PELEGRINO VS.

PEOPLE
FACTS
Stripped of the non-essentials, the prosecution's evidence shows that about the last
week of July or early August of 1991, accused Atty. Buenafe delivered a letter of
authority dated July 4, 1991 (Exhibit K) to complainant Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano in the
latter's office at Valgozon Bldg., Pasong Tamo, Makati. Said Exhibit K is addressed to
Dr. Antonio [N.] Feliciano signed by one Eufracio D. Santos a [d]eputy [c]ommissioner
of the BIR stating inter alia that 'x x x the bearer(s) hereof Revenue Officer Eutiquio
Peligrino to be supervised by Buenaventura Buenafe is/are authorized to examine
your books of accounts and other accounting records for income and business
for the calendar/fiscal year(s) ending 1988 & 1989 x x x.' Atty. Buenafe was referred
to the accountant of the complaining witness.
"About two weeks later, the complainant received a telephone call from accused Atty.
Buenafe asking him if his accountant had not told him anything, and when he
(complainant) inquired from his accountant Ellen Quijano about the matter, he was
informed that the accused were demanding half a million pesos. Surprised about the
demand, since the books were not even examined, he instructed Ellen Quijano to
further clarify the matter. Thereafter about Sept. 1991, Atty. Buenafe called him up
requesting for a meeting in his (complainant's) office.
"On October 10, 1991 accused Eutiquio Peligrino and Atty. Buenaventura Buenafe
appeared in the complainant's office and told the latter that his tax deficiencies
would amount to [f]ive [h]undred [t]housand [p]esos (P500,000.00)[.]
"Flabbergasted, because his books were not even examined, complainant
entertained the idea that it was the beginning of an extortion, and he tried to
negotiate for a smaller amount, and finally the two (2) accused agreed to the
amount of [t]wo [h]undred [t]housand, of which [f]ifty [t]housand [p]esos would
be paid to the BIR, and the rest to them. The pay-off would take place on that coming
Monday. He immediately wrote a letter to the NBI (Exhibit A) requesting for
assistance, and an NBI Agent Atty. Rafael Ragos, went to his office where they
talked and arranged for an entrapment which was set on October 14.
At around 4:30 p.m., accused Peligrino arrived, and so upon hearing the sound of the
buzzer, he [Ragos], together with his co-NBI agents immediately proceeded to the
room of Dr. Feliciano, and on seeing the accused in possession of the brown
envelope which contained the marked money, arrested him, and made a body
search on him.
BUENAFE – ACQUITTED BY SANDIGANBAYAN
PELEGRINO – FOUND GUILTY
ISSUE:
W/N Sandiganbayan erred in finding that petitioner demanded and received the
envelope with the boodle money
RULING:
The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the offense described in Section
3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), 11 had
been proven. Being a public officer, specifically an examiner of the BIR, Peligrino had
the right to intervene in the subject transaction. He was a member of the Special
Project Committee tasked to verify the tax liabilities of professionals, particularly
physicians, within the jurisdiction of Revenue Region No. 4-A, Manila.

Demand and Receipt of

"Boodle Money"

Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended)
provides:

"SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

"(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,

share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law.

ELEMENTS
(1) the offender is a public officer
(2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or
a benefit
(3) on behalf of the offender or any other person
(4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government
(5) in which the public officer, in .an official capacity under the law, has the
right to intervene.

 Entrapment is resorted to in order to apprehend a public officer while in the act of

obtaining undue benefits.
 In "instigation," officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure
the accused into committing an offense, which the latter otherwise would not
commit and has no intention of committing. In "entrapment," the criminal intent
 or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused,
and the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the crime.

 Petitioner PELEGRINO:
- denies that he received payoff money from complainant. According to
him, receive, as contemplated in the offense charged, connotes a
voluntary act coupled with knowledge. Hence, where the giving of the
money affords the accused no opportunity either to refuse or to return it to the
giver, no punishable offense ensues. 20 Petitioner claims that the 40
seconds or less that the boodle money was in his hands was merely a
momentary possession that could not prove "receipt," which the law
requires for the offense charged to be consummated.
- He avers that he merely informed complainant of his tax deficiencies,
and that it was the latter who requested the reduction of the amount
claimed.

CA:
- Section 3(b) of RA 3019 penalizes three distinct acts –
(1) demanding or requesting;
(2) receiving; or
(3) demanding, requesting and receiving -- any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the government and any other party,
wherein a public officer in an official capacity has to intervene under the law.

These modes of committing the offense are distinct and different from
each other. Proof of the existence of any of them suffices to warrant
conviction.16 THE LACK OF DEMAND IS IMMATERIAL. 
 MENDOZA-ONG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS

The Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, Northern Samar, passed Resolution No.

93-132,  authorizing the municipality to borrow heavy equipment from
the Philippine Army’s 53rd Engineering Battalion, to be utilized in the
improvement of Laoang’s Bus Terminal. Resolution No. 93-132 likewise
mandated the municipal government to shoulder the expenses for fuel, oil,
and the subsistence allowances of the heavy equipment operators for the
duration of the project.

Allegedly, however, the borrowed Army equipment was diverted by the

petitioner, who was then the town mayor6 of Laoang, to develop some of
her private properties in Rawis, Laoang, Northern Samar. A concerned
citizen and ex-member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, Juanito G.
Poso, Sr., filed a complaint against petitioner and nine (9) other municipal
officers7 with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), Visayas, for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Investigator Sarmiento recommended the filing of the appropriate criminal

action against petitioner for violation of Sections 3(c) and (e) of R.A. 3019, as
amended.9 Despite strenuous opposition and objections by the defense, on
August 1, 1997, two informations were filed against her at the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with the Sandiganbayan alleging in the

main that:

(1) the informations especially in Criminal Case No. 23848, failed to

allege facts constituting an offense;

(2) that the officer who filed the information has no authority to do so; and

(3) that the accused was deprived of her right to due process and to the
speedy disposition of cases against her.

On May 8, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to

Quash.1awphi1.nét Petitioner duly moved for reconsideration but this was
likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan in its order dated November 9, 2000.
 ISSUE:
whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred or gravely abused its discretion in
denying the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner, particularly on the ground that
the information in Criminal Case No. 23848 does not constitute an offense.

RULING:

Petitioner:
- Criminal prosecution for violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. 3019 as
amended, the law requires that the gift received should be "manifestly
excessive" as defined by Section 2(c) of the same Act. She adds that it
is IMPERATIVE TO SPECIFY THE EXACT VALUE OF THE FIVE DRUMS
OF DIESEL FUEL ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED BY MAYOR ONG as public
officer to determine whether such is "manifestly excessive" under the
circumstances

Elements of the offense charged in the assailed information are as

follows:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) he has secured or obtained, or would secure or obtain, for a person any
government permit or license;

(3) he directly or indirectly requested or received from said person any gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for another; and

(4) he requested or received the gift, present or other pecuniary or material

benefit in consideration for help given or to be given.

(1) accused Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being then the

Municipal Mayor of Laoang,
(2) committed the crime charged in relation to, while in the performance
and taking advantage of her official functions,
(3) did request or receive directly or indirectly, a gift, present or other
pecuniary or material benefit in the form of five drums of diesel fuel, for
herself or for another, from spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons
for whom accused Mendoza-Ong,
(4) has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, a Municipal
Government permit or license anent the operation of the bus company,
JB Lines, owned by said spouses, in consideration for help given or to
be given by the accused.
 SC:

- Petitioner contends that pursuant to her reading of the above provision, the
value of the alleged gift must be specified in the information. But note that
Section 2(c) abovecited mentions a situation where
- (1) the value of the gift is manifestly excessive;
- (2) from a person who is not a member of the public officer’s immediate
family; and
- (3) even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity.

In contrast, Section 3 (c) earlier quoted in the present case applies

regardless of whether the gift’s value is manifestly excessive or not, and
regardless of the occasion. What is important here, in our view, is
whether the gift is received in consideration for help given or to be
given by the public officer. The value of the gift is not mentioned at all
as an essential element of the offense charged under Section 3 (c), and
there appears no need to require the prosecution to specify such value in
order to comply with the requirements of showing a prima facie case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed resolutions

of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23848 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
 JUAN CORANDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner, Juan Coronado, for

violation of Section 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, from which the decision 1 this petition
for review on certiorari was filed.

Herein petitioner JUAN CONDRADO, then a newly hired Process Server

in the office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of
Antipolo, Rizal, was charged, along with Cesar Villamor and Oscar Caing.

First — The Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Br. 71) issued an Order, dated 11
July 1984, denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the order of 23
January 1984, that dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 290-A, entitled
"Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro-Development Corporation, et al. v. Mariano Lim
et al.";

Second — On 31 August 1984, the complaining witness Mariano Lim, one

of the defendants in the above civil case, learned the rendition of the
Order and the fact that it had not yet then been served upon the
plaintiffs. Lim left "agitated about the loss of eleven days before the
decision's period of finality had commenced to run," and he, therefore, made
representations with the Executive Judge, the Hon. Antonio Benedicto,
to have the Order served on Atty. Patrocinio Palanog, the counsel for the
plaintiffs;

Third — The accused, a process server, was directed to effect the

service. His first attempt was unsuccessful because he could not locate the
address of Atty. Palanog. The accused again tried on September 02, 1984,
and although this time he found the address, Atty. Palanog and his entire
family had apparently gone out for the weekend. The accused found only a
woman, not a member of the family of Atty. Palanog, who had only been
asked to watch over the house. Accused Coronado did not thus leave the
Order;

Fourth — On 22 February 1985, Lim went back to the courthouse where he

was informed that the case had meanwhile been sent to the archives together
with 29 other cases (Exhibit "E"{ (Ibid.)
Fifth — On 25 February 1985, Lim returned to the courthouse and, examining
the records, he observed additional unnumbered pages that include, among
other things, a) a return, dated 4 September 1984 (Exhibit "F"), signed by
accused Coronado stating the plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Palanog, could not be
contacted; b) an entry at the foot of the Order of 11 July 1984 (Exhibit "A-2")
to the effect that Atty. Palanog had received the Order on 25 February 1985;
and (c) a return, dated 25 February 1985 (Exhibit "B") that the Order had
indeed been served on plaintiffs (pp. 35-36, Rollo).

On the basis of the foregoing, particularly the 5-month delay in the service
of the court order, the Sandiganbayan convicted herein petitioner of
having violated Section 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 3019 and imposed upon
him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1)
month to nine (9) years and one (1) day.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the failure of the petitioner to successfully serve the 11

July 1984 Order, given the above settings, warrants his conviction under
Section 3(f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
-----------
The pertinent provision of the law (Republic Act No. 3019) alleged to have
been violated provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers: The following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared unlawful:
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or without
sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any
matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining,
directly or indirectly from any person interested in the matter
some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of
or discriminating against another interested party.

Admittedly, the elements of the offense are that:

a) The offender is a public officer;

b) The said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient
justification after due demand or request has been made on him;
c) Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without
the public officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and

d) Such failure to so act is "for the purpose of obtaining, directly or

indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or
material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or
discriminating against another.

The attendance of the first three elements in this case can hardly be disputed.
The controversy, however, lies on the fourth element.

RULING: (CONDRADO ACQUITTED)

We agree with Sandiganbayan that, indeed, there was failure on the part
of the petitioner, a public officer, to observe due diligence in his
assigned task; let us call it one of neglect, a broad term which is defined as a
failure to do what can be done and what is required to be done (West's legal
Thesaurus/Dictionary, 1986).

In its generic sense, it would not matter whether such refusal is intended or
unintended. But here is not the real issue.

To warrant conviction for a violation of Section 3 (f) of the Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act, the law itself additionally requires that the
accused's dereliction, besides being without justification, must be for
the purpose of :

(a) obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the

matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an
interested party or

(b) discriminating against another interested party.

The severity of the penalty imposed by the law leaves no doubt that the
legislative intent is to consider this element to be indispensable.

The record is bereft of evidence, (NO EVIDENCE) albeit alleged, to indicate

that the petitioner's failure to act was motivated by any gain or benefit
for himself or knowingly for the purpose of favoring an interested party
or discriminating against another. It is not enough that an advantage in
favor of one party, as against another, would result from one neglect or
refusal. Had it been so, the law would have perhaps instead said, "or as a
consequence of such neglect or refusal, undue advantage is derived by an
interested party or another is unduly discriminated against."

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from a REVERSED and the petitioner,

Juan Coronado, is hereby acquitted of the charge on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
 EDGAR Y. TEVES AND TERESITA Z. TEVES VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting petitioners Edgar

and Teresita Tevesof violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law; and
ordering the confiscation of all their rights, interests, and participation
in the assets and properties of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation
Center in favor of the Government, as well as perpetual disqualification
from public office.The conviction was anchored on the finding that the
petitioners possessed pecuniary interest in the said business enterprise on
the grounds that
(a) nothing on record appears that Mayor Teves divested himself of his
pecuniary interest in said cockpit;
(b) as of April 1992, Teresita Teves was of record the owner/licensee of
the cockpit; and
(c) since Mayor Teves and Teresita remained married to each other from
1983 until 1992, their property relations as husband and wife, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, was that of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
Hence, the cockpit is a conjugal property over which the petitioners have
pecuniary interest. This pecuniary interest is prohibited under Section
89(2) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as theLocal Government
Code(LGC)of 1991, and thus falls under the prohibited acts penalized in
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

ISSUE:

1. WON PETIONERS ARE GUILTY? -YES but only under the 2ndMode

2. WON the petitioners be convicted, considering that the information

does not charge Petitioners of the 2ndMode of violation of Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft Law even though it was proved through evidence? -
YES

RULING:
The petition is not totallydevoid of merit.Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law
provides:
 Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or
takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

The essential elements set out in the afore-quoted legislative definition of the
crime of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction;
3. He either(2 MODES)
a. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection
with such interest; or
b. is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution
or by any law.

There are, therefore, two modes by which a public officer who has a direct
or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction
may violate Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

#1 - The first mode is if in connection with his pecuniary interest in

any business, contract or transaction, the public officer intervenes or takes
part in his official capacity.

o #2 - The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such

interest by the Constitution or any law.

PETITIONERS ARE AQUITTED ON THE FIRST MODE

Regarding petitioners culpability anent the first mode:

- That portionof the Information which seeks to indict the spouses Teves
for his causing the issuance of a business permit/license to operate the
Valencia cockpit on or about February 4, 1992is not well-founded. Mayor
Edgar Teves could not have issued a permit to operate the cockpit in the year
1992 because as of January 1, 1992 the license could be issued only by
the Sangguniang Bayan. He may have issued the permit or license in 1991
or even before that when he legally could, but that is not the charge. The
charge is for acts committed in 1992.
 Why did the Court held that Petioners are NOT guilty under First
Mode?
- The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing
the issuance of the business permit or license to operate the Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center is not well-founded. This it based, and
rightly so, on the additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan
could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992.
Indeed, under Section 447(3)of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1
January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to
issue a license for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of
cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the
municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,under
the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened
or taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license
during the material time, as alleged in the information, because he was
not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.(Remember on the Law on
Public Corporation)
-
- A fortiori, there is no legal basis to convict Teresita Teves as a co-conspirator
in the absence of a finding that Mayor Teves himself is guilty of the offense
charged. In short, the Sandiganbayancorrectly absolved the petitioners of the
charge based on the first mode. And there is no need to belabor this point.

BUT PETIONERS ARE GUILTY WITH RESPECT TO THE SECOND MODE

-
- The Sandiganbayan, however, convicted the petitioners of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law based on the second mode. It
reasoned that the evidence overwhelmingly evinces that Mayor Teves
had a pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit,which is prohibited
under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991.

- HERE the 2nd Mode was PROVED but the information does not charge
Petitioners under this 2nd Mode

The last part of the dispositive portion of the information states that said
accused Edgar Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein
considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by
him and accused Teresita Teves.
A careful reading of the information reveals that the afore-quoted last
part thereof is merely an allegation of the second element of the crime,
which is, that he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract or transaction. Not by any stretch of imagination
can it be discerned or construed that the afore-quoted last part of the
information charges the petitioners with the second mode by which Section
3(h) of the Anti-Graft Lawmay be violated. Hence, we agree with the
petitioners that the charge was for unlawful intervention in the issuance
of the license to operate the Valencia Cockpit. There was no charge for
possession of pecuniary interest prohibited by law.

However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner
Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental,owned the cockpit in
question.
Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over
thecockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a
thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of
that nature.

His affidavit he turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs.

Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that hecould no longer devote a full time as
managerof the said. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred
to Teresita Teveseffective January 1990.
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit
were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon
because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they
remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as suchtheir
property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of
gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil
Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the
property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the
husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct
and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991,
which reads:

Section 89.Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest.

(a)It shall be unlawful for any local government officialor employee,
directly or indirectly,to:
(2)Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a
local government unit.
 REMEMBER: 1stMode was charged and 2ndMode was NOT
charged BUT WAS PROVED DURING TRIAL.

IMPORTANT:
The offense proved, is the second mode of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a
prohibited interest. But can the petitioners be convicted thereof,
considering that it was not charged in the information? YES
LEGAL BASIS:
VARIANCE DOCTRINE embodied in Section 4, in relation to
Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read:
Sec. 4.Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof:

When there is a variance between the offense charged in the

complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.

Sec. 5.When an offense includes or is included in another. An

offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included inthe offense
proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter.

The elements of the offense charged in this case, which is

unlawful intervention in the issuance of a cockpit license in
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law(1stMODE)are:

1. The accused is a public officer;

2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction, whether or not prohibited by law;
and
3. He intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest.

The offense PROVED, the essential ingredients of the offense

proved, which is possession of prohibited interest in violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are asfollows
 (2ndMODE):
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract or transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the
Constitution or any law.

CONCLUSION:
It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved
constitute or form part of those constituting the offense charged.
Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense
charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense
proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the
offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved.The variance doctrine thus finds application to this
case, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves
for the offense proved.

LUZ ALMEDA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

This Petition for Certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the September 6, 2012 Order [2] of the
Office of the Ombudsman tor Mindanao (Ombudsman) in OMB-MIN-01-0183 denying
herein petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration [3] of the Ombudsman's March 19, 2003
Resolution[4] indicting her for violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA
3019);[5] and directing that the corresponding Information therefor be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

Factual Antecedents

In 2001, petitioner Luz S. Almeda, then Schools Division Superintendent of the

Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DepEd), Surigao del Norte, and
several other public officers and employees were charged ADMINISTRATIVELY
AND CRIMINALLY BEFORE THE OMBUDSMAN, IN CONNECTION WITH THE
ALLEGED IMPROPER USE AND DISBURSEMENT OF THE COUNTRYWIDE
DEVELOPMENT FUND (CDF) allotted to petitioner's co-respondent Constantino H.
Navarre, Jr. (Navarro), Surigao del Norte Congressman, and implemented through
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the DepEd. The
criminal charges were consolidated and docketed as OMB-MIN-01-0183. On March 19,
2003, a (Resolution was issued FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE TO CHARGE) in said
case by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) II Hilde C. dela Cruz-Likit
(dela Cruz-Likit), to the effect that probable cause existed to indict petitioner and her co-
accused for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019. [6] This Resolution was
disapproved in part by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo (Marcelo), who made
minor modifications and instructions thereto.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) then took over the case, and it
prepared the corresponding Information against petitioner, which was approved
by then Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio and Marcelo. On May 19, 2003,
the Information was forwarded to the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, who in
turn indorsed and forwarded the same, together with the Ombudsman's
Resolution, to the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte on June 3, 2003, for
appropriate filing in court.[7]

Petitioner received a copy of the Ombudsman's March 19, 2003 Resolution on May 29,
2003. On July 3, 2003, PETITONER FILED VIA A COMMERCIAL COURIER
SERVICE[8] HER MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WITH A PRAYER FOR
REVERSAL OF THE OMBUDSMAN'S RULING AND TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE
FILING OF AN INFORMATION AGAINST HER UNTIL THE MOTION IS RESOLVED.
An advance copy of the motion was transmitted to the Ombudsman by fax on June 16,
2003.[9]

On July 7, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Filing of

Information[10] before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte, which
in turn referred the said motion to the Ombudsman. [11]

On July 18, 2003, dela Cruz-Likit issued an Order [12] giving due course to petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration and a similar motion filed by one of her co-respondents. The
Order states, among others:

In their Motions for Reconsiderations [sic], both respondents-movants are united in

pointing to co-respondent ex-Congressman Constantino H. Navarro, Jr., as the
one who entered into the transaction of PURCHASING THE NINE COMPUTERS
DELIVERED TO DEPED SIARGAO, WHICH TRANSACTION IS MADE THE BASIS
OF THEIR INDICTMENT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(G) OF RA 3019.

Before taking further action on the motions, thus filed, let copies thereof be served.to
respondent Constantino H. Navarro Jr. and to complainant, or them to file their
respective Comment or Opposition thereto.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES considered, this office resolves to give due course to the
motions under consideration. Accordingly, let copies of the Motions for Reconsideration
and Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Filing of Information be served to then
Representative Constantino H. Navarro, Jr. and to COA Auditors Rosalinda G. Salvador
and Mila L. Lopez, who are hereby directed to file their Comment and or [sic] Opposition
thereto within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Failure to comply with this order will be
deemed a waiver and the herein motions will be resolved accordingly.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Navarro filed his Comment[14] to petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

On August 25, 2003, petitioner filed before the Ombudsman her Supplemental motion
for reconsideration.[15]

Through a June 16, 2004 Indorsement of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and all other pleadings, orders, and communications relative
thereto were forwarded to Marcelo for appropriate action, pursuant to Office Order No.
31 entitled "Review and Consideration of Motions for Reconsideration Filed in Relation
to Orders and Resolutions Issued by the Tanodbayan," which pertains to cases where
the Ombudsman disapproves orders, resolutions, or decisions emanating from sectoral
offices, and considering that the OSP has taken over the case. [16]

In another Indorsement dated October 11, 2004, then Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao Antonio E. Valenzuela forwarded a copy of an October 11, 2004 Order which
ultimately closed and terminated OMB-MIN-01-0183 as far as the Ombudsman for
Mindanao is concerned, pursuant to an August 4, 2004 Order issued by Marcelo
ordering the OSP to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case. [17]

On May 25, 2010, petitioner sent a letter of, even date to the Ombudsman, seeking the
early resolution of her motions.[18] However, the letter was not acted upon, as the
handling Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO), dela Cruz-Likit, was then
on official study leave and no GIPO was as yet assigned to the case. [19]

On September 1, 2011, petitioner filed before the Ombudsman a Manifestation,

[20]
 seeking resolution of her Motion for Reconsideration. On November 18, 2011, she
filed a second Manifestation[21] with the Ombudsman with a prayer for dismissal of OMB-
MIN-01-0183 as against her.

Meanwhile, petitioner received copies of Indorsements dated September 28, 2011 and
December 9, 2011 and signed by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Humphrey T.
Monteroso, referring and forwarding to the OSP. Petitioner's September 1, 2011
Manifestation and other pleadings and documents filed in OMB-MIN-01-0183, and
noting and informing that the entire record of the case has been forwarded previously to
the OSP.[22]

On August 8, 2012, petitioner filed a third Manifestation before the Ombudsman, instead
of the OSP, entitled "Manifestation Reiterating the Right of the Accused to Speedy Trial
with Prayer for Dismissal of the Case."[23] 

This time petitioner bewailed the inaction and procedure taken by the Ombudsman and
OSP in not taking cognizance of OMB-MIN-01-0183 and instead indorsing and
repeatedly tossing the case back and forth to each other.
She cited a June 18, 2012 Memorandum [24] within the OSP recommending that her
Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestations be resolved by the Ombudsman
for Mindanao instead and not the OSP, which had no jurisdiction over petitioner
since she is not a high-ranking public official charged before the Sandiganbayan;
she also noted a June 21, 2012 Indorsement [25] by the OSP to the Ombudsman for
Mindanao, referring back petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestations for
action by the latter. She claimed that as a result, her Motion for Reconsideration
remained unresolved to date; that said flip-flopping attitude of these two offices
resulted in unwarranted delay and unending torment, which has unduly affected
her work; and consequently, her constitutional right to speedy trial was violated.
Petitioner thus prayed for dismissal of her case.

On September 6, 2012, the Ombudsman through dela Cruz-Likit issued the assailed
Order denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, stating as follows:

This resolves the Motions for Reconsideration filed by respondents Luz S. Almeda and
Miguela S. Ligutom, seeking reconsideration to [sic] the Resolution dated March 19,
2003, indicting them for Violation of Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019.

x x x x

The motions should be denied.

As informed by respondent Almeda, she received a copy of the approved Resolution on

May 29, 2003. Her motion for reconsideration dated June 12, 2003, with request to hold
in abeyance the filing of the Information in court, was sent through the Courier on July 3,
2003. On the other hand, respondent Ligutom's Motion for Reconsideration, with
request to hold in abeyance the filing of the Information in court, was filed on June 9,
2003. While counsel of respondent Almeda sent by fax an advance copy of the Motion
for Reconsideration on June 16, 2003, both motions were still filed out of time.

Section 7(a), Rule II, of Administrative Order No. 07, which provides for the
Ombudsman Rules of Procedure in criminal cases, states:

"Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or

resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS FROM
NOTICE THEREOF WITH THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, or the proper
Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in
cases where the information has already been filed in court."
Accordingly, the motions, on procedural grounds, should be denied.

On the other hand, the matters raised by respondents Almeda and Ligutom in their
motions for reconsideration were already passed upon by this Office, and need not be
discussed all over again. Moreover, these are evidentiary in nature, and are best
threshed out in court.
x x x x

We also took note of respondents Almeda's [sic] and Ligutom's manifestation for the
dismissal of the case for alleged violation of their right to speedy trial, on the ground that
until now, no information was filed in court, and that their Motions for Reconsideration
were not resolved despite the lapse of a considerable period of time.

OMB-MIN could not be faulted for the non-filing of the Information in court
because as the records would show, both respondents Almeda and Ligutom were
the ones who moved to hold in abeyance the filing of the Information.

The motions to hold in abeyance the filing of the Information were not only filed
with this Office(OMBUDSMAN), but also with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte, and as shown by the records, the Information was
already indorsed to the OPP but was indorsed back to OMB-MIN, in view of the
motions to hold in abeyance the filing of such Information in court. ‘
Significantly, OMB-MIN has nothing to do with the delay in the resolution of the motions
for reconsideration because as the records would show, all motions and pleadings filed
by respondents were appropriately and timely acted upon.

WHEREFORE, Premises considered, the motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED.
Let the corresponding Information for Violation of Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019 approved by then
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, be filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte.

SO ORDERED.[26]
Hence, the instant Petition.

ISSUES:

In a February 5, 2014 Resolution, [27] this Court resolved to give due course to the instant
Petition, which contains the following assignment of errors:

1.
DID PUBLIC RESPONDENT VIOLATE PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL AND PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CASES WHEN IT FAILED TO
RESOLVE THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO HOLD IN
ABEYANCE THE FILING OF INFORMATION FOR A PERIOD OF NINE (9) YEARS
FROM THE DATE OF ITS FILING?

2.
GIVEN THE FACTS OF THE CASE, DID THE RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN ACT
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE
DESPITE THE CLEAR AND PATENT VIOLATION OF THE PETITIONER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND PROMPT DISPOSITION OF
CASES?[28]
Petitioner's Arguments

In seeking reversal of the assailed Order and dismissal of OMB-MIN-01 -0183 as

against her, with additional prayer for injunctive relief, petitioner contends in her Petition
and Opposition[29] to the Ombudsman's Comment, which the Court treats as her Reply,
[30]
 that the Ombudsman's failure to promptly act on her case for nine years from
the filing of her motion for reconsideration, or from July 2003 to September 2012,
is a violation of her constitutional right to a speedy disposition of her case; that
despite her repeated manifestations and follow-ups, no action was taken on her
case; that the Ombudsman and OSP's actions constitute gross neglect and
indifference; THAT THE OMBUDSMAN'S ERRONEOUS ACTION OF ENDORSING
HER CASE TO THE OSP DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE LATTER HAD NO
JURISDICTION OVER HER IS THE SOLE CAUSE OF THE LONG PERIOD OF
INACTION AND DELAY WHICH PREJUDICED HER; and that contrary to the
Ombudsman's argument, she should not be deemed estopped, for filing a motion
to suspend the filing of the information against her, from claiming her right to a
speedy disposition of her case.

Respondents' Arguments

In their joint Comment,[31] respondents contend that there is no grave abuse of discretion

on the part of the Ombudsman in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration; that
her constitutional right to speedy disposition of her case was not violated, as the delay
in the proceedings was not attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive acts on
the Ombudsman's part; that in determining whether the right is violated, each case must
be approached on an ad hoc basis, and the length of and reasons for the delay,
assertion or failure to assert the right, prejudice caused by the delay, and the conduct of
the parties, must be carefully considered and balanced; [32] that the delay in the
resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration and filing of the information
in court was justified in that petitioner's motion for reconsideration was filed out
of time and she herself sought to hold in abeyance the filing of the information;
that for being equally responsible for the delay, petitioner is not entitled to
dismissal of her case; and that no injunctive relief should issue as petitioner has no
right in esse that needs to be protected since, as a public officer who serves on public
trust, she has no vested right to her position.

OUR RULING – (ACQUITTED ACCUSED ALMEDA)

The Court grants the Petition.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that "[a]ll persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies." This right applies to all cases pending before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies; [33] it is "not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In
this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action to [sic] all officials who
are tasked with the administration of justice." [34] It "includes within its contemplation
the periods before, during and after trial,"[35] such as preliminary investigations
and fact-finding investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.[36]

[T]he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay, are considered. [38]
"The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case." [39] For this reason, "[a] balancing test
of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels
the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis."[40]
]

"It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated
by the Constitution, regardless of whether the (respondent) did not object to the
delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to
causes directly attributable to him." [.

Finally, the Court has held that inordinate delay in resolving a criminal complaint
is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to the
speedy disposition of cases, which warrants the dismissal of the criminal case. [48]

Using the foregoing as guides and applying them to the instant case, the COURT
FINDS THAT PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF OMB-MIN-01-
0183 WAS VIOLATED, WHICH MUST RESULT IN THE DISMISSAL THEREOF.

First of all, the preliminary investigation proceedings in said case took more than
11 long years to resolve, or from March 23, 2001 when the proceedings were initiated
and docketed,[49] to September 6, 2012 when petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied.

Secondly, THE DELAY IN THE PROCEEDINGS WAS CAUSED SOLELY BY THE

REPEATED INDORSEMENT OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND THE OSP, WHICH MAY
BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE OMBUDSMAN'S FAILURE TO REALIZE THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE OSP OR
THE SANDIGANBAYAN.

Moreover, when dela Cruz-Likit, the handling GIPO, went on official study leave, no
GIPO was assigned to OMB-MIN-01-0183; as a result, the case was neglected. Even if,
as respondents argue, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was tardy and that she
filed a motion to defer the filing of the information, these have no bearing as in fact they
are irrelevant to the issue; the fact remains that the Ombudsman's resolution of the
case took too long; the fact that the ground for denying the Motion for
Reconsideration involved a simple procedural issue highlights the Ombudsman's
failure to timely resolve the same.

Third, petitioner had no hand in the delay. As a matter of fact, she sent a letter
and filed written manifestations seeking the immediate resolution of her case.
While they were filed only in 2010 and 2011, petitioner's letter and manifestations
cannot be considered late, and no waiver or acquiescence may be attached to the
same, as she was not required as a rule to follow up on her case; instead, it is the
State's duty to expedite the same.

Fourth, the pendency of OMB-MIN-01-0183 undoubtedly prejudiced petitioner. The case

hung like a hangman's cord above her all these years, causing distress, anxiety, and
embarrassment. As was held in the Corpuz [50] case, the passage of time affects the
parties' and their witnesses' ability to prepare a cogent case or defense; secure
witnesses; and preserve honor and reputation, financial resources, memory, and
evidence.

Finally, the Ombudsman's explanation for the delay is not at all acceptable.
INSTEAD, IT CAN BE SEEN THAT IT FAILED TO APPLY A BASIC RULE THAT IN
THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES ACCUSED OF GRAFT, SPECIFIC RULES ON JURISDICTION BASED
ON RANK APPLY. WHAT ENSUED WAS AN ADMINISTRATIVE "PING-PONG," AS
PETITIONER PUTS IT.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 6, 2012 Order of the Office of
the Ombudsman for Mindanao in OMB-MIN-01-0183 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
OMB-MIN-01-0183 and all proceedings or actions arising therefrom are
ordered DISMISSED.
 SO ORDERED.

SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

SUMMARY:
o Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress'
prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID)

filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then
CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions,
approved the application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens.
The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

FACTS

On October 17, 1988, petitioner, then Commissioner SANTIAGO of the Commission

of Immigration and Deportation, allegedly, with evident bad faith, approve the
application for legalization of the stay of 32 aliens, who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984 in violation of EO 324 which prohibits legalization of said
disqualified aliens, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay
in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by petitioner.

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner fixing bail at P15,000. The
Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until her physical condition improves as
she was recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. On May 24, 1991,
petitioner filed concurrently a Petition for Certiorari seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
from proceeding with the Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the
Sandiganbayan to defer her arraignment. The SC dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed
a motion for bill of particulars with Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the
aliens were conspicuously admitted in the complaint. The SC, in its resolution of
November 12, 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioner’s arraignment not
later than 5 days from receipt of notice thereof.

On December 7, 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to admit 32 amended informations. On December 2, 1993, the SC directed the
OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended informations. Said informations
were consolidated under Criminal Case No. 16698.

On July 31, 1995, the prosecution filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue
an order preventively suspending petitioner. The Sandiganbayan directed petitioner
to file her opposition to the July 31 motion for the prosecution within 15 days from
receipt thereof.. Petitioner filed her opposition on August 22, 1995. On January 25,
1996, the Sandiganbayan suspended petitioner from her position as Senator for
90 days.---

In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for
legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted
with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324
which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago
were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed
against Santiago. Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued
a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since
she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was
filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a
senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to
suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE:
o Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day
preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines
without violating the Constitution

RULING: - YES

Yes. It is true that the Constitution provides that “each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member.  A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed
sixty days.”

But on the other hand, Section 13 of R.A No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act provides:

Suspension and loss of benefits. – Any incumbent public officer against

whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act
or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as
a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. 
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled
to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.

In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is DISTINCT

from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure (PENALTY ) that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as
the case may be, upon an erring member.

This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of

RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a PRELIMINARY, PREVENTIVE
MEASURE, presiding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress.

BUT SANTIAGO COMMITTED THE SAID ACT WHEN SHE WAS STILL THE
CID COMMISSIONER, CAN SHE STILL BE SUSPENDED AS A SENATOR?

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public
officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. 

Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “OFFICE” would
indicate that it APPLIES TO ANY OFFICE WHICH THE OFFICER CHARGED
MAY BE HOLDING, and NOT ONLY THE PARTICULAR OFFICE UNDER
WHICH HE STANDS ACCUSED.

SANTIAGO HAS NOT YET BEEN CONVICTED OF THE ALLEGED CRIME,

CAN SHE STILL BE SUSPENDED?

The LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE that the guilt of the accused must be
established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits
proceeds. 

Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine

(1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him,

(2) the gravity of the offense charged, or

(3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses
or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another
evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive
suspension pending the trial of the case. 
All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he
has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the
acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds
set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

PLUNDER
GLORIA-MACAPAGAL ARROYO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately filed by former

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and  PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas
(and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose charges were
later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to
evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at large) for
conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 (b)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then
President of the Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts
Manager, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices
and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating
with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public
treasury].
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for
bail which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt
against them was strong.

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas  then separately filed
their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for
plunder against them. The same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there
was sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the
respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by
the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.
ISSUES:

Procedural:

1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial
of the demurrers to evidence.
Substantive:
1. Whether or not the State sufficiently   established the existence of conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte ;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of
plunder: (a) Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten
wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the predicate
act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved by the
Prosecution?
RULING:

Re procedural issue:

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer
to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however,
that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order
that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring
accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the
conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is
doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be
limited, because to do so “x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and
usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show
that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise
of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that
the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice.”
The exercise of this power to correct  grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the
convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty
to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus,
notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the
demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of
the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the
existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an
implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their
collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the
Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express
agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965,
February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 556] to the effect that an information alleging
conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of
the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive,
collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a
manner that a person of common understanding would know what is being conveyed,
and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about the
sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but
rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A.
No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main
plunderer was not only necessary because the law required such identification,
but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused
to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for. The
main purpose of requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the
information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because they
are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the
offense charged.
Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind
was, the Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10,
2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information
to that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping
generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be
fatal to the cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of
each accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.
Re second substantive issues:

(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at

least Php50 Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas.

The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten

wealth valued at not less than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus
delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated
or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution
adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that
matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount.
There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the
Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs
[Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or
Aguas, or Uriarte.
(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury
(under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look
at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of
public funds [See Sec. 1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is conformable with the maxim of
statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular
word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings
may be made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is
found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used
in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified
or restricted by the latter. To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own; to misappropriate means to own, to take something for
one’s own benefit; misuse means “a good, substance, privilege, or right used
improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;” and malversation occurs when “any
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially.” The common thread that binds all the four terms
together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the
public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of the
property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of the
property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the
mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public
treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on the public
treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal
benefit.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more
importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the
Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS
ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the
Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’
respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as
to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for
insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said
petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.
JOSEPH ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Summary:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada was prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law). He assailed,
however, that the Plunder Law does not constitute an indictable offense because of its
failure to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in
the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par.
(d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to
Estrada, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against
petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but
was denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest
of the accused.
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder
charged more than one offense. Same was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law
which states that:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset,
property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following means
or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten
wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
 Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).

ISSUE:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in
his defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct  to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.  The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech. (The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply
only to free speech cases, but not to penal statutes. )
ORGANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

FACTS:
 In 1996, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Lilia Organo for the crime of
plunder as it was alleged that she and some other government officials stole ₱ 193 million from the
government.  Organo filed a motion to quash alleging that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
the case pursuant to Republic Act No. 8249 which provides that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over government employees who do not belong to Salary Grade 27. Organo was able to prove that her
position in the Bureau of Internal Revenue does not belong to Salary Grade 27.
 The Sandiganbayan denied her motion. It insisted that under the Plunder Law (Republic Act No.
7080, as amended), the Sandiganbayan was vested with the jurisdiction over plunder cases and since RA
8249 is a general law and that RA 7080 is a special law, RA 7080 should prevail.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can try plunder cases where the accused is below Salary Grade 27.
NO

HELD:
 The Plunder Law itself provides: o Until otherwise provided by law, all pro-sections under this Act
shall be within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 The Sandiganbayan only had provisional jurisdiction over all plunder cases. In 1997, when RA 8249
was passed which further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, there is already no question as
to which plunder cases are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The said law finally
prescribed that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over government employees which are below
Salary Grade 27. RA 8249 is a special law the intention of which was to declog the dockets of the
Sandiganbayan. As such, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Organo. The case should be filed in
the appropriate court.
 In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
 This latest enactment collated the provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is
a special law enacted to declog the Sandiganbayan of “small fry” cases. In an unusual manner, the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend not on the penalty
imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade of
accused government officials and employees.  However, the crime of “plunder” defined in Republic
Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan “until otherwise provided by law.” Republic Act No. 8429, enacted on February 5,
1997 is the special law that provided for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan “otherwise” than that
prescribed in Republic Act No. 7080.
 Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless
committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade “27” or higher,
G.R. No. 133535 Organo v. Sandiganbayan September 9, 1999 under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.
 In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though none of the accused occupied positions with Salary
Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, entitling petitioner to the relief
prayed for.