B.

Exempting circumstances; fortuitous event

Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of
risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable. 

SUBSECTION 2. Vigilance Over Goods

Article 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration
of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

A fortuitous event under Article 1174 may either be an “act of God,” or natural
occurrences such as floods or typhoons, storms, earthquakes or other cataclysmic
events; or an “act of man,” such as riots, strikes, wars, governmental prohibitions,
robbery, etc.
 GV Florida Transport, Inc. v Battung (2015)

GV Florida Transport, Inc., Petitioner v Heirs of Romeo L. Battung GR No. 208802,

October 14, 2015

FACTS: Romeo Battung boarded the bus of petitioner in Delfin Albano, Isabela, bound
for Manila. He was seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during the ride.
Battung was seated at the first row behind the driver and slept during the ride. When the
bus reached the Philippine Carabao Center in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, the bus driver,
Duplio, stopped the bus and alighted to check the tires. At this point, a man who was
seated at the fourth row of the bus stood up, shot Battung at his head, and then left with
a companion. The bus conductor, Daraoay, notified Duplio of the incident and
thereafter, brought Romeo to the hospital, but the latter was pronounced dead on
arrival. Hence, respondents filed a complaint on July 15, 2008 for damages in the
aggregate amount of P1,826,000.00 based on a breach of contract of carriage against
petitioner, Duplio, and Baraoay (petitioner, et al.) before the RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 22-1103.   

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable for damages arising from culpa contractual  

RULING: No.  

Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due
to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to the
negligent or wilful acts of [the common carrier'sl employees, and therefore involving no
issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable [care] as well as competent
employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which
the carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the
presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule
otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its
passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)   

The case involves the death of Battung wholly caused by the surreptitious act of a co-
passenger who, after consummating such crime, hurriedly alighted from the vehicle.   

The law exacts from common carriers (i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods
or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public) the
highest degree of diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety of its
passengers.   

Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code state:   

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and
for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case.   

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.   

In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." This disputable presumption may also be
overcome by a showing that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.   

The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, it should be pointed out that the law does not
make the common carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.   

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it
does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.

Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance[,] and
precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human
care and foresight can provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged
with due regard to all the circumstances.   

Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the
part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for
the time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former,
because the presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption,
however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised
extraordinary diligence as required by law in the performance of its contractual
obligation, or that the injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous
event.   

In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and
Congress to curb the recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the
conduct of their business.   

Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation
company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal
injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the
degree of diligence that the law requires.   

Therefore, it is imperative for a party claiming against a common carrier under the
above-said provisions to show that the injury or death to the passenger/s arose from the
negligence of the common carrier and/or its employees in providing safe transport to its
passengers.    

In Pilapil v. CA, the Court clarified that where the injury sustained by the passenger was
in no way due   

(1) to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting, or  (2) to the
negligent or willful acts of the common carrier's employees with respect to the foregoing
– 

such as when the injury arises wholly from causes created by strangers which the
carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to prevent — there would be no issue
regarding the common carrier's negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable care,
as well as competent employees in relation to its transport business; as such, the
presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil Code should not
apply:   

First, as stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only
a disputable presumption.[The presumption] gives in where contrary facts are
established proving either that the carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required
by law or the injury suffered by the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.   

Since Battung's death was caused by a co-passenger, the applicable provision is Article
1763 of the Civil Code, which states that:   

"a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission."   

Notably, for this obligation, the law provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence
of a good father of a family, in assessing the existence of any culpability on the common
carrier's part.   

Case law states that the concept of diligence of a good father of a family "connotes
reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have
observed when confronted with a similar situation.   

The test to determine whether negligence attended the performance of an obligation is:

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence."    

At bar, no danger i.e. intelligent reports from law enforcement agents that certain
lawless elements were planning to hijack and burn some of its buses, as to impel
petitioner or its employees to implement heightened security measures to ensure the
safety of its passengers. There was also no showing that during the course of the trip,
Battung's killer made suspicious actions which would have forewarned petitioner's
employees of the need to conduct thorough checks on him or any of the passengers.    

Relevantly, the Court, in Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, has held that
common carriers should be given sufficient leeway in assuming that the passengers
they take in will not bring anything that would prove dangerous to himself, as well as his
co-passengers, unless there is something that will indicate that a more stringent
inspection should be made.  Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to
which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when
he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the
contrary, as in the case at bar.   

in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had
already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could
not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain.  

SULPICIO LINES, INC., Petitioner 

vs.
NAPOLEON SESANTE, NOW SUBSTITUTED BY MARIBEL ATILANO, KRISTEN
MARIE, CHRISTIAN IONE, KENNETH KERRN AND KARISNA KATE, ALL
SURNAMED SESANTE, Respondents

Facts:

On September 18, 1998, at around 12:55 p.m., the M/V Princess of the Orient, a
passenger vessel owned and operated by the petitioner, sank near Fortune Island in
Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150 were lost.Napoleon Sesante, then a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and a lawyer, was one of the
passengers who survived the sinking. He sued the petitioner for breach of contract and
damages.

Sesante alleged in his complaint that the M/V Princess of the Orient left the Port
of Manila while Metro Manila was experiencing stormy weather; that he had noticed the
vessel listing starboard, that he witnessed the strong winds and big waves pounding the
vessel; and the passengers had been panicking, crying for help and frantically
scrambling for life jackets in the absence of the vessel's officers and crew.

In its defense, the petitioner insisted on the seaworthiness of the M/V Princess of
the Orient due to its having been cleared to sail from the Port of Manila by the proper
authorities; that the sinking had been due to force majeure; that it had not been
negligent; and that its officers and crew had also not been negligent because they had
made preparations to abandon the "'vessel because they had launched life rafts and
had provided the passengers assistance in that regard.

Issue:

(1) Is the complaint for breach of contract and damages a personal action that
does not survive the death of the plaintiff?;
(2) Is the petitioner liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code?; and
(3) Is there sufficient basis for awarding moral and temperate damages?

Ruling:
1. An action for breach of contract of carriage survives the death of the plaintiff.

The application of the rule on substitution depends on whether or not the action
survives the death of the litigant. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates
the following actions that survive the death of a party, namely: (1) recovery of real or
personal property, or an interest from the estate; (2) enforcement of liens on the estate;
and (3) recovery of damages for an injury to person or property. On the one hand,
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court lists the actions abated by death as including:
(1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2)
judgments for money; and (3) all claims for money against the deceased, arising from
contract, express or implied.

A contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty, neglect or

malfeasance of the carrier's employees and gives ground for an action for damages.
Sesante's claim against the petitioner involved his personal injury caused by the breach
of the contract of carriage. Pursuant to the aforecited rules, the complaint survived his
death, and could be continued by his heirs following the rule on substitution.

2. The petitioner is liable for breach of contract of carriage.

Article 1759 provides that “Common carriers are liable for the death or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although
such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of
the orders of the common earners.”

Said article does not establish a presumption of negligence because it explicitly

makes the common carrier liable in the event of death or injury to passengers due to the
negligence or fault of the common carrier's employees. This liability of the common
carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. The liability of common
carriers is demanded by the duty of extraordinary diligence required of common
carriers in safely carrying their passengers.

The presumption of negligence applies so long as there is evidence showing

that: (a) a contract exists between the passenger and the common carrier; and (b) the
injury or death took place during the existence of such contract.23 In such event, the
burden shifts to the common carrier to prove its observance of extraordinary diligence,
and that an unforeseen event or force majeure had caused the injury.

3. The award of moral damages and temperate damages is proper.

The petitioner argues that moral damages could be meted against a common
carrier only in the following instances, to wit: (1) in the situations enumerated by Article
2201 of the Civil Code; (2) in cases of the death of a passenger; or (3) where there was
bad faith on the part of the common carrier. It contends that none of these instances
obtained herein; hence, the award should be deleted. However, the Court contends,
that moral damages may be awarded if the contractual breach is found to be wanton
and deliberately injurious, or if the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or
bad faith.

The report revealed that the immediate and proximate cause of the sinking of the
M/V Princess of the Orient was brought by the erroneous maneuvering command of
Captain Esrum Mahilum and due to the weather condition prevailing at the time of the
tragedy; the Chief Mate attested that he was not able to make stability calculation of the
ship vis-à-vis her cargo; that as cargo officer of the ship, he failed to prepare a detailed
report of the ship's cargo stowage plan; he likewise failed to conduct the soundings
(measurement) of the ballast tanks before the ship departed from port; that he
presumed that the ship was full of ballast since the ship was fully ballasted when it left
Cebu for Manila; and that, being the officer-in-charge for emergency situation, like this,
he failed to execute and supervise the actual abandonship procedure; that there was no
announcement at the public address system of abandonship; that there is no orderly
distribution of life jackets and no orderly launching of life rafts; the deck and engine
officers (Second Mate, Third Mate, Chief Engineers, Second Engineer, Third Engineer
and Fourth Engineer), being in charge of their respective abandonship post, failed to
supervise the crew and passengers in the proper execution of abandonship procedure;
and that the Radio Officer (spark) failed to send the SOS message in the internationally
accepted communication network, instead, he used the Single Side Band (SSB) radio in
informing the company about the emergency situation.

The aforestated negligent acts of the officers and crew of M/V Princess of the
Orient could not be ignored in view of the extraordinary duty of the common carrier to
ensure the safety of the passengers. The totality of the negligence by the officers and
crew of M/V Princess of the Orient, coupled with the seeming indifference of the
petitioner to render assistance to Sesante, warranted the award of moral damages.

The Court recognizes the mental anguish, agony and pain suffered by Sesante
who fought to survive in the midst of the raging waves of the sea while facing the
immediate prospect of losing his life. His claim for moral and economic vindication is a
bitter remnant of that most infamous tragedy that left hundreds of families broken in its
wake. The anguish and moral sufferings he sustained after surviving the tragedy would
always include the memory of facing the prospect of his death from drowning, or
dehydration, or being preyed upon by sharks. Based on the established circumstances,
his survival could only have been a miracle wrought by God's grace, by which he was
guided in his desperate swim for the safety of the shore. But even with the glory of
survival, he still had to grapple with not just the memory of having come face to face
with almost certain death, but also with having to answer to the instinctive guilt for the
rest of his days of being chosen to live among the many who perished in the tragedy.

While the anguish, anxiety, pain and stress experienced by Sesante during and
after the sinking cannot be quantified, the moral damages to be awarded should at least
approximate the reparation of all the consequences of the petitioner's negligence. With
moral damages being meant to enable the injured party to obtain the means, diversions
or amusements in order to alleviate his moral and physical sufferings, the Court is called
upon to ensure that proper recompense be allowed to him, through his heirs.

The award of temperate damages was proper.

Temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty.
Article 2224 of the Civil Code expressly authorizes the courts to award temperate
damages despite the lack of certain proof of actual damages.

Should the petitioner be further held liable for exemplary damages?

In contracts and quasi-contracts, the Court has the discretion to award exemplary
damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner. Indeed, exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of
right, and it is left to the court to decide whether or not to award them. In consideration
of these legal premises for the exercise of the judicial discretion to grant or deny
exemplary damages in contracts and quasi-contracts against a defendant who acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner, the Court hereby
awards exemplary damages to Sesante.

Clearly, the petitioner and its agents on the scene acted wantonly and recklessly.
Wanton and reckless are virtually synonymous in meaning as respects liability for
conduct towards others. Wanton means characterized by extreme recklessness and
utter disregard for the rights of others; or marked by or manifesting arrogant
recklessness of justice or of rights or feelings of others. Conduct is reckless when it is
an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation in which a high degree of danger
is apparent. It must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience,
excitement, or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or
simple inattention.

The actuations of the petitioner and its agents during the incident attending the
unfortunate sinking of the M/V Princess of the Orient were far below the standard of
care and circumspection that the law on common carriers demanded.