing them for this purpose at the disposal of the judicial authority
or of the officials designated by special provisions.

5. Under the provisions of Article 362, the plaintiff, in order to hold the
defendant liable, was obliged to prove that the damages to the goods by
virtue of their nature occurred on account of its negligence or because
the defendant did not take the precaution adopted by careful persons.

6. If the fact of improper packing is known to the carrier or his

servants, or apparent upon ordinary observation, but it accepts the
goods notwithstanding such condition, it is not relieved of liability
for loss or injury resulting therefrom. Furthermore, petitioner itself
frankly admitted that the strings that tied the bags of rice were broken;
some bags were with holes and plenty of rice were spilled inside the
hull of the boat, and that the personnel of the boat collected no less
than26sacks of rice which they had distributed among themselves.
This finding, shows that the shortage resulted from the negligence of
petitioner.
SWEET LINES, INC.,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, MICAELA B.
QUINTOS, FR. JOSE BACATAN, S.J., MARCIANO CABRAS and
ANDREA VELOSO, G.R. No. L-46340 April 28, 1983

1. Yes, the shipping company is liable for damages. Article 614 of the
Code of Commerce provides that a captain who, having agreed to make a
voyage, fails to fulfill his undertaking, without being prevented by
fortuitous event or force majeure, shall indemnify all the losses which his
failure may cause, without prejudice to criminal penalties which may
be proper.

2. Article 698 provides that in case of interruption of a voyage already

begun, the passengers shall only be obliged to pay the fare in proportion
to the distance covered, without right to recover damages if the
interruption is due to fortuitous event or force majeure, but with a right
to indemnity, if the interruption should have been caused by the captain
exclusively. If the interruption should be caused by the disability of the
vessel, and the passenger should agree to wait for her repairs, he may
not be required to pay any increased fare of passage, but his living
expenses during the delay shall be for his own account.

3. Here, there was no fortuitous event or force majeure which prevented

the vessel from fulfilling its undertaking of taking private respondents to
Catbalogan. In the first place, mechanical defects in the carrier are not
considered a caso fortuito that exempts the carrier from responsibility.

4. Even granting arguendo that the engine failure was a fortuitous event,
it accounted only for the delay in departure. When the vessel finally left
the port of Cebu on July 10, 1972, there was no longer any force
majeure that justified by-passing a port of call. The vessel was completely
repaired the following day after it was towed back to Cebu. In fact, after
docking at Tacloban City, it left the next day for Manila to complete its
voyage.

5. As to the defense of the petitioner that it relied on the conditions in

small bold print at the back of the ticket reading, the Court held that
even assuming that those conditions are squarely applicable to the case
at bar, petitioner did not comply with the same. It did not cancel the ticket
nor did it refund the value of the tickets to private respondents. Besides,
it was not the vessel's sailing schedule that was involved. Private
respondents complaint is directed not at the delayed departure the next
day but at the by- passing of Catbalogan, their destination. Had
petitioner notified them previously, and offered to bring them to their
destination at its expense, or refunded the value of the tickets purchased,
perhaps, this controversy would not have arisen. Furthermore, the
conditions relied upon by petitioner cannot prevail over Articles 614 and
698 of the Code of Commerce heretofore quoted.