READINGS ON PHILIPPINE HISTORY

Topic 8: World War II

List of Reading Materials:
1. 1943 Constitution
2. Memorandum in War Memoirs
3. Bataan Has Fallen
4. Excerpts from Recto’s Three Years of Enemy Occupation
5. Executive Order No. 40
6. Excerpt from 1941 Report of the Philippine High Commissioner
7. Excerpt from Report of Philippine (Executive Commission)
8. Letter of President Quezon to Douglas MacArthur, February 20, 1942
9. Message of General MacArthur to the Filipino people, January 1, 1946
10. Message of President Osmeña to Supreme Allied Commander Douglas
MacArthur on the occasion of the signing of the Japanese surrender document,
September 3, 1945
11. Instrument of Surrender of the Japanese and the Japanese-Controlled Armed
Forces

World War II in the Philippines, 1941-1945

In 1941, the Commonwealth government was interrupted with Japan’s bombing of the US
Naval Base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii that started the Second World War. Following the
attack of Pearl
Harbor, the Japanese bombed Manila and the suburbs. In order to save Manila from
destruction, General Douglas MacArthur declared it an open city. However, the bombing
continued resulting in the destruction of Manila. Shortly after the occupation of Manila, the
Japanese forces established their government in the country that lasted until 1945.

This section includes pertinent documents related to World War II in the Philippines such as
the 1943 Constitution, memoirs of political personalities like Jose P. Laurel and Claro M.
Recto and selected articles discussing different themes like public safety, health, education
and public instruction. These references are invaluable source of information about the life
and struggles of Filipinos during the Japanese occupation.
 The 1943 Constitution

At the outset of the occupation, the Japanese government formed the Philippine Executive
Commission which was composed mainly of political leaders of the Commonwealth
government. They also organized the KALIBAPI (Kapisanan ng Paglilingkod sa Bagong
Pilipinas), the only political organization allowed in the country at that time.
On June 16, 1943, Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo promised to grant Philippines its
independence. The KALIBAPI then formed the Preparatory Committee on Philippine
Independence (PCPI) which was tasked to draft a new Constitution for the Philippines. The
PCPI approved the new Constitution on September 4, 1943 and was ratified by the
KALIBAPI Convention on September 7, 1943.
The 1943 Constitution adopted 12 of the Articles from the 1935 Constitution with a powerful
executive branch vested in the President who is to be elected by a majority of the members of
the National Assembly. One notable characteristic of the 1943 Constitution is the absence of
the Bill of Rights.

Excerpt:

PREAMBLE

The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divine Providence and desiring to lead a free
national existence, do hereby proclaim their independence, and in order to establish a
government that shall promote the general welfare, conserve and develop the patrimony of
the Nation, and contribute to the creation of a world order based on peace, liberty, and moral
justice, do ordain this Constitution.

Article I: The Republic of the Philippines

SECTION 1. The Philippines is a republican state. The government established by this

Constitution shall be known as the Republic of the Philippines.

SEC. 2. The Republic of the Philippines shall exercise sovereignty over all the national
territory as at present defined by law.

Article II: The Executive

SECTION 1. The Executive power shall be vested in the President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SEC. 2. The President shall be elected by a majority of all the members of the National
Assembly at the place and on the date to be fixed by law.

SEC. 3. No person may be elected President unless he be a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines, is forty years of age or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding the election.

SEC. 4. The President shall hold office during a term of six years and may not be re-elected
for the following term.

SEC. 5. The term of the President shall end at noon on the thirtieth day of December
following the expiration of six years after his election, and from such time the term of his
successor shall begin. If his successor shall not have been chosen before such time, or if the
President-elect shall have failed to qualify, then the outgoing President shall continue in
office until his successor shall have been elected and qualified. In the event of the removal of
the President from office or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the same shall devolve on the ranking Minister in the order of precedence
established by law until a new President shall have been elected for the unexpired term. In the
latter case, the election shall be held within sixty days after such removal, death, resignation,
or inability.

SEC. 6. Before assuming the duties of his office, the President shall take the following oath,
or affirmation:

“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its
laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me
God.” (In case of affirmation, the last sentence will be omitted.)

SEC. 7. The President shall have an official residence and receive such compensation as may
be fixed by law which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which
he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument
from the government or any of its subdivisions or instrumentalities.

SEC. 8. The President shall have supervision and control of all the ministries, bureaus or
offices, all local governments, and all other branches or instrumentalities of the Executive
Department, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

SEC. 9. The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Republic of the
Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawlessness, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, or when the public safety so requires,
he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law.

SEC. 10. The President shall appoint the Ministers and Vice-Ministers, and with the advice of
his Cabinet, shall appoint ambassadors, diplomatic ministers and consuls, heads of bureaus
and offices, officers of the Army from the rank of [colonel, of the Navy and of the Air forces
from the rank of] captain or commander, provincial governors, city and municipal mayors,
and all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law.

SEC. 11. There shall be a Council of State to advise the President on matters of national
policy. It shall be composed of not more than twenty members to be appointed by the
President from among citizens who may have rendered distinguished service to the Nation.

SEC. 12. The President, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the National
Assembly, shall have the power to declare war and make peace, and, with the concurrence of
a majority of all its members, conclude treaties. He shall receive ambassadors and diplomatic
ministers duly accredited to the Republic of the Philippines.

SEC. 13. The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, upon such conditions and
with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly.

SEC. 14. The President shall from time to time give to the National Assembly information of
the state of the nation, and recommend to its consideration such measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient.

Laurel, Jose P. 1962. "Memorandum" in War Memoirs of Dr. Jose P. Laurel.

(September 15 - November 16, 1945) Manila: Laurel Foundation. pp. 1-21.

Jose P. Laurel is known for his distinguished career as a supreme court justice and as a
politician. In 1925, he was elected to the Philippine Senate and would serve for one term
before losing his re-election bid to Claro M. Recto. In 1934, he was again elected as delegate
to the 1935 Constitutional Convention where he headed the committee on the Bill of Rights.
He was the Secretary of Justice when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. In
1943, he assumed Presidency under the Japanese-sponsored independence.
After Japan's surrender in 1945, Laurel was arrested and was charged of treason but never
tried due to an amnesty. This memoir was written while in Sugamo Prison in the outskirts of
Tokyo, from September 15, 1945 to November 16, 1945. Because the Americans did not
allow Laurel to have a writing paper, the memoirs were written across a book, The World in
2030 A.D. by the Earl of Birkenhead. This was published by the Jose P. Laurel Memorial
Foundation which was founded after his death on November 6, 1959.

Excerpt

MEMORANDUM
 I

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War I was Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines — was successful law-practitioner and recommended for appointment to the
Supreme Bench by the Filipino and the American Bar Associations (1935-36). Was appointed
in the month of February, 1936.'

II

When the Philippine Army was federalized and the Pacific War seemed imminent, I
wrote a letter to Marshal MacArthur, then also military adviser to the Commonwealth
Government, offering my services. He sent me a personal letter appreciating. I thought I
could be useful in the Judge Advocate Department.

III

Around September or October of 1941 President Quezon invited me to breakfast and

requested me to be his Secretary of Justice. My first reaction was against it. I was thru with
politics and I wanted to make a name in the juridical field and bring about the codification
and integration of all our laws. I had already succeeded in the creation of a Code Committee
of which Don Ramon Avancena was Chairman and I was a member. But I was prevailed
upon and thus I became a member of the President’s War Cabinet.

IV

After my induction into office (Secretary of Justice) I attended the meetings of the War
Cabinet in the country Manila, March 9, 1962 house of the Quezon’s under the shade of a big
mango tree just a few feet up from an air-raid shelter. (See photo, opposite page —) I
prepared (with former Speaker Roxas —then Lieut.-Col. and aide to Gen. MacArthur—and
former Secretary Jose Abad Santos who had just been appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court) two radio speeches for President Quezon. The last speech was made inside the air-raid
shelter in the presence of U.S. Naval officers, Chief Justice Santos, Secretary Vargas, Mrs.
Quezon and children and myself. I think J. E. H. Stevenot and another American in charge of
the radio connection were also present.
V
The Cabinet of Pres. Quezon met every day, frequently twice a day — morning and
afternoon — up to the time I personally accompanied Pres. Quezon and family to the
Presidential landing at the Luneta — from Malacanan bound for Corregidor. President
Quezon was terribly nervous and as I shook hands with Doha Aurora she said to me, with
copious tears from her eyes — "May God Bless all of you."
VI
It was in one of those hectic days of December (1941) that Gen. MacArthur, accompanied
by Lieut-Col. Roxas (in full uniform with overseas cap), arrived at Marikina either while the
war cabinet was in session, or I was there because I had an important official business to
transact with the President. It was the anniversary of the marriage of President and Mrs.
Quezon. I do not remember the exact date. Pres. Quezon and Gen. MacArthur embraced each
other and a picture was taken in which I appear with Secretary Vargas and Lt. Col. Boxes
(See photo opposite page —)
VII.
I recall that the call of Gen. MacArthur on President Quezon and the radio speech made
by him — mentioned in the preceding paragraph, IV — took place after December 8,1941
when Baguio and other places of the Philippines were bombed by the Japanese. President
Quezon was in Baguio when this city was bombed on that date
VIII.

The daily or frequent meetings of the members of the Cabinet present in Manila
continued (some prominent public officials at this time had evacuated Manila) until President
Quezon was advised—according to him by Gen. MacArthur — that he might move to
Corregidor. The reaction of the President was against it. He believed that the step might be
interpreted as abandonment by him of his people. He dictated a letter addressed to Gen.
MacArthur refusing to go. I went over this draft which he read at the meeting of his war
cabinet in the afternoon of the same day or the following day. The following were present (if
memory does not fail me) VicePresident Osmena, Chief Justice Santos, Sec. Vargas, Gen.
Valdes, Gen. Francisco, Sec. Guinto and others. At this gathering, President Quezon looked
sad but not broken in spirit. He moved from his seat and transferred to my right side, placing
himself between Gen. Guillermo B. Francisco and me, and said to me: "What do you think,
Secretary? I do not want to go to Corregidor because our people will think I am abandoning
them." I replied: "I don't think so; they will understand," and he moved back to his former
seat to hear the observation of the people present. The suggestion of all those present —
except General Francisco—was that the President had better go. It was felt that the capture of
the President would mean the overthrow of the Commonwealth Government and that the
suggestion came after a deliberate decision of Washington. Secretary Guinto moved that the
members of the Cabinet accompany the President to Corregidor. To this, President Quezon
replied that there was not enough space in the island fortress for so many people, and that if
he were to go, he should—according to the advice of Gen. MacArthur — pick the people who
were to accompany him. He then observed that he would like to have Vice-President Osmena
with him because in case anything should happen, Mr. Osmena could take his place, General
Valdes, who was then the Secretary of National Defense and a physician-surgeon, Manoling
(Manuel Roxas) who after all was already aide to Gen. MacArthur and one or two more
members to give hint technical assistance. After adjournment of the meeting, Pres. Quezon
said: "Laurel, please wait, I would like to see you." I waited and then followed him to the
principal building (coming from the place of meeting behind, under the mango tree). Once in
the small reception room where there was a Japanese painting of orchids (I say Japanese
because of combination of strong colors peculiar to Japanese painters), first story or floor of
the house, the President placed his arm around my waist and said: "Laurel, I would like you
to go with me to Corregidor to help me prepare papers and documents there; are you in a
position to come?" My reply was: "Yes, Mr. President, if you need me." "Then," he said "get
ready, we may leave any moment" And I departed and went to my room in the Executive
Building (Malacanan Palace) where I was installed as Secretary of Justice and legal adviser to
the President According to my recollection, all this occurred on December 22, 1941. After
transacting business in my office I went home, started to prepare my belongings, placing them
in a suitcase. My wife was sick; she had cardiac ailment and my plan was to tell her on the
eleventh hour and bid her and the children good-bye.
IX.
The following day, Dee. 23, 1941, another meeting of the Cabinet was held in the same
place under the mango tree in Marikina. President Quezon and Vice-President °ameba were
present. I believe that Manuel Boxes was also present and members of the Cabinet and other
important officials of the Government. It was at this meeting that he announced finally those
who were to go with him; that he would take along Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos, appoint
me Acting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court at the same time, and leave me in Manila "to
help Mr. Vargas" who became the Mayor of Greater Manila (words in quotation were
President Quezon's). It was at this juncture that I raised the very important question
pertaining to the conduct and behavior of those of us he was leaving behind; I said: "Mr.
President, it is easy to say that you are leaving us to take care of the situation with a view to
the protection of our civil population considering the fact that when the Japanese forces
come we shall be performing neutral functions pertaining to municipal administration and
the administration of justice; but the Japanese may require or compel us to do many things
which are inimical to our Government or that of the United States. In my case, may I leave
my position and go to the mountains. I am asking this question, because when you come
back you might disapprove of our acts and accuse us of disloyalty. We would hate to be
placed in that predicament." "George," said President Quezon in a loud voice; (calling for
Secretary Vargas) "Secretary Laurel is raising a very important question here"—he restated
it —"will you call up Gen. MacArthur and find out if I could talk to him?" I do not know
whether Pres. Quezon was able to take up this matter with the General but he (Quezon) told
me before his departure for Corregidor in the provisional air-raid shelter below the ballroom
of Malacanan (with Chief Justice Abad Santos, Gen. Francisco and Secretary Vargas) that he
(Quezon) had talked to Gen. MacArthur who told him (Quezon) : "What can you do under
the circumstances? You have to do what they ask you to do except one thing—the taking of
any oath of allegiance to Japan." In the various conversations that I had with Mr. Vargas—
the last during our confinement at the Yokohama Prison—he informed me that he himself
had submitted the question to Gen. MacArthur upon instruction of President Quezon, and
that Gen. MacArthur's reply was transmitted to me by President Quezon. I must say that
Vice-Pres. Clemens and other members of the Cabinet and others were present when I raised
the question; and I reported the incident to Don Ramon Avancena and the Justices of the
Supreme Court at the time.
 X
December 24, 1991. I accompanied Pres. Quezon and family from Malacanan Palace to
the Presidential landing at the Luneta in the hour between 1 and 2:00 p.m. I saw Dr. Antonio
Bison
(whom I took in my car on my way home), Don Vicente Madrigal and also Col. Antonio
Torres, Chief of the Manila Police, who was waiting to see the President. In this connection
(vide paragraph V. supra).

XI.
Before departure or already in Corregidor, President Quezon reorganized and simplified
the Government setup but I was left as Secretary of Justice and at the same time Acting Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court," with definite instruction to stay or remain in Manila "to help
Mr. Vargas" in protecting the civilian population, bearing in mind the line of action embodied
in the reply of Gen. MacArthur as transmitted to me by Pres. Quezon (See paragraph IX,
above) and later confirmed by Mr. Jorge B. Vargas.
XII

Since then (Dec. 24) I never had occasion or opportunity to contact Pres. Quezon or any
of his companions. Mr. Vargas, I understand, was able to communicate with Pres. Quezon
before the entry of the Japanese forces into Manila which took place on January 2, 1942.

XII
After the departure of Pres. Quezon, Mr. Vargas, who was then the Mayor of Greater
Manila, became the head and representative of the Commonwealth Government with me
helping him. I was all the time practically with him in Malacanan and, when necessary, we
transacted business by telephone.

XIV
On December 31, 1941, we were informed that the advance unit of the Japanese forces
were near Manila. Mr. Vargas called me to his office in Malacanan and told me that the plan
was for a representative of the Commonwealth Government to go with the Japanese Consul-
General, Jitaro Kihara, and meet the Zones coming from the south. Because of certain
difficulties, I was not able to go but Consul Kihara, accompanied by his assistant (Mr.
Okazaki) and General Arsenio Natividad went as far as the town of Began, Laguna, where
they contacted the first contingent of the Japanese invading forces. They used a Cadillac-7
passenger or (also chauffeur) No. 6, that I was using then as Acting Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
XV
There was confusion, excitement and general consternation when the Japanese unit
entered Manila in the afternoon of Jan. 2, 1942. Before this date, Manila and Cavite were
bombed with many casualties. Sto. Domingo Church, Intendencia Building, the Philippine
Herald Building and other important buildings in Intramuros were destroyed; the Cavite
Naval area was razed to the ground; looting was rampant all over Manila; the Manila Police
had to be disarmed; wild rumors were circulated — these. and more contributed to the
deplorable state of moral collapse of the people of Manila at the time of the occupation of
that city by the Imperial Japanese forces.
XVI

Among the first high ranking officials of the Japanese Army that entered Manila were
Lt.Col. Maeda and Maj. Gen. Hayashi. The name of the Commander-in-chief was kept
secret, although somehow it was known that he was Gen. Homma. Gen. Maeda, who was
the Chief of Staff, occupied the Manila Hotel. I think Gen. Hayashi went to the Army and
Navy Club building. Around the 4th or 5th of that month of January (1942) several Japanese
residents of importance in the Philippines began to contact prominent Filipinos in Manila.
Mr. Imamura introduced Mr. Vargas to Gen. Maeda and Mr. Kanegae accompanied Messrs.
Aquino, Recto and Alunan. I think that Mr. Paredes and I were also introduced to General
Maeda but at different dates. There might have been other people who had seen Gen.
Maeda. Later Consul Kihara and Mr. Morokuma arrived from Japan and contacted Vargas
and the other Filipinos who saw Gen. Maeda. They were told forthwith to organize
themselves into what was called "central administration organ," ostensibly for the
maintenance of peace and order and as instrumentality of the consequent military
occupation of certain places by the Japanese forces.

XVII

As the order of Gen. Maeda was imperative and urgent, Mr. Vargas, who was our
representative and spokesman, suggested that a meeting be held at the call of former
Speaker Yulo who at the time was President of the Nacionalista Party, the ruling party of
President Manuel L. Quezon. This was done and for almost two weeks we met in the house
of Speaker Yulo at Peñafrancia. In the beginning few were able to attend. Stenographic
notes of the proceedings were taken but according to Mr. Yulo they were destroyed for fear
of the Japanese. The reply to the directive of Gen. Maeda, addressed to Mr. Vargas asking
us among other things to organize and to entirely cut or sever our connections with the
Americans was the subject of a prolonged discussion. A temporary political expedient was
the continuation of the Commonwealth Government and its officials. This was rejected,
however. by Gen. Maeda on the ground that the Commonwealth was a creation of the
United States and fought the Imperial Japanese Forces. After repeated conferences of Mr.
Vargas (who, as observed, was the spokesman) and Gen. Maeda we were definitely told to
organize an entirety new setup. Everybody war.ted to be excused, considering that the
American-Filipino forces were still fighting the enemy in Bataan and Corregidor. We were,
however, made to understand that failure to organize in the manner indicated would be
deemed a hostile act; that military administration would have to be established any way
either by the Japanese themselves or other Filipinos. (About this time, Mr. Benigno Ramos
and General Artemio Ricarte had come to the forefront and were active) and we were
finally given 24 hours within which to act. Our conformity was thus obtained and Mr.
Vargas sent a formal letter and a list of prominent Filipinos who became members of the
Council of State. These Filipinos were invited to the U.S. High Commissioner's building
and a photograph was taken.
XVIII

The high command of the Javanese Army later selected the people who wore to become
members of what was known as the Executive Commission (Ad. Order No. 1, Jan. 23,1943,
addressed to Jorge Vargas).' Mr. Jorge B. Vargas became chairman, Benigno Aquino,
Commissioner of the Interior. Antonio de las Alas, Commissioner of Finance, Jose P. Laurel,
Commissioner of Justice, Rafael Alunan, Commissioner of Agriculture and Forestry, Claro
M. Redo, Commissioner of Education and Public Welfare, Quintin Paredes. Commissioner of
Public Works and Communications, and Teafilo Sison, Auditor General and Director of the
Budget. I pleaded to Mr. Vargas that I be retained in the Supreme Court, but he said that
could not be done because the High Command of the Japanese Army had already decided. I
forgot to state that Mr. Jute Yulo became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in this setup.
I think that the Executive Commissions was formally organized Jan. 23, 1942, although we
received our appointments as commissioners several days later.
XIX

In my capacity as Commissioner of Justice. I endeavored to retain everybody and to

leave the organization undisturbed. But the military people began to interfere, to submit
appointments and actions for approval; I was surrounded by a group of military advisers who
were utterly incompetent and unfamiliar with the progress and development of juridical
science in other parts of the work' and it soon became unbearable. Members of the
Kempeitai (military police) would appear before courts and judges and ask for the dismissal
of cases which were actually being tried. In one case, Judge Cervasio Diaz, of the Court of
First Instance of Manila had to abide by the desire of the military people on account of fear.
In another case, a fiscal of the City of Manila in the course of an investigation of a criminal
case had to run away and hide under a table when an agent or officer of the military,
accompanied by a Japanese interpreter who was apparently interested in the case, began
slapping everybody in the mom. Other incidents occurred; and, in the prey-nee, it was worse.
To give at least a semblance of regularity to the administration of Justice I issued a circular
prohibiting dismissal of raw pending trial or investigation except in due course of legal
procedure. For this circular. I was asked to report to Fort Santiago and detained for three
hours and asked to repeal the circular. Mr. Emilio Abello who was my brilliant assistant
commissioner is in a position to give the necessary information pertaining to the
administration of justice during this time.
XX

Each commissioner must have had his bitter experience this time. Mr. Vargas is in a
better position to give an account of what had transpired during this period, he being the
chairman of the Council of State and of the Executive Commission. The official acts of the
Executive Commission are a matter of record. The government was reorganized,
administrative orders issued by the Chairman of the Executive Commission on matters
covering an extensive field, including city, provincial and municipal administration. What
the Japanese military authorities wanted had to be done. Consul Kihara received the military
orders and instructions for Mr. Vargas. We were made to send cables to President Roosevelt
and President Quezon and a manifesto to the fighting Filipinos in Bataan and Corregidor. To
save ourselves and avoid retaliatory measures from the Japanese, all these things had to be
done. The cruelties in dealing with Filipinos since Japanese occupation and the very idea of
"Fort Santiago" had stricken terror in the hearts of the Filipinos. We protested and
demonstrated, but to no avail; they did what they warned. Perhaps the only consoling feature
was our intervention in behalf of war prisoners. We were allowed to tile a petition for their
release (after many had perished) ; we were able to intercede in behalf of Gen. Manuel
Roxas who was a prisoner of war in Mindanao (I talked personally to Gen. Homma-- in
behalf of Gen. Roxas and Chief Justice Abad Santos but the latter seemed to have been
executed already). Aquino and I also talked to Gen. Hayashi in behalf of these two Filipinos.
We tried to help the prisoners of war by giving them what we could in the midst of antipathy
of the Japanese. I had in the Department of Justice Gen. Alberto Ramos, Col. Poblete and
Col. Sevilla and others, and in the Department of the Interior a special section was organized
to give these ex-prisoners of war temporary employment or relief. They had to live: and
there was nothing left undone in this direction. The same efforts were made in
Malacanan and in all the departments. bureaus and offices of the Government

XXI

Much more perhaps could be said of the Executive Commission but reference to the
official records becomes necessary. The Executive Commission covers a period from Jan.
23, 1942 to October 14, 1943—about 1 year and 8 months announced that the policy with
respect to the Philippines was to give her independence as early as possible upon tangible
evidence of collaboration with Japan in the establishment of the Co-prosperity sphere. This
policy was reiterated by him in a subsequent pronouncement and re-affirmed on the occasion
of his first official visit to the Philippines. There was some kind of excitement but no
spontaneous or genuine rejoicing on the part of the people in general There was doubt as to
what kind of independence it was going to be. The association with the Japanese was full of
misgivings; the general impression being that the political education of the Japanese was
inferior to the Filipinos and that their methods were feudal, cruel and inhuman. The more
intelligent group recalled the experiences of peoples of China, Manchukuo. Korea and
Formosa. On the other hand, the star being still in progress, it was felt that the granting of
independence was not opportune. General Roxas and I discussed this point and we coincided
in the expression of this view and of the precarious character of independence once obtained.
He and separately transmitted this view to Gen. Wachi. the Chief of Staff of the Japanese
Army in the Philippine. We became convinced that the granting of independence to the
Philippines seas part of the general plan of Japanese political propaganda "to emancipate the
peoples of Greater East Asia" and could not be deterred; some Filipinos expressed the
opinion that-refusal to accept the offer of political independence would place the Filipinos in
an awkward position many, on the other hand, said that any change from the 'military
administration would be an advantage to our people; and all agreed that after all, in the end,
the United States would understand the predicament in which the Filipinas (mind
themselves.

XXII
As early as January 21, 1941 December, 1942 the Kalibapi (Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod
sa Bagong Pilipinas) was organized by the Executive Order of the Chairman of the
Executive Commission at the instance of the military authorities (the idea was. I think Gen.
Wachi’s) patterned after the Yoko Sankai of Japan and the Concordia of Manchukuo. The
fundamental idea behind it was the abolition of all political parties and the integration of all
the Filipinos for purposes of an effective totalitarian government and the realization of the
ideals expressed in the order. The Chairman of the Executive Commission was made the
President and Mr. Benigno Aquino, then Commissioner of the Interior, made the Vice-
President and DirectorGeneral of the Organization. The military authorities offered all
facilities, including financial, and a separate central office established in Manila with
ramifications in the provinces and municipalities which were under Japanese control.
Because of the transfer of Mr. Aquino to the Kalibapi I was moved from the Department of
Justice and became the Commissioner of the Interior.' I requested Chairman Vargas to keep
me in the Department of Justice but he told me that my transfer had been decided upon by
the high command of the Japanese Army.

XXIV

Peace conditions were very bad; when I assumed office Gen. Jose de Ion Reyes was at
the head of the Constabulary organized and "rejuvenated" by the Japanese military
authorities; several constabulary academies were established by said authorities; and many
Filipino war prisoners were made to enter these academies. Many of them entered because
they had to live and had no other means of survival. Gen. Francisco, Col. Arsenio Natividad
and Col. Alberto Ramos were later made director and assistant directors, respectively, of the
organization. The provinces and municipalities being under my administrative supervision
as well as the Constabulary, I was placed by Chairman Vargas at the head of the
pacification campaign and each commissioner was assigned a district This pacification
campaign was not only a requirement of the Japanese military administration but the only
alternative, in the opinion of the members of the Executive Commission, if something had
to be dune to minimize the killing, among other things, of so many people.The Japanese,
true to their announcement, (soon after the cremation of Mania} for every Japanese killed,
wiped out men, women and children and even the inhabitants of an entire barrio. The
Filipinos, on the other hand, were killing each ocher. Many styled themselves as
"mien:Three" when in reality they were not, and had no political ideology whatsoever.
Many of them robbed or killed to rob. Gen. Roxas told me that the idea of Gen. MacArthur
was for the guerillas to "lie low" until the opportune time and that this had reference to
genuine guerillas and not to i groups devoted to rapine and banditry. This must be the case
if the Filipinos were to have any chance of survival Hence in our pacification campaign in
Davao`, General Francisco who accompanied the party. and Major Batongmalaque who was
the senior inspector of Constabulary in Davao, were in contact with guerilla leaders who
assumed the obligation to protect the people outside the cities and towns. This information
was confidentially transmitted to me by Gem Francisco in a hotel in Davao. It was here in
Davao, when crossing a flooded river, that we almost lost our lives when the ferry-boat was
carried by the current, hit a dynamited bridge and capsized. The principal members of our
party were. Mr. Benigno Arstino, Asst. Commissioner Arsenio Bonifacio. Gem Francisco,
and Adviser T. Shiohara. We returned to Manila about the end of May, 1943.

XXVII

As Commissioner of the interior, I also had supervision over games and amusements.
The Department of the Interior had a separate division in charge of games and amusements.
It was in this division that we were able to take care of many released prisoners. of war.
Upon arrival from Mindanao. I had to decide a case involving the fraudulent character of a
horse race, held in the San Lazaro Hippodrome. I appointed Col. Telesforo Martinez, an
honest and upright veteran, then Chief of the Public Order Division to make the inquiry
immediately. He submitted a report upon receipt of which I ordered the dismissal of the
judges, the disqualification of a jockey — the details I don't remember — and cancelled the
race and ordered the devolution to the public of the amount or amounts involved In the
controversy. This decision, I was informed, incurred the dissatisfaction of the persons
adversely affected.

XXVI

Early morning of June 5, 1943, while I was playing golf at the Wack Wack Country
Club in Mandaluyong, with Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, President of Far Eastern University
Nicanor Reyes, Dean Leoncio B.. Monzon Liling Roces, Aurelio Montinola, Sr. and
Enrique Katigbak in two groups. I was treacherously shot from behind just about 12 or 15
yards:, from Tee No. 7 where 1 was standing by. With the help of Dr. Jacinto, Dean
Monson and Pres. Reyes, I was taken to my car and moved to the Philippine Genera!
Hospital where I was attended by Drs. Antonio Sison, Nicanor Jacinto, Ramon Macasaet.
Januario Estrada. Fortunato Guerrero, Col. Ishii and others. I stayed in the hospital for about
two months.
XXVII.
There was a great deal of discussion as to why I was attacked. I myself, to the present
day, do not know. The current belief was because I was a pro.Japanese. The other version
was because of the San Lazaro incident mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 1. of worse,
deep resented the cowardly and treacherous character of the attack, but 1 felt more the
accusation that 1 was pro-Japanese was not pro-Japanese Furthermore, I was in the
government against my wishes and if I remained it was because of specific instruction of
President Quezon and deeply.my heart I mild not love the Japanese more than my own
people. The other reason (S. Lazaro incident) was also possible but seemed to have been
discarded by the Japanese military and Filipino civil authorities. Motive of personal
character was likewise discarded because I had no personal enemies. Because of the
position I held in the Executive Commission which was the civil agency created by the
Japanese military authorities, the Kentpeilai (Japanese Military Police) arrested a number of
people and after a few days published the photographs of some four or five persons said to
have been killed or executed for alleged attempt against my life. I told the Military Police
(through Captain Yanase) that I did not believe they were the authors of the crime and that
the finding of the Manila Police under Col. Torres seemed more rational pointing to a certain
"Little Joe" as the guilty party. He (Little Joe) great physical similarity to the man who had
assaulted at the Wack Wack golf course. This Little Joe was later demanded by the
Kempeitai but I told them that I was not certain whether he was the man and that they (the
Japanese) having already found (according to them) and executed the guilty parties without
consulting me. this man (Little *Joe) should not be executed. This attitude of mine reached
the knowledge of some people and I received an anonymous letter admiring "my bigness of
heart" The truth is that, having assumed the obligation to help my people to survive and to
tide them over to better times I did not want to be in anyway responsible for the killing or
suffering of any of my countrymen. I condemn. cowardice and treachery but I must respect
the political ideology of people plunged into desperation in a situation in which I played an
important role.
XXVIII

Whatever the reason or motive behind the shooting at Wack Wack, I attracted
considerable public attention. My survival was marvelous. The people who have known me,
the sacrifice I was making, the instruction I had received from President Quezon. my own
public record, my little reputation earned during more than 35 years of public service
brought me more forcibly to the attention of the Japanese administrators. And so, when the
preliminary steps had to be taken with a new to Philippine independence I was at the head
of the list of the Filipinos who were to integrate the Preparatory Commission for Philippine
Independence.' The members of this Commission were, it is true, named by the Kalibapi
which had been specially called for the purpose. but the selection had to be made from the
list informally submitted by the military police. I became chairman of the Preparatory
Commission when I was still confined in the Philippine General Hospital; Don Ramon
Avanceria, the first vice.president: Don Benigno Aquino. 2nd vice-president: and Messrs.
Caro M. Recto, Quintin Paredes, Jose Yulo, Chairman Varga Emilio Aguinaldo, Sultan Sa
Ramain., Pedro Sabido, Manuel Mons, Col. Osiers. Teofilo Sison, Antonio de las Alas,
Melecio Arran; Vicente Madrigal, Rafael Munan, Miguel Unson, Manuel Briones, Emilio
Tria Tirona and other members. We proceeded to organize accordingly to prepare a
constitution. for the Philippine Republic as we were urged. The first two meetings were
presided over by Don Ramon. Advancena. The third meeting I convoked in the Philippine
General Hospital in a room opposite mine in Ward No. 20 or 22. I submitted a plan
indicating two alternatives. After several meetings the firs: draft was approved and
submitted to the Convention of the Kalibapi and approved. The discussion, incidents and
difficulties are not here mentioned as reference to the record of proceedings and other
documents is necessary. Judge Proceso Sebastian was the Secretary of the Preparatory
Commission.
 XXIX
After the approval of the Cor.stitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the National
Assembly had to be organized. The Executive Commission promulgated an election law
under which an election was held in the manner provided. Most of the former members of
the Legislature of the Commonwealth Government were returned. Hon. Benigno Aquino
was unanimously elected Speaker and thereafter I was unanimously elected by the National
Assembly President of the newly established Republic of the Philippines. The details,
pertaining to the election, organization, etc. of the Assembly are omitted. But it should here
be mentioned that Chairman Vargas participated as President of the Kalibapi.
XXX

After my election and that of Speaker Aquino, we (Aquino, Vargas and 1) were invited
(requested) to go to Tokyo to pay our respects and to report. Mr. Vargas as the retiring
chairman of the Executive Commission, and Speaker Aquino and I as newly elected
Speaker and President of the impending Republic of the Philippines, respectively. I think we
left the Philippines on or about September 29, 1943, by plane: passed the night at Fukuoka
and arrived at Tokyo Haneda airport) the following day. We remained seven! days (3 or d)
in Tokyo; we paid respects to His Majesty, the Emperor and registered our names as visitors
of other members of the Imperial family, a banquet was given in our honor by Premier
Hideki Tojo in the latter's official residence and official calls were made on the Ministers of
War, Navy Foreign Affairs and of Greater East Asia. The most transcendental event,
however, was the invitation extended to us by Premier Tojo in the afternoon of the day
following our arrival in Tokyo. After ordinary salutations, we were closeted in a conference
room adjoining the reception room of his official Residence; Messrs. Jose G. Sanvictores
and Leon Ma. Gonzales who accompanied us to Tokyo were not allowed to be present; and
after Premier Tojo, Minister Shigemitsu (Foreign Minister) and Aoki (Minister of Greater
East Asia), Ambassador Murata, Gen. Wachi and others had taken their seats around a
rectangular table, Premier Tojo rose and read his instructions (translated by Mr. Hamamoto)
asking us to declare war against the United States and Great Britain. I was seated in front of
Premier Tojo and Mr. Vargas was seated on my right while Mr. Aquino, on my left. It was a
shock to all three of us; we did not expect this instruction and we were not prepared to meet
it on the spot. I silently prayed and said the Pater Noster. After the translation by Hamamoto
of the speech of the Premier I got up to say as politely as I could that I could not comply
with the request. I said that my people would not approve of it; that I could not carry them;
that I have never been a popular leader, the three powerful leaders of the country being
Messrs. Quezon, Osmeña and Roxas; that even if I should be willing to do what they
wanted me to do, I would be a leader without any following because the Filipinos were
opposed to such a step; and that it would not be "decent" for the Filipinos to declare war
against the United States that was their benefactor and ally and that only unworthy people
could be expected to do that. The unprepared reply seemed to have impressed
Messers.Vargas and Aquino and I was congratulated by them. Afterwards, I was given a
copy of this speech of the Premier which I took along with me to the Philippines. After the
meeting, I also met Messers.Sanvictores and Gonzales who were waiting for us in the
reception room. I reported confidentially all that transpired to my cabinet and council of
state and, I understand, Speak er Aquino also gave an account to the members of the
National Assembly. I realized that I was in a most difficult situation. The atrocities reported
to us, the Japanese feudal and cruel methods had created a deep hatred against the Japanese
and I wished I had not been in this predicament of leadership. When at this time (September
30, 1943) we were asked to declare war against the United States and Great Britain it was
evident that independence was being granted with that price; but we could no longer back
out. In the language of Tojo our choice. was between extermination or freedom. (Guest
House visit). — Personal conf. - Jan., 1943 - Vargas Commission.

XXXI.

We, (Vargas, Aquino, Sanvictores and Gonzales) returned to the Philippines in the early
part of October and on the 14th of that month inaugurated the Republic of the Philippines
with appropriate ceremonies. (The details of inauguration may be written later). In the
afternoon of the same day--if I remember correctly—the Republic was made to sign a Pact of
Alliance? – political, economic and military (military with reference to the defense of the
independence and territorial integrity of the Philippines) and this was done by Claro M.
Recto, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the new Republic. The setup of the Republic was
promptly accomplished by the retention of all the Commissioners of the Executive
Commission and later the creation of one or two more departments; the retention practically
of all those then in the Government service; the extra-legal creation of the cabinet at large in
which the Speaker and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court are ranking members, in the
order mentioned, with the President; the formation of a Council of State as provided in the
Constitution under the chairmanship of D. Ramon Avanceña; the creation of an Economic
Planning Board under former Speaker Manuel Roxas; the reorganization of the Naric and the
creation of the Biba; the establishment of a council of scientists to help, among other things,
in the solution of the food problem and a board thereunder to undertake investigation in the
field of medicinal plants; and other official activities which are a matter of record and may be
verified.

XXXII

The frequent change of command of the Japanese Army (from Homma to Tanaka to
Kuroda -- to Terauchi — to Yamashita), the arrests, tortures and disappearance of good
people; the inattention to and disregard of our pleas in behalf of our people; the
commandeering of houses, animals, automobiles, trucks and properties of private citizens; the
confiscation of food supplies; the complete disregard of human dignity; the conqueror's
complex; the low non-christian civilization of the great mass of these conquerors; their
domination of and dictation to our Government and Government officials -- the preaching
contrary to actual deeds — these and more made it evident that the Filipinos were doomed
under Japanese occupation or influence and that we were correct in simply trying to do what
had to be done for the purpose of tiding our people over to better times; and that I was correct
in repeatedly announcing that the primordial policy of the Government was that of national
survival." It was during this time that as a matter of duty and personal admiration — to
prevent liquidation — that I asked General Roxas to join the Government in any capacity.
General Francisco had to transfer to Malacañan as my adviser on peace and order because I
was told he would land in Fort Santiago because of his connection with the guerillas, and had
on that account to appoint Gen. Paulino Santos as Commanding General of the Constabulary;
I had to advise Gen. Mateo Capin pin to play safe and he realized the menace from the
military police, and so with many ex-service men of our Philippine Army, like Gen, Alberto
Ramos, Gen. Simeon de Jesus, Col. Martinez, Col. Poblete, Col. Sevilla, Col. Castañeda and
many others.

XXXIII

Since I assumed the office of President in the midst of hardship and suffering of our
people and after the attempt against my life, I became intensely religious. Everyday and
evening, I would go down to the chapel of the Palace, unnoticed, to pray. After the prayer, I
felt greatly relieved. Every Sunday morning I invited my colleagues in the Cabinet and other
friends to hear Mass in the Malacañan chapel and thereafter to take breakfast with me and
then play golf on the other side of the Pasig River. Those who frequently came were Gen.
Roxas, Don Ramon Avanceña, Chief Justice Yulo, Minister Recto, Minister Arsenio Luz,
Minister Sabido and Secretary Abello. My deep and sincere concern was the salvation of our
people. I ordered that everything that Malacañan had be given to the people, especially to the
poor and suffering masses. I prohibited social functions in Malacanan. I even prohibited
people calling on me on my birthday. I prohibited the giving of gifts to me and to high
Government officials for any occasion. And I imposed upon myself and the members of the
cabinet the one-course meal service in banquets and regular gatherings. Even in official
banquets which we had to give, only one course had to be served. I silently endeavored to
share and feel the suffering of our people. I did not overlook the families of people who were
away. Secretly and frequently without success I instructed Mrs. Pecson, superintendent of
Malacañan Palace, to help Mrs. Osmeña, Mrs. Romulo, Mrs. Valdes, Mrs. Abad Santos and
others. Mrs. Pecson is in a better position to state what had been accomplished in this humble,
yet sincere attempt. By instinct or some kind of premonition, my wife refused to live in
Malacañan, Aside from her aversion to social life she did not like the Palace. I had to go to
our modest Peñafrancia home after office hours every day and spend the night there with my
wife and children. It was only about three months after my inauguration that she came to visit
me in Malacañan and joined Mrs. Trining Roxas (wife of General Roxas) and Mrs. Angela
Zobel (wife of Major Jake Zobel) to view the exhibition of cinematographic films in the
Palace's formal dining room.

XXXIV.

. The days of my presidency were hectic days. Every day was a day of reflection and prayer.
On my inauguration I wanted to visit the Sto. Tomas concentration camp and offer some
material relief to my American friends. I wanted particularly to see Mr. Clyde C. DeWitt, my
first American teacher in my native town, my lawyer in a case I had in my boyhood days and
later my professor in law at the University of the Philippines; but I was sternly cautioned
against it because it would be misunderstood by the Japanese. Instead, I visited the Philippine
General Hospital where I saw and shook hands with Theo. Rogers (Business Manager of the
Free Press) who whispered to me that he understood the situation; and also Mr.
Heindenreich, formerly superintendent of schools of Batangas. I was accompanied by Dr.
Antonio G. Sison, Director of the Hospital on this occasion. I also visited the disabled
Filipino war veterans in Calle S. Rafael, and the charitable and social welfare institutions all
over Manila. God knows how deeply I sympathized with them.

XXXV.

Bearing in mind the instruction I had received from President Quezon --- (with the
approval of Gen. MacArthur) vide pars. IX-XI — after prayers and meditation, I boldly
announced my national policy, my political ideology, and my moral philosophy in my
speeches, interviews and conferences. The fundamental national policy, I said, was that of
national survival. All around us was devastation and suffering. No food, no medicine -- not
enough at least of the essentials of life. Means of communication and transportation
disrupted; we could not drive away the Japanese because they proved stronger - but we must
live and survive as a people, we must tide over our people to better times and for this purpose
we must unite, love one another, stop killing one another because only the Filipinos can love
the Filipinos. No foreigner can pretend to love the Filipinos more than the Filipinos
themselves. As to the political ideology, I said that the dream and aspiration of Filipino
heroes and patriots have always been complete and absolute political freedom for the
Philippines and that all true Filipinos are pledged to the realization of that ideal. I therefore
stood for a Government of the Filipinos, by the Filipinos and for the Filipinos exclusively and
alone without the interference of, or injunction, or dictation from a foreign power. I
announced that my moral philosophy - the deeper foundation of my administration was that
of righteousness which is divine and is common to all religions worthy of the name; that man
lives in the triple world, physical, intellectual and moral; that physical and mental vigor
(mens sana in corpore sano) is not enough, but that man's life must be dominated by moral
principles. I therefore concluded that righteousness was the foundation of genuine popular
and political leadership (Service to the people on the basis of Righteousness)

Lopez, Salvador P. “Bataan has Fallen” Presidential Museum and Library. Accessed
October 28, 2020. http://malacanang.gov.ph/1226-bataan-has-fallen/

A well-written but little-known broadcast piece about the struggle of the Filipino and
American soldiers, "Bataan has fallen" is the surrender announcement of the Filipino and
American forces against the Japanese forces during the World War II. It was radio
broadcasted inside Malinta tunnel in the evening of April 9, 1942. This message was written
by Captain Salvador P. Lopez, who later became the Philippine Ambassador to the United
Nations and President of the Univeristy of the Philippines. The announcement was delivered
by 3rd Lieutenant Normando Ildefonso "Norman" Reyes on the "Voice of Freedom" radio
broadcast. EXCERPT:

RADIO BROADCAST MESSAGE, AS WRITTEN BY CAPTAIN SALVADOR P. LOPEZ,

DELIVERED BY THIRD LIEUTENANT NORMANDO ILDEFONSO “NORMAN” REYES
ON THE “VOICE OF FREEDOM” RADIO BROADCAST OF APRIL 9, 1942 FROM
MALINTA TUNNEL, CORREGIDOR:

Bataan has fallen. The Philippine-American troops on this war-ravaged and bloodstained peninsula
have laid down their arms. With heads bloody but unbowed, they have yielded to the superior force
and numbers of the enemy.

The world will long remember the epic struggle that Filipino and American soldiers put up in the
jungle fastness and along the rugged coast of Bataan. They have stood up uncomplaining under the
constant and grueling fire of the enemy for more that three months. Besieged on land and blockaded
by sea, cut off from all sources of help in the Philippines and in America, the intrepid fighters have
done all that human endurance could bear.

For what sustained them through all these months of incessant battle was a force that was more than
merely physical. It was the force of an unconquerable faith—something in the heart and soul that
physical hardship and adversity could not destroy! It was the thought of native land and all that it
holds most dear, the thought of freedom and dignity and pride in these most priceless of all our human
prerogatives.

The adversary, in the pride of his power and triumph, will credit our troops with nothing less than the
courage and fortitude that his own troops have shown in battle. Our men have fought a brave and
bitterly contested struggle. All the world will testify to the most superhuman endurance with which
they stood up until the last in the face of overwhelming odds.

But the decision had to come. Men fighting under the banner of unshakable faith are made of
something more that flesh, but they are not made of impervious steel. The flesh must yield at last,
endurance melts away, and the end of the battle must come.

Bataan has fallen, but the spirit that made it stand—a beacon to all the liberty-loving peoples of the
world —cannot fall!
All of us know the story of Easter Sunday. It was the triumph of light over darkness, life over death. It
was the vindication of a seemingly unreasonable faith. It was the glorious resurrection of a leader,
only three days before defeated and executed like a common felon.

Today, on the commemoration of that Resurrection, we can humbly and without presumption declare
our faith and hope in our own resurrection, our own inevitable victory.

We, too, were betrayed by Judases. We were taken in the night by force of arms, and though we had
done wrong to no man, our people were bound and delivered into the hands of our enemies. We have
been with mock symbols of sovereignty, denied by weaklings, lashed with repeated oppression,
tortured and starved. We have been given gall to drink, and we have shed our blood. To those who
look upon us from afar it must seem the Filipino people have descended into hell, into the valley of
death. But we know that the patient and watching men who said their simple prayers in the hills of
Bataan, have not lost faith, and we know that the hushed congregations in the churches throughout the
land, drew from the gospel as Mass renewed hope in their resurrection. To all of them we give today
the message of the angel of Easter morning: “Be not afraid, for He is risen.”

We, too, shall rise. After we have paid the full price of our redemption, we shall return to show the
scars of sacrifices that all may touch and believe. When the trumpets sound the hour we shall roll
aside the stone before the tomb and the tyrant guards shall scatter in confusion. No wall of stone shall
then be strong enough to contain us, no human force shall suffice to hold us in subjection, we shall
rise in the name of freedom and the East shall be alight with the glory of our liberation

Recto, Claro M. Three Years of Enemy Occupation, The Issue of Political Collaboration
in the Philippines. Manila: People’s Publishers. 1946.

Claro M. Recto held positions under the Laurel administration during the Japanese
occupation.
He was the Commissioner on Education, Health and Public Welfare from 1942-1943 and the
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs from 1943-1944. After the war, he was arrested and
tried for collaboration. In 1946, he wrote a defense and explanation of his stand in his book,
Three Years of Enemy Occupation which narrated the views and actions of the Filipino elite
during World War II. Known for his academic excellence and nationalist ideas, Recto fought
his legal battle in court and was acquitted.

In this excerpt, Recto highlighted the different views of the Americans and the Filipinos on
the issue of collaboration. According to him, the Americans who remained in the security of
their homes and were miles away from the brutality of the Japanese forces cannot appreciate
the courage of the Filipinos who faced the brutality of the Japanese conquerors. The Filipino
leaders on the other hand were more aware of the nature and character of events in the
Philippines and should not be “judged by standards of post-liberation thinking.”
EXCERPT:

Differences in points of new between Americans and Filipinos on the question of

collaboration

Three and a half years under the Japanese rule the Filipinos suffered a living death. They
came to expect that each day would be their last upon this earth. They went throul,111
nameless tortures and indignities. Hunger was to them a physical, gnawing pain, to which
hundreds succumbed daily in the streets, in the internment and prison camps, in the filthy
dungeons of the military police. The American planes that began to come in September 1944,
sweeping and irresistible, caused damage to civilian properties and casualties among the
people. Later, more of them were to meet death on the beaches bombed and shelled by
Americans, in contested areas in the path of their advancing forces and, finally, in the terrible
holocaust that reduced Manila and other cities and towns into rubble and ashes. Still, the
Filipinos kept their faith. For their loyalty to the United States they paid the supreme price in
countless innocent men, women and children abused and butchered by the Japanese, in
thousands of homes destroyed; but even that was not too much to pay for redemption and,
they hoped, for the peace that was to follow.

However, it seems that peace and concord are not for them. Openly or behind the scenes,
forces are selfishly at work pulling wires that may plunge the country into more suffering and
more misery. Now that the Filipinos need more than ever to be united, they hurl accusations
and recriminations against one another, the bitterness of which is in no way assuaged by the
American leaders who, having expressed concern for their present situation, should be among
the first to deplore the existence of internal dissension here. These men against whom
principally the accusations are made have so far kept their silence; their hearts they still
preserve the solicitude that, during all their years of public service, they have felt for the
country and for the people; and in the spirit of true leadership that those years have instilled
in them, they did not wish to make matters worse by accepting their accusers' challenge to a
public discussion, which would be unavoidably fraught with passion and prejudice.

Those who alone can pass is easy to defy the enemy if one is thousands of miles away.

They have unquestioning faith in the judgment of their countrymen who remained here with
them under the Japanese rule and saw at first hand their acts and inner motivations. The man
in the street, the humble farmer in the field, the employee in the government, the true
guerrilla who fought and suffered a thousand hardships not because of ambition for personal
glory and postliberation political power, but because of pure desire to help the American
cause; yes, the American prisoner of war and civilian internee—these are the ones who are in
a position to pass correct judgment upon these leaders, because together they inseparably
underwent, bore the brunt of, and pulled through three long years of Japanese hell on earth.
Not those who were able to escape abroad to engage in profitable undertakings or who fled to
mountains not to fight the enemy but for reasons of personal safety, and lived there in
comparative comfort and ease of mind, coming out of their self-exile and hiding enriched and
acclaimed as heroes and superpatriots, only after the Japanese had all but surrendered to the
returning victorious American armies. And certainly not those who are without that virtue of
humility which is the beginning of wisdom—those pharisees who themselves served in the
two puppet governments and their instrumentalities if only in a subordinate capacity and then
retired when they found that the buy-and-sell mart was more profitable, and now appear, after
the Japanese have been driven out, in heroes' and patriots' clothing, because in their peacock's
vanity they fail to perceive that they too have feet of clay.

At this juncture, it seems opportune to remind ourselves of the words of a French physician, a
member of the French underground. to Demaree Bess, who quoted the statement ill his article
' 'Which Way Will France Go?" appearing in the Saturday Evening Post's issue of November
18, 1944: ' 'Frenchmen who lived abroad came back here with preconceived notions about so-
called collaboration, notions which are nosy being altered. It was easy, in New York or
London, to be openly defiant of Germans, and it was tempting for the emigres to be self-
righteous when they first returned home. But as they talk with those of us who stayed here,
they are beginning to understand better what it meant to live under German occupation. The
over- whelming majority of Frenchmen never left France, and their judgments about who
were and who were not collaborators are beginning to prevail."

The American point of view

Washington high officials and the rest of the American people who throughout Washington
high officials and the rest of the American people who throughout the war remained in the
security of their homes thou- sands of miles away cannot begin to appreciate the utter misery
and defenselessness of the Filipinos in the face of the unexampled brutality and lack of
principle of the Japanese conqueror. They can- not truly understand the bargainings, the
evasions, the temporizings and the show of apparent cooperation with which the Filipinos had
to placate the ruthless invader until America could organize and bring back here her mighty
armed forces. At best, the American point of view with respect to the Philippines could not
but be purely objective, so much so that according to Admiral Richardson, former Pacific
Fleet Commander. in his recent testimony before the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee.
President Roosevelt told him in 1940 that he (the President) doubted whether the United
States would enter the war even if Japan attacked the Philippines, but that the Japanese could
not always avoid making mistakes. That mistake was the attack on Pearl Harbor. At the
hearings before the Congressional Committee investigating Pearl Harbor it has been disclosed
that in the high command conference held in February 1941, General George C. Marshall.
then and until recently Chief of Staff, made the following statement: ' 'We really have two
active defense issues—the Panama Canal and Honolulu. They are the two great outposts of
our defense. We have some troops in the Philippines but the Philippines are so weak they
could not be defended against any first class power. They would have to be sacrificed."
General Marshall testified also before the committee saying that “he knew of no agreement
before the veal' committing the United States to war unless she was attacked."
After these meaningful revelations, paradoxical though it may sound, we Filipinos should
feel happy that the Japanese made the mistake of attacking Pearl Harbor. That mistake
decided the fate of Filipino democracy and civilization. Had the Japanese attack been directed
against the Philippines alone, the Filipinos, out of their loyalty to America, would probably
have been in the tragic situation of fighting America's war without America even being a
belligerent. That, as the Americans would say, would have left the Filipinos hanging out on a
limb. And with America out of the war, the Philippines, after a futile resistance which could
have lasted month only, would have been definitely incorporated into the Japanese empire,
not even as an ostensibly sovereign member of the co-prosperity sphere, because such
propaganda stunt would have been superfluous, but as a mere colonial possession like Korea
and Formosa.

But Pearl Harbor was attacked and America entered the war. It was not America, however,
but the Philippines that became the gory battlefield of the war, and for over three years was
virtually converted into one big prison camp. It was not American cities that were destroyed,
American homes burned. fields laid waste, food supplies confiscated, private belongings
looted, population decimated by the action of the ruthless enemy. No American in the United
States was deprived of his home and thrown into the street; or ever lived in stark. abiding fear
of the Japanese spy and military police; or found himself between •non-cooperation" and the
enemy torture-chamber; or felt the sting of a slap in his face, the cold steel of a bayonet in his
entrails, the pain of burning flesh, or any of the countless torture methods employed by the
Japanese. It was only natural that the primary concern of the United States should be to win
the war and to save as many American lives as possible in the process. The retaking of the
Philippines was not an end in itself but part of an overall strategic plan. And when it came to
the final execution of that plan, the objective approach toward the plight of the Filipinos had
to be maintained, even at the cost of almost completely obliterating Manila and other cities
and towns and killing thousands of civilians as a result of the intense bombing and shelling.

The Filipino point of view

On the other hand, the Filipino leaders who were left here. During the occupation could not,
for the very reason that they are Filipinos, adopt the same detached attitude toward their
country. They had to tax their ingenuity and make the most of their practical wisdom to meet
the grave implications of the enemy invasion and occupation, in the face of the
defenselessness and bewilderment of the people. They had to feign cooperation and pretend
to play into the hands of the wily enemy because the latter was not only suspicious but
already convinced that the Filipinos were just waiting for the opportune moment to strike
back. True they wished. as fervently as did the Americans themselves, an American victory
But at the same time, while they could not plan to bring about that victory they had to face
perplexing problems that were immediate and no less urgent. While their faith in the ultimate
triumph of American arms never faltered, they had to plan not for a month or two of enemy
rule but for a protracted period that might well drag for many years. For America was, by her
own admission. hopelessly unprepared and the prodigious scientific achievements and
productive power that were to turn the tide eventually in her favor were not then reasonably
fore- seeable in the near future. In the midst of those terrible realities this handful of Filipino
leaders was entrusted with the task of looking after the well-being of their own people and
trying to save the country from abject misery, even possible extinction. How well and
effectively they went about that task, only those whom they served are competent to judge,
not those in whose very selfishness the enemy found comfort and assistance. President
Osmena himself, in his Leyte speech, said that there were those among the men who held
public office during the Japanese occupation who were prompted by a desire to protect the
people and comfort them in their misery, and to prevent the Japanese from governing directly
and completely or utilizing un- scrupulous Filipino followers capable of any treason to their
people.

So, while the Filipinos who headed the government under the Japanese occupation, intent as
they were upon speeding up the liberation of the Philippines, were exultant over the
formation of guerrilla units, because these meant so much to the American war strategy, they
could not, on the other hand, feel so happy when the unwitting exploits of some of the
guerrillas brought about reprisals and death to whole communities of innocent people. And
while the Americans. unaware of the real nature and character of the events here, could close
their eyes to the countless robberies, rapes and murders commit- ted by lawless elements in
the name of the resistance movement but really prompted by lust and personal vengeance, if
not from motives of banditry pure and simple, these Filipino leaders could not so callously
ignore them but, being powerless to repress them effectively, at least had to morally condemn
them, because such horrible crimes and abuses had for their victims thousands of Filipinos
and in the end weakened the power of resistance of our people against the common enemy.

The conduct and actuations of the Filipino leaders cannot be judged by standards of
postliberation thinking.

Some would say that for all their good intentions the efforts of these Filipino leaders were of
no avail, as they were not able to pre- vent the enslavement of the people. Considering the
implacable enmity and bitter resentment between the Japanese and the great masses of the
people, which was daily coming to a crisis, and the deep distrust professed by the Japanese
toward the Filipino officials, it is doubtful whether any group of men could have done better
in the interest of their people. It is a matter of public knowledge that there was at the time a
current saying among the Japanese to the effect that with the exception of Ricarte and Ramos
and their followers, the Filipinos were ninety-five per cent pro-Americans and five per cent
liars. Under those circum- stances their efforts to protect the people could not meet with
eminent success. But that fact does not make them criminals; and it is unfair to judge their
actuations at the time, when the nation was dazed by defeat and everything was chaos and
confusion, through the perspective of victory and by the present standards of post-liberation
thinking. They started with hopefulness in the efficacy of what they had expected to do, but
they could not then know the relentless character of Japanese bestiality and double-dealing
they had to put up with later on, progressively became worse as the Japanese realized more
and more the hostility and doublecrossing tactics of the Filipinos, officials and masses alike.
At any rate the events of the last four months of the occupation have shown that if there had
been no pretense of co-operation the indiscriminate slaughter of the Filipinos would have
been carried out from the beginning and there would have been only a handful of them left to
liberate in the end.

What would the Americans have done?

It would be interesting, from the academic point of view, to know what would have happened
if the Japanese had pressed their initial success at Pearl Harbor and actually occupied Hawaii
or some part Of the American mainland along the Pacific coast. Would the Americans in
those places have shown an absolutely uncompromising stand and resisted the enemy to the
last unarmed and defenseless man? Or while biding their time would they have also
temporized and bargained for terins that would give them at least a reasonable chance of
survival? The Americans in the Philippines, both soldiers and civilians, who surrendered to
the Japanese or were captured or interned, did exactly this. Self-preservation, individual or
national, is an instinct common to men of all races and to all countries of the world. If the war
had been between the Philippines and Japan as the principal belligerents the Filipinos would
probably have found some measure of protection in that very status. But the war was between
the United States and Japan, and the Philippines became involved only because it was under
American sovereignty. It was a situation that was exploited to the fullest extent by the
Japanese and made the basis of their propaganda that the Filipinos were not their enemies but
brother Orientals whom they had come to free. At the same time it was used to justify the
measures of coercion and punishment they employed, because if the Filipinos were not
enemies they could not plead their pro-Filipinism as an excuse for openly refusing to
cooperate with the Japanese. Such refusal meant, in the Japanese eyes, only one for and
attachment to the Americans, and this in turn meant certain torture or death.

Not only the Americans in the Philippines at the time of Pearl Harbor but also the Filipinos
were sacrifice to America's unpreparedness.

The problems thus faced at the time by these Filipinos now accused of political collaboration
were, from the subjective point of view, much more difficult than those faced by the
Americans who were concerned exclusively with the conduct and strategy of the war. The
difference is so patent officials and certain sectors or the American press, is perhaps
unconsciously fortified in its condemnation of these so-called political collaborationists by
the belief that the moral fiber of a Filipino is weaker than that of an American, so that where
one would be betraying his country by certain acts under a given situation the other would be
incapable of intending such betrayal by similar acts under a similar situation. Nothing else
can explain why those brave American soldiers who surrendered to the Japanese in the
Philippines and who were forced to make statements plainly pro-Japanese o or tending to
give comfort to the enemy. should be lionized and acclaimed as the heroes they really are,
while the Filipinos who were forced to make similar statements are now accused of having
given aid and comfort to the enemy and are condemned in the eyes of the world even before
they are accorded a trial. There is somewhere the purpose of exacting a higher measure of
loyalty from the Filipinos than from America s own nationals. No other explanation can be
conceived of why General Wainwright, and the other American generals and officers under
his command, for instance, were, as President Truman said, a sacrifice to America’s state of
unpreparedness, while the Filipinos who perforce had to deal and bargain with the Japanese
on account of that very unpreparedness should now be called traitors. While it is true that
these Americans were prisoners of war, from the standpoint of freedom to act, both they and
the Filipinos were not free agents; they were both under pressure, taking orders In a sense the
pressure exerted on the from the erstwhile conquerors. Filipinos was greater, because while
an American could not be properly requested to make a pro-Japanese or an anti-American
statement, a Filipino who would decline to make not an anti-Filipino but a pro-Japanese or an
anti-American statement would appear in the eyes of the Japanese as pro-American and,
therefore, an enemy of Japan.

“Executive Order No 40: Initiating A National Campaign For The Cultivation Of Idle
Lands To Produce Food Crops.” Presidential Museum and Library. http://
malacanang.gov.ph/6369-executive-order-no-40-s-1942/

Jorge B. Vargas was designated to be the executive secretary of President Laurel during the
Second Republic. He issued this executive order on a national campaign that will enforce
local officials to produce food in idle land in the midst of food shortage brought by the war.

The document showed which food was prioritized for cultivation. Among these prioritized
foods were rice, corn, camote, cassava, gabi, cowpeas, soybeans, mongo. The document also
allowed local officials such as governors and mayors to distribute uncultivated public lands
within their respective jurisdictions to preferably unemployed for one year.

EXCERPT:

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION

MALACAÑAN PALACE

BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 40

INITIATING A NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR THE CULTIVATION OF IDLE LANDS

TO PRODUCE FOOD CROPS.
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the present emergency, many farms are abandoned and the
country is threatened with food shortage;

WHEREAS, the importation of essential food commodities is problematical under the present
circumstances; and

WHEREAS, food crops must be grown in order to avert hunger and forestall famine
throughout the land;

NOW, therefore, pursuant to the authority conferred upon me as Head of the Central
Administrative Organization by Order No. 1 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial
Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and upon the recommendation of the Executive
Commission, it is hereby ordered:

1. That a nation-wide campaign for the cultivation of rice, corn, camote, cassava, gabi,
cowpeas, soybeans, mongo and other short-time food crops suited to local conditions, be
started at once under the joint sponsorship of the Department of the Interior and the
Department of Agriculture and Commerce.

2. That it shall be the duty of all city and municipal mayors to distribute uncultivated
public lands within their respective jurisdictions among the citizens thereof preferably to
those who are unemployed in order to enable them to plant food crops therein for a period of
one agricultural year.

3. That if for any reason the owner or the one in possession of any private land is unable
to cultivate the same, it shall be the duty of the mayor of the city or municipality where such
land is located to turn it over to the citizens of such city or municipality preferably to those
who are unemployed for the same purposes and under the same conditions prescribed in the
next preceding paragraph.

4. That it shall be the duty of every person or persons to whom public or private land has
been turned over for cultivation to carry into effect the national food production campaign by
planting thereon the crops contemplated in paragraph 1 of this Order: Provided, That they
may not alter or damage any permanent improvements existing thereon: And provided,
further, That kaiñgin may not be resorted to without permission from the Director of Forestry
and Fishery or of his representative in the locality. When a portion of public lands is found
more suited for agricultural than for forest purposes kaiñgin shall be allowed.

5. That crops obtained on public and private lands distributed in accordance with
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Order shall belong to the grower and no rent for the use of the land
shall be collected: Provided, however, That a portion of the crops or so much thereof as may
be necessary, not exceeding ten per centum, shall be set aside and the proceeds therefrom
turned over to the Government as payment of the real estate tax corresponding to the year in
which such crops arc gathered or harvested.
6. That it shall be the duty of all provincial governors personally or through the
agricultural supervisors, to inspect the activities of the mayors in this food production
campaign. The governors and city mayors shall also submit a monthly report to the
Commissioner of the Interior and the Commissioner of Agriculture and Commerce on the
progress of the campaign in their respective provinces and cities.

7. That it shall be the duty of all provincial governors and city or municipal mayors who
may receive seeds, seedlings, cuttings, shoots, or tubers from the Government in the
furtherance of the national food production campaign to distribute such seeds, seedlings,
cuttings, shoots, or tubers immediately to the farmers for planting, and it shall be unlawful for
them to utilize the same for their own benefit, or to intentionally permit or give tacit consent
to the diversion of the same for consumption purposes.

8. That any person who neglects or fails to perform any duty enjoined by this Order, or
who performs any act which defeats or tends to defeat its purposes, or who otherwise violates
any provision thereof, shall upon conviction be punished with imprisonment not exceeding
six months, or by fine not exceeding two hundred pesos, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.

9. That the provincial governors and city or municipal mayors who infringe the
provisions of this Order shall, in addition to the criminal responsibility to which they may be
subject, also be liable to suspension or removal from office.

10. This Executive Order shall be printed in Japanese, English, and in the principal
dialects of the Philippines for distribution in all cities and municipalities.

Done in the City of Greater Manila, Philippines, this 14th day of May, 1942.

(Sgd.) JORGE B.
VARGAS Chairman of the
Executive Commission United
States. High Commissioner to the
Philippine Islands. 1941. Annual
Report of the
United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands Commissioner to the
Philippine
Islands Covering the Calendar Year 1941. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. Accessed December
4, 2020. https://archive.org/details/annualreportofun4041unit/page/112/mode/2up
Prior to the Japanese occupation, several documents from the U.S. government and the
Philippine Commonwealth had written on the conditions of preparedness in the Philippines
should the Second World War encroach the Pacific. The US High Commissioner to the
Philippines included in his reports the wartime preparations in various aspects such as public
safety, relief and refuge from the attacks that would eventually ensue. Treatment from
injuries in the several attacks during the wartime became difficulty due to the scarcity of
resources such as medicine and other supplies.

The excerpt below is taken from a section on public safety and health which were among
several wartime instructions to armed forces and civilian troops. It highlighted the role of the
Philippine Red Cross to be in-charge of first-aid units during the attacks. These instructions
from the government show the immediate treatments during bombs as well as
decontamination instructions from chemicals that was obtained in these attacks.

EXCERPT:

FIRST-AID UNITS

First-aid units will be organized on the basis of four persons and one automobile with
driver to each party. Two ambulances with drivers and two attendants for each ambulance
will form an integral part of such units. Where regular ambulances are not available, they
should be improvised from suitable motor vehicles in the locality. A sufficient number of
these units will be organized in each com- munity so as to provide a minimum of one such
unit to each 3,000 of population or major fraction thereof.
The Philippine Red Cross will be responsible for the organization and training of all
firstaid units.
The instruction of such units should include the treatment of shock, hemmorrhage,
fractures, unconsciousness, suffocation, electric shock, and burns and scalds, as contained in
the usual first-aid course of instruction. In addition to this, instructions must be given in the
proper treatment of gas casualties. Such instructions are briefly summarized below :

Localized areas of contamination on the body caused by blister gas (mustard) should
be treated by removing the blister gas from the skin by using gasoline, alcohol, or
naphtha as a solvent. To apply these solvents a small piece of cotton batting should be
held between the finger and the thumb, only the end of it being dipped in the solvent.
Rubber gloves, if available, should be worn while applying the sol- vent. It is
important to avoid spreading the blister gas by rubbing or using an excess of solvent.
Solvents only remove the blister gas — they do not destroy it. For this reason a
succession of swabs should be used, and the contaminated swabs burnt or buried. If
 the above solvents are not readily available, the affected part should be thoroughly
washed with soap and water. In all cases where there has been contamination it is
advisable for the casualty to be washed completely with soap and water, in addition to
the solvent treatment described above for the affected part. It must be emphasized that
the success of any method of preventive treatment depends upon the promptness with
which it is applied.

Lung Irritant Gas

Whether symptoms are present or not, any person who has been ex- posed to a lung
irritant gas must, from the outset, be spared any further exertion. He must be kept
lying down and be protected from chill. He should be removed as a stretcher case.

Eye Irritant Gas

Face the wind with the eyes open. Do not rub the eyes under any circumstances. If it
is available, wash the eyes with a weak solution of boric acid. First-aid stations for the
treatment of ambulatory cases will be established in each community. The personnel
and equipment for these stations will be trained and furnished by the Philippine Red
Cross. These stations will be located in such places and in such numbers as not to
require an injured person to walk any great distance. Existing hospitals will be
expanded, and buildings suitable for hospitals will be selected for use as hospitals
whenever present facilities are inadequate. The Philippine Red Cross is responsible
for the determination of the adequacy of existing facilities and for arranging for their
expansion where deemed necessary. The Philippine Red Cross is also responsible for
the securing of additional buildings suitable for hospitals whenever present facilities
prove inadequate^ Doctors, nurses, hospital attendants and other personnel will be
procured by the Philippine Red Cross.

RESCUE UNITS

In each municipality rescue units will be formed whose duties are to rescue persons trapped
in fallen buildings and in debris from such buildings. Each unit will consist of a leader and
eight men, all of whom will be recruited from men skilled in the building trades. Rescue
work requires a special knowledge of the method of handling and storing up debris in order
to prevent injury to the persons being rescued and to the members of the rescue units. Rescue
units will be organized by, trained by, and operate under, the district and city engineers. One
such unit will be organized for each 6,000 of population or major fraction thereof. Tools and
equipment for the use of these units will be provided by the local authorities.

DEMOLITION AND REPAIR UNITS

Units to handle demolitions and repair will, be organized in each community. The duties of
such units are to clear streets of their wreckage, fill bomb craters, assist when necessary in
the repair of damaged water and gas mains, sewers, electric transmission lines, etc. They also
will cooperate with fire-fighting units when it becomes necessary to use explosives on or
otherwise demolish structures in order to prevent the spread of fire and to bring a fire under
control. The personnel of these units should be recruited from persons skilled in construction
work, the handling and use of explosives, street and highway repair, and general utilities
repair and maintenance. These units will be organized by, trained by, and operate under, the
district and city engineers. The strength and composition of each unit and the number of units
in each locality will be determined by the district or city engineer after consideration of the
installations to be maintained in each case.

DECONTAMINATION UNITS

Units formed for the purpose of decontaminating areas in which poisoned gas has been used
will be organized in each community under the direction of district and city engineers. Each
unit will consist of a leader and six men. One unit will be formed for each 5,000 of
population or major portion thereof. While such units should be trained in the approved
methods of decontaminating gassed areas, they also should be trained to assist in rescue,
demolition, or repair work. The first step taken by these units will be to work out, with
danger signs and barriers, the contaminated areas. No unauthorized persons should be
allowed to enter these areas. Decontamination work should then begin promptly. The
following materials may be used for decontaminating work:

a. Earth. Earth, sand, ashes, or sawdust may be spread over a contaminated area
to provide temporary protection. The layer of covering material should be at
least 3 inches thick and will be much more effective if wet down with water.
The

chemical used in the gas is not destroyed by this procedure but the covering
layer will prevent the escape of further poisonous vapors.
b. Water. Some gases are readily decomposed by water, and a liberal wetting of
the contaminated area is sufficient to destroy them. With some gases such as
mustard, water has no neutralizing effect. Therefore, even long after an area
has been washed with water it is dangerous to sit or lie down therein. If
practicable, the area should be covered with a 3-inch layer of earth, sand, or
ashes. Whenever it is available, chloride of lime should be used as indicated
below.
c. Chloride of lime. This is a white powder which readily gives up its chlorine
content when exposed to the air or moisture. It should be kept in air-tight
containers and used immediately after removal from them. It combines
quickly with blister gases (mustard) and if it is mixed with sand or earth no
 violent reaction will occur. The proportions should be about one part of
chloride of lime to three parts of sand or earth. One pound of chloride of lime
is required for each square yard of gassed area. In decontaminating machinery,
woodwork of buildings, etc., chloride of lime generally can be more easily and
effectively applied in liquid form with rags, swabs, or brushes. The solution
used should consist of one part of chloride of lime to one part of hot water.
d. Fire. An area covered with high dry grass or brush may be decontaminated by
burning it, provided this can be done without danger to nearby personnel or
property. The heat in many instances will cause a heavy cloud of mustard
vapor to be given off down-wind during the burning.
Vargas, Jorge. Report of Philippine (Executive Commission) to the Director, J.M.A. Jorge
B.
Manila: 1943
As the designated executive secretary of President Laurel, Vargas was tasked to create annual
reports on the activities of the Philippine Government to the Imperial Japanese forces. This
report of the Executive Committee consists of activities ranging from economic programs to
address scarcity of resources to wartime propaganda through public instruction and cultural
activities
The excerpt below shows the efforts by the provisional government to use education and
public instruction for propaganda. These areas included the expansive utilization of Japanese
and Filipino as languages as the provisional government. Cultural activities such as lectures
from different experts on Filipino and Japanese culture and propaganda films were also used
to spread the idea of the wider imperial vision of Japan, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere to Filipinos.

EXCERPT:
For the purpose of giving spiritual and intellectual reorientation to ranking employees in the
different bureaus and offices, a government employees training institute was organized on
October 15, 1943, and the first term of training was started on October 19, 1942. The
Supervision of the Institute was placed under the Executive Secretary to the Commission and
its administration under the Chief of the Civil Service.
During the first term, October 19 to December 14, 1942, 199 trainees were enrolled; during
the second term, January 10 to March 15, 1945, a total of 395 employees were graduated.
The curriculum of instruction approved for the Institute and consisting of the following
studies was carefully followed: General Information Concerning Japan; Public Service
Administration; Japanese Language; Philippine Culture; Music Japanese and Filipino songs;
Physical culture; and Lectures on various topics to the New Order, the intentions of Nippon
in waging the Greater East Asia War, the development of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere, the establishment of the New Philippines, and others. To supplement the regular
classroom instruction there was provided a series of lectures by prominent and distinguished
Nipponese and Filipino government officials and scholars, moving pictures shows consisting
of both recreational and instructional files.
“Letter of President Quezon to Douglas MacArthur, February 20, 1942.” Official
Gazette. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1942/02/20/letter-of-president-quezon-to-
douglasmacarthur-february-20-1942/
During the war, President Manuel L. Quezon along with his several key official of the
Philippine Commonwealth fled from the Philippines and remained in the United States until
1944. Quezon executed most of his duties and responsibilities as president.
Below is his letter to General Douglas MacArthur, the head of the United States Army Forces
in the Far East. It contains personal words to General McArthur written in personal
correspondence beyond his issuance of Executive Order No. I, series of 1942, which
appointed General MacArthur as the Military Adviser of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines.

EXCERPT:
Fort Mills, P.I.
February 20, 1942

My dear General MacArthur:

Although I have given official recognition to the services you have rendered to the
government of the Commonwealth and to the Filipino people in my Executive Order No. I,
series of 1942, I feel that I must write you this letter, which partakes of an official as well as
private character, in order to tell you how grateful I am, my own family, and the members of
my whole staff for the kindness and generosity with which we have been treated here; and to
ask you to convey to all the officers within your command, particularly to General Moore,
our deep gratitude.

As I have already told you, I would have remained here to the very bitter end, if you deemed
it necessary for me to stay. I am going only because you and I have agreed that the cause for
which we are fighting can be best promoted by my being in the unoccupied territory where I
could render you help and assistance by keeping up the morale and determination of my
people to stand by America. But I am leaving you with a weeping heart, for you and I have
not only been friends and comrades; we have been more than brothers. My thoughts will
always be with you and your dear wife and my godson. If better days should come to all of
us, as I hope they will, I expect that the memory of these hectic days will strengthen our
friendship and cooperation even more. I am leaving my own boys, the Filipino soldiers, under
your care. I know that you will look after their welfare and safety and that, above all, you will
see to it that their names may go down in history as loyal and brave soldiers.

With my love to you, Jean and the boy, in which all my family joins, I say good-bye till we
meet again. May God ever keep you under His protection.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) Manuel Quezon

“Message of General MacArthur to the Filipino people, January 1, 1946.” Official

Gazette. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1946/01/01/message-of-douglas-macarthur-
to-thefilipino-people-january-1-1946/
Douglas MacArthur was the head of the United States Army Forces in the Far East or
USAFFE from 1941 to 1946. In the Philippines during the Second World War, President
Quezon appointed General MacArthur as the Military Adviser of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. MacArthur led the efforts for the defense of the Philippines at the onset of the
Pacific War in 1941. Upon the defeat of US and Philippine forces in the early year of the war,
he escaped the Philippines in 1942, and continued with efforts to defend Allied Forces in the
Asia-Pacific.

In July 1944, MacArthur returned in the Philippines in the landing of Leyte Gulf, where he is
quoted to have said, “I have returned,” one of his wartime promises to head the efforts
liberate the Philippines from the Japanese forces. Below is his message to the Filipino people
towards the end of the Second World War.

EXCERPT:
Messag
e of
General Douglas MacArthur
Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers To the Filipino People
[Released on January 1, 1946]
Tokyo, 1946
To the Filipino People:
With the dawn of a new year—a year of peace following the ravage of war—I send you from
Tokyo a message of my enduring affection. I can never forget the courage, the determination
and the unity with which you fought your way to victory.
Confronted with the pressing problems of building anew amid the ruins left in war’s wake,
and at the same time entering upon your destiny as a member of the Nations of the World,
you face a task the magnitude of which demands the dedication of all of your faith and all of
your strength as a people.
Move forward to meet this challenge of the future as magnificently as you met that of the
past. With continued help of Almighty God, in this noble purpose, I know you will not fail.
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
“Message of President Osmeña to the Filipino people on V-J Day, September 2, 1945.”
Official Gazette. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1945/09/02/statement-of-
presidentosmena-to-the-filipino-people-on-v-j-day-september-2-1945/
Sergio Osmeña Sr. was the second President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, who
succeeded Manuel L. Quezon in 1944. President Osmeña accompanied U.S. General Douglas
MacArthur, several ranking officers in the U.S. forces and key officials in Philippine
Commonwealth in the liberation of the Philippines. Among his key priorities were the
reorganization of the government and rehabilitation after war.
The document below shows the message of President Osmeña to mark the Victory over
Japanese Day or V-J Day after the surrender of the Japanese Empire to the Allied Forces.

EXCERPT:
Message of His Excellency Sergio Osmeña
President of the Philippines To the Filipino People on V-J Day
[Released on September 2, 1945]
With the formal surrender of the Japanese Empire today, September 2, 1945, the long and
terrible war is at an end. President Truman, speaking on behalf of all the United Nations, has
proclaimed this day as V-J Day.
The surrender of Japan marks the turning point for us and for the peoples of all the United
Nations.
Our effort has been devoted toward the paramount task of winning the war. Today the task is
done. We must now devote ourselves to the task of winning the peace.
On the indestructible democratic foundations laid under the tutelage of America we must
reconstruct and build. The rehabilitation of our country demands all our energies.
We must prepare for the independence which will soon be ours and, as members of the family
of nations, we must work with other peoples in the effort to assure the peace and welfare of
humanity. For our people we may hope to achieve a greater and lasting happiness.
Today is a day of thanksgiving in the flush of victory. It should also be a day of dedication to
the heavy tasks that lie before us.
“Instrument of Surrender of the Japanese and Japanese-Controlled Armed Forces in
the Philippine Islands to the Commanding General United States Army Forces, Western
Pacific” Lillian Goldman Law Library. Yale University Accessed December 4, 2020.
https:// avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/j6.asp

Tomoyuki Yamashita was a Japanese general of the Imperial Japanese Armey assigned to
areas mostly in Southeast Asia. After being deployed to Malaya and Singapore, he was
assigned to defend the Philippines from the Allied forces in 1944. Under his command, the
Japanese army committed atrocities, some of which were basis for the U.S. Supreme Court's
1946 decision to execute him.
The document below shows the surrender of Yamahista to US Major General Edmond H.
Leavy. Even after the formal surrender of Japan in August 1945, he was able to hold on to
part of Luzon in September 1944.

EXCERPT:

INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER

of the Japanese and Japanese-Controlled Armed Forces in the Philippine

Islands to the Commanding General United States Army Forces, Western

Pacific

Camp John Hay

Baguio, Mountain Province,

Luzon, Philippine, Islands

3 September, 1945

Pursuant to and in accordance with the proclamation of the Emperor of Japan accepting the
terms set forth in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States,
Great Britain, and China on 26 July 1945; at Potsdam and subsequently adhered to by the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and to the formal instrument of surrender of the
Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters signed at
Tokyo Bay at 0908 on 2 September 1945:

1. Acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Imperial
Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, We hereby surrender
unconditionally to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific,
all Japanese and Japanese-controlled armed forces, air, sea, ground and auxiliary, in the
Philippine Islands.
2. We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated in the Philippine Islands
to cease hostilities forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircraft, and
military and civil property, and to comply with all requirements which may be imposed by
the Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, or his authorized
representatives.

3. We hereby direct the commanders of all Japanese forces in the Philippine Islands to
issue at once to all forces under their command to surrender unconditionally themselves and
all forces under their control, as prisoners of war, to the nearest United States Force
Commander.

4. We hereby direct the commanders of all Japanese forces in the Philippine Islands to
surrender intact and in good order to the nearest United States Army Force Commander, at
times and at places directed by him, all equipment and supplies of whatever nature under
their control.

5. We hereby direct the commanders of all Japanese forces in the Philippine Islands at
once to liberate all Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees under their control, and to
provide for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places as
directed by the nearest United States Army Force Commander.

6. We hereby undertake to transmit the directives given in Paragraphs 1 through 5,

above, to all Japanese forces in the Philippine Islands immediately by all means within our
power, and further to furnish to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces,
Western Pacific, all necessary Japanese emissaries fully empowered to bring about the
surrender of Japanese forces in the Philippine Islands with whom we are not in contact.

7. We hereby undertake to furnish immediately to the Commanding General, United

States Army Forces, Western Pacific, a statement of the designation, numbers, locations, and
commanders of all Japanese armed forces, ground, sea, or air, in the Philippine Islands.

8. We hereby undertake faithfully to obey all further proclamation, orders and directives
deemed by the Commanding General, United States Armed Forces, Western Pacific, to be
proper to effectuate this surrender.
Signed at Camp John Hay, Baguio, Mountain Province, Luzon, Philippine Islands, at 1210
hours 3 September 1945:

TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA,

General, Imperial Japanese

Army Highest Commander,

Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines.

DENHICI OKOCHI,

Vice Admiral, Imperial Japanese

Navy, Highest Commander,

Imperial Japanese Navy in the Philippines.

By command and in

behalf of the Japanese

Imperial

General Headquarters

Accepted at Camp John Hay, Baguio, Mountain Province Luzon

Philippine Islands, at 1210 hours 3 September 1945:

For the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific:

EDMOND H. LEAVY,

Major General, USA

Deputy Commander, United States Army Forces,

Western Pacific.